# Petition — Daniel v. Pettway

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 467 U.S. 1243

## Text

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IN THE APR 30 1984
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ALEXANDER L. STEVAS. |
CLERK

October Term, 1983

No.

CHARLES L. DANIEL, et al.,
Petitioners,

vs.

RUSH PETTWAY, et al.,
Respondents,

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Respondent,

AMERICAN CAST IRON PIPE COMPANY
Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Ralph E. Coleman

2175 11th Court South
Birmingham, Alabama 35205
(205) 939-0444

Counsel of Record for Petitioners,
Charles L. Daniel, et al

Ronald L. Spratt

1929 North Third Avenue North
Smith Yowers, Suite 3200
Birmingham, Alabama 35203
(205) 251-7180

Attorney for Petitioners,
Charles L. Daniel, et al

OF COUNSEL:

COLEMAN & COLEMAN
2175 lth Court S ‘th
Birmingham, Aiaba.iia 35205
(205) 939-0444

i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Did the court below err in failing to enforce the mandate of
Pettway v. American Casi iron Pipe Company, 576 F.2d. 1157
(Sth Cir. 1978), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979) and Pettway v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Company, 494 F.2d. 211 (Sth Cir. 1974)
and in sanctioning a consent settlement approved by the district
court which contained no “opt out” provisions as mandated in
the cases enumerated above?

2. Should the supervisory power of the court below have been
invoked to enfoce the “opt out” procedures outlined by the Fifth
Circuit to assure class members due process of law?

3. Did the District Court err in advising the objectors to the
proposed consent decree to consult with Attorney Wiggins, the
class attorney on objections to the proposed decree and his
conduct in consulting with the attorney for the defendant on
how to meet these objections and did this action constitute a sell-
out, compromise or collusion to such an extent the court should
have provided separate counsel and created a sub-class for the
protection of this definable minority?

4. Were the petitioners denied even minimum due process of
law by the District Court’s failure to insist that .he proponents of
the settlement offer any proper witnesses and any testimony,
especially expert testimony, as to the economic factors
considered in finding the settlement to be fair, just, and
reasonable thereby denying the objectors any right to confront
witnesses or to conduct cross-examination, with the result being
that the burden of proving the settlement to be unfair, unjust and
unreasonable being improperly sh fed to the objectors, also in
violation of due process of law?

5. Did the District Court deny the objecting class members
due process of law by improperly shifting the burden of proof to
the objecting class members and improperly considering as
evidence economic facts proffered by the class attorney denying a
right of cross-examination to petitioners?

LIST OF PARTIES

The parties in the court below were Charles L. Daniel, et al.',
Rush Pettway, et al.*, Equal Employment Opportunity’, and
American Cast Iron Pipe Company‘.

'Charles L. Daniels; Lewis Spratt, Sr., Henry Goodgame; Henry Arnold, Jr.;
James Barnes; Elijah Brown: Willie Brundidge; Mose Bunch; Robert Caldwell;
William Caldwell; Robert Cannon; Melvin Carson, Rosie Catlin, Willie Curry,
Ed Dancy. Jr.; Carl Edwards: Leon Elliott’ Randolph Ellis, Fuchue Anderson;
Willie Harper, Hattie Hopkins; Nathaniel Howard, Eddie Huggins, Johnnie
Hughes. Fred Jemison; Rufus Johnson; Laura Kimbrough, Hubert Moore,
Henry O'Neal: Theodore Peoples; Willie Perdue, William Pollard; Booker T
Powell; David Powers; Farnest Rich; Lemmie Ruffin; William Spencer, Estelle
Allen: Joe Steel, Jr. Zonnie Stuckey; Andrew Thomas, Melvin Turner, Eugene
Williams, Raymond Williams Jerry Zorns, Erwin Callens, Sr., Willie Blue;
Henry Rice; S. W. King, Jr.; Earl Murray; Jim Amison, Jr.; Peter J. Wrenn®;
Benjamin Shorter: Melvin Brown; Melvin C. Story; M. L. Walls; Calvin C
Johnson: John Jenkins; Thomas M. Phillips; Bruce Square....... Plainuflt-
Appellants

*Named plaintiff in 1966

>Rush Pettway, David Jordan, Alex Fitts, and the class of black employees of
the American Cast Iron Pipe Company .............+00+06+ Respondents

‘American Cast Iron Pipe Company............0500eeeeeeee Respondent

“Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ..............+.- Intervenor

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented for Review ............006:
SRG Fe CRS ve cacrcvede che keeceeneewonns

Se EE, oa cae cdviedesbe Ov ehbeaake

Reference to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law in Court Below and Report of | ith Circuit

Statutory Provision Conferring Jurisdiction ......
Constitutional Provision and Statutes Involved ...

SAE OE OE EN oc ene ced neesa teen

Reasons for Granting Writ:

PATER CHEE CIGD a ook. v6 8b t6 866008040 OD
RORSMSN TOO TWO os vncde cucssveccewenesen

NE Sacks bo oh bb ole ae See ee

eee ee oe

(Appendix submitted separately bound and indexed)

iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page

Bauman v. United States District Court, 557 F.2d. 650 ....20
(9th Cir. 1977).

Daniel v. American Cast Iron Pipe Company, 721 F.2d. 315 2
(11th Cir. 1983).

Dosier v. Miami Valley Broadcasting Corp., 656 F.2d. 1295 20
(9th Cir. 1981).

East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Ridreguez, 431 ..17
U.S. 395, 52 L.Ed. 453, S.CL. 1984 (1977).

