# Petition — Hill v. Florida > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1643%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition - **Published:** January 1, 1983 - **Citation:** 464 U.S. 977 ## Text CORRECTED i RECEIVED dv. 25,1 fs | = $8: 9188. fT oocnd IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED dias . October Term, 1982 wi 25 865 ALEXANOER L STEVAS ALVIN HILL, oS Petitioner, . -V= THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, Respondent. PETITION POR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI JACK GREENBERG JAMES M. NABRIT, III JOHN CHARLES BOGER STEVEN L. WINTER* Suite 2030 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 (212) 586-8397 Attorneys for Petitioner *Counsel of Record * - « CORRECTED Jr. : : bs ee Office Supe sere F - s 83-5 153 FILED QUESTIONS PRESENTED l. Who bears the burden of proof on the question of independent source for physical evidence that is a pre- sumptive fruit of an illegally obtained confession and py what standard? 2. Do instructions to the jury at the sentencing phase of a capital case that a reasonable juror could have under- stood to mandate death based on the relative weight of the aggravating circumstances and to preclude consideration of mercy regardless of the existence of mitigating circumstances violate the eighth and fourteenth amendments? 3. Did the admission of photographs of the thirty- six-day-old, decomposed corpse of the victim at both the guilt/innocence and sentencing phases of petitioner's capital trial despite the tact that they had littie or no probative value and that every relevant fact was already proved by competent, more reliabie, and less prejudicial testimony violate the sixth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments? Questions Presented ......... eee eeeresceccessseeeeescese i Table of Contents ........... TETTTIITTITILITT TTT TTT ia Table of Cases ........ Coc cccrceesecesescesseeeccecaceos iv Statement of the Case ...... Coe eeeseesecceseccsscecccces 2 A. Course of Proceedings ........ceeees ececcccose’s 2 B. Pacts Relevant to the Questions Presented ..... pts Ghe bees eee eeneeoecdeccoces 3 (1) Petitioner's Challenge to the Admission ot Evidence Discovered by Exploiting nis Illegaliy GRGRe GE, cb Bebececencccecsce 3 (2) Petitioner's Challenge to the Instructions at the Sentencing Phase that a Reasonable Juror Could Have Understood to Mandate the Imposition of a Death Sentence and Preclude the Jury from Exercising its Discretion in Pavor otf Mercy ....... 7 (3) Petitioner's Challenge to the Admission of Highly Emotional, Prejudicial Photographs otf the Badly Decomposed Body of the Victim at both the Guilt/Innocence and Sentencing Phases of his Triai ..... 10 Reascas for Granting Che GED ccccsedcdoccsoccesccccecece 12 I. The Court Should Grant the Writ to Delineate the Standard of Proot by which the State Must Carry Its Burden of Showing an Independent Source for Physical Evidence that, Otherwise, is a Presumptive “Pruit” of an Illegally Obtained Contession ......... 12 A. The Errors Below eee eee ewe errr reer er eer eee eee 13 B. Clear and Convincing Evidence as the Appropriate Standard ............+.: 15 II. The Court Should Grant Certiorari to Determine Whether Instructions to the Jury at the Penalty Phase that a Reasonabie Juror could have Understood to Limit His or Her Discretion to Exercise Mercy and, Under Certain Circumstances, Mandate the Imposition of a Death Sentence Violate the Eighth and Pourteenth Amendments ............ 18 -ii- Page III. The Court Should Grant Certiorari to Determine Whether Emotionally Charged Photographs of the Thirty-Six-Day-Old Decomposed Body of the Victim Which had Only De Minimis Probative Value can be Admitted at the Guilt/Innocence and Sentencing Phases of a Capital Case .......... 22 GCORBRUBESD ¢ 00d 0006050008 506865606505 6606600666 560464 068% 25 ~iii- TABLE OF CASES Page Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). cc nwecenvvseveess 17 Barclay v. Plorida, __U.S. ___, 51 U.S.L.W. 5206 (July 6, 1983) wcccccccscccccccccccsccsccscescssssscsss 2141522 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) wwsseesseveess 18 Coleman v. State, 378 So.2d 640 (Miss. 1979)..ceeeeeees 9 Garéner v. Plorida, 430 U.8. 337 (IDST7T) ceocccccecsecceosspatoas Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) wuseseesneveuess 25 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) weseeeennnveeee 9,21,22 Hill v. State, __- So.2d _, “Now $3,795 (1983) ..... 2 Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959) wocceeeeevevecveces 24 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) wnceceeeesevcees 18 Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d 1242 (Miss. 1976) ....606. 8,9 Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972) wncceseeesesscvces 12,16 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) wesseesesesenees 20 Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) .. 12,18 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) wseseees 12 Ramos v. California U.S. _, 51 U.S.L.W. 5220 (July 6, 1983) eevee eneeneneeeeeee een eee eereee eee er eer er eee 20,24 Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) *eeeereeeeeee eee en ee eeeeeeeeeere rere eee eer ee ee 9 Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) wnnseeennees 18 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) ...«+.- 18 Smith v. North Carolina, U.S. , 74 L.Ed. 2d 622, 103 S.Ct. 474 (1982) crcccccceeccceceesesees 18°19,20 Spain v. State, 59 Miss. 19 (1881) wnnseesessecsceess 9 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) wweseesesenes 18 Tippet v. Maryland, 436 P.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971) .. 17 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) wwsssesesesseeces 22 United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980) ...seees 16 United States v. De La Feunte, 548 F.2d 528 (Sth Cir. 1977) ccccccccccccccccccscssccessecs 5 United States v. Hale, 422 U.S 171 (1975) w.seeeees 23 -iv- Page United States v. Houltin, 525 P.2d 943 (5th Cie. 1976) ewveeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 5 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) ««eeeees 12 United States v. Tweel, 550 P.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1977) eeeeeeeeeeneeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeereeeeeee 5 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) ...+++- 12,16,17,18 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S 510 (1968) «.sseeeues 22 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S 471 (1963) «-seeees 3 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) «sseees 9,22 Zant v. Stephens, U.S. , 51 :0.S.L.W. 4891 (June 23, 1983) cccccccccccccscccccccccccceess 21,22,25 OTHER AUTHORITIES E.W. Cleary, et al., McCormick on Evidence (1972) eeeeeeeeeee eee eeeee eee eeeereereeeeeeeee 14,15,16,23 28 0.8.C. § 1257(3) eeeeeeveeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 1 Ped. R. Evi. 403 “eee eeeeeeeee “eeeeeevneveeeeneeeereereereeee 23 Adv. Comm. Note, to R. 403 “eer eneeeee “ee eeneeeeeereneeeeee 23 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES October Term, 1982 ALVIN HILL, Petitioner, age THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, Respondent. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI Petitioner, ALVIN HILL, prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the decision of the Supreme Court of Mississippi of May 4, 1983, affirming his conviction of capital murder and his death sentence. OPINION BELOW The opinion of the Supreme Court of Mississippi is not yet reported and is set out at pp. A. l- A. 66 of the Appendix. JURISDICTION The judgment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi was entered on May 4, 1983, and rehearing was denied on May 25, 1983. A timely request for a stay of execution pending consideration of a petition for a writ of certiorari was granted by Justice White on June 10, 1983. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3). CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED EE SEE ERE ERUV IS LONS INVOLVED This case involves the fifth amendment to the Constitution which provides in relevant part: No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ...; the sixth amendment to the Constitution which provides in relevant part: In all criminai prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury ...; the eighth amendment to the Constitution which provides in relevant part: Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted; and the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution which provides in relevant part: (N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.... It also involves §§ 99-19-101 and 99-19-103, Miss. Code Ann. (Supp. 1982), which are set out at pages A. 83-A. 85 of the Appendix. STATEMENT OF THE CASE A. Course of Proceedings Petitioner and two other persons were charged with the robbery and murder of Robert Watkins, a truck driver. On November 21, 1979, petitioner was convicted of capital murder in the Circuit Court of De Soto County, Hernando, Mississippi. He was sentenced to death on November 26, 1983. On May 4, 1983, the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the conviction and sentence. Hill v. State, So.2d , No. 53,795 (1983). Rehearing was denied on May 25, 1983. An execution date was set for June 15, 1983. On June 8, 1983, the Mississippi Supreme Court denied an application for a stay of execution pending consideration of a petition for a writ of certiorari. Justice White, acting as Circuit Ja Justice, granted a stay on June 20, 1983. B. Pacts Relevant to the Questions Presented (1) Petitioner's Challenge to the Admission of Evidence Discoverea z 10iting his Illegall Obtain Confession: At the time that the body of the victim was discovered on August 17, petitioner was in custody on another charge. A. 2.-/ His co-defendant on that charge, Sammy Hampton, made a statement implicating petitioner in the death of Watkins. A. 2-3. Petitioner was questioned by Sheriffs Monteith and Sowell and Officer Ward on Saturday, August 18, 1979. At 5:00 P.M., petitioner confessed to the robbery/murder of Watkins. He told the officers that the weapon used in the crime had been thrown into the river. A. 3-4. Officer Ward went to retrieve the weapon, but was unable to find it. He returned at 8:00 P.M. and interrogated Hill further. At that time, Hill told him that the weapon was with a Mr. Carter in Memphis. T. 492. The next day, on Sunday, August 19, Sheriff Monteith contacted Officer Rust in Memphis and asked him to retrieve the gun from Carter. Rust met Carter at his workplace on Monday, August 20, and took possession of the gun. Petitioner made a pretrial motion to suppress the confession as involuntary. The trial court heard the testimony of Sheriffs Monteith and Sowell and Officer Ward. It granted the motion to suppress, finding that the confession was involuntary because it was obtained as a result of induce- ments made by Officer Ward. A. 5. Based on Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), defense counsel made a timely motion to suppress the weapon as a fruit of the illegal confession. T. 490. The state then adduced the e/ References to the Appendix to this petition are designated by A. __.- References to the trial transcript are designated ee testimony of Sheriff Monteith to establish an independent source for his knowledge cof the location of the gun. In response to leading questions by the prosecutor ,+/ the sheriff affirmed that he had interviewed petitioner's accomplice to the prior robbery, Sammy Hampton. And, in the prosecutor's words, he also affirmed that he called the Memphis police "“(ajs a result of those interviews." The sheriff, however, could not remember when he had called Memphis. T. 381-82. - The court denied the motion to suppress the gun at that time. At trial, defense counsel renewed his motion to suppress the gun. The hearing on that motion was held in chambers. The Memphis officers testified that the sheriff never mentioned to them the source of his information. fT. 473 & 475 (Sgt. Rust). More importantly, they testified that they had arrested Sammy Hampton at his home in Memphis the day before they retrieved the gun, T. 482 (Sgt. Priddy), -- i.e., on Sunday, August 19th, the very day Sheriff Monteith called them about the gun. The balance of the state's evidence established the chain of custody. See, e.g., T. 485-86. The defendant then took the stand and testified to the conversation he had with Officer Ward at 8:00 P.M. on the night of the confession. The state made no attempt 1/ The exact text of the testimony relied on by the Mississippi Supreme Court in affirming the finding of independent source is as follows: Q. Sheriff Monteith, in the course of your investigation, did you have occasion to interview Sammy Hampton? A. I did. Q. As a result of those interviews, did you at anytime inform officers of the Memphis Police Department where a possible gun could be found? A. I did. A. 5 (quoting T. 379) (emphasis in original). Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor leading the witness through such critical testimony. Although noting that the questions were "somewhat leading," the trial judge overruled the objection and characterized the questions as “basically proper." fT. 379-80. to explain or rebut this testimony. It failed to call Sheriff Monteith, Officer Ward, or Sammy Hampton who might have esta- blished that Ward did not learn about the gun from petitioner, that Monteith and Ward did not speak, or that Monteith and Hampton did. Nevertheless, the trial court admitted the gun into evidence on the ground “that the information [concerning the gun obtained] by Sheriff Monteith was developed from some source other than the Defendant." T. 495. The court did not find that the source was in fact Hampton, who was in Memphis, or that it was not Ward, who had obtained it from petitioner. On direct appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the admission of the weapon. Relying on three Pifth Circuit, fourth amendment cases that held only that the burden of proving independent source or attenuation falls on the government -- United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297 (Sth 1977); United States v. De La Puente, 548 P.