# Petition — Crim v. Hunter

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 465 U.S. 1080

## Text

83-1288 | FILED
AUG & {984
NO. ALEXANDER L. STFVAS

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1983

ROBERT BRIAN CRIM, an individual,

Petitioner,

G. WILLIAM HUNTER, United States
Attorney for the Northern
District of California,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

ROBERT BRIAN CRIM, pro se,
32 Pierce Lane,

Naugatuck, Connecticut,
06770.

Telephone: (203) 729-6119.

——————

Questions Presented for Review

Whether under the First, Fifth, or

Ninth Amendments, or under the Horn-

blower's Provision of the Organized

Crime Control Act of 1970, Petitéoner

has standing to sue in an action see-

king to oblige compliance of a United

States Attorney with Title 18, United

States Code §3332(a), 84 Stat. 924:

A.

Whether the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of
Connecticut erred by dismissing

sua sponte Petitioner's action;

Whether the United States Dis-

trict Court for the District of
Connecticut erred or abused its
discretion by not allowing Peti-

tioner to amend his complaint:

Whether the United States Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit

ii

erred or otherwise abused its
discretion by not allowing Peti-

tioner to amend his complaint;

Whether the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Cir-

cuit erred by upholding the ac-
tions of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of
Connecticut in dismissing Peti-
tioner's complaint or denying

his motion to amend;

Whether the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit erred or otherwise abused
its discretion by declining to

recall its mandate;

Whether the Supreme Court of the
United States should vacate judg-
ment to allow Petitioner to

amend his complaint.

II

iii

Whether Petitioner enjoys an implied

right of action to seek reliefs under

the Hornblower's Provision of the Or-

ganized Crime Control Act of 1970, 16

U.S.C. §3332(a), 84 Stat. 924:

Whether the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of
Connecticut erred, upon Petitio-
ner's original attempt to amend
his complaint, in failing to
find an implied right of action
extant in the Hornbdlower's Pro-

vision, §3332(a):

Whether the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit erred in upholding the fin-
ding of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of
Connecticut that no implied
right of action lay latent in

the Hornblower's Provision.

iv

III Whether the instant complaint(s) are

IV

precluded from all future litigation
by the principle of res judicata.

(By anticipation:) Whether any por-
tion of the instant complaint(s) have
been mooted by any Statute of Limita-

tions.

Whether the Supreme Court, of its own
motion, should make inquiry into al-
legations of fraud perpetrated upon

it or ‘the courts below in a case pre-

viously before all.

Syllabus

Note: This syllabus constitutes no
part of the argument advanced by Petition-
er but has been prepared by him for the
convenience of the reader and in the inte-
rests of judicial economy. See United
States vy. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,

200 U.S. 321, 337 (1906).

Petitioner brought suit seeking writ
in the form of mandamus to compel Respon-
dent, a United States Attorney, to pre-
sent information obtained and provided by
Petitioner to a special federal grand jury
sitting in the Northern District of Cali-
formia pursuant to Title 18, United States
Code §3331 et seg., and for compensatory
and declaratory relief, alleging violation
on part of Respondent of the Hornblower's
Provision to Title 18, United States Code
§3332(a). The United States District

vi

Court for the District of Connecticut dis-
missed and denied Petitioner's motion to
amend complaint, and on appeal judgment
was affirmed and further efforts by Peti-
tioner to amend were denied. Brief at 8
to 19, infra. Petitioner's underlying
complaints have their origin in a case

previously before this Court on two occa-

sions not involving Petitioner as a party
Brief at 2 to 8, infra. Jurisdiction of
this Court is asserted to lie pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §1254(1). Brief at xl, infra.

Dismissal was predicated upon the
district court's conclusion that Petitio-
ner lacked requisite standing to sue and
had failed to plead a judicially cogniza-
ble cause of action. Brief at 11 to 13,
infra; see Appendices A to F, infra. Pe-
titioner brings error and seeks writ of
certiorari.

Argument: At common law, a private
individual had an unqualified right to ap-

vii

pear before a properly convened grand jury
and lay an indictment before it. Brack vy.
Wells, 184 Md. 86, 40 A.2d 319, 322, 156
A.L.R. 324, 328 (1944). See Brief at 22
to 27, infra. The appellate panel of the
Second Circuit failed properly to analyze
Petitioner's asserted right to have his
materials presented to the special grand
jury, and therein was the root of the

claimed error, Brief at 23 to 26, infra:

(a) At the founding of the Govern-
ment, the right of a private person
to appear before a federal grand jury
and present evidence for its inspec-
tion was the right at common law,
United States vy. Dionisio, 410 U.S.
1, 17n.5 (1973); Wharton, Criminal
Law (7th ed., 1874), §453 at i:356.
See Brief at 27, infra.

(bo) The relevant statute passed in
the last century prohibiting approach-
es by private citizens to the grand

viii

jury having been amended in the form
of a repeal, 62 Stat. 770, 18 U.S.C.
§1504, 18 U.S.C.A. §1504, the state
of the law in 1970 when the Hornblow-
er's Provision was passed, as well as
today, in relevant terms is the same
as in 1794. United States y. Tynen,
11 Wall. 88 (1870); see State vy. Ba-
ker, 33 W.Va. 319, 10 SE. 639, 640
(1889), Brief at 27 to 29, infra.
(c) Legislative history of Hornblow-
er's Provision demonstrates that Con-
gress intended to incorporate into 18
U.S.C. §3332(a) a balence between un-
restricted access of private indivi-

duals to the special grand jury and

no access at all. See Petition of
Thomas, _. Me. _, 434 A.2d 503
(1981); United States vy. Chanen, 549
F.2d 1306, 1311 (CA9, 1977), cert.
den. 434 U.S. 835; Hott vy. Yarborough,
112 Tex. 179, 245 S.W. 676 (1922).

ix

Brief at 29 to 36, infra.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is in
conflict with other circuits and at least
two States with similar statutes, and
there is a general confusion among the
lower courts on the underlying question of
control of a grand jury. Brief at 36 to
38, infra. These conflicts provide the
Supreme Court with adequate reason to
grant the writ of certiorari and say defi-
nitively what the law is concerning how
private citizens are to go about playing
their role in the prosecution and suppres-
sion of crime. Cf. Parker yv. People of
Illinois, 332 U.S. 846 (1948). See Brief
at 39, infra.

Applying the broad dicta of Linda R.
S. ve Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973),
to the facts of the instant action gener-
ates an absurd consequence and a fundamen-
tal injustice. S. vy. De, supra, 410 U.S.
at 619n.5; United States vy. Hicks, 625 F.2d

216 (CA9, 1980), reh.den.; Orr ye Orr, 440
U.S. 268 (1979); accord Strauder vy. State
of West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); see
Application of American Broadcasting Con-
panies, 537 F.Supp. 1168 (D.D.C., 1982).
Brief at 39 to 40, infra:

(a) Respect for the rules of due
process are essential to securing the
rights of all under a system of or-
dered liberty, and to prevent false
deprivations. Marshall vy. Jerriso,
Ince, 446 U.S. 238 (1980). Brief at
41, infra.

(bo) “John Wayne" approaches to the
problem of law enforcement are pre-
cisely what courts have criticized,
Finn xe United States, 219 F.2d 894
(CA9, 1955), reh.den. 75 S.Ct. 583
Brief at 40, infra.

(c) Proposition advanced by Respon-
dent that United States Attorney and

superiors have discretion as to what

grand jury shall be allowed to hear
is contraindicated by Fifth Circuit
and State of Maryland. United States
xe Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (CA5, 1965),

381 U.S. 935; Ewell ye State, 207 Md,
288, 114 A.2d 66, 71 (1955). Brief
at 41 to 43, infra.

The Supreme Court shvuld grant writ of
certiorari to reconsider the breadth of
the dictum in Linda B.S. ve Bichard D.,
Supra, as well as the Second Circuit's ex-
tension of same to important federal ques-
tion of private access to special grand
juries. Heflin ye United States, 358 U.S.
415, 416-417 (1959); see Hale y. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43, 63 (1906); Exdsbie vy. United
States, 157 U.S. 160, 163 (1895). Brief
at 43, infra.

That an implied right of action does
lie under the Hornblower's Provision, par-
ticularly where the United States Attorney

or his superiors entertain clear conflicts

xii

of interest is supported by language of

statute. Cf. Petition of Thomas, supra,
434 A.2d at 507; Board of Supervisors y.
Simpson, 36 Cal.2d 671, 227 P.2d 14, 15
(1951); and Hott vy. Yarborough, supra,
with Cort vy. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 68n.1
(1975). Brief at 43 to 46, infra. That
mandamus is proper remedy is clear. Board
of Supervisors Y. Simpson, supra, 227 P.2d
at 17. Brief at 44 to 46, infra. Here, a:
private right of action arises by implica-
tion. Miller vy. Mallery, 410 F.Supp. 1282
(D.,Ore., 1976). Petitioner clearly is
within the "zone of interest" protected by
the Hornblower's Provision. Cannon y. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689
(1979); Texas & Pacific Co. vy. Rigsby, 241
U.S. 33, 40 (1916). Brief at 46 to 51,
anfra. Supreme Court should grant writ of
certiorari to consider important question
of implied right of action under 18 U.S.C.
§3332(a). S.Ct. Rule 17.,1(c).

xiii

The Court of Appeals should have al-
lowed Petitioner to amend his complaint,
Warth ye Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501-502
(1975). Petitioner suffered injury in
fact, Ludlow Corporation y. Securities &
Exchange Com'n., 604 F.2d 704, 706-707
(CADC, 1979), reaching to constitutional
dimensions, Perry et al. vy. Sinderman, 408
U.S. 593 (1972), and benefits directly by
being allowed to "put his money where his
mouth is" and approach the grand jury.
Petitioner does have requisite standing
and cause of action. Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228 (1979. Brief at 54 to 56,
anfira. This lawsuit neither is res judi-
cata nor moot. Brief at 59, infra. And,
if nothing else, this Court ought to make
inquiry upon its own motion into matters

previously before it. Brief at 60, infra.

xiv

TABLE OF CONTENTS ©

Questions Presented for Review. i

Syllabus... Vv
Contents. xiv
Tables of Authorities. xix
Jurisdictional Statement: xxxvii
A. Opinions Below. xxxvii
B. Jurisdiction. xxxviii

C. Constitutional and Sta-
tutory Provisions. xli
Statement of the Case: 2
A. Foundational Incidents. 2
B. The Instant Action. 8
C. Opinion of the Panel. 16
Reasons for Granting the writ: 19

I

A. Introduction. 19

B. The Appellate Panel Has Not
Performed the Analysis of Pe-
tioner's Asserted Rights
Which the Second Circuit in
Its Previous Decisions Required. 23

Failure of the Appellate Panel
to Perform Appropriate Analysis
of Petitioner's Asserted Right
Places Its Order of 17 December
1982 at Variance with Decisions
of Other Circuits and at Least
Two of the States.