Four Seasons Sec. v. Law Litigation, 502 F.2d. 834 ....... 15
(10th Cir. 1974).

Gen. Tele. Co. v. Southwest v. Falcon, 547 U.S., 147, 72 ..17
L.Ed. 2nd. 740, 102 S.Ct. 234 (1982).

Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d. 67 (Sth Cir. 1973) ......... 15

Grigsby v. North Miss. Medical Center, 586 F.2d. 417..... 20
(Sth Cir. 1978).

Grunin v. International House of Pancake, 513 F.2d. 114..13
(8th Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975).

Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 61 S.Ct. 115, 85 L.Ed. 2d. 2217
(1940).

Holmes v. Continental Can Co., Inc., ...... 13,14,16,18,20,21
706 F.2d. 1144 (11th Cir. 1983).

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States ..\9
43! U.S. 324 (1977).

Lachappelle v. Owen Illinois, 513 F.2d. 286 .........0005 20
(Sth Cir. 1975)

Vv

Laskey v. International Union United Auto,..........064. 20
638 F2d. 964 (6th Cir. 1981).

Nyzen vy. Kissinger, 70 F.R.D. 656 (N.D. Cal. 1975); ...... 17
app. dismissed 602 F.2d. 925 (9th Cir. 1979).

Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d. 1204 (Sth Cir. 1982) ....... 22

Penson v. Terminal Transport Co., 667 F.2d. 1204.. 20,21,22
(Sth Cir. 1982)

Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,.......4.. 1,7,18,22
494 F.2d. 211 (Sth Cir. 1974).

Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., . 1,7,12,13,15-18,21,22
(Pettway IV) 576 F.2d. 1157 (Sth Cir. 1974).

Pettway v. American Cast /ron Pipe Co., .......06045. 7,8,10
681 F.2d. 1269 (11th Cir. 1982).

Phillip v. Klassen, 502 F.2d. 362, 163 U.S. App. D.C. ..... 17
360 (1974); cert. denied 419 U.S. 996 (1974).

Plammer v. Chemical Bamk ....cccccccccccceces 13,14,15,20
668 F.2d. 654 (2nd Cir. 1982).

Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Commission,....... 21,22
688 F.2d. 615 (9th Cir. 1982).

Twyman v. Rockville Housing Authority,..........00606 17
99 F.R.D. 314 (D.C. Md. 1983).

United States v. City of Miami, Florida,...............6. 15
614 F.2d. 322 (Sth Cir. 1980).

United States v. United States Steel Corp., ........660055 20
520 F.2d. 1043 (Sth Cir. 1975). cert. denied
429 U.S. 817 (1977).

West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer Co., 440 F.2d. 1079......... 22
(2nd Cir. 1971); Affirmed 404 U.S. $48 (1971).

vi

Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d. 239,......... 20
(3rd Cir. 1975).

STATUES
Fifth Amendment — Constitution of the United States ..... 2
EM Era dabewds be besbecccesesvecedeess 2,3
Rule 23 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure..........3-6,12,13

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Rosen; Title VII Classes and Due Process to (b) (2) or ....21
not to (b) (3), 26 Wayne Law Review 919 (1980).

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1983

No.

CHARLES L. DANIEL, et al.,
Petitioners

VS.
RUSH PETTWAY, et al.,
Respondents

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Respondent

AMERICAN CAST IRON PIPE COMPANY
Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

TO THE HONORABLE, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED
STATES AND THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:

Your petitioners, Charles L. Daniel, ct al., respectfully pray
that a writ of certiorari be issued ou. of and under the seal of this
court to review the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rendered on the 21st day of
November, 1983, which judgment affirmed the District Court
Decision that the Respondent's consent settlement was fair,
reasonable and adequate.

The timely application for rehearing in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was denied without an
opinion on the ai day of January, 1984.

0

2

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit has been reported at 721 F.2d 315, and is
attached herto in Appendix A, infra, pp. A-36 - A-39.

The previous opinion of the Trial Court, the United States
District Court of the Northern District of Alabama, Judge
Seybourn H. Lynne has not been officially reported but is
attached hereto in Appendix A, infra, pp. A-3 - A-35.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit was entered on the 21st day of November, 1983,
and is annexed hereto in Appendix A, infra, pp. A-1 - A-2.

A timely petition for rehearing was denied on the Bth day of
January, 1984, and the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit thereon is attached hereto in
Appendix A, infra, pp. A-40.

The statutory provision believed to confer jurisdiction upon
this Court to review the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals of the Eleventh Circuit rendered the 28th Day of
January, 1984, is 28 U.S.C. 1254 (1). 30

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides in pertinent part:

No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.

STATUTE INVOLVED

The statutory provision involved in this proceeding is 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) which provides as follows:

If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally
engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful

3

employment practice charged in the complaint, the court
may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such
unlawful employment practice, and order such
affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of
employees, with or without back pay (payable by the
employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as
the case may be, responsible for the unlawful
employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the
court deems appropriate. Back pay liability shall not
accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing
of a charge with the Commission. Interim earnings or
amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the
person or persons discriminated against shall operate to
reduce the back pay otherwise allowable. No order of the
court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an
individual as a member of a union, or the hiring,
reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an
employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such
individual was refused admission, suspended, or
expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or
was suspended or discharged for any reason other than
discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of this
title.

Rule 23. Class Actions

(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a
class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all
only if (1) the class is so numerous ‘hat joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.

(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as
a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied,
and in addition:

4

(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against
individual members of the class would create a risk of

(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would establish
incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or

(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive
of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests; or

(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, therby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole or

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the
findings include:

(A) the interest of members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims
in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of a class action.

