# Petition — Rees v. County of Los Angeles > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1362%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition - **Published:** January 1, 1984 - **Citation:** 467 U.S. 1205 ## Text FILED MAR 22 1984 7 . . 5 97 ALEXANDER L. STEVAS. Misc. No. CLERK Seiad IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1983 JOHN REES, Appellant, a Ve a COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Appellee. IN RE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT JOHN REES 2805 St. Paul Street Baltimore, MD 21218 301/366-2531 Petitioner Pro Se QUESTION PRESENTED 1. May a state which by statute pro- tects journalists from being compelled to disclose “in any legal proceeding the source of any news or information that was obtained for the purpose of publication" Or other media dissemination deny that protection to a resident journalist prac- ticing that profession without interrup- tion for seventeen years by ordering him not only to appear before the grand jury of another state to testify but also to produce information that falls within the protective language of the statute. TABLE OF CONTENTS Opinions Below e*eeeeeeeeneeneeeensneneeneeee Jurisdictional Statement ....cccecees Pertinent Constitutional Provisions and Statutes ....ceceecess Statement of the Case: Procedural History eeeeeeeeeneseeeeeee Relevant FactS cecccccccccccccccvcces Reasons for Allowance of the Writ ... CONCLUSION cccccccccccccccccccccccccs APPENdices .ccccccccccccccscccccccece Appendix A: Order of the Maryland Court of Appeals eeeeoeeeeeeeeeeneeee Appendix B: Opinion of the Mary- land Court of Special Appeals ... Appendix C: Relevant Proceedings of September 15, 1983, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland eeeseeeeeeeeeeeeeaeene Notice of Appearance ......seeseeees Service eeeneeeaeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeaeeeee - 7 of Vat nt *. lh eee ie a Ee EE LS 45 47 i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES KSDO v. The Superior Court of Riverside County, 136 Cal. App.3d 375, 186, Cal. Rptr. 211, 214, 216 (1982) ... Constitution of the United. States, Amendment I e*eeeeeeeeneteeeneeneeeeneeee Amendment XIV e*eneeeeeeeeeneeeeneneeeeee California Evidence Code Section 1070.. Maryland Annotated Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings, Section 9-112 ccoccccceccosscee Section 9-301 eeseeeeeeereseee Section 9-302 eeeeeereeeeeeees Section 9-304 eeeeeeeeeseeeee ii 13 vil 4 4-2 6 " Misc. No. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1983 JOHN REES, Appellant, = Ve © COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Appellee. IN RE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, I GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION eee De ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ly 7 . ¥ * i> t Pe at. Ee on Petitioner John Rees respectfully requests that this Court issue a Writ of Certiorari to review the denial of certior- ari by the Court of Appeals of Maryland on December 27, 1983, and the decision and order of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in In Re State of California for the County of Los Angeles, Grand Jury Investigation, Md. App. ’ A.2d (No. 1088, September Term, 1533, @ecided October 7, 1983). OPINIONS BELOW The Court of Appeals of Maryland denied Petitioner's application for a Writ of Certiorari by order dated December 27, 1983. A copy of said order is attached as Exhibit "A." The Court of Special Appeals filed a reported opinion on March 6, 1984, which is attached as Exhibit "B." The relevant proceedings in the trial court, attached as Exhibit "C," contain an oral opinion delivered by the trial judge. =2- . t.) ee Lo bs het Ae BAe oes 1 ai Ore ee ae ~~ oe JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT On 27 December 1983, the Court of Appeals of Maryland denied Petitioner's Application for Writ of Certiorari. The Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 20 U.S.C. 1257(3). PERTINENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES United States Constitution, Amendment I. "Congress shall make no law *** abridg- ing the freedom of speech or of the press; ***," United States Constitution, Amendment XIV. "nor shall any person *** be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ***, Maryland Annotated Code, Courts & Judicial .? Proceedings, Section 9-112. | "A person engaged in, connected i with, or employed on a newspaper or : journal or for any radio or television é station may not be compelled to dis- close, in any legal proceeding or ott ch trial or before any committee of the ie legislature or elsewhere, the source of any news or information that was obtained by the person for the pur- poses of publication in a newspaper or journal or for purposes of