# Opposition — Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 466 U.S. 980

## Text

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Office - Supreme U
FIL A ”

No. 83-1290 APR 29 1994

ALEA OEP 1. STEVAS

Inu the Supreme Court of the Hn

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

MoBIL OIL CORPORATION, PETITIONER
vs

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

Rex E. LEE
Solicitor General

F. HENRY HaBIcut, II
Assistant Attorney General

Jacques B. GELIN
ROBERT L. KLARQUIST
Attorneys

Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether Section 308 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
1318, authorizes EPA to enter the facilities of a point source
of water pollution and obtain samples of wastewater
streams prior to their final treatment.*

*The Petition also presents a question of the sufficiency of the affida-
vits submitted in support of the application for an administrative search
warrant in this case. We do not believe this issue is properly before this
Court.

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
ea a l
ere CO CeVS phe kn kbasesectevneenes l
Statutory provision involved ...........eeeeeeeees 2
Vande ke ebb els sn 6050606500000 6a 3
eee sia hha pahseebdbeneteenceesees 7
ere ein 665s kh ae hae v2'6 a0 609008 14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:
American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan,

a Se 11
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.

ARS oo Be Or 9
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.

CUT etek che wabenseeecesececess 7,9
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 ..........005: 8
EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n,

each nes Ube se 6066200000 12
Marshall vy. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S.

LTT aikido dhsa sb beeedcceres 7, 8,9
National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d

eee. ons Soph eens esee eee snes 12
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 .........08: 8
United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 ........ 11

(111)

IV

Page
Constitution and statutes:
Sek Sc, SOUL OW cdc dcanescaevesnbavce 8,9
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. :
Sey oP a BEE cbs ecereornecensces 12
© FONG), 33 U.S.C. TSINE) on ccccscvcsses 12
Fg ok” oererrr esr Terr rs 12
© iyo We AONE cevenenveciosdeetes 13
§ 308, 33 U.S.C.
Pe CilLauseae uae 1.6 7,9, 0. 11, 12, 13
6 Fume), 33 U.E... ISIE) on cc cccccssens 1,6
§ 308(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. 1318(a)(1) ........ 6, 12
§ 308(a)(A)(iv), 33 U.S.C.
ST ee eT eT TT eer ee Tey 11
§ 308(a)(B)(ii), 33 U.S.C.
Ps Docc vagesskbaacess anus ee 11
§ 308(b)(2), 33 U.S.C. 1318(b)(2) .......... 10
SORE, FF WU, FINE Kccccrcevsreuscvencs 3
§ 402(b)(8), 33 U.S.C. 1342(b)(8) ........-. 13
Miscellaneous:
H.R. Rep. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
UNTER sack Reh Vout hee ae besareCatansuers 12

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary
CUFF Scndacravncntaneeestnceressess cerns 12

In the Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

No. 83-1290
MoBIL OIL CORPORATION, PETITIONER
v.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-8a) is
reported at 716 F.2d 1187. The final order and judgment of
the district court (Pet. App. 9a-13a) is not reported.

JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
September 14, 1983. A petition for rehearing was denied on
November 8, 1983 (Pet. App. 14a). The petition for a writ of
certiorari was filed on February 6, 1984. The jurisdiction of
this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

2

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

Section 308 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1318,
provides in pertinent part:

(a) Whenever required to carry out the objective of
this chapter, including but not limited to (1) developing
or assisting in the development of any effluent limita-
tion, or other limitation, prohibition, or effluent
standard, pretreatment standard, or standard of per-
formance under this chapter; (2) determining whether
any person is in violation of any such effluent limita-
tion, or other limitation, prohibition or effluent stand-
ard, pretreatment standard, or standard of perfor-
mance; (3) any requirement established under this
section; or (4) carrying out sections 1315, 1321, 1342,
1344 (relating to State permit programs), and 1364 of
this title—