(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Actions to be
Maintained; Notice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as
Class Actions.

(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an
action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by
order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this

5

subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or
amended before the decision on the merits.

(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3),
the court shall direct to the members of the class the best
notice practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each
member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if
he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether
favorable or not, will include all members who do not request
exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request
exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his
counsel.

(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action
under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to
the class, shall include and describe those whom the court
finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action
maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3),
whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and
specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in
subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who have not requested
exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the
class.

(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues,
or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and each
subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall
then be construed and applied accordingly.

(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to
which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders:
(1) determining the course of proceedings or prescribing
measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the
presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the
protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair
conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the
court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the
action or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the

6

opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the
representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims
or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing
conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4)
requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom
allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the
action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural
matters. [The orders may be combined with an order under Rule
16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time
to time.

(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be
dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and
notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to
all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.

7

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is the sixth appeal of this case before the Eleventh Circuit
and its predecessor, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The history of the litigation is fully stated in its last previous
appearance, Pettway, et al. v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 681
F.2d 1259 (11th Cir. 1982). Originally the trial court found the
existence of racial discrimination in the employment and
promotion practices of the defendant. The court granted an
injunction and then declined to find any damages in favor of the
plaintiff class. Upon appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
remanded for a determination of back pay, 494 F.2d 211, leaving
open, of course, the possibility of a settlement between the
parties. Such a proposed settlement was recommended by the
class representatives and their counsel, in a sum amounting to
approximately $1,000,000.

There were objections and an appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals who disapproved the consent settlement and stated

we further hold that on remand the district court must
provide those claimants who decide to opt-out of the
settlement with an opportunity to assert their individual
claims in this action. Pettway /V, 576 F.2d at 1220. Such
claimants must be permitted to exclude themselves from
the class and must be given an opportunity to prove
entitlement to a larger individual award in the same court
that hears the claims of the class. 706 F.2d 1220 (1978)

A substantial number of the members of the class had accepted
checks mailed out by the defendant in accordance with the
proposed settlement. The court in Pettway IV further opined:

Of course, each of the 399 awa.dees who opted into the
settlement should be provided notice of their right to
disaffirm their award and participate in further back pay
proceedings. This notice should fully explain the
awardee’s rights and the proper procedures for exercising
them.

After Pettway IV the district court and parties proceeded to
settle the injunctive aspect of the action and in attempting to

settle the back pay aspect ordered in 1971 were unable to agree.
The defendant desired to make an offer of judgment to members
of the class, and the court appointed a special master where the
individual had to establish his entitlement. The class appealed
and the Eleventh Circuit in Per*way v. American Cast Iron Pipe
Company, 681 Fed.2d 1259 (1982) (certiorari pending) reversed
the district court and ordered settlement on a classwide basis.

On remand the parties shortly thereafter arrived at a tentative
settlement and began meeting and notifying the class of the
proposed classwide settlement for $3,983,401.91 in satisfaction of
all racial discrimination. The consent settlement and notice did
not provide an “opt out” provision as mandated in Pettway IV
supra nor had the court and parties provided the 399 a right to
disaffirm their award and participate in further back pay
proceedings (these were meted out $500 each without regard to
the amount of discrimination.)

The objectors appealed the district court's finding that the
consent decree was fair, adequate and reasonable. The Eleventh
Circuit addressed none of the issues presented but after a history
of the case summed up appellant's argument as follows, “trey did
not receive amounts in the proposed distribution equal to
comparable members of the cluss.” The parties in their notice to
members of the class advised any person who might object as
follows:

The attorney representing the class is available to assist
you... He will also assist any member of those who
objects to the settlement by providing advice on the
proper procedure to follow in presenting such objections.

The 110 objectors filed their objections but contrary to the
intent of the notice, Robert L. Wiggins, Jr , attorney for the class
according to his accounting to the court (R. 146) was meeting
with Acipco’s attorney, Pat Logan, to “sell out” those who
objected. On April 22, 1983, the class attorney “reviewed the
Status of objection at the courthouse; talked to Logan, April 26,
1983. Review objections and draft joint motion to require
disclosure of facts by objectors, draft letter to Logan
summarizing objections by categories—5 page letters to April 27,

9

1983 .. . prepare and meet with Pat Logan on approach to
objections.” (emphasis supplied) (R. 146)

The objectors had requested the court to allow separate
counsel, but the court had taken no action on the several requests
and advised the objectors that it would award no fees to the
attorney for objectors. The constitutional guarantee of due
process of representation had not only been breached but their
counsel, contrary to ethics, as well as our adversary system was
plotting with the defendant against their interest. The court may
not have been aware of this at the time of its occurrence. Attorney
Wiggins filed his supplemental affidavit with the court showing
the misconduct on June 23, 1983, on the same day the court
issued and approved his finding of facts and his actions against
members of the class in conjunction with their adversary were set
forth in his affidavit was commended and he was compensated an
additional $50,000.00.

Your petitioners would be remiss in not taking issue with the
court's finding of fact and conclusion of law. Ihe district court
judge included many facts which were not of record at the
fairness hearing nor the subject of any judicial scrutiny i.e.
meetings held at church, votes of the individual members at
meetings and conclusions drawn therefrom. On one occasion in
the appendix he notes that an objector was either absent or not
listening at one of the class meetings several weeks earlier. The
court was also privy to many of the meetings with the class
attorney and the class at the attorney's office or, at least, his facts
indicate as much. The court also in its conclusion takes liberties
statistically to minimize the petition of those filing objections.
The class initially contined some twenty-two hundred (2,200) and
had been reduced to eight hundreu and thirty three (833) who
would participate in bck pay award. The court finding of fact that
less than five per cent objected when in the record page 4, the
court noted “some hundred ten (110) objections have been
received.” The court also, contrary to presumptions under the
law, assumed that all who did not object were in accord and
agreement with the whole settlement.

