# Opposition — McManus v. Village of Southhampton > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1533%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Opposition - **Published:** January 1, 1984 - **Citation:** 467 U.S. 1206 ## Text NO. 83-1658 Octroser Term, 1983 ——-— ce | JAMES F. McMANTUS, Petitioner, —against— THE VILLAGE OF SOUTHAMPTON, NEW YORK, and THE TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON, NEW YORK, Respondents, DONALD FANNING and JAMES CHISM, Defendants. _ . a - = BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO WRIT OF CERTIORARI E. Ricnarp RrwMezs, JR. Counsel for Defendants, Village of Southampton, James Chism and Donald Fanning Montrort, Hearty, McGume & Sauiey 163 Mineola Boulevard Mineola, New York 11501 (516) 747-4082 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE EE I ecieerteterrtecteninninns ii FD ye IN 1 Pornt I—No basis for jurisdiction is alleged as IE THN TO srceicteteeeccstencicthigtrencenienieetesicinatiolnneeinsent 4 Pornt II—The District Court, in the exercise of its discretion, properly declined to retain State law claims under the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction 4 i aA et ae 5 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Table of Authorities Cases Cited po Bee Bik FRETS sattista v. Rodriguez, 702 F. 2d 393 oon. eeceeceeee Monell v. New York City Department of Social Ser- CE, ee Sha ND bdabinbencee eh Coa Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 20. Nelson v. Meyer, 520 F. 2d 1276, cert. den, 423 U.S. I: se cisssietdiniancatetseslacsanaiuhsatishdeuinaabesndauacbacseaacalaieee en Owens v. Haas, 601 F. 2d 1242, cert. den, 444 U.S. 980 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S, 715 ...0.......... United States Constitution Cited Fourth Amendment ............... 5 asonladanbasmaanenaiiaiea aii: en Sc Seo 2 ee Statutes Cited New York State Penal Law: eR Renner Nien AG ane ON edt LOL CR STS Us 28 USC: ES, MIIEEP -scesloanesseeioptchnittiicdennenateianananolenininciabanaablaghibganaas IIs UIUEE: Setesistecesienciedecbensdibonnsiitinasiluiigsiciacoosuibeanadaaniaamiddiiadcate ETI TIE fcesanscistiesiolisssscieeandsdaicicrepsesalscanhedeeiamneteinaiaiaaiace te NEL: SII. sceicscthiicnsiesesnescnmninenicriemincnsanbtidaeatelbaniapaiaialnatinds PAGE on ~ OTF bo Se ee on So - Fe CO a lr TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii PAGE 42 USC: a oii LS ge ee 1 Rule Cited Rules Governing Magistrate’s Proceedings in the Eastern District of New York: Rule 14 NO, 83-1658 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States Ocroper Term, 1983 in — JAMES F,. McMANUS, Petitioner, —against— THE VILLAGE OF SOUTHAMPTON, NEW YORK, and THE TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON, NEW YORK, Respondents, DONALD FANNING and JAMES CHISM, Defendants. BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO WRIT OF CERTIORARI Statement of Facts The Petitioner commenced this proceeding in the Dis- trict Court for the Eastern District of New York contend- ing that jurisdiction existed based upon 42 USC Sections 1983 and 1988, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amend- ments to the Constitution, and 28 USC Sections 1331, 1332 and 1343. Diversity jurisdiction being lacking, the serious basis for the retention of the action in the Federal Court system was premised upon 42 USC Section 1983, The Dis- trict Court determined that jurisdiction against the Town and the Village could not, under the allegations of the complaint, be sustained upon that statute and dismissed the action as to the Town and the Village, That deter- mination was sustained by the Second Circuit. Factually, the Petitioner alleges in his complaint that on July 2, 1980 Fanning was acting in a “triple capacity”. First, it is alleged, that he was acting as a private citi- zen, thus indicating that he had no relationship in this capacity with either the Village or the Town. Secondly, it is alleged that he was acting as an employee of the Village of Southampton, to wit, as a truck driver for the Department of Public Works, Thirdly, it is alleged that Fanning, at the time, was acting as a police officer for the Town of Southampton, Acting in one of the above capacities, Fanning sum- moned the Village Police for assistance in the arrest of the Petitioner, At this point, Fanning arrested the Peti- tioner charging him with harassment, a violation of See- tion 240:25 of the New York State Penal Law and, also, with a traffic violation. The Petitioner was handeuffed, the handeuffs allegedly causing pain, abrasions and contusions. He was taken to the Police Station and detained for a number of hours and released, These facts gave rise to the first cause of action alleged in the complaint, to wit, unconstitutional