# Petition — Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks v. Russell > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1475%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition - **Published:** January 1, 1984 - **Citation:** 467 U.S. 1204 ## Text 83-1414 No. 83-__ ALEXANDER L. STEVAS. IN THE Supreme Court of the Anited States OCTOBER TERM, 1983 BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY, AIRLINE AND STEAMSHIP CLERKS, FREIGHT HANDLERS, EXPRESS AND STATION EMPLOYES, Petitioner, Vv. LAURENCE G. RUSSELL, WILLIAM L. HANNA, AND EppiE D. LANGWELL, Respondents. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT JaMEs L. HIGHSAW, JR. (Counsel of Record) JOSEPH GUERRIERI, JR. HicHsaw & Manoney, P.C. Suite 210 Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employes PRESS OF BYRON 8. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C. (282) 347-6203 -_: i ISSUE PRESENTED This petition presents the following issue: 1. Does a decision of the National Mediation Board dis- missing, after investigation, a representation application filed by an individual pursuant to Section 2, Ninth of the Railway Labor Act, upon the basis of the uncontested fact that the individual seeks certification by the Board as a representative of an already represented craft or class of employees of a carrier subject to the Act, solely for the purpose of terminating the collective bargaining agreement governing such employ- ees and their status as represented employees, constitute a gross violation of a specific statutory command of that Act so as to subject the Board’s action to judicial review? 2 2? eee TABLE OF CONTENTS Page eG TINIE ooo ccc ctvcccccnsccscdvciesee iv ET oc ct ca Ue bacncbescuttegeand eaenneie 2 ree CUE Mw nd ke vba t'pst ons eiatded ednoas 2 STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED .............0+00- 2 I ad oe Ue ae ekeceeee 4 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ..............-006: 8 I. The Court Of Appeals Decision Reversing The Dis- trict Court Raises Issues Of Substantial Importance In The Administration Of The Railway Labor Act Which Should Be Reviewed By This Court ...... 8 II. The Decision Below Conflicts With Established ee oe ar ee Oe oe ith Respect To The Exclusive Jurisdiction i" Mediation Board In Representation Proceed- si cused pededaegetes ee ceseaveverescccsvecnesos 17 APPENDICES: for the Fifth Circuit, decided APPENDIX C: Unived States Court of Appeals forthe November 28, 1983) .............05- 34a APPENDIX D: Applicable Provisions of the Constitu- tion of the United States and the Lae et GS Gein ie Sn Say of the petition) AppEenpix E: Application to the National Mediation of Representa- APPENDIX E-1: Decision of the National Mediation Board dated May 21, 1981 APPENDIX F: APPENDIX G: APPENDIX H: APPENDIX I: APPENDIX J: iii Table of Contents Continued Page Russell v. National Mediation Board Amended Compliant for Declaratory Injunctive Relief and Petition For Re- view and For Extraordinary Relief CUBA TA) Sab edine cnsvcess 48a Russell v. National Mediation Board, Defendant National Mediation Board’s RED. oon OR A cc a ee cas 02 57a Russell v. National Mediation Board BRAC’s Answer to the Complaint and Cross Claim Russell v. National Mediation Board, — of Appeal filed, September 7, iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases RELIED UPON: Page Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 478 (1964) ...... 13 Brotherhood of Railway Clerks v. Association for the i of Non-Contract Employees, 380 U.S. 650 ee a. tin See So ae Pee cae 12, 13, 16 General Committee v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company, 320 U.S. 323 (1943) ...........0eees ll General Committee v. Southern Pacific Company, 320 Oe WMD kt sc cs eeri..: AERIS Y Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 Se RIN gb onc KikteUeaeddc eackus 6Uaace ces 17 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. BRAC, 402 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. BRAC v. National Mediation Board, 398 U.S. 848 (1968) .. 13 Inthe Matter of the Application of Laurence G. Russell, 8 BOE PE ON COTE 60 thine 00st sascccsdbecsic 14 Laurence G. Russell, William L. Hanna and Eddie D. Langwell v. National Mediation Board, the Atchi- son, T and Santa Fe Railway Company, et al., 110 L DEED Cis bd wisi eb dco cankes xe 2 Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958) ............. s 12, 13 Philbrook v. Glodett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975) ............ 15 Railway E Department v. Hanson, 351 U.S. aoe (1966) ....... se i6 shite Case ¥ bts cle’ aabrwrk te 17 ’s Union of North America v. NMB, 320 U.S. STM ss occbabdcchhdenamnss eerantnens 11, 12, 15 vere: Co. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515 eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee ee eee eee eee STATUTES AND OTHER MATERIALS RELIED UPon: Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151, et seg. Section la, 45 U.S.C. § 15a 22... .eecceeeeeneeees 3, 9 Section 1, Sixth, 45 U.S.C. § 151, Sixth ........ passim Section 2, First, 45 U.S.C. § 152, First ........ 3, 9, 10 Section 2, Second, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Second ........ 3, 10 Section 2, Third, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Third ........... 9, 10 ’ Vv Table of Authorities Continued Page Section 2, Fourth, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth .... 3, 9, 10 Section 2, Sixth, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Sixth ........... 10 Section 2, Seventh, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Seventh ...... 10 Section 2, Ninth, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth ........ passim Te 5 Cot > * eer me cores 4 ORT i Sie: IED bg sti cends vereandccdunn 3, 10 Rule oe), Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the SE wn ot cain cbiwend sabdiiccd uveusweunn SEND i. a:c soba c Gund Wesei pun dkehs awe 2 ED bv be bene bdcvecednuccentbastga 2 a SE LE cance s taste conseseceys 3, 6, 17 ae SES CEN, Wt vnc ceacededb's cocecaeghhe 3, 6 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States OCTOBER TERM, 1983 No. 83-___ BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY, AIRLINE AND STEAMSHIP CLERKS, FREIGHT HANDLERS, EXPRESS AND STATION EMPLOYES, Petitioner, Vv. LAURENCE G. RUSSELL, WILLIAM L. HANNA, AND EppiE D. LANGWELL, Respondents. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT The petitioner, Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employes (hereinafter, “BRAC”], respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the final judgment and decree of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversing a decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Amarillo Division, granting the National Mediation Board (hereinafter, “Mediation Board”) summary judgment on the complaint of respondents Laurence G. Russell, et al., and dismissing said complaint, which sought to invalidate the action of the Mediation Board in dismissing a representation application of respondent Russell filed with the Board pursuant to Section 2, Ninth of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth) to certify respondent Russell as the representative of the craft or class of certain Police Officer 2 employees of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company (hereinafter, “Santa Fe”], so that he could then terminate such representation and the collective bargaining agreement governing the rates of pay, rules, and working conditions of said employees. OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the Court of Appeals, reproduced as Appen- dix A hereto,’ is reported at 714 F.2d 1332 and styled Laurence G. Russell, William L. Hanna and Eddie D. Langwell v. National Mediation Board, the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, et al. The decision of the District Court, (App. B hereto) is reported only in 110 LRRM 2167. JURISDICTION The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered on Septem- ber 22, 1983 (App. A hereto). A petition of the petitioner BRAC for rehearing and the suggestion of petitioner for Rehearing En Banc were denied by the Court of Appeals on November 28, 1983 (App. C hereto). This petition is governed by the provisions of Title 28, Sections 1254(1) and 2101(c) of the United States Code and Rule 20(2) of the Revised Rules of this Court which require the petition to be filed within ninety (90) days after the entry of the final judgment or decree of the Court of Appeals. STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED This case primarily involves the provisions of Section 2, Ninth of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth) providing for the resolution by the Mediation Board of disputes among the employees of a carrier subject to the Act as to who ‘The Appendix is hereinafter referred to as “App.”. Pe Lane, . 3 are the representatives of such employees. The section reads as follows: Ifany dispute shall arise among a carrier’s employees as to who are the representatives of such employees designated and authorized in accordance with the requirements of this Act, it shall be the duty of the Mediation Board, upon request of either party to the dispute, to investigate such rvs taagchesanl agin lh se! sexy hy no , within thirty days after the receipt of the invocation of its serv- ices, the name or names of the individuals or organizations that have been designated and authorized to represent the employees involved in the dispute, and certify the same to the carrier. Upon receipt of such certification the carrier shall treat with the representative of the craft or class for the of this Act. In such an investigation, the M ion Board shall be authorized to take a secret ballot of the employees involved, or to utilize any other appropri- ate method ascertaining the names of their duly desig- nated and authorized representatives in such manner as shall insure the choice i any by the employ- ees without interference, influence, or’coercion ex by the carrier. In the conduct of any election for the herein indicated the Board designate who may — in the election, or we appoint a commit- 7 aah br naar wage Abantannr bgp BS og n days designate the emp who may parti in the election. The Board have access to pin corto power to make copies of the books and records of the carriers to obtain and utilize such information as may be deemed necessary by it to carry out the purposes and provisions of this paragraph. The case also involves Sections 1, Sixth, la, 2, First, Second, Fourth, and 6 of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. §§ 151, Sixth, 151a, 152, First, Second, Third, Fourth and 156). These provisions are quoted in full in App. D hereto and pertinent portions thereof are also quoted at appropriate places in this petition. The complaint also alleged that the Mediation Board action violated the rights of respondents to freedom of associa- tion under the First Amendment to the United States Con- stitution as well as their Fifth Amendment rights. The provi- ee ee ee to. 4d STATEMENT OF THE CASE This case began on March 23, 1981, when Laurence G. Rus- sell filed an application with the Mediation Board pursuant to Section 2, Ninth of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth) alleging the existence of a representation dispute in- volving special agents and security guards employed by the Santa Fe, a railroad subject to the provisions of the Act (App. E hereto). Such employees generally constitute the craft or class of Police Officers below the rank of Captain. Such employ- ees were represented by petitioner BRAC. Section 2, Ninth of the Railway Labor Act, quoted in full, supra, page 3, provides that upon the request of either party to a dispute among employees of a carrier subject to the Act, “as to who are the representatives of such employees designated and authorized in accordance with the requirements of the Act,” the Mediation Board, a Federal agency created by Sec- tion 4 (45 U.S.C. § 154) of the statute, shall investigate and certify the name or names of the individuals or organizations designated or authorized to represent the employees involved in the dispute. The section authorizes the Board to conduct an election or “to utilize any other appropriate method” of ascertaining the employee representative to be certified. Upon certification of an employee representative by the Mediation Board, the employer railroad is required to “treat” with such representative. This requirement constitutes a command to the employer to act affirmatively to bargain exclusively with the certified representative with respect to rates of pay, rules, and working conditions of the employees involved. Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515 (1937). The Mediation Board conducted the investigation of the dispute alleged in Mr. Russell’s application as required by Section 2, Ninth, in which BRAC participated as the duly certified representative of the employees involved, and on May 21, 1981, issued its “Findings Upon Investigation, Dismissal” of the application (App. E-1 hereto). This decision is reported 5 at 8 NMB No. 135 (1981). The dismissal was based upon two basic findings. First: the Mediation Board found that an application for certification as an employee representative is void ab initio where the applicant lacks the intent to represent the craft or class, if certified. This finding reads as follows: The Railway Labor Act, unlike the National Labor Relations Act, contains no statutory provision for decertification of a ining representative. Atchison, ag and Santa Fe Railway Company, 8 NMB No. 18 (1980). See also, Manufacturers Railway Company, 7 NMB Nos. 233 and 250 (1980). The Board will not progress an application for investigation of a representation dispute where the applicant lacks the intent to represent the craft or class, if certified. Chicago Union Station, 8 NMB No. 45 (1980), and will dismiss such an application because it is void ab initio. (App. E-1 at 46a). Second: The Mediation Board found that applicant Russell lacked the intent to represent the class or craft of employees involved. This finding reads as follows: The Board finds that Laurence G. Russell lacks an in- leaving the employees ge Bog in effect, notwithstanding the ification the obliga- (App. E-1 at 47a). The Board also found that respondent Rus- sell’s objective of achieving “exempt” status for the employees involved as set forth in cited documents was erroneous because there was no such status under the statute, and thus simply meant