# Appendix — ADAMS v. WAINWRIGHT (No. 83-5701)

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1695%3A5

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1983

## Text

IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

NO. 82-5595

JAMES ADAMS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
Vv.

LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, Secretary,
Florida Department of Corrections,

Respondent-Appellee.

On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Florida

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER-APPELLANT

RICHARD L. JORANDBY

Public Defender

15th Judicial Circuit of Florida
224 Datura Street - 13th Floor
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
(305) 837-2150

TATJANA OSTAPOFF
Assistant Public Defender

RICHARD H. BURR, III
Of Counsel

Attornevs for Petitioner-Apnellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

STATEMENT OF THE LOSER os CUS SSEURESES CO bb CE RHOCCEreo®E 1-2
ARGUMENT

I. PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT THE SENTENCING
PHASE OF HIS CAPITAL PROSECUTION 3-5

II. EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE IMPOSED
AGAINST MR. ADAMS IS GROSSLY DISPROPOR-
TIONATE, EXCESSIVE, AND STANDARDLESS
WHERE THE KILLING WAS NOT DELIBERATE
BUT COMMITTED DURING A FELONY, AND
WHERE AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE
WAS APPLIED WHICH FAILS TO DIFFERENTIATE
THIS CASE FROM ANY OTHER FELONY-MURDER 9-11

Itt. THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES CONSIDERED
BY THE JURY AND JUDGE FAILED TO CHANNEL
THEIR SENTENCING DISCRETION AS REQUIRED
BY THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS 12-15

IV. THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT'S HARMLESS ERROR
RULE, CONCERNING THE SENTENCER'S RELIANCE
UPON LEGALLY IMPROPER AGGRAVATING CIRCUM-
STANCES, DEPRIVED PETITIONER AND DEPRIVES
OTHER CAPITAL DEFENDANTS OF RIGHTS NECESSARY
TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPOSITION OF THE
DEATH PENALTY. 15-19

V. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING CONCERNING THE
SCOPE OF ADMISSIBLE MITIGATING EVIDENCE
ALONG WITH ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY,
IMPERMISSIBLY RESTRICTED THE CONSIDERATION
OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE TRIAL
COURT. 20-22

VI. THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT'S EX PARTE CON-
SIDERATION OF EXTRA-RECORD PSYCHIATRIC,
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CORRECTIONAL REPORTS
IN PETITIONER'S CASE AND OTHER PENDING
APPEALS VIOLATED PETITIONER'S CONSTITU-

TIONAL RIGHTS. 22

VII. PETITIONER WAS DENIED EQUAL PROTECTION AND
DUE PROCESS BY THE RESOLUTION OF HIS CLAIM
CONCERNING THE ARBITRARY APPLICATION
OF THE DEATH PENALTY WITHOUT FIRST PRO-
VIDING THE EXPERT ASSISTANCE NECESSARY
FOR THE FULL AND FAIR CONSIDERATION OF
THIS CLAIM. 22-23

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. 6c édkmOed pak seek siwes San bbsnd 24
~ia

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases Page
Adams v. State, 341 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1977) ..ccccccceces 10,17
Adams v. State, 380 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1980) ............. 8
Adams v. State, 380 So.2d 423 (Fla. 1980) ............. 21
Aldridge v. State, 351 So.2d 942 (Fla. 1977) .......... 17
Arango v. State, 411 So.2d 172 (Pla. 1982) ............ 12,13
Armstrong v. State, 399 So.2d 953 (Fla. 1981) ......... 17
Beavers v. Balkcom, 636 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1981) ...... 4
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1967) ............. 23
Blair v. State, 406 So.2d 1103 (Fla. 1981) .....-...... 18
Bollender v. State, So.2d , 1982 F.L.W., $.CO.4990

rn rey Si SERPs. ins o cee DAES ES 0 aoe eh eee eS he 17
nee eae City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1296 (11th Cir. .

OL 55 a rn ee are errr ares ee ee he ee ed oe
Breedlove v. State, 413 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1982) ........... i eS
Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967) ......... 4
Clark v. State, 379 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1979) wcccccccsccees 17
Cooper v. State, 336 So.2d 1133 (Fla. 1976) ........... 17
Davis v. Alabama, 596 F.2d 1214 (Sth Cir. 1979) ....... 4
Demps v. State, 395 So.2d 501 (Fla. 1981) ...-cceceeees 17
Dobbert v. State, 375 So.2d 1069 (Pla. 1979) ... > }? TH - >} -b L
BRIEF FO! TIONER-APPELL?

