# Petition — BUNCH v. VIRGINIA (No. 83-5406) > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1666%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition - **Published:** January 1, 1983 ## Text | “a4 ee | Dale Bunch was tried by a jury and found guilty as charged. In | Bunch's punishment at death. After receipt of a pre-sentence — 1 ; rf i Aes ~ Cow / De Present: Carrico, C.J., Cochran, Poff, Compton. Stephenson, and Russell, JJ., and Harrison, Retired Justice TIMOTHY DALE BUNCH OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO v. Record No. 822081 June 17, 1983 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY Percy Thornton, Jr., Judge Indicted for capital murder in the commission of rob- bery while armed with 4 deadly weapon, Code § 18.2-31(d), Timothy the sentencing phase of the bifurcated proceeding, the jury fixed report, the trial court confirmed the jury's verdict and imposed the death penalcy. Bunch is here for automatic review of his death sentence. This review has been consolidated with Bunch's appeal from his conviction, and the matter has been given priority| on our docket. Bunch seeks, alternatively, a new trial on 4 non-capital offense, a new trial on the capital charge, or com- mutation of his death sentence. The record shows that in the months of December, 1981, and January and February, 1982, Bunch, a sergeant in the Uniteca States Marine Corps, was detached from duty in Japan and assigned to temporary duty 4¢t Quantico in Prince William County. During | this period, he met Su Cha Thomas, a divorced woman living alone | in Dale City near Quantico, and an intimate relationship developed | between them. At the time, Bunch was separated from his wife. | On February 2, after Thomas had failed to report for ; work, Prince William County police went to her home and found her | body hanging from a door knob by a scarf tied around her neck. Au autopsy revealed a gunshot wound to the head and “congestion of the blood [vessels] within the lungs." The medical examiner fa I a ce Record No. |concluded "this was 4 combined cause of death due to a gunshot = wound to the head ... with a secondary complication, asphyxiation by hanging.” One of the items missing from Thomas's home was & Jlady's Rolex wristwatch. On the day Thomas's body was discovered, . sold a similar watch to an Arlington County pawn shop. A ireport filed by the pawn shop with the police, as well as other |, . | information, led investigators to Bunch, who had returned to his ipermanent duty station in Japan. Bunch was interrogated in Japan on February 16 by 52st Donald L. Cahill, a Prince William County police investigator who had journeyed to Japan with warrants charging Bunch with the robbery and murder of Thomas. In the course of the interrogation, Bunch made certain incriminating statements to Cahill. Bunch i = returned to the United States, and, upon his arrival in Prince William County on February 21, made a statement to Cahill = he had killed Thomas on January 31 and had taken her aa watch, a diamond ring, a string of pearls, and other items lof jewelry. Bunch stated he killed Thomas because “she was 4 slut and she reminded him too much of his wife and he wanted her money.” I. Pretrial Proceedings a. Suppression of Confession. In a pretrial motion, Bunch sought to suppress the confession he made to Investigetor Cahill on February 21, fol- lowing his return to Prince William County from Japan. In the lmotion, Bunch claimed that he gave the confession after his | f | jearlier “requests for counsel had been unfulfilled.” Finding i Bunch had requested and been denied the assistance of counsel fin Japan, the trial court suppressed the incriminating statements ‘made there by Bunch. The court refused, however, to suppress the ‘confession Bunch gave to Investigator Cahill on February 21 in | = 2 Prince William County. Bunch contends this refusal was error. The record shows that Investigator Cahill was ac- companied to Japan by William Hamblen, an assistant Commonwealth's attorney for Prince William County. Upon their arrival at Bunch's duty station at Iwakuni, Bunch was brought to Naval Intelligence Service Headquarters by military police. He was placed ina room with Cahill and Hamblen, and Cahill read him his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Bunch signed a "Warning and Consent” form and indicated he was willing to talk. Cahill then began to interrogate hin. According to Bunch's testimony at the suppression hearing, he. asked to consult counsel "approximately a dozen times” during the interrogation at Iwakuni. Cahill and Hamblen denied Bunch made any outright request for counsel, but claimed he stated once, after the interrogation had continued for some time, that “he felt like he might want to talk to a lawyer.” When this