decertification. This factual finding was supported by documents, including letters signed by Mr. Russell, and a statement of counsel for the applicant to the Mediation Board’s Chief Hearing Officer. Among the cited documents were let- ters from the applicant Russell to United States Senators and a Member of the House of Representatives advising that Mr. Russell’s objective was “to negotiate an agreement to termi- 6 nate the collective bargaining agreement then in effect and thereafter to refrain from engaging in further representation of the employees.” Mr. Russell has not contested the factual accuracy of the Mediation Board’s findings in the subsequent litigation with respect to its decision. On July 7, 1981, Mr. Russell, along with Messrs. William L. Hanna and Eddie D. Langwell, two other Santa Fe employees, filed a two count complaint in the District Court against the Mediation Board, the Santa Fe, and petitioner BRAC. OnJuly 23, 1981, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint (App. F hereto). The first cause of action in the amended complaint alleged that the Mediation Board action in dismissing the rep- resentation application was unlawful, arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion in excess of its statutory jurisdiction, and violative of the First and Fifth Amendment rights of plaintiffs under the United States Constitution. The amended complaint also alleged that the Railway Labor Act was unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs. The complaint prayed that the District Court order a representation election or utilize another appro- priate method of ascertaining the duly authorized representa- tive of the employees involved. The second count of the complaint repeated the allegations of the first count and added a claim that the union security provi- sions of the collective bargaining agreement between the San- — ta Fe and BRAC was violative of plaintiffs’ rights of freedom of association guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and prayed for a court order to enjoin the enforcement of the union security agreement.’ The defendants Mediation Board and BRAC filed answers to the amended complaint alleging that it did not state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted; that the District 2 A copy of the amended complaint is attached as App. F. 7 Court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the amended complaint; and denying any unlawful action. (App. G and H). The Santa Fe filed an answer denying any illegal activity. The amended complaint against the Santa Fe was dismissed by the District Court on August 20, 1982. (App. B hereto).’ The National Mediation Board filed a motion for summary judgment with the District Court, which was granted by that Court on March 17, 1982, on the ground that the District Court had no jurisdiction to review and set aside the Board’s order dismissing the representation application (App. B hereto). The District Court’s decision found that: (1) it is well established law that Mediation Board representation decisions under Sec- tion 2, Ninth are not subject to judicial review with two limited exceptions not here applicable i.e., (a) where the Board has acted in excess of its power or contrary to statutory provisions, and (b) where there are constitutional grounds therefore; (2) the Mediation Board’s investigation as to whether a represen- tation dispute existed in the present case was sufficient and within its scope of authority; and (3) the Mediation Board’s investigation met all due process requirements. BRAC also filed with the District Court on March 18, 1982, a motion to dismiss the complaint or to grant BRAC summary eS ae, a ee 22, 1982. On September 7, 1982, respondents Russell, et al., filed their notice of appeal of the District Court’s order granting the motion of the Mediation Board for summary judgment. The notice of appeal did not include the District Court’s order of August 22, 1982, dismissing the amended complaint as to BRAC (App. J hereto). 3 BRAC and the Santa Fe also filed cross claims and counterclaims against each other which were dismissed by agreement. am o AD 8 The Court of Appeals issued its decision reversing the Dis- trict Court judgment on September 22, 1983. This decision found that the Mediation Board violated the statutory mandate of Section 2, Ninth of the Railway Labor Act by refusing to further progress respondent Russeil’s representation applica- tion because he was a “representative” within the meaning of Section 1, Sixth of the Railway Labor Act even though he sought certification as a representative in order to terminate the collective bargaining agreement governing the employees involved and end representation of such employees. The Court did not address respondents constitutional claim in light of its conclusion of a statutory violation. (App. A hereto) BRAC filed with the Court of Appeals a timely petition for rehearing and a suggestion of rehearing en banc which were denied by the Court on November 28, 1983 (App. C hereto).‘ The Court of Appeals also denied the BRAC motion for a stay of mandate. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT I. The Court Of Appeals Decision Reversing The District Court Raises Issues Of Substantial Importance In The Administration Of The Railway Labor Act Which Should Be Reviewed By This Court The decision below held that the Mediation Board violated the mandate of Section 2, Ninth of the Railway Labor Act that it investigate representation applications and certify a “repre- sentative” thereunder by dismissing the Russell application ‘On October 10, 1983, the plaintiffs-respondents filed a motion with the Court of Appeals challenging the extension of time granted by the Court to BRAC to petition for rehearifig and to file a sugges- tion of rehearing en banc on that ground. The challenge was based on a claim that BRAC, which had been a party in interest before the NMB, a defendant before the District Court, and fully participated as an appellee before the Court of Appeals, had no standing because did not desire to appeal the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to BRAC. That motion was denied. 9 after the Board’s investigation thereof revealed that it was the intent of the applicant to use certification to terminate repre- sentation of the employees involved in favor of an “exempt status” and to terminate the applicable collective bargaining agreement. The decision rests such conclusion on the ground that Mr. Russell was a “representative” of the employees involved within the meaning of Section 1, Sixth of the Railway Labor Act even though his clearly established intent was to terminate representation under the statute. This conclusion is rendered within the context of a statute which, unlike the National Labor Relations Act, contains no provision for decertification of a statutory representative, which was passed by Congress for the stated purpose of providing, inter alia, for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning grievances and rates of pay, rules, and working conditions (45 U.S.C. § 15la) and which provides for the implementation of such purpose by: (a) requiring employees and carriers to make’ every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements and settle all disputes