dissemina- : tion by a radio or television station where the verson is engaged, connected with or employed." - Maryland Annotated Code, Courts & Judicial Proceedings, Section 9-301. "(a) In General. - In this title the following words have the meanings indicated. (b) State. - "State" means any state or territory of the United States and the District of Columbia. (c) Summons. - "Summons" means a subpoena, order, or other notice requiring the appearance of a witness. (4) Witness. - “Witness means a person whose testimony is desired in any proceeding or investigation by a grand jury or in a criminal prosecu- tion or proceeding.” Maryland Annotated Code, Courts & Judicial Proceedings, Section 9-302. "(a) Certificate that witness is ) needed in another state; hearing. - If ° a judge of a court of record in any state which by its laws has maje pro- vision for commanding persons within *; that state to attend and testify in a the State certifies under seal of the 3 court that there is a criminal prose- | cution pending in the court, or that a grand jury investigation has commenced — or is about to commence, that a person being within the State is a material witness in the prosecution, or grand jury investigation, and that his pre- sence will be required for a specified number of days, upon presentation of | the certificate to any judge of a court of record, in the county in which the person is, the judge shall fix a time and place for a hearing, and shall make an order directing the witness to appear at a time and place certain for the hearing. (b) Court may order witnesses to attend. - If at the hearing the judge Aetermines that the witness is material and necessary, that it will not cause undue hardship to the witness to be compelled to attend and testify in the prosecution or a grand jury investiga- tion in the other state, and that the laws of the state in which the prose- cution is pending, or grand jury in- vestigation has commenced or is about to commence, and of any other state through which the witness may be re- quired to pass ordinary course of tra- vel, will give to him protection from arrest and the service of civil and criminal process, he shall issue a summons, with a copy of the certifi- cate attached, directing the witness to attend and testify in the court where the prosecution is pending, or where a grand jury investigation has commenced or is about to commence at a time and place specified in the sum- mons. In the hearing the certificate shall be prima facie evidence of all the facts stated therein." -5- “ae? Se — SY Fe a. ee a PR ea a ee Maryland Annotated Code, Courts & Judicial Proceedings, Section 9-304. “(a) Exemption of person coming into State to attend and testify. - If a e person comes into this State in obe- dience to a summons directing him to attend and testify in this State he « siall not while in this State pursuant to such summons be subject to arrest or the‘service of process, civil or criminal, in connection with matters which arose before his entrance into this State under the summons. (b) Exemption of person passing through State while going to another state. - If a person passes through this State while going to another state in obedience to a summons to attend and testify in that state or while returning therefrom, he shall not whole so passing through this State be subject to arrest or the ser- vice of process, civil or criminal, in connection with matters which arose. before his entrance into this State under the summons." California Evidence Code, Section 1070. "(a) A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, or by a press association or wire service, ‘¢ or any person who has-been so connect- © ed or employed, cannot be adjudged in contempt by a judicial, legislative, administrative body, or any other body having the power to issue subpoenas, ae elt . oo) eee a et RN ea eee 8 Ne aeons ee . 4 Ty : . : ey , - - tod . oy for refusing to disclose, in any pro- ceeding as defined in Section 901, the source of any information procured while so connected or employed for publication in a newspaper, magazine 4 or other periodical publication, or for refusing to disclose any unpublish- ed information obtained or prepared in 4 gathering, receiving or processing processing of information for com- munication to the public.” STATEMENT OF THE CASE “PROCEDURAL HISTORY The Grand Jury of Los Angeles County, California, is investigating alleged theft and concealment of public records by offi- cers and employees of the Los Angeles Police Department and their disclosure to third parties. The State of California requested that Se the Petitioner, John Rees, appear before the Grand Jury bringing with him "all records of information" furnished him by any Los Angeles Police Department officer -7- or employee and "all