# Opposition — Union Carbide Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 467 U.S. 1219

## Text

Office - Supreme Court, WS,
FILED ,

APR 16 Re
No, 83-1345
— ae
IN THE an

Supreme Court of the United States
OcTOBER TERM, 1983

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION, ef al.
Petitioners,

V,

WILLIAM RUCKELSHAUS
As ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., ef ai.
Respondents,

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS NATURAL RESOURCES
DEFENSE COUNCIL, et al., INOPPOSITION

J. TAYLOR BANKS
(Attorney of Record)
RONALD J. WILSON
Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.
1725 I Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
(282) 223-8210

Counsel for Respondents
Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., et al.

April 16, 1984
A A A

i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether some, but not all, of the provisions of a Consent
Decree, voluntarily negotiated by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency and subsequently endorsed by Congress, im-
properly limit the discretion of the Agency.

2. Whether Congress, in endorsing the strategy of the
Consent Decree and codifying certain of its provisions, in-
tended to supplant the Decree.

3. Whether some portions of the four causes of action
underlying the Consent Decree were rendered moot by sub-
sequent legislation and administrative actions.

e. or a
Ce ee ee ee eee eee Tem he eens re ss

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED. .......0ccccccccccsces
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1. The Complaints and the Consent Decree ......
2. Court of Appeals Consideration of the Consent
ND cobs ves dadee nadbsrebinenessicenveeds
3. EPA’s Implementation of the Consent Decree. .
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION.......
1. The Petition should be denied because the Con-
. sent Decree has little remaining vitality........
2. Review of the broad separation of power issue
proffered by the Petition is unnecessary because
the 1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act
approved the Decree ..........ccccccccccsees
3. Review of the District Court’s power to enter the
Consent Decree will yield an extremely narrow
decision even if the Court reaches the issues
proffered by petitioners ...................05.

4. The Circuit Court’s 1980 ruling should not be
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APPENDIX

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) 11
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.

BE SO oa esccncqntcdesaip ghee tasoeheueenens il
NRDC v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1977)...... 4
System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642

CIOGEE ntiie ¢ ccnswsdddixstancstudbateuvede Sauakbe 12,13

United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932) ... 13
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435
U.S. 519 (1978)...... Sale duke odes ebe hanes Meunvaee 12,13

STATUTES AND RULES:
Clean Water Act
Section 307(a), 33 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) § 1317(a) ...
Section 307(b)\(1), 33 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) §
SRR 0 ain o's o eae beearekEE Mead de tboweses
48 Fed. Reg. 51407 (November 8, 1983) .............
49 Fed. Reg. 5831 (February 15, 1984) ..............
49 Fed. Reg. 10357 (March 20, 1984)................

N

Annwn

MISCELLANEOUS:

A Legislative History of the Clean Water Act of 1977,
Cong. Research Service, Comm. Print No. 14, 95th
Cane. 26 Bean. COTE) occ cccveccucovasssdsccncven 9,10

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

No. 83-1345

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
FMC CorRPORATION,
MONSANTO COMPANY,

EXXON CORPORATION,
AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,
AMERICAN IRON & STEEL INSTITUTE,
AND AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,

Petitioners,

Vv.

WILLIAM RUCKELSHAUS
As ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.,
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC.
NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY,

CiT1ZENS For A BETTER ENVIRONMENT,

AND BUSINESSMEN For THE PUBLIC INTEREST, INC.,

Respondents,

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals dated October 4,
1983 (Pet. App. 1a) is reported at 718 F.2d 1117. The
corresponding opinions of the district court dated February

2

5, 1982 and May 7, 1982 (Pet. App. 103a, 117a) were unofficially
reported at 16 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2084 and 17 Env’t Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 2013, respectively. The opinion of the court of
appeals dated September 16, 1980 (Pet. App. 45a) is reported
at 636 F.2d 1229. The corresponding opinion of the district
court dated March 9, 1979 (Pet. App. 121a) was unofficially
reported at 12 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1833.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of the Court lies pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(1).

duties for regulating toxic and other pollutants; and also the
manner in which the Agency exercised its discretion under
the Act. For example, Section 307(a) of the Act required EPA
to issue a list of toxic pollutants based on rather detailed
criteria.' Among other things, NRDC’s complaint
ignoring

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EPA had failed to regulate all pollutants required by these
statutory criteria.