e thas ro:
MNTOCTIIAN r ADA
aoe CHA! D bse WS INAALWN B I

Public Defender

15th Judicial Circuit of Florida
224 Datura Street/1l13th Floor

nD

West Palm Beach, Florida 33401

(305) 837-2150

ANA OST
5
bs

TAT
ahria
Assistant

RICHARD H. BURR, III

Of Counsel

F
ic Defender

Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant

PREFERENCE: Habeas Corpus

T BLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT CT THE ISZUES ccc cccccccceses sneébderl eee Cre eee
STATEMENT OF TET ChE. ee ee ee eter eee eer ecoce oveewe oa e806 we
Prior ProceeCingSecccccccccccccce ocbaw ee cesee bee
Statement of the FactS...........6. nena bes keanadses

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT... cccceccees “ee eee e606 65.28 OS 2 8 68'S. 0 2 SS

STATCMENT OF. JURISDICTION. cc ccc ccc cces Cor cccccssccscecces
ARGUMENT

I. PETITIONE® “AS DEPRIVED OF THE FFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT THE SENTENCING
PHASE OF HIS CAPITAL PROSECUTIC

A. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO APGUF AND
PROTECT PETITIONER'S RIGHTS THROUGH
WELL©FOUNDED OBJECTIONS, OP INVESTI-
GATE OR PRESENT AVAILABLE MITIGATING
EVIDENCE DEPRIVED PETITIONER OF HIS
RIGHT TO COUNSEL.

B. TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO ARVOCATE
PETITIONER'S POSITION DURING THE
PENALTY PHASE OF TRIAL MUST RESULT
IN VACATION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE.

“~

EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE IMPOSEN AGAIN
NWR. ADAMS IS CROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE,
EXCFSSIVE, AND STANDARDLESS WHE*E THE KILLING
‘25 MOT DELIBERATE BUT COMMITTED DURING A
FELO!’, AND WHERE AN AGGRAVATING CIRCLU™“STANCE
WAS APPLIED VHICH FAILS TO DIFFERENTIATE THIS
CASE rvROM ANY OTHER FELONY=-"‘URDER.

TUE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES CONSIDERED BY THE
JUPY ANP TED TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO CHANNEL
THEIR SENTES ICING DISCRETION AS REQUIPED BY

MIE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENT! AMENDMENTS.

THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT'S PAne’rtESS ERROR RULE
CONCERNING THE SENTENCE DEI GLAST 5 fot ot \TION Or

AND RELIANCE UPON LEG “ALLY gPervaa(. ose ‘CRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCTS, DEPRIVED Milt cs PY ) DEPRIV?
OTHER CAPITSL DEFENDANTS Cl iG "S BESeESSAR\ ri
THE CONSTITTTIONAL IMPOSITION OF PVE DSATH
PENALTY.

13

14-264

28-34

@ TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTINUED
PAGE

VY. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING CONCERNING THE

OF ADMISSIBLE MITIGATING EVIDENCE,

WITH ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY,
SPMISSIBLY RESTRICTED THE CONSIDERATION

oF MITIGATI!*> CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE TRIAL

COURT. 50-583

yu th

VI. THE FLGRIDA SUPREME COURT'S EX PARTE CON-
SIDERATION OF EXTRA-RECORD PSYCHIATRIC,
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CORRECTIONAI. REPORTS
IN PETITIONER'S CASE AND OTHER PENDING
APPEALS VIOLATED PETITIONER'S CONSTIT'-

TIONAL RIGHTS. 59-61

VIT, PETITIONER WAS DENIED EQUAI. PROTECTION AND
DUE PROCESS BY THE RESOLUTION OF HIS
CLAIM CONCERNING THE ARBITRARY APPJ,ICATION
OF TYE DEATK PENALTY WITHOUT FIRST PRO-
VIDISG THE EXPERT ASSISTANCE NECESSARY
TOP THE FULL AND FAIR CONSIDERATION OF

THIS CLAIM. 61-64

ati-

decision arrived at was therefore neither fair nor reliable, since
it was based on an inaccurate, one-sided sense of Mr. Adams
because of counsel's failure to convey any of the “compassionate
or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of
mankind." Id. Obviously, a decision és impose death under these

ns

conditions is no different from one that is founded "in part

upon misinformation of constitutional magnitude." Tucker v. United

States, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972). Errors of this kind, which
affect the essential character of the capital sentencing proc-
cess can never be deemed harmless or nonprejudicial. See, e.g.,

Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 319 (1977); Green v. Georgia, 442

U.S. 95 (1979). Mr. Adams' death sentence must, therefore, be
vacated.
II. EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE IMPOSED
AGAINST MR. ADAMS IS GROSSLY DISPROPOR-
TIONATE, EXCESSIVE, AND STANDARDLESS WHERE
THE KILLING WAS NOT DELIBERATE BUT COMMITTID
DURING A FELONY, AND WHERE AN AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE WAS APPLIED WHICH FAILS TO
DIFFERENTIATE THIS CASE FROM ANY OTHER
FELONY MURDER.