The court fails to note negative factors in its finding i.e. that the
E.E.O.C. failed to sign the agreement nor signifying accord as to

10

its adequacy or fairness. The court also fails to note that no
member of the class or class representative testified in favor of the
proposed consent settlement. Joe Marbury, a representative of
the class Committee for Equal Job Opportunity testified in
Opposition to the settlement, the way it was negotiated and
presented to the class and the manner in which awards were
granted i.e. one man was given ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for
praying. There were ten witnesses who testified and the court
after an initial statement in opening recessed unti! 1:30 and
adjourned at 4:25 p.m. Although the court in its record of fact
implies that objectors were provided ample time stated that he
wanted the matter brought toa close and advising “you've got ten
more minutes”. (F.H. 95)

The purported computer print outs on which the court relies to
substantiate the heresay affidavits which were never received
were examined by your writer and the material contains no
conclusions nor calculations only parties’ names, race and job
class. Mr. Wiggins advised your writer that there had been no
written opinion arrived at and recieved by the “expert” who was
to receive $175,000. The court was advised that the computer
printouts had not been furnished as requested and the expert
proffered by the objectors was brushed aside by the court.

The class representatives were not representative of all the
class members. The Committee for Equal Job Opportunity
(C.E.J.E.) removed all (being part of the 399) who cashed their
checks in 1975 from the committee although they were some of
the original members of the committee when it numbered less
than ten.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (E.E.0.C.)
was a party to the action having appealed to the Eleventh Circuit
in 1982 to reverse the trial court for deleting them from the case.
Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Company, 681 F.2d 1269
(llth Cir. 1982). The E.E.0.C. was not a party to the consent
seti!cuient nor a signator but after an appeal noted that the
settlement appeared on its face to be fair. This was noted by the
Eleventh Circuit in its opinion at page 316.

In the fairness hearing the defendant offered no evidence only

affidavits which were objected to by petitioner as to the proposed
settlement being fair, reasonable and adequate. No ruling was
made as to the reception of this offer by the trial judge and this
was included in the record on appeal by supplementing the
record.

The parties gave notice to the class of its proposed settlement
and attached form objection to be filed by persons having
objection. Objectors were advised to see the class attorney
Wiggins since 110 objections were filed. Prior to the fairness
hearing while he was obliged by notice to meet with the objectors
Attorney Wiggins was meeting and conferring with the attorney
for the defendant Pat Logan on “approach to objection.” As
early as February 24, 1983, the class attorney noted “dissention in
class and distribution formula.” The court noted the possible
conflicts within the class but took no steps to create a subclass or
enter an order allowing the objectors to “opt out” of the proposed
settlement.

The Court of Appeals had mandated that the court provide an
“opt out” right to persons who might disagree with any future
settlements and also that as to the persons who cashed their
checks in 1975. The court ordered established a procedure
whereby they might repay the money or place security for monies
received in the 1975 settlement offer thus allowing them to “opt
in the class. No procedure was established by the court although
the defendant had made a motion for repayment of the money or
posting pursuant to the mandate. These provisions were
inferentially approved by the Supreme Court in its denial of
certiorari.

The court on May 12, 1983, issued its final judgment that the
consent decree was fair, reasonab’ ard adequate. A Motion for
Rehearing was filed on May 23, 1983 and the court at the time of
rendering its finding of fact and conclusion of law on June 23,
1983, overruled the Motion for Rehearing. Notice of appea! was
filed by the objectors, Charles L. Daniel and Estelle Allen on July
22, 1983 and the cases were consolidated on appeal. The
obdjectors appealed to the Eleventh Circuit and on November 21,
1983, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in its opinion at 721
F.2d 315 (11th Cir. 1983) upheld the trial court's ruling and found
the consent settlement was “fair and reasonable.” The appellants
moved for an en banc rehearing which was denied on January2% 40
1984 (Appendix, pp. A-40), and appellants petition at this time
for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.

12

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
ISSUE I

Whether the district courts approval of the consent settlement
notice and the conduct of the class representative, class counsel
and court so abridged the objector’s rights of due process and to
render the same collusive and cause the “fairness hearing” to
amount to “boiler plate” approval of an inadequate award and a
‘sell out” of a large definable minority, departing to such an
extent that the supervisory powers of this court be invoked by
certiorari to define the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceeding.

The fairness hearing conducted and noticed by the district
court provided no “opt out” procedure for the class objectors
which the court in Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Company
(Pettway IV) referred to as “subclass members” noting the class
was divided. The total receiving awards were less than 800, the
number noted in Pettway IV was 399. The notice itself advised
any objector he would be subject to cross-examination on the
fairness hearing. The class objectors were advised to see Mr.
Wiggins, the class attorney. After ob‘ections had been filed this
same attorney Wiggins met and talked with defendant
ACIPCO’'s counsel Logan summarizing the objector and
ultimately “meet with Pat Logan on approach to objection. 10.9
hours.” (pp. A-42)

At the hearing the court allowed the class representative and
defendant to offer affidavit of economic data to substantiate that
the proposed settlement was fair, reasonable and adequate. The
class attorney filed his own affidavit as to the settlement being
fair, reasonable and adequate although the proposed settlement
approved a fee of $175,000 to the expert. There have been several
attempts to arrive at consent settlements and how to treat the
competing of the members of the case.