(1) Legislative History of the
Hornbdlower's Provision.

Applying B3road Dicta of Linda
R.S. v- Richard D. to the Facts
of the Instant Action Generates
Absurd Consequences and Funda-
mental Injustice.

il

Implied Rights of Action Lie
Under the Hornblower's Provi-
sion Where the Executive Enter-
tains Conflicts of Interest.

III

The Courts Below Erred by De-
nying Petitioner's Motion to
Amend Complaint.

(1) The Court of Appeals Fo-
cused on Petitioner's Se-
cond Claim of Injury to

the Detriment of the First.

(2) Petitioner's Complaint
Should Have Been Construed
Liberally.

26

30n

39

43

53

53

54

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

xvi

Petitioner Was Injured
in Fact.

Petitioner's Injuries Were
Constitutional in Scope.

Petitioner Had Requisite
Standing and a Cause of
Action.

This Court May Allow
Amendment of Pleadings.

The Instant Action Is Not
Res Judicata.

The Instant Action Has
Not Been Mooted.

This Court Should Inquire
Upon Its Own Motion Con-
cerning Matters Previously
Before It.

G. Conclusion.

(1)

Writ of Certiorari Should

Be Granted to Consider Im-
portant Federal Questions

Raised.

Proof of Service.

Appendix:

Appendix A: Opinion and Order, Uni-

ted States Court of Ap-
peals, Second Circuit,
17 December 1982.

54

55

56
56
59

59

60
61

63

Appendix

Appendix

‘Appendix

Appendix

Appendix

Appendix
Appendix

Appendix

Appendix

Appendix

B:

xvii

Order, United States
Court of Appeals, Se-
cond Circuit, 08 March
1983.

Order, United States
Court of Appeals, Se-
cond Circuit, 27 Jan-
uary 1982.

Order, United States

Court of Appeals, Se-
cond Circuit, 19 May

1983.

Opinion & Order, Uni-
ted States District
Court, District of
Connecticut, 31 March
1981.

Minute Order, United
States District Court,
District of Connecti-
cut, 02 July 1981.

Judgment & Mandate.

Reply Brief of Appel-
lant, Crim v. Hunter,
#81-6177 (CA2) at
15-17 .

Opinion & Order, Uni-
ted States Court of
Appeals, Second Cir-
cult, 10 April 1979.

Complaint, Crim v.
Hunter, #N81-150 (D.
onn.).

Complaint (as amended).

A-7

A-10

A-12

A-14

A-17
A-19

A-22

A-32
A-52

xviii

Appendix L: ‘Complaint (as amen-
ded II).

Appendix M: Complaint (as amen-
ded IV).

Appendix N: Statutes.
Jurisdictional Statutes.
Declaratory Judgment Act.
Statutes of Limitations.
Principals and Accessories.
Criminal Statutes.
Insurrection.

National Bank Robbery Act.
Treason.

Note on “Capital Crimes.

xix

TABLES OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Abbott v. The Queen, 63 Crim.App.
19

R. 241 (
A ee v.
Jaite, 5 . 9 CAM,

Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S.
(1947).

P.C.)-

Application a American Broad-
Casting ompanies. 537.
F.Supp. 11 D ’ 1982).

Application of Eisenberg, 654
F.2d 1107 (CA5, 1981).

Application of Yamashita, 327
. + Ti9h6).
Aspen Mining & Smelting Co. v.
ee . 2 5 ai
1 93 .

Association of Data Processin
ervices v. Camp, ;
150 (1970).

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962).

Ballou v. General Electric Co.,

393 F.a 396 (CA1, 1968).
Bienville Water Se Co Vv.

Obile, 106 U.S. 212 (1902).

5n +3

bout

30n.41,
35n.43

4, 4o,
18n.13

8n.11

44

2n.1

17

24-25,
24n.24,
61n.134

60n.133

2n.1

xX

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
Federal Bureau of Narcotics,

403 0.5. 300 (1971). t™~*” 14
Blaney v. State, 74 Md. 153, 21 A.
Tey (1891). 22n.22

Boag v. MacDougall, 70 L.Ed.a 54, 57,
551 3 62

Board of Supervisors v. Simpson, 24,
36 CeLR OF. 12d 071, 227 Pais On.41,

(1951). n.111,
4446
Boyne v. Ryan, 100 Cal. 265,
Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 19n.14,
46 A. 19, 156 A.L.R. 22»
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
(1972). 19-22
Browning v. State, 37 Ala.App.
137, 13 So.a 54 (1943). 5n.3
Burke v. Compania Mexicana de
Viacion, S.A., 433 F.a
SOST (eho, 1970). 47, 48
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 43,
Gat U. . 979). 47-51,
61n.134
Carolene Products Co. et al. v.
United States, 323 U.S. 18
Tiga). an.1
Cawley v. Warren, 216 F.m% 74
tcn?, 1955). 38

xxi

Charge to eS eee #18,255,

30 F.Cas. 953— 2 Sawy. 667

(0.6.0. Cai., 1872). 28n. 33
Commonwealth v. Fu » 330 Pa.

3, 198 A. 99 C1538) . 7

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 11

Coppedge v. United States. 311 30n.41,

wad 128 (CAD, 38
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 17, 33,
44un.111,
47, 50
5in.114

Costello v. United States, 350
.S. 359 (1956). 21

x v. Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935 (1966). 12
ee yparne » 331 U.S. 367
19

Qa
°

8n.11

Crim v. Bell et al _ -150

TD.fonn., 1978) 59
Crim v. Bell et al., #78-2132

Tca2, 1979). 17
Crim Ve E er, C.I.R., #21268-82
oY ie ie 49n.113
Crim v. Hunter, #81-6177 16-18, ,
4Gu.S. 862 (1979). 20n.21
Harris v. Superior Court of
Alameda rh » 19 Calex
, 140 Sal.Rptr. 318,
567 P.w 750 (1977). 2n.1
Hearst v. United States, 435 2ne1, 6,
* Pee 1977). 61n.141
Heflin v. United States, 358
U. . 9). 43
Hollman v. Warren, 32 Cal.a@ 351,
-20 502 ( ). 45
Holtzman et al. v. Schlesinger,
14 U.S. 1304 (1973). 4in. 44
Hott v. ace hs 112 Tex. 30n.41,

179, 676 (1922) .,

Hurtado v. California, 110
De 516 (1884).
eo a Attica Correctional

acility v. Rockefeller,
Bats 375

(CA2, 1973)-
in re ao Jury,

Januar
~ 315 F.Supp. 662 se 1 70).

Te. nee y

26n. 31,
27n. 32

46n.112

11,
26n.31

xxiv

re Mills, 135 U.S. 263 (1890). 27n.32
e Opinion oe overnor, 22n.22,
=~ I. 200, 4 A.ad 487 11999) 26n. 31

J.I Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S.

: I5'

~ “B26 (i965). 50
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41
~ (1899). 24n. 24
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States
et al., 440 U.S. 668 (1979). 29n.34
Leyra v. Denno, Warden, 347 U.S.
556 (1954). 6n.4
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 11, 17,
470 U.S. 615 (1973). 18n.13, 23,
2 39-40, 43,
| 53, 59n.131
Liverpool, N.¥.& P. Steamship
eo: v. Commissioners 3
migration, 113 U.S. 3
Ties}. oun. 24
Ludlow Cor . S.E.C., 604 F.m
se Ob CRALE, 1979). 54
Lynch v. Director = At
secutions, [1 1 Al R.
913 (H.L.). 5n.3
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch
7 (1805). 24n.24

Marsh v. Commercial and Savings
Bank of Winchester, Vir c
Nia, 205 F.supp. 014 (W.D.
Vir., 1967). 8n.11

Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.,
U.S. 230 (1980). 41, 61

XxXV

Medical Committee for Human Rights

Vv. 8 Ay 432 F.2 259 ’

1970). 38
Merckins v. F.i- ee Glore

Forgan & Co., 514 F.% 20

core 1975). 11

Merri. L eh, Pierce, Fenner &

Curran, 456 U.S. 29, 50,

333 (1 582- 60n.132
Meyer v. State of Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 Ti9Z3). 55
Miller v. Mallery, 410 F.Supp.
~~ $283 (D.oree, 1976). 12, 48
Moone - Holohan, Warden,
So Gu.S. 103 (1935). 6n.4
Moose Lodge No. se v. Irvis
07 ede 163 (1972). 25

Nagler v. Admiral gOERe 248 F.2d
319 (CA2, 1 1957 60n. 133
sh ¥. Galifene: 613 F.2d 10

a

26
New York Indians v. United
= “States, 170 U.S. 1 (1898). 2n.1
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
Us. 254 (1964). 56
Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
129 (1958). 5n.2

Office of Communication, United
vhurch of Chris

h of Christ v. F.C.C.,
G25 F.a 543 (CADC, 1969). 38

Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1928). 42

xxvi

Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).