statement was made, Hamblen left the room and Cahill talked to Bunch on another matter an additional several minutes. Then, as Cahill was leaving the room to ask Hamblen whether the inter- rogation should continue ia light of Bunch’s statement concerning counsel, Bunch stated he woulé cooperate. He told Cahill that "che gun" was at his mother's home in Indiana and that "the ring” was in Japan. Cahill and Hamblen decided Bunch should not be inter- rogated further unless he signed another “Warning and Consent” form. ‘When a new form was presented to him, Bunch refused to sign it, and the interview was terminated. In the custody of military personnel, Bunch was trans- ported by plane from Japan to Dulles Airport in northern Virginia | and by automobile from Dulles to Quantico, the trip consuming . some forty-two hours. Although he was not questioned during the | trip about Thomas's murder, military personnel escorting Bunch ott advised him of his Miranda rights on the flight from Los Angeles to Dulles. Upon arrival in Quantico after midnight on February 21, Bunch was processed for delivery to Prince William County authorities. As a part of this process, Bunch consulted with Major Donald R. Jillisky, a lawyer attached to the Marine Judge Advocat General's Office. The major told Bunch that he was “a Marine Corps lawyer ... not his lawyer" and that it was his, the major's, | purpose “to inform [Bunch] of what his situation was and to sur- render him to State authorities." Jillisky informed Bunch of the charges against him and told him he would be required to hire his own lawyer or secure court-appointed counsel. Jillisky ad- vised Bunch that “he did not have to say anything until he con- sulted with his lawyer, and that it was probably not in his best interest to say anything until he consulted with his lawyer." At the conclusion of the processing at Quantico, Bunch was turned over to Investigator Cahill, who transported him to a Prince William County police substation. En route, Cahill asked Bunch "if he felt he was ready to sit down and go over the case.” Cahill told Bunch that “(i]t was entirely up to him” and that "he certainly was not required to talk to [Cahill] if he didn't want to.” Bunch stated that he had talked to the Jawyer at Quantico and had been advised "not to, say anything” and to talk to a civilian lawyer before talking to the police. Bunch added, however, that he had decided "he was ready to tell the whole story" and that "he wanted to get it off his chest.” At the substation, Bunch was advised of his Miranda rights, and he executed a “Warning and Consent" form. He then proceeded to give Cahill the confession that is now in controversy. At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the | trial court ruled that Bunch had “intelligently, wittingly, freely ee and voluntarily ... waived [his Miranda] rights” before he gave Cahill his conf»ssion. Accordingly, the court held that the ‘eonfession was admissible into evidence. Bunch argues that the confession should have been sup- es pressed because, despite his request, he was denied counsel during his interrogation in Japan, as the trial court found in |holding inadmissible the incriminating statements he made there. Then, citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), Bunch as- serts that he should not have been interrogated again until he was allowed to consult with counsel or unless he initiated the second interrogation himself. He did not initiate the second interrogation, Bunch maintains, and his discussion with Major Jillisky did not satisfy the requirement that he be allowed to consult counsel before he was interrogated further. In Edwards, the accused was arrested for robbery, he indicated a willingness to submit to questioning. During the course of the interrogation by a police officer, the defendant stated he wanted an attorney, and the questioning ceased. The next morning, two detectives who were colleagues of the previous When informed of the request, the accused told the jail guard he | did not want to talk to anyone. The guard told the accused that “the had' to talk” to the officers and took him to them. Id. at 479. They advised him of his Miranda rights. He indicated he Holding that the use of the accused's confession at trial violated his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend- ments, the United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction. In the course of its opinion, the Court stated: [W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, burglary, and murder. After he was informed of his Miranda rights was willing to talk and thereupon implicated himself in the crime. eee ee De day's interrogator went to the jail and asked to see the accused. ——- SD ee eee oe ~~ — — a valid waiver of that right