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1977); and United States v. Houltin, 525 P.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1976) -- the Mississippi court pegged that burden at the preponderance of the evidence standard. A. 14. It then turned to the evidence in this case. Hill testified he gave Ward information about the gun. This is uncontradicted. On the other hand, if Hampton also gave Tunica County Sheriff Monteith information about the gun, this could very well be an independent source, and certainly “sufficiently distinguishable" from the information from Hill “to be purgred of the primary taint.* Regrettably, for all concerned -- including this Court -- the record is incomplete. Let us go to Wednesday afternoon, November 19, 1980, in the chambers of the circuit judge. The previous day he has heard Sheriff Monteith testify, and from that testimony (although perhaps not as clearly stated as it might have been), coupled with what the Memphis police officers testified, one could only conclude that Hampton told Sheriff Monteith about the Carter gun. Indeed, there seemed to be no question about it. The circuit judge is then suddenly confronted with a startling second possibility. Hill had just testified that he told Ward that Carter had the gun. At this intriguing, tantalizing moment, the well of information runs dry. While either Ward, Monteith, or Hampton -- certainly two out of these three -- could have cleared the air and removed all doubt in a few moments of testimony, none was called. Why? The defense cogently argues that their hypothesis for the information concerning the location of the gun was correct. But, with the record before us, that is all it is. While we agree that the state arguably should have offered some rebuttal to Hill's testimony in chambers, it chose not to do so, and rested on the testimony of Sheriff Monteith the previous day. Conduct of defense counsel is puzzling. They did not recall Ward or Sheriff Monteith for further cross-examination. This failure might be understandable in the middle of this difficult and enormously burdensome trial. But, let us move further in the proceedings. Following trial, defense counsel made a motion for a new trial, and one of their strongest arguments was the admission of the gun into evidence. With ample time to prepare for the hearing on this motion, they did not subpoena Ward, Sheriff Monteith, or Hampton to testify, and no affidavit of any of these three was supplied the court. On the testimony which was before the circuit judge and the record as made, no one could ever know which of these two hypotheses is correct. Argument from now until doomsday coud never give the answer; from this record we are damned to an eternal suspense. Under these circumstances we are not about to fault a beleaguered trial judge, nor can we say he abused his discretion in finding that the in- formation about the gun came from an independent source. A. 14-a. 16.2/ 2/ While the court also affirmed on the theory that, “[oJn he record before him at trial, and in the motion for a new trial, [the trial judge] had a right to believe the testimony of the officers, and we find no reversible error on this record in his having done so...," A. 16, it identified no such credibility determinations by the trial judge. It could not, because the trial judge did not even deal with the relevant question: whether Monteith obtained the information from Ward. Recognizing the tenuous nature of its conclusions, the Mississippi court concluded that: "“Ruefully, we are con- Strained to ... remind the state that with all the post- conviction proceedings available to an accused in both our state and federal courts, this opinion may not be the last word on the above assignment of error." A. 16 n. 5. (2) Petitioner's Challe e to the Instructions at the Sentencin oho hat a Reasonable At the sentencing phase, the trial court gave one instruction proposed by the prosecutor that could have led a reasonable juror to conclude that, under certain cir- cumstances, he or she was requiréd to impose death. at the Same time, it refused defense instructions that would have Clarified to the jury that it retained the right to exercise its discretion in favor of mercy. The instruction chat was given indicated that, in order to impose only a lite sentence, the jury had to find that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors. Jury instruction S. 3-A read: If an element of aggravation is found to exist, then you must consider whether there are mitigating circumstances which outweigh the aggravating circumstance.... If you find from the evidence that one or more of the preceding elements of mitigation exists, then you must consider whether they out- weigh the aggravating circumstances you previously found.... A. 70. Defense counsel requested an instruction that would have made clear to the jury that it was entitled to exercise mercy under any circumstances it deemed appropriate: "A life sentence may be returned regardless of the evidence." Proposed Instruction D-2, A. 77.3/ Defense counsel objected to S. 3-A unless D-2 were given to clarify that the jury could still impose life. T. 733-35. He argued that under Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d 1242, 1256 (Miss. 1976), the jury always retains the option to impose only lite. T. 734-35. The judge overruled the objection and denied D-2, stating that: "I don't think I can give D-2. I don't think there's any basis in law for that instruction .... D-2 is retused. It just doesn't work in with what I am required to do.” T. 736. Instruction S. 3-A also prescribed the form of the jury's verdict. It provided the jury with three options only. The jury could decide “that the Defendant should be sentenced to lite imprisonment...;" that it “has been unabie to agree unanimously on punishment...;" or to impose the death sentence. A. 70-A. 71. In the latter case, the jury was instructed to enter the following verdict: We, the Jury, unanimously find that the aggravating circumstance or circumstances of: {Here the instruction left six blank lines for the jury to fill in the cir- cumstances found] outweigh the mitigating circumstances and are sufficient to impose the death penalty, and that there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances and we unanimously find that the Defendant should suffer death. A. 70-A. 71. The actual jury verdict was returned in exactly those words. A. 8l1-A. 82. 