(A) The Administrator shall require the owner or
operator of any point source to (i) establish and main-
tain such records, (ii) make such reports, (iii) install,
use, and maintain such monitoring equipment or
methods (including where appropriate, biological
monitoring methods), (iv) sample such effluents (in
accordance with such methods, at such locations, at
such intervals, and in such manner as the Administra-
tor shall prescribe), and (v) provide such other infor-
mation as he may reasonably require, and

(B) The Administrator or his authorized represen-
tative, upon presentation of his credentials—

(i) shall have a right of entry to, upon or through
any premises in which an effluent source is located or
in which any records required to be maintained
under clause (A) of this subsection are located, and

3

(ii) may at reasonable times have access to and
copy any records, inspect any monitoring equipment
or method required under Clause (A), and sample
any effluents which the owner or operator of such
source is required to sample under such clause.

STATEMENT

1. Petitioner operates a petroleum refinery near Joliet,
Illinois. In the course of normal plant operations, the facil-
ity discharges wastewater into a navigable river. Pursuant
to Section 402 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1342, the
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency issued a National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit
authorizing petitioner to make such discharges subject to
the restrictions set forth in, or incorporated into, the permit
(Pet. App. 15a-40a). Among other things, the permit
requires petitioner to conduct periodic sampling of its var-
ious wastewater streams ‘at a point representative of [the]
discharge” but “prior to mixing with other effluent streams”
or “prior to its combination with the process water” and to
forward the results to both the United States Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) and the State agency (Pet.
App. 18a-26a).

On April 28, 1982, Basim J. Dihu, an EPA environmental
engineer, attempted to conduct an inspection of petitioner’s
Joliet facility. Dihu was admitted to the premises and per-
mitted to take samples of the process treatment plant and
non-contact cooling water, as well as storm water dis-
charge. Petitioner refused, however, to permit Dihu to
sample internal waste streams before the point at which
they reach an aeration basin or a treated water guard basin.
Permission to obtain samples of sludge before heat treat-
ment was similarly refused. Pet. App. 2a, 46a-47a.

2. On August 27, 1982, EPA applied to the district court
for an administrative warrant “to enter, inspect and photo-
graph the premises and to take samples of sludge and liquid

4

influents and effluents at the Mobil Oil Company facility
* * * on three separate days within a ten-day period in
accordance with Section 308 of the Clean Water Act” (Pet.
App. 42a). The warrant application was supported by an
affidavit executed by Dihu recounting petitioner's refusal to
allow him to take the requested samples (Pet. App. 46a-
47a). The warrant application was also supported by the
affidavit of Jonathan Barney, an EPA chemical engineer
(Pet. App. 43a-45a). Barney’s affidavit stated that peti-
tioner’s facility had been selected for inspection pursuant to
“an ongoing administrative program to monitor facilities
that have some potential for the discharge of toxic pollu-
tants” (Pet. App. 45a). Such extended compliance sampling
inspection for toxicants (known as CSI-Ts) is intended to
check for compliance with existing permit requirements
and to determine whether toxic pollutants are being dis-
charged that are not subject to permit limitations, but which
should be regulated in future permits (id. at 43a). Barney
further explained that, for a complex plant such as petition-
er’s facility, samples must often be collected from selected
process waste streams within a plant, as well as from the
final effluent, in order to achieve the most accurate mea-
surements possible, to assess the adequacy of existing
treatment methods, and to eludicate the nature of the sludge
resulting from treatment (id. at 44a). The Barney affidavit
described the specific locations at which EPA desired to
take samples, concluding that “[a]nalysis of these samples is
necessary to enable the U.S. EPA accurately [to] assess
compliance and develop any necessary new permit limits for
this Mobil Oil facility” (id. at 45a).

The United States Magistrate granted the warrant appli-
cation and issued the inspection warrant on August 27,
1982. The warrant authorized inspector Dihu to (Pet. App.
49a-50a):

5

1. Entfer] * * * upon or through the above de-
scribed premises including all buildings, struc-
tures, equipment, machines, devices, materials
and sites to inspect, sample, monitor and inves-
tigate the said premises.