between them (45 U.S.C. § 152, First); (b) providing employees with the right “to organize and bargain collectively through “representatives” of their own choosing (45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth); (c) providing that the majority of a craft or.class shall have the right to determine who shall be the “representative” of the craft of class “for the purposes of this Act” (45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth) (Emphasis supplied); (d) providing for the designation of “Representatives, for the purpose of this Act” without interference, coercion, or interference (45 U.S.C. § 152, Third) (Emphasis supplied); (e) imposing a duty on the “representatives” thus chosen a duty of deciding, in conference with carrier representatives, all disputes between the parties (45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth); A, Be , i ae dé 10 (f) by imposing a duty on the employee “representatives” in case of a dispute concerning grievances or interpretation or application of agreements (“minor disputes”) to comply with specified requirements for conference with carrier representa- tives with respect thereto (45 U.S.C. § 152, Sixth); (g) by imposing a duty in Section 6 (45 U.S.C. § 156) upon employee representatives to give written notice in accordance with statutory requirements of intended changes in agree- ments and confer with carrier representatives with respect thereto as the first step in the mandatory Railway Labor Act procedures of conference, and mediation by the Mediation Board under Section 5 during which periods the status quo must be maintained to prevent disruptions of commerce lead- ing up to, where necessary, the appointment of a Presidential Emergency Board and/or efforts by the Mediation Board to obtain voluntary arbitration of the dispute pursuant to Section 2, Seventh. (45 U.S.C. § 152, Seventh) Thus, when the Court below concludes that respondent Rus- sell “intended to represent” tic employees involved within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act since there are no qualifiers attached to the Act’s simple definition of “representative” in Section 1, Sixth of that statute, the Court gives no significance to the provisions of Section 2, First, Second, Third, Fourth and Sixth which require a Railway Labor Act “representative” to be a person or organization designated “for the purposes of this Act,” who must comply with the statutory duties imposed upon such an employee “representative,” including the duty of mak- ing, maintaining and amending agreements, and handling dis- putes with respect thereto. In short, the decision below reads out of the Railway Labor Act all of the statutory duties of a “representative” of employees, which for some 60 years have been the heart of a statute passed to bring order out of chaos in labor relations in the railroad industry (subsequently extended to air transportation) in the public interest. A decision which can have such a dramatic effect upon labor relations in rail and air transportation based on grounds which ; % "4 11 conflict with all of the statutory purposes, which reverses the Mediation Board practices with respect to representation and which reads into the Railway Labor Act provisions of the National Labor Relations Act not included in the rail statute, should not be permitted to become the law of the land without review by this Court. II. The Decision Below Conflicts With Established Princi- ples Of Law Set Forth In Decisions Of This Court With Respect To The Exclusive Jurisdiction Of The Mediation Board In Representation Proceedings It has been a settled principle of law established by decisions of this court for at least the past forty (40) years that the Congress in enacting and amending the Railway Labor Act gave the National Mediation Board the exclusive power and responsibility to determine matters arising out of the adminis- tration of Section 2, Ninth of the Railway Labor Act. Switch- men’s Union of North America v. NMB, 320 U.S. 297 (1943); General Committee v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company, 320 U.S. 323 (1943); General Committee v. South- ern Pacific Company, 320 U.S. 338 (1943). In the Switchmen’s Union case, which first articulated the extremely narrow and limited area of judicial review of Mediation Board determina- tions in representation proceedings, this Court stated: The act in Section 2, Fourth writes into law the ‘right’ of the or of any craft or class of employees” to deter- mine who shall be the representative of the craft or class rig oo gt ge te t’ is protected by Section 2, Ninth, which gives the Mediation the power to resolve controversies concerning it and as an incident thereto to determine what is the riate craft or class in which the election should be held (citations omitted). A review by the Federal courts of the National Mediation Board’s n is not necessary to e or which it created. It selected the precise machinery and fashioned the tool which it deemed suited to that end. Id. at 300-301. 12 This Court further stated that Congress in giving the Na- tional Mediation Board the exclusive right to enforce the “rights” created by the Railway Labor Act intended that “the dispute was to reach its last terminal point when the adminis- trative finding was made. There was to be no dragging out the controversy into other tribunals of law.” Jd. at 305. (Emphasis supplied). While the bar to judicial review of National Mediation Board determinations in representation disputes enunciated by the Supreme Court in Switchmen’s Union. id., has remained firm,’ this Court subsequently recognized an extremely nar- row limitation thereto. In Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1968), this Court upheld a District Court injunction setting aside a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) election and certification where the NLRB had clearly acted “in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the act.” Jd. at 184. The limitation of the Leedom v. Kyne, supra, “exception” to the bar of review of Mediation Board representation announced by this Court in Switchmen’s Union, is set forth in it’s decision in Brotherhood of Railway Clerks v. Association for the Benefit of Noncontract Employ- ees (ABNE), 380 U.S. 650 (1965). In its decision in ABNE, supra, the Court reiterated the principle of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Mediation Board in representation matters, stating: That Leedom v. Kyne was no exception to Switchmen’s Union. Rather the Court was careful to note that “this 5See also e.g., Sedalia-Marshall-Boonville Stage Line, Inc. v. N.M.B., 574 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1979); Machinists v. N.M.B., 426 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 889 U.S. 912 (1967); BRAC v. N.M.B., 374 F.2d 269(D.C. Cir. 1966); Teamsters v. N.M.B., 363 F.2d 311 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 920 (1966); Ruby v. American Airlines, Inc., 323 F.2d 248 (2nd Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 918 (1964). 