# Petitioners Reply Brief — FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION v. TENNECO OIL CO. (Nos. 83-1618, 83-1321, 83-1432, 83-1433, 83-1442, 83-1443)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petitioners Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1984

## Text

Office-Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED

No. 83-1618 - MAY 25 1984 .
ass MCL nn Sairaermetns: | ar
CLERK

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1983

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,
PETITIONER

Vv.

TENNECO OIL COMPANY, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

REPLY MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER

REX E. LEE
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases :

Consumer Federation of America Vv. FPC, 515 F.2d

347, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 906 ............................-.
Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 370 F.2d 57, cert. de-

a a re ee Ae deed
El Paso Natural Gas Co., 25 F.E.R.C. § 61,292......
El Paso Natural Gas Co., 57 F.P.C. 989 ..................
FERC Vv. Pennzoil Producing Co., 489 U.S. 508......
pe a ee nee
Phillips Petroleum Co. Vv. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672..
Public Service Commission v. Mid-Louisiana Gas

Co., No. 81-1889 (June 28, 1983) —.......................
Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 30 F.P.C. 759....
United Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil

ie ot eee) ee ea

Statutes :

Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717 et seq. ....................
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. 3301
et seq.:

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In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

No. 83-1618

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,
PETITIONER

v.

TENNECO OIL COMPANY, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

REPLY MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER

In our petition, we contended that the decision of
the court of appeals—holding that the lease sale
agreements at issue are not subject to Commission
reguiation under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717
et seq.—constitutes a clear departure from the funda-
mental teachings of this Court in Phillips Petrolewm
Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954), and United
Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 381 U.S.
392 (1965) (Rayne Field). We also argued that, un-
less the decision below is reversed, respondents would

(1)

2

reap an enormous windfall—at the expense of the
pipelines and/or their customers—for many years to
come.’ The points raised by respondents warrant
only a few brief comments.

1. It is common ground that, in determining
whether the Commission has jurisdiction over lease
sale agreements, the dispositive question is whether
what was sold was gas reserves or merely the right
to explore for gas. Respondents contend (PLA Resp.
Br. in Opp. 14; Tenneco Oil Br. in Opp. 12-13) that
under Rayne Field, “substantiality of development”
is an absolute prerequisite to a finding of Commission
jurisdiction. We disagree. The central teaching of
Rayne Field, which respondents ignore, is that the
jurisdictional question turns on the overall economic
and commercial realities of the transaction, not on
application of a rigid, mechanistic formula.

Viewed in these terms, the lease sale transactions
at issue must be regarded as subject to the Commis-
sion’s jurisdiction. As we demonstrated in our peti-
tion (at 19-20), the economic realities support the
Commission’s conclusion that the respondent gas pro-
ducers were not leasing the right to explore land for
gas but were selling gas in place. The record con-
vincingly shows that the producers sold proven gas
reserves * for resale in interstate commerce pursuant

1 For example, the GLA respondents are presently receiv-
ing “royalties” of about $3.50 per MMBtu—a rate that ex-
ceeds by more than 400% the current NGPA price for “old”
or “flowing” gas. As we explain below (see note 5, infra),
this rate could almost triple by next year.

2 Where lease sale acreage is proven, the economic reality
is that gas, not exploration rights, is being sold. The court of
appeals in this case acknowledged (Pet. App. 15a) that “the
record reveals the reserves in the [San Juan] Basin may well

3

to contracts that were similar in substance to con-
ventional wellhead sales contracts.* Moreover, these
reserves were sufficiently developed to permit the two
pipeline companies to obtain the regulatory approval
and financial commitments necessary to construct
major segments of their pipelines.* In short, “[t]he

have been ‘proven’ at least within reasonable estimates.” As
the ALJ observed, the particular geological structure of the
Basin “tended to assure that gas would be encountered at
virtually any location” (Pet. App. 53a (footnote omitted) ).
The ALJ cited the testimony of a witness for Northwest, who
stated that the pipeline had drilled several hundred wells
in the Basin and had never encountered a dry hole (id. at 53a
n.47).

’ The contracts provided for: (1) a specified sum per Mcf
subject to periodic escalation; (2) rate redetermination at the
end of a fixed term; and (3) favored nations clauses and take-
or-pay clauses. In addition, the contracts imposed strict drill-
ing requirements on the pipelines.

*To be sure, the San Juan Basin fields here involved were
not as developed as was Rayne Field. As we explained in our
petition, however, under the practical approach applied in
Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 370 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 388 U.S. 910 (1967) (Ship Shoal), the fields here
certainly “reached the stage of proof and development neces-
sary to satisfy the Rayne criteria” (370 F.2d at 64).