“Although settlement is the preferred method of resolving Title
VII suits, the class action settlement process is “more susceptible
than adversarial adjudications to certain types of abuse.”
Pettway vs. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 Fed. 2nd 1157,
1169 (Sth Cir. 1978) (Pettway IV). Federal Rule of Civil

13

Procedure 23(c) mandates judicial approval of all class action
settlements and that requirement is manifested in both
substantive and procedural protections afforded to absent class
members . . .” the law accords special protections, primarily
procedural in nature to individuals class members whose
interests may be compromised in the settlement process “Pettway
IV 576 Fed. 2nd 1326, 1330 (Sth Cir. 1977). The fact that
appellant objectors were denied both procedural and thereby
substantive protection previously guaranteed by the Court of
Appeals is the basis for this writ of certiorari.

Holmes vs. Continental Can reaffirms that appellate courts:
“must have a basis for judging the exercise of the district judge’s
discretion.” Cotton vs. Hinton, supra., the proponents of class
action settlements bear the burden of developing a record
demonstrating that the settlement distribution in fair,
reasonable, and adequate. Grunin vs. International House of
Pancakes, 513 F. 2d 114, 123 (8th Cir.) cert. denied 423 U.S. 864,
965 Ct. 124, 46 L.Ed. 2d 93 (1975).

The Holmes case also notes that when a settlement explicitly
provides for preferential treatment for the named plaintiffs in a
class action, a substantial burden falls upon the proponents of the
settlement to demonstrate and document its fairness. The Court
of Appeals noted the similarity to Pettway IV 576 F. 2d at 1217
where the court ruled on a prior dispute in the allocation of a
settlement fund. “The court should not allow a majority, no
matter how large, to impose its decision on the minority . . .
Objection by a few dissatisfied class members should trigger close
judicial scrutiny to ensure that the burden of settlement is not
shifted arbitrarily to a small grou’ >f class members.” Plummer
vs. Chemical Bank , 668 F. 2d 654 (2nd Cir. 1582) states that “such
disparities must be regarded as prima facie evidence that the
settlement is unfair to the class, and a heavy burden falls on
those who seek approval of such a settlement.”

The proponents of the settlement in this case have clearly failed
to carry their heavy burden to overcome objectors prima facie
case. There was simply no evidence offered at the hearing in
support of the settlement. The only evidence offered in support of
the scitlement were affidavits of Plaintiff's attorney Robert

14

Wiggins, Jr. et al. explaining reasons why in his opinion the
settlement was fair, just, and reasonable and explaining his
expert's calculations (F.H. 5, 6) and affidavits of the proposed
experts of the defendants. Plaintiff's objectors properly objected
to this injection of hearsay testimony. The district court's
continuing failure to rule on this objection and failure to admit
the same gave no basis for its use and was error sufficient for
reversal, and should have in fact resulted in reversal. With no
ruling whatsoever, objectors were denied due process in that they
had no way of knowing what evidence was being considered in
support of the settlement, and were denied the opportunity to
intelligently contest such evidence in the best possible manner i.e.
by cross examination that is by confronting the witness and
discovering the basis of their opinion.

In Holmes vs. Continental Can Co., at 1148 the Court of
Appeals, 11th Circuit, notes that they limit their inquiry to the
record of the fairness hearing. Any advocate or party relying on
this standard of review would expect substantial evidence to be
produced at such a hearing. As in Pettway IV, the fundamental
problem facing us in our task today is the absence of an
adequately developed factual record “576 F. 2d at 1183. Holmes
vs. Continental Can. Co., at 1150. The fact that numerous
materials were considered in judges's chambers both before and
after the hearing does not provide an adequate record for review.
Such procedure heightens the impression that the fairness
hearing is a mere rubber stamping used to rama settlement down
the throats of unwilling objectors., Holmes vs. Continental Can.
Co. 706 at 1150.

Even if the affidavits were in the mind of the court entered in
the open court in the fairness hearing, since these were the only
evidence offered by proponents, reversal should follow.
“Findings and conclusions should be made with respect to every
controverted settlement. Moreover, those findings and
conclusions should not be based simply on the arguments and
recommendations of counsel,” Plummer vs. Chemical Bank, 668
F. 2d 654, 659 (2nd Cir. 1982) quoting Pettway IV, 576 F. 2d at
1169. Further “when the district court approves a settlement
which is not based upon well reasoned conclusions arrived at

15

after a comprehensive consideration of all relevant factors” its
decision will not survive appellate review.” Under its prior
analysis in Pettway IV, the court should not have allowed this
decision to survive appellate review.

As the Plummer case again quotes Pettway IV 576 at 1169,
“The interest and of lawyer and class may diverge, as may the
interests of different class members and certain interests may be
wrongfully compromised, betrayed, and sold out without
drawing the attention of the court.” Such a sell-out is signalled
here where there is simply no evidentiary foundation in support
of the proposed settlement, except the erroneous reliance on
counsel's opinion. Reliance on counsel's opinion tends to render
the district court captive to the attorney and fosters rubber
stamping by the court rather than the careful scrutiny which is
essential for judicial approval. Even though statistics are
competent evidence, they should not be so when they are
“incomplete data.” United States vs. City of Miami, Fla., 614 F.
2d 1322 at 1352.