3/ Proposed defense instruction D-8 would also have told the jury that it could tind that the aggravating circum- stances outweighed those in mitigation but that they were still insufficient to support a death sentence. A. 80. This instruction was also refused. A. 79. On appeal, a divided Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the instructions. Over three dissenting votes, the majority held that the jury did not understand the instructions to mandate death if the aggravating circumstances were not outweighed by the mitigating circumstances. It deduced this from the language of the jury's verdict, which stated (as instructed) that it found the aggravating circumstances to outweigh the mitigating circumstances and that the aggravating circumstances were sufficient. A. 26. The dissent would have found error as a matter of both state and federal law. It noted that, at least since 1881, Mississippi law “confers on ... a jury the unconditional right to fix the punishment at imprisonment for life." A. 32 (quoting Spain v. State, 59 Miss. 19, 24 (1881)). Twice, construing both post-Purman statutes, the Mississippi court had held that the jury retained that power. Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d at 1256;4/ Coleman v. State, 378 So.2d 640, 646-47 (Miss. 1979) .2/ Moreover, the dissent noted that this Court's decisions in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976), and Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 332 (1976), precluded a mandatory death sentence while Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), upheld the Georgia statute based, in part, on the observation that the jury retained the power to exercise its discretion in favor of mercy. Id., 428 U.S. at 197 and 222. It concluded that the majority's approval of the instructions in this case 4/ In Jackson, the Mississippi court held that: "The jury shall not be required to make a special finding of any mitigating circumstance in order to return a verdict that the accused should be sentenced to life in prison." Id., 337 So.2d at 1256 (emphasis added). 5/ In Coleman, the Mississippi court held that: "If the State merely proves the existence of an aggravating circum- stance, the jury is free to find it insufficient to warrant death and is not required to automatically impose death." Id., 378 So.2d at 646-47 (emphasis added). moves the clock back to an age and practice this state found unconscionable over a century ago, and rejected. Such construction will most assuredly make us open to the attack of violating the "evolving standards of human decency.” (3) Petitioner's Challenge to the Admission of Highly emotional, Prejudicial Photographs of the Badly Decoapored Body of the Victim at th t uilt/Innocence an ntencing ses o s Trial. The victim was killed on July 12, 1979. A.2. His body was not discovered until August 17, 36 days later. A. 1. By that time , it was so badly decomposed that it was nothing more than “human bones and remnants of rotting tlesn.” A. 2. The medical examiner testified that he “had to get a screen mesh and a water hose and go through it [aj handtui at atime." T. 500. Nevertheless, the trial court allowed the prosecutor to admit seven photographs of the decomposed body at both the guilt/innocence and sentencing phases ot petitioner's trial. At the guilt/innocence phase, the prosecutor argued that the photographs were relevant to prove identiti- cation, corpus delecti, and cause of death. T. 279. In his opening statement, however, the prosecutor had said that identity and cause of death would be established by the testimony of torensic experts. T. 200. Indeed, the experts did establish both identity and cause ot death; they did so without once reterring to the photographs. T. 536 and 546- 59. Similarly, the prosecutor put on two eyewitnesses who testified about the discovery of the body and its deteriorated condition -- more than enough to establish corpus delecti. T. 274 and 291. The prosecutor also offered the photographs at the sentencing phase. T. 659. He argued that they were relevant to show that “the crime was committed in a cruel, atrocious and heinous manner.“ T. 654 (emphasis added). The court readmitted the photographs. T. 659. At both the guilt/innocence and sentencing phases, the prosecutor deliberately compounded the prejudicial effect of the photographs. At the guilt/innocence phase, the prosecutor specifically requested that the photographs be passed amongst the jury for their view. That request was granted. T. 295-96. The record shows that no other exhibit was passed amongst the jury. The prosecutor also made reference to the decomposed state of the body in both his opening statement at the guilt/innocence phase and his closing statement in support of the death penalty at the sentencing phase. T. 200 and 744. Defense counsel's timely objections to the introduction of the photographs at both the guilt/innocence and sentencing phases were overruled. T. 276 and 653. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the admission of the photographs in one sentence, noting that it was within the court's discretion and that the photographs had “probative value.” loitation of th Id. at 487-88 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Wong Sun held that not only was evidence acquired as a direct result of a violation of a constitutionally protected right excluded; indeed, if the trail of illegal conduct led to other evidence, such other indirect evidence would also be excluded unless it was shown such other evidence came from (1) an independent source, or (2) had become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint. The above loose and rather general pronouncements of the Supreme Court have been delineated in a multitude of state and federal court decisions. It is to the Sth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, that we must an, The Court of Appeals for the Sth Circuit has held that once a defendant makes a showing of unconstitutional conduct by the government in securing its evidence, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate by a pre- ponderance of the evidence that one of the above two noted exceptions applies. See United States v. Tweel, $50 P.24 297 (Sth Cir. 1977); United States v. de La Puente, $48 P.24 $28 (Sth Cir. 1977); and United States v. Houltin, $23 P.24 943 (Sth Cir. 1976). We are not concerned in this case with the second | | noted exception, but whether the information about the location of the gun came from an independent source. | Hill testified he gave Ward information about the gun. This is uncontradicted. | On the other hand, if fampton also gave Tunica | County Sherif! Monteith information about the gun, this could | very well be an independent source, and certainly “sufficientiv istinguishable* from the information from Hill “to be purged of the primary taint’. Regrettably, for all concerned -- including this { Court -—- the record is incomplete. Let us to go Wednesday afternoon, November 19, 1986, ' in the chambers of the circuit judge. The previous day he has heard Sheriff Monteith testify, and from that testimony ; 4 Some state courts and other federal circuit courts have en- grafted another exception to the “fruit of the poisonous tree" Goctrine: inevitable discovery. This exception would also allow introduction of indirect evidence if it were shown