arrest or false imprisonment. The complaint, although inartful, alleged in the second count damages because of negligence in the way the hand- cuffs were applied, The third count sought damages for malicious prose- cution, Insofar as the Town and Village are concerned, the complaint is devoid of any allegation as to their fault other than the claim that defendants Chism and Fanning were employees of the municipal corporate defendants. Further, upon the motion to dismiss by the Village, Peti- tioner suggested no other theory, although otherwise ex- panding upon his complaint, as duly noted in the order of Judge Pratt dated February 4, 1982 (B1-B3). The District Court dismissed the action as to the Town and the Village, Thereafter by stipulation pursuant to 28 USC Section 636 the parties stipulated to try the case before Magistrate Jordan. It was so tried with there being a jury verdict in favor of the defendant Chism and against the defendant Fanning and in favor of the Peti- tioner for the total sum of $500.00. An appeal was filed by the Petitioner, The appeal with respect to the de- fendants Fanning and Chism was, according to stipula- tion, to be taken to the District Court. The Petitioner has not perfected this appeal within the time limits pro- vided by Rule 14 of the Rules Governing Magistrate’s Pro- ceedings in the Eastern District of New York and, pre- sumptively, has abandoned that appeal. The appeal from the orders dismissing the action as to the Town and Village was perfected to the Second Circuit, which Court affirmed the dismissal. At this point, the Petitioner seeks to have this Court re- view the propriety of the dismissal of the action as against the Town and the Village. POINT I No basis for jurisdiction is alleged as against the Village. The District Court afforded the Petitioner the oppor- tunity to explain the nature of his causes of action in- corporating that explanation as a part of his order and decision dated February 4, 1982 (B-2). At the same time the Court noted that the plaintiff did not allege any theory of liability against the Village other than on the basis of respondeat superior. Such allegations are not suffi- cient to impose liability or jurisdiction under 42 USC Sec- tion 1983. Monell v. New York City Depariment of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 and Owens v. Haas, 601 F. 2d 1242, cert. den. 444 U.S. 980; and Battista v. Rodriguez, 702 F. 2d 393. The Courts below were, clearly, correct when they held that there was no jurisdiction under the Civil Rights allegaticns. POINT II The District Court, in the exercise of its discretion, properly declined to retain State law claims under the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction. Petitioner complained in his complaint regarding the actions of Fanning and Chism. With respect to Fanning, the complaint all: ged that he was acting either in his individual capacity, in his capacity as a truck driver of the Village of Southampton or in his capacity as a part time police officer of the Town of Southampton. The jury awarded the Petitioner the sum of $500.00 for the alleged wrongful acts. Since that portion of the judgment stands, the potential liability of the Village, if Fanning’s acts were done in the scope of his employment to the Village, would be the sum of $500.00. With respect to Chism, who re- ceived a verdict, there is no liability and, hence, nothing that can effect the Village. The District Court, in the exercise of discretion, de- clined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the Village and such determination was not inappropriate. United Mine Workers vy. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 and Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693. Particularly, under the facts of this case, it was proper for the District Court, in the ex- ercise of its discretion, to decline to exercise any pendent jurisdiction, presuming that such existed. Nelson v. Meyer, 520 F. 2d 1276, cert. den. 423 U.S. 1034. Clearly there is no independent Federal jurisdiction against the municipal defendants since diversity does not exist. Since the Civil Rights allegations are insufficient as a matter of law, it would not seem that pendent jurisdiction is available. Aldmger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1. CONCLUSION This Court should not grant the writ. Respectfully submitted, E. Ricnarp Rimes, Jr. Counsel for Defendants, Village of Southampton, James Chism and Donald Fanning Montrort, Hearty, McGuire & Sauey 163 Mineola Boulevard Mineola, New York 11501 (516) 747-4082 Dated: April 27, 1984 (THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK) --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1533%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.