caznot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.... [A]n accused ... having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to hin, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversatsons with the police. | Record No. 822081 Id. at 484-85 (footnote omitted). Factually, however, Edwards is distinguishable. Where the accused in Edwards was told “"he had’ to talk" to the police, in this case Bunch was advised “he certainly was not required to talk to [the police] if he didn't want to." Further, where Edwards involved an unequivocal statement by the accused that he wanted counsel, Bunch's statement here was couched in ambiguous terms to the effect that he might want to talk to a lawyer. And, where the accused in Edwards made his statement “without having ‘had access to counsel,” id. at 487, Bunch was allowed to consult \with Major Jillisky, who gave Bunch the same advice, “not to say anything,” that counsel of Bunch’s own choosing or court-appointed counsel probably would have given hin. Furthermore, Edwards did not establish, as Bunch seems to suggest, a per se rule forbidding any finding of waiver of - counsel unless subsequent interrogation is suspect-initiated. Wyrick v. Fields, _ U.S. ___. 103 S. Ct. 394 (1982). Indeed, in Wyrick, the Supreme Court reversed summarily a holding of the ‘United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that Edwards had established such a per se rule. The Supreme Court stated that the Court of Appeals’ holding “imposed a new and un- justified limit on police questioning of a suspect who volun- jtarily, knowingly, and intelligently waives his right to have | counsel present [during questioning)." Id. at __. 103 S. Ce. at 1394. 4 Although the Supreme Court stated in Wyrick that “the . oe 4 an Record No. totality of the circumstances, including the fact that the 822081 suspect initiated the questioning, is controlling,” id. at , 103 S. Ct. at 397, the Court has not ruled that the only way a suspect may waive the right to counsel at a subsequent inter- 2 eet. - rogation is by initiating the interrogation himself. Instead, eo ee the Court indicated in Wyrick that the ultimate test is whether the suspect makes a "'knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment’ of his rights." Id. at, 103 S. Ct. at 396. The question, therefore, is whether, as the trial couz= found, Bunch made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to have counsel present at the time he confessed to Investigator Cahill on February 21. Whether such a waiver is made “depends ia each case ‘upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding | that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.'" Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See McFadden v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. _, __ $.E.2d __—-« (1983), and Simmons v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. , _.. §.8.24 __. 963). J Bunch was no novice in police matters. A four-year veteran in the Marines with the rank of sergeant, he was a “correctional specialist" in the “military police field.“ Before he confessed to Investigator Cahill on February 21, he had been informed of ais Miranda rights on three different occasions in the space of a little more than three days; he had received advice from Major Jillisky “not to say anything"; and he had been told he was not required to talk to Investigator Cahill. In response to this admonition from Cahill, Bunch acknowledged Major Jillisky’s advice “not to say anything” and stated he had decided “he was ready to tell the whole story." Even then, Investigator Cahill did not hasten to WE SES aa extract the story from Bunch. He again advised Bunch of his Miranda rights and had him execute a "Warning and Consent" forn. tl 23a In the form, Bunch acknowledged, inter alia, that he had been —? « 3 ee -—4- ———- A A Te Ee — . = - - —_ ete oe .. © — eee eee ——- ad ee ee eee —————— 9 es Record No. advised he had the right to talk to a lawyer, to have the lawyer 822081 present during questioning, and to stop answering questions at any time. In addition, under a heading entitled "Consent to Speak" and directly over Bunch's signature, these statements appeared: 1. I understand ny rights. | 2. I do not want a lawyer. 3. No promise or threats have been made to me by anyone. 4. I understand and know the purpose of this interview. 5. 