# Appendix — McDonald v. United Air Lines, Inc. > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1117%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appendix - **Published:** January 1, 1984 - **Citation:** 466 U.S. 944 ## Text 88-1780 "FILED JAN 18 1984 ALEXANDER L. SIEVAS, IN THE CLERK Supreme Court of the United States OCTOBER TERM, 1983 LIANE BuIx MCDONALD, on her own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Petitioner, v. UNITED AIR LINES, INC. and ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS and JOYCE BARR, Respondents. APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT ISAAC N. GRONER Counsel of Record WALTER H. FLEISCHER JAMES A. BENSFIELD COLE AND GRONER, P.C. 1780 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 881-8888 THOMAS R. MEITES LYNN SARA FRACKMAN MICHAEL M. MULDER MEITEs & FRACKMAN 185 South LaSalle Street Chicago, Illinois 60608 Counsel for Petitioner WILson - Eras Printing Co., Inc. - 789-0096 - WasHineTon, D.C. 20001 o> ~ TABLE OF CONTENTS OPINION, Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (September 21, 1983) MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (January 12, 1982) ORDER, District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (July 14, 1982) JUDGMENT, Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, affirming Judgment of the District Court (Septem- ber 21, 1983) ORDER, Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, denying Petition for Rehearing (October 20, 1988) Page la 40a 94a 99a 102a la APPENDIX IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT Nos. 82-2647, 82-2660, 82-2661 CAROLE ANDERSON ROMASANTA, et al., and LIANE Burx MCDONALD, on her own behalf and and behalf of all others, Plaintiffs-A ppellants- Cross-A ppellees, v. UNITED AIR LINES, INC., a corporation, : Defendant-A ppellee- Cross-A ppellant, ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, Intervenor-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois No. 70 C 1157—James B. Moran, Judge ARGUED MAY 9, 1983—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 21, 1983 Before PELL and CUDAHY, Circuit Judges, and GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge.“ * Floyd R. Gibson, Senior Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. PELL, Circuit Judge. These interlocutory appeals concern the district court’s determinations, following a hearing, as to the seniority relief to which former flight attendants of United Air Lines, Inc. (United), who left United because of that airline’s no-marriage“ rule, are entitled upon reinstate- ment with the airline. The principal issue raised on appeal is whether the district court properly applied the rule in Franks v. Bow- man Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976), in granting seniority for competitive purposes equal only to the number of days the claimants had previously been employed as flight attendants by United. On cross-appeal, United challenges the grant of seniority retroactive to date of original hire for purposes of compensation and other non-competitive benefits. Con- solidated with this appeal and cross-appeal is the class’ appeal from the district court’s denial of injunctive relief upon United’s recall in October, 1982, of 175 furloughed flight attendants. I. BACKGROUND A. Prior Proceedings Prior to November, 1968, United prohibited the con- tinued employment as a flight attendant of any female employee who married. United also employed a small number of male flight attendants who were permitted to retain their positions after marriage. On November 7, 1968, United and the flight attendants’ union agreed to revoke this no-marriage rule. Reinstatement was offered to those flight attendants terminated because of the rule only if they had filed a grievance with the union or a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com- mission (EEOC). On November 27, 1968, Mary Burke Sprogis brought suit in the Northern District of Illinois alleging that the 8 8a no-marriage rule was violative of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (Title VII). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Sprogis. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 308 F.Supp. 959 (N.D III. 1970). That result was affirmed by a majority of this court in June, 1971. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971). During pendency of the Sprogis appeal, Carole Ander- son Romasanta filed a class action in the Northern Dis- trict of Illinois on behalf of herself and other. United flight attendants terminated because of the no-marriage rule. The district court ruled that the Romasanta case should not proceed as a class action but by individual in- tervention of those discharged flight attendants who had either filed a union grievance or an EEOC complaint. A settlement was reached by the parties providing for re- instatement and backpay awards to the plaintiffs and a final order was entered by the district court approving the settlement. One of the discharged flight attendants who had been excluded from the Romasanta case because of the adverse class ruling, Liane Buix McDonald (McDonald), sought to intervene to challenge the class determination. The dis- trict court denied intervention and an appeal was taken to this court. A majority of this court reversed, remand- ing the case with instructions to permit McDonald to intervene, to treat the case as a class action, and to fashion relief for the class. Romasanta v. United Air Lines, Inc., 587 F.2d 915, 920 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'd sub nom. United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 482 U.S. 385, 97 S.Ct. 2464, 53 L.Ed.2d 423 (1977). On remand, the district court limited the class to per- sons actually discharged by United. Those who had resigned because of the rule were excluded. This court again reversed, holding that resigners were entitled to be class members and noting that the class might include all persons who left United because of the rule within the 4a period from ninety days before the filing of EEOC charges to the date on which the no-marriage rule was abolished. McDonald v. United Air Lines, Inc., 587 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934, 99 S.Ct. 2869, 61 L.Ed.2d 303 (1979). On remand, the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA), the union representing incumbent flight attend- ants at United, was permitted to intervene. After notice was given, approximately 1,750 potential class members were identified. Before the commencement of individual hearings to determine actual class membership, United and the AFA successfully urged that the district court hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether rein- statement with retroactive seniority to the date of original hire would result in an “unusual adverse impact” on incumbent flight attendants, see, Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 776, 779 n.41, 96 S.Ct. at 1270, 1271 n.41 (1976). In the course of the ensuing hearing, the class plaintiffs clarified that they sought re- instatement only as openings among the ranks of flight attendants occurred (openings proposal) rather than im- mediate reinstatement of the entire class. In a memorandum and order issued January 8, 1982, the district judge found the openings proposal, as condi- tioned by the class, to be unworkable. He also found that “unusual adverse impact” would surely result if the class members were reinstated immediately with full retro- active seniority for competitive purposes. The relief granted credited the class members with seniority based on the number of days they had actually worked at United as flight attendants for those benefits requiring competi- tion among flight attendants. The district judge granted the claimants seniority from date of original hire for those benefits representing a cost to the airline but not impacting directly on incumbent flight attendants. The class immediately filed a motion to reconsider, urging that they at least be accorded “relative seniority” for competi- 5a tive purposes (relative seniority proposal). Under this proposal, a class member whose seniority for competitive purposes placed her at the ninetieth percentile when she left United would be inserted into the current seniority list at that same percentile. This motion was denied with- out opinion. On July 12, 1982, the district judge issued an order implementing his earlier memorandum and order. He certified for immediate appeal the question whether less than full retroactive senicrity could be granted class members for competitive purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b). The class’ appeal on that issue, No. 82-2660, and United’s cross-appeal pertaining to the award of full retroactive seniority for purposes of compensation and other company benefits, No. 82-2661, followed. In August, 1982, United indicated that it would recall 175 flight attendants from furlough on October 1. The plaintiff class sought to enjoin this recall, believing that it prejudiced the seniority rights awarded claimants pur- suant to the order of July 12, 1982. The district court denied the requested stay, refused to require the recall of claimants rather than furloughees, and declined to rule on the claimant class’ alternative request that they be per- mitted to accrue seniority during the period of the recall. The plaintiffs’ appeal from this ruling, No. 82-2647, has been consolidated with Nos. 82-2660 and 82-2661 for purposes of argument and decision. B. Factual Background Relevant to Reinstatement Issues 1. Competitive and Company Seniority. Seniority is extremely relevant to the flight attendant position. The term “seniority” is used in several different contexts. The first, company seniority, determines a flight attendant’s number of vacation days and number of passes to which he or she is entitled, as well as other similar benefits provided by the airline. Company senior- ity reflects the employee’s total service with the airline. Because all of the matters determined by company senior- 6a ity represent a cost to the airline, but are not otherwise limited in their availability, the amount of company sen- iority awarded the class members is extremely important to United but has little direct impact on incumbent flight attendants. Classification seniority, on the other hand, reflects the amount of time an employee has worked as a flight at- tendant. Classification seniority is utilized in an absolute sense to determine the flight attendant’s salary. Like company seniority, the classification seniority awarded class members for purposes of salary calculation is of primary concern to United and of minimal concern to incumbent flight attendants. Classification seniority also is utilized in a relative sense and is pertinent to those aspects of the flight attendant job that require United to distinguish among the flight attendants. For instance, the airline maintains eleven separate “domiciles” to which flight attendants are as- signed. Some, like Seattle and Miami, are considered far more attractive by flight attendants than others, such as Chicago. Because flight attendants bid for domiciles based on their classification seniority, the flight attendant with the greatest classification seniority relative to other flight attendants, has the best chance of being stationed where she chooses. The impact of relative classification senior- ity, therefore, is directly felt by other flight attendants. Because of this effect, we will hereafter in this opinion refer to such seniority as “competitive seniority.” ' Besides determining the attendant’s domicile, competi- tive seniority is utilized in furloughing, or laying off, flight attendants if such action is required, with the least senior employee being the one most vulnerable to fur- lough. Within each domicile, competitive seniority deter- mines whether the flight attendant is a “lineholder,” who 1“Competitive seniority” is therefore synonymous to “relative classification seniority.” 7a flies a predetermined fixed monthly schedule, or one who must serve on “reserve,” in which case the flight attend- ant’s lines of flying are determined by the airline, at its option, and according to its needs. Competitive seniority also determines whether the individual will work only during weekdays or also during the weekend and whether he or she will work a flight that offers premium pay. Finally, and of extreme importance to the flight attend- ants, whether one is subject to involuntary transfer to a different domicile is determined by competitive seniority within the domicile from which the flight attendants are to be transferred. Although much of the evidence presented in the trial below on reinstatement issues will be developed later in this opinion, it is important to note that assignment of a domicile is considered extremely important by flight at- tendants. The evidence indicated, for instance, that some flight attendants would be more willing to fly “reserve” at a more desirable domicile than to be a lineholder at a less desirable domicile. Accordingly, the possibility of involun- tary transfers is regarded with great concern. Such a transfer presents the flight attendant with a choice of relocating or “commuting” from one’s home to one’s domicile. The cost of commuting—both in terms of time and money—are significant. Similarly, the costs of re- location can be exceedingly high in personal terms, par- ticularly if the flight attendant has been assigned to one domicile for a lengthy period of time and/or has a spouse and children with work and community ties in that locale. Not surprisingly, the other part of the flight attendant experience affected by competitive seniority that is of overriding concern to flight attendants is the possibility of furloughs. A furloughed flight attendant does not receive regular compensation during the furlough, does not continue to accrue seniority, and all recall rights are extinguished after the lapse of five years. 8a 2. Economic Factors. Particularly relevant to disposition of this case are eco- nomic factors affecting United in the past several years. In the years 1979, 1980, and 1981, United experienced operating losses, after taking into account the tax ad- vantages of these losses, of $99,583,000, $15,043,000, and $104,368,000, respectively. Undoubtedly reflecting this economic picture, United has not hired a single flight at- tendant since 1979 and has furloughed 1,530 employees during that period. Although 547 of these employees were furloughed because of cutbacks necessitated by the air traffic controllers’ strike in 1981, and one would therefore assume their lay-off to be temporary, the AFA brief submitted in this case indicates that there are currently 1,255 furloughed flight attendants. The district court also found that reinstatement of 1,480 claimants? would create an immediate non-recur- ring cost to United in excess of $10,000,000. The annual recurring cost to the airline of reinstating the claimants would be approximately $21,000,000. 