# Petition — ELLEDGE v. FLORIDA (No. 83-5463) > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1675%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition - **Published:** January 1, 1983 ## Text No. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM 1983 WILLIAM DUANE ELLEDGE, Petitioner, vs. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA RICHARD L. JORANDBY Public Defender 15th Judicial Circuit of Florida 224 Datura Street/13th Floor west Palm Beach, Florida 33401 (305) 837-2150 7 + CRAIG S. BARNARD Chief Assistant Public Defender RICHARD H. BURR, ill Of Counsel Counsel for Petitioner QUESTION PRESENTED whether the outcome determinative test 1S an appropriate measure of prejudice in the analysis of a claim of the denial of the Sixth Amendment cight to effective assistance of counsel, where that claim is based upon counsel's substantial failure to investigate compelling mitigating circumstances due to the trial court's failure to allow sufficient time for preparation? er LL TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Question Presented ..ceeecceessseesseeseseseeee i Authorities Cited eeesoeeeeeeenreneneeeeeneeeeeeeeenrr ff « iii Citation to Opinions Below .wseesencces TeTTTTT l JTUTISGICtiON .ccccccccesesesssessesscesecs eeece l Constitutional and Statutory Provisions TNVOLVER cccccccccceceececeesesececesececese ne Statement OF the CASE wise esseeesesseseessseses 2-3 Statement of the PactS weseseseseseseseceees ees 3-5 * Reasons for Granting the Writ: CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO RESOLVE WHETHER "“OUTCOME-DETERMINATIVE” IS THE PROPER STANDARD FOR ANALYZING PREJUDICE RESULTING FROM THE DENIAL OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN SUCH DFNIAL IS CAUSED, AT LEAST IN PART, BY THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO INVESTIGATE COMPELLING EVIDENCE IN MITIGATION. wccccccccsssssccseseceesseces 5-13 CONCLUSION cccccccccseceesecesesesesesecesseseses 14 AUTHORITIES CITED CASES CITED Rehearing denied January 10, 1983 U.S. U.S.L.W. 3510 Elledge vs. Graham, 432 So.2d 35 (Pla. 1983) Elledge vs. State, 346 So.2d 998 (Pla. 1977) Elledge vs. State, 408 So.2d 1021 (Pla. 1982) Geders vs. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) Glasser vs. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942; Hintz vs. Beto, 379 F.2d 937 (Sth Cir. 1967) Knight vs. State, 394 So.2d 997 (Pla. 1981) Lockett vs. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) Powell vs. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (Pebruary 22, 1983) (No. 82-6609) United States vs. Cronic, 675 P.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1982) United States vs. Decoster, 624 P.2d 196 (b.C. Cir 1976) Ungar vs. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964) Washington vs. Strickland, 693 P.2d 1243 (Sth Cir. 1982) Woodson vs. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) Elledge vs. Florida, U.S. , 103 S.Ct. 316 (1982), Strickland vs. Washington, U.S. 51 U.S.L.HW. 3865 (June 6, 1983) (No. 82-1554) United States vs. Cronic, U.S. » 32 Os PAGE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED This case involves the Sixth, Eighth, and Pourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. It further involves Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1977), entitled "Sentence of death or life imprisonment for capital felonies; further proceedings to determine sentence.” Because of its length, the statute is set out in its entirety at Appendix C. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Petitioner was charged by indictment with the rape and first degree murder of Margaret Strack. On March 17, 1975, following denial of his motions to suppress custodial statements, peti- tioner pled guilty to both offenses and was so adjudged. A sentencing trial was held, at the conclusion of which the jury recommended death. The sentencing judge sentenced petitioner to death for first degree murder and fifty years imprisonment for rape. Thereafter, petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Plorida, which affirmed the conviction but reversed the death sentence and remanded for a new sent- encing. Elledge v. State, 346 So.2d 998 (Pla. 1977). Immediately prior to commencement of the resentencing proceeding, counsel moved for a continuance. The motion was denied, the resentencing proceeded and petitioner was again sentenced to death. The FPlorida Supreme Court affirmed the sentence. Elledge v. State, 406 So.2d 1021 (Pla. 1962). After denial of rehearing, a petition for writ of certiorari was filed with this Court. That petition was denied, Elledge v. Plorida, __—s«U«. Se, «103 S. Cth. 316 (1982), and rehearing was denied on January 10, 1983, U.S.___, 51 U.S.L.W. 3510 (1983). On January 25, 1983, executive clemency proceedings were held before the Governor and Cabinet. On February 15, 1983 the Governor signed a deéth warrant ordering petitioner's execution between noon March 11, 1983 and noon March 18, 1983. Peti- tioner's execution was scheduled for 7:00 a.m., March 15, 1983. Petitioner then commenced the post-conviction proceedings which have led to the petition filed with the Court today. Petitioner filed a motion to vacate judgment and death sentence “No. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM 1983 WILLIAM DUANE ELLEDGE, ’ Petitioner, vs. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. SSSS SSS SSS SS SSS SSS SS SSS SS SSS SSS sSSssssesseeseee Sees sseeeee22e222=== PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA Petitioner prays that the writ of certiorari issue to review che judgment of the Florida Supreme Court filed March 10, 1983, upon which rehearing was denied on June 22, 1983. CITATION TO OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the Supreme Tourt of Plorida which is the subject of this petition is reported as Elledge v. Graham, 432 So.2d 35 (Fla. 1983) and is set out as Appendix A tu this petition, Rehearing with, respect to this opinion was denied, and the order denying rehearing is attached as Appendix B to this petition. JURISDICTION The judgment of the Supreme Court of Plorida was filed on March 10, 1983, and petitioner's timely motion for rehearing was denied on June 22, 1983. The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Sr., Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, granted petitioner an extension of time until September 20, 1983, to file this petition for writ of certiorari. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C §1257(3), peti ioner having asserted below and asserting herein the deprivation of rights secured to him by the Constitution of the United States. pursuant to Pla.R.Crim.P. 3.850 in the trial court, along with an application for stay of execution. An evidentiary hearing was held on March 9, 1983 with respect to petitioner's claim that his counsel during resentencing had rendered ineffective assistance. The trial court issued an order on March 10, 1983 denying the motion to vacate judgment and sentence and denying the appli- cation for stay of execution. Pollowing denial of his appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Elledge v. Graham, 433 So.2d 35 (Fla. 1983), petitioner timely filed in this Court for certiorari review. STATEMENT OF THE PACTS This case involves the death of Margaret Strack in peti- tioner's apartment after an alleged rape on August 26, 1974. Ms. Strack first met Mr. Elledge in a bar in Hollywood, Plorida. After talking and drinking for a whiie with Mr. Elledge, Ms. Strack voluntarily accompanied him to his nearby apartment, where they continued drinking and began to smoke marijuana. Ms. Strack then undressed and initiated sexual activity with Mr. Elledge. When Mr. Elledge began to respond to Ms. Strack's overtures, however, Ms. Strack refused to continue. At that moment, Mr. Elledge “freaked out” and while in such a state choked Ms. Strack, forcing her to engage in intercourse. (Transcript of Guilty Pleas Proceedings, March 17, 1975, at 13) While Mr. Elledge was still in this mental and emotional state, Ms. Strack again resisted him, and he “just kind of blacked out, and lost ail control of what [he] was doing” and choked Ms. Strack until he realized, some time later, that she was dead. (Ibid.) At the hearing on his post-conviction motion to vacate, Mr. Elledge claimed that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at resentencing because of counsel's substantial in- ability to prepare for the proceeding. Mr. Elledge claimed that counsel's inability was caused by the court's denial of a continuance; counsel thus failed to prepare for trial through no strategic choice but rather through the interference of the State. The evidence adduced in support of this claim over- whelmingly demonstrated that as 2 result of this court-imposed lack of preparation, petitioner, not unlike the petitioners in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) was deprived of “the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him." Two witnesses testified at the hearing on effective assist- ance. Robert McCain, petitioner's counsel for the trial and resentencing, discussed his theories of defense and his con- versations with Mr. Elledge. His theory of defense prior to Mr. Ellecge's guilty plea was essentially two-fold. The first was a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, but when two court-ap- pointed psychiatrists returned a report finding Mr. Elledge competent that defense was abandoned. The second defense was suppression of the custodial Statements made by petitioner. When this motion was denied, the fall back defense was to enter a plea of guilty and “go to the mercy of the court." After the denial of the mction to suppress, he advised Mr. Elledge to plead guilty and the pleas were entered the same day. Regarding the penalty trial, in 1977, Mr. McCain testified that he was definitely not prepared and that there were addi- tional specific matters that he needed to investigate in order to properly represent Mr. Elledge. He testified that these matters related to petitioner's mental condition at the time of the offense, including the the fact that Elledge had been placed on "mind drugs” at the prison. Counsel testified that without a continuance, he was left with virtually no defense except for his client, in essence, saying what he said in the prior trial. Counsel had wanted to investigate the fact that Mr. Elledge was on Mellaril and an epilepsy drug while in prison and wanted to bring in several witnesses concerning Elledge's background. Mr. McCain said that he thought Elledge was “crazy” and thought that if he were able to investigate the ¢sychiatric defense it would “bear fruit”. Mr. Elledge also testified at the hearing as to his con- versations with Mr. McCain about the case. He consistently told Mr. McCain that at the time of the offense, he was “not in his right mind”, “in a complete daze." He said that Mr. McCain advised him to plead guilty and “throw himself on the mercy of the court" after the competency issue had been decided and the suppression had been denied. Mr. McCain did not discuss with him the elements of the offense or possible defenses prior to entry of the plea. Prior to the 1977 sentencing trial, Mr. Elledge had been in the jail a week or two before he saw Mr. McCain. He Saw Mr. McCain, only a few days before trial, as a result of Mr. Elledge's telephoning Mr. McCain, who had not known that Elledge had been returned to the Broward jail. He told Mr. McCain about having received drugs and psychiatric treatment in prison. Mr. McCain told him he was going to move for a continuance. The continuance was denied, and thus the only preparation was reading over his testimony of the first trial. In addition to the testimony below, Mr. Elledge proffered certain testimony and records. A proffer was made of the report of Dr. Dorothy Otnow Lewis, M.D. as to her extensive evaluation of Mr. Elledge. Also proffered was the testimony of certain members of Elledge's family. The purpose of the proffer was to establish the evidence that would have been available had counsel been able to conduct an investigation. The trial court reserved ruling on the motion, and then on March 10, 1983 issued his ruling denying the motion. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO RESOLVE WHETHER "OUTCOME-DETERMINATIVE” IS THE PROPER STANDARD FOR ANALYZING PREJUDICE RESULTING FROM THE DENIAL OF EFPPECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN SUCH DENIAL IS CAUSED, AT LEAST IN PART, BY THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW COUNSEL SUPPICIENT TIME TO INVESTIGATE COMPELLING EVIDENCE IN MITIGATION. This petition presents the question of the proper standard for determining prejudice in the context of a capital sent- encing proceeding where ineffective assistance of counsel results from judicial interference with the attorney-client relationship. This Court presently has before it the issue of the constitutional standards for judging claims of the denial of effective assistance of counsel when the state is blameless for the resulting ineffectiveness. See Strickland v. Washington, U.S. , 51 U.S.L.W. 3865 (June 6, 1983) (No. 82-1554) {granting certiorari in Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243 ~~ OS ———— (Sth Cir. 1982) (Unit B) (en banc)}, and United States v. Cronic, U.S. , 51 U.S.L.W. 3598 (Pebruary 22, 1983) (No. 82-6609) {granting certiorari in United States v. Cronic, 675 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1982)]. Because it provides an Opportunity co resolve important, recurring, questions concerning state-induced in- effective assistance of counsel which are not presented by Washington and Cronic, Mr. Elledge's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is especially ripe for review by this Court. After showing why his case is a necessary companion to Washington and Cronic, Mr. Elledge will discuss the historical facts underlying his constitutional claim to demonstrate the appropriateness of deciding the issue he presents “on the record of his case. A. Issues Requiring Resolution by this Court Two aspects of this case merit review by this Court. Pirst, here it was the court's action, the circumstances Surrounding its appointment of counsel and then its denial of a continuance needed to develop crucial mitigating evidence, that caused counsel to be ineffective. This case thus presents the question of the proper standard of ineffective assistance and prejudice required when the ineffectiveness resulted from judicial inter- ference with the attorney-client relationship. Secondly, mr. Elledge's case squarely raises the appropriateness of an “outcome-determinative" test of prejudice in ineffective assist- ance cases, The Florida courts, in rejecting mr. Elledge's claim, relied upon the outcome determinative Standard for evaluating prejudice that the Plorida Supreme Court established in Knight v. State, 394 So.2d 997, 1001 (Pla. 1981) .Elledge v. Graham, supra, 432 S0.2d at 37. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Washington v. Strickland, 693 PF. 2d 1243 (Sth Cir. 1983) (en banc) rejected the Knight test applied in Plorida. There is hence a direct conflict between the standard applied by the federal court, and presently under review by this Court, and the standard followed to affirm mr. Elledge's death sentence. Mr. Elledge was denied the effective assistance of counsel at his resentencing due to his counsel's total inability to and failure to investigate mr. Elledge's one plausible line of defense. The facts,as developed during the state evidentiary hearing and discussed in more detail below, demonstrate that (1) counsel made no investigation regarding the one plausible defense - Mr. Elledge's mental condition; (2) this lack of investigation was caused by the lack of time allowed to prepare for the resentencing; it did not result from a strategic or tactical decision by counsel; (3) this lack of investigation was extremely prejudicial; had such investigation and preparation been done, significant and compelling evidence could have been presented on mr. Elledge's behalf. It is the second element, the reason for the ineffective representation, which raises iffportant sixth amendment issues and which makes this an excellent companion to the two ineffective assistance cases presently pending in this Court.Unlike counsel in Washington and Cronic, counsel in Mr. Elledge's case was prevented by judicial action from effectively representing hin. Mr. Elledge's trial counsel was unable to prepare because the court appointed him at the eleventh hour and then denied his motion for a continuance.! Specific cases of ineffective assistance and prejudice fall along a continuum based, in part, upon the degree cu which the state is responsible for the resulting deficiencies of defense counsel and calibrated to the degree of prejudice which must be shown before a new sentencing is mandated. On one pole are cases where a state procedure places a disability upon counsel that pervades his entire conduct of the defense. Cases at this extreme of the spectrum include Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (defense counsel not permitted to confer with client during overnight mid-trial recess); Herring v- New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (statute barred final summation by defense counsel); 1 mr. Elledge readily acknowledges that in general a court's dispositon of a motion for continuance, though it must comport with requirements of due process, Ungar v.- Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964), is a matter within ee Sound discretion of the trial court. But the question now presented is a violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel, and the standards are significantly stricter: the inquiry now must focus on the quality of represention actually received by Mr. Elledge, and here that inquiry is inseparable from the question of the propriety of the continuance. The issue is the proper inter- relationship between the court's power over continuances and the effect the exercise of such power may have upon 4 criminal defendant’s right to effective representation. a a - Glasser v. United States , 315 U.S. 60 {iv42j} (aerendants witn conflicting interests); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (counsel denied adequate opportunity to confer with defendants and to prepare for trial). In these cases, defense counsel was appointed but prevented by agents of the state from discharging functions vital to effective representation of the clients. The state-created procedures in these cases were what impaired the accused's enjoyment of the sixth amendment guarantee “by disabling his counsel from fully assisting and representing him. Because these impediments constitute direct state interference with the exercise of a fundamental right, and because they are sus- ceptible to easy correction by prophylactic rules, a categorical approach is appropriate.” United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ‘en banc). Reversal in such cases is required, without need of showing prejudice, for the reasons discussed in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-91 (1978). At the opposite pole of the ineffectiveness spectrum are claims that counsel committed certain discrete errors of omission and commission that reasonably effective counsel would not have committed; these errors resulted from counsel's own shortcomings rather than from actions by the State. This type of ineffective representation may just as seriously jeopardize the rights of a critinal defendant as the ineffectiveness discussed above,but they are less offensive to our sense of fairness because here the state is not the cause of the breakdown of the attorney-client relationship. In part for this reason, courts decline to find per se prejudice in this type of case. The Court's recent grants of certiorari in Washington and Cronic have provided an opportunity for the Court to address the critical issue of the degree of prejudice required to be shown in connection with a claim of ineffective assistance when counsel is alleged to have committed discrete errors. The lower courts have divided into three groups concerning the measure of prejudice in this category of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The tenth circuit in Cronic held that where the claim involves lack of preparation and experi- ence, prejudice “cannot be nicely weighed." 675 F.2d at 1128. The fifth circuit, by contrast, held in Washington that a petitioner asserting ineffective assistance must show that that his representation resulted in “actual and substantial dis- advantage to the cause of his defense." 693 P.2d at 1128. The most extreme position is that developed by the District of Columbia Circuit in Gaited States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d at 208, 211-12, adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in Knight v. State, 394 So.2d 997, 1001 (Fla 1981) and applied by the PFloriza Supreme Court in this case: that a defendant suffering inadequate counsel must show, to receive a new trial or sentencing that adequate counsel would change the resulfé on tetrial. Even assuming that the validity of the outcome determinative test is squarely before this Court in Washington, Mr. Elledge's case presents a dimension of the prejudice issue not raised by Washington or Cronic. This case presents the issue of whether the outcome determinative test is too stringent a standard of prejudice for ineffectiveness caused, in part, by governmental interference with the right to counsel. Thus, this case falls somewhere between the two polar extremes discussed above. The governmental interference arguably was not so severe that a new trial should be granted automatically. Yet it was sufficiently severe to preclude a conclusion that defense counsel was unhamp- ered in his conduct of Mr. Elledge's case. The requisite showing of prejudice should be less where the denial of effective assistance of counsel results from interference by the state with that right. Regardless of the level of State involvement, however, Florida appears determined to apply its outcome deter- minative test of prejudice. This is an issue requiring resolution by this Court. B. Petitioner's Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Mr. Elledge's trial attorney testified below that he had only a few days (3 or 4) in which to prepare for the resentencing trial and that this was wholly insufficient for proper pre- paration, consultation and investigation. This lack of time arose from the lawyer not knowing that the scheduled trial date of August 2, 1977 was firm, not knowing that the Plorida Supreme Court had denied rehearing or issued a mandate, and not being informed or otherwise aware that Mr. Elledge had been returned to Broward County and thus was available for consultation. 