1 am willing to answer questions. This is a case of an individual with background and experience in police matters who, despite repeated warnings of his rights and contrary to sound advice “not to say anything,” decided "he was ready to tell the whole story” and “wanted to get it off his chest." Moments before confessing, he stated in writing that he did not want a lawyer and that he was willing to answer euctitdens. We can conceive of no clearer case of a "'knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment’ of [Miranda] rights," Wyrick, __ 'U.S. at ____, 103 S. Ct. at 396, and we hold, therefore, that the evidence fully sustains the | trial court's finding that Bunch “intelligently, wittingly, freely and voluntarily ... waived those rights.” The trial court's refusal to suppress Bunch's con- fession may be sustained on yet another ground. As Justice Powell pointed out in a concurring opinion in Edwards, “police legitimately may inquire whether a suspect has changed his mind about speaking to them without an attorney.” 451 U.S. at 490. Investigator Cahill's inquiry whether Bunch “felt he was ready to sit down and go over the case” amounted to nothing more than an effort to ascertain if Bunch had changed his mind about — 2 Se TS EE ee ss deen ff ee ee eee _ & il Be Record No. wanting an attorney and, hence, did not amount to police- - 822081 initiated interrogation within the meaning of Edwards. b. Suppression of Property Seized in Japan. i Bunch contends that the trial court erred in refusing ‘ ‘ to suppress a diamond and setting purportedly belonging to Thomas that was seized in a search of Bunch’s barracks in Japan pursuant to a search warrant issued by a military commander. Bunch clains that the warrant was issued on the basis of his statement to | Investigator Cahill that “the ring” was in Japan, 4 statement jthe trial court ruled inadmissible because made after Bunch had requested and been denied the assistance of counsel in Japan, Hence, Bunch concludes, because the ring was the "“fruic of the poisonous tree,” it"should have been excluded from evidence.” The trial court, however, made this specific finding with respect to the property seized in Japan: "(Cahill] didn't use a statement in order to get the search warran®™ or any acknowledgement from the defendant. He used other information.” On brief, Bunch mentions this finding, but does not question its correctness. The finding is supported by the evidence and will not be disturbed here. Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 268, 257 S.E.24 808, 814-15 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980). In connection with the search in Japan, Bunch also complains that he was not permitted to inspect the affidavit that supported the issuarce of the search warrant. We fail to find in the record, however, amy request by Bunch to inspect the affidavit or any ruling by the trial court concerning the matter. We will not notice the point now. Rule 5:21. c. Suppression of Property Seized in Indiana. Bunch contends that the trial court should have sup- pressed a string of pearls, allegedly belonging to Thomas, that wee seized during « search of his mother's tome in Indians. | ! oe | | ee ee S ia «he Bunch states on brief that an Indiana search warrant, pursuant to which the search of his mother's home was conducted, listed jonly “a .22 caliber weapon and ... two rings (diamond and pearl).” f ‘Because the string cf pearls was not identified in the warrant, : | Bunch maintains, it was not properly seized and should have been ‘ suppressed. The Indiana search warrant is not in the record, and oe a emine otherwise what items were listed in the : ti) ra) 7 3) *) al ™ @ a ~ Further, we cannot find where any question was raised lan the trial court concerning the sufficiency of the warrant with respect to the string of pearls. As with all nonjurisdictional ssues, a search and seizure question cannot be raised for the i first time on appeal. wle 5:21: Girardi v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 4 9 9, 465-66, 270 S.E.2d 743, 747 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 3 98 motion for discovery, Bunch requested, [acon other chings, “(sjummaries of any statements given to lagents of the Commonwealth by persons the Commonwealth intends ito call as witnesses upon the [trial] of ‘this matter)."” Bunch os that, given the seriousness of the charge upon which he ™ to be tried, the trial court should have exercised its | discretion and granted his request in order to prevent a “trial by ambush.” Rule 3A:14(b)(2) provides that upon the written motion of an accused, the court shal’ order the Commonwealth's attorney to permit the accused to inspect and copy or phetograph certain materials. The rule provides further, however, that “{c)his sub- | paragraph does not authorize the discovery or inspection of statements made by Commonwealth witnesses or prospective Con- |monwealth witnesses to agents ef the Commonvealth Hence, oe M8 ee of fact to conclude that he acted without premeditation.” All as the evidence, including the testimony from Bunch himself, showed that Thomas's killing was a premeditated act. An accused is not entitled to instructions on lesser included offenses “solely because the case is one of murder.” Clark v. Comnonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 209, 257 S.E.2d 784, 789 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. * « 16 s 2 ‘ —— : ——— ‘ ie ue * — —— i a ie ee ee death sentence might be imposed on "'caprice or emotion.'” 