# Appendix — Union Carbide Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 467 U.S. 1219

## Text

FILED

R3-1345 FEB 14 1984
No. &3-
a IN THE ae
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
FMC CoRPORATION,
MONSANTO COMPANY,
EXXON CORPORATION,

AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,
AMERICAN IRON & STEEL INSTITUTE,
AND AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,

7 Petitioners,
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.,
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC.,
CITIZENS For A BETTER ENVIRONMENT,
AND BUSINESSMEN FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, INC.,

Respondents.

APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

CHARLES F. LETTOW
(Attorney of Record)
DouGLas E. KLIEVER
MICHAEL A. WIEGARD
CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN &
HAMILTON
1752 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 728-2748
Counsel for Petitioners
Union Carbide Corporation,
FMC Corporation, Monsanto
February 14, 1984 Company and Ezxzon Corporation

[Additional Counsel listed on inside cover]

WILSON - Eras Printing Co. Inc. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

DouGLas E. MCALLISTER
1920 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Counsel for Petitioner
American Mining Congress

RICHARD E. SCHWARTZ

Davip P. HACKETT
COLLIER, SHANNON, RL & Scott
1055 Thomas Jefferson Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007

Counsel for Petitioner
American Iron and Steel Institute

STARK RITCHIE

JAMES K. JACKSON
1220 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005

Counsel for Petitioner
American Petroleum Institute

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A Page
Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 718
. 1a
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 636
e ee ee 45a
NRDC v. Gorsuch, 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2084
i Fi. SR EERE ney ead ee kore 108a
NRDC Vv. Gorsuch, 17 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2018
rr 117
NRDC v. Costle, 12 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1833
rr Tebiiet Ooeidewontaiincanpiagii 121
NRDC v. Train, 8 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120
SORE Seger Poet See rene 149a
Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch,
/ 195a
Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch,
Order on Petition for Rehearing ...............0000....... 203a
Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch,
Order on Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc ..... 205a
Appendix B
Constitution of the United States (excerpts) ) 1b
Clean Water Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
| REE a Mm WORD ONCE 8b
Appendix C
List of non-wholly owned subsidiaries and affiliates
Be I PPP lc

.

la

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 82-1365

CITIZENS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT
DENNIS L. ADAMCZYK

V.

ANNE GORSUCH, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE,
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
FMC CORPORATION,

Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY,
CELANESE COMPANY,

E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY,
EXXON CORPORATION,
MONSANTO CORPORATION,
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,
AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,

Appellants

2a
No. 82-1366

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.,
V.

JAMES I. AGEE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR WATER AND
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, ET AL.

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE,
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
FMC CORPORATION,
Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY,
CELANESE COMPANY,
E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY,
EXXON CORPORATION,
MONSANTO CORPORATION,
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,
AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,
Appellants

No, 82-1367

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.,
A NON-PROFIT NEW YORK CORPORATION, ET AL.

Vv.

ANNE M. GORSUCH, AS ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE,
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
FMC CorRPORATION,

Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY,
CELANESE COMPANY,

E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY,
EXXON CORPORATION,
MONSANTO CORPORATION,
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,
AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,

Appeliants

8a

No. 82-1368

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC.,
A NON-PROFIT NEW YORK CORPORATION, ET AL.

v.

ANNE M. GoRSUCH, AS ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE,
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
FMC CoRPORATION,
Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY,
CELANESE COMPANY,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY,
EXXON CORPORATION,
MONSANTO CORPORATION,
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,
AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,
Appellants

No. 82-1673

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.
A NON-PROFIT NEW YORK CORPORATION, ET AL.

V.

ANNE M. GORSUCH, AS ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE,
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
FMC CORPORATION,

Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY,
CELANESE COMPANY,

E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY,
EXXON CORPORATION,
MONSANTO CORPORATION,
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,
AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,

Appellants

4a
No. 82-1674

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.
V.

JAMES I. AGEE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR WATER AND
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, ET AL.

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE,
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
FMC CORPORATION,
Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY,
CELANESE COMPANY,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY,
EXXON CORPORATION,
MONSANTO CORPORATION,
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,
AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,
Appellants

No. 82-1675

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC.,
A NON-PROFIT NEW YORK CORPORATION, ET AL.

V.

ANNE M. GORSUCH, AS ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE,
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
FMC CORPORATION,
Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY,
CELANESE COMPANY,
E. I. pu Pont DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY,

5a

No. 82-1676
CITIZENS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT, ET AL.
V

ANNE M. GoksUch, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE,
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
FMC CoRPORATION,

Dow CHEMICAL COMPANY,
CELANESE COMPANY,

E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY,
EXXON CORPORATION,
MONSANTO CORPORATION,
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,
AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,

Appellants
No. 82-1770
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL,
INC., ET AL.

V.

ANNE M. GORSUCH, ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY, ET AL.,

Appellants
No. 82-1771
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL,
INC., ET AL.

v.
JAMES I. AGEE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR WATER AND
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, ET AL.

ALABAMA PowER COMPANY, ET A.,
Appellants

6a

No. 82-1772
CITIZENS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT, ET AL.
v.

ANNE M. GORSUCH, ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY, ET AL.,
Appellants

No. 82-1773

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC.,
A NON-PROFIT NEW YORK CORPORATION, ET AL.

V.

ANNE M. GORSUCH, ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY, ET AL.,

Appellants

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia

(D.C. Civil Action Nos. 75-01698, 75-01267,
73-02153 & 75-00172)

Argued March 1, 1983
Decided October 4, 1983

Charles L. Lettow, with whom Douglas F. Kliever,
Michael A. Wiegard, Douglas F. McAllister, Richard F.
Schwartz, Stark Ritchie, James XK. Jackson, Arnold 8.
Block, Michael B. Barr and Scott Slaughter were on the

brief, for appellants.

7a

Barry S. Neuman, Attorney, Department of Justice,
with whom Peter R. Steenland, Jr., Nancy B. Firestone,
Attorneys, Department of Justice, Michael Brown, Dep-
uty General Counsel, Environmental Protection Agency,
Bruce M. Diamond, Acting Associate General Counsel,
and Susan G. Lepow, Assistant General Counsel, Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, were on the brief, for
appellees, Anne M. Gorsuch, et al. Donald W. Stever,
Attorney, Department of Justice, also entered an ap-
pearance for appellees, Anne M. Gorsuch, et al.

Ronald J. Wilson, with whom J. Taylor Banks was on
the brief, for appellees, Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., et al.

William Scott Ferguson, entered an appearance for
appellees, Olin Corporation in 82-1365, 82-1366, 82-1367
and 82-1368.

Before: WILKEY and WALD, Circuit Judges, and Box-
SAL,“ Senior District Judge for the Southern
District of New York.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior District Judge
BONSAL.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge WILKEY.

BONSAL, District Judge: The intervenors in these con-
solidated cases, several corporations and trade associa-
tions (collectively the Companies), appeal from orders
of the United States District Court, Flannery, J., (1)
denying their motion to vacate or, alternatively, to revise

a settlement agreement (“the Agreement”) previously

* Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(d).

1 These include the American Iron and Steel Institute, Union
Carbide Corp., FMC Corp., Dow Chemical Co., Celanese Co., E. I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., Exxon Corp., Monsanto Corp., the Ameri-
enn Petroleum Institute, the American Mining Congress, and numer-
ous utility companies.

approved by the district court, and (2) denying the cross-
motion of the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”
or “the Agency”) and its Administrator to modify the
Agreement due to changed circumstances. The issue pre-
sented by this appeal, as formulated in our earlier opin-
ion, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 636 F.2d
1229, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1980), is whether the “settlement
agreement impermissibly infringes on the discretion Con-
gress committed to the Administrator to make certain
decisions under the [Clean Water Act].” For the reasons
hereinafter stated, we hold that the Agreement does not
impermissibly infringe on the Administrator’s discretion
and accordingly we affirm the orders of the district court.

BACKGROUND

The facts are set forth in some detail in our prior
decision, 636 F.2d at 1234-38, familiarity with which is
assumed. Briefly, the Agreement was entered into by the
original parties“ to these consolidated cases in settlement
of the plaintiffs’ claims that EPA had failed to carry out
its statutory duty to implement certain provisions of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251
et seg. (1976), known in its amended form as the Clean
Water Act (“CWA” or “the Act”).* Following negotia-
tions between the parties, the proposed settlement agree-
ment was submitted to the district court, which held

2 Other aspects of these cases were addressed in Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir.
1977).

The plaintiffs are the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
the Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., the National Audubon So-
ciety, Inc., Citizens for a Better Environment, Inc., and Business
and Professional People for the Public Interest, Inc. (collectively
“NRDC”). The defendants are William Ruckelshaus, Administrator
of EPA, and the Agency itself.

The provisions involved are sections 801-304, 306, 307 and 402,
codified at 83 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1814, 1816, 1817, and 1842.

9a

hearings and received comments from the intervenor
Companies, which opposed it. The Agreement was au-
thorized and executed for the government by both EPA
and the Department of Justice. After making some
changes in the agreement, on June 9, 1976 the court
entered a “Final Order and Decree” (“the Decree”)
approving it as a “just, fair, and equitable resolution of
the issues raised.” Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Train, 8 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120, 2122
(D.D.C. 1976). No appeal was taken from the Decree.
Therefore, the issue of whether, in a general sense, the
district court acted properly in entering the June 9,
1976 Decree is not now before us.“

The Agreement contains a detailed program for de-
veloping regulations to deal with the discharge of toxic
pollutants under the CWA. It required EPA to promul-
gate guidelines and limitations governing the discharge
by 21 industries of 65 specified pollutants. It also man-
dated the use of certain scientific methodologies and
decision-making criteria by EPA in determining whether
additional regulations should be issued and whether other
pollutants should be included in the regulatory scheme.
It did not specify the substantive result of any regula-
tions EPA was to propose and only required EPA to
initiate “regulatory action” for other pollutants identi-
fied through the research program. The regulations en-
visaged by the Agreement were, after full notice and
comment, to be promulgated in phases by December 31,
1979 and the industries affected were to comply with
them by June 30, 1983.

Had the Companies appealed from the Decree, the scope of our
review would have been narrow. “The district court’s approval of a
proposed settlement by consent decree should be reversed only if its
approval is an abuse of the district court’s discretion.” United
States v. City of Miami, Florida, 664 F.2d 486, 442 (5th Cir. 1981)
(en banc) (plurality opinion) ; accord Metropolitan Housing Devel-
opment Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006, 1015
(7th Cir. 1980) ; Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers’ Union,
614 F.2d 767, 771 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976).

10a

The district court explained in its Decree that the
Companies would be free to influence the content of the
proposed regulations by participating in the rulemaking
proceedings and then could attack the legality of any
final regulations in court. 8 Env’t Rep. Cas. at 2121. The
court also emphasized that EPA and NRDC had modified
the Agreement to make clear that the court would not
review EPA’s “substantive judgments” under it. Id.

When EPA’s implementation of the Agreement failed
to meet the deadlines imposed therein, NRDC moved to
have the Administrator held in contempt. Soon after, the
Companies moved to vacate the Decree on the grounds
that the 1977 Amendments to what became known as
the CWA had superseded the Decree and rendered it
moot, and that the Decree violated the Administrative
Procedure Act’s notice and comment provisions. EPA
and NRDC then jointly moved for an order modifying
the Decree in settlement of NRDC’s contempt motion.
On March 9, 1979 the district court modified the Decree
according to EPA’s and NRDC’s request and denied the
Companies’ motion to vacate the Decree. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1833 (D.D.C. 1979). In general, the modifi-
cations granted EPA more time and flexibility to imple-
ment the requirements of the Decree in exchange for re-
quiring EPA to provide NRDC more detailed information
regarding implementation. Several of the Companies
appealed the District court’s decision, which we affirmed.
We found that Congress did not intend the 1977 Amend-
ments to supersede the Decree, that the district court con-
tinued to have the power to enforce the Decree, and that
the modifications in the Decree were not “rules” within
the meaning of the APA for which EPA had to provide
notice and comment. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.
v. Costle, supra, 636 F.2d at 1244, 1251, 1255-56. How-
ever, we remanded the case for the district court to con-
sider whether the settlement agreement impermissibly
infringes on the discretion Congress committed to the

lla

EPA Administrator to make certain decisions under the
CWA. Id. at 1258-59.