2 Counsel did not learn that Mr. Eliedge was in the county jail until July 28, 1977 when he received a call from Mr. Elledge who wanted to know why counsel had not come to see him. In their first meeting counsel and Mr. Elledge discussed the case briefly and counsel then prepared a motion for continuance which he filed on July 29, 1977. Defense counsel thought the motion would be granted because he could not see any reason it should not be --there was no speedy trial problem, there was no question of bail, there were no other pendfng charges, and most importantly because he was telling the court that he needed more time to prepare and that he needed to investigate and call witnesses. The continuance was not granted and the trial proceeded over coun- sel's protestations that he was not prepared. Consequently, he was forced to proceed to trial without any substantive witnesses, with only Mr. Elledge's uncorroborated testimony, and with pretrial preparation limited to going over Mr. Elledge'‘s testimony in the prior trial. The facts showing prejudice under these circumstances are compelling. Counsel did have specific, concrete information bearing upon sentencing that he was unable to present to the fact-finders. And, had counsel been able to investigate this information, it is now known that dramatic evidence would have been found in mitigation of punishment. None of this evidence, however, was able to be presented on Mr. Elledge's behalf The 2 Counsel's involvement with the case had ended more than two years previously (he did not represent Mr. Eliedge on appeal). Sometime near the middle of July, 1977, the trial judge asked counsel to represent Mr. Elledge at the resentencing trial and indicated that August 2nd was the scheduled date. Counsel agreed to do so. Upon agreeing to represent Mr. Elledge at the new sentencing trial, counsel assumed that the August 2nd trial date was only tentative and that he could move for additional time if needed. Counsel's view of the tentativeness of the date was also re- inforced by the fact that he knew that a rehearing had been filed in the Plorida Supreme Court and was under the erroneous im- pression that the Plorida Supreme Court had not issued its mandate. Counsel also was unaware that Mr. Elledge had been returned to Broward County and was available for conferences and consultation. capitel sentencing of Mr. Elledge is thus neither individualized nor reliable, as it omitted the major aspects of Mr. Elledge's character and the circumstances of the offense. Counsel emphatically reiterated at the hearing below what he told the judge during the hearing held on his motion to continue: that he was not ready to proceed on August 2, 1977. There were a number of important facts that counsel needed to investigate and confirm. When he met with Mr. Elledge in those few short days before trial, Mr. Elledge had informed counsel that while in prison the doctors had prescribed and placed Mr. Elledge on “mind drugs" such as “Mellaril and another drug used for epilepsy [dilantin].” Counsel testified that this was critically important because for the first time there might be concrete evidence to support his belief (and his only line of defense) that Mr. Elledge was “crazy.” Counsel did not mention this evidence in his motion for continuance because he needed more time to investigate it (and because he thought the continu- ance would be granted). See Hintz v. Beto, 379 F.2d 937, 942 (5th Cir. 1967) Counsel also wanted to find and present witnesses concerning Mr. Elledge's "early upbringing". Counsel believed that if he would have had time to prepare, the "psychiatric evidence would bear fruit." Counsel testified emphatically that he was “not prepared” in his representation of Mr. Elledge at the penalty trial. Thus, there were specific areas that r«quired investigation. These areas related directly to the only plausible line of defense. Counsel however could not investigate these matters sufficiently to present these matters at trial. The hearing below established the dramatic and compelling evidence that could have been discovered and presented had counsel been able to conduct the investigation he believed essential. This evidence is of such a quality as to provide a powerful defense to the imposition of the death penalty.3 3 The evidence that could have been discovered with adequate investigation was proffered below. [The witnesses could not be present to testify because the trial judge denied the motion’ by Mr. Elledge to provide the funds necessary to secure their attendance at the proceedings below.] mJ - — —— ~ ~ -- I= : 7 First, Dr. Dorothy Lewis conducted a complete psychiatric evaluation of Mr. Elledge and concluded, as suspected by Mr. Elledge's trial counsel, that at the time of the offense Mr. : Elledge was suffering from a severe mental disorder inat caused him to act the way he did and precluded him from controlling his actions. Dr. Lewis found that for a long time before th» offense, as well as at the time of the cffense, Mr. Elledge was severely mentally ill as a result of central nervous system disorders as pervasive and potentially as documentable as a brain tumor. She described his illness as consisting of three severe, interactionally related disorders: an organic impairment of his brain, which was most akin to*( and which may have been) psycuo- motor epilepsy; episodic dyscontrol, a scvere dysfunction of the electrical system of the brair precipitated by the ingestion of drugs and alcohol; and psychotic paranoia. In Dr. Lewis’ opinion, all three of these disorders combined to produce uncontrollable violent outbursts resulting in the sexual assault upon and homicide of Margaret Strack.[A copy of Dr. Lewis' report is set out in Appendix D} Second, these findings of Dr. Lewis were firmly supported by Mr. Elledge's documented biological vulnerabilities, his family history and background and his environment. The testi- mony of members of Mr. Elledge's family that would documert the specifics of the family life and environment was proffered b=2low in detail, more completely than ever before. 4 4 Although Mr. Elledge was evaluated prior to his original trial by two psychiatrists, these evaluations focused only on the narrow issues of competency and sanity (as a guilt-innocence defense). Moreover, the evaluations were quite perfunctory and were not based on the extensive information which could have been developed -~had counsel been provided adequate time -- and which was available to Dr. Lewis. With the information available to Dr. Lewis, and with Dr. Lewis' evaluation of Mr. Elledge in light of that information, counsel testified at the post-conviction hearing that he could have effectiely countered any effort by the state to use the earlier psychiatric evaluations to defeat his claim that Mr. Elledge was severely impaired at the time of the homicide. ll ~~ Third, confirming trial counsel's firm belief that adequate investigation of Mr. Elledge's mental state would “bear fruit,” this evidence expiained -- in a mitigating way ~~ why Mr. Elledge committed the homicide. Mr. Elledge assaulted and killed Margaret Strack because her perceived sexual teasing --in his life long context of sexual abuse and brutalization -- triggered his latent psychotic paronia. While the psychosis caused him to attack Ms. Strack, his ingestion of drugs and alcohol, along with the stress of Ms. Strack's perceived rejection, also triggered the abnormal electrical activity in his brain which produced an outpouring of rage which he had absolutely no means of con- trolling. His loss ot memory for the several hour period following the rage attack of Ms. Strack further confirmed the brain dysfunction underlying the homicide. Accordingly, at the time of the homicide Mr. Elledge was severally mentally ill, and his illness ébeclutely foreclosed any possibility of his con- forming his behavior to the requirements of law.