Mr. Adams was indicted for felony-murder, and the prosecutor
frankly conceded throughout the proceedings that the only basis
for return of a first degree murder verdict was the fact that the
killing occurred during a felony (T 1050). Moreover, the evidence
showed that the assailant was surprised during the course of a
burglary by the deceased, whose death resulted from a violent

struggle likely initiated by the latter. No weapons were brought

into the house by the intruder, who used a fireplace poker be-

longing to the Browns to repel the deceased.

o
$s Mr. Adams was thus clearly convicted of the capital crime sole-
ly because of the jury's finding that the homicide occurred

during the course of an enumerated felony. But as an aggravating
factor justifying imposition of the death penalty, the trial court
relied on the fact that the killing occurred during the course of
a felony, the same factor on which conviction was predicated, and

ed

Not

oO
o
a)
=
o
b
Q
jo
o
0)
12]
v
W
0)
w

irily exists in every felony-murder case.
only is the death sentence excessive when there has been no finding

intentional, as in the present case, but

ct
He
oF)
ct
it
@m
oe
©
.

()
an
( ‘
i

PS

fu
”

>

this reliance on a factor which does not distinguish Mr. Adams'
crime from any other felony murder strips Florida's death penalty
statute of compliance with the requirement that capital sentencing
be imposed only upon an individualized basis, as required by the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the Supreme Court

expressly recognized the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition
may be violated where a punishment is disproportionate to the se-

verity of the crime. Id. at 173. The Gregg holding expressly applied

only to those cases where there was jeliberate taking of life.
"[W]e are concerned here only with the imposition
o£ capital punishment for the crime of murder,
and when a life has been taken deliberately by
the offender, we cannot say that the punishment
is invariably disproportionate to the crime. It
is an extrem sanction, suitable to the most ex-
treme of crimes."428 U.S. at 187 (emphasis
supplied, footnote omitted.)

In Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), the Court held

that the Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis must be
applied even to particular serious crimes which do not involve

the deliberate takinsa of human life. Id. at 592. The death

- 29 ;

viole

¥

or the

¢

tionate

08]
> O
“4
WY)
a ep)
Vv Qa
LD. af
x ©
VO
_—_
re
“4
ib
4) «rd
=
@ ve
& set
=
YO eS
4
Gj &
3 0
Duce
4J
mo
J
-~ 4
y\4
Sn Ww)
Myc
hu} O
OOo
GS
SS
08)

i.

tion to acceptable
hence

and

ait

o~

ct
“4

t

is nothin

.

Wa
O

n

-

impositio

needless

purposeiess

is grossly

A,

a =|
Y Yd
ES
“a 4
Maced
oO YW
a &
& O
4)

4
UVa W
wv
se)

a)
4 WV
oA
hy 4J
0?)
oe |
Q@) «A
WY)

G4
08]
ome ©)
WG

@)
C) «ed
&

&

as presently applied comes into the penalty phase with at least
yne automatic aggravating factor, the burden of proof at that
stage of the proceedings shifts to the defendant to establish
mitigating evidence to outweigh the presumptive death sentence.
Such a result can never be constitutionally permissible, cf.,

Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 J.S. 684 (1975), particularly not ina

case where the stakes are so high. See, Lockett v. Ohio, supra,

_-———-

438 U.S. at n. 16 [plurality expressly reserves question as to the
constitutionality of Ohio statute, reversed on other grounds,
which required death unless defendant proved mitigation].

Finally, Eddings v. Oklahoma, _U.S._, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.

Ed.2d 1 (1982) teaches that even mental factors which do not com-
pletely excuse criminal liability must be considered as relevant
evidence on the issue of sentence in a cavital case. Thus, even

thouch the non-intentional-nature of the killing in the instant

$ case is not a legally sufficient excuse which would result in the
total avoidance of culpability for a capital felony because of the
felony murder theory of prosecution—although it may well have
been a complete defense had the State charged premeditated murder—
it is a matter which is properly considered in mitigation of the
sentence. But what vrovides the mitigation in the present case
also provides an aggravation: the underlying felony, as a matter
of law. Once again, the sentencer is left without substantial
guidance on the punishment issue, leading to that standardless
and arbitrary sentencing process condemned in Furman v. Georgia,
supra.
III. THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES CONSIDERED

BY THE JURY AND THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO

CHANNEL THEIR SENT ING DISCRETION AS

REQUIRED BY THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT.

Mr. Adams contends that three of the aggravating circum-
stances considered by the jury and the trial judge in his case
were considered in violation of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
safeguards. One of the circumstances—that the homicide was
“especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” [Fla.Stat. §921.141 (5)
(h)]—was improperly considered because it was not supported by
the evidence consistently held as necessary to support it. Two
other circumstances—that Mr. Adams had a criminal record of “at
least five" convicticns and that the victim has been a prominent
outstanding citizen—were improperly considered because thoy were
non-statutory agaravatina circumstances precluded from consider-
ation by the Florida Jeath penalty statute. Because the

@ consideration of these siege circumstances in the sentencing

- 34 - ‘ :

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1695%3A5. Public record. Not legal advice.