13 suit is not one to ‘review,’ in the sense that the term is used in the act, a decision of the Board made within its jurisdic- tion, rather it is one to strike down an order of the Board made in excess of its delegated powers and rt to : : gecatatng in the act” Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. Id. at 659-660. See also Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964). The Court, at page 660, also referred to the “narrow limits” and the “painstakingly delineated procedural bound- aries of Kyne.” The Court of Appeals for the District of Col- umbia Circuit in /nternational Brotherhood of Teamsters v. BRAC, 402 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 768 (1968), stated that the Congressional purpose of ending repre- sentation matters with a Mediation Board finding may be fulfilled only if the courts are extremely chary of involving themsevies.in NMB determinations and then went on to ex- plain the narrow limits of judicial intervention in the following terms: The narrow exceptions to the “jurisdictional” bar created Leedom v. Kyne, and similar cases must be instances f) pee eh at racy ened Avrahen ute. The exception inevitably e len Ny of a lack of , it a peek at merits. The reco not in = - Ei 5 14 ceived extensive position statements and numerous support- ing documents from the respondents, petitioner BRAC and the Santa Fe, the employing carrier. The Board also received copies of letters sent by the respondents to their congressional representatives and the Board’s chief hearing officer had a discussion with counsel for the Mediation Board regarding Mr. Russell’s intentions. On the basis of this investigation the NMB made a finding, which was not challenged by the respon- dents, that Mr. Russell intended to “negotiate an agreement to terminate the collective-bargaining agreement then in effect, and to thereafter refrain from engaging in further representa- tion of the employees.” Jn the Matter of the Application of Lawrence G. Russell, 8 NMB No. 135, p. 472 (1981) (App. E-1 hereto). In light of this finding, the Board concluded that the applicant lacked the intent to represent the employees in- volved if elected and certified by the Board and intended to pursue a path of conduct resulting in these employees being unrepresented notwithstanding the certification and obliga- tions which attached thereto, Jd., at 475. The District Court properly declined respondent’s invitation to substitute its judgment for that of the Board either in the conduct of that investigaton, or in the Board’s ultimate findings. In summary, the District Court guided by the overwhelming case authority on the subject found that the Mediation Board’s actions regarding representation applications under Section 2, Ninth of the Railway Labor Act are reviewable by the Federal courts only where there has been a substantial showing by the plaintiff that: (1) the Mediation Board’s actions are contrary to specific prohibitions in the Railway Labor Act; or (2) that the constitutional rights of the applicant have been violated. The court correctly found based on the undisputed facts of record that neither exception was present in the case at bar. The Court of Appeals recognized that there are narrow limits to any judicial review of Mediation Board decisions in representation cases which it characterized as permitting such review only in a case of “egregious errors.” However, when that Court applied such principle to the instant case, it found 15 such error in the Board’s interpretation of its duty under Section 2, Ninth of the Railway Labor Act on the basis of what the Court below described as a clear statutory mandate to the Board derived from the Court’s interpretation of the word “representative” in Section 1, Sixth of the Statute. In so doing, the Court below, as pointed out in Section I above, ignored the fact that the statute always speaks of “representative” only as a person so designated for purposes of the Act and as the bearer of numerous duties, including that of making and maintaining agreements, processing grievances, and settling disputes in accordance with mandatory requirements of the statute. Thus, respondent Russell’s application amounted to a request that the Board certify him as a representative so he could disregard all of the statutory requirements. The defini- tion of a “representative” relied upon by the Court below as determinative of the reviewability of and reversal of the Mediation Board’s decision dismissing the Russell application is that an employee “representative” under the Railway Labor Act is a person designated to act upon behalf of employees to accomplish anything they want to accomplish regardless of whether such desire serves the purposes and requirements of the Railway Labor Act or not. The decision below thus brings itself within the narrow confines established by this Court with respect to judicial review of Mediation Board representation decisions only by ignoring the purposes of the statute as enunciated by Congress as well as the purposes of representa- tion specifically set forth in the cited statutory provisions. Such a decision also violates the clear principle of statutory interpretation established by this Court which requires that an interpreting Court not be guided by a single sentence or mem- ber of a sentence, but that a statute be read so as to give effect to the whoie law and to its object and policy. Philbrook v. Glodett, 121 U.S. 707, 713 (1975). The conclusion of the Court below that the decision of the Mediation Board constitutes a gross or egregious violation of a statutory mandate opens wide the door to the destruction of the principles long ago estab- lished by this Court in Switchmen’s Union, supra, 12. 16 The emphasis of the decision below on a right of the employ- ees involved not to be represented for collective bargaining suggests that the Court of Appeals was lead into its untenable position by such consideration. However, given the absence of any statutory provision for decertification and the specific statutory provisions discussed above which negate the validity of the application of respondent Russell, the result produced by the Court below does violence to the statutory purposes of such provisions. Such a result is not necessary in light of this Court’s decision in ABNE, supra, 13, in which the Court was faced with a claim for a “no union” place on a representation ballot to permit a no certification vote. The Mediation Board rejected such a claim and this Court reversed the decision of a lower court interfering with the Board’s determination. In so doing this Court stated: The legislative history supports the view that the em- , ployees are to have the option of rejecting collective repre- , ~ sentation. The ballot that the Board proposed to use in future elections fully —_ with this conception of the Act. Using the Board’s ballot an employee may refrain from joining a union and refuse to — collectively. All wekeecsndnr frag eos igy shee ne alah ponte 0 2 representation er Board’s practice of requiring that a majority of the eligible voters in a craft or class actually vote for some representative before the election is valid. The practicalities of voting—the fact that many who favor some representation will not vote—are in favor of the employee who wants “no union.” Indeed, the mothe’ peseenes og ge i ee ee ve viding a union” box, since, if one were added. 