> Thus, the investigation which Mr. Elledge's counsel did not undertake had extraordinarily serious consequences for Mr. Elledge. His counsel did not -- and could not -- present on his behalf evidence which thoroughly explained -- and mitigated -- a crime which appeared to be the kind of crime that ought to be punished by death. What were in truth the acts of a terribly impaired, ill man were thus seen by the jury and the judge as the acts of a terribly evil man, because defense counsel was not given the opportunity to investigate and develop facts which came to his attention on the eve of trial. 5 priefly, it should be mentioned that Dr. Lewis' credentials are unassailable. Her curriculum vitae was proffered below and is available for this Court's review. In addition, as also proffered, Dr. Lewis has been selected to author the chapter concerned with delinquency, violence, and central nervous system disorders in the leading textbook of psychiatry, The Comprehen- sive Textbook of Psychiatry. She is undoubtedly among the current leaders, not the leader, in the nation in this field which seeks to understand the causes of delinquent and violent / behavior, She has authored two books, more than forty7eight articles and book chapters in her field, and has presentes more than sixty papers at conferences and symposia all over the country. eee Surely Mr. Elledge was prejudiced by this. Yet no one can say that the outcome of his sentencing trial would have been altered if counsel had been able to investigate these facts and present the kind of evidence described in the preceding para- graphs. What can be said, with certainty, is that Mr. Elledge's character and the circumstances of the offense would have been much more thoroughly considered had these facts been investigated and presented. What can also be said, with certainty, is that a capital sentencing proceeding which omits from the sentencer's consideration the kind of evidence discussed herein cannot "ensure the reliability, under the Eighth Amendment standards, of the determination that ‘death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.'" Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.586, 601 (1978), quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). Accordingly, the Court should grant certiorari to determine the constitutionally proper measure of prejudice in the analysis of a claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance in a capital sentencing trial because, in part, the state prevented coursel from conducting the investigation which would have produced relevant, compelling evidence in mitigation. CONCLUSION Por the reasons expressed herein, the petitioner, WILLIAM DUANE ELLEDGE, respectfully requests that this Court grant his petition for writ of certiorari. Respectfully Submitted, RICHARD L. JORANDBY Public Defender ; 15th Judicial Circuit of Plorida 224 Datura Street/13th'P r West Palm Beach, Florid 33401 (30 837-2150 vn ; | ~ / \ BY (MPa | ate \ CRAIG S, .BARNARD Chief Assistant Public Defender ‘«i2 had . Run RICHARD H. BURR Of Counsel. j APPENDIX ELLEDGE v. GRAHAM t la > Cite as 432 Sa2d 35 (Fla 1943) William Duane ELLEDGE, Petitioner/Reiator, Robert GRAHAM, Gw:-ernor, State of Florida; Losie L. Wainwright, Secre- tary, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondents. William Duane ELLEDGE, Petitioner, ’. Leuie L. WAINWRIGHT, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, , Respondent. William Duane ELLEDGE, Petitioner, v STATE of Florida, Respondent. William Duane ELLEDGE, Appellant, ¥. STATE of Fiorida, Appellee. Nos. 63344, 63345, 63387, 63388. Supreme Court of Florida April 14, 1983. Rehearing Denied June 22, 1983. we Petitioner convicted of first-degree murder urged Supreme Court to issue its writ of haheas corpus to permit appellate review of denial by the Circuit Court, Bro- gari County, M. Daniel Futch, Jr., J., of his motion to suppress custodial statements god, in addition, to issue writs of quo war- ranto and/or habeas corpus to prevent exe- gtion of death warrant. Petitioner also sppealed denial ef his motion to vacate jocgment and sentence and, further, peti- toned for leave to file late petition for writ d error coram nobis and/or for extraordi- gry relief with regard to capital penalty tral. The Supreme Court held that: (1) jtioner was not entitled to appellate re rew of trial court's denial of his motion to gppress his confessions, and (2) petitioner gas not entitled to vacation of judgment wd sentence. Order accordingly. 1. Criminal Law 1219 When death sentence was posed upon existing life sentence, petitioner had no legal right Ww serve life sentence before death sentence could be carried out Suparimn- 2 Criminal Law 1026, 1140 Petitioner was not entitled to appellats review of tral court's denial of his motion to suppress confessions, where he plead guilty and did not raise this ixsue on hi previous appeals. . 3. Criminal Law 1026 A guilty plea cuts off any right to an appeal from court rulings that proceeded the plea with the exception of a limited class of issues which occur contemporaneously with the entry of the plea, namely, the subjeet- matter jurisdiction, the illegality of the ser- tence, the failure of the government to abide by the plea agrcement, and the volun- tary amd intelligent character of the ples 4. Criminal Law 997.8 Petitioner was not entitled w writ of error coram nobis on ground of newly «is- covere! evidence, in that facts were cither available or could heave been obtained at time of sentencing. 5. Criminal Law 2-998(7, 8) Petitioner was not entitled te vacation of judgment and sentence, in that his con- fessions and guilty plea were properly a«!- tnitted and allegation of ineffective ussist- ance of counsel had not been shown West's F.S.A. RCrP Rule 3.450. Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender; Craig S. Barnard, Chief Asst. Public De- fender, and Richard H. Burr, II], Asst. Put lic Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, for petitioner/relator, i: No. 63344, petitioner in No. 63345 and 62.47 and appelice in Nv. 63338. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Joy B. Shear- er, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for respondents in No. @3344 and 6245 and appellee in No. 63388. 