other data base information whether stored electronically or otherwise." - On 15 September 1983, following a 4 Cis Sh Bele 4° - ; a . oe, * Pare SB: MAIR OP cg So ol SA A ee ‘ y {Appendix B]. A Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Maryland was denied on December 27, 1983. RELEVANT FACTS A hearing was held on September 15, 1983, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City pursuant to Section 9-302 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Annotated Code at which time the State introduced a certificate signed by a Superior Court Judge of Los Angeles County, California. The certificate stated that the Los Angeles County Grand Jury is investigating an alleged theft and concealment of public records, and further, that Petitioner is a material and necessary witness. ~ The State then rested its case. The lower court then ruled that the certi- ficate was insufficient to prove that Petitioner was a material and necessary witness, and it permitted the State to re- open its case. The State called Detective Ben Lovatto who testified that Detective Jay Paul of the Los Angeles Police Depart- ment had a contractual relationship with Western Goals Foundation under which Paul was to provide information to Western Goals in exchange for money. Detective Lovatto further testified that the Petitioner, a newsman and editor of Western Goals, took certain computer tapes and floppy discs containing information provided by Paul. The testimony was objected to by the Petitioner as being hearsay, but was admitted by the court. No additional evidence was introduced and arguments of counsel were presented. The court ruled that the evidence pre- sented established that Petitioner is a material and necessary witness in the Grand Jury investigation, and that his attendance will not cause him undue hardship. The court further ordered that Petitioner must also produce tangible evidence at the time of his appearance in California. REASONS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE WRIT The Constitutionally provided rights to free speech and a free press, supported by due process considerations, demand that appellant be permitted to assert the pro- tection of the Maryland "Press Shield Statute" [Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code Annotated, Section 9-112 (1980 Repl. Vol.)j. Under that Maryland statute, the petitioner, John Rees, a Maryland resident -ll- and professional journalist of some twenty years standing who carries out the writing of his articles and books in his Maryland residence and has compiled an extensive "data base” on the subjects of his writing which include criminal subcultures an4 terrorist organizations, could not be com- pelled to disclose in any legal proceeding the source of information obtained for the purpose of publication or for dissemina- tion via television and radio, video docu- mentaries or other media formats. Consideration of the Constitutional protections above require the least intru- sive means of investigation or that the information sought is unavailable from any other source. In this matter, evidence introduced into the Circuit Court hearing on September 15, 1983, indicated that a number of other witnesses from the Los -]2- . vt ’ P 4% ¥ * * f « : : “| 7 Bis imse ; 3 3 4 as di “hen Shem ee ee OU ee : = es wn Oy) 4 Angeles Police Department, active duty and retired, directly involved in this matter r were available to the Grand Jury and had already testified concerning disclosure of information to third parties. Unlike the Maryland “press shield," the California "press shield law" to which he must look for protection if the Maryland rulings are upheld does not create any privilege. It does not protect his research documents, notes, files or other materials, nor does it provide protection from any sanction except contempt. KSDO v. The Superior Court of Riverside County, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211, 214, 216 (1982). The Los Angeles County Grand Jury, having other directly involved wit- nesses including at least one self- identified source at its disposal, is not harmed by appellant John Rees's assertion -l3- , : - 1) wR i" . 2 As Mckay) Jo" a Wr Bee "Ne Ter Ne Eg a ree i OS Oe fet) Vy of his Maryland press shield privilege. Moreover, there is no compelling need to require the appellant to’ disclose all sources he may have had within the Los Angeles Police Department during his career or what information they may have provided him. Nor is there a compelling need for him to produce for the Los Angeles Grand Jury .all of the documents and materials Rees has amassed over the years during the course of his journalism, in the words of the California subpoena, “all other data base information whether stored electronically or otherwise." CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, appellant John Rees respectfully requests that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland. Respectfully submitted, 10 DATED: 26th March, 1904(] . ee oe JOHN REES 2805 St. Paul Street Baltimore, MD 21218 301/366-2531 oo Seclvlonir, : Misc. No. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1983 IN RE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI APPENDICES APPENDIX A Order of the Court of Appeals of Maryland eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee APPENDIX B Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland ..eeeeseecsees APPENDIX C Relevant Proceedings of September 15, 1983, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland .....s+.6. Lie tah ka, ane 16 18 APPENDIX A IN RE: STATE OF CALIFORNIA: FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS : ANGELES, GRAND JURY : INVESTIGATION : : : : : : : : 3 : ORDER IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Petition Docket No. 499 September Term, 1983 Court of Special Appeals) Upon consideration of the peti- tion for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Special Appeals in the above entitled case, it is ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the petition be, and it is hereby, denied as there has been no ee ° showing that review by certiorari is | desirable and in the public interest. {3/ ert C. Murphy ef Judge Date: December 27, 1983. APPENDIX B REPORTED IN THE C OF SPECIAL APP ‘ OF MARYLAND No. 1088 September Term, 1983 IN RE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION Gilbert, C.J. Adkins Bloom, JJ. Opinion by Gilbert, C.J. Piled: March 6, 1984 “ A mt - ¥ rd ee we eee Tee eee This Court on October 7, 1983, issued a per cuiram order affirming an order by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City (Karwacki, J.) that commanded John Rees to "appear before the Grand Jury of the County of Los Angeles, State of California ..."1 We now explain why we affirmed the Circuit Court. From the record we learn that the Grand Jury of the County of Los Angeles is inguiring into the unauthorized removal and theft of intelligence information from the Intelligence Division of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPDID) by Detective Jay Paul (Paul). There was testimony in the record that Paul, who was assigned to the LAPDID, was under a contractual relationship with Western Goals Foundation in which he was + The Court of Appeals denied cer- tiorari on December 27, 1983. -19- paid thirty thousand dollars a year “to maintain a computer for Western Goals Foundation and develop a computer program to input information in the Western Goals computer." Detective Ben Lovato of the LAPD testified that, "Western Goals is a private intelligence gathering foundation e+e.” The computer for Western Goals was maintained in the “office of ... Paul's wife, in Long Beach, California." Apparently Paul would feed information gleaned from the LAPDID records into the Western Goals computer. The editor of Western Goals, John Rees, allegedly removed from the office of Paul's wife, “thirty discs and one tape which contained" LAPDID “intelligence information." Rees refused to turn over the discs and tape to the LAPDID and left California. Obviously, he made his way to Maryland. -20- Because the Grand Jury of the County of Los Angeles desired Rees's appearance before it, a subpoena was issued on August 9, 1983, which commanded that Rees present °* himself before that body on September 29, 1983. In addition to appearing personally before the grand jury, Rees was directed to produce: "All records of information furnish- ed you or Western Goals by Jay S. Paul or any other Los Angeles Police Department officer or employee, and/ or a representative of the office of Ann Love. Such records are not limited to but are to include 30 floppy discs and their printouts, and storage tape and its printouts, received on or about March ll, 1983, from Jay S. Paul, and all other floppy discs and their printouts, and all other data base information whether stored electronically or otherwise." Pursuant to the terms of the “Uniform Act to Secure Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings,"2 ~° because 5 See California Evidence Code, 8 1970 (a), which provides: "A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, or by a press association or wire service, or any person who has been so connect- ed or employed, cannot be adjudged in contempt by a judicial, legislative, administrative body, or any other body whatever occurred between Rees and Detec- tive Jay Paul took place in California, not Maryland. The Maryland Press Shield Law was de- signed to protect newsmen and neewomen in this State; it has no extra-territorial application. The legislature did not enact