8. Factors Not Yet Determined by the District Court. Although this court has accepted this interlocutory ap- peal on the reinstatement issues, there are several facts not yet determined that are relevant to the seniority issues we address herein. First, the size of the class is not yet certain. Subsequent to oral argument in this case, hear- ings before special masters have commenced. The purpose 2 As discussed in Section II, infra, the district judge determined that the figure 1,400 represented a reasonable estimate of class members likely to seek reinstatement by United. Accordingly, he utilized that figure throughout his memorandum opinion. The only exception is in the findings regarding costs to United resulting from reinstatement of the class. Only United presented evidence on that point and, in so doing, United assumed that 1,480, rather than 1,400, class members would seek reinstatement. The district judge similarly utilized the 1,480 figure for purposes of this one issue and, in footnote, explained his reasons for doing so. 9a of these hearings is to determine whether a claimant left United because of the no-marriage rule or for other rea- sons. Only upon completion of these hearings will there be certainty as to the size of the class. Whether all class members, once they are determined, will actually seek reinstatement is similarly unknown.“ Second, the district court held hearings in November and December, 1982, relating to the issues of back pay and front pay for class members in this action. Front pay is the amount that United would be required to pay class members whole they await actual reinstatement by the airline. Although the district judge did not consider the impact of front pay in his order, that potential cost is relevant to this appeal. Because of the financial im- pact it would have on United, the airline has indicated that it both could, consistent with the collective bargain- ing agreement, and would furlough incumbent flight at- tendants in order to permit a more rapid reinstatement of claimants. II. ISSUES RAISED BY INTERVENOR BARR The initial issue we must consider is whether the dis- trict court’s use of the number 1,400 as an estimate of class members likely to seek reinstatement misrepresents the size of the class and prejudices the results of analyz- ing the impact on incumbents of the proposed seniority remedies. Joyce Barr, a member of the class represented by McDonald, urges that a substantially smaller number should be utilized and that the class should be subdivided between those former flight attendants who want to re- turn to work and those who primarily seek a financial remedy. Barr’s argument is that the number 1,400 is unrealistic because many of the persons who responded to the class In portions of this opinion, the term “class members” is used in speaking of all those persons who potentially will be found entitled to relief and who will seek reinstatement. 10a notice will be unable to prove that they left United because of the no-marriage rule and, of those who survive that threshold determination, many will not want to return to a position they left fifteen or more years ago. Barr asserts that McDonald is using this inflated number in order to force financial concessions from the airline. The result is that those class members who actively want to return to United are being sacrificed to a litigation strategy that favors those seeking financial benefits, rather than work, from this suit. Contrary to Barr’s contentions, the 1,400 figure is not simply McDonald’s estimate. It is the number upon which the AFA, United, and McDonald agreed at pretrial con- ferences in September, 1980, and February, 1981, because all the parties recognized that some figure had to be used for purposes of resolving the reinstatement issues in this case. By the time the hearing below was held, all three parties were urging different numbers, of which Mc- Donald’s 1,069, was the lowest. The district court utilized the figure 1,400 after care- fully analyzing the methodology used by McDonald in arriving at the 1,069 figure. The district judge’s conclu- sion was that any one mistaken assumption in McDonald’s calculations would raise the figure by three to five hun- dred class members and therefore the 1,400 figure was more realistic. The real difficulty here, as recognized by the judge be- low, is that the relevant assumptions are untestable. Only after the conclusion of the class membership hearings now in progress, and scheduled over the next two to three years, will it be clear who is in the class. Even that fig- ure may not reflect the number of claimants who finally seek reinstatement. That variable is virtually impossible to assess at this time, especially because the attractiveness of reinstatement may depend, in the view of some claim- ants, on the resolution of this appeal. lla In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 376, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1875, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977), the Court observed that until “both the number of identifiable victims and the consequent extent of necessary relief have been determined, it is not possible to evaluate the abstract claims concerning the equitable balance that should be struck between the statutory rights of victims and the contractual rights of nonvictim em- ployees.” This passage suggests that the reinstatement issues now before this court would be better addressed by the district court only after the number of persons at least entitled to reinstatement is determined. Delaying resolution of the seniority questions to that time would be the only practical way of responding to intervenor Barr’s concerns. The district court decided to proceed, however, and this court has accepted the resulting interlocutory ap- peal, because a case that has already been unresolved too long threatens to extend indefinitely if resolution of the seniority questions are delayed until completion of the class eligibility hearings. Because the district court found it imperative to proceed before the precise num- ber of class members was determined, we can demand no more than that the estimate of class members reflect the varying positions of the parties and that the basis for choosing the figure 1,400 be demonstrated in the record. Both conditions are satisfied here. Not only do we find the number 1,400 a reasonable estimate of persons who will seek reinstatement, but, like the district court, we are persuaded that McDonald is not undermining the interests of some members of the class. She has presented alternative proposals regarding seniority relief, briefed each at length, and actively sought full, retroactive seniority for class members. We find no error in the district court’s refusal to subdivide the class. Not only is subclassing unnecessary in view of McDonald’s vigorous representation, but it would be im- 12a possible to determine at this point which potential class members “really” want to return to their positions at United and which “really” seek only a financial remedy. In light of our decision that the district court did not err in utilizing the figure 1,400 and in refusing to sub- divide the claimant class, we hereby deny the various mo- tions pending before this court that pertain to materials bearing on a reevaluation of the number of claimants likely to seek reinstatement.‘ III. COMPETITIVE SENIORITY The primary issue raised by the plaintiffs on this appeal is whether the district judge abused his discre- tion, particularly in view of Franks v. Bowman Trans- portation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (Franks), in declining to grant the class members full, retroactive competitive seniority upon their being rehired by United. The class members are entitled, under the court’s ruling, to only the competitive seniority they had actually accrued at the time they left United because of the no-marriage rule. A. Franks and Its Progeny In Franks, the Supreme Court, reversing the Fifth Circuit, held that nonemployees who had applied for and been refused employment as over-the-road truck drivers by Bowman Transportation Co. (Bowman) solely because of their race were entitled, pursuant to Title VII, to sen- iority status retroactive to the dates of their employment * The following motions are accordingly denied: (1) Intervenor Barr’s motion to supplement record on appeal (filed 5/18/88); (2) AFA’s motion for leave to comment on intervenor Barr’s Circuit Rule 11 submissions (filed 5/18/83) ; (3) class’ motion for leave to file response to post-argument submissions (filed 4/20/88); (4) response of intervenor Barr to AFA’s motion for leave to file com- ment (filed 5/20/88); and (5) responses of AFA to class’ motion to file response to post-argument submissions (filed 5/27/88). 13a applications. The Supreme Court reasoned that one of the central purposes of Title VII is “ to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful em- ployment discrimination.“ 424 U.S. at 763, 96 S.Ct. at 1263 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2372, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975) ), and that ordinarily a grant of seniority reflect- ing the discrimination victim’s date of application is nec- essary to achieve that “make-whole” purpose, 424 U.S. at 766-67, 96 S.Ct. at 1265. One of the arguments advanced by Bowman in support of the lower courts’ refusal to grant the seniority relief was that the district court had correctly exercised its discretion in denying retroactive seniority because of the competing interests of incumbent employees. The Su- preme Court rejected this argument for two reasons: first, because the district court had not mentioned these considerations in denying the relief,“ and, second, because if relief under Title VII can be denied merely be- cause the majority group of employees, who have not suffered discrimination, will be unhappy about it, there will be little hope of correcting the wrongs to which the Act is directed.’” Id. at 775, 96 S.Ct. at 1269 (quoting United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 663 (2nd Cir. 1971)). Although the Court recognized that the burden of granting competitive seniority falls primarily on innocent incumbent employees, see 424 U.S. at 773 n. 33, 776-78, 96 S.Ct. at 1268 n. 33, 1270-71, it held that a “sharing of the burden of past discrimina- tion” is “presumptively necessary,” id. at 777, 96 S.Ct. at 1270. The Court recognized, however, that an award of full, retroactive seniority may not be appropriate in every case. In footnote, the Court clarified that it did not 5 There is no indication in the Franks opinion that the question of impect on incumbents had even been presented to the district court. 14a intend to abrogate the equity powers of the distriet courts: Rather our holding is that in exercising their eq- uitable powers, district courts should take as their starting point the presumption in favor of rightful- place seniority relief, and proceed with further legal analysis from that point; and that such relief may not he denied on the abstract basis of adverse impact upon interests of other employees but rather only on the basis of unusual adverse impact arising from facts and circumstances that would not be generally found in Title VII cases. Id, at 779 n. 41, 96 S.Ct. at 1271 n. 41. The appellants interpret Franks as holding that a di- minution of incumbents’ job expectations can never con- stitute unusual adverse impact. Although they are less explicit as to what would, in their view, constitute the degree of impact envisioned by the Franks Court as suf- ficient to preclude the granting of full, retroactive sen- iority, two possibilities are suggested. First, circum- stances unrelated to the impact on incumbents might sup- port a finding of unusual adverse impact. Second, im- plementing a seniority remedy so as to cause the dis- charge of incumbent employees might result in “unusual adverse impact.” We find little support in Franks, the appellate decisions of this and other courts that have applied Franks, or the Supreme Court disposition in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) (Teamsters), for such a limited interpretation of the “unusual adverse impact” standard. Because the Franks Court was well aware that the burden of granting retroactive seniority to discrimi- nation victims falls primarily on innocent incumbents, see 424 U.S. at 773 n. 33, 776-78, 96 S.Ct. at 1268 n. 33, 1270-71, there is no basis in either law or logic for concluding that “unusual adverse impact” must reflect 15a factors unrelated to the impact of the remedy upon in- —— employees. Similarly, the Franks opinion no- where states that only the resulting discharge of in- cumbents will constitute unusual adverse impact. What Franks does clarify is that full retroactive seniority should not be routinely denied discrimination victims merely because such relief will have some impact, as it always will, on incumbents. Because neither the district nor appellate courts in Franks had relied on the compet- ing rights of incumbents as a ground for denying sen- iority relief, the impact in that case was indeed “ab- stract,” id. at 779 n. 41, 96 S.Ct. at 1271 n. 41, and was not demonstrated by “facts and circumstances that would not generally be found in Title VII cases,” id. Our conclusion that Franks did not limit the “unusual adverse impact” inquiry to the extent urged by the class is supported by the Supreme Court disposition in Team- sters. Again emphasizing that it is within the equitable discretion of the district court, in the first instance, to fashion a seniority remedy, the Court referred to the “equitable balance that should be struck between the statutory rights of victims and the contractual rights of nonvictim employees,” 431 U.S. at 376, 97 S.Ct. at 1875, and suggested in footnote that the number of victims, the number of non-victim employees affected, the alternatives available to incumbents, and the economic circumstances of the industry would be relevant to the district court’s exercise of discretion, id. at 376 n. 62, 97 S.Ct. at 1875, n. 62. Focusing on the timing of the equitable remedy, the Court observed that: Especially when immediate implementation of an equitable remedy threatens to impinge upon the ex- pectations of innocent parties, the courts must “look to the practical realities and necessities inescapably involved in reconciling competing interests,” in order 16a to determine the “special blend of what is neces- sary, what is fair, and what is workable.