36 Fla PER CURIAM. Petitioner urges this Court to issue its writ of habeas corpus to permit appellate view of the lower court's denial of his motion t& suppress custodial statements and, in addition, to issue writs of quo war- rante and/or habeas corpus to prevent the execution of the death warrant. Petitioner also appeals the denial of his rule 3.450 motion to vacate judgment and sentence and, further, petitions for leave to file a petition for writ of error coram nobis and/or for extraordinary relief with regard to the capital penalty trial We have juris diction. Art V, § SMT) & (9), Fla Const We find no merit in petitioner's argumen’s, deny al! petitions and affirm the denis! of his motion to vacate judgment and sen- lence On March 17, 1975, in the Seventeenth Judicial Cireuit in and for Broward County, petitioner Wille Duane Elledge moved to suppress certain custodial statements Upon the denial of his motion, he entered pleas of guilty to first-degree murder and rape, and on March 27, 1975, was sentenced to death, On direct appeal, this Court af- firmed petitioner's conviction but vacated the death sentence, ordering the tria! court © conduct a new sentencing trialy Elledge v. State, 346 So 2d 998 (Fla. 1977) Follow- ing that tral, petitioner was resentenced to death on August 3, 1977. On appeal this Court affirmed the death sentence. £)- ledge v. State, 408 So2d 1021 (Fila 1981), cert. denied, —— US. ——, 103 S.Ct. 316, 74 LEd2d 233 (1982) On February 15, 1983, the Governor of Florida signed a Geath warrant ordering petitioner's execu- on a QUO WARRANTO AND/OR HABEAS CORPUS [1] Petitioner contends that since his 1977 death sentence contained a provision that the sentence run consecutive to a sen- tence of life imprisonment imposed in Case No. 74-3811, in which petitioner also plead- ed guilty to first-degree murder, the death sentence cannot be carried out until after the expiration of the life sentence, which 42 SOUTHERN REPORTER. 2d SERIES carnes a mandator; m:nmum of tweet? five calendar years We [ind ths pew? wholly without meril When a death =? tence 3 superimposed upon an erssting sentence, the defendant has no legal re@ to serve the life sentence. Bilitch ». & chanan, 100 Fla. 1242, 132 So. 474 (1809 and Whitney v State, 132 So2d 599 (Fs 1961) HABEAS CORPUS {2,3} Relying on Anderson v. State, @ So.2d 574 (Fla 1982), petitioner also org® that he now is entitled to appellate revie® of the trial court's denial of his motion @ suppress his confessions, even though be pleaded guilty and did not raise, this svt en his previous appeals. We disagree - A guilty plea cuts off any right to an appeal from court rulings that preceded the pia with the exception of a limited class of issues which oceur contemporaneously wit the entry of the plea: (1) the subject mat ter jurisdiction, (2) the illegality of the se>- tence, (3) the failure of the government & abule by the plea agreement, and (4) the voluntary and intelligent character of the plea. Robinson v. State, 373 So.2d 698 (Fla 1979). The petitioner's challenge falls this latter category because it is base! of the assertion that he would not have plead- ed guity had the confessions teen sup pressed. A proper challenge to the volun tary and intelligent character of a guilty plea is presented to the trial court by 6 motion to withdraw the pica A denial of such motion would be subject to review on direct appeal. Robinson So far as we are aware, the petitioner has not previously sought to withdraw his guilty plea nor did he raise the issue on the direct appeal of his death seatence. We accorded the petitioner automatic review as we do in all death cass, and affirmed his conviction and sen tence of death Elixig’ Il & 921.144). Fla Stat. (1975) Petitioner since has raised the wsue of the voluntariness of his guilty plea tefore the trial court by means of a rule 3.850 motion, which we address below We know of no other right of review w which the petitioner is cntutled. ERROR CORAM NOBIS Elledge's petition presents whai is pur- ported to be newly-available evidence: trol his behavior at the time of the murder was seriously unpaired.” 2 A series of conclusions by petifioner's counsel based eon personal and tele- phonic interviews with various mem- bers of Eliedge’s family. Counsel concludes that there is “some organic vulnerability to violent behavior in petitioner's family; and ... petition- er's thinking may also stem from an inberited tendency toward disorya- nized thought processes.” [4] The “facts” on which Dr. Lewis and counsel rely are not new: they were cither available or could have been obtained at the time of sentencing. We note that Elledge was examined by two peychiatrists pnor to trial and both stated that at the time of the rape/murder he understood amd could ap preiate the nature and consequences of his acts. Petitioner fas presented no new in- formation—merely a psychisinst who draws different qonclusions. Booker ¥. State, 413 So.2d 736 (Fla 1982); Hallman v State, 371 So.2d 482 (Fla. 1979) RULE 3850 Elledge appeals the denial cf his rule 3.350 motion He presents five issues for our consideration: l. Ineffective assistance of counsel. 2 The voluntarivess of his guilty plea 3. Alleged error by the trial court in sinking grounds for relief. 4 Denial of equal ~rotection and a fair hearing by denia) of funds for expert and lay witnesses. 5. The wnconstitutionality of Florkia’s death penalty as applied. Fla 37 [5] Our review of the record convinces us that the appellant's confessions and guilty plea were properly admitted and that the allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel has not been shown Knight + State, 334 So.2d 997 (Fla 1981); Williams v State, 316 Sol 267 (Fla 1975} We have fully reviewed the remaining issues ras! by the appellant and find them to be with- out merit. The petition’ for quo warranto, haleas corpus, and leave to file @ writ of error coram nobis are denied. The denia! appellant's 3.550 motion is af twaed. f «3 vt ihe It is so ordered. ALDERMAN, CJ. and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, McDONALD, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., auncur Supreme Court of Florida WEDNESDAY, JUNE 22, 1983 WILLIAM DUANE ELLEDGE, * Petitioner/Relator, ad v- : * CASE NO. 63,344 ROBERT GRAHAM, Governor, State * of Florida; LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, , Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, ® Respondents. e - The defencant was previously c ad another capita! feiony or of a feiony involving the use or threat of + ence t TT - ’ “~- - 7 ‘ne cele a x A risa = Geath to many person - | ihe capital feiony was committed whiie Gelencant was engaged. or Was an aCcomMpiice t mmission ‘ ra sttemopt t commit - ght o _—_— ein —— n ‘ —" o ooh a er _ ra 4 ot * ” a , > ber rape. are Urgiary. a:Gnapo a fr aircrat . , - ‘ . , 7 acy r ne ¥wiu r ~ Zz. Diac g r dis harging of a destructive device or bornt - - ine p " ¢ - “as om tte 2 er 2 puse avoiding or preventing @ iawtu! arres r 7 r ™ — ] e! a! -_ - stug + . 5 fhe pit , Ws Tifr ec r i ary gain TT . . > . ihe capita ‘ ny was Comm ec ru r minder the wu «exer any govern erta furction or the enforcement of _ n ihe apita ié n> Was espe Livy nemou atrocious r crue cry Tr} torr * rar ra us © MITIGATIN , rr MSTA w. BO wit gating circumstances sha 2 the f wing 2 ihe Getendant as sigt ant mastor ior Crimin , P : ’ ¥ - > The casita! felon was mmitted e t? jefendant was under the influence xtreme n ta r emotuona: Cisturdance . . The ctim was @ Darticipant in the defend pnt s neuct or nsented the act 4 The defer ~~ . ——- -~ +) 3 ; seit 22 was ar of © aE . ny committed by another person and s par pation was relatively minor . ihe Gefencant actec uncer extreme duress or under the substar torr stion of another persor T> . +> ~ A ‘* rr . i Mh pac e Gelendcer apprec he cris tw of his nduct or to conform his cor ' the requirements of law was substantial y mpaire - ine age ' ne Gelendan?t [ ~e time the r - Mistery as 66d 056 " . 