Parker v. People of Illinois,
532 U ‘ . 6 (1 od

Payne v. State of Arkansas, 356
U.S. 560 (1958).

Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671 (M.D.
Ala., 1903).

People v. Adcock, 29 Ill.App.x

People v. Button, 106 Cal. 628
39 P. 10735 (1895).

People v. Doss, 382 Ill. 307,

People v. Harris et al.,
FIZLOSGA (L.A.Cty., Cal.,

1976).
People v. Merhige, 212 Mich.
60T, 180 N.W. 418 (1920).

People v. Municipal Court, 27
Cal.App.od oF 103 Cal.Rptr.

A.L.R.3d 717 (1972).
People v. Parker, 374 Ill. 524,
People v. Remiro et al., 89

“at las, Ty B09, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1979).

People v. Sheridan, 349 Ill.
202, 161 NE. 617 (1932).

645,

People v. Sing Chan, 64 Cal.App.2
167, 148 P.a 81 (1944).

46n.112

28n. 33

xxvii

People v. Yoshimura, 91 Cal.App.x
609, 154 Cal.Rptr. 314 (1979). 2n.1

People ex rel. Ferrill v. Gray- 22n.22,
don. wapitit , aS oan 29, 26n.31,
(3338) 38

Perry et al. v. Sindermann,
408 Us. 593 (1972). 55

Petition of Thomas, Me. _, 25,

A.2d 503 (1981). 30n.41
35n.43,
44n.i11

Prarie Band of Tribe of Pot-
awatomie Indians v.
Udall, 355 F.a 364 (Ca10,

1966). 30n.41
Prince v. United States, 352

U.S. 322 (1957). 60n.1 32
Proto v. Bridgeport Herald Corp.,

136 Rene aor 72 Awe ao

(1950). 8
Pugach v. Klein, 193 F.Supp. 630
ee (SDNY, 1961) . . 41-42

Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961). 6n.4

Reeves v. American Broadcastin
Companies, inc., 719 F.a 8n.11,
602 (CAz, 1983). 56n.122
Regina v. Russell, Car. & M. 247. 22n.22

Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.
eee Ro, SSE US+ 500 (1557). 25

Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S.
- 'o t2oec 44

xxviii

Ross v. State, 169 Ind. 388,

B2 N.E. 781 (1907). 5n.3
Schware v. Board of Bar Exami-

ners, State of New Mexico,

353 U.S. 252 (1957). 55
Simpson v. United States, 435

U.s. 6 (i978). 60n.132
State v. Baker, 33 W.Va. 319,

~ 10 S.E. 639 (1889). 22n.22, 29
State v- California Packin

~ Or *?, a ’

TOS a 7B (iouks 59n.124
State v. Hauptmann, 115 N.J.L.

472, Tob A. 809 (1935). 7
State v. Kearns, 27 N.

34, 219 S.E.2 328 (355). 5n.3
State v. St. Clair,

262 S.w.20 25, 4O A. om Re

903 (1953). 5n.3
Stewart v. Traveler's Corp.,

503 F. cAD, TOPL} 46-47
Strauder v. State = west Vir- ton. 23.
ee ginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 0
Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,

Sweat v. State, 90 Ga. 315, 17

~~ SeE. 273 (1893). 6in.141
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 61n.134
Texas & Pacific Co. v. Rigsby,
~~ 2461 0.5. 33 (1916). 51

xxix

Tipton v. State, 23 Okl.Crim. 86,

212 P. 612 (1923). 61n.141
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 17, 32,
42° U.S. 560 (1979). 5in.114

Transamerica Mortgage Advisors,
Inc. v. Lewis, G44'U.5.
11 (1979). 5in.114

United States v. Ashton,
14,470, 24 Fitas. 873,
2 Sumn. 13 (C.C.D.Mass.,
1834). 5n.3

United States v. Calandra, 414
mecomens ee. tis7ay— 29, 61n.134

United States v. Cariola, 323

~~ Fea 103 (CA3, 1963). 12n.12
United States v. Chanen, 549 30n.41,
~ FF, 13060 (CAO, 1977). ‘“H. x
United States v. Chapman, 455

~ B,2d 246 (GAS, 1 : 5n.3

United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S.

~~ 562 (1974),

United States v. Chovenec, 467
F.Supp. 41 (SDNY, 1979). 37

United States v. Christian,

“660 FF. 892 (CAS, 1981). 27.32

United States v. Cosby, 601 F.m

54° (CA5, 1979). 38
United States v. Cox, 342 12, 26n.31,
2c 167 (Ca5, 1965). 37, 42, 52

United States v. Dionisio,
10 U.S. TI (19 . 26n. 31

XXX

United States v. Fein, 504 F.2
1170 (CA2, 1974).

United States v. Glidden Co.,
119 F.2% 235 (CA6, 1941).

United States v. Hearst, 412
"F.Supp. 858 et seq. (N.D.
Cal., 1975-1976).

eae States ¥: Hearst, 424
~ #,SUpp. 3° 4g et seq. (N.D.
Cal., 1976

United States v. Hearst, 435

~ FeSupp. 29 (N.D.Cal., 1977).

United States v. Hearst, 466
oa 1068 (N.D.Cal.,
1978).

United States v. Hearst, 563
—— ae, 5, 107

~ ’ .

United States v. Hearst, 573
~~ Fea 570 (CAS, 1580).

United States v. Hearst, 638
“Fa 1190 (CAS, 1980).

United a ye Hicks, 625
(Ca9, 1980).

United States oe eoease! 79
a ll la ‘>,

United States v. Keogh, 391
~ Fea Loo (C 8).

United States v. Kilpatrick,
16 F. 765 (w. oe One 1883).

27n.32, 41
59n.124

2nel,
6in.141

ani.
6in.141

ani,
61n.141

2n.1

enel.
61n.141

2n.i,
6in.141
2n.i1, 15

18n.13, 40

6in.141

12n.12

28n. 33,
37

xxxi

United States v. Luros, 243 F.Supp.

~~ $60 (N.D.1lowa, 1965). 59n.124

United states v. McClain, 531 F.dd
"B31 (CA9, 1976). 5n.3

United States v. M‘Clellan, 127 F.

971 (S.D.Ga-, 1904). 6in.141
United States v. Moore, 486 F.2
United States v. Morgan, 346
ee mm. Tissayo 12n.12
United States v. Nixon, 418
0.5. 683 (1974). 25, 46n.112
United States v. Fersico, (in

re Subpoena of persico),
” 522 . (Ch2, 19” i. 12, 37
United States v. Pink, 315

U.5. 203 (1942). 2n.1
United States v. Shackney, 333

F.o 475 (TA2, : 61n.141

United States v. Shinnick, 546
F.2 420, Bue Ft Get (CA3,
1976). 2n.1

United States v. Smyth, 104
Su Dp. 283 . Se 26n.31, yy
1952) 37, 38

United States v. Soliah, #Cr. 2nel,
75-5235 POW (E.D.cal., 1976). 59n.131

United States v. Steel, 238
F.Supp. 580 (SDNY, 1965). 37

United States v. Stone, 429
F.2 138 (Ca2, 1970). 21

xxxii

United States v. Thompson,
"251 U.S. 407 Ci g80). 52

United States v. Tynen, i1
~ Wall. 60 (1870). 29

United States v. Union Pacific
Ri Giles 9L Uels Fa (Ler ol 29n. 34

United States v. Weiner et al.,
18 F.Supp. 941 (M.D.pPa.,

1976). 2n.1
Universities Research Assn. v. 12, 17,
Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981). 32, 51,
Kins 52

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 :
(1975). 17, 23, 4

Wells v. United States, 318 |
U.S. 257 (1943). 2n.1

Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962). 21

Constitution & Statutes:

U.8. Const... Art. TTI, $2. o1.2. 60
U.S. Const., Amend. I. 56
U.S. Const., Amend. V. 22, 55-56
U.S. Const., Amend. IX. 22

§ u.S.C. §702, 80 Stat. 392, 90
Stat. 2721. 14

18 U.S.C. §2, 62 Stat. 684, 65
Stat. 717. 7

18 U.S.C. §4, 62 Stat. 684. 7

xxxiii

18 U.S.C. §242, 62 Stat. 696, 82

Stat. 75. 7
18 U.S.C. §401, 62 Stat. 701. ?
18 U.S.C. §1503, 62 Stat. 769,

96 Stat. 1253. 7
18 U.S.C. §1504, 62 Stat. 770. 28, 38
18 U.S.C. §1583, 62 Stat. 772. 7
18 U.S.C. §1622, 62 Stat. 774, 7
18 U.S.C. §2113(a,d), 62 Stat.

796, 64 Stat. 394, 66 Stat.

46, 73 Stat. 639, 84 Stat.

1017. 4
18 U.S.C. §3281, 62 Stat. 827. 59n.131
18 U.S.C. §3282, 62 Stat. 828. 7
18 U.S.C. §3332(a), 84 Stat. 924

(including Hornblower's Pro- et

vision). assim
18 U.S.C. §3333, 84 Stat. 924. 30n.41
28 U.S.C. §1254(1). 60
28 U.S.C. §1331, 90 Stat. 2721,

94 Stat. 2369. 9, 14
28 U.S.C. §1343(4), 93 Stat.

1284, 9, 14
28 U.S.C. §1361, 76 Stat. 744, 9, 14
28 U.S.C. §1391(e), 90 Stat.

Bran « 9, 14
28 U.S.C. §1653, 62 Stat. g44, 13, 56

xxxiv

28 U.S.C. §2201, 62 Stat. 964,

63 Stat. 105, 68 Stat.

890, 72 Stat. 349, 90 Stat.

1719, 92 Stat. 2672.
42 U.S.C. §1981, R.S. §1977.
Fed.R.Civ.Pro. Rule £9(a).
Fed.R.Civ.Pro. Rule 60(b).
S.Ct. Rule 17.1(c).
Calif. Civ.Code §47.,
Calif. Code Siv.Proc. §731.
Civ.Proc. §1085.