0 telage 06 Vole watld thaw ba'taleea chi eee — the choice of a majority of those voting. This is of the National Labor Relations Board. Id. at 669 n.5. There thus exists an avenue under the statute to terminate representation not involving applications such as the Board dismissed. Rejection of the Court of Appeals decision does not give rise to any substantial constitutional issue to be decided. Union membership in a union certified to represent Railway Labor 17 Act employees does not violate any First Amendment rights. See Railway Employees Department v. Hansen, 361 U.S. 225 (1956). Similarly, this Court has interpreted the Act to issue the protection of First Amendment rights of union members. International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). The relationship between a railroad employee and the union representing him does not involve or affect any association right cognizable under the First Amendment. The District Court properly dismissed the constitutional claims of respondent. CONCLUSION The petitioner BRAC respectfully submits that this Court should, upon the basis of the points and authorities set forth above, grant the petition for certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit here involved so as to correct the violence done to the administration of the repre- sentation provisions of the Railway Labor Act by that judg- ment and to restore the long established principles of the exclusive jurisdiction over representation proceedings of the Mediation Board with only limited and narrow judicial review . ¢ is re *. ° 42! h(a inn" Se ane to eliminate gross violations of specific statutory commands, 18 also violated by that judgment. February 24, 1984 Respectfully submitted, JAMES L. HIGHSAW, JR. (Counsel of Record) JOSEPH GUERRIERI, JR. HicHSAW & MAHONEY, P.C. Suite 210 1050 - 17th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 296-8500 Attorneys for Petitioner Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employes APPENDIX No. 83-___ IN THE Supreme Court of the Anited States OcTOBER TERM, 1983 BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY, AIRLINE AND STEAMSHIP CLERKS, FREIGHT HANDLERS, EXPRESS AND STATION EMPLOYES, Petitioner, Vv. LAURENCE G. RUSSELL, WILLIAM L. HANNA AND EppIE D. LANGWELL, Respondents. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT JAMES L. HIGHSAW, JR. (Counsel of Record) JOSEPH GUERRIERI, JR. HicHsaw & MAHONEY, P.C. Suite 210 1050 -.17th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 296-8500 Attorneys for Petitioner Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employes February 24, 1984 TE ae ee eS GE RS EY AR AT PRESS OF BYRON 8. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-6203 gail la APPENDIX A UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 82-1466 LAURENCE G. RUSSELL, WILLIAM L. HANNA and Eppie D. LANGWELL, Plaintiffs-Appellants, Vv. NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD, the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Sept. 22, 1983 OPINION E. Grapy Joy, Circuit Judge: This case, one of first impression, involves the question of whether jurisdiction exists under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188, to review refusal by the National Mediation Board to process an employee’s application to hold an election among a class of employees after the Board determined that those employees apparently desired to terminate collective representation. We find that while judicial review of Board actions is limited, jurisdiction does exist to compel compliance with the Act. We find further that the Board has here failed to fulfill its statutory duty to investigate a representational dis- pute so as to allow full and free expression of employee desires with regard to collective representation. Jurisdiction exists, therefore, and we reverse the lower court and remand this case for disposition consistent herewith. In June 1943 the police officers and special agents below the rank of captain on the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad 2a elected to be represented under the Railway Labor Act by the National Council of Railway Patrolmen’s Union, AFL. This selection was certified by the Board in Case R-1091 (1943). As revealed by the record, the employees in the bargaining unit over the years apparently considered the union a good representative. No attempt was made, prior to the events involved here, either to oust the union or to replace it with another union. No subsequent ratification of the union’s repre- sentation has ever been made, even when the Railway Patrol- men’s Union was replaced as the collective bargaining repre- sentative by its successor in interest, the Brotherhood of Rail- way, Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Ex- press and Station Employees (“BRAC”). For whatever reason. however, this era of good feelings between BRAC and the Santa Fe police officers became incle- ment in 1980. In the wake of similar efforts by other Santa Fe employee groups, some of the officers formed an “Association of Santa Fe Railway Police Officers.” On January 4, 1981, the Association mailed a letter to members of the bargaining unit soliciting their support in the attempt to “discertify” BRAC as the collective bargaining representative. According to the let- ter, the Association “will have its own representation, with collective bargaining rights, to bargain for our own needs, not those of the clerks.” A follow-up letter on February 22, 1981, from two of the plaintiffs and a third bargaining unit indicated that response to the January 14 letter had been favorable and proposed selection of “a rank and file employee,” Larry Russeil, as the unit’s representative “for purposes of getting us placed in the ‘exempt employees’ category.” The letter indicated that such “exemption” should “result in im- proved benefits and conditions. . . .” The letter included a detailed list of proposed salary terms and conditions of employ- ment. The last “proposal” stated that “(all agreements, rules, practices, interpretations, and/or understandings, however established, shall be abrogated. . . .” Also included with the letter was an authorization card designating Larry Russell as representative “for all purposes under the Railway Labor 3a Act.” According to the plaintiffs brief, BRAC responded to the February 22 letter with two letters in opposition to the proposed rejection of BRAC as collective bargaining agent. These letters, however, are not included in the record. In response to the second letter, 113 cards were returned “authorizing” Larry Russell to serve as “representative” for the employee unit. According to the plaintiffs, the unit com- prised 210 employees and, thus, also according to the plaintiffs, a majority of the employees desired to be “exempt,” i.e., desired no permanent collective bargaining representative. Armed with the authorization cards, on March 21, 1981, Russell filed an “Application for Investigation of Representa- tional Dispute” with the Board. The application stated that “a ‘ dispute has arisen among the employees of (Santa Fe] as to who are the representatives ... designated and authorized in accordance with the requirements of the Railway Labor Act.” Russell requested that the Board “investigate this dispute and certify the name or names of the individuals or organizations authorized to represent the employees involved in