Accordingly, the Consent Decree as negotiated by the
parties’ and entered by the District Court addressed not only
the mandatory duties that EPA had ignored, such as strict
deadlines, but also EPA's failure to apply properly the criteria
set forth in Sections 307(a) and 307(b) of the Act. The Decree
first established the deadlines by which EPA was required to
promulgate the mandated regulations.‘ In order to resolve the
dispute over EPA's application of criteria, the parties agreed
to procedures and studies’ that would assist the Agency in
applying the statutory criteria without abusing its discretion.
And the parties also agreed that if the appropriate criteria
were applied correctly, a specific list of toxic pollutants,
discharged by specific industries, would be subject to regu-
lation.®

Because the original complaints focused on the correct
statutory criteria and on how the Agency exercised its dis-
cretion in applying those criteria, no party, including the
Industry petitioners here, objected to the Decree as imper-
missibly infringing the Agency's discretion. Like Petitioners,
the District Court was not concerned that the Decree included
criteria, as well as related studies to assist in their application,
since this was the core of the dispute. The Court was concerned
that certain provisions of the proposed settlement might
require it to review decisions clearly within the Agency’s
allowable zone of discretion, and therefore required a modi-
fication to the Decree so that it would not ‘*be put in a position

» The impetus for a negotiated settlement came from EPA on the basis

* Original Consent Decree, 19 7, 13, 14. Pet. App. 1640, 171a-172a).

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of supervising the discretionary actions of the [Administrator]
of the EPA’’ because ‘‘I don’t think it is a proper judicial
role.’’ Tr. of Status Conference, 3-4 (April 30, 1976). (Appen-
dix, infra).

After the District Court entered the Consent Decree over
objections from Industry (which did not include the imper-
missible infringement issue), Industry did not appeal the merits
of the Decree.’ Thereafter, EPA began to carry out its
responsibilities, but by 1978 the Agency was in clear violation
of the Decree’s specific, objective provisions. It had fallen
behind most of the deadlines imposed by the Decree, and had
taken absolutely no steps toward creating the procedures and
studies which would enable it to exercise its discretion in
accordance with the criteria set forth in the Decree. EPA also
had concluded by then that some aspects of the Decree,
particularly Paragraph 8, were difficult to administer.

The parties resolved these problems by negotiating rea-
sonable modifications to the settlement and submitting a
revised Decree to the Court. For the most part, these modi-
fications eased the requirements of the Decree. EPA obtained
substantial extensions of the deadlines in Paragraph 7, and a
relaxation of the criteria under Paragraph 8 for removing
pollutants and segments of industry from regulation. EPA
also received substantial extentions of its deadlines for com-

5

Rather, the Decree was attacked as moot, as invalid rule-
making by the Agency, and as superseded by the 1977
amendments to the Clean Water Act. The District Court
rejected these arguments. (Pet. App. 123a-138a).

2. Court of Appeals Consideration of the Consent Decree.

Once again, Industry appealed, but only on the grounds
raised in District Court. The Court of Appeals upheld the
District Court with respect to all arguments directly raised.
636 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Pet. App. 45a). Specifically,
in ruling that the Decree had not been superseded by the 1977
amendments, the Court noted the strong Congressional sen-
timent that the Decree be retained to provide any missing
elements necessary for a comprehensive toxic pollution con-
trol program. The Court's opinion referenced key legislative
history which ‘‘approves and endorses this strategy’’ embod-
ied in the Decree, and indicates that the 1977 amendments”
were ‘‘specifically designed to codify the so-called ‘Flannery
decision’ .’’ 636 F.2d at 1243-1245 (Pet. App. 65a-71a).

However, at oral argument the Court of Appeals sua
sponte raised the question of impermissible infringement, and

After full briefing, the District Court ruled that the Decree

did not impermissibly infringe the Agency's discretion. The
Court noted that the relief granted was responsive

i

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Industry appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Court agreed that ‘‘Congress implicitly sanctioned the
limited infringement on the Agency's discretion which the
Decree entails.’ 718 F.2d at 1129 (Pet. App. 28a). The Court
also ruled that a ‘‘court’s duty when passing on a settlement
agreement is fundamentally different from its duty in trying a
case on the merits."’ 718 F.2d at 1126 (Pet. App. 20a-21a).
Thus, the trial court must determine that the decree is
responsive to the violations alleged, consistent with the
statute, fair, reasonable, and in the public interest. Additional
inquiry could require a full-scale hearing on the merits. Jd.