On remand, the Companies filed a motion to vacate or,
alternatively, to revise the Decree on the ground that it
impermissibly infringed upon the Administrator’s discre-
tion under the CWA. EPA filed a cross-motion to modify
the Decree in light of changed circumstances, seeking to
extend certain deadlines and to delete from the Decree
those provisions compelling the performance of “discre-
tionary” actions by the Agency.

In a memorandum opinion filed February 5, 1982, the
district court found that the Agreement “does not im-
permissibly infringe upon the discretion accorded to the
EPA Administrator by Congress.” Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 16 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 2084, 2090 (D.D.C. 1982). Accordingly, it en-
tered an order on the same date denying the Companies’
motion. The district court based its decision on five fac-
tors. First, it stressed the breadth of a district court’s
equitable power to give effect to remedial statutes. Sec-
ond, it concluded that the Decree was “process” rather
than “result” oriented. Third, it pointed out that the
parties had participated extensively in formulating the
Decree. Fourth, it noted that it had taken a flexible ap-
proach to fashioning the Decree, modifying it a number
of times in response to objections raised by the parties.
Finally, it found that Congress had the Decree in mind
when it enacted the 1977 Amendments to the CWA and
“clearly approved of its procedures.” Id. at 2087-89.

On May 7, 1982 the district court issued a second
order, denying EPA’s cross-motion and directing the
Agency to submit proposed schedules for promulgating
within one year all those regulations envisaged by the
Agreement which had not yet been promulgated.* The

On June 21, 1982 EPA moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60 (b)
for an order modifying the district court’s May 7 order so as to give

2
S

12a

Companies have appealed from the district court’s first
order and from that part of the second order which de-
nied EPA’s request to delete those portions of the Decree
allegedly involving matters entrusted to the Administra-
tor’s discretion under the CWA. EPA has not appealed
the denial of that request.

DISCUSSION
The February 5, 1982 Order

The Companies’ principal contentions on appeal are
that: (1) the district court had no power to approve the
provisions of the Agreement which direct EPA to take
actions not required to remedy specific violations of the
CWA; and (2) these provisions impermissibly infringe
on the EPA Administrator’s statutory discretion by pre-
cluding him from taking action otherwise open to him
under the CWA.

L

Underlying both these contentions is the distinction
drawn by the Companies between “statutory” and “non-
statutory” provisions in the Agreement. They maintain
that certain provisions in the Agreement flow directly
from specific requirements in the Act and hence are
“statutory.” As to the presence of these provisions in
the Decree, the Companies raise no objection.’ However,

the Agency more time to promulgate the required regulations. On
August 25, 1982 the district court issued an order indicating its
willingness to grant EPA's motion if this court were to remand for
that purpose, which it did on September 10, 1982. The district court
then entered the order on October 26, 1982.

Following oral argument of this appeal, EPA and NRDC jointly
moved for an order modifying paragraph 10(b) of the Decree. In
an order dated June 10, 1988 the district court found the requested
modification consistent with § 807 (b) of the CWA, and on July 18,
1988 we remanded to the district court for entry of an order grant-
ing the joint motion.

7 The Companies identify only Paragraphs 7 and 18 as belonging
in this category. In their view, these provisions impose deadlines on

18a

they assert that other provisions, which they refer to as
“non-statutory,” are not mandated by the Act and thus
should have been excluded from the Decree by the dis-
trict court. The Companies admit that the “non-statu-
tory” provisions could have been included in the Agree-
ment—but not in the Decree.

Amongst the so-called “non-statutory” provisions are
ones which “impose criteria not prescribed in the statute
for EPA’s regulations.” Br. for Appellants at 17. Here
the Companies cite inter alia Paragraph 8 of the Decree,
which sets forth criteria for EPA’s decision to exclude
“specific pollutants” or “point source categories” from
proposed regulations.“ Under the CWA, EPA is required

EPA for the promulgation of regulations explicitly required by the
CWA, and therefore do not impermissibly restrict EPA’s statutory
discretion. Br. for Appellants at 16-17.

8. (a) Upon completion of the technology, economic, and pub-
lic health and ecological data gathering, including contracts,
for a point source category listed in Appendix B and prior to
publication of proposed regulations for such point source cate-
gory, the Administrator may exclude from regulation under the
effluent limitations and guidelines, standards of performance,
and/or pretreatment standards contemplated by this Agreement
for such category a specific pollutant for any of the following
reasons, based upon information available to him:

(i) Equally or more stringent protection is already
provided by an effluent, new source performance, or pretreat-
ment standard or by an effluent limitation and guideline pro-
mulgated pursuant to Section(s) 301, 804, 306, 807 (a), 807(b)
or 807 (e) of the Act.

14

to analyze various factors in the course of developing
toxic pollutant regulations. Section 307 (a) (1) of the
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (a) (1), provides that:

limitation for such pollutant pursuant to the requirements of
Section 307; or

(iii) the specific pollutant is either not present in the
discharge or in the effluent which is introduced into treatment
works (as defined in Section 212 of the Act) which are publicly
owned or is present only in trace amounts and is neither caus-
ing, nor likely to cause, toxic effects with respect to any iden-
tifiable organisms affected or likely to be affected by such dis-
charge or effluent.

Such exclusions may also be made following proposal or pro-
mulgation of standards whenever information comes to the at-
tention of the Administrator indicating that exclusion for any
of the foregoing reasons is warranted.

(b) Upon completion of the technology, economic, and pub-
lic health and ecological data gathering, including contracts, for
a point source category listed in Appendix B and prior to pub-
lication of proposed regulations for such point source category,
the Administrator may exclude from regulation under the pre-
treatment standards contemplated by this Agreement all point
sources within a point source category or point source subcate-
gory:

(i) if 95 percent or more of all point sources in the
point source category or subcategory introduce into treatment
works (as defined in Section 212 of the Act) which are publicly
owned only pollutants which are susceptible to treatment by
such treatment works and which do not interfere with, do not
pass through, or are not otherwise incompatible with such treat-
ment works, or

15a

The Administrator in publishing any revised list [of
toxic pollutants subject to regulation] shall take into
account toxicity of the pollutant, its persistence, de-
gradability, the usual or potential presence of the
affected organisms in any waters, the importance of
the affected organisms, and the nature and extent of
the effect of the toxic pollutant on such organisms.

The Companies contend that because the criteria specified
in Paragraph 8 of the Decree are more extensive than
those set out in section 307(a) (1) of the Act, the criteria
should not be incorporated in the Decree.

Also alleged to be “non-statutory” are provisions which
“create programs, not found in the statute, which EPA
must now undertake.” Br. for Appellants at 18. Here the
Companies cite inter alia Paragraph 4(c) of the Decree,
which requires EPA to “identify and study” additional
pollutants (aside from the 65 listed ones) for which pre-
treatment standards may be necessary. Paragraph 4(c)
describes in detail how EPA is to fulfill this requirement
by implementing a study program to identify other pol-
lutants for which EPA should initiate “regulatory

to this section of this Agreement, he shall promptly serve upon

the parties to the captioned cases, or their designated repre-
sentative or attorney, a statement under oath designating the
point source category or subcategory or specific pollutant to be
eacluded together with the reasons therefore. Such statement
shall detail the reasons for the Administrator's exclusion, and
shall set forth the data and information forming the basis for
the exclusion. Proposed regulations for each point source cate-
gory or subeategory shall identify each such exclusion, shall
summarize the Administrator's statement, and shall invite pub-

16a

action.”* Paragraph 4(c) appears to leave the scope,
substance and particulars of “regulatory action” to EPA’s
discretion, as subject to the rulemaking process. Section

4(c) The Administrator shall establish and implement a pro-
gram to identify and study other pollutants which are intro-
duced into such treatment works and which are not susceptible
to treatment by such works or which interfere with, pass
through, or are otherwise incompatible with such works. The
program shall, at a minimum, address those pollutants listed in
Appendix C identifiable by computer-based mass spectra search
programs (“computer matching”), and shall consist of steps
to: tentatively identify by computer matching pollutants dis-
charged by point source categories listed in Appendix B; de-
termine frequencies of occurrence and order-of-magnitude con-
centrations for the tentatively identified pollutants; analyti-
cally confirm the computed identification of those pollutants
found with significant frequency in at least one subcategory
and in high concentrations (the term “high” to be based on
comparison with the concentrations of other pollutants found or
known to be in the discharge and, where possible, on readily
available information with respect to toxicity of the pollutants) ;
determine for those pollutants analytically confirmed, based

laboratory test data and/or field studies, or other appropriate

17a

307 (b) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (b), which discusses
pretreatment standards, states only that EPA must
promulgate such standards “[n]ot later than ninety days
after . . publication [of proposed regulations], and
after opportunity for public hearing... The Com-
panies complain that the program called for in Paragraph
40e) “is [not] mentioned in, much less required by, the
Act.“ Br. for Appellants at 19.

NRDC and EPA do not dispute that such provisions as
Paragraphs 4(c) and 8 in the Decree are not mandated
by the CWA. However, they contend that the programs
and criteria specified in the Decree are consistent with
the Act and do not bind the Agency to any particular sub-
stantive outcome. Instead, the programs and criteria es-
tablish analytic processes that EPA must employ in for-
mulating proposed standards. NRDC and EPA both be-
lieve that there is a sufficient nexus between the Decree
and the Act, even if every provision in the Decree is not
derived from a particular requirement of the CWA.

II.

The Companies' first contention, regarding the distriet
court’s power to approve the “non-statutory” provisions
of the Decree, requires a brief discussion of the principles
of law government consent decrees. In United States v.
Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1971), the Supreme
Court provided the following analysis:

Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a case
after careful negotiation has produced agreement on
their precise terms. The parties waive their right to
litigate the issues involved in the case and thus save
themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of
litigation. Naturally, the agreement reached normally
embodies a compromise; in exchange for the saving
of cost and elimination of risk, the parties each give
up something they might have won had they pro-

18a

ceeded with the litigation. Thus the decree itself can-
not be said to have a purpose; rather the parties have
purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the
resultant decree embodies as much of those opposing
purposes as the respective parties have the bargain-
ing power and skill to achieve.

(Footnote omitted). Elsewhere the Supreme Court has
stated that

{cJonsent decrees and orders have attributes both of
contracts and of judicial decrees or, in this case, ad-
ministrative orders. While they are arrived at by
negotiation between the parties and often admit no
violation of law, they are motivated by threatened
or pending litigation and must be approved by the
court or administrative agency.

United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 US.
223, 236 n.10 (1975). While construction of a consent
decree is essentially a matter of contract law, see United
States v. Armour & Co., supra; Sportmart, Inc. v. Wol-
verine World Wide, Inc., 601 F.2d 313, 316 (7th Cir.
1979), the decree itself must be treated “as a judicial
act.” United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115
(1932). Finally, a district court’s “authority to adopt a
consent decree comes only from the statute which the de-
cree is intended to enforce.” System Federation No. 91,
Railway Employees’ Department, AFL-CIO v. Wright,
364 U.S. 642, 651 (1961).

The district court referred to the Agreement as a
“classic settlement.” 8 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2122.
The Agreement certainly follows the principles laid down
in United States v. Armour and United States v. ITT
Continental Baking, supra. By its terms, EPA achieved
its objective of basing the regulation of toxic discharges
on a technology-based, industry-by-industry approach in-
stead of a health-based, pollutant-by-pollutant method.

19a

As we have previously noted, the technology-based ap-
proach “marked a change in EPA’s regulatory strategy”
and “offered substantial advantages over the old” one.
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, supra, 636
F.2d at 1235-36. In addition, as the district court stated,
the Agreement represents a compromise for NRDC insofar
as it accepted that EPA could regulate toxic pollutants
under section 304 of the Act rather than under the health-
based effluent standards called for by section 307, as
NRDC’s complaint had alleged. 8 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) at 2122. At the same time, NRDC also bene-
fited from the Agreement, which bound EPA to promul-
gate regulations without specifying the exact substance
of those regulations according to a fixed timetable for a
specified list of pollutants.