“ Id. at 375, 97 S. Ct. at 1874 (citation omitted). The courts of appeals similarly have not read Franks as mandating so limited an inquiry as that urged by the class. For instance, in Moore v. City of San Jose, 615 F.2d 1265, 1272 (9th Cir. 1980), the Ninth Circuit noted the district court’s findings that, not only would no in- cumbent lose his job, but that the seniority relief granted the twelve class members would have minimal“ impact on the incumbent workforce of 590 people. In Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Association, Local 550 v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 680 F.2d 1164, 1169 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982), this court relied in part on the likelihood that the claimants, who constituted three percent of the incum- bent workforce, could be reinstated in less than one-half year through normal attrition. In Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Association, Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc., 573 F.2d 960 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876, 99 S.Ct. 214, 58 L.Ed.2d 190, this court relied in part on the representation made to the district court that the class members, who again constituted approxi- mately three percent of the incumbent workforce, would return only to domiciles where openings occurred. Id. This court also noted that the district court had made “an admirable effort to sort out the likely impact of and the ‘balance of equities’ surrounding the provision of ret- roactive occupational seniority,” id. at 965, and had as- sured itself that no present employees would lose their jobs and “also that the number of returning employees was not so large as to create undue pr tems,“ id. Fi- nally, in Association Against Discrimination in T r (2nd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988, 102 8. Ct. 1611, 71 L.Ed.2d 847 (1982), the Second Cireuit, in affirming the 17a district court’s order of a freeze on incumbent promo- tions in order to equalize promotional seniority among current employees and victims of discrimination, noted that it was possible the City could act to minimize the burden on incumbents. /d. at 287. The appellate cases discussed above compel the conclu- sion that courts have considered numerous factors, not just whether current employees would lose their jobs, in granting or reviewing a grant of seniority relief.“ We therefore reject the appellants’ argument that the court below abused its discretion in considering the many differ- ent kinds of impact a grant of full, retroactive seniority would have on those persons currently employed by United as flight attendants. The only court of appeals case that arguably could be construed to hold that it is an abuse of discretion, under Franks, not to grant full, retroactive competitive seniority is Association Against Dis- crimination in Employment, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256 (2nd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988, 102 S.Ct. 1611, 71 L.Ed.2d 847 (1982). In a portion of that opinion not discussed supra, the Second Circuit held that the district court had erred in granting less than all the benefits of seniority to discrimination victims. The court noted that the plaintiffs had not specified what benefits they had been denied, id. at 288, but suggested that the plaintiffs should be provided with vacation and sickpay appropriate to their “rightful place” in the seniority system and should have the benefits of seniority for purposes of avoiding lay-off if the City maintained a last-hired-first-fired seniority system. Initially, we note that benefits such as vacation days and sick 18a B. Application of Franks and Teamsters to this Case Franks mandates that a finding of “unusual adverse impact” be based on factors not generally found in a Title VII case. 424 U.S. at 779 n.41, 96 S.Ct. at 1271 n.41. Teamsters suggests that the relevant considerations would include the number of victims, the number of non- victim employees affected, the alternatives available to incumbents, and the economic circumstances of the in- dustry. 431 U.S. at 376 n. 62, 97 S.Ct. at 1875 n. 62. Relying on the first two factors enunciated in Team- ters, the appellants argue that the ratio of class members to incumbents in this case, sixteen percent, is less than that in Franks, Teamsters and Association Against Dis- crimination in Employment, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256 (2nd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988, 102 S.Ct. 1611, 71 L.Ed.2d 847 (1982). Because none of those cases precluded an award of full, retroactive com- petitive seniority, and particularly because the Second Circuit in the Bridgeport case held that the district court had abused its discretion in ordering less than full sen- iority, the appellants claim that the judge below should have ordered the full measure of competitive seniority. The difficulty with the class’ argument is that it focuses on only two of the factors enunciated by the Teamsters Court. The current economic conditions affecting the air- line industry are extremely relevant to the present case and, under Teamsters, were properly considered by the district court. By contrast, economic considerations have not been deemed pertinent to other courts of appeals de- cisions regarding competitive seniority. We conclude, *The appellants assert that the class members in Bridgeport constituted twenty percent of the incumbent workforce. This repre- ratio of the 102 persons ordered entitled to priority in the district court to the workforce of 512. Because the 19a therefore, that the prior case law has limited relevance to evaluation of the district court’s application of Franks and Teamsters to this case and reject the appellants’ suggestion that an award of retroactive competitive sen- iority is required in this case because of the ratio of class members to incumbents. Having determined that the district court neither ig- nored nor misapplied the controlling principles of law, our task on review is to determine whether evidence in the record supports its conclusions that an award of full, retroactive competitive seniority would result in an “un- usual adverse impact” on incumbents. Before undertak- ing that review, however, we address the appellants’ contention that the district court mischaracterized the relief they sought. During the course of the trial below on reinstatement issues, the class clarified that it sought reinstatement at United only as openings permitted. This proposal was conditioned in several ways, which are developed in detail, infra. In his memorandum opinion, the district judge did consider this openings proposal. He found it unworkable because of the conditions upon which the class insisted. The district court then also considered the impact of Having determined that Franks and Teamsters require the dis- trict court to evaluate carefully the many facets of impact that an award of competitive seniority will have on innocent, incumbent employees, the fact that we herein review the district court’s denial, as a matter of discretion, of full competitive seniority relief further distinguishes this case from previous decisions in which this and other courts of appeals have reviewed a grant of full seniority. See, e. g., Air Lines Stewards and Stewardesses Associa- tion, Local 550 v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 680 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 445 U.S. 385, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 284 (1982); Moore v. City of San Jose, 615 F.2d 1265, 1271-72 (9th Cir. 1980) ; Air Lines Stewards and Stewardesses Association, Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc., 578 F.2d 960 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 876, 99 S.Ct. 214, 68 L.Ed.2d 190. 20a immediate reinstatement of all the class members and concluded that “unusual adverse impact” would result. He similarly considered the impact that would result if the openings proposal were workable and were imple- mented and, as to some of the categories of consequences reviewed, found it to be somewhat less than the impact of immediate reinstatement. We find no error in the district court’s consideration of the impact that would result from immediate reinstate- ment of the class. Such analysis was wholly appropriate in light of the mandate in Franks and Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2872, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975), that the district court should fashion a remedy that would “make [the class] whole” for the injuries suffered as a result of discrimination. Further, the district court did not ignore the openings proposal but, rather, found it both unworkable and the cause of signifi- cant, adverse impact on incumbents if it were workable. We are not persuaded, therefore, that the district court’s “error” lay in its mischaracterization of the relief sought by the class. C. Review of the District Court’s Findings A total of three proposals regarding seniority relief were presented by the class. We first review the findings regarding immediate reinstatement of the class. Second, we review the determinations regarding the openings proposals and, finally, we consider the class’ request for relative seniority. Throughout his opinion, the district judge grouped the consequences. of granting the requested relief as follows: (1) the possibility of furloughs and firings; (2) the po- tential for involuntary transfers; (3) demotions to re- serves; (4) impact on lineholder schedules; (5) the eco- nomic impact on United; and (6) the impact on minority hiring. The findings of “unusual adverse impact” relate primarily to the considerations relevant to groups (1) 21a and (2). In reviewing the lower court's findings, there- fore, we shall address primarily the possibility of fur- loughs and firings and the potential for involuntary transfers. 1. Immediate Reinstatement. The district judge found that if the 1,400 class mem- bers were immediately reinstated by United, all incum- bent attendants hired by United since March 7, 1977, would be furloughed. Those incumbents who were fur- loughed would suffer immediate financial consequences from loss of income. Further, it is possible that many of those furloughed as a result of reinstating the class, as well as those flight attendants already on furlough, would not be recalled before the five-year limit and would there- fore effectively be “fired.” As discussed in Section III (A), supra, the appellants themselves seem to suggest that a discharge of incumbents because of relief granted to discrimination victims might constitute “unusual adverse impact.” The combination of a very large class and an economically depressed airline industry might well result in a significant number of current United flight attendants losing their jobs. We find ample support in the record for this finding and for the district judge’s conclusion that such an impact would be “unusually adverse.” Immediate reinstatement would also result in a large number of involuntary transfers. As indicated supra, United maintains eleven separate domiciles for which flight attendants “bid” based on their seniority. Working from the assumption that returning class members would seek assignment to the domicile nearest their current residence, the district judge found that 147 claimants would choose to go to Seattle, one of the most popular domiciles. If they did, thirty-five percent of the flight attendants currently domiciled in Seattle would be sub- ject to involuntary transfer to another domicile. Those 22a subject to transfer would be all Seattle-based flight at- tendants hired after September 30, 1969. Because the popular Miami domicile is considerably smaller than the Seattle one, the impact there would be even more striking. If the 143 claimants who live nearest the Miami domicile all returned, seventy-six percent of the current Miami domiciliaries would be subject to transfer. This would include all flight attendants cur- rently stationed in Miami who were hired after February 28, 1966. The effect of an involuntary transfer is to force a flight attendant either to disrupt his or her family and com- munity life or to commute to the new domicile. There is evidence in the record of this case that many of these displaced incumbent flight attendants would resign their positions with United rather than suffer the disruption associated with transfer or incur the costs, in both time and money, involved in commuting. Choosing to resign in the face of two equally unsatis- factory alternatives—relocating or commuting—may be marginally preferable to being furloughed for an extended time or effectively discharged upon the expiration of recall rights. The difference, however, is merely a matter of degree. There is ample evidence in the record to support the district judge’s findings regarding the impact of in- voluntary transfers on incumbents and the likelihood that such transfers would result from the immediate reinstate- ment of the class members. We cannot say that the dis- trict judge abused his discretion in characterizing this impact as unusually adverse. Of the other consequences of immediate reinstatement discussed by the district court, the most significant is the impact on minority flight attendants currently employed by United. Pursuant to a consent decree entered in 1976, EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 78 C 973 (N. D. IIl. 1976), aff'd, 560 F. 2d 224 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 23a 434 U.S. 1063, 98 S.Ct. 1237, 55 L.Ed.2d 764 (1978), United has hired an increasing number of flight attend- ants who are members of minority groups in recent years. Accordingly, these persons have relatively low seniority. They would, therefore, be more affected as a group by the immediate reinstatement of the class than the other in- cumbent flight attendants. Evidence in the record sug- gests that immediate rehiring of all class members would decrease the percentage of minority flight attendants from fifteen to ten percent. Further, because of the many furloughs that would result from implementation of this remedy, there would be less or no hiring by United in the next several years and the number of minority members working as United flight attendants would not be in- creased by new hires. The judge below did not find that the consequences to minority flight attendants would, by themselves, consti- tute “unusual adverse impact.” Nonetheless, we believe the district judge correctly considered this impact to be significant. When it is considered along with the possi- bility of furloughs, possible firings, and involuntary trans- fers, the impact on minorities buttresses the district court’s conclusion that “unusual adverse impact” would result if the class members were immediately reinstated. 2. Openings Proposal. The claimants do not suggest that they will wait pas- sively for openings to occur among the rank of flight attendants without regard to how long the delay in re- instatement might be. The class conditioned their open- ings proposal on all claimants being fully reinstated within two and one-half to three years. McDonald indi- cated that if that timetable were not met, she would “undoubtedly . . . petition the court to modify the decree.” Second, all openings were to be filled by class members before any furloughed incumbent flight attendant was recalled to work. Third, class members were to receive : 54 a 24a “front pay” consisting of full pay and benefits until all class members were reinstated.