Moreover, according to the Court, the context of the
Decree is important. The fact that the Decree was crafted
primarily by EPA, and that no substantive result was foreor-
dained, are factors which must be considered in evaluating
whether an Agency's discretion is impermissibly infringed.

programs that differ in kind as well as scope from the duties
imposed by the Act.’’ 718 F.2d at 1131 (Pet. App. 33a).

|
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20,

7

By 1982, EPA had issued all but one of the water quality
criteria required by Paragraph 11. The final water quality
criterion was issued on February 2, 1984 (49 Fed. Reg. 5831
(February 15, 1984)), completing EPA's obligations under
Paragraph 11.

As to Paragraph 12, on July 27, 1981, EPA completed
initial identification of water bodies in 34 metropolitan areas
that were believed to be seriously contaminated by discharges
of toxic pollutants, and on February 3, 1982, set forth a
strategy for developing additional controls to protect water
quality. U.S. EPA, Paragraph 12 Strategy (February 3, 1982).
NRDC initially was concerned that EPA's activities under
Paragraph 12 did not comply with the Decree because the
strategy only encouraged, but did not require, remedial ac-
tions. However, a subsequent EPA reguiatory action has
corrected this problem, so that the Agency now has completed
all its commitments under Paragraph 12. 48 Fed. Reg. 51407
(November 8, 1983).

Likewise, the Agency has all but completed its use of
the deletion criteria in Paragraph 8. EPA announces its
decisions to delete pollutants and industrial subcategories
pursuant to Paragraph 8 at the time it issues proposed
regulations under Paragraph 7. As noted above, only one
regulation remains to be proposed; EPA will complete this
task by the end of April, 1984. To date, the Agency has
deleted from regulation 10 entire industrial categories, over
100 subcategories, and dozens of pollutants. Not one of these
decisions has been challenged in the District Court as incon-
sistent with the requirements of Paragraph 8.

In sum, all that remains to be implemented is the issuance

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current effect.* EPA has fulfilled almost all its obligations
under the Decree, and those few that are outstanding probably
will be accomplished before the Court can complete its review
of the Court of Appeals decision.

Furthermore, the broad issues raised by the Petition
should not be reached by the Court, even if review were
granted, because 1977 Congressional action sanctioned the
controverted provisions of the Decree and the manner in
which EPA has been implementing them.

In any event, this case is not properly resolved by
expounding the broad principles advanced by the Petition and
set forth in Judge Wilkey's dissent. Rather, even if those
principles are correct, each specific provision of the Decree
must be measured against the allowable zone of discretion
permitted EPA under the Clean Water Act to determine if the
of the Clean Water Act and the Consent Decree in the context
of a settlement agreement resolving disputed allegations will
produce only narrow interpretations of the Act that have been
overtaken by the 1977 amendments and EPA's largely com-
pleted regulatory actions.

* Petitioners did not consider the discretion issue important enough to
raise until identified by the Court of Appeals four years after
was entered.

9

Consequently, if the petition were granted, the Court
would review a husk.

2. Review of the broad separation of power issue proffered
by the Petition is unnecessary because the 1977 amendments
to the Clean Water Act approved the Decree.

There is no danger that the Decree narrows the zone of
discretion Congress granted to EPA. Petitioners’ separation
of power argument is bottomed on the notion that the courts
may not constrain an agency's discretion beyond the limits
imposed by Congress. (Pet. 20). Here, Congress has examined
the Consent Decree, and has approved and codified it in the
1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act.

Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals below
found support in Congress’ 1977 amendments for their view
that the Consent Decree did not limit EPA's discretion beyond
the limits intended by Congress. (Pet. App. 28a, 112a). In
amending the Clean Water Act in 1977, Congress shifted its
focus to the mounting problems posed by toxic pollutants.’
The Consent Decree itself had been a pivotal development
with respect to toxics between passage of the Act in 1972,

Congress quite simply adopted the strategy of the Consent
Decree. It amended Section 307(a) to require that EPA issue

Senator Muskie, the architect of the 1972 legislation and
the Senate Floor Manager of the Conference Report in 1977,
stressed that the amendments were ‘‘specifically designed to
codify the so-called ‘‘Flannery decision."’ 1977 Legis. Hist.,
supra at 455. The Senate Report stated that the “Committee
approves and endorses this strategy."’ Jd. at 689. Even
Congressman Roberts, who is cited by Petitioners for support
(Pet. 8-9), assumed during the floor debates that the Decree’s
Paragraph 8 criteria would remain in place. Jd. at 328.

