# Opposition — Davis v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 466 U.S. 950

## Text

No. 83-1241

Jn the Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

Roy E. Davis, ETC., PETITIONER
Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

Rex E. Lee
Solicitor General

F. HENRY Hasicurt, II a
Assistant Attorney General

Dirk D. SNEL
JANET L. STECKEL
Attorneys

Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the district court properly dismissed petitioner's
action under the Federal Tort Claims Act for damages to
compensate for the government's alleged violation of the
Clean Water Act's pollutant discharge restrictions.

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S.

Dl adh Adnan é6ekwedbbesedtievecesone 5, 6, 7,8
Flanagan v. Gregory and Poole, Inc.,

136 W. Va. 554, 67S.E. 2d 865 .........0008. 6
Hough v. Marsh, 557 F. Supp. 74 .........+++: 8
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S.1 2.6.6.6. c eens 7
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.

National Sea Clammers Association, 453

CEU DE Reesk che eCnebes cedebeccdcoes 5, 6, 7,8
National Sea Clammers Association v. City

of New York, 616 F.2d 1222 ........ceeeeeeee 7

Statutes:
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

DT UMihats da bbeshsdebderinerovcocecces 8
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. (& Supp. V)

SEO GU GDE, cccccccvcccesecccccccecoecccccs 2

§ 404, 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1344 ........... iy
Fae BP OME RIED ccccccccccccccce 1,3,8
(111)

IV

Page
Statutes—Continued:

§ 50S(a), 33 U.S.C. 136S(a) «2... cece eee 5,6
§ 505(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. 136S(aX(2) ..... 600s x
§ 50S(e), 33 U.S.C. 136S(e) «0... cece ee eeenes 8

Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217,
© 2, DE Beat. 1566 .cccccccccccvccccvcsccccess 4

Federal Tort Claims Act:

BO UGG, CRUG cccccicccccccecccovs 1, 2,6
28 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 2671 ef seg. ......++: 2
p fie rrr 6

42 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1983 ......cccereeeeeeeees 7

Gu the Supreme Court of the Mnited States

Octoser Term, 1983

No. 83-1241
Roy E. Davis, ETC., PETITIONER
Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 38a-44a) is
reported at 722 F. 2d 1157. The opinion of the district court
(Pet. App. 3la-37a) is unreported.

JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeal was entered on
September 14, 1983. The petition for a writ of certiorari was
filed as of December 2, 1983. The jurisdiction of this Court
is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATUTES INVOLVED
28 U.S.C. 1346(b), originally enacted as part of the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, and portions of Section 505 of the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1365, are set forth at Pet. App.
31a-32a, 34a-37a.

(1)

STATEMENT

1. Petitioner instituted this action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in
October 1980. He sought damages against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b) and
28 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 2671 et seq., for alleged violations of
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 1251 et seq., by
the United States Air Force at Langley Air Force Base in
Virginia. Petitioner buys polluted clams and transplants
them from polluted waters to the Back River in Virginia
where the clams are cleansed and resold. Langley Air Force
Base, which fronts on the Back River, operates a sewage
collection system and pumping facility through which sew-
age and wastes are pumped into sewage lines owned and
operated by the Hampton Roads Sanitation District, alsoa
defendant in the district court. Pet. App. 3la-32a, 40a-4la.

2. On June 22, 1979, the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) issued a notice of violation and
order for compliance to Langley Air Force Base. EPA
found that in recent years because of increased pressure
during heavy rains, Langley had been unable to pump all of
its sewage into the Sanitation District's system, resulting in
sewage overflow in violation of the Clean Water Act.'
EPA's order directed Langley to identify the causes of past
releases of untreated sewage and to plan preventive actions.
It also required Langley to submit to EPA and the Virginia
State Water Control Board a schedule for expeditious
compliance with Virginia's sewage regulations. Langley
notified EPA of the actions it was taking to alleviate the

'We are lodging with the Court a separate addendum of documents
that were filed in Davis v. United States, No. 79-1 13-NN (E.D. Va), the
companion case to the instant action. The EPA orders, as well as
a oe Se ee ee eee

aaa 4.

al

3

problem. However, Langley noted that it was having diffi-
culty pumping sewage into the Sanitation District's force
main because of high pressures in the main that caused
overloading and resulted in untreated discharges. Langley
also asserted that other point-source discharges from
Hampton contributed to sewage discharges into the Back
River.

Prior to the commencement of the present action, peti-
tioner had filed another suit in the Eastern District of
Virginia (No. 79-113-NN) against the Air Force and the
EPA, invoking the “citizen suit” provision in Section 505 of
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1365. Thereafter, the
Commonwealth of Virginia intervened as a plaintiff in No.
79-113-NN, naming Langley, the Sanitation District, and
the Cities of Hampton and Newport News as defendants
and alleging violations of the Clean Water Act. The Com-
monwealth agreed to dismiss its suit after an adequate
program commenced for elimination of infiltration and
inflow.