§1963(15).

Calif. Code
Calif. Code Civ.Proc.
Calif. Gov't.Code §14.
Calif. Gov't.Code §26528.
15 Me.R.S.A. §1256.

Miscellaneous:

Jane Alpert, geou re Up incer-
ground (New York: Wm.
ierrce, 1981).

Wm. Bradford, letter to Edmond
Randolph, 20 Feb. 1794,
Op.Atty.Gen. 22.

Burroughs, "Criminal Law and
Procedure,” 51 L.Q.Rev. 36.

Cong.Rec.

(Senate, 18 Dec. 1969).

9, 14
29, 50
19n.14
19n.14

52
8n.11
44, 4s
45

46

30n.41

27

22n.22
30n.41

XXXV

Cong.Rec. (House, 10 Mar. 1970). 30n.41,
Cong.Rec. (House, 06 Oct. 1970). 30n.41,

Cong.Rec. (House, 07 Oct. 1970). 30n.41,

Editors of Look, The Story of
the FBI (New York: t B-
ton). 7

"The Grand Jury as an Investiga-
tory Body," 74 Harv.L.Rev.
590. 26n. 31

Patricia Campbell Hearst with
Alvin Moscow, Every Secret

Thing (Garden City, N.Y.s .

SGabteday, 1982). 3
House of Representatives, Report

No. 91-1549. 35n.43

House of Representatives, Commit-
tee on Internal Security,
93d Congress, 2d session,

Terrorism, Part 3 (hearings). 2n.1
55 C.J.S. Mandamus. 45
Senate Report No. 91-617. 30n.41
Thompson & Merriam, Juries (1882). 22n.22
8 U.Chi.L.Rev. 561. 36
Wharton, Criminal Law (7th ed,

1874), 27, 28
2 U.S.Cong.& Adm.News 1970. 30n.41,

35n.43

xxxvi

Act of 10 June 1872, ec. 420,

17 Stat. 378. 28
18 U.S.C. (1940) §243, 35 Stat.
1113. 28n. 33

xxxvii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Robert Brian Crim, pro se,
petitions this honorable Court for writ of
certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit that this
Court might review favorably decisions of
the courts below, reversing the order en-
tered by the court of appeals on 17 Decem-
ber 1982. For the purpose of this peti-
tion, Petitioner avers that the grevenen
of his complaints is not affected adversely
by any mooting of the suit occasioned by
lapse of the general Statute of Limitations
of the United States, 18 U.S.C. §3282, 62
Stat. 828, 68 Stat. 1145, 75 Stat. 648.

OPINIONS BELOW

None of the lower courts' opinions
have been published. The six opinions or

orders relevant and material to the instant

xxxviii

petition are attached hereto in the juris-
dictional appendix. See Appendices A
through F, inclusive, infra.

Additionally, the opinion and order
of the court of appeals entered 10 April
1979 affirming dismissal of Petitioner's

complaint, Crim v. Bell et al., #78-2132

(CA2), is attached hereto as Appendix I.
JURISDICTION

On 17 December 1982, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit entered an
order affirming the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut's

dismissal sua sponte, for want of his stan-

ding to sue, Petitioner's complaint. Peti-
tioner filed motions for rehearing en bane
and rehearing out of time on 04 January
1983; the motion for rehearing out of time
was granted, and on 08 March 1983, the mo-
tion for rehearing was “denied without pre-

judice to the application that the petition

xxxix

be heard en banc."

On 09 May 1983, Mr. Justice Marshall
granted Petitioner's motion before this
Court seeking extension of time in which
to file petition for writ of certiorari;

per Mr. Justice Marshall's order, Crim v.

Hunter, #A-909 (1983), time for filing the
petition was extended through and inclu-
ding 08 August 1983. On said date, the
petition was mailed to the Court pursuant
to S.Ct.Rule 28.2. An attorney's affida-
vit attesting to timely mailing has been
filed with the Clerk.

The Clerk returned all papers to Pe-
titioner pursuant to S.Ct.Rule 33.7; sub-
sequent efforts by Petitioner to file his
papers were interdicted by the Clerk, and
a lengthy legal discussion followed.° Now

° petitioner felt constrained from filing

a Form-4 affidavit required by Rule 46.1
because the form seeks absolution from all
costs and Petitioner at the time had suf-
ficient funds to pay the Clerk's fee but
not print the brief. An alternative affi-

xl

comes Petitioner and proffers forty copies
of a printed brief conforming to S.Ct.Rule
19.3. It respectfully is submitted that
this Court has jurisdiction over the in-
stant petition pursuant to the provisions
of 28 U.S.C. §1254(1), and that sanctions
under Rule 33.7 would be inappropriate.

See note 0, supra.

davit and a Rule 42 motion to be freed
from printing requirements were proffered
instead and rejected, even though Peti-
tioner cited numerous cases of this Court
where such motions had i wba See
Calle Callawa 23 U.S
i857 Un t 24 states ve. S.C.R.A.P., 409

(1967); Prudhomme v. ii 3 nmson Construc-
fas Co., 414 U.S. 1090 Jofmscr Durs*

United States Court of Appeals fer th

Ninth Circuit et al., uBs U.s. £5 Teo),
Cardona et al. v. Saxbe, Attorne eneral
et al., 415 U.S. 908 (1 OB (i972); Mart ene

na v. Supreme Court of Illinois, 415
zo S. 910 (1 1978) 5 D.H. Ove er Co. et al.

ter of nittington, 88 S.Ct. 1096 (1968) ;
e et al. v. Vowe et . 14 U.S.
Yea = wee to Petit

Ti974). ioner (who
is not an attorney), this Court recently
had changed its procedure. Miller v
Pierce, #82-6778 (31 Oct. 19 . For this
reason, Petitioner avers that this Court
should not penalize him per Rule 33.7 for
being so late in the instant submission.

xli

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Art. II, §1, ¢l. 1 of the Constitu-

tion of the United States says in part:

The executive power shall be
vested in a President of the
United States of America.

Art. II, §3 of the Constitution of
the United States says in part:

(The President] shall take care

that the laws be faithfully ex-

ecuted * * *#

Art. III, §2, el. 1 of the Constitu-
tion of the United States says in part:

The judicial power shall ex-

tend to all cases, in law and

equity, arising under this Con-

stitution, the laws of the Uni-

ted States, and treaties made,

or which shall be made, under

their authority; * * *

Art. III, §1 of the Constitution of

the United States says in part:

The judicial power of the
United States shall be vested in

tion

tion

tion

xlii

one Supreme Court, and in such
inferior courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and
establish.

The First Amendment to the Constitu-

of the United States says in part:

Congress shall make no law
* * * abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition
the government for a redress of
grievances.

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitu-
of the United States says in part:

No person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or other-
wise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of
a een jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the militia, when
in actual service in time of war
or public danger; nor shall any
person * * * be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without
due process of law; * * *

The Ninth Amendment to the Constitu-
of the United States says:

xliii

The enumeration in the Con-
stitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by
the people.

Title 18, United States Code §3332(a),
84 Stat. 924, says:

It shall be the duty of each
such grand jury impaneled within
any judicial district to inquire
into offenses against the crimi-
nal laws of the United States
alleged to have been committed
within that district. Such al-
leged offenses may be brought to
the attention of the grand jury
by the court or by any attorney
appearing on behalf of the Uni-.
ted States for the presentation
of evidence. Any such attorney
receiving information concerning
such an alleged offense from any
other person shall, if requested
by such other person, inform the
grand jury of such alleged of-
fense, the identity of the per-
son providing the information,
and such attorney's action or re-
commendation.

Title 18, United States Code §1504,
62 Stat. 770, says in part:

Nothing in this section shall
be construed to prohibit the

xliv

communication of a request to
appear before the grand jury.

Title 42, United States Code §1981,
R.S. §1977, see c. 114, §16, 16 Stat. 144,

says in part:

All persons within the juris-
diction of the United States
shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to
* # * give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the se-
curity of persons and property
as is enjoyed by white citizens
* +

Title 5, United States Code §702, 80
Stat. 392, 90 Stat. 2721, says in part:

A person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action
or adversely affected or ag-

- igi by agency action within
he meaning of a relevant sta-
tute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof. An action in a
court of the United States seek-
ing relief other than money da-
mages and stating a claim that
an agency or an officer or em-
ployee thereof acted or failed
to act in an official capacity
or under color of legal author-
ity shall not be dismissed nor
relief therein be denied on the

xlv

ground that it is against the
United States or that the Uni-
ted States is an indispensable
party.

Title 5, United States Code §701(a),

80 Stat. 392, says:

This chapter applies accor-
ding to the provisions thereof,
except to the extent that --

(1) statutes preclude ju-
dicial review; or

(2) agency action is commit-

ted to agency discretion by
law.

Title 28, United States Code §1653,

62 Stat. 944, says:

tion

Defective allegations of ju-
risdiction may be amended, upon
terms, in the trial or appellate
courts.

Art. III, §2, cl. 2 of the Constitu-

of the United States says:

In all cases affecting ambas-
sadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and those in which
a State shall be a party, the

xlvi

Supreme Court shall have origi-
nal jurisdiction. In all the
other cases before mentioned,

the Supreme “ourt shall have ap-
pellate jurisdiction, both as to
law and to fact, with such ex-
ceptions, and under such regula-
tions as the Congress shall make.

Petitioner has consigned to the Ap-
pendix texts of the relevant jurisdictional
Statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§1331, 1343(a) (4),
1361, 1391(e), and 2201, along with other
statutes of interest. Appendix N, infra;

see Petition at 7, infra.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Foundational Incidents.

As both the district court and the
court of appeals quite accurately recog-
nized, Petitioner is an accredited histo-
rian seeking to publish in the future cer-
tain manuscripts concerning one Patricia
Campbell Hearst (whom this honorable Court
has met before on several occasions) and a
fourth manuscript devoted in part to co-
verage of the Iranian hostage crisis. Ap-
pendices A and E, infra. The instant ac-
tion has its origins in these incidents
and the legal proceedings which this Court

i
should notice were generated by them.