5 =hiatric Renart or 91 Jie -& 2 J 2 + rae nat#rhor > rovis ~* wr -- ‘ - ~-=* es ertfor , ait S$ other, @ revicw vu europsyCnolOy ite C , perro G by cil2 J 2 J — > -* nana = . of éh t-7 : C on, © v., and a rev v we J on 5 fc ais Tearncerint of Mr c ecce's ceatdec ‘ ro ¢ Pian ss onse ye Y , CiieCyge S&S slew e's » ae A - s oJ arcic aed Prahation Commissior - ~ ~~ © ~ ~w ° © ~ , - ~~ - . alifornia snartment of — Bue oY . . > - ~~ - a ~~. ¥ — ~~. “~ © ~ — S ~ ~~ - - ~ * . . . . errr... ‘ Line +> rorar . . . +. ecice ecorc, Fil G8 otdte Cc ’ e/3 tO presene c Seicaner'e £17 — . - > " ' or , -- so $ - (excerpts), ) Ga ota sc G-lO-/3 tO pre ‘ => ~ ~ . y iA - + n am Ellegge iS @ vec yee! Viv ' te a as vec U CAC > — « - > > Oe cnr = - oF, . > . Ps - ‘ 4 3 e J GE Gece 30 aS ul pase eryne g ’ ° ‘ urce a 72 Te +. o 7 -+ 6 ‘ r ’ y ‘ +) 4 ” S ~ ~¥ Cyvyeltwetl ¢ - ~ ° L ~ LY ue “ J ‘ . . a'e Sane +torne , c - ecye > itye Serens attorney verever & Cepiseocic aiure 9U “ “ - aie + s- +e —~* r - ~l¢ > > Ps e + a rr { L. cge Ss VIOIENL SCs aiiv Ss aditerec Stdits sciousness SsuLusCuuU ‘ ene ~- +e ece a cot Ch wes oa ~> mic *trer ee Go > 4 ——— . . 7 ~ te > + - thre - + “ lac res P » wi its > » efi » wv wv © we “~ Coe Cie, © yj. 3 4 J J at a a rarnn* e erfar ~ to r , - 7 nae > ° Ccwe- “ www -- ~~ oO co stood w i iwee G)'} - ~ 0 ' 2 CxAtLreore ece Aten) - co >) whic tar?) . oY 2c ecice 6nG stAve histories. ws SVinde tha ar ct of aan ‘ . ; : r. Elledge was we p ouUc r @ preyne ,;1Catce vy e vic » - ao piezing #r ~ an + 4 +o S| a ror rer + ~ - or So © oiwviwi rrequenvis @associaves Will GC: ervous sys ten wS 4! tefan? ae Ki rth » cick?) Cuee sn fant dif wl ¢n enothe v. Ae | SB SiILAlF Moos ' - - rGe Vie V owve Apparently, on one occasion, his mother was so creinec and angered by tne infant, that she attempted to throw him out @ Car wincow, but was stoppec by her husband. This episode was but the earliest instance recorced in a long series of batterings experienced at tne hancs of nis motner, Mrs . Elledge herself, an extremely guarded woman, acmittec tat et times sne wo. knew she had “gone too far” in her phys Elledge recalls episodes when his mother pushed nin to the floor, sat or top of him, and banged his heac on the floor. On on@é occasion, she alsc threatened him with a rifle anc was restrained by Mr, Elledge's fatner Given the history of severe battering by nis mother from infancy onward, it woule be impossible cto determine whetner the or anically influcted aspects of William's symptoms and Deneviors evident throughout his lifetime were prinarily the result of inutero central nervous system damage or of the numerous head injuries inflicted by his motner, a In addition to perinatal complications and batterings, “r. El leds phic ye? His mother reports an episode in which he ULasnec Nis heed a ainst a concrete wall in the cellar” at age 5 years. Mr. Elledge sti his forehead, attesting to the severity of the blow. In addition to tne — | accident at eye 5, he sustained a béow to Ais Neae at eoout age 9 ull was hit over the head with a croquet mallet by nis brotner. At around this time, his nose was first broken in an accident, the nature of which is unclear. His nose was subsequently broken in his early teens wher was hit in tne face with a 2 x 4 board. The severe injurics to nis nose (attested to by its present deformity) are important because severe injury to the nose is often transmitted to the temporal lobes of the brain, which are situatee benine tne nasal cavity. Oamage to this area of the brain is often associated with episod: C ny, 4 o , vw r ane ~ cr - - > nar cr - rage. Ouring young acuitnooc, ™r. Ciiceye cise Sustained t& 4 severe eaG injuries prior to the murder in question, one wher ne wes v the rignt + ~ : ~ +) aA nthe ar ntr ror -+ frontal area with a rifle outt, the otner w 5 motorcycic t a car anc he slammed into the side of the car. in snort, hr. cilecge Sustainec nunerous + , _ ! an are a mark ee rennet e e n traumata to his head, any one of which could have contributed to his cpisocic rage reections. Ad ¢ 7 nice ernm 2exXuUa) IS LCry v | = ~ = 4 TilesAc - ‘ or ~_-+ rar 7 + The sexual nature of Mr. cCilecge S eggressive ect Can Oily ve ulcerative . acl e. a eam enstenaAcce ~¢ a ot eahksieae ASS P an early age (approximately 9 yeers), Wo Cpisaes of sexuai aduse occurred cy ~ m3 - + - r - - no r - 7 - a Mr. Elledge was accosted by a man in atruck from whom he hitcnes ¢ rice, Instead of taking him to his destination, tne man Grove him to a woocee area, then atacked him, choking him, throwing him to the ground, and forcing anal ; il toramding th Si eten he inet Cancetmmenece and late intercourse. Accorcing to £ ciiécsge, ~ wo’ Consciousness alii idter awekened in the woocs, injured enc Trignhtenesc GC was atraic to te S e . hor = ho had €r s¢ifar - ctetc nis First experience wi intercourse waS Ww - is wi ter. + a > an 72 ar 24 Mr Fllerfre anf mic cscs ‘ ¢ raecrr aror r “rr At about age io OF i, | » BIieese - S sister were ciscoverec oy $ a atu "o — 5 a falas rn a tn tea 2 Thic seta Sexual reiations oy a rehe ie neéiynoor, @ wole ] er 30's. inis women tnen . wu ei 7 an - + =, fey Fh x. 7 auon ine tc sc brought Mr. Elledge to her apartuent anu, wiicer threat of revealing to his = ‘ os 7 a ii : Sa eciteten . Se A a } perents nis sexual reiationsnip with his sister, she forced nim to pervorn orei » | - ~ 5 - Ff —— c - s° re + - ar Faas ’ c - ar ar r sexual ects on her. ther semancs on ini Continsec over the subsequen™ yeur or — : . ‘ € ae eae ee ee ae ili ’ Se two and, with tne prumse 0% teecning ni ow to please any women, sme encouragec nim to have intercourse with her. peer ee ne Ee Rl er cE GC AE: CE A ae — eel RN IE AOL LE SR LET ETT CT mm Of special note, the only violent juvenile act of which Mr. Elledge . i a was accused, the battery of a 9 year old girl, occurred when he ieft tnis wouan's house after having been yiven liquor and sexually stimuluted by her. Thus, tnere would seem to be a fairly clear etiological relationsni; ct least in this instance, between sexual abuse and aygression. Ouring childhood Mr. Elledge was also sexually abused ty a 20 year uid male cousin. He was frequently beaten while naked by his mother and father and he also witnessed his father beat his sister on her bare buttocks, Family mistory Little is known about Mr. Elledge's fauily because of their reluctance to become involved in his case. They have never visited him since his incarceration in 1974, According to records and to Mr. Elliedge's report, both of his parents were alcoholic_and violent. tie witnessed numerous physical fights between then and saw his mother smashed to tle floor by nis father. Although Mr, Elledge idealizes nis father, calling hin a very yentle, kind nan, he recalls an instance when his father assaulted a neighbor, many episoces when he ang his sister were beaten by his father and verbal battles between his parents when his mother accused his father of “screwing wita your daughter." The likelihood that this act did ind occur is supported by the fact that Mr. Elledge‘s sister initiated nin into sexual activity and attempted to have intercourse with him when he was only 9 or 10 years old. The exact nature of Mrs. Elledge's psychopathology could not be cetermined because of her reluctance to meet with me. Her periodic fierce ee —- — ee — rages in which on occasion she had to be restrained from killing her son, coupled with times of great lethargy, withdrawal, alconolisn, and inability to function as a wother suyyest that she probably suffered from a serious mood disorder. At times her