that such evidence inevitably would have been discovered from an independent source. The Court of Appeals of the Sth Circuit has rejected such exception, however. See United States +. Houltin, 328 F.2d 943 (Sth Cir. 1976). (although perhaps not as clearly stated as it might have been), coupled with what the Memphis police officers testified, one could only conclude that Hampton told Sheriff Monteith about the Carter gun. Indeed, there seemed to be no question about it. The circuit judge is then suddenly confronted with a startling second possibility. Hill had just testified that he told Ward that Carter had the gun. At this intriguing, tantalizing soment, the well of information runs dry. While either Ward, Monteith, or Hampton = certainly two out of these three -- could have cleared the air and removed all doubt in a few moments of testimony, none was called. Why? The defense cogently argues that their hypothesis for the information concerning the location of the gun was correct. But. with the record befcre us, that is all it is. While we agree that the state arguably should have offered some rebuttal to Hill's testimony in chambers, it chose not to do so, and rested on the testimony of Sheriff Monteith the previous day. Conduct of defense counsel is puzzling. They " ’ " o a a ' did not recall Ward or Sheriff Monteith for furthe examination. This failure might be understandable in the middle of this difficult and enormously burdensome trial. But, let us move further in the proceedings. Following } trial, defense counsel made a motion for a new trial, and one of their strongest arguments was the admission of the gun into evidence. With ample time to prepare for the hearing on this motion, they did not subpoena Ward, Sheriff Monteith, or Hampton to testify, and no affidavit of any of these three was supplied the court. -15- » r ui On the testimony which was before the circuit judge and the record as made, no one could ever know which of these two hypotheses is correct. Argument from now until doomsday could never give the answer; from this record we are damned to an eternal suspense. Onder these circumstances we are not about to fault a beleaguered trial judge, nor can we say he abused his discretion in finding that the information about the gun came from an independent source. On the record before him at trial, and in the motion for a new trial, he had a right to believe the testimony of the officers, and we find mo reversible error on this record in his having done aS, tr. (a) OfD THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN REMOVING A PROSPECTIVE JUROR POR CAUSE? A prospective juror was excused for cause after stating he could not return a verdict imposing the death penalty. He had stated there were cases in which he might consider the death penalty, but not this case. No error was committed by the circuit judge in excusing this juror for cause. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. $10 (1968); Irving v. State, 361 So.24 1360 (Miss. 1978), cert. denied, 441 0.5. 913 (1979); and Armstrong v. State, 214 So.24 $89 (Miss. 1968), cert. denied, 39° U.S. 965 (1969). (>) DID THE CIRCUIT JUDGE ERR IN DENYING THE DEFENSE REQUEST POR FURTHER MENTAL EXAMINATION? . Several months prior to trial, upon motion of the defense for mental evaluation, Hill was sent to the 2 further in this opinion we will discuss the prosecution's statement to the jury that their verdict was not the “last word", an argument we do not condone. Ruefuily, we are con- strained to use this language and remind the state that with all the post-conviction proceedings available to an accused in both our state and federal courts, this opinion may not be the last word on the above assignment of error. 16 A.16 Mississippi State Hospital in Whitfield, where the medical staff rendered an Opinion that Hill was competent to stand trial. The motion for his examination did not claim he lacked the mental capacity to form a criminal intent, and was therefore not guilty because of insanity; rather, the motion was predicated on whether or not he was mentally incompetent to the extent that he could not assist his counsel and prepare for trial. Onsatisfied with the medical evaluation of the stafs at Mississippi State Hospital, counsel made a motion for another examination to Getermine his Sanity and competency to stand trial. The Circuit judge overruled this motion. The circuit judge was under no obligation to locate another psychiatrist for the defense. Moreover, if there is one thing clear from this record, Hill was competent to stand trial. Or, put another way, if he were mentally incompetent to answer questions and to fully assist his counsel, it would take an extraordinarily skilled psychiatrist to Getect it. Just prior to trial #ili was examined by a psychologist, who administered a test. Counsel did not offer this psychologist as a witness in either the guilt or sentencing phase of the trial. Nor was any evidence adduced ‘ron lay or expert witnesses either on the guilt or sentencing phase of Hill's competency to stand trial or his mental ability.” In the motion for a new trial counsel offered the psychologist as @ witness, who was of the Opinion that the test revealed Hill had emotional problems which were “relatively great"; that he was prone to make “impulsive Gecisions, and 6 If counsel had thought the psychologist's evaluation of some benefit, it would have been relevant and proper to have hia testify on the sentencing phase. See Miss. Code Ann. § 9919-101 (6) (b), (£) (Supp. 1981). A.17 ol? was unable to control those impulses"; that he was unable to “profit by experiences he had had in life"; and that he was experiencing some euoepawenio behavior*® at the time of testing. (R. 1252-1253). He also stated no psychologist could sake a determination based on a test. Pinally, he was of the opinion that further testing and evaluation were needed. Om this record, no error was committed in overruling the motion for a new trial based on this clain. (¢) WERE PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE VICTIM'S REMAINS ADMISSIBLE? The admission of photographs of the remains of Watkins was within the discretion of the circuit sudge, and having probative value, no error was committed in offering them into evidence. See Tubbs v. State, 402 So.24 830 (Miss. 1981); Davis v. State, 376 So.2d 1079 (Miss. 1979); Voyles v. State, 362 So.24 1236 (Miss. 1978), cert. denied, 441 0.8. 