Congress would not have endorsed the limits in the
Decree, and at the same time intended that EPA have
discretion to ignore them.

3. Review of the District Court’s power to enter the Consent
Decree will yield an extremely narrow decision even if the
Court reaches the issues proffered by petitioners. ‘

Petitioners do not attack the entire Consent Decree. On
appeal, petitioners conceded that the provisions of the Decree
which established deadlines and priorities for issuing regula-
tions called for by the Clean Water Act were a proper exercise
of the District Court's judicial power. 718 F.2d at 1122 (Pet.
App. 12a-13a). Rather, Petitioners seek a modification of those
parts of the Decree which they claim impermissibly infringe
EPA's discretion.

The problem posed for this Court in such a review is
plain from Petitioners’ formulation of the principles they
invoke. Petitioners contend that the Article III “case and
controversy”’ limitation ‘‘precludes a court from embodying
in a judicial decree a settlement agreement that goes beyond
the actual legal dispute between the parties,"’ and that “‘a
court’s power to adopt a consent decree derives from, and is
limited by, the terms of the statute that the decree seeks to
enforce." (Pet. 19-20). Further, Petitioners urge that the
Supremacy Clause prevents a court from telling the Executive
Branch how to exercise its discretion. (Pet. 21).

The application of these principles, of course, requires a
detailed analysis of the legal and factual disputes between the
parties in four separate lawsuits, as well as a close study of

—“ -.. = |

the criteria imposed by the statute and the zone within which
Congress intended EPA to exercise its discretion.'' This Court
has long taught that Congress rarely grants the Executive
Branch unfettered, unreviewable discretion, and that generally
there is law to apply in reviewing the exercise of discretion.
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967);
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1972). The law to apply is derived from the governing statute,
and operates as a restraint on the exercise of administrative
discretion. 401 U.S. at 402.

Petitioners sidestep this problem by claiming that ‘‘ev-
eryone involved in this litigation has acknowledged that
substantial portions of the Consent Decree constrain the
statutorily-conferred regulatory discretion of an Administrator
of EPA.”’ (Pet. 18). But this is not the case. The catch phase
in the above quotation is ‘‘statutorily conferred.'’ An impor-
tant part of the underlying controversy involved just how
much discretion Congress actually conferred upon EPA in
the Clean Water Act.

The complaints in these consolidated cases charged that,
among other things, the Agency had abused its discretion and
wandered beyond the zone of allowable discretion by applying
unlawful criteria and by failing to apply required statutory
criteria. (See Complaint, No.2173 p. 13). Indeed, when NRDC

" The dissent's description of what the Act requires is too facile. 718

12

filed its first legal memorandum on the merits of the case, it
said: ‘The question of the Administrator's discretion is at the
heart of this case—where discretion does exist and where it
is circumscribed and hence reviewable.’*'?

In essence, NRDC claimed that EPA applied the wrong
statutory criteria and did not exercise its discretion properly.
EPA claimed the opposite. A classic settlement followed
where the parties agreed on the appropriate criteria and an
appropriate way to guide EPA's exercise of discretion within
the authority provided by the Act."

If a court had no power to enter such a settlement, it
would surely chill the judicial policy favoring settlement in
any case where the alleged law violations include an abuse
of discretion. Indeed, under Petitioners’ view, the District
Court must in every instance determine if the relief provided
in the settlement fits precisely with what Congress had in
mind, rather than make a more general finding that the
settlement is consistent with the objectives of the statute and
in the public interest.

Viewed in this light, the Court of Appeals decision is
entirely consistent with principles enumerated by this Court
in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S.
519 (1978) and System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S.
642 (1961). In Vermont Yankee, this Court reversed a lower
court ruling which had imposed extra-statutory procedures

" NRDC v. Train, No. 2153-73, Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss or, in The Alternative, For
Summary Judgment, p. 16 (April 1, 1974).