Certainly we did not expect the district judge to convert the
fairness hearing into a full-blown trial on the merits. However,
class action settlements should accept affidavits as evidence only
after careful scrutiny. There was no such careful scrutiny in the
case before us. At any rate, the alfidavits were never properly
introduced, and cannot be considered as evidence. Nor should
the objectors have been under any burden to cross examine a
witness, such as attorney for plaintiffs-appellee when he had not
made a prima facie case by offering any testimony whatsoever.
The apparent justification of the a/torney and the committee for
withholding all information whi... oever from the rest of the
plaintiff class, supposedly a danger that such information would
aid the defense is not in accord with our rules of discovery. A
failure to satisfy the requirement that the representative parties
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class “produces a
defect of constitutional dimension, which makes the judgment
vulnerable to be reopened on a collateral attack.” Gonzalez vs.
Cassidy, 474 F. 2d 67 (Sth C:r. 1973); in re Four Seasons Sec. Law
Citigation, 502 F. 2d 834 (10th Cir. 1974).

16

The proposed consent decree, notice and the fairness hearing
were all deficient to such an extent that the cumulative effect was
to deny due process of law to the objectors.

Many deficiencies of due process may be bent, compromised
or narrowed, but the attorney for a party should ethically and
professionally represent only the interest of his client or clients.
This principal is true without citation or authority or our
adversary system has failed. The counsel for the parties should
not have engaged in conduct that might even take on the
appearance of collusion. The district court had been forewarned
by the appeals, Pettway IV 576 Fed. 2d 1157, 1169.

The interest of lawyer and class may diverge, as may the
interests of different class members and certain interests
may be wrongfully compromised, betrayed or sold out
without drawing the attention of the court,” Pettway 576
F. 2d 1157, 1169

For the numerous breaches noted herein the courts writ of
certiorari should issue to grant due process to petitioners,
reconcile the conflicts in the various circuits and to insure that the
mandates of the appellate courts be accorded deference when the
matters are implemented in the district court.

The writ of certiorari should be issued in this case for the
reasons that an important question of federal law which has not
been, but should be, settled by the court and the split in the
circuits which is pronounced when the same case receives
different treatment on a change in the circuits. The failure by the
district court to follow the mandate of the Circuit Court of
Appeals and the Eleventh Circuit's failure to enforce the “opt
out” provision and implement the opting in of the 399 who
cashed their checks had mandated and even reiterated in Pettway
III and Pettway IV the “opt out” opportunity to be provided
noting the conflict and dissatisfaction that might arise in the
attempt to settle the case. The Eleventh Circuit, by quoting this as
authority in Holmes v. Continental Can Company (supra)
adopted the Fifth Circuit holdings as to opting out and due
process for individual claimants in the class.

17

The conflicts of interest and the divided cohesiveness of the
class qua the counsel so permeated the proceedings that the
requirements of due process for adjudication taken in the name
of the 399 previously identified and those objecting to the
procedures and adequacy of the settlement were substantially
breached. Phillip vy. Klassan, 1974, 502 Fed.2d 362, 163 U.S.
App. D.C. 360 cert. denied 95 S.Ct. 309; Nguzen v. Kissinger, 70
F.R.D. 656 (D.C. Cal. 1976); app. dismissed, 602 Fed.2d 925.

This court in Gen. Tele. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S.
147, 72 L.Ed.2d. 740, 1025 S.Ct. 2364:

We have repeatedly held that “a class representative must
be part of the class and possess the same interest and
suffer the same injury as the class members” East Texas
Motor Freight System Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395,
§2 L.Ed.2d. 453, 97 S.Ct. (1894) . . . (emphasis added).

The class representative and defendant thwarted “the same
interest" of the class when they failed to hold the “opt in”
procedure suggested by the court of appeals in Pettway V.
American Cas! Iron Pipe Company, 576 Fed.2d 1159 (1978 Sth
Cir.) pg. 1220, ..3. that is the court set up a procedure for the 399
who cashed their checks to return the monies received or post
security for the same. While the court has supported a broad
reading of Rule 23 “they do not justify the jettionsing of the
cardinal principal that a class representative may not head a class
whose interest substantially conflicts with his or her own. East
Texas Motor Freight, Inc. v. Rodriguez” (supra).

The testing for the adequacy of representation was aptly
summed up as to F.R. Civ. P. 23(a) (4) in Twyman v. Rockville
Housing Authority, 99 F.R.D., 314 (1983):

Because absent members of the class would be
conclusively hound by results obtained by
representatives and their attorney due process requires
they be more than proforma representative. c.f.
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 US, 32,61 S.Ct. 115,85 L.Ed.2nd
22 (1940) (emphasis added).

Mr. Wiggins, the class attorney, had the competency to
recognize the problems as to the conflicts within the class as he
had been lead counsel in the Pettway cases since 1975 and
obtained the “opt out” nghts and “opt in” procedure in Pettway
IV.

18

The lower court was not without guidance for as herein
Pettway III (supra) gave explicit instructions and the Fifth
Circuit again in Pettway IV advised the lower court that an “opt
out” right should be provided for persons dissatisfied with their
entitlement and the other 399 who cashed checks be allowed to
come back in as full members of the class not as second class
claimants. Surely ii could not be argued that under Rule 23 the
district court can't require inclusion of an opt out right as noted
in Holmes vs. Continental Can Co. (supra) but the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals did not possess the power exercised in Pettway
Ill and Pettway IV.