956 (1979); Irving v. State, Supra; Brown v. State, 235 So.2¢ 458 (Miss. 1970); Stokes v. State, 240 Miss. 453, 128 So.24 341 (1961); and Price v. State, Miss. ° $4 So.2d 669 (1951). (¢) OID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN PERMITTING TESTIMONY THAT HILL ESCAPED FROM JAIL? In August, 1979, while Hill was in the Tunica County jail, he escaped. Approximately four days liter, he returned voluntarily. The thrust of counsel's argument is that Hill had not been indicted for the capital crime, and therefore evicence of his escape from jail was incompetent. of course, the time of indictment is immaterial but even on the question ? The schizophrenic testing, according to the psychologist, indicatec a “possible problem*. (R. 1254). of whether Hill was charged with, or was a suspect of this robbery at the time he escaped, there are two answers to this argument: ps Tt is not clear from the record whether OF mot at the time Hill left the Tunica County jail the authorities had questioned his about the Watkins robbery and disappearance, but it would appear that they had. FBI Agent Shanks interviewed his in July about this hijackiag; and (2) ther the authorities knew or 414 not know of his guilt of the Watkins robbery and slaying, Hill knew it. Plight is edmissible on the issue of guilty knowledge. See Tnited States v. Ballard, 423 ?.24 127 Sth Cir. 1970); McClendon v. State, 387 $0.24 112 Miss. 1980); anc Ransom v7. State, 149 Miss. 262, L1S So. 208 (1928). @) ‘Two assignments of error can be joiatly discussed: WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR COMMITTED BY THE STATE'S REVEALING THE CONVICTION OF A CODEPENDANT OF MANSLAUGHTER? WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR COMMITTED IN THE CLOSING ARGUMENT oF THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY TO THE JURY THAT ITS VERDICT was NOT THE “LAST WORD‘? The state called the codefendant Gregory Tucker as a witness. Ouring questioning of Tucker, the record reveals the following: Q. What have you been convicted of? A. Assault and larceny of a person in Tennessee, and sanslaughter down here. Q Manslaughter down here in connection with what? A. With this here case. R. 1013-1014). NO Objection was sade to either the questions or the answers. in fact, defense counsel cross-examined Tucker about the comviction, and agked his about being offered leniency. R. 1943). In closing argument, the prosecuting «attorney sade the following argument: I knew that the attorneys would attempt to place a heavy burden on you. They would have you believe that lL the Ns Semele as ct as ou s e in ten minutes and bung so, and know t's not so. and « snat 8 liy unfair. They now wors is not ~48t words. ‘ney (R. 1190-1191) (emphasis added). Again, there was no obsection by ¢efense counsel +> this argument. As to the state's questioning of Tucker about his conviction of manslaughter, this constituted error. See Buckley v. State, 223 So.2¢ 524 (Miss. 1969). The error was not as egregious as it would have been had Tucker been a witness for the defense, and the state had brought it cut on cross-examination. See Warren v. State, 407 So.2¢ 100 (Miss. 1981); and Senderson v. State, 403 $o.24 139 (Miss. 1981). The state's questioning of Tucker, « state witness, about his comviction of manslaughter was scot altogether a one way street benefitting the state. This information enabled the jury to see that a radically different treatment tad been extended by the state to Tucker than that proposed {cr #ill The defense sought mileage out of this concession in cross-examination. In view of the fact that so cbjection was sade, that Tucker was cross-examined about his plea and conviction, and the defense at least three times in closing argument compared the treatment and punishment of Tucker as opposed to that being sought for Hill (R. 1075-1076), defense counsel's complaint at this stage appears directed towards « trial strategy in which they were participants. What this amounts to is a trial strategy counsel aided and abetted, and cw seek to criticize. A.20 -20- Moreover, counsel did not even see fit to assign this error in their sotion for a new trial. if defense counsel did consider that their client was done an injustice in this respect, we cannot understand their failure to sention it is their motion for « new trial. The argument sade by the prosecuting attorney to the jury that their verdict was not the “last word" was clearly erroneous and would ordinarily be considered highly pretudicial. In the usual case the jury merely determines guilt or innocence, and the circuit judge determines the sentence. In a capital surder case the jury also determines the sentence. Any argument by the state which distorts or sinisaizes this solemn obligation and responsibility of the jury is serious error. Every attorney knows the jury verdict is indeed the last word on a factual dispute. Neither the circuit judge nor this Court is authorized to set aside a jury verdict om conflicting evidence, or a disputed factual issue. Moreover, in a death penalty case a jury should never be given false comfort that any decision they sake will, or can be, corrected. Im Bowell v. State, 411 So.24 772 (Miss. 1982), which was not a death penalty case, we condemned a “last word’ argument. A prosecutor making this sort of argument is asking for a aistrial. _ In this case, however, there was no objection mace to this argument. We have consistently held that con- temporaneous objection sust be made to improper argument by the state, and unless such objection is made, any claimed error for such improper argument will not be considered a.zt* on appeal. See Coleman v. State, 378 S$o.2¢ 640 (Miss. 1979); Thomas v. State, 358 S$o.24 1311 (Miss. 1978); Griffin v. Stace, 292 So.2¢ 159 (Miss. 1974); Myers v. State, 268 $o.24 353 (Miss. 1972); Peterson v. State, 242 $0.24 420 (Miss. 1979); Pord v. State, 227 So.2¢ 454 (Miss. 1969); Showers v. State, 227 So.24 452 (Miss. 1969); and Coburn v. State, 250 Miss. 684, 168 So.24 123 (1964). It need also be soted that this holding has applied to death penalty cases, as well as other crisinal anc civil cases. There is even further foundation for application of this well settied rule in such 4 case as this, where, not only was there no objection mace at trial, but even in the motion for a new trial counsel still did not consider this argument as error. The motion for a new trial was filed December 12, 1980, cover two weeks after the trial was con- cluded, and a hearing was held on this sotion January 6, 1981. The record reveals Hill was represented by alert, avid, and thorough defense counsel. We can only conclude counsel did not consider this argument prejudicial, and #ill is bound thereby. Por these reasons, we will not consider either of these two assignments of error on this sopeal. 