° The proposal also required United to “take appropriate steps to encourage the creation of openings.” Two spe- cific suggestions were made by the class: initiation of an early retirement program and the creation of a continuing “shared work” program. The district court found that it lacked power to impose either the early retirement or shared work program. Ab- sent any allegation that the United-AFA collective bar- gaining agreement violates the Civil Rights Act or wrong- fully perpetuates the effects of past discrimination, the court below lacked the power to rewrite the terms of that agreement to provide for either of the programs sug- gested by plaintiff class. See Myers v. Gilman Paper Corp., 544 F.2d 837, 857 (5th Cir. 1977), amended and modified on other grounds, 556 F.2d 758, cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801, 98 S.Ct. 28, 54 L.Ed.2d 59. Absent affirmative action to encourage openings, the district court found that the openings proposal was un- workable, primarily because of the two and one-half to three year time limit. The feasibility of meeting the time limit turns primarily on two factors: the anticipated at- trition from the ranks of flight attendants and the antici- pated growth in the total number of flight attendants required by United. Experts for both the plaintiffs and United testified as to attrition rates. The plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Carl Hoff- man, predicted an attrition of between 670 and 833 flight attendants by year-end 1983. These figures represent an attrition rate of approximately three and one-half percent. United’s expert, however predicted that the attrition rate would be something under one percent over the next five years, resulting in 367 available places for flight attend- . As indicated in Section I(B) (8), the district court has not yet resolved the issue of front pay. 25a ants. Judge Moran did not credit one expert over an- other. He noted that both were subject to challenge on methodological grounds, and “most importantly, both are subject to certain imponderables beyond the control of the airline or the flight attendants that will greatly affect the rates of attrition.” The failure to resolve definitively how much attrition will occur among United flight attendants is not critical, however, because it is clear that 1,400 class members could not be reinstated within the time frame set by Mc- Donald without some growth in the total number of active flight attendants required by the airline. United had originally projected an annual growth rate of four to five percent. This would have resulted in the recall of 102 furloughees in 1981. Instead, 125 flight at- tendants were furloughed in July, 1981. Another 350 flight attendants were furloughed in September, 1981, and because of the strike by the professional air traffic controllers and the resulting reduction in the number of United flights, another 547 were furloughed in October, 1981. United’s “growth projections” for 1981 were ac- cordingly off by 1,124 individuals. United now projects no growth for the next few years. According to the brief submitted by the AFA, there are still 1,255 United flight attendants on furlough. It is apparent that, absent a dramatic change in the economies affecting the airline industry, it will be impossible for United both to recall those flight attendants currently on furlough and to provide places for the 1,400 class mem- bers within the two and one-half to three year limit set by the class. Even if the class members could all be re- instated within that period, which appears unlikely, the result is that some current furloughees would be effec- tively discharged at the expiration of their recall rights. This is the same effect that the district judge found, when considering immediate reinstatement of the class, to con- stitute “unusual adverse impact.” 26a Even if the openings proposal were “workable,” there- fore it is likely that some furloughees would eventually lose their job with United. This effect would be exacerbated if the district court awards front pay to the class and United creates artificial vacancies by furloughing incum- bent flight attendants. United has indicated that it would take such action in order to avoid paying full salaries to those waiting for reinstatement. Although no award of front pay has yet been made, this possibility is relevant because it suggests that the impact of the openings pro- posal would be virtually indistinguishable from that of immediate reinstatement insofar as furloughs and pos- sible firings are concerned. Further, even if the openings proposal were workable within the conditions set by the class, there is no indica- tion that the impact, in terms of involuntary transfers, would be appreciably less than if the class members were reinstated immediately. The greatest attrition occurs among the more junior flight attendants. As a result, the majority of openings will occur at the less popular domiciles. Because of the significant competitive seniority that returning class members would have, they would gen- erally be able to utilize that seniority to be stationed at the domicile of their choice. There is simply no guarantee that openings would occur at the domiciles that class members would request. If they did not, incumbents now stationed at those domiciles would have to be involuntarily transferred to the less popular domiciles where the open- ings had occurred. The only other alternative would be for class members to wait until an opening occurred at the domicile of his or her choice or to accept employment wherever a vacancy occurred, regardless of domicile. The class members have not indicated a willingness to do either. The time limit set by the class precludes the first option which might, as the district court recognized, involve an inordinately long wait. Further, even if the class members indicated a will- 27a ingness to suffer such a long delay in reinstatement, United might be expected, if front pay were awarded, to create false vacancies to put the class members back to work at domiciles of their choice. The result in this case would be virtually the same as if the class members were immediately reinstated. Both in terms of furloughs or firings and the potential for involuntary transfers, there is ample support in the record for the district court’s conclusion that the impact on incumbents resulting from implementation of the open- ings proposal would be only slightly less than if the entire class were immediately reinstated. More importantly, there is support for the judge’s conclusion that the condi: tions insisted upon by the class as part of the openings proposal simply cannot be met. Bearing in mind that, in Teamsters, the Supreme Court indicated that in “devising and implementing remedies under Title VII. . a court must. . determine the ‘special blend of what is neces- sary, what is fair, and what is workable,’” 481 U.S. at 375, 97 S.Ct. at 1874 (citation omitted), we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s rejection of the class’ openings proposal. 8. Relative Seniority. Pursuant to the class’ motion to reconsider, the district judge considered and rejected an alternative proposal which would have given class members the same “rela- tive” seniority they had when they left United. Under this relative seniority proposal, a class member who was in the sixty-seventh percentile for seniority purposes when she left United because of the no-marriage rule would, upon reinstatement, be placed at that same percentile.” 1% The district court denied the motion to reconsider without opinion. We reject the plaintiffs’ contention that the court’s failure to issue an opinion constitutes “clear error” under Franks. The court had advised the parties, prior to the trial on reinstatement issues, that he would consider the full “gamut” of possible seniority 28a At the time of the plaintiffs’ terminations, sixteen percent were in the top quarter of the seniority rankings, twenty- seven percent were in the second quarter, thirty-five per- cent were in the third quarter, and twenty-two percent were in the bottom quarter. Under the remedy devised by the district court, approxi- mately ninety-three percent of the claimants will be in the bottom quarter of the seniority list. The plaintiffs argue that stagnation at the top of the seniority list means that they will remain at the bottom of the list for the rest of their careers. They therefore suggest that the relative seniority proposal at least achieves the district court’s apparent goal of placing them where they were when they left United, whereas the relief granted by the court below actually gives them far less. The difficulty with the relative seniority proposa] stems largely from the change in how flight attendants view their flying experience in the 1980’s as compared to the 1960’s. What was once viewed as a temporary, glamorous job is now considered a career position. As a result, a flight attendant who began working for United in 1966 had accrued as much relative seniority by late 1968 as a flight attendant who began in 1970 had by 1982. The rela- tive seniority proposal effectively equates twenty months of experience fifteen years ago to twelve years of more recent experience. Such a result places a great burden on incumbents who were in no way responsible for United’s no-marriage rule. Whether that burden would, in a different economic setting, be consistent with the shared-burden rationale remedies. The detailed opinion issued by the district judge demon- strates that he fulfilled this promise. As our review of the relative seniority proposal indicates, see infra, its impact is different in only a matter of degree from the proposals discussed at length by the district court. We find no error in the district judge’s failure to write yet another lengthy opinion concerning the same issues that had already been treated in depth in the memorandum opinion. 29a articulated in Franks, 424 U.S. at 777, 96 S.Ct. at 1270, need not be resolved because implementation of the rela- tive seniority proposal would, in the context of this case, result in “unusual adverse impact” on incumbents. In light of the small attrition rate at United and, more im- portantly, the lack of anticipated growth in the total num- ber of flight attendants required, the effect of granting the plaintiffs relative seniority would be to require the existence of 951 openings in the ranks of flight attendants before the most senior of the current furloughees would be recalled. Because there are currently 1,255 flight at- tendants on furlough, there would have to be over 2,000 openings for flight attendants within the five-year limit, at the conclusion of which furloughees lose their recall rights, in order for the class members to return to United without some percentage of incumbent furloughees losing their job as a result. The relative seniority proposal, if implemented on an “openings” basis, as apparently the class intends, does not resolve the impossibility of reinstating the class mem- bers within the time limit set by the class. The district court found it unlikely that sufficient openings would oc- cur to accommodate the class members if they were hired before any furloughees were recalled. Utilizing the rela- tive seniority approach, some furloughees would be re- called before some of the least senior class members. As a result, more than 1,400 openings would be required to reinstate both the class and the more senior of the current furloughees within the time limit. The relative seniority proposal, implemented on an openings basis within the time limit set by the class, is even less workable than the openings approach presented by the class during the trial below. To reintegrate immediately the 1,400 class members into the active work force, even with relative seniority, would differ from immediate recall with full seniority only in a matter of degree. The furlough of flight attend- 80a ants now in active service would be necessary. The possi- bility is strong that many of the furloughees, quite likely those laid-off as a result of the reinstatement of the plain- tiffs and almost certainly some of the present furloughees, would not be recalled within the five years and would, therefore, lose their jobs. Similarly, because many of the class members would enter the ranks of flight attendants with substantial sen- iority, the likelihood of involuntary transfers of incum- bents remains extremely high. This is true whether reinstatement were implemented immediately or on an openings basis. In summary, we conclude that those factors compelling a conclusion of unusual adverse impact under the immedi- ate reinstatement or openings proposals are mitigated to only a slight extent if the class members are granted rela- tive seniority. The remaining “unusual adverse impact” on the incumbents makes this remedy, under Franks, inappropriate and the district judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to adopt it. IV. ISSUES RAISED ON CROSS-APPEAL On cross-appeal, United urges that the district court erred in awarding the plaintiff class seniority from the date of original hire for purposes of compensation and various benefits such as the number of vacation days and number of passes a flight attendant receives.“ Unlike competitive seniority, see Section I(B)(1) supra, the burden associated with this award of non-competitive sen- iority falls primarily on United rather than on incum- bent flight attendants. 11 Referring to the terminology developed in Section I(B) (1), supra, seniority from date of original hire was awarded the class for purposes of company seniority and classification seniority utilized in the absolute sense. Apparently, compensation is the only variable determined by this absolute use of classification seniority. 31a United asserts that Franks requires a district court to “balance the equities” in awarding seniority relief and offers two arguments in support of its conclusion that the equities favoring the plaintiffs are few. As discussed in Section III(A) supra, Franks created a presumption in favor of full retroactive seniority relief, implemented on an openings basis, in Title VII cases. Franks, 424 U.S. at 779 n. 41, 96 S.Ct. at 1271 n. 41. Arguably, the ap- proach taken by the Teamsters Court could be charac- terized as a balancing of equities. 