" By agreeing to Paragraphs 4(c) and 12, EPA undertook only to

13

on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission despite the fact that
there was ‘‘no doubt’’ NRC had complied with the only statute
governing its procedural obligations. 435 U.S. at 549. That
does not remotely resemble this case, where EPA resolved a
substantial dispute over the statutory criteria and the statutory
limits on its discretion by entering a settlement which set
forth appropriate criteria and limits.

While System Federation, unlike Vermont Yankee, in-
volved a consent decree, its principles also are consistent
with the holding below. There, Congress had eliminated the
statutory provision which had supported the requirement of
a consent decree, thereby making it necessary for the decree
to be modified. 364 U.S. at 644.“ Here, by contrast, there
has been no elimination of statutory provisions on which the
Decree was based. Instead, Congress has specifically ap-
proved and endorsed the provisions of the Decree. The
Consent Decree therefore not only conforms to the precept
in System Federation that a settlement must be ‘‘in furtherance
of the statutory objectives,’’ Jd. at 651, but also carries out
the specific intentions of Congress.

Thus, this Consent Decree cannot be overturned simply
by invoking the principles of Vermont Yankee and System
Federation. Rather, the Court must laboriously parse provi-
sions of the Clean Water Act and its history, the complaints
in the case, and the individual provisions of the Decree to
determine if the Administrator's discretion is in any way
constrained beyond what was intended by Congress. In the
context of this case, such a detailed review is more properly
left to the lower courts.

4. The Circuit Court’s 1980 ruling should not be reviewed.

Petitioners also seek review of the 1980 ruling of the
Court of Appeals. 636 F.2d 1229 (Pet. App. 45a). That decision

“ Decrees retain inherent flexibility, since Courts must be prepared to
modify them “‘as events shape the need.’ United States v. Swift & Co.,
286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932). Here, the District Court has been receptive to
such events, twice modifying the Decree on EPA's request. 718 F.2d at
1130 (Pet. App. 29a).

14

held that the 1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act were
not intended by Congress to supersede the Consent Decree,
and that the Decree was not moot because parts of the original
proceedings remained live controversies.

Petitioners themselves do not take seriously their request
for review of the 1980 ruling. They devote a single paragraph
to a description of the 1980 decision, and conclude with the
totally unsupported assertion that ‘‘these rulings are erroneous
and deserve review by this Court because of the considerable
continuing effect of the decree on the Agency's regulatory
actions under the Clean Water Act."’ (Pet. 27).

For the reasons stated in Part I above, the Consent
Decree now has a small and diminishing effect on the Agency’s
implementation of the Clean Water Act. Petitioners do not
show the contrary. Moreover, the 1980 ruling has virtually
no ongoing significance in itself. That decision involved issues
relating only to the application of the 1977 amendments and
the mootness doctrine to this particular Consent Decree.

These narrow issues can never resurface.

15

CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

J. TAYLOR BANKS

(Attorney of Record)
Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.
1725 1 Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 223-8210

RONALD J. WILSON
810 18th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 628-3160

Counsel for Respondents

Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.

Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc.

Citizens for a Better
Environment

National Audubon Society
Businessmen for the Public
Interest, Inc.

April 16, 1984

IX

A-1

Transcript of Status Confercace Before United States District
Judge Thomas A. Flannery, April 30, 1976

Now, with respect to the proposed settlement agreement
I have carefully reviewed it and I have carefully read the
various comments and objections that have been filed by the
intervenor and other parties permitted to comment and this
Court is not prepared to approve the settlement in its present
form. ’
Specifically with reference to paragraph 8(c), page 12 of
the proposed Settlement Agreement, which provides that
whenever the administrator decides to exclude a point source
category or a specific pollutanf*from coverage pursuant to
this specific agreement he shall promptly file with the Court
and serve the parties to the captioned cases, designating the
point source category, sub-category or specific pollutant to
be excluded together with the reasons therefor. If the plaintiffs
file objections to the proposed exclusion, the Court shall
determine whether such exclusion shall be permitted under
the criteria previously enunciated in (a) and (b) of this

Now, that as I view it, would put the Court in a position
of supervising the discretionary actions of the director of the
EPA until conceivably 1983 or beyond. I don't intend to
undertake any such role, and I don't think it is a proper

And, therefore, I just won't approve of that.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1415%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