2. Sample and seize combined effluent from the
east and west clarifiers of the activated sludge
treatment system.

3. Sample and seize sludge prior to the heat treat-
ment system.

4. Sample and seize influent to the east and west
aeration basins to the activated sludge treat-
ment system (combined raw waste following
east equalization basin).

5. Sample and seize any and all final effluent(s).

6. Takesuch photographs of the above authorized
procedures as they may be required or necessary.

EPA commenced execution of the warrant and taking of
samples. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the warrant, but
the motion was denied by the magistrate. Thereafter, EPA
completed execution of the warrant.

3. Petitioner commenced this action on September 2,
1982. Petitioner's complaint alleged, inter alia, that “{t]he
Clean Water Act does not authorize U.S. EPA to inspect,
sample or monitor MOBIL’S internal waste streams at
points other than the NPDES point source discharge”
(C.A. App. 5) and that the warrant exceeded the scope of
EPA's statutory powers. Petitioner sought an injunction
directing the EPA to return “all samples taken, findings,
test results and any other data, records or documents”
resulting from the completed inspection and barring EPA
“from at any time inspecting, sampling or monitoring

6

MOBIL’S internal waste streams at points other than the
NPDES point source discharge” (C.A. App. 6-7).

Petitioner’s action was consolidated with an appeal taken
by petitioner from the magistrate’s order denying its motion
to quash the warrant. The district court entered an interloc-
utory order restraining EPA from disclosing or using the
contested samples or any information derived from them
pending a final decision. After considering the case on the
merits, the district court entered a final order dissolving the
preliminary injunction, denying injunctive relief, and dis-
missing the complaint (Pet. App. 9a-13a).'

4. The court of appeals affirmed (Pet. App. la-8a). The
court held that Section 308(a) of the Clean Water Act
authorizes EPA to sample the wastewaters of a point source
at any location within the facility, including wastewaters
prior to treatment or partially treated effluents. The court
observed that Section 308(a)(1) indicates that one of the
primary purposes of Section 308 was to give EPA access to
information useful in “ ‘developing or assisting in the
development of any effluent limitation, or other limitation,
prohibition, or effluent standard, pretreatment standard, or
standard of performance’ " (Pet. App. 5a, quoting Section
308(a)(1)). To achieve the statutory goal of setting rational
effluent limitations, “information is necessary to determine
how efficiently the permittee is treating the water, which
obviously requires a sample of water both before and after
treatment” (Pet. App. 5a). The court also noted that EPA
can more accurately assess samples of the final treated

'The court of appeals entered an interim injunction prohibiting EPA
from using, transmitting or releasing any of the samples obtained
pursuant to the warrant or information derived from those samples
during the pendency of the appeal. The stay order also barred EPA
from “inspecting, sampling or monitoring Mobil’s waste streams at
points other than those described in the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System Permit pending disposition of this appeal.”

7

effluents “if it knows the level of pollutants in that waste
water before it has been treated” (Pet. App. 6a).?

ARGUMENT

Petitioner’s primary submission (Pet. 12-21) is that the
affidavits that EPA submitted in support of its application
for an administrative warrant did not meet the standards
articulated by this Court in Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436
U.S. 307 (1978), and Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523 (1967). This issue was not raised in the court of appeals
and accordingly is not properly presented here. In any
event, the affidavits in question satisfy the standards deli-
neated in Barlow's and Camara. In addition, petitioner
contends (Pet. 21-27) that, in the circumstances of this case,
Section 308 of the Clean Water Act affords EPA no author-
ity to obtain samples of its wastewater before it has been
fully treated. The court of appeals correctly rejected this
contention.