While it ordinarily is true that the
Supreme Court will notice only such facts
as are found by the courts below, it may
take notice of matters of common observa-
tion, of statutes, records, or public doc-
uments previously not called to its atten-
tion, of reports of the committees of the
House of Representatives, of other peti-
tions for certiorari granted or denied,
the accompanying documents, officially

The Court also should notice that the
Said Patricia Campbell Hearst recently has

found it within herself publicly to relate

reported opinions and findings of the low-
er courts, or similar matters of judicial
Cognizance. New York Indians v. United
States, 170 U.S. 1, 18 (1898); Carolene
Products gee et er; v. United States, 323
U.S. 18, 28 (1944); Aspen Minin & Smel-
ting Co. v. Billin 5, 156 ws; 3 31 (1893) ;
Welts v. United States, 318 U.S. 257, 260
(1943); pienvilie Water Suppl Co. v. Mo-
bile, 186 U.S. 212 (19062); tatted States
Vv. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (194e).

oe rine oye ny wir Soyge its me-
mory by taking a look at People y. Remiro,
“et al., 89 Cal Appe2d 809, 35 Bat: note
B9 (1979), reh.den.; Committee on Internal
Security, House of Representatives, 93d
Congress, 2d session, Terrorism, Part 3
(hearings of 26-27 June, 10-11 July, 23
July & 13 Aug. 1974) at 3915-36, 3979-
4008, 4029-59; Harris v. Superior Court of
Alameda County, 19 Gal. 7BE- 146 Cal.
FP r. 318, P.a& 750 (1977); United
States v. Hearst, 412 F.Supp. 858 eft seq.
(N.D.Cal., 1975-76); United States v. Wei-
ner et al., 418 F.Supp. 941 (M.D.Pa‘’,
1976), aff'd. sub nom. United States v.
Shinnick, 546 F.% 420, 546 F.m 427, cert.
den. 429 U.S. 1105; People v. Yoshimura,
91 Cal.App.% 609, 154 Cal.Rptr. 31
(1979), reh.den.; United States v. Hearst,
563 F.& 1331 (CA9, 1977), reh. en banc
den. 573 F.a& 579, cert.den. 435 U.S. 1000;
United States v. Hearst, 424 ae: 307
et seq. (N.D.Cal., 1976), aff'd. 563 F.x
1331; United States v. Hearst, 435 F.Supp.
29 .D.Cal., 1977), aff'd. 563 F.m i331,

certain of those details of her circum-
stances immediately familiar to her. Pa-
tricia Campbell Hearst with Alvin Moscow,

Every Secret Thing (Garden City, N.Y.:

°° this honorable Court

Doubleday, 1982).
should recall (and may consult its own

records if it does not recall) that Miss
Hearst was convicted of violating the Na-
tional Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C. §2113

(a,d), and that her case involved, among

United States v. Hearst, 466 F.Supp. 1068

.D.cal., 1978), aff'd. in part, rev. in
part 638 F.&% 1190, cert.den. 451 U.S. 938;
see also People v. Harris et al., #321099A
(L.A.Cty., Cal., 1976), cert.den. 444 U.S.
862; United States v. Soliah, Cr. #75-523
PCw (E.D.cal., 1976).

Petitioner, himself, has no doubts
concerning the abilities of the members of
this Court properly to recognize the legal
presumptions they may make concerning all
this. See e.g. Dusky v. United States,
295 F.2 743, 753-785 (Ca8, 1961), cert.
den. 368 U.S. 998. Proof of such may be
found by them in the very papers which Pe-
titioner asks this honorable Court to re-
view. Notice that Petitioner having wor-
ked the Hearst case very hard since 14 Au-
gust 1974, the Court can rest assured that
Petitioner knows what he is about.

other matters, a plea of duress. Peti-

tioner has studied the parameters of this
defense very carefully, and though he ad-
mittedly is not an attorney, nevertheless,

"after exhaustive research of the Hearst

2
See D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.a

338 (CA9, 1951), cert.den. 343 U.S. 935;
(i998). Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129

Cf. United States v. Chapman, 455 F.a
746 (CA5, 1972); United States v. McClain,
531 af Phe (CAS, 1976), cert den. 2
U.S. 835; and Browning v. State, 37 Ala.
App. 137, 13 Sox 3 T1 943); with State v.
Kearns, 27 N.C.App. 354-249 S.E.& 226
(1975), cert.den. 289 N.C. 300, Pisa S.E.m
700; see further aa os a ooeye ge, 212

a 601, 180 N. iW B18 } oe cf. nch
v. Director of Public ABE sed ons 3 1975 ]
T All E.R. 913 CHE}, alte abbott ve The
Queen, 63 Crim.App.R. 241 (1976)(P.c.);
but see also United States v. Moore, 486

F.2d 1139, 1179-85 (CADe, 1 rhe, aranaeess
1

Jos concurring) » cert. den. S 464
cf. Ross v. Stare. 169 Ind. 388, 82 N

781 (1907); and People v. Sing Chan,
Cal.App.a 167, GE Poh Bi 1944); Beh

State v. St. Clair, a

64

them in a first-class-postage-prepaid wrap-
per, one addressed to:

AUSA Barry K. Stevens,

United States Attorney's Offc.,

915 Lafayette Blvd.,
Bridgeport, Ct., 06604.

ano the other addressed to:

Solicitor General of the
United States,
Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C., 20530.
which mailings were effected on the th
day of January, 1984.

I did prepare and have read the fore-
going affidavit and swear tat it is true
ana correct to t.e best of my knowledge,
information, and belief. I understand
that a false statement made by me in the

above affidavit could subject me to penal-

ties for perjury.

Respectfully submitted this th

day of January, 198,

65

Robert Brian Crim, pro se,
32 Pierce Lane,

Naugatuck, Ct’, 06770.
Tel. (203) 729-6119.

Sworn to and subscribed
before me tnis th day

of January, 1984.

Clerk
United States District Court,
District of Connecticut.

APPENDIX

Appendix A:

Opinion and Order
of the
United States Court of Appeals
for the

Second Circuit.

A-2

;
UNITFD STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

At a Stated Term of the United States
Court of Appeals, in and tor the Second
Circuit, held at the United States Court
House, in the City of New York, on the 17th
day of Decer er, one thousand nine hundred
and eighty-two.

Present: Hon. Ellsworth A. Van Graafeil-
and,
Hon. James L. Oakes,

Hon. Tnomas J. Meskill,

Circuit Judges.

Robert Brian Crim, )
Appellant,
v. 81-6177
G. William Hunter, United States
Attorney for the Northern
District of California, )
)

Appellee.

OR DER

A-3

This is an appeal from a judgment en-
tered on March 31, 1981 by the United
States District Court for the District of
Connecticut, T.F. Gilroy Daly, Judge, dis-

missing this complaint sua sponte on the

grounds that the court was without subdject
matter jurisdiction inasmuch as the plain-
tiff lacked standing. On July 2, 1981,
that court further denied Crim's motion
for vacation of judgment, leave to amend
complaint, and new trial.

Appellant Crim, a private citizen,
sought to compel Appellee Hunter, a United
States Attorney, to submit Crim's material
to a Special Grand Jury convened under
Chapter 216 of the United States Code of
Criminal Procedure. He asserted an im-
plied private cause of action under 18
U.S.C. §3332(a), which describes the pow-
ers and duties of such grand juries.

A private person who is neither pro-

secuted nor threatened with prosecution

A-4

has no standing to contest policy deci-
sions of the United States Attorney, Linda
B.S. ¥. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619
(1973), nor does 18 U.S.C. §3332(a) create
standing. A directive that the United
States Attorney receive, make a recommen-
dation, and if requested forward informa-
tion from any person to a special grand
jury does not create a private right of
action in the absence of congressional in-

tent. Universities Research Ass'n., Inc.,

v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770 (1981); see

also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442

U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 78 (1975).

Crim's complaint also sought declara-
tory and compensatory relief; he alleges
“loss of marketability” of papers that he
might publish in the future showing that
Patricia Hearst was deprived of her con-
stitutional right to a fair trial, anda

connection with the Iranian hostage crisis.

A-5

Publication, he states, may subject him to
liability for libel; Crim wishes to filter
nis materials through the Grand Jury on
the theory that he can thereby avoid a fu-
ture libel action. Reply Brief at 15-17.
Crim fails to show now the remedy he
seeks could prevent the speculative and
remote injury he claims, Linda R.S. v. Ri-
chard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973). The
jurisdiction of this court extends only to
cases and controversies. U.S. Constitu-
tion Art. III. Even when a statute ex-
pressly or impliedly creates a private
cause of action -- whicn is not the case
nere -- a plaintiff must allege injury in
fact to an interest within the zone of
interests protected by the statute deemed
violated by executive conduct. Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Linda R.S. v.

Richard D., supra; Association of Data

Processing Service Organizations, Inc., v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). We take note

A-6

that Crim has previously had an opportuni-
ty to present nis claim of a judicially
cognizable injury. See Crim v. Bell, No.
78-2132 (2d Cir., Apr. 10, 1979), aftir-
ming district court's judgment that Crim

lacked standing in, inter alia, a mandamus

action to Hunter and Grand Jury to inquire
into Crim's materials. Where lack of
standing is predicated not only ona sta-
tutory analysis, but also upon the plain-
tiff-appellant's failure to plead a judi-
cially cognizable injury, the doctrine of
res judicata bars relitigation of the
claim.

The district court correctly dis-
missed Crim's complaint for lack of juris-
diction and the judgment is hereby af-

firmed.

s/James L. Oakes
s/Ellsworth A. Van Graafeiland
s/Thomas J. Meskill,

Circuit Judges.

A-7

Appendix B:

Order of the
United States Court of Appeals
for the

Second Circuit.