On December 2, 1980, the EPA issued an extension order
to Langley. It found that Langley had made a substantial
and good faith effort to comply with the June 22, 1979 order
and the requirements of the Clean Water Act. Beause of the
corrective actions taken by Langley, Hampton and other
users of the Sanitation District's system, the agency found
that no overflow had occurred since December 1979. EPA
therefore extended the time for Langley to achieve complete
compliance. As a result of these actions by EPA, on Janu-
ary 27, 1981, petitioner entered into a consent decree with
EPA and the Air Force to dismiss No. 79-113-NN. If this
consent decree, petitioner expressly concurred that the
actions of the EPA were “adequate and reasonable based on
current circumstances.” The consent decree further stated
that it should not be construed to be an admission of

4

liability by any agency of the United States. Consequently,
the district court entered an order dismissing No. 79-
113-NN.

3. While No. 79-113-NN was still pending petitioner filed
the present complaint against the United States and the City
of Hampton (Pet. App. 2a-13a). With respect to the United
States, the new complaint alleged the same violations of the
Clean Water Act by Langley—the discharge of untreated
sewage into the Back River—that were asserted in No.
79-113-NN. These violations of the Act, the complaint
alleged, caused the closing of Back River by the Common-
wealth of Virginia and therefore of petitioner's shellfish
business (Pet. App. 4a-6a, paras. 7,9, 11). Asa result of this
alleged breach by the United States of its supposed duty not
to injure petitioner by a “wrongful discharge of sewage into
a navigable river in violation of the [Clean Water Act]
(Pet. App. 6a, paragraph 11), petitioner claimed $321,852
as damages against the United States pursuant to the Tort
Claims Act as compensation for his loss of business (Pet.

App. 2a-3a, Ila, para. 22).’

The United States moved to dismiss the complaint. The
district court granted the motion, relying on only one of the
several grounds urged by the government—that the com-
plaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted (Pet. App. 32a). The district court held that

2Petitioner Mfers to the Clean Water Act as the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act. Both designations may properly be used to
describe the Act. See Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 2,
91 Stat. 1566.

‘Petitioner had previously submitted an administrative claim for
damages as required by the Tort Claims Act. The Air Force denied the
tort claim on May 6, 1980 (Pet. App. 7a-8a), on the ground that there
was no negligence in the discharge of untreated sewage.

‘Thus, petitioner is incorrect when he asserts (Pet. 9-10) that the court
dismissed the case because it lacked “tort jurisdiction.”

5

petitioner’s action for damages under the Tort Claims Act,
based upon a violation of the Clean Water Act, was barred
by Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Association (Sea Clammers), 453 U.S. 1 (1981),
and City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). The
district court noted that Sea Clammers and Milwaukee held
that the citizen suit provision of Section 505(a) of the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1365(a), is the exclusive remedy for
private citizens for violations of that Act, and preempts
private claims under federal common law or statute (Pet.
App. 33a-36a). Since all claims against the United States
were dismissed, eliminating the federal causes of action, the
court also dismissed without prejudice petitioner's pendent
claim against the City of Hampton (id. at 36a-37a).

4. The court of appeals affirmed (Pet. App. 38a-44a). It
agreed with the district court that petitioner was, in the
guise of a federal tort claim, seeking a private remedy for
violation of the Clean Water Act, a course barred by Sea
Clammers. Since petitioner’s complaint based the right of
recovery solely on Clean Water Act violations, and con-
tained no allegations of negligence or wrongful conduct
other than Clean Water Act violations, the court of appeals
held that the district court correctly dismissed the action for
failure to state a claim (Pet. App. 43a-44a).

DISCUSSION
The decision of the court of appeals is correct and does
not conflict with any decision of this Court or any other
court of appeals. Accordingly, further review is not
warranted.

1. Petitioner seeks to have this Court decide an issue that
was not raised by his complaint and was not decided by the
lower courts. Petitioner concedes (Pet. 9-12), as he did
below, that this Court's decision in Sea Clammers bars any
private cause of action to remedy violations of the Clean

6

Water Act other than actions properly brought under the
citizen suit provision of Section 505(a) of that Act, 33
U.S.C. 1365(a). Petitioner argues, however, that Sea
Clammers did not eliminate “separate, independent and
long standing remedies for damage caused by the tortious
misconduct of the government” under the Tort Claims Act
(Pet. 12-13), and asserts that his claim was not based on
violations of the Clean Water Act, but on negligent pollu-
tion of the Back River (id. at 12-14). This is incorrect.