Nevertheless, the Companies contend that, while EPA
was free to dispose of this litigation by entering into the
Agreement with NRDC, the district court had no author-
ity to enforce those parts of it which “go beyond statutory
requirements.” Br. for Appellants at 26. They assert
that since, under System Federation No. 91 v. Wright,
supra, the court’s authority to approve the Agreement
“comes only” from the CWA, each provision in the
Agreement must be necessary to remedy a specific viola-
tion of the Act. In other words, the district court was
permitted only to remedy those wrongs which it could
specifically identify.

We think that this view of a court’s power to adopt a
consent decree is unduly narrow. The rule contended for
by the Companies depends on an overly literal reading of
System Federation No. 91 v. Wright. The statement that
a district court’s “authority to adopt a consent decree
comes only from the statute which the decree is intended
to enforce,” 364 U.S. at 651, means only that the focus
of the court’s attention in assessing the agreement should
be the purposes which the statute is intended to serve,
rather than the interests of each party to the settlement.

nt el a ede oy

15

Before approving the settlement in this case, the district
court held hearings and solicited comments, and concluded
that the Agreement was “a just, fair, and equitable reso-
lution of the issues raised” in these cases, 8 Env’t Rep.
Cas. (BNA) at 2122, and that it was “consistent with

Congress’ intent that water pollution be curbed by 1983.“

Id. The fact that certain provisions in the Decree track
the language of the Act more closely than others is irrele-
vant, so long as all are consistent with it. The Com-
panies’ suggested approach would require the court to
undertake a close examination of each part of the Decree
in order to establish that it was responsive to a specific
violation of the Act. This would require, in turn, detailed
findings that the Act had been violated in various ways.

However, the long-standing rule is that a district court
has power to enter a consent decree without first deter-
mining that a statutory violation has occurred. Swift &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 327 (1928). % The

© As Justice Brandeis stated in Swift:

It is contended that the consent decree was without jurisdic-
tion because it was entered without the support of facts. The
argument is that jurisdiction under the Anti-Trust Acts cannot
be conferred by consent; that jurisdiction can exist only if the

laws is not sufficient; that the facts must also be established
according to the regular course of chancery procedure; that this

2la

court’s duty when passing upon a settlement agreement
is fundamentally different from its duty in trying a case
on the merits. As we have previously held, “prior to ap-
proving a consent decree a court must satisfy itself of
the settlement’s overall fairness to beneficiaries and con-
sistency with the public interest“ United States v.
Trucking Employers, Inc., 561 F.2d 318, 317 (D.C. Cir.
1977), quoting United States v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus-
tries, 517 F.2d 826, 850 (5th Cir. 1975). In a more
recent case, the Seventh Circuit has explained the nature
of the inquiry to be undertaken by the district court:

The trial court in approving a settlement need not
inquire into the precise legal rights of the parties nor
reach and resolve the merits of the claims or con-
troversy, but need only determine that the settlement
is fair, adequate, reasonable and appropriate under
the particular facts and that there has been valid
consent by the concerned parties.

Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006, 1014 (7th Cir. 1980);
accord United States v. City of Miami, Florida, 664 F.2d
435, 441 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Franks v. Kroger
Co., 649 F.2d 1216, 1224 (6th Cir. 1981); Patterson v.
Newspaper & Mail Deliverers’ Union of New York, 514
F.2d 767, 771 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911
(1976); United States v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 430
F.Supp. 83, 86 (D. Alaska 1977); see also Carson v.
American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n. 14 (1981);
Note, The Consent Judgment as an Instrument of Com-
promise and Settlement, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1814, 1816
(1959).

an error is waived by the consent to the decree. Clearly it does
not go to the power of the court to adjudicate between the

parties.
276 U.S. at 327 (citations omitted).

22a

Furthermore, it is precisely the desire to avoid a pro-
tracted examination of the parties’ legal rights which
underlies consent decrees. Not only the parties, but the
general public as well, benefit from the saving of time
and money that results from the voluntary settlement of
litigation. Thus, “[vJoluntary settlement of civil con-
troversies is in high judicial favor.“ Autera v. Robinson,
419 F.2d 1197, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

In light of these settled principles governing judicial
approval of settlement agreements, we see no merit to the
distinction drawn by the Companies between “statutory”
and “non-statutory” provisions of the Decree. The dis-
trict court’s findings that the Agreement was consistent
with the purpose of the CWA and that it fairly resolved
the controversy demonstrate that it conscientiously per-
formed the duty of a court when asked to approve a set-
tlement agreement. The focus of the court’s inquiry
throughout was the Act itself, as System Federation No.
91 requires. As the court determined, and as EPA itself
now urges, the Decree as a whole provides an effective
means of carrying out EPA’s obligations under the Act,
and one that is acceptable to both sides in this dispute.
It therefore was clearly within the district court’s power
to enter the Decree.

The Companies wanted the district court to do more
than test whether the Decree complied with the purpose
of the Act. The Companies in effect wanted the district
court to circumscribe EPA’s discretion to implement the
CWA by stating that EPA could not enter into this De-
cree to settle a lawsuit attacking EPA’s actions under the
Act. If the court had done so, the practical effect would
have been to limit EPA’s discretion to move forward with
its preferred CWA toxic regulation program, which the
Decree promoted and protected. We believe the court’s
role should be more restrained.”

11 It would be especially unfortunate if a lack of judicial restraint
stified the evolution of less adversarial approaches to developing

3 = >). r

28a

III.

The Companies’ second contention is that the Decree
impermissibly infringes on EPA’s discretion by dictating
the approach to be taken by the Agency in promulgating
regulations under the CWA. They claim that “the estab-
lishment of criteria and the development of programs
within the confines of its regulatory obligations are funda-
mental aspects of the Agency’s discretion under the Act.
In the absence of the Decree, EPA could in the exercise
of this discretion choose whether or not to establish the
criteria and programs which the Decree mandates.”
Reply Br. for Appellants at 21.

The Companies rely heavily on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat-
ural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519
(1978), as support for their argument. In particular,
they cite the following passage as evidence that a court
has no power to specify the procedures to be utilized by
an agency: “The court should . . . not stray beyond the
judicial province to explore the procedural format or to
impose upon the agency its own notion of which proce-
dures are ‘best’ or most likely to further some vague, un-
defined public good.” Id. at 549. The Companies argue
that both the Supreme Court and this court have re-
peatedly emphasized their intention to prohibit interfer-
ence by the judiciary with procedural matters committed
by statute to an agency’s discretion. See, e. g., Steadman
v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 104 (1981); Chrysler Corp v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 312-13 (1979); Sierra Club v.
Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 391-92 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Natural

regulations. See generally Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure
for Malaise, 71 Geo. LJ. 1 (1982) (describing the costs and fre-

plemental procedure); see also Note, Rethinking Regulation: Ne-
gotiation as an Alternative to Traditional Rulemaking, 94 Harv. L.
Rev. 1871 (1981). -

24a

Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692,
711-12 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

EPA and NRDC advance the same reasons for affirm-
ing the district court’s decision that were relied on by the
district court itself. Conceding that the decree infringes
to some extent on EPA’s discretion under the CWA, they
contend that on the facts of this case the level of in-
fringement is permissible. First, they assert that the
Decree, far from prescribing any substantive outcome,
merely sets forth procedures designed to remedy the
Agency’s prior allegedly unlawful actions. Second, they
argue that EPA was a “prime formulator” of the Decree
and that its judgment is entitled to great deference.
Finally, they stress that Congress implicitly determined,
by means of the 1977 Amendments to the Act, that the
limits placed by the Decree on EPA's discretion were
appropriate.

We begin by noting that the infringement of agency
discretion issue normally arises in the context of a judi-
cial order disposing of a case on its merits.” The issue is
framed somewhat differently here because the Decree was
entered by the district court with EPA’s consent. It may
well be, as the Companies argue, that “a court has a duty
to determine that any consent judgment rendered is
within the bounds of its judicial power, notwithstanding

However, in a recent case this Court identified the issue in a
different context, that of a pretrial stipulation staying the proceed-
ings. National Audubon Society, Inc. v. Watt, 678 F.2d 299, 301
(D.C. Cir. 1981), a decision which features prominently in the ap-

25a

the parties’ consent.” Br. for Appellants at 40. Neverthe-
less, as the discussion in Part II above indicates, a court
fulfills its responsibility in this respect simply by deter-
mining that the settlement is consistent with the statute
the consent judgment is to enforce and fairly and reason-
ably resolves the controversy in a manner consistent with
the public interest. Thus, the Companies’ claim that a
court does not have power to fashion consent decrees
based upon its perception of the public interest misses
the point. The Decree here was largely the work of EPA
and the other parties to these suits, not the district
court; manifestly, the requirements imposed by the De-
cree do not represent judicial intrusion into the Agency’s
affairs to the same extent they would if the Decree were
“a creature of judicial cloth.” Weinberger v. Catholic
Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, 454 U.S. 139,
141 (1981).

For this reason, the district court’s decision to enter
the Decree does not run afoul of the holding in Vermont
Yankee. As we stated in Association of National Adver-
tisers v. FTC, 617 F.2d 611, 619 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1979):

The Court [in Vermont Yankee] held that absent
extraordinary circumstances the federal courts can-
not upset the products of agency rulemaking on the
ground that the agency abused its discretion in fail-
ing to provide procedures that the courts rather than
Congress or the agency believed necessary. Thus the
case restricts the ability of courts to refashion nor-
ma] rulemaking procedures with judicially-conceived
notions of administrative fair play.

In Vermont Yankee it was undisputed that the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission had fully complied with the pro-
cedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act. The issue was whether a court could order that
agency to afford more procedural rights to license appli-
cants than the APA provided. Here, by contrast, EPA
failed to comply with the statutory directive that the
Agency promulgate various regulations. The ultimate

26a

issue raised by NRDC’s suit, therefore, was what action
EPA should be required to take in order to correct that
deficiency. Since the solution arrived at was to a consid-
erable extent the work of the Agency itself, and since the
district court’s role was confined to approving the fair-
ness of the consent decree which incorporates it and en-
suring the consistency of the Decree with the Act, Ver-
mont Yankee’s concern for “judicially-conceived notions
of administrative fair play” is inapposite here.

None of the other cases cited by the Companies satisfy
us that the Decree impermissibly infringes on the EPA
Administrator’s statutory discretion. First, none of them
involve consent decrees. Second, they do not support the
Companies’ position in this case. For example, our state-
ment in Public Service Commission of New York v. Fed-
eral Power Commission, 543 F.2d 757, 833 n.42 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), that “a court may not compel an administra-
tive agency to pursue a particular course of action when
another is open to it” is quoted out of context by the
Companies. As a reading of the rest of the opinion makes
clear, “a particular course of action” refers to the
agency’s final decision on the merits of the question be-
fore it. See Federal Power Commission v. Idaho Power
Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20 (1952) (holding that this Court had
“usurped an administrative function” in deciding that a
license should be issued by the FPC without the conditions
attached to it by the agency). The Decree here does not
prescribe the content of the regulations that EPA must
promulgate. Nor does the Decree direct the Agency to
enforce the regulations in any particular way.

In National Association of Postal Supervisors v. United
States Postal Service, 602 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1979), we

27a

sonable.“ The court's error lay in its failure to recognize
the Postal Service’s broad discretion over “internal man-
agement matters.” Id. at 432. In Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir.
1975), another case involving the federal government’s
efforts to curb water pollution, we reversed in part a dis-
trict court order requiring EPA to publish by a fixed
date all effluent limitations guidelines mandated by the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (b) (1) (A). We held that the
district court had erred in setting a deadline for publi-
cation of guidelines covering categories of “point sources”
not listed in the statute, as Congress had clearly intended
to leave such matters to the Agency’s discretion. Here
We are reviewing an order approving a settlement agree-
ment that EPA voluntarily entered into, rather than an
order requiring EPA to take action against its will.
Hence our admonition in Train concerning the limits of
a court’s role in effectuating regulatory legislation“ is
not applicable. Indeed, in this case the Companies want
the court to narrow EPA’s discretion to settle litigation
in a manner that permits EPA to implement the CWA
through EPA’s preferred approach.

Our decision in Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) supports the district court’s
holding. In Adams we affirmed a district court order re-
quiring the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
to take various steps to end segregation in public schools
pursuant to Title VI. The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged
that HEW had adopted a general policy of seeking volun-
tary compliance with the statute which amounted to an
abdication of its statutory duty. In its appeal, HEW con-

18 “Where there has been no violation of a statutory duty, we
think the proper course is to confine ourselves to a declaration of
the intent of Congress and to give the Administrator latitude to
exercise his discretion in shaping the implementation of the Act.”
610 F.2d at 711-12.