accordance with Section 2, Ninth, of the Act.” The Board requested responses to Russell’s application from Santa Fe and BRAC. BRAC filed a Statement of Position, opposing the application on the grounds that “(1) Russell’s application in effect constitutes a petition for decertification,” not authorized by the Act; “(2) Russell lacks any intention to act as the ‘representative’ of employees, as that term is used in the Railway Labor Act;” and (3) Santa Fe had “assisted and encouraged, if not initiated and orchestrated,” Russell’s appli- cation. In a significant portion of its statement, BRAC discussed three previous Board cases in which a Santa Fe employee, acting on behalf of his craft or class of employees, had sought to oust the incumbent union, abrogate the collective bargaining 4a agreement, and then have the Board revoke the certification, thereby leaving the employees unrepresented. ' The Board received the statements and evidence from BRAC and Santa Fe, as well as a statement from the plaintiffs in response to BRAC’s statement. The Board also considered a documented telephone conversation between the chief hearing officer for the Board and Russell’s attorney. According to the ' As indicated in BRAC’s Statement of Position, in Case No. R- 5039, an individual, J. J. McDaniel, acting on behalf of Santa Fe’s yardmasters, had been certified by the Board after a Board election as the bargaining representative on March 31, 1980, to replace the Railroad Yardmasters of America. McDaniel abrogated the collec- tive bargaining agreement with Santa Fe. On July 1, 1980, at McDa- niel’s request, the Board revoked McDaniel’s certification, thereby leaving the employees unrepresented. In Case No. R-5123, Raul Herrera was elected to represent the yardmasters employed by a Santa Fe subsidiary, Los Angeles Junc- tion Railway Co. Herrera was certified as the representative on September 22, 1980. After abrogating the collective bargaining agreement, Herrera requested revocation of his certification. That request remains pending. In the Matter of the Application of J. D. Blankenship, 8 NMB No. 18 (Oct. 20, 1980), involved an attempt by Blankenship to be certified as the representative for the class or craft of Santa Fe’s dispatchers. The authorization cards distributed by Blankenship provided that he was to undertake “whatever processes are necessary to discertify {sic} my current application with the American Train Dispatchers Association and to pursue whatever course of action is necessary to become an exempt employee of the Santa Fe. . . .” The Board dis- missed the application on the grounds that the Act does not provide for “decertification” of a union. On October 28, 1980, the Board issued a Notice of Hearing to determine whether there was any impropriety “on the part of the employee representatives and the carriers” involved in the McDa- niel, Herrera and Blankenship cases. Insofar as the record reveals, that inquiry is pending. ix ant ms : S 3 A y > et) Fa ah eat 5a officer’s report, dated April 13, 1981, the attorney indicated that Russell intended “to do what McDaniel did with the Yard- masters . . ., namely, win, negotiate an ‘exempt’ status and walk away from his status as a representative.” Among other things, the hearing officer told Russell’s attorney that “the Board could dismiss an application any time it found a lack of intent to represent employees.” The other items of information considered by the Board in its investigation were three letters, verbatim copies each of the others, dated April 17, 1981, from Russell to his congressman, Representative Hightower, and to his two senators, Senator Tower and Senator Bentsen. These letters, consistent with the representation made by Russell’s attorney to the Board’s chief hearing officer, complained that the Board’s officer had in- dicated that Russell could not be elected despite the employ- ees’ desire to elect him. Consideration of these items was the extent of the Board’s investigation. On May 21, 1981, the Board issued an order dismissing Russell’s application. In pertinent part, that order stated: treme get ne yal Russell lacks an in- ment, pom tions which attach + Bw The order declared that, absent intent to represent, certifica- tion was not appropriate under the Act: The Railway Labor Act, unlike the National Labor Relations Act, contains no statutory provision for decertification of a as e. [ATSF), 8 NMB No. 18 (1980) [the case]. See also, Man- R Company, 7? 03. 233 and 250 f ~ Ww . —~ CS Spat al p Re ’ ny at 5; ox A a, | Me | Set & | sory, mo . me . ; ? 1) oe : 56a Evidence Of Representation This application is supported by at least a majority, if the employees are represented. Signed at Amarillo, Texas this 23rd day of March, 1981 /s/ Laurence G. (Larry) Russell LAURENCE G. (LARRY) RUSSELL Title: An Individual** **Plaintiff's Exhibit A-2, containing a letter and an additional list of applicable has also been omitted for this reason. And Exhibit B to the Amended Complaint has been omitted as it is reproduced herein as Exhibit E-1. 57a APPENDIX G IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AMARILLO DIVISION Civil Action No. 2-81-138 LAURENCE G. RUSSELL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL MEDIATION Boar, et al., Defendants. DEFENDANT NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD’S ANSWER Defendant National Mediation Board, by its undersigned attorneys, answers the Amended Complaint as follows: First Defense The Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. Second Defense The Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Third Defense In answer to the numbered paragraphs of the Amended Complaint, defendant National Mediation Board hereby admits, denies, and alleges as follows: 1. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ introductory re- marks and not allegations of fact to which an answer is re- quired, but insofar as an answer may be iequired, denied. 58a 2. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ jurisdictional allega- tions and not allegations of fact to which an answer is required, but insofar as an answer may be required, denied. 3. Denied, except to state that defendant National Media- tion Board is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations concerning plaintiff Russell’s residency. 4. Defendant National Mediation Board is without knowl- edge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in the first sentence of this paragraph. The second sentence is denied, except to admit that defendant National Mediation Board has authorization cards purportedly signed by plaintiffs Hanna and Langwell but that it has not verified these signatures. 5. Denied, except to admit that defendant National Media- tion Board is the federal labor relations agency which adminis- ters the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., and is charged with certain responsibilities concerning disputes as to employee representation under Section 2, Ninth of the Act. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth. The Court is referred to the Railway Labor Act for a full and complete statement of its contents. 6. Admitted. 7. Admitted. First Cause Of Action 8. Sentences one, two, three, four, and seven of this para- graph are admitted. All other allegations in this paragraph are denied. 