446 1U.S. at 433. We adhere to the view expressed in Clark, therefore, and hold that the trial court's instruction on vileness was sufficient. Indeed, "[a]s to the trial court, Godfrey does not require that the court do any more than state exactly what the (Ga. 1981); accord Stamper v. Baskerville, 531 F. Supp. 1122, 1130-32 (E.D. Va. 1982). e. Failure of Trial Court to Set Aside Death Sentence. the report of a probation officer as well as all other relevant facts and, “upon good cause shown,” may set aside the sentence of death and impose a life sentence. Bunch contends the trial court erred in not setting aside his death sentence. The record shows that the trial court received the report and heard the testimony of a probation officer and also heard the testimony of Robert Showalter, M.D., a psychiatrist. After hearing argument cf counsel, the trial judge stated that he had spent “many, many hours reviewing the evidence” and had compared Bunch's sentence with “all the cases involving the dea penalty” that "were forwarded to [him] by the Supreme Court” pursuant to Code § 17-110.1(E). The judge concluded that he would not “interfere with the jury's verdict." Bunch's argument on this point stresses his lack of a prior criminal record. He also emphasizes the te -:imony of the | distress at the time he murdered Thomas and yet is capable of rehabilitation. As the Attorney General points out on brief, . - 25 - statute says." Westbrook v. Zant, 518 F. Supp. 1262, 1264 (M.D. psychiatrist to the effect that Bunch was under extreme emotional Under Code § 19.2-264.5, before imposing sentence when | punishment has been fixed at death, the trial court shall consider | th rca SS IS Se a. SR = REEL oe ea. 7 Sa ER Se Ss - however, the record unerringly supports the proposition that the murder of Thomas "resulted from a depraved and evil mind, rather than a disturbed one.” Hence, we do not believe Bunch established “good cause” sufficient for the trial court to set aside the sentence of death. IV. Propriety of the Death Sentence Under Code § 17-110.1(C), we are required to determine whether the death sentence was "imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary fector." We are also obligated to decide whether the sentence is "excessive or dis- proportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, con- sidering both the crime and the defendant.” a. Product of Passion. Here, Bunch reiterates his contention that there was insufficient evidence of vileness to support the death penalty. He also adverts to the testimony concerning his contact with certain prostitutes the night before Thomas's murder. He then reasons that the ,ury must have been offended by the testimony concerning the prostitutes and that the death verdict, there- fore, was the product of passion, prejudice, or some other arbitrary factor. We disagree with Bunch. We have previously demon- strated that the evidence of vileness was amply sufficient to support the death penalty. Given the depravity of mind exhibited by Bunch on the day of Thomas’s murder, we do not believe that the evidence of his contact with prostitutes the night before would have swayed the jury to return a death verdict if not otherwise so inclined. b. Excessiveness and Disproportionality. In this connection, Bunch belabors his lack of a prior criminal record, and he repeats his assertions that Thomas was » Sea unaware she was about to be shot and that she was either dead or unconscious when he hung her by the neck “over the doorknob.” He then argues that his sentence of death is excessive and dis- porportionate. Bunch cites three cases in which we upheld the death penalty but where, he says, there was evidence not only of the defendants’ "prior criminal record and/or history involving crimes of violence” but also of torture or aggravated battery to the victims while still eonscious.” Because, Bunch argues, he had “no prior criminal record” and the evidence of aggravate: battery "at most” showed he tied the scarf around the victim's neck while she was unconscious although still alive, the “factusl pattern” of this case “does not come within the legislative intent with regard to the imposition of the ultimate penalty." Aside from the fact that the record doesnot support the "factual pattern” which forms the basis of Bunch's argument, the argument is fallacious. The presence or absence of a criminal record is pertinent to the dangerousness standard. 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Not legal advice.