A-8

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
At a Stated Term of the United States

Court of Appeals, in and for the Second
Circuit, held at the United States Court
House, in the City of New York, on the 8
day of March, one thousand nine hundred
and eighty-three.
Present:

Hon. James L. Oakes,

Hon. Ellsworth A. Van Graafeiland,

Hon. Thomas J. Meskill,
Circuit Judges.

Robert Brian “Crim,

Appellant,

Vv. 81-6177
G. William Hunter, United States
Attorney for the Northern District

of California,
Appellee.

ORDER

Appellant, pro se, has moved for leave
to file a motion for rehearing out of time
which is nereby granted. He has also pe-
titioned for renearing with a suggestion

that the rehearing be heard en banc, and

A-9

this petition is hereby denied witnout
prejudice to the application that the pe-
tition be heard en banc. He has also ap-
plied for leave to file a supplemental me-
morandum and that application is hereby

granted.

(s) James L. Oakes,
(s) E.A. Van Graafeiland,
(s) Thomas J. Meskill,

Circuit Judges.

A-10

Appendix C;

Order of the
United States Court of Appeals
for the
Second Circuit,

27 January 1982.

A-11

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
for the

SECOND CIRCUIT

Robert Brian Crim
81-6177

v«

G. William Hunter, U.S. Attorney.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion
for vacation of judgment; leave to amend
complaint; and new trial, be and it hereby

is denied.

s/Thomas J. Meskill, U.S.C.Jd.
s/Richard J. Cardamone, U.S.C.J.

1/27/82 s/James S. Holden, U.S.D.J.*

* Sitting by designation.

A-12

United States Sourt of Appeals
for the

Second Circuit.

A-13

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
for the
SECOND CIRCUIT

Robert Brian Crim,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 81-6177

G. William Hunter, United
States Attorney,

\Defendant-Appellee. |

a a

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion
to recall mandate, vacate judgment, allow
amendment of pleadings, and grant new trial

thereon be and it hereby is denied.

s/James L. Oakes,

s/Ellsworth A. Van Graafeiland,
May 19, s/Thomas J. Meskill,
1983. Circuit Judges.

A-14

Appendix E:
a ; ‘
Upinion and Order
of the
United c+ > :
) ’ 1 St: ms ~ M
ates District Court
for the

District
rict of Connecticut.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

ROBERT BRIAN CRIM,
Plaintiff,
-vs- Civil No. N 81-150
G. WILLIAM HUNTER,
United States Attorney
for the Northern Dis-

trict of California,

Defendant.

Plaintiff, "an nistorian", requested
of the defendant that he present to a fe-
deral grand jury evidence in nis posses-
sion which he believes tends to prove that
a number of criminal offenses were commit-
ted against the United States between Au-
gust 21, 1973 and February 1, 1979. Hav-
ing never received a reply from the defen-
dant to his letter of February 13, 1981
the plaintiff claims that the defendant
has failed to discharge his duty pursuant

to 18 U.S.C. § 3332(a) thereby denying

A-16

plaintiff his right to have his allega-
tions tested for their veracity and has
materially damaged the plaintiff by impe-
ding the marketability of his manuscript
which addresses the criminal activity he
seeks to have investigated.

“Whatever merit there may be to
plaintiff's [underlying] claims he has al-
leged nothing that entitles him to bring
his suit in a federal court." Sohlberg v.
Castor, Dkt. No. B-74-469 (D.Conn., Jan.
14, 1975)(Newman, J.). Title 18 U.S.C.
§1332(a) confers no private right of ac-
tion to seek the relief requested.

Accordingly, the complaint is dis-

missed, sua sponte, for lack of jurisdic-

tion.
Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut,
this 3ist day of March 1981.
(s) Thurnby Daly
T.F. Gilroy Daly

United States District
Judge.

A-18

Upon Petitioner's motion made before
the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut and seeking vaca-
tion of judgment, leave to amend plead-
ings, and new trial, the Hon. T.F. Gilroy

Daly atfixed the following endorsement:

July 2, 1981--DENIED. Plaintiff's
amended complaint does not cure the ju-
risdictional defects found by this court
in its ruling of March 31, 1981 nor those
noted by the Government in its response

filed May 15, 1981. See also Crim v.

Griffin Bell et al, No. N-78-135 (D.Conn.

1978)(Newman, J.).

(s) Thurnby Daly
T.F. Gilroy Daly,
U.S. District Judge.

A-19

Judgment and Mandate

A-20

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND CIRCUIT

At a stated term of the United States
Court of Appeals, in and for the Second
Circuit, held at the United States Court-
house, in the City of New York, on the
twenty-third day of March, one thousand

mine hundred and eighty-three.

ROBERT BRIAN CRIM,
Appellant,
v. No. 81-6177
G. WILLIAM HUNTER, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY for the
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CAL-
IFOPNIA,

Appellee.

ee ee

A petition for rehearing containing a
suggestion that the action be reheard in
bane having been filed herein by appel-

lant, Robert Brian Crim, pro se, and the

panel that neard the appeal naving denied
said petition in an order filed on March

8, 1983,

It is further noted that the sugges-
tion for rehearing in bane has been trans-
mittea to the judges of the court in regu-
lar active service and to any other judge
on the panel that heard the appeal and
that no such judge has requested that a

vote be taken thereon.

A. Daniel Fusaro, Clerk
by
s/Francis X. Gindhart,

Chief Deputy Clerk

A-23

B. Appellee Has Not Shown That
Appellant Lacks Standing
for Failing to Establish a
Nexus Between Injury Al-

leged and Relief Sought.

Plaintiff alleged loss of marketabi-
lity in his works the result of Defendant's
apparent failure to present Plaintiff and
Plaintiff's investigation to the special
federal grand jury. The trial court cor-
rectly found this to be an “injury in

fact." Ludlow Corporation v. Securities

and Fxchange Com'n., 604 F.m 704 (CADC,

1979). Appellee's objections, see Brief
of Appellee at 9, are totally sans merit.
Allegation of loss of marketability
was rooted in the law of libel. Plaintiff
alleged tnat Patricia Hearst was not guil-
ty of the crimes for which she was charged
and convicted and also alleged that the
conviction appeared fraudulent. Finally,

Plaintiff alleged that no insanity was

A-24

present to account for Miss Hearst's be-
havior; thus, someone, somewhere had to be
guilty.

Patricia Hearst's innocence may be
argued as a matter of law rather than sym-
pathy by “closing the door” upon the pos-
sibility of her escaping her abductors.

Cf. United States v. Chapman, 455 F.a 746

(CA5, 1972), with State v. Kearns, 27 N.C.
App. 354, 219 S.E.a 228 (1975), cert.den.
289 N.C. 300, 222 S.E.% 700. On the ques-
tion of “brainwashing,” that is not a de-
fense per se but may be invoked to explain
why an individual at a certain time inter-
preted the data of reality in a certain
way. It being a legal principal that one
who reasonably perceives his life to be in
danger may act upon appearances, it be-
comes necessary to show only that Miss
Hearst was fearful both of the SLA and

the USA, and that her fear of each was

“reasonable” within the context of her

A-25

abilities to perceive reality. Toward
this end, marshaling of all the extra-ju-
dicial remarks made by such as Atty. Gen.
William Saxbe certainly is material. But,
to say that William Saxbe incited a kid-
napping victim to commit criminal acts is
to say that William Saxbe, ‘not Patricia
Hearst, is the criminal. Such is a libe-
lous statement, unless true.

Attorneys General and other such of-
ficials come under the rule set down in

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.

254, 84 S.Ct. 710 (1

wo

64), and must prove
"actual malice" to effect recovery under
the law of libel. Plaintiff's circun-
stances are similar to a degree to the

circumstances attending Curtis Publishing

Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975
(1967), reh.den. 88 S.Ct. 11, 13. The de-
gree of similarity at this point depends
upon how credible a jury finds Plaintiff.

However, fortuitious circumstances allow

A-26

Plaintiff to pass between the horns of his
dilemma by writing, at least to a degree,
aoout himself (a tactic not uncommon among
those who wrote books about the Hearst
case). Plaintiff, the witness, is privi-
leged to say what ne tninks to the grand
jury and to answer truthfully any question

which it might care to ask him. Marsh v.

Virginia, 265 F.Supp. 614 (W.D.Va., 1967).
Plaintiff, the reporter, is privileged to
report fairly judicial proceedings. Crai
Vv. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947). What
nappens atter that really is not Plain-
tiff's problem. If the President chooses
publicly not to prosecute, then so what?
If the grand jury chooses not to present,
then so what? If the United States Attor-
ney chooses not to recommend, then so
what? Plaintiff fails to see Defendant's
point.

Plaintiff does acknowledge that the

original and first amended pleadings in
the district court fail properly to plead
urisdictional racts on this portion of
the complaint, since the case here arises
not solely under the Hornblower's Provi-
sion but also directly under the First

and Fifth Amendments. The amenaed com-
plaint currently before the district court
corrects this. Plaintiff seeks a continu-
ance upon the instant appeal to unify the
two causes of action and to obtain a fin-
ding of fact from the trial court whether
the instant case comes within the Curtis
precedent. In the event the trial court
rejects Curtis applicability, then such
will sharpen the alternative pleading of
implied cause of action, since the Defen-
dant will have no rational basis for de-

clining to present to the special federal

grand jury.