Petitioner’s complaint did not allege any negligent action
cognizable under the Virginia common law of tort. His
federal tort claim was based solely on “the wrongful dis-
charge of sewage into a navigable river in violation of the
[Clean Water Act] (Pet. App. 6a (emphasis added)). This
was the allegation that the district court (Pet. App. 32a) and
court of appeals (id. at 40a, 44a) addressed.‘

2. As a result of his change in tactics petitioner appar-
ently does not challenge the holdings made below that this
Court’s decisions in Sea Clammers and Milwaukee stand as
a bar to his action based on violations of the Clean Water
Act. The concession is compelled. “The establishment [in
the Clean Water Act] of such a self-consciously comprehen-
sive program” for the regulation of water pollution was
intended by Congress to preempt any private right of action
under federal common law to remedy any matter addressed

‘It is doubtful that petitioner could have asserted a negligent tort
against the government. The government denied petitioner's adminis-
trative claim for damages because it found that whatever pollution may
have occurred was not due to the negligent operation by Langley of its
sewage pumping facilities. A federal tort claim must be based ona claim
of negligent conduct by government employees, as opposed to other,
non-negligent, torts such as the creation of a nuisance. See 28 U.S.C.
1346(b), 2674; Flanagan v. Gregory and Poole, Inc., 136 W. Va. 554,
562, 67 S.E. 2d 865, 871 (1951) (defining nuisance as the violation of an
absolute duty, which may occur when the best of care is taken).

.

by the Act. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 319,
320. Sea Clammers, like the instant case, was a suit for
damages to remedy violations of the Clean Water Act. This
Court held (453 U.S. at 14) that recovery of damages for
violations of the Act was not permitted:

In view of the elaborate enforcement provisions it can-
not be assumed that Congress intended to authorize by
implication additional judicial remedies for private
citizens suing under [the Clean Water Act].

The Court there a!so considered, sua sponte, an alternative
statutory basis for the recovery of damages for violations of
the Act—42 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1983, which authorizes rec-
overy of damages against state officials for civil rights viola-
tions. The Court found that recovery of damages was
barred for violations of the Clean Water Act under 42
U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1983 or any other statute. 453 U.S. at
20-21.’ Thus, it is beyond dispute that petitioner may not
pursue an action under the Tort Claims Act seeking com-
pensation for the government's alleged violation of the
Clean Water Act.®

*See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. | (1980).

Petitioner correctly notes (Pet. 14) that Tort Claims Act recovery for
Clean Water Act violations was not addressed in Sea Clammers because
the federal tort claim was dismissed in the court of appeals as not timely.
National Sea Clammers Association v. City of New York, 616 F.2d
1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1980). However, given this Court's broad language
in both Milwaukee and Sea Clammers regarding the preemptive nature
of the Clean Water Act in matters involving the enforcement of its
provisions, we cannot suppose a Tort Claims Act suit to remedy viola-
tions of the Clean Water Act would be treated differently from a civil
rights suit under 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1983.

*Petitioner contends (Pet. 18) that the same issue is raised in other
actions pending in the district courts and that, therefore, his petiti
should be granted. Plaintiffs in Kelley v. United States, No. 79-10199
(E.D. Mich.) did raise a claim similar to petitioner's, but it was resolved
by aconsent decree. In Dickerson, Inc. v. American Electric Corp., No.
82-244-Civ-J-B (M.D. Fila.), plaintiffs claimed damages against the

This result is not altered by the savings clause in Section
505(e) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1365(e), referred to
by petitioner (Pet. 15-17), which states:

Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which
any person (or class of persons) may have under any
statute or common law to seek enforcement of any
effluent standard or limitation or seek any other relief
(including relief against the Administrator or a State

Agency).

Petitioner's contention conflicts with this Court’s decisions
in Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 328-329 and Sea Clammers, 453
U.S. at 20-21 n.31. Actions preserved by Section 505 are for
enforcement of other “anti-pollution standards arising
under other statutes or state common law,” but not other
remedies for the enforcement of the Clean Water Act. Sea
Clammers, 453 U.S. at 20 n. 31.9

private defendants for violating the Clean Water Act. But the claim
against the United States was a federal tort claim for damages based on
the government's alleged negligence. Therefore, Dickerson does not
involve precisely the same issue presented here.

*Hough v. Marsh, $57 F. Supp. 74 (D. Mass. 1982), cited by peti-
tioner (Pet. 13), does not present a square conflict with the lower court
rulings here. There, plaintiffs sought review under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701-706, of a decision by the Corps of
Engineers to issue a permit, pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1344, to a party seeking to deposit landfill ina
wetland. The court correctly held the action under the APA should not
be dismissed because of the preemptive effect of the Clean Water Act's
citizen suit provision. It found that Section 505 had no application to
review of agency action under Section 404. And it noted that, while
Section $0S(a(2) (33 U.S.C. 1365(a)(2)) does permit actions to compel
performance cf nondiscretionary agency duties, issuance of a Section
404 permit wes a discretionary function, properly reviewable under the
APA. 557 F. Supp. at 78. The court also stated that the Clean Water
Act's citizen suit provision did no’ preempt an APA action because,
under Sea Clammers, the savings clause preserved actions under other

9
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

Rex E, LEE
Solicitor General

F. HENRY HABICHT, II
Assistant Attorney General

Dirk D. SNEL
JANET L. STECKEL
Attorneys

MARCH 1984

laws, such as the APA. 557 F. Supp. at 78-79. As we demonstrate above,
this portion of its ruling was incorrect. However, that error is of little
consequence here since the court's alternative ground for decision was
correct.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1176%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