28a

tended that “although enforcement is required, the means
of enforcement is a matter of absolute agency discretion

... Id. at 1162. We rejected this argument and con-
cluded that, in light of the unequivocal duty imposed on
the agency by Title VI, the district court acted properly
in directing it to pursue an affirmative enforcement pol-
icy. We think our observation in Adams v. Richardson,
to which we recently referred in Adams v. Bell, No.
81-1715, slip op. at 6 n.24, 9 (D.C. Cir. June 10, 1983) (en
banc) is equally applicable to this case: [Ol ur purpose,
and the purpose of the District Court order as we under-
stand it, is not to resolve particular questions of compli-
ance or noncompliance. It is, rather, to assure that the
agency properly construes its statutory obligations, and
that the policies it adopts and implements are consistent
with those duties and not a negation of them.” 480 F.2d
at 1163-64 (footnotes omitted).

Finally, we think that the argument, advanced by EPA
and NRDC, that Congress implicitly sanctioned the lim-
ited infringement on the Agency’s discretion which the
Decree entails is well taken. As set out in our prior
opinion, 636 F.2d at 1238-45, the legislative history of
the 1977 Amendments contains numerous references to
the Decree which suggest that “Congress expected the
settlement agreement to continue in effect.” Id. at 1244.
We pause to emphasize just one of many: Senator Mus-
kie, chairman of the Senate subcommittee that reviewed

14 We also noted in Adams v. Richardson that [f lar from dictat-
ing the final result with regard to any of these [school] districts,
the order merely requires initiation of a process which, excepting
contemptuous conduct, will then pass beyond the District Court’s
continuing control and supervision.” 480 F.2d at 1168 n.5, quoted
in Adams v. Bell, No. 81-1715, slip op. at 6 n.24 (D. C. Cir. June 10,
1988) (en banc). The same may be said of the Decree in this case:
it requires EPA to begin the process of formulating regulations in
compliance with the Act and describes a methodology to be followed
by the Agency, but it leaves the outcome of the process (the sub-
stantive regulations) to the Agency’s discretion.

29a

EPA’s implementation of the Act and floor manager of
the Conference Report in the Senate, explained to his col-
leagues that [t] he conference agreement was specifically
designed to codify the so-called ‘Flannery decision,’ [a
consent decree that] ... EPA has been implementing.”
123 Cong. Rec. 39, 181 (1977), quoted in Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, supra, 686 F.2d at 1243.
Had Congress felt that the Decree infringed too much on
the discretion it had given EPA’s Administrator, that
sentiment would likely have appeared in the legislative
history. The Companies cannot identify any evidence of
it, and all we have found is evidence to the contrary.

The May 7, 1982 Order

The Companies also appeal from part of the district
court’s order of May 7, 1982, denying EPA’s cross-motion
to modify the Decree in certain respects. EPA itself does
not. appeal from that decision. The Companies’ argu-
ments with respect to this order are similar to the ones
they make with respect to the first order. In essence,
they contend that the district court erred in declining to
exclude from the Decree those provisions which the Com-
panies deem “non-statutory.” For the reasons stated
above in our review of the February 5 order, we find no
error in the district court’s order of May 7, 1982.

We note in passing that the Companies’ concern that
the district court has imposed a “high hurdle to modifi-
cation of the Decree,” Br. for Appellants at 56, appears
misplaced. The district court’s own assessment of the
flexibility with which it has administered the Decree, 16
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2089, is borne out by the
record. For example, while this appeal was pending, the
district court twice considered Rule 60(b) motions by
EPA and NRDC to extend certain deadlines for the
promulgation of regulations and for compliance by the
Companies therewith, and in each case decided to grant
the motion. See note 6 supra.

30a

CONCLUSION

The settlement agreement between EPA and NRDC
does not impermissibly infringe on the EPA Administra-
tor’s discretion under the Clean Water Act. Therefore,
the district court properly entered the Decree and its
orders denying the motions to vacate, revise, or modify
the Decree are affirmed.

31

WILKEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting: This case comes
before this Court again on one issue: does the consent
decree impermissibly restrict the discretion of the Ad-
ministrator of the Environmental Protection Agency?
I conclude that it does, and so would modify the decree
“to restore the agency’s discretion.

I. THE Lntrrs IMPOSED ON THE
ADMINISTRATOR’S DISCRETION

The consent decree at issue in this case is a judicial
act.“ It is not a contractual settlement agreement? or
a tentative projection of agency policy. The court shaped
it, scrutinizing and even altering its terms.* The court
will be called upon to enforce it, should the agency have
a change of heart.‘

1 Pope v. United States, 823 U.S. 1, 12 (1944); United States v.
Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1982).

2 This court has already faced a case which raised similar issues
in a contractual context. See National Audubon Society, Inc. v.
Watt, 678 F.2d 299 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Although the court in that

In undertaking this, or any other, judicial act, the
court must heed the limits on the power of an Article
III court.“ The court’s power to adopt a consent decree
is limited by the terms of the statute it seeks to enforce.*
The court cannot prescribe rules of procedure to an ad-
ministrative agency,’ nor may it enlarge upon the stat-
ute’s substantive requirements.* In short, the court can
only enter as a consent decree such relief as would have
been within its jurisdictional power had the case gone to
trial.“

The case law makes perfectly clear that one sort of
judicial relief commanding the Executive Branch to
exercise its administrative discretion in a particular
way—exceeds the reach of the federal court. Case after
federal case has established that federal courts may not
tell the Executive or Legislative Branches how to exer-
cise their diseretion.“ As one court has explained the
doctrine :

5 System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 652-58
(1961).

Id.

1 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 485 U.S. 519
(1978).

® National Association of Postal Supervisors v. United States
Postal Service, 602 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arling-
ton Heights, 469 F.Supp. 836, 865 (N. D. III. 1979), af d, 616 F.2d
1006 (7th Cir. 1980).

1 Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 US.
228, 227-28 (1980) (a reviewing court “cannot ‘interject itself
within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the
action to be taken.); FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line
Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 881-84 (1976) (setting aside court order ro-
r oho ade cae
Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20 (1962) (reversing court order which modified

This self-imposed limitation on judicial power stems
from the doctrine of separation of powers; courts
cannot invade the jurisdiction of the other depart-
ments of government in matters of policy, and for a
court to substitute its judgment or discretion for
that of a member of the executive branch would
amount to such an invasion."

The consent decree at issue here cannot be recon-
ciled with this principle. All parties agree on the dis-
positive issue: the decree does restrict the discretion of
the Administrator of the EPA.“ The consent decree con-
strains the agency in two basic ways. It requires the
agency to apply criteria and standards not found in the
Clean Water Act, and it requires the agency to under-
take programs that are not required by the statute.

These constraints are not de minimis. This is obvious,
of course, from the fact that the legitimacy of these re-
straints is worth litigating. They impose duties on the
Administrator that differ in kind as well as in scope
from those duties imposed by the Act.

A. Paragraph 4(c)

Paragraph 4(c) of the agreement, for example, re-
quires the agency to “identify and study” additional pol-
lutants to be subject to future pretreatment standards.”
The decree specifies with great particularity the meth-

ity in which FCC should consider license applications); National
Assoc. of Postal Supervisors v. United States Postal Service, 602
F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (setting aside court ordered pay in-
crease).

u Huntt v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 382 F.2d 38, 45
(8rd Cir. 1967).

1 Brief for Appellants at 16; Brief for Federal Appellees [here-
inafter EPA Brief) at 23; Brief for Appellees NRDC [herein-
after NRDC Brief) at 24.

Joint Appendix (JA) at 160.

34a

ods by which the Administrator must identify a list of
pollutants that are “candidates for national regulation,”
the grounds upon which he may then remove pollutants
from this list of “candidates,” and then concludes by
requiring the Administrator to “undertake regulatory
action for those pollutants remaining on the list.”

The Clean Water Act, by way of contrast, requires no
such precisely delineated regulatory program. Section
307 (b) of the Act requires only that the EPA promul-
gate standards for incompatible pollutants within a speci-
fied time period after the enactment of the Federal Wa-
ter Pollution Control Amendments of 1972 and “from
time to time thereafter.” "*

B. Paragraph 8

Paragraph 8 of the decree similarly sets forth require-
ments and criteria for removing substances from the list
of toxic pollutants."* The statutory provision “ requires
the EPA to take into account “toxicity of the pollutant,
its persistence, degradability, the usual or potential pres-
ence of the organisms in any waters, the importance of
the affected organisms, and the nature and effect of the
toxic pollutant on such organisms.” So long as the Ad-
ministrator does not act arbitrarily and capriciously, the
court cannot vacate his decision. Even if his action is
“arbitrary and capricious,” the court’s power is limited
by statute to ordering a redetermination."

Paragraph 8 of the consent decree sets forth a differ-
ent set of criteria for the Administrator to follow. The
court decree replaces the “considerations” set forth by
the statute with specifically defined circumstances under

4 838 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (Supp. V 1981).

* JA at 161-1638.

1 83 U.S.C. § 1817(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
7 Id.

35a

which the Administrator may choose not to regulate
specific pollutants. The Administrator must regulate the
pollutants unless they fit within the alternative categories
decreed by the court.

C. Paragraph 12

Paragraph 12 requires the EPA to establish “a spe-
cific and substantial program” to determine if “more
stringent” effluent standards are necessary to protect
water quality.“ The decree defines the required program
with precision: the Administrator must identify navi-
gable waters which are seriously contaminated by toxic
pollutants, identify toxic pollutants for which more
stringent limitations may be necessary, and publish a
strategy for reducing or eliminating discharges of such
pollutants. No such program can be found anywhere in
the Act.”

In at least these provisions, the judicial decree imposes
duties on the Administrator which are not imposed by
the Act itself. The decree thus differs not in degree but
in kind from the decree the court might have issued if
the case had been tried. At most, the court could have
declared that the agency’s actions were inconsistent with
the statute; at most, the court could have required the
agency to perform those functions mandated by the
statute. In no circumstances could the court have obliged
the agency to take discretionary action which differed
from that required by the statute.

JA at 161-168.
9 JA at 164-165.

The agency argues that this paragraph is meant to
grate” Sections 302, 308 and 807(a) of the Clean Water Act.
for Federal Appellees at 23.

However, none of these provisions contains any requirements for
establishment of a program and publication of a strategy.

36a

The duties imposed by the court’s decree may not be
inconsistent with the Act; each action taken by the Ad-
ministrator under the decree might also conform with the
Act. But the Administrator’s discretion clearly is fet-
tered—under the Act alone, he could choose to switch to
another equally reasonable mode of compliance with the
Act; under the consent decree he may not swerve from his
judicially appointed course without risking contempt of
court charges.

II. THE “PERMISSIBILITY” OF LIMITING THE
ADMINISTRATOR'S DISCRETION

The court’s decree clearly intruded upon the province
of the executive. The court went far beyond merely deter-
mining whether the EPA has acted lawfully in imple
menting the Clean Water Act. It imposed a consent de-
cree consisting in large part of provisions which are
neither mandated by the Clean Water Act nor necessary
to ensure that the EPA performs its statutory duties.

The trial court and the appellees argue that these con-
straints on the agency are somehow “permissible.” ™
While some of the arguments advanced in this regard are
frivolous,” others raise serious constitutional and pru-
dential issues.“

21 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 12 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 18838 (D.D.C.); EPA Brief at 32-89; NRDC
Brief at 21-88. The majority finds that the decree does not “im-
permissibly infringe” on the Administrator's discretion, Majority
Opinion at 80, but fails to specify whether it holds that the decree
does not infringe upon the Administrator's discretion at all—

Nothing in the concept of “executive discretion” gives an agency

87a

A. Process or Result

The majority argues that those cases forbidding courts
to intrude upon an agency’s discretion speak only to situa-
tions where the court would make “the agency’s final deci-
sion on the merits of the question before it.“ This claim
has two flaws. First, it is not supported by the case law.
The prior cases limiting a court’s power to intrude upon
an agency’s discretion dealt with issues as far removed
from “final determination on the merits” as the order in
which applications should be considered by the agency,”
and the agency’s method of gathering evidence.“

More subtly, the argument overstates the distinction
between “merits” and “procedural” determinations.
Where, as here, the “process” oriented decree requires the
creation of new programs the court’s decree always will
affect substantive agency actions. The consent decree com-
mits the EPA Administrator to certain choices—choices
as to priorities, choices as to methods, choices as to alloca-
tion of resources. Such choices are not free. By choosing
to follow the course of action outlined in the consent de-
cree, the EPA necessarily has incurred certain costs.
Some of those costs relate to the balancing of conflicting
goals—here, the EPA is committed to a certain level of
environmental protection, even though that level of pro-

concluded only that the 1977 amendments to the Act did not super-
sede the decree. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 686
F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1980). We are content to accept the silence
of the Act on the validity of this decree for what it is—silence.