431 U.S. at 374-76, 97 S.Ct. at 1874-75. The court below reconciled the language in Franks and Teamsters by applying the Franks pre- sumption, requiring United and the AFA to carry the burden of demonstrating unusual adverse impact,” and relying on the factors enumerated in Teamsters as rele- vant to that showing. Absent any explicit statement in Teamsters that the standard enunciated in Franks was no longer viable, we believe the approach taken by the district court is correct and have followed the same mode of analysis on appeal. We are not persuaded, therefore, that United’s characterization of this case as one involv- ing a mere balancing of equities is correct. Our reluctance to resolve this case by a balancing of equities is quite relevant to evaluation of one of the argu- ments posed by United. United stresses the equities in its favor: that the airline promptly abrogated the no- marriage rule once it became clear that the rule violated Title VII, and that, although other airlines had similar rules during the period that United’s was in effect, only United is subject to.a potential liability that includes an increase in annual operating expenses of approximately $21,000,000. United also stresses the change in how flight attendants view their position—what was once a job of limited duration is now a career position—and concludes that there is only a one-in-three chance that a flight at- tendant who married between 1965 and 1968 would still be flying for the airline, even if the no-marriage rule had never existed. In this regard, United finds it significant 82a that less than ten percent of the potential class members reapplied to United as preferred hires after abrogation of the rule. Finally, United asserts that the incumbent flight attend- ants are extremely hostile to the class members and that such hostility, together with service reductions United will be forced to make as a result of the relief granted the class, will have a negative impact on the public served by the airline. Although the judge below did not address all of these factors in the portion of his opinion discussing company seniority, the district court opinion, read as a whole, does recognize the “equities” favoring United. The conclusion drawn by Judge Moran regarding these issues differs from that of United primarily because the district court read Franks as mandating the fullest possible relief for the class. Because we concur with the district judge’s reliance on, and interpretation of, Franks, we are not persuaded by United’s argument that the district court failed to weigh properly the equities in this case. The second argument raised by United in support of its contention that the award of non-competitive seniority was an abuse of the district court’s discretion relies on United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977), Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982), and Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, —— U.S. ——, 102 S.Ct. 3057, 78 L.Ed.2d 721 (1982). United asserts that because many members of the plaintiff class did not individually file timely charges with the EEOC and did not subsequently return to United as “preferred” hires after abolition of the no-marrige rule, they have failed to meet the prerequi- sites necessary to an award of retroactive seniority for non-competitive purposes. 12 United also relies on this argument as an alternative ground in support of the district court’s judgment regarding competitive 88a In United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977), the plaintiff, who had left United because of the no-marriage rule,“ did not file a charge with the EEOC within ninety days. Approxi- mately four years later, in 1972, she returned to United but was not granted retroactive seniority upon her return. The following year, Evans filed charges with the EEOC alleging that United had discriminated against her and continued to do so. The Supreme Court held that, because of Evans’ failure to filed a timely charge before the EEOC in 1968, the airline’s discriminatory action in dis- charging her was of no legal consequence. Id. at 558, 97 S.Ct. at 1889. Further, the Supreme Court held that Evans demonstrated no continuing violation of Title VII because she introduced no evidence that she was being treated differently, pursuant to United’s seniority system, from other flight attendants—male or female—who had been discharged for non-discriminatory reasons and sub- sequently rehired. Id. Evans is distinguishable from the present case in that Evans was not a class action whereas the present case is. It is well established that, in a Title VII class action, unnamed plaintiffs are not precluded from class member- ship merely because they did not individually file timely EEOC charges. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 396, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1134, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982) ; United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 482 U.S. 385, 389 n. 6, 97 S.Ct. 2464, 2467 n. 6, 58 L.Ed.2d 428 (1977) ; Franks v. Bowman T'ransportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 771, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1267, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n. 8, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2370 n. 8, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975). United recognizes this distinction yet urges that the failure of individual class seniority. Because we have resolved that issue on the grounds set forth in the district court opinion, we will not consider United's alternative ground in that context. 18 Evans is a member of the claimant class in this case. 34a members to file timely EEOC charges is nonetheless rele- vant to the “balancing of equities” required in this case. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982), is relevant to this prong of United’s argument. The plaintiff class in Zipes involved a large percentage of persons who had neither themselves filed charges with the EEOC nor been discharged, pursuant to Trans World Airlines’ rule prohibiting mothers from employment as flight attendants, within ninety days preceding the filing of charges by other class members. This court had held that this subgroup of the plaintiff class was jurisdiction- ally barred from relying on Title VII. In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982). While petitions for certiorari were pending on the jur- isdictional issue, the plaintiff class and the airline reached a settlement agreement that was approved by the district court and by the Seventh Circuit. That agreement pro- vided for retroactive seniority relief for the entire class, including those members whom the Seventh Circuit had held jurisdictionally barred from Title VII relief. Although the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Cir- cuit’s decision regarding jurisdiction, it affirmed this court’s approval of the settlement agreement. Zipes, 455 U.S. at 401, 102 S.Ct. at 1186. Concurring in the result as to the award of retroactive seniority, Justice Powell wrote: [W]hen the victims of discrimination have slept on 85a ing whether to award competitive-status seniority, and the presence of a settlement between the em- ployer and the plaintiffs should not affect the balanc- ing of these equities. Id. at 401 n. 1, 102 S.Ct. at 1137 n. 1 (opinion of Powell, J., concurring in the judgment in No. 80-951). The above-quoted language from Justice Powell’s opin- ion forms the primary basis for United’s argument that it is inequitable to award retroactive seniority for non- competitive purposes to the plaintiff class in this action. The argument is inapposite for two reasons. First, Justice Powell’s remarks are directed to competitive rather than non-competitive seniority. Second, United overlooks the fact that the class members in this case are not in the same position of having “slept on their rights” as the subclass of plaintiffs in Zipes. The class membership in this case was carefully limited to include only flight at- tendants who had left United pursuant to the no-marriage rule within the period from ninety days before the filing of EEOC charges until United’s abolition of the rule. Unlike the relevant subclass of plaintiffs in Zipes, all members of the class in the instant case have a timely EEOC charge upon which to rely. To penalize them for not having individually filed EEOC charges would be con- trary to the well established rule that individual, timely filings are not essential to a class action. We therefore reject United’s argument insofar as it rests on the prem- The third prong of United’s argument is based Motor Co. v. EEOC, —— U.S. ——, 102 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 721 (1982). In that case, several women 58 FRG si af Fourth 86a Circuit, the Supreme Court held that, absent unusual cir- cumstances, an employer’s unconditional offer of the job previously withheld ends the accrual of potential back pay liability. United relies on Ford, by broad analogy, for the propo- sition that the failure of the plaintiffs to seek available rehire by United weighs the equitable balance in favor of the airline. We are not persuaded that Ford has relevance to the present case. Not only does this appeal not involve issues of back pay, but more importantly, it is not a case in which United unconditionally offered employment to any of the flight attendants who had left during the era of the no-marriage rule. United’s “offer” was no more than a statement, in its publicity aimed at potential flight attendants, to the effect that priority would be given to applicants who had previously worked in positions involv- ing “customer service.” This is obviously something short of an unconditional offer of employment made directly to the victim of discrimination. Further, although the former flight attendants may have known that United had abandoned its no-marriage policy and may have known that they would be given hiring preference if they re- applied, neither of these facts is established in the record. We therefore conclude that Ford has little relevance to this case. We conclude that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in construing Franks to require an award of seniority for non-competitive purposes from date of orig- inal hire. The judge below evaluated the increased costs to United occasioned by the relief ordered and found that, in light of United’s recent assumption of increased com- pensation costs pursuant to collective bargaining,“ the The district judge found that the relief ordered would result in less than a ten percent rise in gross flight compensation costs to United. In comparison to this figure, United’s recent contract negotiations resulted in assumption of a twenty-three percent in- crease in 1980 and an additional ten percent increase in 1981. 12 ee 87a economic impact on the airline could not be considered “unusually adverse.” Although a greater measure of non- competitive than competitive seniority was awarded, the district judge sought to insure that each type of seniority relief was the maximum measure that would not result in “unusual adverse impact.” We find no abuse of dis- cretion, under Franks, in this approach. V. DENIAL OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF In August, 1982, United indicated that on October 1, 1982, it would recall 175 furloughees. The class petitioned for a stay of the recall. The class proposed that plaintiffs with greater days-of-service seniority (the measure of competitive seniority awarded by the district court) should be recalled instead of the incumbent furloughees or, alternatively, that action such as denying the recalled furloughees the accrual of competitive seniority should be ordered to prevent deterioration of the class’ competi- tive position. The district judge did not grant the sought relief and, according to the class, abused his discretion in so doing. We find no abuse of discretion in the district judge’s refusal to require that claimants be recalled in place of incumbent furloughees because, absent the results of any class membership hearings at that time, it would have been impossible to know if the claimants recalled would ultimately be found to be members of the class. We similarly find that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to order that recalled fur- loughees be denied the accrual of competitive seniority. Such a denial would be contrary to the terms of the col- lective bargaining agreement between United and the AFA, and, absent any assertion of illegality in that agree- ment or an assent to the denial of competitive seniority, the district court lacked power to alter the terms of the agreement. See Myers v. Gilman Paper Corp., 544 F.2d 837 (7th Cir. 1977), amended and modified on other 88a grounds, 556 F.2d 758, cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801, 98 S.Ct. 28, 54 L.Ed.2d 59. Two other forms of relief suggested by the class per- tained to the granting of extra competitive seniority to claimants in light of the recall. The district judge de- clined to rule on these requests. The first of the alternative suggestions was to permit claimants with greater seniority than the recalled fur- loughees to accrue competitive seniority from the date of the recall. The primary difficulty that would arise if such relief were granted is that if the 300 to 350 claimants with greater competitive seniority than the most senior furloughees were awarded this “extra” seniority, the re- lief bears a limited relationship to the recall which involved only 175 furloughees. If, on the other hand, the extra seniority were awarded only the 175 most senior of the claimants, the possibility exists that the beneficiaries of this seniority grant would subsequently be determined not to be members of the plaintiff class. The second of the alternatives suggested by the class was to permit all claimants to begin accruing competitive seniority from the date of the recall or from the date of the district court’s opinion on reinstatement questions issued. While this approach eliminates the difficulties associated with awarding extra seniority to just some of the class members, it substantially alters the reinstate- ment relief ordered by this district judge in his memo- randum opinion. Because the district court’s resolution of this extremely complicated case sought to grant class members the fullest possible seniority remedy without creating an “unusual adverse impact” on incumbents, it necessarily involved a careful balancing of rights and consequences. We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in declining to alter that balance merely because 175 furloughees were recalled. Although we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s failure to alter at this time the seniority remedy 89a granted, we are cognizant that many variables remain in this case. If the economic conditions affecting United, conditions that are largely responsible for the finding of “unusual adverse impact,” take a drastic turn for the better and numerous furloughees are recalled, or if the class determination hearings stretch on for longer than anticipated, it is possible that the district judge will need to make adjustments as to when class members begin accruing competitive seniority. Nothing in this opinion, of course, precludes the district judge from ordering such additional relief upon a showing that modification of the original order is required. CONCLUSION Having considered all the arguments urged by the parties and intervenors on this appeal, for the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, the judgments of the district court regarding the appropriate measure of senior- ity relief and the denial of injunctive relief are AFFIRMED. 