1. In Camara v. Municipal Court, this Court held that,
outside of certain carefully defined classes of cases, a war-
rantless non-consensual search of private property is un-
reasonable even though not undertaken to uncover evi-
dence of crime. At the same time, however, the Court held
that, in the context of such civil administrative searches, a
warrant need not rest upon a showing of probable cause to
believe that a violation is occurring in the location to be
inspected. 387 U.S. at 534. Rather, a warrant may issue
where the applicant has shown that its request to search
private property is justified by reasonable governmental

?The court of appeals denied petitioner's motion to stay issuance of its
mandate pending certiorari. Thereafter, on November 23, 1983, Justice
Stevens denied petitioner's application to stay issuance of the court of
appeals’ mandate and to bar EPA from employing the samples it had
obtained or conducting further sampling pending dispostion of this
petition.

8

interests. “[R Jeasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If
a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated,
then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted
search warrant.” /d. at 539. Inthe companion case of See; v.
City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), the Court held that the
general requirement of obtaining a warrant for searches
applies in the context of commercial buildings as well as
private residences.?

In Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), this
Court reaffirmed that the Fourth Amendment ordinarily
requires authorities to obtain a warrant prior to conducting
an administrative search of a commercial establishment.
Again, however, the Court emphasized that the government
need not show thata specific violation is likely taking place
in a particular establishment. “Probable cause in the crimi-
nal law sense is not required” (id. at 320). Rather, a warrant
may issue upon a “showing that a specific business has been
chosen for a * * * search on the basis of a general adminis-
trative plan for the enforcement of the Act derived from
neutral sources” (id. at 321). The Court explained: such “{a]
warrant * * * would provide assurances from a neutral
officer that the inspection is reasonable under the Constitu-
tion, is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an adminis-
trative plan containing specific neutral criteria. Also, a
warrant would then and there advise the owner of the scope
and objects of the search, beyond which limits the inspector
is not expected to proceed” (436 U.S. at 323 (footnotes
omitted)).

3In See, this Court left open the question of whether “business pre-
mises may not reasonably be inspected in many more situations than
private homes * * *."387 U.S. at 546. Recently, in Donovan v. Dewey,
452 U.S. 594, 598-599 (1981), this Court stated that “the expectation of
privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such property
differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individual's home™
and recognized that, in certain commercial circumstances, this expecta-
tion may be so limited as to justify warrantless searches.

9

b. Petitioner asserts that the affidavits that EPA sub-
mitted in support of its warrant application did not satisfy
the foregoing standard and complains that “the Seventh
Circuit did not examine EPA's action in light of the stand-
ards set forth in Barlow’s” (Pet. 13.) The court of appeals’
failure to advert to Barlow's or Camara, or to address the
adequacy of EPA's affidavits, however, affords no basis for
complaint in this Court for petitioner simply did not con-
tend on appeal that those affidavits were in any way defi-
cient.4 Because petitioner failed to raise its primary conten-
tion in the court of appeals and the court of appeals’ opinion
reflects no ruling on that point, the issue is not properly
before this Court. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 147 n.2 (1970).

c. Even if it had been properly presented, the question of
the sufficiency of EPA’s affidavits merits no further review,
for the affidavits satisfied the Barlow’s and Camara stand-
ards. The affidavit of Jonathan Barney (Pet. App. 43a-45a)

‘Contrary to petitioner's suggestion (Pet. 13) the court of appeals did
not “use[] its own ‘interest-balancing’ analysis to determine whether
Mobil had any Fourth Amendment rights * * * worthy of protection
and whether EPA's regulatory interest out-weighed Mobil's privacy
interest”. The court of appeals confined its opinion to the question
whether Section 308 of the Clean Water Act authorized EPA to obtain
the samples at issue. The court's language quoted at pages 13-14 of the
petition clearly addresses this statutory argument and not any Fourth
Amendment issue. In the court of appeals, petitioner argued only that
the sampling conducted under the warrant was not authorized by
Section 308 (Pet. C.A. Br. 7-35; Pet. C.A. Reply Br. 4-21). Petitioner
did not challenge the sufficiency of EPA's affidavits, and did not cite
Camara at all. Barlow's was cited only in connection with petitioner's
argument that injunctive relief from the alleged statutory violation
should be granted (Pet. C.A. Br. 37, 40; Pet. C.A. Reply Br. 22).
Petitioner invoked the Fourth Amendment only in asserting that,
because ultra vires, the challenged inspection was an unreasonable
intrusion upon its protected privacy interests (see Pet. C.A. Reply Br. 22
& n.17). Nor did petitioner's rehearing petition present the contention
now made in this Court.