9. Denied. 10. The second sentence of this paragraph is admitted, to state that the Board’s certification occurred in Case Ne. R-1081. Defendant National Mediation Board is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the first, third, and fourth sentences. 59a 11. Defendant National Mediation Board is without knowl- edge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in this paragraph. 12. Admitted, upon information submitted to this Court by defendant Santa Fe in its Motion for Leave to Deposit Funds with the Court. 13. Admitted. 14. Denied. 15. Denied. 16. Denied. Second Cause Of Action 17. The answers to paragraphs 1 through 16 of the Com- plaint are incorporated herein as if fully set forth. 18. Defendant National Mediation Board is without knowl- edge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in this paragraph, except to state that BRAC is the certified representative of these employees. The National Mediation Board hereby specifically denies all the allegations of the Amended Complaint not herein before otherwise admitted. 60a WHEREFORE, defendant National Mediation Board, hav- ing fully answered, prays that this action be dismissed with prejudice and that it be granted its costs and attorney’s fees. Respectfully submitted, J. PauL McGRATH Assistant Attorney General JAMES A. ROLFE United States Attorney /s/ Sandra M. Schraibman SANDRA M. SCHRAIBMAN /s/ Ann M. Sheadel ANN M. SHEADEL Attorneys, Department of Justice 10th & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20530 Tel: (202) 633-4102 Attorneys for Defendant National Mediation Board OF COUNSEL: RONALD M. ETTERS General Counsel Davip M. CoHEN 6la APPENDIX H UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AMARILLO DIVISION NO. CA 2-81-138 LAURENCE G. RUSSELL, et al., Plaintiffs, Ve NATIONAL MEDIATION BoarbD, et al., Defendants. BRAC’S ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT AND CROSSCLAIM The defendant, Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees (herein BRAC), by its attorneys, in answer to the complaint states as follows: FIRST DEFENSE The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain this action. SECOND DEFENSE The complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. THIRD DEFENSE BRAC answers the enumerated paragraphs of the complaint as follows: 1. The first paragraph of the complaint contains conclusory and argumentative allegations and therefore no responsive pleading on BRAC’s part is required. 62a 2. BRAC denies the allegations of paragraph 2 of the com- plaint and further answering BRAC states that judicial review of a National Mediation Board (NMB) representation decision under Section 2, Ninth of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth, is precluded. 8. BRAC is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to plaintiff Russell’s residency and BRAC denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 3 of the com- plaint. Further answering BRAC states that at all times mate- rial it is, has been and continues to serve as the certified bargaining representative for the craft or class of patrolmen employed by the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. (Santa Fe). 9. BRAC denies the allegations of paragraph 9. 10. BRAC admits the first two sentences of paragraph 10 and is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of the third sentence thereof. BRAC admits the allegations of the last sentence of paragraph 10, and further answering states that the mem- a ee ee satisfies constitutional and statutory requirements. 1. ‘BRAC denies the allegations of paragraph 11 of the Pond 12. Upon information and belief, BRAC admits the allega- tions of paragraph 12 of the complaint but further answering states that any demands by Russell for recognition and for deducted dues were made as a result of illegal assistance, inducement, coercion and interference by Santa Fe in violation of Sections 2, Third, Fourth, Ninth and Eleventh of the Rail- way Labor Act. 13. BRAC admits the allegations of paragraph 13 of the complaint. 14.-16. BRAC denies the allegations and each of them of paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of the complaint. 17. Pee: pedro oe he eey mra-nddy 80 hos to paragraphs 1 through 16, inclusive, in answer to cosdelaas ef Ga deaiahes. 18. BRAC denies the allegations of paragraph 18 of the complaint. Se 64a WHEREFORE, the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice and costs taxed against plaintiffs. ° Robert S. Sugarman Ropert S. SUGARMAN Stephen B. Horwitz STEPHEN B. Horwitz Attorneys for BRAC Jacoss, Burns, SUGARMAN & ORLOVE 201 North Wells Street, Suite 1900 Chicago, Illinois 60606 312/872-1646 *BRAC’s pleadings on Santa Fe’s Crossclaim for interpleader have been omitted as well as BRAC’s Exhibit A to its Answer for reasons of space. 65a APPENDIX I IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AMARILLO DIVISION CIVIL ACTION NO. CA-2-81-138 LAURENCE G. RUSSELL, WILLIAM L. HANNA, and Eppie D. LANGWELL, Plaintiffs, vs. NATIONAL MEDIATION BoarD, THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE Raitway Company, and BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY, AIRLINE AND STEAMSHIP CLERKS, FREIGHT HANDLERS, EXPRESS AND STATION EMPLOYES, Defendants. ORDER OF DISMISSAL IT IS ORDERED that the claim of Plaintiffs LAURENCE G. RUSSELL, WILLIAM L. HANNA and EDDIE D. LANGWELL against Defendant THE ATCHISON, TOPE- KA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY be, and the same is, hereby dismissed. DATED This 20th day of August, 1982. /s/ Mary Lou Thompson Mary Lou THompson UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE PRESIDING 66a APPENDIX J IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AMARILLO DIVISION CIVIL ACTION NO. CA-2-81-138 LAURENCE G. RUSSELL, WILLIAM L. HANNA, and Eppie D. LANGWELL, Plaintiffs, vs. NATIONAL MEDIATION BoarD, THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RaILway ComPANy, and BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY, AIRLINE AND STEAMSHIP CLERKS, FREIGHT HANDLERS, EXPRESS AND STATION EMPLOYES, Defendants. NOTICE OF APPEAL Notice is hereby given that plaintiffs Laurence G. Russell, William L. Hanna and Eddie D. Langwell hereby appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit from the March 17, 1982 order granting defendant National Mediation This order became final and appealabie upon the subsequent final orders of this Court dismissing the defendant Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company (Santa Fe) on August 20, 1982, and the Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steam- ship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and State Employees (BRAC), on August 27, 1982. The dismissal of the Second 67a Cause of Action against defendants Santa Fe and BRAC is not being appealed. Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of September, 1982. /s/ Robert F. Gore Rospert F.. Gore National Right To Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc. 8001 Braddock Road Springfield, VA 22160 (708) 321-8510 JoHN CosMICc 910 Barfield Building Amarillo, TX 79101 (806) 373-0711 Attorneys for the Plaintiffs --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1475%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.