40a IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION No. 70 C 1157 CAROLE ANDERSON ROMASANTA, et al., and LIANE BuIx MCDONALD, on her own behalf and on behalf of others, Plaintiffs, vB. UNITED AIR LINES, INC., a corporation, Defendant. ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, Intervenor. [Filed January 12, 1982] MEMORANDUM AND ORDER The original plaintiffs filed this action in 1970 chal- lenging defendant United Air Line’s rule requiring stewardesses to step down from their positions upon mar- riage. That same year the rule was held to violate the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibit- ing discrimination in employment on the basis of gender. But only now, almost twelve years from the date of filing, has the question of remedies begun to be addressed. In May 1981 this court held a three-week evidentiary hear- ing concerning reinstatement of those former women em- ployees forced to resign during the late 1960s upon their 41 marriages. The focus of that hearing was whether the granting of such relief would have an “unusual adverse impact” upon United and its current work force of flight attendants. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). What follows herein, in opinion form, are the court’s findings of fact (pp. 11-44) and con- clusions regarding reinstatement in this instance (pp. 44-53). I. INTRODUCTION This case is as old as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act itself; its origins date back to the mid-1960s. The dis- pute is over a rule which now can only be viewed as an historical anomaly. Until November 7, 1968 United Air Lines, Inc. (“United”), like most other airlines, required its women flight attendants to resign their positions upon their marriages. From a contemporary perspective, it is almost a matter of faith that work rules such as the no-marriage policy are flatly inconsistent with the precepts of Title VII. These days the presence of married flight attendants aboard United’s aircraft seems almost the rule and not the exception. No one disputes that these women have been easily integrated into the work force without dimin- ishing the quality of services provided by the airline or causing a drop in demand for air travel. Even United must wonder why it adopted a work rule which forced it to bear the additional cost of training 8,500 new hires between 1945 and 1967. Binder, Sex Discrimination in the Airline Industry: Title VII Flying High. 59 Cal. L. Rev. 1091, 1101 n. 59 (1971). But while the unlawfulness and inefficacy of the no- marriage rule is apparent today, the issue was not always considered so clear-cut. Legal challenges to the airline’s policies were initiated as early as 1965 in arbitration proceedings. In this case certain of the class members filed grievances with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) as early as January 25, 1966. 42a McDonald v. United Air Lines, Inc., 587 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934 (1979). The Commission, however, struggled for years with the issue before concluding, only after extensive industry-wide hear- ings in 1968, that the no-marriage rule violated the Civil Rights Act. Neal v. American Airlines, Inc., CCH Emp. Prac. Guide J 6002 (1968) ; Colvin v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., CCH Emp. Prac. Guide J 6003 (1968). At least two early court decisions upheld the practice. See Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. La. 1967) ; Lansdale v. United Air Lines, Inc., 2 FEP Cases 462 (S.D. Fla. 1969), rev’d per curiam, 487 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1971). In a case related to this one, Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 959 (N. D. III. 1970), aff'd. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971), the courts first held the no-marriage rule illegal. With liability established in this action as early as 1970, this case should have long since been closed. But subse- quent proceedings failed to proceed smoothly and the case has ripened to an age and to a dimension unparalleled by virtually any other Title VII lawsuit. Not until 1978 was the present scope of the action finally defined. The case originally was filed by Carole Anderson Romasanta on behalf of herself and other former United flight attendants. In its early stage the litigation largely was sponsored by the flight attendants’ union, then the Air Line Pilots’ Association (“ALPA”) and now known as the Association of Flight Attendants (“AFA”). The court initially refused to certify the Romasanta class, instead permitting twelve other former flight attendants to proceed “by way of joinder” as addi- tional parties. When Romasanta refused to challenge that order, the decision was appealed by Liane Buix Mc- Donald (“McDonald”), an excluded member of the puta- tive Romasanta class, as an intervenor. In 1976 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the 43a district court’s denial of class certification and remanded the case for further proceedings. Romasanta v. United Air Lines, Inc., 587 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1975), aff'd. sub nom. United Air Lines v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977). McDonald has remained the current class representative to this date and AFA has now intervened to represent the interests of the current work force. Upon remand the composition of the class was subject to still further dispute. At one point the district court in- cluded in the McDonald class only those former employees who were discharged by the airline. The exclusion of those former flight attendants who resigned from their posi- tions because of the rule, rather than waiting to be fired, was also reversed by the Court of Appeals. In McDonald v. United Air Lines, Inc., 587 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 442 U.S. 934 (1979), the court held that both discharged and resigned flight attendants should be in- cluded in the McDonald class. Accordingly, the case was once again remanded to the district court, the class now being composed of all those individuals terminated on account of marriage between October 27, 1965 and No- vember 7, 1968. In 1979 the case was transferred to this court for pur- poses of awarding class-wide relief. To contend, as plain- tiffs do, that United has wrongfully drawn out these pro- cedings as a delaying action solely to frustrate meaning- ful relief to the class, overstates the matter. In a real sense, United had successfully litigated this action prior to 1976, confining it to finite and limited dimensions, and, until 1978, restricted the scope of the class. Only after that time did the gargantuan proportions of this case become established. What cannot be overstated, however, is the uniqueness of this action as it now stands. The class is enormous—comprising as many as 1800 former women flight attendants. An unprecedented number of those employees now seek reinstatement with full senior- ity. Based on a random sampling of class members during 44a discovery in the past two years, approximately 1400 class members are still interested in returning to their old jobs after some 18 to 16 years of litigation. Finally, this case is unique in the ironies it now pre- sents. The Civil Rights Act’s prohibitions against sex- based discrimination and this case grew out of the “women’s movement” of the late 1960s and the past decade. That movement was the motivating cause of un- paralleled changes in women’s roles in American society, including the role of the airline flight attendant. In this case, however, because of the passage of time and the pressures of economics, the result has an unfortunate twist. One class of women, the claimants, are pitted against another class of women, the current flight attend- ants, for a limited number of job positions at the airline. The “sisterhood” that might otherwise exist between these two groups has now been frustrated by competition for existing positions, perhaps the last casualty of the no- marriage rule. II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES The legal parameters of permissible relief are defined by the purposes of Title VII: “to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment dis- crimination.” Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975). As the Supreme Court noted in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (“Franks”), the attainment of this “make whole“ ob- jective requires “that persons aggrieved by the conse- quences and effects of the unlawful employment practices be, so far as possible, restored to a position where they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimina- tion.” Franks, supra at 764. To this end, the Franks court concluded that an award of retroactive seniority is presumptively warranted. Franks, supra at 766 (“It can hardly be questioned that ordinarily such relief will be necessary to achieve the ‘make whole’ purposes of the 45a Act.”). However, the inquiry here is just not that simple. The Supreme Court also recognized that the interests of incumbent employees must be considered in determining an appropriate remedy. While retroactive seniority can- not be withheld merely because incumbents may be af- fected adversely, the court clearly stated that an award of seniority status is not required in all circumstances. Franks, supra at 770, 779. Rather, the fashioning of appropriate Title VII remedies has been left to “the sound equitable discretion of the district courts.” Franks, supra at 770. In Franks, and later in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (Team- sters“), the Court attempted to give some substance to its general equitable charge. In a now famous footnote, the Franks Court stated: [I]n exercising their equitable powers, district courts should take as their starting point the presumption in favor of rightful-place seniority relief, and proceed with further legal analysis from that point; and that such relief may not be denied on the abstract basis of adverse impact upon interests of other employees but rather only on the basis of unusual adverse im- pact arising from facts and circumstances that would not be generally found in Title VII cases. Franks, supra at 779, n. 41. In Teamsters the court added further content by citing prior language from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200-201 (1974), com- manding courts to “look to practical realities” such as the “number of victims, the number of non-victim employees affected and the alternatives available to them” to deter- mine the “special blend of what is necessary, what is fair and what is workable.” Teamsters, supra at 875 and 376, n. 62. All of the parties have sought to add further content to the holdings of Franks and Teamsters; plaintiff, by con- 46a tending that the issue is “when” and not “whether” re- instatement will occur, and United and the union claiming that after Teamsters victims of employment discrimina- tion cannot be reinstated if that will cause the displace- ment of existing employees. Neither argument is deter- minative. Plaintiff’s suggestion that reinstatement is auto- matic was specifically rejected in Franks. The union’s suggestion of a “no-bumping” rule has been adopted by at least one federal court of appeals. In Sledge v. J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 585 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979), the Fourth Circuit rejected a district court decree that modified an employer’s layoff policy by providing that present black employees, who on the basis of their plant seniority would otherwise be laid off, could bump non-minority employees with greater seniority. The Sledge court cited an earlier Fourth Cir- cuit decision which had announced a “no-bumping” rule, stating: “(B]umping” is an unsettling process. Its domino effect adversely affects employees who have done no wrong and who, indeed, may have been victims of discrimination. Sledge, supra at 652, citing Patterson v. American To- bacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 268 (4th Cir. 1976), modified on other grounds, 586 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1978). The Pat- terson case is, in turn, premised upon a decision of the Fifth Circuit, Local 189, United Papermakers & Paper- workers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), 1 See also, Page v. Bolger, —— F.24 ——, 21 FEP Cases 780, 786 (4th Cir. 1979) af d. rehearing en banc, 645 F.2d 227 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 8278 (1981); Shortt v. County of Arlington, Va., 589 F.2d 779, 782 (4th Cir. 1978). Accord, Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721, 726 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1978). In Reed, however, the Eighth Circuit merely reversed a “super-seniority” award causing displacement of in- cumbent workers in that instance. The Reed court did not purport to establish an absolute “no-bumping” rule. 11 r R 47a cert, denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970), decided prior to Franks and Teamsters, in which the court held: White incumbent workers should not be bumped out of their present positions by Negroes with greater plant seniority; plant seniority should be used only with respect to new job openings. This solution ac- cords with the purpose and history of the legislation. Papermakers, supra at 988. The Fourth Circuit’s “no-bumping” rule has been re- jected by other courts, see, ¢.g., Criswell v. Western Air- lines, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 384, 394 (C.D. Cal. 1981),? and, of course, is not controlling herein.* The application of an 2In Criswell, supra, two pilots brought claims for reinstatement under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seg. The district court, citing Franks v. Bowman Transportation, granted such relief with the express recognition that other employees would be displaced. The court stated: [The Court has considered Western’s claim that. . reinstate- ment will cause displacement of less senior pilots and the ulti- mate furlough of two active pilots at the bottom of the pilot seniority list. Although such a result is unfortunate and may be inevitable in a shrinking economy, the Court must assume that such a possibility was within the contemplation of Con- gress in enacting the ADEA. Such displacement is not a suffi- cient reason not to fully effectuate the ADEA. Criswell, supra, at 394. But see, Moseley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 612 F.2d 187, 191 (5th Cir. 1980), where the Fifth Circuit appears to have followed the Fourth in fashioning a rigid “no-bumping” rule. 5 Alternatively, plaintiff's suggestion that the Seventh Circuit's approval of settlement decrees calling for reinstatement with seniority in recent cases involving American Airlines and Trans World Airlines, see Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Ass n., Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc., 578 F.2d 960 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, Ass’n. of Professional Flight Attendants v. Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Assoc., 489 U.S. 876 (1978) (“Ameri- can”); Airline Stewords & Stewardesses Ass’n., Local 560 v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 680 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir. 1980) (“TWA”), mandates reinstatement here must be rejected. In neither American 480 absolute no-bumping“ rule is hardly consistent with the Supreme Court’s mandate in Franks and Teamsters that district courts are to exercise their own discretion, based on equitable principles, in fashioning relief under Title VII. A hallmark of equity is its flexibility—the ability to examine the “practical realities” to determine “what is necessary” and “what is fair.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra. This court recognizes that a decree which causes the displacement of incumbent employees impacts on in- terests of those workers differently than an order which merely affects certain terms and conditions of continuing employment. That recognition, and the conclusion that flows from it—that such decrees should be used sparingly —is consistent with equitable principles. The existence of a hard and fast rule precluding “bumping” in all cir- cumstances is not, [sic] and this court declines to follow the lead of the Fourth Circuit. Accordingly, it is within the legal context of pre- sumptive necessity for reinstatement with seniority ab- sent “unusual adverse impact” that plaintiff McDonald’s proposal for relief and the evidence presented at the hearing have been considered. III. PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSAL FOR REINSTATEMENT In light of the extraordinary circumstances of this case, plaintiff has not proposed to the court that her class members be reinstated immediately upon a determination of their entitlement regardless of the availability of open- ings at United. Instead, to cushion the potential impact of reinstatement, McDonald’s proposal is slightly more limited. What follows is a brief review of the specifics of that proposal and a review of some of the over-arching nor TWA did incumbent flight attendants face the loss of their jobs by virtue of reinstatement with retroactive seniority. More- over, both American and TWA were decided on principles govern- ing the review of settlement agreements and not Title VII generally. 49a difficulties in implementing that plan in light of the evi- dence adduced at trial. A. Plaintiff's Suggestions Regarding Reinstatement Plaintiff’s basic premise is that all claimants whose em- ployment as United flight attendants during the late 1960s terminated because of United’s ne-marriage rule are entitled to an offer of reinstatement with restoration of their original flight attendant and company-wide senior- ity dates. As individual claimants are identified as vic- tims of the rule in individual entitlement hearings (or by a later settlement agreement), McDonald requests that these women be offered retraining at United’s training center. Plaintiff asks that United be compelled to operate that training center at full capacity until all of the “entitlees” are reintegrated into the work force. The most significant element of the proposal is its “openings” feature. Specifically, McDonald proposes that, as an alternative to immediate reinstatement, reintegra- tion of retrained class members should occur as there are openings in United’s flight attendant work force. All of these openings would be filled from the pool of retrained claimants instead of by new hires. And although Me- Donald does not expressly so state in her proposal, all available openings would also go to the claimants before being filled by current United flight attendants returning from furlough status. As a condition for this “openings” compromise, McDonald requests that, until an entitlee is reinstated, she shall accrue “front pay” as well as other benefits (including seniority, sick pay, pension, vacation time, and passes), as does a flight attendant of comparable company and flight attendant seniority. Finally, to assure that reinstatements occur as expedi- tiously as possible, McDonald incorporates into her plan the requirement that United be compelled to take appro- priate steps to encourage the creation of openings. Two specific suggestions raised by McDonald are the “initia- 50a tion of an early retirement program” and the “creation of a continuing ‘shared-work’ program” akin to the Partnership Time-Off (“PTO”) plan now in use at the airline. Plaintiff also requests additional safeguards such as the imposition of periodic reporting requirements on United, access to flight attendant requirements projections and a decree forbidding both United and AFA from dis- criminating or retaliating in any way against a returning class member. B. Feasibility of the McDonald Proposal Not Considering Any Impact on the Current Work Force The evidentiary hearing conducted in May featured the presentation of two distinct cases. The union and the air- line presented their cases based on two assumptions: (1) the immediate reinstatement of (2) approximately 1400 class members. McDonald’s case, however, rested on dif- ferent premises: reinstatement only as openings occur in the present work force (subject to a reasonable time limit) and the existence of only 1069 claimants seeking reinstatement. During trial plaintiff’s counsel charac- terized AFA’s and United’s demonstration of the impact of immediate reinstatement of 1400 plaintiffs as a “co- lossal waste of time.” Tr. at 1278. This court does not agree. Given the significant problems in implementing the McDonald proposal as presently structured, the presenta- tion of evidence concerning the impact of immediate re- instatement was both helpful and necessary. Two major difficulties with plaintiff’s proposed rein- statement scheme exist independent of any impact it might have on United and its current work force. The plan’s reliance on shared work and early retirement is misplaced. More importantly, the timetable for reinstate- ment is unrealistic. * The resolution of the parties’ dispute over the conflicting esti- mates of the number of claimants who are likely to accept rein- statement, if offered, is discussed below, infra, at n.16. 51a 1. The Reliance on Shared Work and Early Retire- ment N Plaintiff's suggestion of a continuing shared work pro- gram at United is modeled on the current Partnership Time-Off Program instituted at the airline in 1980. The program’s origin was a union’s response to United’s Feb- ruary 1980 notice that due to higher operating costs and less than optimistic business projections it would be forced to furlough approximately 200 flight attendants. Tr. 690- 692. In response to what was perceived to be a short term furlough situation and United’s demand for a certain dollar amount in payroll savings, AFA suggested the initiation of the program. Tr. 691-692. According to Susan Rohde, the Master Executive Council Chairperson of the AFA, PTO was proposed as a “job-sharing concept offered to flight attendants on a voluntary basis for the sole purpose of avoiding what we thought at the time was going to be a temporary furlough.” Tr. 6 In operation PTO is a shared-work program in which two flight attendants, a junior and a senior, voluntarily agree to form a pair to split the senior flight attendant’s monthly flying schedule. As two flight attendants now cover one line of flying, the removal of the junior flight attendant from the bidding roster requires an additional flight attendant to cover the second attendant’s line of flying (assuming, of course, a constant number of lines). In the program full seniority is accrued and full insur- ance and pension benefits are retained by each member of the partnership pair. Sick leave and vacation time are divided between the attendants equally. Pay for the lines of flying is awarded on the basis of the senior partner’s pay rate and allocated between the partners as they agree. The partnership pair itself is also responsible for deter- mining which flights are flown by each partner. Me- Donald Ex. 17. If the PTO program is considered as a device to pre- vent the furloughing of current flight attendants, the 52a program must be characterized as a considerable success. The program eliminated the need for 125 of the planned 200 furloughs in April 1980, when it was implemented. Successive renewals of the PTO program were also help- ful in forestalling furloughs. In August 1980, 130 posi- tions were saved out of a planned furlough of 275 attend- ants. In September 1980, 110 furloughs were avoided using the PTO program, and in May 1981 the need for a still further furlough of 200 flight attendants was totally eliminated.“ AFA Ex. 11. Certainly the track record of PTO lends a basis for plaintiff’s suggestion that additional manpower demands theoretically can be created (or additional cutbacks avoided) by the incorporation of a like program in any reinstatement decree. As a practical matter, however, linking any hopes of prompt reinstatement to a shared- work program seems unwise. An on-going part-time or shared-work arrangement modifies the basic contractual understanding existing be- tween United’s flight attendants (as represented by AFA) and the airline.“ The union correctly notes that the find- 5 Stating that PTO eliminated the need for a substantia) number of furloughs may, in some respects, overstate the case. Lagging consumer demand in the airline industry has caused a continuing series of furloughs at United. In a real sense, therefore, the PTO program has only postponed the date of furlough for some flight attendants. The PTO program has also been used to faciliate the early recall of furloughed attendants from January to April 1981. Tr. at 64. vacations and sick leave (§§ 18-19), and most directly those terms covering flight assignments and scheduling (§9). AFA Ex. 1. Indeed, plaintiff's assertion that PTO does not change the agree- ment, (Pi. Post-Trial Br. at 765 n. 84), is contrary to the under- standing of both parties to that instrument. Tr. 63, 696. 58a ing that United engaged in an unlawful employment pra tice by enforeing its no-marriage rule does not endow the court with carte blanche remedial authority to rewrite the terms of the United-AFA collective bargaining agree- ment or to rearrange existing terms and conditions of employment. As the court noted in Meyers v. Gilman Paper Corp., 544 F.2d 887, 857 (5th Cir. 1977), amended and modified on other grounds, 556 F.2d 758 (1977): A court in considering prospective relief is not auto- matically empowered to make wholesale changes in agreements negotiated by the employees’ exclusive bargaining agents . Allowing such changes without findings of inadequacy in the revised agree- ments would conflict with the policies reflected in the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. We are reminded that while Title VII expresses an important national policy, it does not exist in a vacuum. Important national policies also emanate from the NLRA, among them the principle that terms and conditions of employment are to be shaped by the employer and the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees. Meyers, 544 F.2d at 8657. Plaintiff has not suggested that the current terms of the United-AFA collective bargaining agreement violate the Civil Rights Act, or in any way wrongfully perpetu- ate any lingering discriminatory effects of United’s no- marriage rule. Accordingly, it is not the province of the court to superimpose modified terms and conditions of employment, in the form of a mandatory shared-work program, to ameliorate the equitable dilemma posed by reinstatement. A continuing shared-work arrangement in any rein- statement decree is dependent on the voluntary coopera- 54a tion of at least the union and the incumbent employees.’ Neither’s cooperation is likely. At the hearing Chair- person Rohde repeatedly reiterated the union’s opposition to any long-term PTO-type program. Tr. 699, 2325. She noted that AFA had previously been approached by United in hopes of initiating a part-time work arrangement, and not until it became necessary to participate in such a program as a condition for saving the positions of in- cumbents was AFA amenable to such a solution. More importantly, the success of PTO, or any similar voluntary program, is completely dependent on current flight attendants volunteering for the program. Although the program has achieved a good deal of success, it has generally not been so fully subscribed as to eliminate the need for furloughs. Flight attendants participation in the PTO program is largely determined by the preferences of the present work force for a part-time arrangement along the lines of PTO. For those who can afford to forego a full-time salary for a limited duration PTO offers several benefits. Flight attendants in the program may accrue full seniority and other benefits while working part-time. The junior partners in the pairing benefit from the ability to fly the schedule of their more senior partner. The benefits of this program, however, diminish when it is viewed as a long-term proposition. At least one flight attendant testified at the hearing that while PTO was an initially desirable option she did not con- tinue in the program because she couldn’t afford to be paid only partial wages. As the program increases in duration her experience likely will become more prevalent. 7 Assuming AF A's acquiescence to a continued form of shared work could be obtained, notwithstanding the provisions of its col- lective bargaining agreement, compelling United's participation might be leas troublesome in light of the fact that it is the alleged wrongdoer in this action, and the rights of the “innocent” incum- bent employees would not be as directly impinged. 