the Press Shield Law so as to create a sanctuary to which out-of-state newsper- sons could flee and thereby avoid disclo- Sure of news sources. Rees's attempted utilization of the Maryland Press Shield Law is disingenuous. We reject it. 3 continued having the power to issue subpoenas, for refusing to disclose, in any pro- ceeding as defined in Section 901, the source of any information procured while so connected or employed for publication in a newspaper, magazine or other periodical publication, or for refusing to disclose any unpublish- ed information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing processing of information for com- munication to the public." -34- IV. "Courts Art. 89-301 et. seq. does not authorize a Maryland court to issue a summons directing the appellant to produce computer tapes and floppy discs." Rees's argument relative to the inabi- lity of the Los Angeles County Grand Jury to issue a subpoena duces tecum for an Out-of-state witness is likewise devoid of merit. Courts Art. § 9-301 provides: "(a) In this title the following words have the meanings indicated. (b) "'State’ means any state or territory of the United States and the District of Columbia. (c) ‘Summons’ means a subpoena, order, or other notice requiring the appearance of a witness. (ad) ‘Witness’ means a person whose testimony is desired in any proceeding or investigation by a grand jury or in a criminal prosecu- tion or proceeding.” Conspicuously absent from the provi- sion of § 9-301 is the term subpoena duces @ tecum. Inasmuch as the statute does not use that term, Rees concludes that the certifying State is without power to issue such a subpoena. In short, Rees asserts that because the subpoena duces tecum is not specifically authorized under the act, its issuance is unauthorized. He employs a slight variance on the old saw, “out of sight is out of mind."6 Although Maryland has not heretofore considered the issue,’ posed to us by Rees, several of our sister States have had the 6 Arthur Hugh Clough (1819-1861) in "Songs of Absence” (1862). 7 In re Special Investigation, No. 219, 52 Md. App. 17, 445 A.2d 1081 (1982), in- volved a subpoena duces tecum issued in Maryland to a citizen of Virginia. The question of the authority of the Grand Jury for Baltimore City to — a subpoena duces tecum was not decided, wires i its validity appears to have been assumed. -36- occasion to pass upon a similar argument. New Jersey, in In re Saperstein, 30 N.J.Super 373, 104 A.2d 842 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 874, said that "the term ‘subpoena’ ... embracef[{d] ‘subpoena duces tecum.'" See also Davis v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 97 N.J.L. 412 (Sup. Ct. 1922). In Application of a Grand Jury of the State of New York, 397 N.E.2d 686 | (Mass. App. 1979), the same argument as that made by Rees was before the court. There a bank upon which was served a sub- poena duces tecum from a New York Grand Jury sought to avoid compliance by assert- ing that the word “summons” as defined in the Uniform Act did not include a “subpoena duces tecum." The Massachusetts court opined: "The Uniform Act makes no men- tion of subpoenas duces tecum or of the power of a court under the Act to order the production of documents. That silence does not necessarily imply a rejection of the power. The powers to compel the testimony of a witness and to compel the production of documents are so similar in nature and so fundamental to the gathering of evidence in judicial proceedings that one is hard put to imagine a reason for permitting the former and rejecting the latter; and one suspects that a conscious inten- tion to differentiate between testi- monial and documentary evidence would have found some concrete ex- pression in the words of the Act, rather than mere silence. It is not inconceivable that the question of how the Act would relate to the pro- duction of documents simply never occurred to the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The record of their deliberations can be read as confirming such a suspicion, for we find therein no reference to the production of documents, even in passing, much less a discrete sub- ject of discussion. See Handbooks of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws for the years 1915 (at 64-65, 88), 1922 (at 118, 358-361), 1923 (at 78-180), 1924 (at 678-679), 1927 (at 915-918), 1928 (at 430-433), 1929 (at 119-123), 356, 359), 1930 (at 110-113), 575-577), 1931 (at 41-69, 120-122, 417-423), 1932 (at 41), and 1936 (at 96, 100-102, 155-158, 333-338) ." =38< The court, after noting that the gen- eral power to subpoena witnesses includes the authority to compel the production of documents, citing, inter alia, Catty v. Brockelbank, 124 N.J.L. 360, 12 A.2a 128 (1940), Marston's