These clear instructions were not lost or forgotten but were
cited with approval by the Eleventh Circuit in Holmes vs.
Continental Can 706 Fed. 2nd, 1154 (1983) and the irony of the
situation is that Mr. Robert Wiggins, attorney for the class
obtained a reversal of a consent decree for failure to include an
“opt out” right for individuals when he at the same time was co-
author of this settlement where the 5th Circuit had mandated an
opt out provision. This does not speak of equal protection or for
representation, but cries out for redress to fulfill the promises of
those who labored since 1966 to correct the “scourge of
discrimination.”

The decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in this
petition has the unique distinction of being a case wherein there
exists a conflict with the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in the same case and on the identical proposition of law,
ie. the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals mandated that a procedure
for persons dissatisfied with any future settlement be established
allowing them to opt out and pursue their claim in the same suit,
Pettway vs. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. 576 Fed. 2nd, 1157 (Sth
Cir., 1978); cert. denied 439 U.S. 115 (1979).

Rule 23 envisions the court making orders to effectuate the
purpose of the rule in line with the “opt out” right urged herein
“Rule 23... In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies
the court may make appropriate orders . . . (2) requiring for the
protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair
conduct of the action .. . or of the opportunity of members to

19

signify whether they consider the representation fair and
adequate .. .” This accords with the courts of the various circuits
noting this method of requiring an opt out in b(2) class actions.

The defendant, American Cast Iron Pipe Company, has a
pending petition for certiorari being Supreme Court case number
82-1074 and therein is urged that the court’s proposal of hearing
individual claims by a special master was proper and relied on
language from this court out of /nternational Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) and sought to
place the burden of proof on each individual his entitlement to an
award. The defendant would impose on the individual the burden
of going forward to prove his entitlement but does not even
accord him due process by way of dedicated legal counsel in so
complicated a case. Teamster (supra) can not stand for this
proposition for our court surely would not impose so great a
burden without a corresponding guarantee of due process.

Therefore petitioners are unable to see that any distinction can
be found to justify the split of the circuits in the case within the
case, Pettway III; Pettway IV; and Pettway VI (the instant case).

The writ of certiorari should be issued in this case for the
reasons that an important question of federal law exists which
has not been, but should be, settled by this Court and the split in
the circuits on this issue causes different results on identical facts
depending on where the cause of action arises.

ISSUE II

Whether “opting out” of a 23 (b) (2) civil rights class action is
permissible and in certain occasions mandatory where class
members are denied substantive Jue process with the Circuit
Courts of Appeals being divided on this issue which has not but
should be settled by this court.

The United States Supreme Court has not decided the question
of the right of a b(2) class member to opt out of the class and the
permissibility of opting out. The several circuits have split on the
issue and the necessary usage of class action under Rule 23,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dispose of multiple claims
and defenses mandates the court define the parameters of

20

conserving the courts’ and parties’ energies and expenses with the
deprivation of class members due process rights to a point that
the “fairness hearings” become patently unfair.

The Eleventh Circuit in Holmes vs. Continental Can, 706 Fed.
2nd, 1144 (1983), Judge Vance noted:

(11) The United States Supreme Court has not yet
decided whether opting out of (b) (2) classes is ever
permissible, and the circuit courts of appeals are split on
the issue. Compare Plummer v. Chemical Bank, 668 F.2d
at 657; Dosier v. Miami Valley Broadcasting Corp., 656
F.2d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir. 1981); Laskey v. International
Union, United Automotive; Aerospace & Agricultural
Implement Workers, 638 F 2d 954, 956 (6th Cir. 1981);
Penson v. Terminal Transport Co., 634 F2d 989, 993 (Sth
Cir. 1981); Bauman v. United States Dis:rict Court, 557
F2d 650, 659-60 (9th Cir. 1977). Cases examining the
right to opt out of Title VII class actions brought under
subsection (b) (2) reflect a tension between the policy of
facilitating antidiscrimination class actions and the need
to protect the rights of absent class members. The general
rule in this circuit remains that absent members of (b) (2)
classes have no automatic right to opt out of the lawsuit
and to prosecute an entirely separate action. See Penson,
634 F. 2d at 993; Grigsby v. North Mississippi Medical
Center, Inc. 586 F.2d 457, 461 (Sth Cir. 1978);
LaChappelle v. Owens-Illinois, 513 F2d 286, 288 n. 7(Sth
Cir. 1975); United States v. United States Steel Corp.,
520 F.2d 1043, 1957 (Sth Cir. 1975), cert. denied 429 U.S.
817, 97 S. Ct. 61, 50 L.Ed.2d 77 (1977).

The abuse engendered by the attempts of the several circuits to
balance the rights of individuals with due process and fairness has
been the subject of serious inquiry:

(1)n Wetzel[v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d
Cir. 1975)], the court in part justified its refusal to require
notice for absent members by pointing to the need to
effectuate the policies of Title VII: “Suits brought by
private employees are the cutting edge of the Title VII

21

sword which Congress has fashioned to fight a major
enemy to continuing progress, strer.gth, and solidarity in
our nation, discrimination in employment . . . The
imposition of notice and the ensuing costs often
discourage such suits.”

This passage epitomizes the dilemma spawned by the
growth of Title VII back pay class actions. Courts are
mindful of the fact that traditional (b)(2) certification
policies deprive absent members of due process
consideration, but justify it in the name of the
“overriding” public policy objectives of Title VII and
continue to classify herterogenous (sic) classes under
(b)(2) rather than (b) 3).

The irony here, of course, is that while granting the
class great deference on the substantive and policy issues
in a suit, courts deny many members of the class
procedural fairness.

Rosen, Title VII Classes and Due Process; To (b)(2) or
Not To (b)(3), 26 Wayne L. Rev. 919, 952 (1980)
(footnote omitted).