10

explained that petitioner's facility had been selected for
inspection as part of an ongoing EPA program to monitor
facilities having some potential for discharge of toxic pollu-
tants. The purposes and operations of that program were
also described. Barney’s affidavit also explained why EPA
believed that the challenged sampling procedures were
necessary and it precisely identified the samples that EPA
sought. In the proceedings below petitioner did not chal-
lenge the accuracy of any of the facts in the affidavits.5 The
warrant was carefully limited both in scope and duration.
See pages 3-5, supra. Petitioner, moreover, has not demon-
strated that it was subject to discriminatory treatment or
deliberate harassment; nor has it shown that the sampling
authorized constituted any more than the most minimal of
intrusions upon its normal operations.® Under these cir-
cumstances, the warrant was clearly valid.

‘Petitioner now attempts to do so for the first time in this Court (Pet.
16-17) relying on materials reproduced at pages 5la-94a of its appendix.
None of these materials are part of the record below; they were not
considered by the courts below. Nor has petitioner demonstrated that
they could not have been timely obtained with due diligence. Petition-
er's effort to retry its case in this Court is impermissible. In any event, a
close reading of the materials cited by petitioner discloses that they do
not support its claims. For example, petitioner asserts (Pet. 17) that
EPA policy requires a “lengthy” affidavit when EPA seeks information
from a source and refers to certain documents in the appendix to
support this conclusion. The cited materials, however (even assuming
that they establish a binding agency policy), nowhere require a
“lengthy” affidavit. Rather they indicate that the affidavit should fully
describe the agency program involved and explain why the particular
facility in question was selected for inspection (Pet. App. 57a). As
indicated above, the Barney affidavit meets this standard. The fact that
a different EPA employee may have submitted a lengthier affidavit
when seeking to inspect a different facility in a different industry for
different purposes (See Pet. App. 77a-85a) does not establish that
EPA's affidavit here was inadequate. Petitioners’ other assertions are
similarly flawed.

*Petitioner has not claimed that EPA's sampling threatens to com-
promise any trade secret. Section 308(b)(2) of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. 1318(b)(2), provides a special mechanism whereby an owner or

2. Section 308(a)(A)(iv) of the Ciean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. 1318(a)(A)(iv), provides that the Administrator
shall require the owner or operator of a point source to
“sample such effluents (in accordance with such methods, at
such locations, at such intervals, and in such manner as the
Administrator shall prescribe).” Section 308(a)(B)(ii), 33
U.S.C. 1318(a)(B)(ii), in turn, authorizes the Administrator
or his authorized representative to sample “any effluents”
which the owner or operator is required to sample under the
prior clause. Petitioner asserts (Pet. 21-27) that Section 308
does not authorize EPA to secure samples of its untreated
or partially treated wastewaters. The courts below correctly
rejected this contention. In any event, the decision below
does not — and is not asserted to — conflict with any
decision of this Court or of any court of appeals and war-
rants no further review.

Petitioner initially asserts (Pet. 21-22) that the waste-
waters coming out of its various production facilities do not
become “effluents” within the meaning of Section 308 until
after they have been fully treated and are ready for dis-
charge into navigable waters. Petitioner fails to advance
any creditable argument in support of this assertion. As
petitioner acknowledges (Pet. 21), the term “effluent” is not
defined by the Act. When a term is not defined in a statute
itself, the courts will, whenever possible, assign the word a
meaning that is consistent with the ordinary meaning of the
term, which effectuates the purposes for which the statute
was enacted, and which does not render other provisions of
the statute meaningless. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc.
v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 513 (1981); United States v.
Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961). EPA’s interpretation of
“effluent” is the only one which meets all of these standards.

operator who supplies information pursuant to Section 308 may seek to
have the information held confidential. Petitioner has not attempted to
invoke this provision.