To the extent that the majority argues that Congress has im-
plicitly approved all consent decrees of this type, it fails to avoid
the underlying issue: whether either Congress or the courts can
delegate executive functions to the judicial branch without violating
separation of powers principles.

„Majority Opinion at 26.
* FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 184 (1940).

* FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 428 U.S. 326,
888 (1976).

38a

tection might ultimately generate uneconomic costs for the
public. Still other costs relate to the EPA’s allocation of
its own resources. By committing some of its all-too-
scarce resources to the programs mandated by the consent
decree, the EPA necessarily foregoes developing or en-
forcing other priorities.

The court, by confining the Administrator’s discretion,
thus involves itself—subtly but nonetheless inevitably—
in issues of agency policy. The EPA, in its unsuccessful
bid to be released from the strictures of the decree, made
much the same argument to an unsympathetic district
court: “Extra obligations not required by statute neces-
sarily infringe on EPA’s ability to allocate its limited
resources in the way it finds best. As the Supreme
Court’s experience with the “outcome determinative” test
in the context of applying Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
kins * goes to show, the line between those acts that de-
cide the merits and those that do not is one the existence
of which can be postulated, but not proved.

B. The Administrator's Consent

A more superficially appealing argument claims that
the agreement does not intrude upon the Administrator’s
discretion because he has agreed to its terms.” But,
a decree of this type binds not only those present Adminis-
trators who may welcome it, but also their successors who
may vehemently oppose it. For reasons that ultimately
have to do with preserving the democratic nature of our
Republic, American courts have never allowed an agency

A at 319.

8304 U.S. 88 (1988). For a general discussion of the waxing
and waning of the “outcome determinative” test between Guaranty
Trust of New York v. York, 826 U.S. 99 (1945) and Hanna v.
Plumer, 880 U.S. 460 (1965), see C. Waicnt, A. Mum & E.
Coorem, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PmocepuRE: JURISDICTION § 4504
(1982).

Majority Opinion at 25.

ee.
8 nas

39a

chief to bind his successor in the exercise of his discre-
tion.” Today’s majority decision effectively undercuts that
line of authority by allowing an Administrator to waive
his successor’s power of discretion—so long as a court is
willing to play accomplice.

C. The Equitable Powers of the Federal Courts

The most profoundly troubling of the arguments for the
consent decree holds that the court may, as an exercise of
its equity powers, take virtually any remedial action it
chooses.“ Only a rough equity balancing of all the facts of
the case would tell whether the court’s order was a “per-
missible” extension of its equity jurisdiction. Here, the
argument goes, the court’s action was justified as a prac-
tical way to resolve vexatious litigation.

This argument fails here for two reasons. First, appel-
lees err in contending that the equity power of the federal
courts knows no bounds but necessity.“ Appellees cor-
rectly note that in many cases federal courts have exer-
cised broad remedial powers in correcting Constitutional
violations. Courts have used their equitable powers to as-

See Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206
(1980) (agency position on whether certain children were entitled
to interest payments from a statutorily created fund); West v.
Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 200 (1929) (agency determination as
to whether land contained minerals). See also National Audubon
Society, ine. ©. Watt, 678 F.2d 299, 805 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1981)

40a

sume administrative and legislative roles, supervising in
a highly active and intrusive manner prisons, school sys-
tems, mental hospitals and electoral apportionment.”

In those cases, however the court invariably acts
against state governments or individual citizens. Those
decisions in which the court seizes the broadest powers are
also those in which it declares that the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers does not apply “vertically” when courts act
under the Supremacy Clause.“ In the case at issue, the
court acts against a coordinate and co-equal branch of
government. The court cannot take refuge in the Su-
premacy Clause. The court must face head-on the separa-
tion of powers issue.

The court’s infringement on the agency’s discretion
resolves that issue. The court here acts as an Administra-
tor. It acts without any statutory or constitutional man-
date; the contested provisions of the decree admittedly
exceed what could be required by the statute. To permit
the court’s equity powers to extend so far would abolish
the principle of separation of powers.

The argument also fails because even if the court’s
equity power might conceivably support the decree at

* See, ¢.g., James v. Wallace, 406 F.Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976),
aff'd in part, remanded in part sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559
F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 915, judgment
reversed in part, Alabama v. Pugh, 498 U.S. 781 (1978); United
States v. Jefferson County Board of Bducation, 872 F.2d 836 (5th
Cir. 1969), modified per curiam on rehearing en banc, 380 F.2d
885 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 889 U.S. 840 (1967). See generally,
Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies
and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 Yate LJ. 685 (1982); Diver, The
Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change
in Public Institutions, 66 Va. I. Rev. 48 (1979).

rod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 847, 852 (1976) (“[T)he separation-
of-powers principle, like the political-question doctrine, has no
applicability to the federal judiciary’s relationship to the States.)
See generally, Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Fed-
eral Equitable Remedies, 80 Stan. L. Rev. 661 (1978).

4la

issue, the court still should ask whether its exercise of
power is prudent. In this case of first impression, that
prudential inquiry must necessarily ask whether this new
device for agency administration will prove wise over
time. A look at this procedural innovation suffices to show
that government by consent decree is not only unconstitu-
tional but unwise.

First, any legitimate purpose served by the decree could
have been accomplished by other means. The agency did
not need a consent decree in order to take the actions
mandated by the decree. Since those actions were within
its discretion it could have pursued a course of action
precisely identical to that called for by the court order.

Nor did the agency need a consent decree to lend some
stability to its position. The agency could have, by under-
taking proper notice and comment rulemaking, issued the
substance of the consent decree as regulations.“ Such a
course of action would give all parties affected by the pro-
posed programs a chance to be heard, as well as bind the
agency not to change course “arbitrarily and capri-
cicusly.” *

The flaws with government by consent decree run
deeper than the superfluity of the device. The device in-
vites abuse—intentional or unintentional. Today’s action
may seem desirable to some because it requires a some-
times recalcitrant agency operating under a relatively

42a

mum of regulation “ or which enable regulated industries
to evade prosecution. Nor is the device limited to the
EPA. Under the typical broad and imprecise administra-
tive statute, almost any agency action would pass the
majority’s vague test that the decree somehow be “con-
sistent” with the law. An inattentive or unprincipled
court could thus bind successive administrations to a non-
statutory, limiting “process” of regulatory action.

The abuses to which this device can be put are limited
only by the almost inexhaustible imaginations of liti-
gants. The same sorts of “procedural” agreements that
the majority finds so innocuous could be used to limit the
manner in which an agency goes about seeking evidence
or to constrain the investigative practices of federal agen-
cies. EPA and OSHA, for example, could consent not to
conduct on site inspections without first rendering 60
days notice. Such a “procedural” agreement would be
fully acceptable under the majority’s approach; in prac-
tice, it would limit the effectiveness of the agencies.

The greatest evil of government by consent decree,
however, comes from its potential to freeze the regula-
tory processes of representative democracy. At best, even
with the most principled and fair-minded courts, the de-
vice adds friction.

wee. Se eae Se eS ae ee

48a

rule would. An agency can abandon a rule so long as the
change in policy is not arbitrary and capricious;* an
agency cannot escape a consent decree without the active
participation and approval of the court.

The commitment that occurs through a consent decree
takes place, however, without recourse to the public notice
requirements of notice and comment rulemaking. Those
third parties who wish to know of such consent decrees
would be faced with the nearly impossible task of moni-
toring all of the nation’s district courts. Even then, if
the filing of the suit and the consent decree coincide
closely in time, notice would amount only to learning that
the binding decree is a fait accompli.

Second, government by consent decree inhibits Con-
gressional influence on agency policy. No longer could an
agency freely and voluntarily respond to Congressional
concerns; action would be impossible without prior ap-
proval of the court. The informal give-and-take between
Congress and the agencies that characterizes modern ad-
ministrative practice would be squeezed out by the court’s
assumption of control.

Third, Executive Branch control over agency policy
would be hindered. So long as a consent decree remained
in force, no new policy spurred by a change in adminis-
trations (or prompted by a desire to avoid a change in
administrations) could take effect without the prior
blessing of the court. Conversely, the consent decree pro-
vides the executive with a vehicle for avoiding respon-

sibility for its programs.

This weakening of democratic control over agency pol-
icy accompanies an increase in the power of two non-
democratic groups. Government by consent decree en-
shrines at its very center those special interest groups
who are party to the decree. They stand in a strong tac-

Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mu-
tual Automobile Insurance Co., 108 8. Ct. 2856, 2865 (1988).

44a

tical position to oppose changing the decree, and so likely
will enjoy material influence on proposed changes in
agency policy.

Standing guard over the whole process is the court, the
one branch of our government which is by design least
responsive to democratic pressures and least fit to accom-
modate the many and varied interests affected by the
decree. The court can neither effectively negotiate with
all the parties affected by the decree, nor ably balance
the political and technological trade-offs involved. Even
the best-intentioned and most vigilant court will prove
institutionally incompetent to oversee an agency’s discre-
tionary actions.

As a policy device, then, government by consent decree
serves no necessary end. It opens the door to unforesee-
able mischief; it degrades the institutions of representa-
tive democracy and augments the power of special inter-
est groups. it does all of this in a society that hardly
needs new devices that emasculate representative democ-
racy and strengthen the power of special interests.

I see no need and no warrant for countenancing this
raid on the powers of the Executive Branch. I respect-
fully dissent.

45a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 79-1473

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC.,
a Nonprofit New York Corporation, et al.

V.

DOUGLAS M. CosrLE, as Administrator,
Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE et al.,
Appellants

No. 79-1474
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., et al.
V.

DouGLAS M. CosTLe, as Administrator,
Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE et al.,

Appellants

No. 79-1475
NATURAL Resources Derense CouNcIL, INC.
V.

Jau I. Aczz, as Assistant Administrator
for Water and Hazardous Materials,
Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE et ul.,
Appellants

No. 79-1476

CITIZENS For A BETTER ENVIRONMENT AND
DENNIS L. ADAMCZYK

*

DoucLAS M. CosrLE, as Administrator,
Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE et al.,
Appellants

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia

(D.C. Civil Actions Nos. 75-0172, 2153-78,
75-1267, and 75-1698)

Argued March 25, 1980
Decided September 16, 1980

Richard E. Schwartz, with whom Thomas L. Anderson
was on the brief, for appellant American Iron and Steel
Institute.

Charles F. Lettow for appellants Firestone Tire and
Rubber Company et al.

Douglas E. Kliever and Mary W. Ennis were on the
brief for appellants Union Carbide Corporation et al.

Jacqueline M. Warren entered an appearance for ap-
pellees Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. et al.

James T. Banks, with whom Ronald J. Wileon was on

47a

Moorman, Assistant Attorney General, and Jacques B.
Gelin and Michael A. McCord, Attorneys, Department of
Justice, were on the brief, for appellee Environmental
Protection Agency. E. J. Shawaker, Attorney, Depart-
ment of Justice, and Richard G. Stoll, Attorney, Environ-
mental Protection Agency, also entered appearances for
appellee Environmental! Protection Agency.

Before WRIGHT, Chief Judge, and SwyGEerRT* and
ROBINSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Chief Judge WRIGHT.

WricuT, Chief Judge: A group of companies in the
chemical, petroleum, rubber, and steel industries and an
industry association? (collectively “the Companies”) ap-
peal from a District Court order denying their motion to
vacate a settlement agreement (the Agreement) pre-
viously adopted by the court,’ and granting a motion for
modification of the settlement agreement filed by the
signatories to the Agreement—five environmental groups
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or
Agency). Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Costle, 12 ERC 1833 (D.D.C. 1979). The Companies
contend that the settlement agreement must be vacated
both because it has been superseded by legislation en-

*Of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 291(a) (1976).