55a Also, while the current level of participation in the program is attributable to the economic advantages of the program, it does appear to the court that willingness to join that program is influenced by a desire among the current flight attendants to save the active positions of their colleagues. Insofar as this motivation may have con- tributed to the success of the program, it is likely to diminish once the effect of shared work is to promote openings for the claimants rather than reduce the number of furloughees. Several witnesses at trial testified to the resentment of the current work force toward the claim- ants, in their efforts to secure reinstatement. At the least, the collegiality that exists between flight attendants does not blunt the inevitable competition between incum- bent and claimant. The court believes that if voluntary shared-work arrangements were to be employed as part of a reinstatement effort for the class members, the subscription to that program, and thus its effectiveness in creating openings, would be diminished. For these reasons the court has not looked to either a voluntary or involuntary program of shared work as a means to facilitate the implementation of reinstatement. Involuntary shared work is beyond the power of the court to compel. Voluntary shared work just is not a realistic alternative in the current circumstances. For a much simpler reason the court has not looked to an early retirement program as a significant source of aid in reinstating class members. Currently, the AFA- On several occasions testimony was offered which purported to illustrate the hostility of the incumbent work force to the class members. Such hostility is not, of course, a cognizable ground, either in law or equity, to bar reinstatement. Accordingly, evi- dence of employee animus has not been considered for the purpose of demonstrating “unusual adverse impact.” Such evidence is, however, relevant in evaluating whether current employees would participate in a voluntary program ostensibly established for the benefit of the claimants. 56a United collective bargaining agreement contains provi- sions for early retirement at age 50. AFA Ex. 1 at 209. Susan Rohde testified that the early retirement incentives have, to this point, been unsuccessful in inducing senior flight attendants to leave their positions. Tr. 801. Fur- ther increases in the early retirement incentives are a matter for collective bargaining, not for judicial decree. 2. Me Donald's Proposed Timetable for Reinstatement A central condition to McDonald’s “openings” proposal is that reinstatement of all entitlees be accomplished within two and one-half to three years after the issuance of a decree. Based on current projections of future ‘growth at United and current rates of attrition from the present work force, McDonald believes that enough openings will be created to accomplish that result. How- ever, she notes, If, however, these projections are off . . . plaintiff undoubtedly will petition the court to modify the decree.” (McDonald Post-Trial Brief at 72.) Not sur- prisingly, the union and United both claim that the pro- jected time span is wholly unrealistic. Plaintiff’s reliance on future growth at the airline to supply many of the needed openings is based on the testi- mony of Edward Beamish, senior vice-president in charge of corporate planning at United. Beamish, who was the only witness to testify as to long-term flight attendant needs at United, was “cautiously optimistic” about United’s growth prospects. Tr. 17. He saw the stabiliza- tion of fuel costs, the country’s long-term economic pros- pects and the effects of the airline deregulation as all indicating a growth for United on a projected basis of 4 to 5 per cent per year in terms of available seat miles (“ASM”). Tr. 21, 34-86. Beamish further testified that the growth in ASMs would translate fairly well into increases in the airline's demand for flight attendants.’ * McDonald also hinges her expectation of growth at United on certain statements of Richard Ferris, President of UAL, Inc. in 57a United’s next witness, Robert Wertheimer, comptroller for in-flight services, confirmed this correlation and pro- vided specific figures for projected flight attendant re- quirements. Based on the 4 to 5 per cent assumption of growth provided to him by Beamish, and an assumed attrition rate of 1.3 per cent from the current work force, Wertheimer estimated a need for 333 additional flight attendants in 1982, 466 in 1988, 594 in 1984 and another 594 flight attendants in 1985. United Ex. 8. Certainly, if Beamish’s prediction of growth and Wert- heimer’s forecast of additional flight attendant needs proved correct, there would exist a favorable environment for promptly reinstating the class members within the time frame of McDonald’s proposal. Unfortunately, cur- rent trends at the airline and in the national economy in general suggest that these projections are unreliable. United’s prediction of current and continued growth has been proven wrong by events. Instead of recalls of 102 flight attendants as planned in 1981, an additional 125 flight attendants were furloughed in July 1981, 350 in September 1981, and another 547 in October 1981. More flight attendants would have been laid off but for the con- siderable success of the PTO program in reducing sur- Friendly Times, United’s company newsletter. Those predictions of growth, which are more in the nature of an inspirational charge to United’s employees, have not come to pass, nor have they been given great weight here. % The October 1, 1981 furlough of 547 flight attendants was caused by the strike of the professional air traffic controllers (“PATCO”) and the commensurate reduction in the number of United’s flights ordered by the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”). Wertheimer Aff. of 9/15/81. This latest furlough has been regarded here as a temporary phenomenon. The court can only assume that United was flying a maximum schedule before the strike, that the carrier would return to an approximately equiv- alent level of flying upon elimination of the flight restrictions resulting from the strike, and concommitantly, recall these 547 employees. 58a pluses in the work force. The fact is that United has had no new openings for flight attendants since October 1979, when the last of the current workers were hired. Since then over 1500 furloughs have occurred. For the year 1981 Beamish’s and Wertheimer’s projections of flight at- tendant needs were off by 1124 individuals. Obviously, given the current volatility in the air travel industry, as well as the national economy in general, United has been no more able to accurately predict its future manpower needs than other concerns. While this court certainly is no better seer of future trends than United’s forecasters, the facts are that the airline’s business has shrunk instead of grown and that it has much catching up to do in the immediate future to reattain its former size before it realizes any growth. Although plaintiff has characterized United’s projections of growth as “conservative,” at this point these projections have been unduly optimistic. If, however, United has overestimated its future man- power needs in terms of anticipated growth, it has per- haps understated those needs in terms of projected attri- tion from the projected work force. Much trial time was devoted to the different projections of attrition by plain- tiff’s expert, Dr. Carl Hoffman, and United’s expert, Dr. George Neumann. Dr. Hoffman’s testimony was based on information provided to him by United in the form of the airline’s “out-of-service” listing. Using the termina- tion rates for flight attendants in 1978 and 1979, Hoffman predicted an attrition of between 670 to 833 flight attend- ants by year-end 1983. Hoffman arrived at these by computing termination rates for flight attendants, years of seniority, from United’s experience in 1978 } 59a predictions, based his study on flight attendant attrition rates for the entire period between 1972 and 1980 and his own projected rate of attrition for the period proposed in McDonald’s timetable for reinstatement was significantly lower than that suggested by Dr. Hoffman. Observing that annual attrition rates had fallen dramatically over this period, from a high of 11.40 per cent in 1972 to a low of 1.31 per cent in 1980, Neumann then projected at- trition rates of 1.16 per cent in 1982, 0.93 per cent in 1983, 0.75 per cent in 1984 and 0.60 per cent in 19865. United Ex. 37. On these estimates, and the assumption of no growth at the carrier, Neumann predicted that 367 spots would become available in the next five years. Tr. 2202. At that rate, assuming 1480 class members would be reinstated, it would take almost 20 years to reintegrate them into the work force under McDonald’s proposal. On cross examination Dr. Neumann admitted that had the termination rates for 1972 (an apparently unusually high rate of terminations) and 1980 (an apparently unusually low rate) been disregarded, the attrition rate at United had remained relatively stable at approximately 4 per cent per year, a percentage substantially similar to the rate adopted by Dr. Hoffman. United Ex. 37. On the other hand, Dr. Neumann also noted that his own meth- odology had been more accurate in predicting the current termination rate for 1981. Tr. 2204. The court does not review this testimony as a prelude to conclusively determining which of the competing fore- casted attrition rates is correct. Both Dr. Hoffman’s and Dr. Neumann’s testimony have strong appeal. Both are, however, subject to challenge on methodological grounds, and, most importantly, both are subject to 60a than the conservative 3.5 per cent projection suggested by Dr. Hoffman. The important point to be drawn from this evidence is that the impact of reinstatement in this case could be cushioned by plaintiff’s “openings” proposal only in the most favorable of circumstances—both sustained growth at United and a high attrition rate. The realiza- tion of either is highly improbable at this point. Accord- ingly, the impact of reinstatement must be considered under the “best” and “worst” cases scenarios. IV. THE IMPACT OF REINSTATEMENT A. The Position of Flight Attendant Generally In some respects the content of the flight attendant position is quite familiar to the general public. Airline passengers see a flight attendant serving an in-flight meal or cautioning a passenger to “fasten your seatbelt and return the seatback to the upright position.” Although not many have viewed flight attendants fulfilling their re- sponsibilities in emergency situations aboard aircraft, al- most all travelers are cognizant that these individuals have been trained extensively for these situations should they arise. In contrast, the current hearing has focused on those aspects of the position of a flight attendant gen- erally unknown to the flying public, but of great im- portance to those holding flight attendant positions. In the context of this, an equitable hearing, it is of more than passing interest to note that the position has changed dramatically over the term of this lawsuit. In this case the claimants are seeking to return to a much improved position, very different from the one they left. 6la change in the flight attendant scale. At United Air Lines the pay in 1968 was 8345 a month for 70 hours of actual flying time, Tr. 714, and actually was declining in real terms during the latter part of the 1960s. Tr. at 1214. While compensation levels increased only gradually dur- ing the immediate period thereafter, they rose dramati- cally in the mid-1970s and since then have kept ahead of inflation. AFA Ex. 18; Tr. 715, 1214-15. The increases in pay have taken the form not only of direct improve- ments in the monthly pay rates, but also of indirect compensation such as the increased availability of pre- mium pay positions, compensation for boarding time spent on the ground before takeoff, holiday pay and compensa- tion for understaffed flights. Additional steps were added to the pay scales to provide a further reward for length of service at the airline. AFA Ex. 18. Significant changes also have occurred in the area of pension and retirement benefits. Prior to 1972 United offered only a minimum retirement plan funded solely by employee contributions, with a return on those cuntribu- tions of only 3 per cent. AFA Ex. 19. Thereafter, United funded the pension plan, but at very modest rates, pro- viding relatively few benefits. A significant break- through was made in 1976, during the negotiations be- tween the union and United which concluded in that year’s collective bargaining agreement. At that time United agreed to past fund for prior years of service, AFA Ex. 19, and benefits improved almost threefold. Tr. 719. Sub- sequent collective bargaining agreements have brought additional improvements to the flight attendants’ retire- ment package. These improvements coincide with, and probably were caused by, a significant change in the way the flight at- 12 Some other change in the jobs over the course of the 1970s 62a tendants themselves viewed their positions. As Susan Rohde stated, the job, which was regarded as one “that you came and you flew for a year or two. Then you quit and you went off and did something else,” became viewed as a long-term career. Tr. 714.“ As the perspective of flight attendants changed to a more career-oriented out- look, there came greater impetus for the changes in the terms and conditions of employment described above. In determining the “equities” of reinstatement with full seniority, the court has recognized that the claimants are seeking to return to a job which is more lucrative, more permanent and generally more desirable than the one they were forced to leave. That the claimants might to some extent reap a “windfall” through reinstatement is not troubling in the abstract given the unfairness of United’s past employment practice. But considerations of fairness demand the court to be cognizant of the fact that this windfall would come at the expense of the current work- ers, particularly the more senior attendants, who played a large role in securing these job-related improvements. An analysis of the specific content of the position of flight attendant must begin with a description of its sys- in many instances, where they may live. Within the flight 63a attendant job classification there is only one level, without merit advancements or bonuses. The only way to “move up” is to accrue seniority. As described by Susan Rohde, seniority is “the entire job. The entire job is hinged on seniority. It is the most important thing that is involved with the work and the job. It is what the collective bar- gaining agreement is built on.” Tr. 685. At United, several different seniority systems exist con- temporaneously to define the job. Certain aspects of the flight attendant’s position are determined by “company” seniority, that is, seniority based on all service with the airline, and not necessarily in the capacity as a flight attendant. Company seniority determines the number of free flight passes a flight attendant is eligible for, as well as the number of vacation days. AFA Ex. 3. Other con- ditions of employment are defined by “classification” sen- iority, i.e., the seniority credited to an employee for time worked as a flight attendant. Classification seniority op- erates both in an absolute and relative context. For ex- ample, rates of pay are directly determined by absolute classification seniority. A flight attendant receives com- pensation increases on each seniority anniversary date up to a current maximum seniority bracket of 14 years of service. Most flight attendant working conditions are deter- mined by relative seniority, either on a system-wide basis or w [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_1117%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.