12

The conventional meaning of “effluent” is “something
that flows out.” ’ Accordingly, EPA has sensibly under-
stood “effluent” to include those wastewaters that flow out
of production facilities. Moreover, EPA’s interpretation
effectuates the purposes of the Clean Water Act. For exam-
ple, pursuant to Sections 301 and 304, 33 U.S.C. 1311 and
1314, EPA must establish, periodically review and, if
appropriate, revise, effluent limitations that require the
application of the best available technology economically
achievable (BAT) for a given category or class of dis-
charges. See EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449
U.S. 64, 69-72 (1980).* This task requires that the agency be
thoroughly familiar with all facets of wastewater treatment
technology and economics. The ability to take samples at a
variety of locations in the course of a pollution treatment
process significantly enhances EPA's ability to establish
and maintain rational effluent limitations.’ Finally,

’ Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 363 (1977).

’Section 301(d), 33 U.S.C. 1311(d). The statutory duty periodically to
review and revise effluent limitations belies petitioner's suggestion (Pet.
25-27) that because effluent limitations for petitioner's facility have
already been initially established, EPA could have no possible use for
any data derived from the sampling here.

%As the court of appeals observed (Pet. App. 5a) Section 308 was
expressly designed to provide the EPA Administrator with a means of
obtaining information needed for “developing or assisting in the devel-
opment of any effluent limitation, or other limitation, prohibition, or
effluent standard, pretreatment standard, or standard of performance
(§ 308(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. 1318(a)(1)). The legislative history of the Clean
Water Act confirms that EPA's inspection and sampling authority is to
be construed broadly. Thus, in explaining the need for Section 308,
Congress specifically pointed out the agency's “difficulty in obtaining
reliable cost and waste loading information to set effluent limits and to
enforce effective pollution control.” H.R.Rep. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 113-114(1972). Indeed, unless EPA can secure this kind of data, it
may be vulnerable to challenges to the validity of its effluent limitations
in which it is argued that the limitations do not reflect consideration of
all pertinent data. See National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416,
442-443 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

13

petitioner’s suggestion (Pet. 22) that the term “effluent
encompasses only wastewaters at the point of their dis-
charge into navigable waters renders several other provi-
sions of the Act meaningless. For example, Section 308
expressly provides for inspections, monitoring and sam-
pling to assist in development of “pretreatment standards”
pursuant to Section 307 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 1317, which
applies to discharges to publicly-owned treatment works.
Petitioner’s restrictive interpretation of the term “effluent”
would render these provisions inoperative. See also Section
402(b)(8) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 1342(b)(8).

Petitioner also argues (Pet. 23-24) that Section 308 limits
the Administrator to sampling those effluents that the point
source itself has been required to sample. Assuming that
petitioner’s premise is correct, petitioner still cannot prevail
here. As petitioner admits (Pet. 24), it is required by the
terms of its permit to take samples of its effluents. Pursuant
to the warrant, EPA obtained samples of those same efflu-
ents, only at locations different from those at which peti-
tioner performs its own sampling. Nothing in Section 308,
however, confines EPA's authority to sample effluents to
the particular locations at which the owner or operator
performs sampling to meet the requirements of its NPDES
permit. !°

”

©The court of appeals properly rejected (Pet. App. 4a-7a) petitioner's
claim that sampling of a given waste stream at two locations in the
course of treatment constitutes sampling of two different effluents for
purposes of Section 308.

14

CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

Rex E. LEE
Solicitor General

F. HENRY HABICHT, II
Assistant Attorney General

JACQUES B. GELIN
ROBERT L. KLARQUIST
Attorneys

APRIL 1984

DOJ-1984-04

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