1 The companies are Union Carbide Corp., FMC Corp., Dow
Chemical Co., E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Celanese Co., Olin
Corp., Monsanto Corp., Exxon Corp., Shell Oil Co., Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co., and B. F. Goodrich Co.

* The American Iron and Stee Institute.

* Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. b. Train, 8 ERC 2120
(D. D.C. 1976).

by because each of the law-

ts that were resolved by the Agreement is now moot
and must be dismissed. The Companies further contend
that in proposing the modifications to the settlement
agreement approved by the District Court EPA violated
rulemaking and public participation requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act, the Clean Water Act, and
its own regulations, as well as requirements of consti-
tutional due process.

I.

Between 1978 and 1975 five environmental groups (col-
lectively “NRDC”) brought four separate lawsuits against
EPA to rectify the Agency’s alleged failure to imple
ment several provisions of the statute then known as the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). 33
U.S.C. § 1251 et seg. (1976). The first lawsuit chal-
lenged the criteria EPA was using to decide which pol-
lutants to include in a list of toxic pollutants the Agency
was required to compile by Section 307(a) of the
FWPCA, and also sought to expand EPA’s then existing
list of toxic pollutants (the toxic criteria case)“ The
second and third lawsuits were aimed at compelling EPA

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was enacted in 1972.
Pub. L. No. 92-600. As amended in 1977 the statute is now referred
to as the Clean Water Act. Pub. L. No. 96-217.

* Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, Civil Action
No. 2158-78 (D. D.C.). Section 307 (a) of the FWPCA then pro-
vided in pertinent part:

49a

to promulgate effluent discharge standards for the sub-
stances already on the Agency’s list of toxic pollutants
(the deadlines cases)“ The fourth lawsuit sought an
order requiring EPA to promulgate pretreatment stand-
ards under Section 307 (b) of the FWPCA covering
approximately 35 industries and a wide variety of pol-
lutants (the pretreatment case)“

While these lawsuits were pending EPA officials con-
ducted a thorough review of the Agency’s strategy for
controlling toxic pollutant emissions. They concluded that
there was a need to replace the Agency’s then existing
approach with a new strategy calling for an integrated
program for controlling toxic pollutants. Furthermore,
EPA officials felt that development of the new approach
could provide a basis for resolving the controversies be-
tween the environmental groups and the Agency.’ After
the general outlines of the new program were developed

* Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Train, Civil Action No.
76-0172 (D.D.C.), and Citizens for a Better Environment, Inc. v.
Train, Civil Action No. 75-1698 (D.D.C.). Under the statutory

when comments on the proposed standards revealed major flaws in
the Agency's analysis. See R. Hall, The Evolution and Imple-
mentation of EPA's Regulatory Program to Control the Discharge
of Torte Pollutants, 10 Nat. Rus. Law 607, 614-615 (1977).

* Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. . Agee, Civil Action
No. 76-1267 (D.D.C.). Under § 807 (b) of the FWPCA, EPA was
required to publish within nine months of October 18, 1972 “pro-

posed regulations establishing pretreatment standards for intro-
duction of pollutants into treatment works * * * which are publicly
owned for those pollutants which are determined not to be suscep-
tible to treatment by * * * or which would interfere with the
operation of such treatment works.” 88 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (1)
(1976). Final pretreatment standards were to be promulgated
within 90 days of publishing proposed standards. /d.

* See BR. Hall, supra note 7, at 615-619.

50a

EPA and NRDC, joined by four industry intervenors in
one of the lawsuits,” began settlement negotiations. After
tentative agreement was reached between EPA and
NRDC a proposed settlement agreement was submitted
to the District Court." The District Court held several
hearings on the proposed agreement and allowed in-
terested parties to file comments on it. The Companies
intervened in the proceedings in the District Court and
filed comments vigorously opposing the proposed agree-
ment.” After requiring several modifications the District
Court approved the settlement agreement, finding it a
“just, fair, and equitable resolution of the issues raised.”
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 8 ERC
2120, 2122 (D.D.C. 1976). No appeal was taken from
the court’s order adopting the settlement agreement.

The settlement agreement outlined a comprehensive
strategy for regulation of toxic pollutant discharges under
the FWPCA, including details concerning the timing,
scope, and nature of the regulatory programs EPA
agreed to initiate. Insofar as is relevant to the instant
case, EPA proposed to regulate discharge of toxic pol-
lutants by developing effluent limitations, guidelines, and

% The American Iron and Steel Institute, the American Petro-
leum Institute and member companies, the National Coal Associa-

5la

performance standards for new and existing emission
sources, as well as pretreatment standards regulating in-
troduction of pollutants into treatment works. These
limitations, guidelines, and standards were to cover 21
major industries and 65 specified pollutants or groups of
pollutants. In promulgating effluent limitations and
guidelines EPA agreed that it would employ technology-
based controls such as “best available technology” (BAT)
performance standards for existing emission sources, and
performance standards reflecting the “best available
demonstrated control technology” (BADCT) for new
sources.“ The pretreatment standards EPA undertook to
promulgate were to apply to any of the 65 pollutants
listed in the Agreement and any other pollutants that
proved to be “incompatible” with “publicly owned treat-
ment works” (POTWs).” Promulgation of the regula-
tions envisaged by the Agreement was to take place
according to a phased schedule running through Decem-
ber 31, 1979 and compliance with the regulations by
affected industries was to be achieved by June 30,
19838."*

% In addition to the technology-based program, NRDC insisted
on a provision in the agreement requiring EPA to promulgate
health-based standards for six highly toxic pollutants. See Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, supra note 8, 8 ERC at
2128-2129.

18 Pretreatment standards are similar to BAT effluent limitations,
BADCT performance standards, and other controls prescribed by
the statute in that they are “technology-based.” They differ from
these other controls principally in that they regulate “indirect” dis-
charges into sewers leading into municipal treatment plants rather
than “direct” discharges into receiving waters. The term “incom-
patible” was taken from the language of 807 (b), 33 U.S.C.
§1817(b) (1976).

1% The prescribed schedule for promulgation of regulations di-
vided the 21 industries covered into five groups. Final regulations
for the first two groups were to be promulgated by March 81, 1979,
for the third group by June 30, 1979, for the fourth group by
September 80, 1979, and for the final group by December $1, 1979.
See R. Hall, supra note 7, at 620.

52a

Adoption of the industry-by-industry, technology-based
approach, using statutory authority conferred by various
sections of the FWPCA," marked a change in EPA’s
regulatory strategy. Its previous efforts to control dis-
charge of toxic pollutants had relied on authority con-
ferred by Section 307 of the FWPCA in developing health-
based standards on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis.“ The
new strategy offered substantial advantages over the old.
First, it allowed EPA to cover far more substances and
emission sources than could have been handled under the
old approach.” Second, it allowed the Agency to develop
a single regulatory package which would apply to all of
the problem pollutants in the dis sarge of a particular in-
dustry, enabling the industry to predict the entire cost
of pollution control.” Third, the Agency could allow con-
siderations of cost and technology to enter into its
decisionmaking and industry was allowed a longer com-
pliance period.“ Finally, EPA also expected that the new
program would be easier to administer.”

After the Agreement was adopted by the District Court
Congress began a review of the FWPCA and EPA’s
progress toward implementing its provisions. Commit-
tees of both Houses of Congress held hearings at which

* The new regulatory prograsi relied on authority conferred by
801, 304, 306, and 3807 (b) & (e) of the FWPCA, 838 U.S.C.
$§ 1811, 1814, 1816, 1817(b) & (e) (1976).

18 See R. Hall, supra note 7, at 5616-517.

Id.

58a

various difficulties EPA was experiencing under the then
existing statutory scheme were discussed and the new
regulatory framework and strategy established by the
settlement agreement was explored. In testimony before
the congressional committees NRDC’s representatives
emphasized that the Agreement was working well,“ and
EPA’s spokesman, while acknowledging that the Agency
was having trouble meeting the deadlines set by the
Agreement, strongly supported the Agreement. The
outcome of these hearings was the enactment in December
1977 of several amendments to the FWPCA which was
renamed the Clean Water Act (CWA).* We shall dis-
cuss the nature and importance of those provisions of the
1977 Amendments that are pertinent to this case later.
At this point we simply note that the Companies and
NRDC disagree about the effect of the 1977 Amendments
on the settlement agreement.”

* See generally Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1977: Hearings on Amendments to Pub. L. No. 95-200
before the Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution of the Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works, Serial No. 96-H26,
Part 9, 95th Cong., lst Sess. (1977) (hereinafter “Senate Hear-
ings”); Implementation of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Investigations and
Review of the House Committee on Public Works and Transporta-
tion, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 96-32 (Comm. Pr. 1977) (hereinafter
“House Hearings”).

* See Senate Hearings, supra note 23, at 71 (testimony of James
T. Banks); House Hearings, supra note 28, at 621 (statement of
James T. Banks and Edward L. Strohbehn, Jr.).

54a

Meanwhile, NRDC’s monitoring of EPA’s implementa-
tion of the Agreement’s provisions convinced it that the
Agency would not meet any of the deadlines for propos-
ing and promulgating regulations.“ Accordingly, on
September 26, 1978 NRDC moved for an order to show
cause why EPA should not be held in contempt of
the District Court’s order approving the settlement agree-
ment.” EPA responded on October 20, 1978 with a
motion to amend the Agreement to extend the deadlines
for promulgating regulations, to allow the Agency addi-
tional discretion to exclude certain pollutants and indus-
try categories from regulation, and to extend the dead-
line for compliance with the guidelines to June 30, 1984.”
In its accompanying opposition to NRDC’s motion EPA
explained why it had not been able to meet the original
deadlines specified by the Agreement. Also on October
20, 1978 the Companies filed a motion to vacate the settle-
ment agreement, arguing that Congress had intended the
1977 Amendments which produced the CWA to supplant
the settlement agreement, that the Agreement was in
conflict with the congressional program, and that con-
tinuation of the settlement agreement would inevitably
involve the court in questions of analytical chemistry.”
On October 30, 1978 NRDC served detailed interroga-
tories and requests for documents on EPA. Thereafter,
NRDC and EPA began discussions on a possible settle
ment of the controversy. On November 28, 1978 EPA
officials met with representatives of the Companies to

ing program that EPA had been implementing under the old statute
for nearly two years.” Brief for appellee NRDC at 34 (emphasis
in original).

™* See affidavit of James T. Banks in support of NRDC’s motion

c

* See Supp. App. 105.
* See Supp. App. 182.
* See Supp. App. 187.

55a

announce that a tentative agreement with NRDC had
been reached, and to distribute copies of a proposed joint
motion to modify the settlement agreement that EPA and
NRDC had agreed to. The Companies were given ten
days in which to submit written comments on the pro-
posal. NRDC and EPA considered the suggestions made
in the Companies’ comments and made some changes in
the proposed modifications to reflect these suggestions.“
EPA and NRDC filed their joint motion to modify the
settlement agreement on December 15, 1978.% At the
same time they withdrew all their pleadings relating to
the motion for a show cause order.* The Companies,
however, declined to withdraw their motion to vacate the
settlement agreement. By agreement of the parties the
Companies were given until January 5, 1979 to file with
the court any response or objections to the proposed
modifications. The Companies filed a memorandum op-
posing the motion to modify the Agreement. In addition
to repeating their contention that the Agreement must
be vacated because it had been superseded by the 1977
Amendments, the Companies raised two new arguments.
First, they argued that the Agreement also must be
vacated because each of the four cases which underlie
the Agreement had been mooted by the Amendments and
must be dismissed. Second, they maintained that the pro-
posed modification would violate public notice and com-
ment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), the Clean Water Act, EPA regulations, and an
Executive Order, as well as constitutional requirements
of due process. The District Court heard oral argument
on both motions and permitted additional briefs on the
new issues raised by the Companies. On March 9, 1979
the District Court issued its order denying the Com-

The Companies maintain that the comments did not result
in any substantive revision of the tentative agreement.

%3 See Supp. App. 201-210.

* See Supp. App. 198, 199.

a
*
D

*

56a

panies’ motion to vacate the settlement agreement and
granting NRDC’s and EPA’s motion to modify the

Agreement.