behaviors were so inapprapriate (as when she + played half-nude on the bed with her children and teased them by placi a not dog in her panties) cause one to wonder whether she was inceec psychotic at times ana also whether she was of normal intel] Another indication of possible maternal psychosis was ner reaction wher she received letters from Mr. Elledge's attorney's office, requesting 4 meeting with her. When I spoke to her on the phone, sne told me that she thought she was being tricked by an escaped convict from F m ang she called the F.8.1. to check out the validity of the letters si had received fiom the Legal Defense Offices. On the phone with me she was sO Guarded that sne wuld supply little information about the fe .e did report her bleeding during "the pregnan:y with William and adinitcec tnat sonetines she “went too.far’ when she beat ner son. ww w Rac ie) 4 ~ jiatric history Mr, Elledge's severe psychiatric problems cate from early chi ldnoce As early as age 5 or 6 years, he was unable to function appropriately ir the classroom, got into frequent fights with scnoolmates, and felt suspicious of teachers. These kinds of behaviors are often characteristic of children with brain dysfunction and of prepsychotic children. Because of his extrenic difficulty functioning in a classroom, Mr. Ellecge was often seated in the front of the classroom near the teacher. This increased his discoufort because he was constantly convinced that other children were snickering at nim behind his back and he would frequently reel around and retaliate for imagined insults. As he became older, this paranoid attitude, accompanied by frequer misperceptions and misinterpretations of the words and actions of others, caused him to stike out defensively even when not uncer attack. a Mr. Elledge's extraordinarily bizarre work history (he nade ove 45 moves in a period of about 7 years) is a reflection of his paranoic discomfort at each job he took, from dishwasher to manager of a diner. At each job he felt persecuted and misunderstood by his bosses and scmetizes left after a short time without even being paid. (See xerox of his travels). As early as age 14, Mr. Elledge felt the need al to be armed to defend nimself. Some of Mr. Elledge's moves were precipiatec by even more Diz motives than paranoia. For example, when Mr. Ciledge was in Canaca ie > ’ read a newspaper story about a woman who nad been doused wit! asol and set on fire by a gang in Bostqn. He was enraged because tne stor said that none of the pecple who heard the wonan’s screans nag heipeu ie In response to this story, Mr. Elledge conceived of a plan to obtein a ) gun in New York, go to Coston, and walk around t @ am @ ant ) Ss the murder tcok place. He believed that ne would then be attecked by ? the same gang and would shoot them, This idea Lecame so forceful that Mr. Elledge went as far as to obtain a sawed off shotg then travel to Boston with the intention of finding the aforementioned neighborhood. Once he got to Boston, however, Mr, Eiiecge realizec thet he was possibly psychiatrically il] and, instead of going through with nis clan, sought psychiatric treatment at a Boston hospital. He said ne felt he needed hospitalization, but it was refused and he was put on a waitir list for outpatient treatment, would be able to iure tne old hil — - r. Elledge's wife, Diane, M in his persisted ne wnen a to get he subsequen snd end der murs “Vv periods of extreme depres n fro a serious suicide rant “ fron unconscious for > a apparen - ow ee _ 1tcns.1 hi & hignway and cid not know how he got sere, ine eariiest episode of this kind that he recalls happened when, as 2 teenager, he wes told by his wother that he had siphoned yas irow one Cur wo anotner, an act OF wild he still has no memory. ° - The Murcer — ei : : - 2 3 - re rree enala An FiUm - - The question erises if what ways tne psycnopatnoiogy cocumentes cvuve 4 le . ~ mired = , toh Mr Si isosne s¢ econtenced +o deatr is relevant to the murder for which Mr. cilecge 15 Sentences Le veer Ty ‘ a ne ¢s Re namane4 / . — in great measure by Mir. cCilecge s longstanding paranoia (exacercetec & aS as 01) ac 77 » bde aa adic arnantraliahia ranec (allen pretinic alcohol) as well as nis episocic UNCONYsicvic Feyges \eiev prec avec hae at ttn ta & Clle ha apie hameetit wae. « ] ’ Te by alconol). According to Mr. cilecge, tne vict nerseit waS Sexuaily viting In fact, he says thet sne initiated intercouse by coming ovt oF tne vewnroe with her panties at ner knees and coming over to him, it woulG See, ncwever, cr | aw * = a @m po oe @m —_ @m uw 8 a a m oO fae) © 9 om “yt or “w ) + t * all clear that she dic more thar gently push nin bace or attempt to slo down. Clearly she was interested in having sexual relations. owever, her reluctance to proceed quickiy trigyerec in ‘ir. & ledge a feeling oO beinc totelly rejected and tricked. His veport of fce y teased and anycred is : : ‘ very Similar to his report of feelings engencered when his mother, Sister, and neignbor sexually m ¢.Parsows Karosiis = s.Witchite Kansas Where Gwe. Dany was Lean... ~ ; ne ~ > . Joplin Missoua: ag. [Rinidad Colorade en 5| ?. Langley Oklahoma ae Shinn Abteke % 3) 8. Denver Colonnade ° 30, Vewwa Mii ssoun: ‘= - a. San Jonguin Valley Grill x. San Diane Cali€ Q Ry io. lesAngeles Calet’ 32. Jurlocé& CAli£ ¥ 3 it. “Tenrance Call: 33. fulsa » Langley (Okla hone \ z| 1a. Lolraington Ct 34. )/alseno unc Colenadeo 3} Sis. Long Beach Calet wa Pathe Cilaeads z w.Devver Crlowado Ze. Dower. Cole: /$ 1s, Boulder Colorado 37, Gardwuex Cole | = §| 1%. Los Argeles Colt ; 3g. St. Lean Misseurs | Ry 5} 8. Hellyriocd CAlk 39 . fou! Heurow Mich | $ F 16. San Frayersee alt ¥O. Lanckeinng Mich taf 12, Seattle Wrshring ton © ky Lamberi ville Mich \s 2 spacks opoville Fla, ¥2 loledsn Ohio | \E y a1, Micra Til. 43 BololinasRecn Olno KS ; 22. Moartreal Cansacla 4u¢ Toledo Ob > a 23 S Ross (NGex New York 4s Hol lyusood Fla ‘ K 19. Brooklyn New York ye Tacksoville Bech Fils ‘a = Leste Mass Thats Whew I ogt Gnted & | 2. arnidad Calorencle owe Reem Ahr DNR, Zick 2x} 27 -_ Derwexe lalnaade ug C Vaeker & asdht . i> ee | Plus Shoat tries to co ol %asd....---~ oO ~ .*] wo nal @ @ cr wo m @ Oo @ + wo @ a | cr TH y 4 ; TE Nec vu ai io SC 3 nd ma DA et +h a - + : 14a or Or - I @ @o @ — ~~ he £ ’ & U OCT 7 .1983 SUPREME crijpr us om mal @ ae cr ~~ tv 3 z 5 at , , 2 t st u e-en a + — ec or efly « A - ~~ ec 2a t an S| heiad Qa. o wo wo @ Q Tr @) @ eh) cr sworn according for leave to @ a & case. the costs of ne e. r c T - r ress i seex 1 + 2 ted as follows: rR « + co 3 ‘ + by the LCircult otion was trial court's rtiorari to the r wi re re . - arene sienna 5 REME COUR artac 16 raAM Lal LIA i re ee STATE Re a A , TAL ANE crore 49 WILLIAM J Vc LLEVUUC to aw qcec se oS clhUS6@Y r Ss to law, depose anc sa 1 Su f ceed without eing require 7 ~~ -~ - ~oFf % ‘_ rare fe = S a4v ci ae Because of my povert z — r - = + o . - i Delileve tna i am saic case. >» The nature of said c I was convicted and - Mae m a Pourt of Broward LouNt » FIOGE an oar tat tae 1; Sf in th post-convictio eiie i tne 7 a ™ P nee Bal _ elon sa to ,eniec. e supreme Court Oo tr T a nf - + 4 TAnINA ru - 3° 4 =| Ss petl 2UTiahhy ¢ r -o oc a a F + ++ A € supreme coul ® rne united os rn sténaccan = A _ ~ ra VULY witnessec anc swo to D ao —* Pee be an ay ae ee L SAS cey s ,eptemoer, ‘4 > l ‘'e J Lhd r - / Af AInFTrAc O Tc f YVUIART PUBLIC 4 + AYA 7 / ELLEDGE : --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1675%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.