In an effort to distinguish this case from Ship Shoal, re-
spondents argue (Union Oil Br. in Opp. 19-21; PLA Resp.
Br. in Opp. 19-21) that the field in Ship Shoal was sub-
stantially developed, whereas the fields involved in the in-
stant lease sale transactions were not. Respondents’ argu-
ment is wide of the mark. At the time of the transfer in
Ship Shoal, only two of the estimated 36 to 42 completions
needed to develop the field for gas production were in place.
Of the twelve wells that had been drilled, only one was a gas
well; the others were oil wells or dry holes. The subsequent
drilling of five potential gas wells to which respondents refer
(PLA Resp. Br. in Opp. 20) was done by the pipeline pur-
chasers (following closing), not by the producers. See Ten-

4

crucial fact here, as in Rayne, is that the assignment
of the leases accomplished the transfer of large
amounts of substantially proven * * * gas reserves to
an interstate pipeline for eventual resale in inter-
state commerce * * *.” Ship Shoal, 370 F.2d at 67.

By contrast, respondents’ analysis defies economic
reality. As we pointed out in our petition (at 7 n.9,
16), the special overriding royalties involved here,
which are payable on the net interest assigned (as in
Rayne Field and Ship Shoal), are about six to seven
times greater than typical land owner royalties (70%-
80% v. 1214%). Respondents do not explain why
this “royalty” level is so high if, under their theory
of the case, the transactions merely involved the right
to explore otherwise worthless land for gas. More-
over, respondents’ theory rests on the wholly invalid
assumption that the Commission and the financial
community would approve major pipeline construc-
tion solely on the basis of exploration rights. The
simple economic reality is that these transactions in-
volved the sale of natural gas reserves in place.

2. Respondents contend (PLA Resp. Br. in Opp.
16-19; Union Oil Br. in Opp. 10-11) that the decision
below can have no prospective impact on natural gas
consumers because, under this Court’s decision in
Public Service Commission v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co.,
No. 81-1889 (June 28, 1983), the rates charged by

nessee Gas Transmission Co., 30 F.P.C. 759, 798, 808 (1968).
Respondents’ submissions to this Court overstating the level
of development in Ship Shoal stand in sharp contrast to the
producers’ petition for a writ of certiorari in Ship Shoal, in
which the producers stated that “only one gas well had been
completed, no gas had been produced, and at the time of
transfer 34 to 40 completions were anticipated for develop-
ment” (Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, petition for cert., No. 1823,
at 6 (Oct. Term, 1966) ).

5

E] Paso and other pipelines for first sales of pipeline-
produced gas may not exceed the applicable ceiling
rates in Title I of the Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978, 15 U.S.C. 3301 et seg. (NGPA). On the con-
trary, we submit that the future ramifications of this
one case alone are themselves sufficiently substantial
to warrant certiorari.

Respondents do not dispute the assertion in our
petition (at 22) that the lease sale acreage involved
in this case presently contains estimated reserves of
approximately three trillion cubic feet of gas. In ad-
dition, the GLA respondents cannot dispute that, at
present, they are receiving “royalty” payments of
more than $3.50 per MMBtu for “old” natural gas,
the current NGPA ceiling price for which is well un-
der $1.00 per MMBtu. Nor do respondents dispute
that this approximate “400% monetary gap” will
widen as the remaining reserves are utilized in future
years.’ Rather, respondents assert (Union Oil Br. in
Opp. 14-15; Tenneco Oil Br. in Opp. 24-26) that the
impact of the “400% monetary gap” will fall on the
pipelines, not the consumers—a consequence that,
respondents suggest, does not justify review by this
Court.

To be sure, as we acknowledged in our petition
(at 21) and as respondents emphasize (Union Oil
Br. in Opp. 10-11; PLA Resp. Br. in Opp. 18-19;

*The 400% differential between the “royalty” being paid
respondents and the NGPA ceiling price for the gas may be
dwarfed by future differentials. In June 1985, following the
scheduled deregulation of new gas under the NGPA (see 15
U.S.C. 8331 (a) (1)), El Paso will be required to pay royalties
to respondents based on the average of the three highest prices
the pipeline pays for gas. At that point, the 400% differential
could almost triple.