In its memorandum opinion accompanying the order
the District Court addressed each of the Companies’
arguments. First, it rejected the Companies’ claim that
Congress intended the 1977 Amendments to the FWPCA
to supplant the Agreement. The court concluded that
neither the terms of the Amendments nor the legislative
history support this claim. Instead, it found that Con-
gress intended the Agreement “to remain in effect to
supply the missing details of a cohesive strategy for con-
trolling toxic water pollution.” Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. Costle, supra, 12 ERC at 1836.
Second, the court ruled that two of the four cases that
were resolved by the settlement agreement were not
moot, and that these two cases provided an adequate
basis for continuing the Agreement. Id. at 1837, 1838.
Finally, the court dismissed the Companies’ statutory
and constitutional objections to the modifications to the
settlement agreement proposed by NRDC and EPA. The
court found that the modifications were not “rules”
within the meaning of the APA for which notice and
comment were required, and that appellants’ constitu-
tional rights to effective notice were not violated because
the modifications would have no direct or immediate
effect on them. Jd. at 1838-1840. These appeals followed.

II.

On appeal the Companies raise essentially the same
three arguments that they presented to the District Court.

We will examine these arguments separately.

A. The Effect of the 1977 Amendments

Appellants contend that the District Court erred in
rejecting their claim that Congress intended the 1977
Amendments to supersede the settlement agreement. Ap-

57a

pellants maintain that these Amendments were a direct
response to the problems EPA had faced in attempting to
implement the provisions of the FWPCA, the same prob-
lems that were responsible for the shortcomings in the
Agency’s fulfillment of its statutory obligations that
NRDC’s lawsuits were aimed at rectifying. The Com-
panies point out that Congress devoted a significant
amount of time to studying these problems.“ The out-
come of this detailed review, appellants contend, was a
congressional acknowledgement that EPA’s failure to ac-
complish much in terms of realizing the objectives and
goals of the FWPCA was largely a result of deficiencies
in both substantive and procedural provisions of the Act.
Appellants argue that the toxic pollutant provisions of
the 1977 Amendments were designed to replace the un-
workable provisions of the FWPCA with a comprehen-
sive and workable statutory framework for regulation of
toxic pollutants that would eliminate the need for con-
tinued court supervisior of the toxic pollutants programs.
In particular, Congress abandoned the requirement that
EPA develop health-based standards regulating discharge
of toxic pollutants on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis, sub-
stituting in its place an industry-by-industry, technology-
based BAT approach to controlling emission sources. In
addition, Congress resolved the controversy over how
many pollutants should be included in EPA’s list of
toxic pollutants by specifying 65 pollutants that had to
be included in the list and granting EPA’s Adminis-
trator authority to add pollutants to or delete them from
this list. While acknowledging that these two changes
merely adopted the regulatory framework established by
the settlement agreement, appellants point to other pro-

* Appellants note that both Houses of Congress held hearings
on these problems and the staff of the House Subcommittee on
Investigations and Review prepared a report on their investiga-
tions into the problems of the toxics programs for the House Com-
mittee on Public Works and Transportation. See House Memo-
randum, 128 Cong. Rec. H12929-H12982 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977)..

58a

visions in the Amendments which they contend show
that Congress did more than merely ratify the settle
ment agreement.“ In appellants’ view, the breadth and
detail of these other changes demonstrate that Congress
“went beyond mere ratification of the [settlement agree-

2 Specifically, appellants point to the following amendments:

—Section 301(1) specifies that neither the economic capa-
bility (301 (e)) nor the water quality (301(g)) waiver of
effluent limitations is applicable to toxic pollutant limitations;

—Section 307 (a) (2) (1) authorizes EPA to establish effiu-
ent standards for toxic pollutants which are “more stringent”
than the BAT-level effluent guidelines, if the BAT guidelines
are not sufficient to protect the public health or the environ-
ment; (2) establishes the procedure EPA must follow in estab-
lishing the standards; and (3) establishes its own timetable
for promulgating such standards;

—Section 307 (b) (1) provides that a source discharging
into a publicly owned treatment works (POTW) may have
the stringency of its effluent limitations reduced to reflect
the ability of the POTW to remove some or all of a toxic
pollutant provided certain conditions are met;

—Section 811 authorizes EPA to regulate the plant-site
runoff, spillage, waste disposal and drainage associated with
the use of toxic (section 307(a)) or hazardous (section 311)
pollutants ;

—Section 307 (b) (2) (C) specifies that effluent guidelines for

all the toxic pollutants specified by Congress (the list of sixty-
five) must be promulgated by EPA not later than July 1, 1980;

—Section 801(b) (2) (C) specifies that discharges must com-
ply with the effluent guidelines promulgated for the pollutants
designated by Congress not later tha[n] July 1, 1984 * * *;

—Section 307 (b) (2) [sic] [§ 301 (b) (2) (D) ] specifies that
for pollutants which EPA adds to the new section 307 (a) list,
compliance with the toxic pollutant guidelines is required not
later than three years after such guidelines are established ;

Section 307 (a) provides that the Administrator of EPA
may add to or delete pollutants from the section 307(a) list,
and that his decision shall be final except upon a judicial deter-
mination that it was arbitrary and capricious.

Brief for appellants at 19-20.

59a

ment] and tinkering with its toxics program and instead
devised a comprehensive program to control the discharge
of toxic pollutants to replace the old section 307(a) and
the [Agreement].” *’

Appellants find further support for their view that
Congress intended the Amendments to supersede the
settlement agreement in the legislative history of the
Amendments. In this the Companies largely rely on a
statement made by Congressman Roberts while explain-
ing the toxic pollutant provisions of the House-Senate
Conference Report to his colleagues. Congressman Roberts
said:

In summary, the revisions to the toxics regulatory
program contained in the conference report
simplify the procedures for identifying toxic pollu-
tants and promulgating regulations according to
their characteristics. The discretion exercised by
the Administrator is broadened, the procedures less
formally structured, and burdens of proof modified
to the point where the program may proceed in a
more rapid and orderly fashion without further
recourse to the courts.

Crisis-by-crisis reaction to the problem of toxics
must no longer be the norm, but must be replaced
by an orderly program for adding compounds to the
list, with the Administrator fully in charge. It,
therefore, would be entirely appropriate for the
United States to petition the courts to relinquish
jurisdiction over toxic pollutant control under Pub-
lic Law 92-500, now that the statutory basis has
been laid for a workable regulatory program the
lack whereof led to the litigation resulting in the
consent decree. This is particularly appropriate in
view of the large number of potentially toxic chem-
icals to be addressed by the program and the need

* Brief for appellants at 21.

60a

for administrative discretion within the revised reg-
ulatory framework to carry out the provisions of law
enacted herein.

This is the intent of this legislation, an outgrowth
of House initiatives by the House conferees.

123 Cong. Rec. H12927-H12928 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977).
Appellants maintain that Congressman Roberts’ views
must be given significant weight, pointing out that he
was chairman of the House Subcommittee that drafted
the Amendments, chairman of the House conferees, vice-
chairman of the House-Senate Conference Committee, and
floor manager of the Conference Report in the House.
Appellants suggest that Congressman Roberts’ statement
takes on added significance because the toxic pollutant
provisions of the Amendments were drafted by the Con-
ference Committee and the Conference Report is silent
on the issue of congressional intent.“

Claiming to have demonstrated that Congress intended
the 1977 Amendments ta supplant the settlement agree-
ment, appellants then note that courts have vacated set-
tlement agreements where an intervening Act of Congress
has changed the relevant law in such a manner as to
eliminate the right which the settlement agreement was
designed to safeguard. The Companies find illustrations
of the operation of this principle in two Supreme Court
cases, System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 US.
642 (1961), and Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont
Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855). In Wheeling
& Belmont Bridge the Court examined the effect of sub-
sequent legislation on an outstanding injunction. The
State of Pennsylvania had earlier obtained an injunc-
tion barring the company from constructing or maintain-

0 Appellants note that Senator Muskie, who was the floor man-
ager of the Conference Report in the Senate, was absent from the
House-Senate Conference due to illness. See 128 Cong. Rec. 819636
(daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977).

‘way

6la

ing a bridge across the Ohio River on the ground that
the bridge in question obstructed navigation in such a
manner as to be in conflict with certain Acts of Congress
regulating navigation. A subsequent statute declared the
bridge to be a lawful structure in its existing position
and elevation. The Supreme Court dissolved the injunc-
tion, pointing out that the later Act of Congress had
eliminated the public right the injunction had served to
protect by resolving the question whether the bridge was
an unlawful obstruction. In System Federation the Court
relied on Wheeling & Belmont Bridge in holding that a
District Court had abused its discretion in refusing to
modify a consent decree after an Act of Congress
changed the relevant law. The District Court had earlier
approved a consent decree resolving litigation brought by
non-union employees against a railroad and a number of
unions representing its employees. The plaintiffs had
charged the defendants with violating Section 2 of the
Railway Labor Act which forbade discrimination against
non-union employees. As part of the settlement agree-
ment the court enjoined the defendants from discrimi-
nating against non-union employees because of their re-

Court pointed out that “the District Court’s authority
to adopt the consent decree comes only from the statute
which the decree is intended to enforce” since [ilt was
the Railway Labor Act, and only incidentally the parties,
that the District Court served in entering the consent
decree.” System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, supra, 364
U.S. at 651. The Court then noted that a “court must

when its provisions are amended” by “modify[ing] the
terms of a consent decree when a change in law brings
those

terms in conflict with statutory objectives.” Id.

62a

The Companies argue that since the terms and legisla-
tive history of the 1977 Amendments indicate that Con-
gress intended the toxic pollutant provisions of the
Amendments to supersede the framework established by
the settlement agreement, application of the settled
principles announced by the Supreme Court in Wheeling
& Belmont Bridge and System Federation requires that
the judgment of the District Court in the instant case
be reversed and the settlement agreement vacated.

The power of a District Court sitting as a court of
equity to modify the terms of a settlement agreement it
previously adopted cannot be drawn into question. See
System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, supra, 364 U.S. at
642-647; Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556
(1942); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106
(1932). The decision to grant or deny a request to
modify the terms of a consent decree rests with the dis-
cretion of the District Court. See System Federation No.
91 v. Wright, supra, 364 U.S. at 657; Chrysler Corp. v.
United States, supra, 316 U.S. at 562. However, sound
exercise of judicial discretion may require that terms of
a consent decree be modified when there has been a sig-
nificant change in the circumstances obtaining at the
time the consent decree was entered. This change in cir-
cumstances may result from a change in controlling law,
including changes brought about by subsequent legisla-
tion. See, e. g., System Federation No. 91 v. Wright,
supra; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.,
supra; Daylo v. Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs, 501
F.2d 811, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ; McGrath v. Potash, 199
F.2d 166, 167-168 (D.C. Cir. 1952). Application of these
settled principles does not, however, provide a ready
answer to the case at bar. One of the issues we must
resolve is whether in fact Congress intended the 1977
Amendments to supplant the settlement agreement.

Our starting point, of course, is the language and pro-
visions of the Amendments. Clearly, the strongest evi-

68a

dence of a congressional intent to supersede the settle-
ment agreement would be an explicit declaration of such
an intention in the language of the Amendments. In the
instant case we do not understand appellants to be sug-
gesting that any such declaration of congressional intent
appears in the language of the 1977 Amendments. Nor
have we found any such statements. The silence of the
Amendments on the issue of Congress’ intent with regard
to the settlement agreement is not necessarily fatal to
appellants’ claim, however. As the District Court pointed
out,“ if a congressional intent to supplant the Agree-
ment is a “necessary implication” of the provisions of the
Amendments, we would have to find that appellants are
correct in arguing that the Agreement must be vacated.”
Alternatively, evidence of congressional intent may be
provided by clear statements in the legislative history.

After reviewing the changes made in the toxic pol-
lutant provisions of the FWPCA by the 1977 Amend-
ments, as well as the legislative history of the Amend-
ments, we are unable to accept appellants’ contention
that they show that Congress clearly intended the 1977
Amendments to supersede the settlement agreement.
First, this case does not present an instance of the type
of situation that confronted the Supreme Court in System
Federation and Wheeling & Belmont Bridge—a situation
in which there is a clear conflict between the terms of a
settlement agreement and the provisions of a subsequent
Act of Congress. As appellants concede,“ the two major
substantive changes in the toxic pollutant provisions of

0 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 12 ERC
1888, 1886 (D.D.C. 1979). *

% Thus in System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642
(1961), the absence of an explicit declaration of congressional in-
tent to affect the terms of the injunction at issue in that case did
not prevent the Supreme Court from concluding that the District
Court should have amended its outstanding decree.