N

a 2
aw @
am | os 4p
“4 - ¢
a a |
w bi >
aw ©) +
w Gi “A
bu ”
| ae e
c ® -
£ re) nO X Ww 3 ©)
= a | »
° oO

' + “ Sy
a |
| = op
S + “A
em ] pan ”
(@) @
* Y 4 @)

N
oa
'
iT 4n Re >
Willlam Hunter, 03 March 1981, certi-

+ +> + +
fied mail receipt, return certifi-

cate), said service is equivalent to

ry

service upon Defendant per the rules

f law applicable to the Ninth ana

ted States v. Butler, 56

7
S91 (CAS, 1978); United States Vv.

a

Bryant, 439 F.m 642, 650 (CADC, 1971);

see Barbee v. Warden, Maryland Peni-

tentiary, 331 Fa 842, B46 (CA4,

1965); United States v. Consolidated

Laundries Corp. et al., 291 F.m 563,

570 (CA2, 1961);

~~

~~

Ww

Tne provisions of Title 18, United
States Code, §3332(a) grant unto
Plaintiff a “eivil ri nt" within the
meaning of Title 28, Uni+ea States
code, §1343(4); saia provisions like-
wise impose upon Defendant a minis-
terial duty, Title 16, United States
zode, §3332(a) encompassing in part

@ positive command which is free from
doubt;

tain of the alleged offenses were ac-
tion to be delayed beyond midnight
(0000 hours), 20 March 1581; ana

Plaintiff made Clear that, because of

A-41

wnat ne perceived to be the pending
lapse in the Statute of Limitations,
Plaintiff would consider all adminis-
trative remedies exhausted if Plain-
tiff received no positive response
from Defendant by mail call of 1
Mareh 1961. See Exhibit 3 attached

hereto and previously described.

14, o the best of Plaintiff's informa-

3

tion, knowledge, and belief, Defen-
dant has not complied witn Plaintiff's
formal request of 13 February 1981,
Exhibit 2 attached hereto, as of the
stated deadline, Fxhibit 3 attached
hereto; wherefore Defendant has not
discharged the ministerial duty re-
quired of him by the provisions of

Title 18, United States Code, §

3332(a), and all administrative reme-

dies are exhausted.

15. Publication imputing to another a

16.

17.

Criminal offense subjects the defamer
to liability, even in the absence of
proof of special harm, particularly
where the crime involved involves mo-
ral turpitude or has attached to it
an infamous penalty; nowever, truth
almost universally is a defense to

accusations of libel;

Plaintiff, after exhaustive research
of the Hearst case, has determined to
Plaintiff's satisfaction that there

was no legally recognizable insanity
attendant to Patricia Hearst Shaw's

mental condition during the time she
was a captive of or a convert to the

Symbionese Liberation Army;

Plaintiff, after exhaustive research
of the Hearst case, has determined to
Plaintiff's satisfaction that, as a

matter of law, criminal responsibili-

ty must attach to each and every one

A-43

of the several acts allegedly commit-
ted by the Symbionese Liberation Ar-
my in violation of Federal and State
statutes; and Plaintiff, arter ex-
haustive research of the Hearst case,
has not determined beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that said responsibility
properly attaches to Patricia Hearst
Shaw; nor has Plaintiff, after ex-
haustive research of the Hearst case,
been satisfactorily impressed with
the “fairness” of the trial which Pa-
tricia Hearst Shaw received in San

Francisco, California, in 1976;

Plaintiff, after exhaustive research
of the Hearst case, has determined to
Plaintiff's satisfaction that a de-
finite connection can be drawn be-
tween several of the acts noted in
paragraph 6 of the instant complaint,
Supra, and some of the consequences

noted in paragraph 17 of the instant

19.

complaint, supra, which connection

Plaintiff wishes to state explicitly
in Plaintiff's four manuscripts, pa-
ragraph 4 of the instant complaint,
Supra. Plaintiff asserts that ex-
plicit statement of said connections
is an essential ingredient of the ar-
tistic integrity of Plaintiff's
works, since in the absence of a fin-
ding that Patricia Hearst Shaw was
unlawfully deprived of her Ponatites
tional right to a fair trial, the
historical connection between her
circumstances and the Iran Crisis

dissipates.

To say that someone unlawfully de-
prived another of that others Consti-
tutional right to a fair trial is té
charge the alleged violator(s) with
a crime involving moral turpitude

and to which is attached an infamous

penalty; and to publish such an

20.

21.

to liability unless the al legation

is true;

By his refusal to present Plaintiff
and Plaintiff's investigation and
evidence to the proper special feder-
ai grand jury, as is required by Ti-

\

tle 18, United States Code, §3332(a),
ci

Deferdant has deprived Plaintiff of
Plaintiff's right to have Plaintiff's

allegations tested for truthfulness;

By his refusal to present Plaintiff

and Plaintiff's investigation and

evicence to the proper special feder-
grand jury, as is required by Ti-

tle 18, United States Code, §3332(a),

Defendant has deprived Plaintiff's
works of an element of their market-
ability, since in the absence of a
certification of truthfulness, any

responsible publisher must as a mat-

A-46

ter of law be hesitant to contract

Plaintiff's works;

22. By nis refusal to present Plaintiff
and Plaintiff's investigation and
evidence to the proper special feder-
al grand jury, as is required by Ti-

tle 18, United States Code, §3332(a),

Defendant has altered the conclusion
of Plaintiff's fourth manuscript in

a material way, which alteration
Plaintiff asserts has deprived Flain-
tiff's entire work of its immortality;
and if Defendant is not mandamused to
perform the ministerial act required

by Title 18, United States Code, §

3332(a), and requested of him by the
Plaintiff, Plaintiff will suffer im-
mediate and irreparable injury, for

which damages at law are inadequate.

23. Plaintiff is entitled to the follow-

ing declaratory relief: "Title 18,

A-47

United States Code, §3332(a) confers
by statute upon investigators and
witnesses (private or otherwise) the
Civil right to have information de-
veloped by them presented to a spe-
Clal federal grand jury upon proper
request; and when an attorney for the
Government requested to make such
presentation to a special federal
grand jury fails to honor such re-
quest, mandamus will issue to compel
him to do so, and he may be held lia-
ble for any damages or injury his
initial refusal to present might
Cause." Such declaratory relief is
proper and necessary, since the ori-
ginal reason for the passage of Title

18, United States Code, §3332(a) was

to enable private citizens to spur
federal prosecutors to conduct prompt
investigation of complaints relating

to organized crime. Persons who find

24.

A-48

it necessary to seek mandamus of a
grand-jury investigation into orga-
nized crime place the clear and pre-
sent danger of dying before the com-

plaint is answered.

Plaintiff is entitled to the follow-
ing declaratory relief: "Witnesses
to and investigators of crimes a-
gainst the commonweal are ‘public in-
tervenors' representing ‘public val-
ues', not ‘private values’, and such
intervenors are not ‘interlopers';
rather, they are to be granted such
standing at law as is necessary to
assure that the criminal laws of the
United States are enforced in an

equitable and responsible manner."

See Medical Committee for Human
Rights v. S.E.C., 432 F 24 659, 673-
674 (CADC, 1970), reh.den., vac. and
rem. for dismissal for reasons of

mootness, 404 U.S. 403 (1972); Office

Where

Court

-

Qn $ $ 4 ‘ Qn * |
of Communication of United Church of

christ v. F.C.C., 425 F.m 543, 546-

547 (CADC, 1969), reh. en bane den.,
5

fore Plaintiff prays this honorable

to:

Issue Writ of Mancamus to Lefendant

obliging him to present the evidence

grand jury sitting in the Northern

District of California;

Declare the rights and privileges

conferred by Title 18, United States

Code, $3332(a) per the configurations

of paragraph 23 of the instant com-
plaint, supra, along with the stan-
ding of witnesses and investigators
as "public intervenors" per the con-
figurations of paragraph 24 of the

instant complaint, supra;

termined at a later time, the Plain-
iff currently being unable to make
any estimate of damages (beyond the
threshhold jurisdictional amount) in

The absence of the special federal

Respectfully submitted this 19t day of
March, 1981,

ae, )
/ +) So.

Robert Brian Crim, pro se,
32 Pierce Lane,
Naugatuck, Ct., 06770.

"

A-51

ee

Tnese exhibits, which Consist of letters
and postal documents, are not reproduced
here due to the limitations of the size
format; copies of these exnibits may be
found at pages A-35 to A-41 of the legal-

sized appendix originally submitted by Pe-

itioner to tne Court on 08 August 1983

c+

and now lodged with the Clerk for refer-

ence.

A-53

Re Complaint (as amended);

This document is not reproduced here due
to its size and the expense of the repro-
duction. A copy of Complaint (as amended)
may be found at pages A-43 to A-53 of the
legal-sized appendix originally submitted
by Petitioner to the Court on 08 August
1983 and now lodged with the Clerk for re-

ference.

A=-55

Re Complaint (as amended ITI);

This document is not reproduced here due
to its size and the expense of the repro-
duction. 4 copy of Complaint (as amended
II) may be found at pages A-55 to A-65 of
the legal-sized appendix originally sub-
mitted by Petitioner to the Court on 08

August 1983 and now lodged with the Clerk

Complaint

(as amended IV).

Re Complaint (as amended IV);

This document is not reproduced here due
to its size and the expense of the repro-
duction. A copy of Complaint (as amended
IV) may be found at pages A-67 to A-82 of
the legal-sized appendix originally sub-

mitted by Petitioner to the Court on 08

August 1983 and now lodged with the Clerk

for reference.

A-58

Ww
@
+
=
»
w
»
—~

A-59

Title 28, United States Code §1331
(as amended), 90 Stat. 2721, 94 Stat.

2369, says:

Tne district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all ci-
vil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States.

Title 28, United States Code §1343

(a)(4) (as amended), 93 Stat. 1284, says:

Tne district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any ci-
vil action authorized by law to
be commenced by any person: * * *

To recover damages or to se-
cure equitable or other relief
under any Act of Congress provi-
ding for the protection of civil
rights, including the right to
vote.

Title 28, United States Code §1361,
76 Stat. 744, says:

The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any ac-
tion in the nature of mandamus to
compel an officer or employee of
the United States or any agency
thereof to perform a duty owed to
the plaintiff.