The courts in the earlier Pettway cases in justifying its previous
orders in Pettway II] and IV to include a right to “opt out” in the
event a member of the class disagreed as to his entitlement ona
settlement in the future reasoned that although the action was
initiated as a Rule 23(b)2 in the back pay aspect it “begins to
resemble a 23(b)3 action” Pettway vs. American Cast Iron Pipe
Company (Pettway III), 41) Fed 2nd, 908 (Sth Cir.) Pertway vs.
American Cast lron Pipe Compan : (Pettway IV’), 576 Fed 2nd,
1157 (1978). Penson vs. Terminal Transport Company, 634 Fed
2nc 994 (Sth Cir.)

The ninth (9th) Circuit Court of Appeals has arrived at a
similar holding in allowing an opt out of a 23 (b)2 class action
reasoning that “given the breadth and nature of the claims
asserted the class allegations in the plaintiff's complaint and the
procedures adopted by the district court it appears clear that this
case was in essence a Rule (23)(b)(3) class action.” Officers for

22

Justice vs. Civil Service Commission, 688 Fed 2nd 615, 634-635
(9th Circuit 1982)

In trying to provide due process rights for individual members
several circuits have allowed an “opt out” procedure justifying
this under the “discretion of the court” as set forth in Holmes vs.
Continental Can Company, 1154, (supra).

This is not to suggest, however, that opt out procedures
have no applicability to the (b) (2) class action. Parties to
a proposed class action settlement may themselves
provide for an opt out procedure by which class members
may exclude themselves from the class and litigate their
claims in the same action or in a separate lawsuit, see,
e.g., Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1208 (Sth Cir.).
cert. denied—U.S.—,103 S.Ct. 63, 74 L.Ed.2d 65 (1982):
Penson, 634 F2d at 995: Cotton, 449 F2d at 1333; Wesr
Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer Co., 440 F. 2d 1079, 1982 (2d
Cir.), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 404 U.S. 548, 92
S.Ct. 731, 30 L. Ed.2d 721 (1971), and in appropriate
cases a court may conclude that a proposed settlement
should be disapproved unless the parties agree to sucha
procedure. In Penson \. Terminal Transport Co., the
former fifth circuit held that “although a member of a
class certified under Rule 23(b)(2) has no absolute right
to opt out of the class, a district court may mandate such
a right pursuant to its discretionary power under Rule
23." 634 F.2d at 993. This holding followed from Pettway
Ill, where the court reasoned that Title VII claimants
“dissatisfied with their portion of the (back pay) award
should be allowed to opt out in order to prove that they
were entitled to a larger portion.” 494 F.2d at 263 n. 154.
On remand the district judge entered a final order
providing “a mechanism for subclass members to opt in
or out of the settlement.” 576 F.2d at 1166 n. 2. When the
case once again came before the former fifth circuit,
Judge Goldberg in Pettway IV stated that the court had
“recently commented that opting out of the lawsuit
altogether after a back pay award settlement is not
permitted in 23(b)2) class actions.” Id. at 1220. Judge

23

Goldberg read footnote 154 in Pettway III to require that
“dissatisfied claimants be given an opportunity to prove
entitlement to a larger individual award in the same
lawsuit.”

It is of interest here that the majority here are the individuals
who objected to the $1,000,000 settlement in 1975 and that there
is a reversal in roles. The Court of Appeals, Sth Circuit had
mandated and even reiterated in Pettway III and IV the opt out
opportunity to be provided noting the conflicts and
dissatisfaction that might arise in the attempt to settle the case.
The [Ith Circuit by quoting this as authority in Holmes vs.
Continental Can Company (supra) adopted the Sth Circuit
holdings as to opting out and due process for individual
claimants in the class.

Therefore, petitioners are unable to see that any distinction can
be found to justify the split of the circuits in the case within the
case, Pettway III; Pettway IV; and Pettway VI (the instant case).

24

CONCLUSION

In view of the foregoing, this Court's Writ of Certiorari should
issue to review the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, reverse the judgments of the
Court of Appeals and the District Court entering such orders as
necessary to effectuate the holdings in Pettway III and Pettway
IV and to assure adequate representation of all members of the
class.

Respectfully submitted,

“)
Laud bow. =

Ralph E. Coleman

2175 11th Court South
Birmingham, Alabama 35205
(205) 939-0444

Counsel of Record for Petitioners,
Charles L. Daniel, et al

Ronald L. Spratt

1929 Third Avenue North
Smith Towers, Suite 3200
Birmingham, Alabama 35203
(205) 251-7180

Attorney for Petitioners,
Charles L. Daniel, et al

OF COUNSEL

COLEMAN & COLEMAN
2175 tith Court South
Birmingham, Alabama 35205
(205) 939-0444

25

PROOF OF SERVICE

1, Ralph E. Coleman, a member of the Bar of this Court as
counsel of record for petitioners here, Charles L. Daniel, et al,
hereby certify that three copies of the above and foregoing
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, together with appendices thereto,
have been served by United States mail, postage prepaid and
properly addressed upon Robert L. Wiggins, Jr., Attorney at
Law, Suite 716 Brown-Marx Building, 2000 Ist Avenue North,
Birmingham, Alabama 35203, Ms. Marcia B. Ruskin, Office of
General Counsel Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
2401 E. Street, Washington, D.C. 20506, and J. Fredric Ingram,
Attorney at Law, 1600 Bank for Savings Building, Birmingham,
Alabama 35203 on this the 30th Day of April, 1984.

{
‘

Ralph E. Coleman

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1609%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.