2) WAS ERROR COMMITTED IN THE INTROOUCTION OF A COMPUTER PRINT-OUT OF A SHIPMENT OF GOODS? Wayne Hopper was shipping manager of the J. I. Case Company's Memphis branch office. He testified Franz Tractor Company of Bradenton, Florida, was one of their dealers. Be was handed 4s box containing a carburetor, numbered A19568, and testified it was a part of « shipment being returned by the Pranz Tractor Company. This shipment was on the American Preight Lines truck hijacked and robbed Julv 12, 1979, and was not received by J. I. Case Company. -22 » eee Pollowing admission of the above testimony without objection, Hopper was handed a computer print-out of a list of parts being returned by franz Tractor Company to J. I. Case Company at its Memphis address, on which was listed a car- buretor of the same number as the carburetor offered into evidence. The carburetor above noted had been found in Bill's spartment. Hopper testified the computer print-out listed the carburetor and the computer print-out was admitted into evidence with objection. Pollowing cross-examination counsel objected to the admission of the computer print-out, and cited King v. State ex _ rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp.. 222 So.24 39] (Miss. 1969). The trial judge overruled the objection. The trial judge committed no error in overruling the objection, even if it had been timely made. Although Bopper had nothing to do with its preparation, the computer print-out was part of business records with which Hopper came in daily contact and was familiar with, and upon which he and his company relied. “is testimony was sufficient for a prima facie showing of accuracy, and there being no con- tradictory proof offered, it was competent evidence. The weight and credibility of this evidence was for the jury. Id. (g) WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR COMMITTED IN REFUSING INSTRUCTIONS AUTHORIZING CONVICTIONS OR LESSER OFFENSES? Instructions 0-9 and 0-10 would have authorized the jury to convict Hill of murder or sanslaughter. Instruction > 8-A gives the form of verdict for such lesser included offenses. The circuit judge refused these instructions. No error was committed by the trial judge's refusal to grant these instructions. The testimony of Gregory Tucker made out a case of a planned and pre-conceived robbery by Hill, Milam, and himself, in which Hill was leader and chief actor. After hijacking the truck, Hill marched Watkins off into the edge of the woods where his bedy was later found, and shot him in the back of the head. Tucker heard Several shots. As Hill was taking Watkins from the truck to the woods, Tucker heard Watkins begging for his life. Counsel now argues the robbery took place before the murder. Of course, the record reveals the murder took place during the execution of the robbery. Purthermore, as we stated in Pickle v. State, 345 So.2d 623, (Miss. 1977): If the crime of capital murder could not be sustained unless the homicide occurred during the actual attack upon a victim or during the actual burglary, kidnapping, arson or robbery, such could be an inducement for an assailant to kill his victim after the commission of the first crime in order to silence her/ him as a witness. The rules stated in the foregoing cases is the more reasonable, and we hold that where the two crimes are sonnected in a chain of events and cccur as part of the res gestae, the crime of capital murder is sustained Id. at 626-27. We find no merit in this assignment of error. (h) OFD THE crreurr JUDGE ERR IN OVERRULING HILL'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT, AND A MOTION POR A NEW TRIAL? The testimony of Tucker, corroborated by law enforcement officers finding the carburetor in Hill's apart- ment, Hill's renting of the U-Haul truck which was used in the robbery and returned by him the next day, and the testimony of the law enforcement officers and expert witnesses that the body found in the woods was that of Watkins, lead us to conclude this assignment of error has no merit whatever. -24- (4) WAS ERROR COMMITTED ry ALLOWING INTO EVIDENCE OURING THE SENTENCING PHASE OF THE TRIAL TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE PREVIOUSLY INTROOUCED IN THE GUILT PHASE? During the sentencing phase of the trial the state requested, and was permitted by the trial court, to have the jury consider all previous testimony and evidence adduced on the guilt phase. The trial judge permitted this, and no error was committed in doing so. See In re Jordan, 390 So.2d $84, 585 (Miss. 1980); Irving v. State, supra, at 1367 n.1; and Jackson v. State, 337 $o.24 1242, 1256 (1976). Again, this is a point which counsel for the first time argues on appeal. Iv. BROOM, PRESIDING JUSTICE, POR THE COURT: Argument of appellant is that reversible error was made by the trial court when it failed to grant the following sentencing instruction requested by the defense: Instruction D-2: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I charge you that you need not find any mitigating circumstance in order to return a sentence of life imprison- ment. ad r ma , - 9396... os seme cpeecr |}. * —, So of the Records * andi ad f.tnhest A A. 67 $-2 The Court instructs the Jury that at this phase of the trial conducted for the purpose of cetermining the sentence to be imposed upon the defendant, the State and the defendant may elect to stand on the testimony and evidence introduced during the first or guilt phase of this trial, or the parties may elect to introduce additional testimony and evidence as to matters that the Court deems relevant to sentence, including matters relating to any of the aggravting or mitigating circumstances. In reaching your verdict you may consider the testimony and evidence presented during the first phase of the trial together with the testimony and evidence, if any, relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances presented for your consideration during the second or sentencing phase of the trial. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI DE SOTO COUNTY Jeanette B. Maric, Clerk ct the Circuit Court in ond for sc co county moe stote, herelyy certify thar "ne fgrecoi @ try af oa Dw pee ie ame o-ncor > -ecord ‘nm SO0ce s2Core “‘Arsaissi ope o es i Crcurt Gerk Getore County, Mississise Khaw A. 68 /-t $.\2=A You have found the Defendant guilty of the crime of Capital Murder. You must now decide whether the Defendant will be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment, In reaching your decision you must objectively consider the detailed circum. stances of the offense for which the Defendant was convicted, and the Defendant himself, - To return the death penalty, yOu must find the aggravating circumstances, those which tend to werrant the death penalty, Outweigh the mitigating circumstances, those which tend to warrant the less severe penalty, : Consider the following elements of aggravation in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed. 1.) The capital offense was committed while the Uefendant was engaged in the commission of robbery, 2.) The capital offense was committed for pecuniary gain, 3.) The Defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person, 4.) The capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, You must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the preceding aggravating circumstances exists in this case to return the death penalty, If no element is found to exist, the death penalty may not be Imposed and you shal} write the following verdict on a Sheet of paper: “We, the Jury, find that the f_- >°* '.¢ trvecnd ~rrect copy uf the - = some cppecrs on tile or of record in ee, of *he xo ss sf DeScro County, Missission: non e's! ses ° —.. ?ay of » Ae. 70 outweigh the mitigating circumstances and are sufficient to impose the death penalty, and that there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances and we unanimously find that the Defendant should suffer death." . . Foreman of the Jury 2. “We, the Jury, find that the Defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonmenc." 