A-60

Title 28, United States ‘ode §1391(e),

90 Stat. 2721, says:

A civil action in which a de-
fendant is an officer or employ-
ee of the United States or any
agency thereof acting in his of-
ficial capacity or under color
of legal authority, or an agency
of the United States, or the
United States, may, except as
otherwise provided by law, be
Drought in any judicial district
in wnich (1) a defendant in the
action resides, or (2) the cause
of action arose, or (3) any real
property involved in the action
is situated, or (4) the plain-
tiff resides if no real property
is involved in the action. Ad-
ditional persons may be joined
as parties to any such action in
accordance with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and with such
other venue requirements as
would be applicable if the Uni-
ted States or one of its offi-
cers, employees, or agencies
were not a party.

The summons and complaint in
such an action shall be served
as provided by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure except that
the delivery of the summons and
Complaint to the officer or agen-
Cy as required by the rules may
be made by certified mail beyond
the territorial limits of the
district in which the action was
brought.

A-61

Title 28, United States Tode $2201,
62 Stat. 964, 63 Stat. 105, 68 Stat. 890,
72 Stat. 349, 90 Stat. 1719, 92 Stat.

2672, says:

In a case of actual contro-
versy within its jurisdiction,
except with respect to Federal
taxes other than actions brought
under section 7428 of the Inter-
nal Pevenue Code of 1954 or a
proceeding under section 505 or
1146 of title 11, any court of
the United States, upon the fi-
ling of an appropriate pleading,
may declare the rights and other
legal relations of any interes-
ted party seeking such declara-
tion, whether or not further re-
lief is or could be sought. Any
such declaration shall have the
force and effect of a final
judgment or decree and shall be
reviewable as such.

Title 18, United States Sode §3282,
62 Stat. 828, 68 Stat. 1145, 75 Stat. 648,

says:

Except as otherwise expressly
provided by law, no person shall
be prosecuted, tried, or punished
for any offense, not capital, un-
less the indictment is found or
the information is instituted
within five years next after such
offense shall have been committed.

A-62

Title 18, United States Code §3281,

62 Stat. 827, says:

An lidictment for any offense
punishable by death may be found
at any time without limitation
except for offenses barred by
the provisions of the law exis-
ting on August 4, 1939.

Title 18, United States Code §2, 62
Stat. 684, 65 Stat. 717, says:

(a) Whoever commits an of-
fense against the United States
or aids, abets, counsels, com-
mands, induces or procures its
commission, is punishable as a
principal.

(0) Whoever willfully cau-
ses an act to be done which if
directly performed by him or
another would be an offense a-
gainst the United States, is
punishable as a principal.

Title 18, United States Code §3, 62

Stat. 684, says in part:

Whoever, knowing that an of-
fense against the United States
has been committed, receives,
relieves, comforts or assists
the offender in order to hinder
or prevent his apprehension,
trial or punishment, is an ac-
cessory after the tact.

Wnoever, having knowledge of
the actual commission of a felo-
ny cognizable by a court of the
United States, conceals and does
not as soon as possible make
known the same to some judge or
other person in civil or milita-
ry authority under the United
States, shall be fined not more
than $500 or imprisoned not more
than three years, or both.

Title 18, United States Code §242,

62 Stat. 696, 82 Stat. 75, says in part:

Whoever, under color of any
law, statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, or custom, willfully sub-
jects any inhabitant of any State,
Territory, or District to the de-
privation of any rights, privi-
leges or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution or
laws of the United States * * *
shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both; and if
death results shall be subject to
imprisonment for any term of
years or for life.

Title 18, United States Code §371,

62 Stat. 701, says in part:

A-64

If two or more persons con-
Spire either to commit any of-
fense against the United States,
or to defraud the United States,
or any agency thereof in any
manner or tor any purpose, and
one or more of such persons do
any act to effect the object of
the conspiracy, each shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.

Title 18, United States Code §401,

62 Stat. 701, says in part:

A court of the United States
shall have power to punish by
fine or imprisonment, at its
discretion, such contempt of its
authority, and none other, as --

(1) Misbehavior of any per-
son in its presence or so near
thereto as to obstruct the ad-
ministration of justice;

(2) Misbehavior of any of
its officers in their official
transactions; * #* *#

Title 18, United States Code §1001,

62 Stat. 749, says:

Wnoever, in any matter within
the jurisdiction of any depart-
ment or agency of the United
States knowingly and willfully
falsifies, conceals or covers up
any trick, scheme, or device a

A-65

material fact, or make any false,
fictitious or fraudulent state-
ments or representations, or
makes or uses any false writing
or document Knowing the same to
contain any false, fictitious or
fraudulent statement or entry,
shall be fined not more than

10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.

Title 18, United States Code §1503,

62 Stat. 769, 96 Stat. 1253, says:

Whoever corruptly, or by
threats of force, or by any
threatening letter or communi-
cation, endeavors to influence,
intimidate, or impede any grand
or petit juror, or officer in
or of any court of the United
States, or officer wh may be
serving at any examination or
other proceeding before any Uni-
ted States commissioner or other
committing magistrate, in the
cGischarge of his duty, or injures
any such grand or petit juror in
his person or property on account
of any verdict or indictment as-
sented to by him, or on account
of his having been or being such
juror, or injures any such offi-
cer, commissioner, or other com-
mi+tting magistrate in his person
or property on account of the
performance of his official du-
ties, or corruptly or by threats
of force, or by any threatening
letter or communication, influ-
ences, obstructs, or impedes the

A-66

Gue administration o
shall be fined not
$5,000 or imprison

than five years,

eo a
ry
o
Oo
«+

Whoever attempts to influence
the action or decision of any
grand or petit juror of any
court of the United States upon
any issue or matter pending be-
fore such juror, or before the
jury of which he is a member, or
pertaining to his duties, by
writing or sending to him any
written communication, in rela-
tion to such issue or matter,
shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more
than six months, or both.

Title 18, United States Code §1583,

62 Stat. 772, says in part:

Whoever kidnaps or carries
away any otner person, with the
intent that such other person
be sold into involuntary servi-
tude, or held as a slave; * * #

Shall be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.

Title 18, United States Code §1622,

A-67

62 Stat. 774, says

Whoever procures another to
commit any perjury is guilty o
sudornation of perjury, and
shall be fined not more than
$2,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.

+.
+

Title 18, United States Code §2383,

62 Stat. 808, says:

Whoever incites, sets on foot,
assists, or engages in any rebel-
lion or insurrection against the
authority of the United States
or the laws thereof, or gives aid
or comfort thereto, shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both; and shall be in-
capable of holding any office un-
der the United States.

Title 18, United States Code §2113
(a,d,e), 62 Stat. 796, 64 Stat. 394, 66

Stat. 46, 73 Stat. 639, 84 Stat. 1017,

says in part:

Whoever, by force and vio-
lence, or by intimidation, takes
or attempts to take, from the

A-68

person or the presence of ano-
ther any property or money or
any other thing of value belong-
ing to, or in the care, custody,
control, management, or posses-
sion of, any bank, credit union,
or any savings and loan associa-
tion; * * #

Shall be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more
than twenty years, or both.

Wnoever, in committing, or in
attempting to commit, any offense
defined in subsections (a) and
(>) of this section, assaults any
person by the use of a dangerous
weapon or device, shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or impri-
soned not more than twenty-five
years, or both.

Whoever, in committing any
offense defined in this section,
or in avoiding or attempting to
avoid apprehension for the com-
mission of such offense, or in
freeing himself or attempting to
free himself from arrest or con-
finement for such offense, kills
any person, or forces any person
to accompany him without the con-
sent of such person, shall be im-
prisoned not less than ten years,
or punished by death if the ver-
dict of the jury shall so direct.

Title 18, United States Code §1584,

62 Stat. 773, says in part:

Whoever knowingly and will-
fully nolds to involuntary ser-
vitude * * * any other person

A-69

for any term * * * shall be
fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.

Title 18, United States Code §2381,
62 Stat. 807, says:

Whoever, owing allegiance to
the United States, levies war
against them or adheres to their
enemies, giving them aid and
comfort within the United States
or elsewhere, is guilty of trea-
son and shall suffer death, or
shall be imprisoned not less
than five years and fined not
less than $10,000; and shail be

incapable of holding any office
under the United States.

It is to be noted that the capital
provision of the treason statute is worded
differently from the capital provisions of
the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C.
§1201 (repealed), and the National Bank
Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C. §2113(e), and
therefore does not suffer the same uncon-

stitutional defect. Cf. United States v.

A-70

Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968); Pope v. Uni-
ted States, 392 U.S. 651 (1968). It also

is to be noted that 18 U.S.C. §1201 and 18
U.S.C. §2113(e) define “Capital” crimes
delimited under 18 U.S.C. §3281, the un-
Constitutionality of these provisions’
death penalties notwithstanding. See e.g.

Coon v. United States, 411 F.a 422 (Cas,

1969). “It is for Congress, not the
courts, to rewrite the definition of a ca-

pital offense." United States v. Narciso,

446 F.Supp. 252, 263n.4 (E.D.Mich., 1977).
It not being possible to obtain a judgment

against a statute, Shephard v. Wheeling, 4

S.E. 635 (W.Va., 1887); 39 Ops.Atty.Gen.
22 (1937), it follows that findings of un-
constitutionality in a statute's applica-

tion cannot void relations under the sta-

tute not Specifically addressed by the de-
cision of the court of review. See Chicot

County Drainage District ¥- Baxter State
Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940).

Appendix 0O:

A Sonnet

A-72

I fain would give to thee the loveliest
things,

For lovely things belong to thee of right,

And thou hast been as peaceful to my sight,

As the still thoughts that summer's twi-
light brings;

Beneath the shadow of thine angel's wings

O let me live! 0O let me rest in thee,

Growing to thee more and more utterly,

Upbearing and upborn, till outward things

Are only as they share in thee a part!

Look kindly on me, let thy holy eyes

Bless me from the deep fulness of thy
heart;

So shall. my soul in its right strength
arise,

And nevermore shall pine and shrink and
start,

Safe-sheltered in thy full-souled sympa-
thies.

--James Russell Lowell

IND OF DOCKET

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1215%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.