41 See brief for appellants at 18.
*

* e
— oo

.

64a

the FWPCA that were made by the 1977 Amendments
merely ratified the settlement agreement. Both Congress’
substitution of an industry-by-industry, technology-based
BAT approach for the pollutant-by-pollutant, health-
based approach required by Section 307 of the FWPCA,
and its decision to specify a list of 65 pollutants—the
same pollutants listed in the Agreement—that were to be
included in EPA’s revised list of toxic pollutants under
Section 307(a), amounted to little more than an “at-
tempt to conform the statute to the reality of [the] pro-
gram” EPA had been developing under the terms of the
settlement agreement. National Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Costle, supra, 12 ERC at 1836. See Hercules,
Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

Only in two relatively minor aspects did the amended
statute depart from the framework established by the
settlement agreement. First, Section 307(a) of the Act
was amended to allow EPA’s Administrator to add to or
delete from the list of 65 toxic pollutants. Second, the
Agreement’s deadline for promulgation of BAT regula-
tions was extended to July 1, 1980.% These minor de-
partures from the terms of the settlement agreement can-
not be interpreted as evidence of a congressional rejec-
tion of the Agreement, or as signs of an intention to
supersede all its provisions. If instead of endorsing the
strategy and framework set out in the settlement agree-
ment the Amendments had required EPA to adopt a
different regulatory approach, we might be inclined to
agree with the Companies that a congressional intention
to supersede the Agreement is a “necessary implication.”
But as we have already indicated, this is not such a case.
Indeed, if any inferences are to be drawn from Congress’
actions, it would appear that the District Court’s con-
clusion that “Congress intended for the Agreement to

The District Court modified the settlement agreement to con-
form to the new deadline for promulgating BAT regulations estab-
lished by Congress.

65a

remain in effect to supply the missing details of a co-
hesive strategy for controlling toxic water pollution” “
is the more plausible inference.

We are also not persuaded by the Companies’ claim
that the legislative history of the Amendments offers
clear evidence of a congressional intent to supplant the
settlement agreement. First, we, like the District Court,
have some difficulty understanding why if, as appellants
maintain, Congress wanted to supplant the Agreement,
it did not bother to say so in any of the reports—House,
Senate, or Conference—that accompanied the legislation;
this in spite of the fact that it also failed to express this
intent in the Amendments themselves. The absence of
any indications of such congressional intent in the various
reports could not have been inadvertent since both House
and Senate Committees heard testimony from NRDC and
EPA about the terms of the settlement agreement.“
Moreover, the silence of the committee reports on this
issue of congressional intent stands in marked contrast
to the clarity with which these reports dealt with other
court decisions which Congress chose to supersede. For
example, in amending Sections 313 and 404 of the
FWPCA to make it clear that the dredging activities of
the Army Corps of Engineers are subject to state water
quality laws, the Senate Report explained that these
amendments were intended to overrule a contrary holding
by the Eighth Circuit in Minnesota v. Hoffman, 543 F.2d
1198 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 977 (1977).
S. Rep. No. 95-370, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 68 (1977).

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, supra note
89, 12 ERC at 1836.

Ses notes 24 and 25 supra.

“ Similarly, in discussing a new provision dealing with compli-
ance orders under § 309 the Senate Report noted:

Under existing law there are no circumstances that justify a
time for compliance extending beyond July 1, 1977. The Ad-

66a

The only real support for their interpretation of con-
gressional intent the Companies have pointed to is the
statement by Congressman Roberts quoted above.“ It is,
of course, well established that courts give considerable
weight to the views of sponsors and floor managers of
legislation in determining congressional intent. See
NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousers,
Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1924); Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 374, 394-395
(1954); United States v. United Mine Workers of
America, 330 U.S. 258, 278-284 (1947). However, not
even Congressman Roberts’ statement offers such clear
support for appellants’ claim. Congressman Roberts did
not suggest that it was Congress’ intention (as he under-
stood it) that the 1977 Amendments would automatically
supersede the Agreement. Rather, he merely indicated
that inasmuch as Congress had amended the procedural
provisions of the FWPCA that were responsible for
EPA’s difficulties with implementing the statute, EPA
should consider petition ling] the courts to relinquish
jurisdiction over toxic pollutant control * * *.”* Thus
the most that appellants can claim is that Congressman
Roberts thought it “entirely appropriate” for EPA to ask
the court to relinquish jurisdiction. This is not quite the
same as a suggestion that Congressman Roberts believed
that the Amendments would automatically supersede the
settlement agreement.

ministrator can only issue an enforcement order requiring
compliance within 30 days or initiate civil or criminal action.
Thus, the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in Republic Steel Corporation v. Train et al. and Wil-
liams, ——— F.2d ——., (6th Cir. 1977) was an incorrect inter-
pretation of existing law.

S. Rep. No. 95-870, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 60 (1977).
4% See —— F.2d at ——— (pp. 16-17) supra.

* 128 Cong. Rec. H12927-H12928 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977) (re-
marks of Representative Roberts).

67a

Moreover, there are other statements in the legislative
history of the Amendments, including a statement by
Congressman Roberts, which indicate a different view of
congressional intent from that suggested by appellants.
The Senate Report on the 1977 Amendments had this to
say about the regulatory framework established by the
settlement agreement:

During the course of its hearings the committee ex-
amined in detail EPA’s proposal and strategy for
controlling the discharge of toxic pollutants pri-
marily through the development of effluent guide-
lines for the best available technology economically
achievable under section 301(b)(2)(A) and the
subsequent reissuance of permits under section 402
to require the application of such technology by dis-
chargers by July 1, 1983. The Committee approves
of and endorses this strategy.

S. Rep. No. 95-370, supra, at 56 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in explaining the reasoning behind the toxic
pollutant provisions of the Conference Report to his
Senate colleagues Senator Muskie noted:

Another, and possibly more important, reason for
maintaining the BAT requirements is that the
Agency currently has a major program underway
of using BAT to control toxics. Technology-based
effluent limitations are being developed which will
place limits on toxic pollutants which pose or are
likely to pose human health and ecological hazards.

The conference agreement was specifically de-
siqned to codify the so-called “Flannery decision,”
tuhich set forth 65 families of pollutants which are
to be regulated by BAT, and EPA has been im-
plementing this consent decree. To take a different :
course for dealing with toxics at this point would re- |

quire a major reprogramming of EPA resources. :
Such a delay, whether it be to allow utilization of a

68a

different section of the act or in order to imple
ment this section, would only cause confusion and
add still more delay to efforts to solve the toxics
problem. The discharge of toxic pollutants should be
eliminated as soon as possible. Because EPA is al-
ready embarked upon a program to control toxics
using a proven mechanism, technology-based efflu-
ent limitations, and because of the urgency to con-
trol toxics, prudent public policy demands that the
strategy be maintained.

123 Cong. Rec. $19647-S19648 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977)
(emphasis added). Inasmuch as Senator Muskie was
chairman of the Senate Subcommittee which reviewed
EPA’s implementation of the FWPCA, was a member
of the House-Senate Conference Committee on the 1977
Amendments, and served as floor manager of the Con-
ference Report in the Senate, his views are entitled to
significant weight in fathoming congressional intent.“
Nothing in Senator Muskie’s statement suggests that he
viewed the settlement agreement as being superseded by
the Amendments. If anything, his statement seems to
confirm the District Court’s conclusion that Congress in-
tended the settlement agreement to supply the details
of the toxics program. Further evidence that Congress
intended the settlement agreement to continue in force,
subject to modifications to conform it to the amended
statute, is provided by a statement made by Senator
Randolph in discussing the toxic pollutant provisions of
the Conference Report. He stated:

In the requirements for the control of toxic pollu-
tants adopted by the conferees, the measure before
us largely follows the strategy presently being used

48 Although it is true, as appellants point out, see note 88 supra,
that Senator Muskie was prevented from attending the conference

69a

by the Environmental Protection Agency under the
settlement agreement in the case of Natural Re-
sources Defense Council against Train. That im-
portant case required the development of a mini-
mum degree of control for a specified list of pollu-
tants to be achieved on a definite schedule. The
principal way in which the conference report modi-
fies the settlement agreement is to require the pub-
lication of effluent limitations based on best avail-
able technology at a minimum for the listed pol-
lutants by July 1, 1980, and to specify July 1, 1984,
as the latest date for compliance with those effluent
limitations.
123 Cong. Rec. 819663 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977) (empha-
sis added). Senator Randolph was chairman of the Sen-
ate Committee that drafted the 1977 Amendments and
a member of the House-Senate Conference Committee.
Insofar as Senator Randolph viewed the 1977 Amend-
ments as “modifying” the settlement agreement, it is
difficult to believe that he understood Congress’ intention
to be that the Agreement would be completely superseded
by the Amendments. «

Finally, as we have already indicated, a statement by
Congressman Roberts suggests that he too assumed that
EPA would continue to be bound by the terms of the
Agreement. In describing the BAT-toxic pollutants pro-
visions of the Conference Report to the House, Congress-
man Roberts said the following about the statutory pro-
vision authorizing EPA to add to or delete from the
list of 65 toxic pollutants specified by the statute:

[Tj)he Administrator, in his discretion, may deter-
mine that certain toxic pollutants—or subclasses of
pollutants—are not appropriate for regulation in
certain circumstances. For example, the Adminis-
trator may use his discretion when equal or more
effective protection is already provided with respect
to that pollutant by an effluent limitation and guide-

70a

line promulgated pursuant to other sections of the act
or, when the discharge of [a] specific pollutant re-
sults from its presence in intake water; or, where a
specific pollutant is present in either insignificant or
trace quantities and does not cause or is not likely
to cause toxic effects to identifiable organisms af-
fected by the discharge.

123 Cong. Rec. H12927 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1977). How-
ever, Congressman Roberts did not describe decision-
making criteria contained in the statute. Rather, these
decisionmaking criteria are contained in paragraph 8 of
the settlement agreement. Section 307 (a) (1) merely di-
rects the Administrator to “take into account toxicity of
the pollutant, its persistence, degradability, the usual or
potential presence of the affected organisms in any waters,
the importance of the affected organisms, and the nature
and the extent of the effect of the toxic pollutant on
such organisms.” Thus Congressman Roberts’ state-
ment seems to imply that he too expected that the settle-
ment agreement would continue in force to supply missing
details for the toxic pollutants program.“

These indications in the legislative history of the 1977
Amendments that Congress expected the settlement agree-
ment to continue in effect, and the ambiguity of such evi-
dence as the Companies are able to marshall in support
of their interpretation of congressional] intent, lead us to
conclude that the District Court properly rejected ap-
pellants’ statutory supersession argument. We therefore
turn to the Companies’ claim that the Agreement should

Senator Randolph described these same factors in explaining
the decisionmaking criteria to be used by EPA’s Administrator
in making listing decisions. See 128 Cong. Rec. 819663 (daily ed.
Dec. 15, 1977) (remarks of Senator Randolph).

83 U.S.C. §1817(a)(1) (Supp. II 1978).
51 See K. Hall, supra note 22, at 622 n.80.

71

be vacated because each of the four cases which provided
the basis for the Agreement is now moot and must be
dismissed.

B. Mootness

Appellants begin their discussion by pointing out that
Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement prevents
federal courts from issuing judgments in cases which are
moot. Citing Supreme Court decisions in Hall v. Beals,
896 U.S. 45 (1969), and Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S.
119 (1977), appellants further note that a case may
become moot if the statute upon which a claim is based
is amended in such a fashion that the facts set forth in
the complaint do not present a controversy under the new
law. Appellants contend that application of these con-
trolling legal precedents to the facts of the instant cases
requires vacation of the settlement agreement and dis-
missal of the four cases which underlie the Agreement.
The Companies suggest that both parties agree (and the
District Court found) that two of the four cases are
moot. In these two cases—the deadline cases—NRDC
had alleged that E

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1415%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