6

Tenneco Oil Br. in Opp. 9-10), the decision whether
to shift financial responsibility from the pipelines
to the ultimate consumers through special rate re-
lief is a matter within the ultimate discretion of
the Commission. See 15 U.S.C. 3314(b) (2); FERC
v. Pennzoil Producing Co., 439 U.S. 508 (1979). But
respondents miss the point when they assert simplistic-
ally that the Court should not be concerned about the
adverse future impact of the decision below because
the financial fallout may fall on the pipelines rather
than on the ultimate consumers. Respondents’ argu-
ment is based on an unduly restrictive view of the
scope of the Commission’s responsibility to protect the
public interest under both the Natural Gas Act and
the NGPA. The “public interest” over which the
Commission stands watch encompasses all segments
of the natural gas industry—consumers, distributors,
state commissions, pipelines and producers. See, e.g.,
NAACP vy. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 669-670 (1976). As
the court pointed out in Consumer Federation of
America v. FPC, 515 F.2d 347, 357-358 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S 906 (1975), this Court has
consistently rejected the notion that the Commission
need not concern itself with the level of producer
rates “on the ground that the pressures built up by
producer rate increases could somehow be contained
at the pipeline level by invoking a regulatory agency’s
authority to disallow ‘excessive’ costs.” It is clear
that either the pipelines or the ultimate consumers
will suffer severe financial dislocation absent reversal
of the court of appeals’ erroneous decision.°

* Respondents’ attempt to cast the impact of the court of
appeals’ decision on future gas prices as essentially a pri-
vate dispute between themselves and El Paso (£.g., Union

7

In our petition (at 20-21), we pointed out that if
the Commission is held to have jurisdiction, gas con-
sumers would be able to assert claims for more than
$1 billion in refunds for the special overriding royal-
ties paid to respondents in the period between 1974
and 1983.’ Respondents, not surprisingly, dispute

Oil Br. in Opp. 14-15) is misleading. In order to mitigate the
enormous future impact of the decision below on the pipe-
lines, both El Paso and Northwest have entered into settle-
ments with some of the respondents. The settlement between
Northwest and Phillips has already been approved by the
Commission. In approving that settlement, the Commission
noted that “Phillips is offering to accept rates under PLA-5
that could save Northwest, and eventually its consumers, as
much as $50 million a year.” El Paso Natural Gas Co., 25
F.E.R.C. { 61,292, at 61,674 (1983) (emphasis added). The
settlements between E] Paso and Union (Union Oil Co. of
California, Docket No. CI84-141-000 (filed Dec. 18, 1983) )
and between E] Paso and both Tenneco and Conoco (El Paso
Natural Gas Co., Docket No. CP74-314, et al. (filed May 18,
1984) ), which have not yet been approved by the Commission,
raise numerous complex issues relating to future gas cost and
gas supply.

With regard to the impact of the decision below on the
pipelines, respondents’ argument (Union Oil Br. in Opp. 14-
15; Tenneco Oil Br. in Opp. 24-25) that application of Mid-
Louisiana to the El Paso system will be beneficial to the pipe-
line overall is wholly irrelevant. The fact that E] Paso is en-
titled, under Mid-Louisiana, to additional revenues for its
production from other properties has no bearing on whether
the lease sale transactions at issue are subject to the Com-
mission’s jurisdiction and, if so, whether the rates paid by
El Paso to respondents for the gas are unjust and unrea-
sonable.

T Respondents erroneously suggest (Tenneco Oil Br. in Opp.
22-23) that the Commission, in El Paso Natural Gas Co., 57
F.P.C. 989 (1977), approved the level of these special over-
riding royalties as being just and reasonable. The Commis-

these claims (Union Oil Br. in Opp. 12-14; PLA
Resp. Br. in Opp. 25-27).° It is clear, however, that
unless the court of appeals’ decision is overturned,
the affected natural gas consumers would be deprived
of any opportunity to assert their refund claims.

For the foregoing reasons and those stated in our
petition, it is respectfully submitted that the petition
for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

REx E., LEE
Solicitor General

May 1984

sion simply held that E] Paso had acted prudently in enter-
ing into settlements after the Sun Oil arbitration award.
Indeed, the Commission specifically stated that it was “not
deciding whether the amounts received by the special over-
riding royalty interest owners, were they found to be juris-
dictional, are just and reasonable” (57 F.P.C. at 1000).

® Even if there were merit to respondents’ assertion that
refunds should not be ordered for the period prior to Sep-
tember 25, 1980 (the date of the Commission’s decision on
jurisdiction), a point we do not concede, refunds of nearly
half a billion dollars have been claimed for the period sub-
sequent to that date.

WY os. 6. covennment raintine orrice; 1904 421623 560

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1509%3A15. Public record. Not legal advice.