3. “The Jury has been unable to agree unanimously on punishment." #3427 A. 71 Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the law requires that in order to impose a sentence of death you must reach @n unanimous Gecision. In the event you cannot reach an unanimous decision, defendant will be sentenced to life imprisonment. STATE OF MISSISSIP>; DE SOTO COUNTY ', Jeanette 8. Martin, Clerk ot the Cirevir i po ca certify thet the a te os some of the Recoras of Dus. © County, Mi Witness my hene ons ~iFiecial ec! for seid county 'S © true ond correct D-3 Circuit ! ha lerk, DeSoto County, “Aississ:ppi ge} prt day yy a 120 Grate, A Dvds / Crcut Court Core, Scere Costty. Secs oat bi leat> hited oe ese she. Ue Ladies and gentlemen of th ey your Gecision of the uestion of punishment vou are Pd aggravation anc mitigation, such as this, you are not to be in 1en 3 by ; Or any other arbitrary fact - STATE OF /AlSSISSIFP! DE SOTO COUNTY ; a |. secrete B. Martin, Clerk ot tne Cirey t Court in one for soic cou ‘ s " ~*~ ‘rr - or? | ond stote, hereby certify thot "he jorecarc SS NaS =| ec copy of the aided landhaa clade = copy of tre td AA _ os some cprecits cr ife or of record in Sook Beatatn Opis a? A ee. ae —v¥4 ' STEVEN L. WINTER 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 | | | | | | | } i | | | | || 46. Counsel has not yet received an affidavit from the peti- | | i | ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER | ' ; | ' ] i No. 82- IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES October Term, 1982 ALVIN HILL, Petitioner, ine AFFIDAVIT STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, Respondent. STATE OF NEW YORK ) COUNTY OF NEW YoRK) ‘°*’ STEVEN L. WINTER, being duly sworn, states: 1. I am an attorney for Alvin Hill, the petitioner in the above-captioned action, and I make this affidavit in support of Mr. Hill's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. My representation of Mr. Hill is without remuneration. 2. Mr. Hill is presently in the custody of the State of Mississippi and is not immediately available to sign an in forma pauperis affidavit. Such an affidavit has been sent to Mr. Hill by me and will be forwarded to the Court immediately upon receipt. A copy of the affidavit to be signed by Mr. Hill is attached hereto. 3. Counsel was appointed to represent Mr. Hill at his trial and on appeal. 4. I am informed and believe that because of his poverty, Mr. Hill is unable to pay the costs of this cause or to give security for same. S. Hill is entitled to redress Lal oC @ i - A) < @ t a o ct = " in this action. L —f — a A bes i eid a STEVEN L. WINTER Sworn to before me this | 25th day of July, 1985 i} 4 14 NOTARY PUBLIC GERTRUDE A. REYNDLOS Notary Public. State of New York ! No. 24-4624270 Qualified in Kings County Commission Expires March 30, 1984 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES October Term, 1982 ALVIN HILL, Petitioner, -against- STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, Respondent. I, Alvin Hill, being culy sworn, depose and say, in support of my motion for leave to proceed without being required to prepay costs or fees and to proceed in forma pauperis: l. I am the petitioner in the above-captioned action. 2. Because of my poverty I am unable to pay the costs of said cause; I own no real or personal property; I am incarcerated and receive no income from earnings. 3. I am unable to give security for said cause. 4. Counsel is serving on my behalf without remunera- tion. At trial and on appeal, lawyers were appointed to repre- sent me because I was indigent. 5. I believe that I am entitled to redress. 6. The nature of said cause is briefly stated as follows: I was convicted in the Circuit Court of DeSoto County, a trial court of the State of Mississippi, of murder and robbery and was @ntenced to death. I am being held at the Mississippi State Penitentiary, Parchman, Mississippi. I believe that errors| were committed during the course of my trial in violation of my constitutional rights and that my conviction and death sentence were imposed upon me in violation of my constitutional rights. ALVIN HILL STATE OF MISSISSIPPI COUNTY OF SUNFLOWER The foregoing affidavit of Alvin Hill was subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 1983. NOTARY PUBLIC | | No. 83-5153 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITE SIRTES Prin ) ‘ig . Ce eoeee October Term, 1982 AUG 2. isos ide Geo nd ” SUPREME CUUnT, U.S. ALVIN HILL, Petitioner, -against- : bo se | SH STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, : Respondent. I, Alvin Hill, being duly sworn, depose and say, in support of my motion for leave to proceed without being required to prepay costs or fees and to proceed in forma pauperis: 1. I am the petitioner in the above-captioned action. 2. Because of my poverty I am unable to pay the costs of said cause; I own no real or personal property; I am incarcerated and receive no income from earnings. 3. I am unable to give security for said cause. 4. Counsel is serving on my behalf without remunera- tion. At trial and on appeal, lawyers were appointed to repre- sent me because I was indigent. S. I believe that I am entitled to redress. 6. The nature of said cause is briefly stated as follows: I was convicted in the Circuit Court of DeSoto County, , a trial court of the State of Mississippi, of murder and robbery | and was @ntenced to death. I am being held at the Mississippi State Penitentiary, Parchman, Mississippi. I believe that errors were committed during the course of my trial in violation of my constitutional rights and that my conviction and death sentence were imposed upon me in violation of my constitutional rights. Alauie Hp ALVIN HILL STATE OF MISSISSIPPI COUNTY OF SUNFLOWER The foregoing affidavit of Alvin Hill was subscribed ’ and sworn to before me this 3“ day of 1983. NOTARY PUBLIC QiComminion ts: ae Sd*VLOS Otis Sopcan COTE D FILE JULY 25 983 CLERK No. 82- IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES October Term, 1982 ALVIN HILL, Petitioner, -~against- STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, Respondent. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I am a member of the bar of the Supreme Court of the United States and that I served this peti- tion for writ of certiorari on respondent by placing a copy in the United States mail, first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: Hon. Bill Allain Attorney General of the State of Mississipp* Post Office Box 220 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 All parties required to be served have been served. Done this 25th day of July, 1983. ‘ ‘ -* Sm, he eT ; oO NS Re Veo, oe STEVEN L. WINTER --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1643%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.