Inc. v. Strand, 114 Ariz. 260, 560 P.2d 778 (1977), State ex rel. Pollard v. Marion Crim. Ct., 263 Ind. 236, 329 N.E.2d 573 (1975), concluded that the Uniform Act should be so interpreted as "to authorize the issuance of subpoenas duces tecum." Similarly, the Supreme Court of New York in deciding In re Bick, 372 N.Y.S.24 447, 82 Misc. 2d 1043 (1975), said that a New Jersey Grand Jury's subpoena duces tecum for books, paper, and business records that were located in New York would be honored. The court held that "the term ‘subpoena’ subsumes a subpoena -39- duces tecum requiring the production of books and records." Illinois, on the other hand, in In re Grothe, 59 I1l.App.2d 1, 208 N.E.2d 581 (1965), held that the Uniform Act does not authorize the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. That Illinois case, however, has since been overruled by statute. See 1965 Tll. Laws at 2694 8 1, effective August 6, 1965. Grothe, we note, was not followed by the Court of Appeals in Appel v. New York, 243 Md. 218, 220 A.2d 301, and was expressly rejected in Application of a Grand Jury of the State of New York, supra. Patently, the ability to compel Rees, who apparently has possession of certain rele- vant, material evidence, to appear before the grand jury, but the inability to com- pel the production of that evidence, bor- ders on the absurd. Unless Rees was able -40- to testify as to the content of discs, a tape, and printouts, his appearance before the grand jury would be a decided waste. We believe the weight of authority to be clear. The power to issue a subpoena includes the power to issue a subpoena duces tecum, and we so hold. -41- x APPENDIX C RELEVANT PROCEEDINGS OF SEPTEMBER 15, 1983, IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY, MARYLAND (The Court): Very well. All right. Having conducted the hearing, I am con- vinced that the Certificate plus the testimony given here has established that Mr. Rees is a material and necessary wit- ness in this Grand Jury proceeding. And further, that it will not cause him undue hardship, as I construe that term, to attend the hearing on September 29, 1983. On the last issue of whether he should be ordered to produce certain tangible evidence at the time he appears, pursuant to the summons, which is issued, and that is the issue which is addressed in Grothe, the Illinois case, which reference was made, citation to which is 59 Illinois -42- Appeal, Second, Page l, 1954 decision, or whether to view in Grothe or whether to view in Sapperstein, which is 104 Atlantic Second, 842. And I don't have a date on that case. But that is the case In Re: Sapperstein. These two Courts disagree. And when it comes down to what proper rule of statutory construction should be applied to Section 9-302, Grothe notes, and I think properly, that certainly this Statute is in derogation of the common law. There is no analogous type procedure ever authorized in common law. But Sapperstein equally relies on a well settled rule of construction of statute. And that is that statutes in aid of comity between sister states which assists in due administration of justice should be liberally construed. So we have a colli- sion of two rules of construction in a : «* ¢ ¥ «eae our Pie | 6 ee Ps Ee sense here. I think the latter bends in the more proper direction. I think com- monly in this State of the circumstances surrounding this case outweigh the deviations this statute gives in procedure from common law procedure. And I think it should be given a liberal construction. And I am going to enter the Order duces tecum and not just ad testificandum. So I will issue the Order that is prayed. Misc. No. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ye OCTOBER TERM, 1983 . JOHN REES, Appellant, -¥.= COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Appellee. IN RE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI MR. CLERK: e Please enter my appearance as pro se counsel in the above-entitled case. Lh ee JOHM REES 2806;/St. Paul Street Baltimore, MD 21218 301/366-2531 Petitioner Pro Se -46- Misc. No. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1983 JOHN REES, Appellant, - Vv. = COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Appellee. IN RE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 26th day of March, 1984, copies of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari were de- ” livered to Deborah K. Handel, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General of Maryland, 7 North Calvert Street, 4th Floor, Baltimore, Maryland 21202, Attorney for the Respondent, the State of Maryland. John Re 2805 sY) Paul Street 2803 Sy) e, MD 21218 301/366-2531 Petitioner Pro Se -48- --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1362%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.