# Petition — Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church v. Presbytery of Baltimore > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_0998%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition - **Published:** January 1, 1984 - **Citation:** 465 U.S. 1027 ## Text Office “Supreme Court, U.S, 83-1051 FILED DEC 24 1993 No. 83- ALEXANDER L. STEVAS, CLERK | In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1983 BABCOCK MEMORIAL PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, a body corporate, et al., Petitioners, VS. THE PRESBYTERY OF BALTIMORE OF THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Respondents. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND WARREN JACKSON WILLIAMSON (Counsel of Record) P.O. Box 467 Greenville, Alabama 36037 (205) 382-2635 Mark E. WERNER, II 1102 Court Square Building Baltimore, Maryland 21202 Davin S. PEARL 1209 Court Square Building Baltimore, Maryland 21202 Attorneys for Petitioners ——— — ed E. L. Mexpewnmatt, Inc., 926 Cherry Street, Kansas City, Mo. 64106, (816) 421-3030 QUESTION PRESENTED Whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit a State Court from awarding local church property to a parent denomination with a hierarchical ecclesiastical structure after a due severance of the denominational connection by the local church where there is (1) no provision in the denomina- tion’s constitution prohibiting such a severance or im- posing any penalty or forfeiture of property upon such action and (2) no provision in the denomination’s con- stitution nor in any instrument of title imposing an express trust on the local church property on behalf of the parent denomination? ur TABLE OF CONTENTS QUESTIONS PRESENTED .............. I EE RE 2 a ia CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED ............ 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...................---.-.--c-ceceoeeeeeeeeee 3 REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT WW. 11 EN EE 30 APPENDIX A—Opinion Below @22..220.202....22...-c-cceceeceeeeeees Al APPENDIX B—Order Denying Reconsideration .......... Alg APPENDIX C—Motion for Reconsideration .................. A22 APPENDIX D—Opinion of Trial Court 0.000000... A39 APPENDIX E—Opinion of the Supreme Court of Er A57 APPENDIX F—Sections of the Constitutions of The United Presbyterian Church in The United States of America and The Presbyterian Church in the dali tate sein csancenitasitepsenntnaceseene A69 APPENDI§ G—WMortgage from Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church to the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America .............................. A79 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church, et al. v. The Presbytery of Baltimore of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, et al., Md., 464 A. 2d 1008 (Opinion of Maryland Court of Ap- i ianlihiiawicetiesscnnoninencninidstaimessnsccnmues 2, 12, 14, 15, Al Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church, et al. v. The Presbytery of Baltimore of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, et al., 52 Md. App. 428, 449 A. 2d 1190 (1982) (Opinion’ of Maryland Court of Special Appeals) 0.2.2.2... 9 Iv Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church, et al. v. The Presbytery of Baltimore of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, et al., Ap- pendix D (Opinion of Maryland Trial Court) .......... 9, A39 Foss v. Dykstra, S.D., 319 N.W. 2d 499 (1982) (Original | ee see 12, 14 Foss v. Dykstra, S.D. (Nov. 23, 1983) (yet unreported) (Second South Dakota decision) (Appendix E) ........ 12, 14, 15, 16, A57 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 99 S. Ct. 3020, 61 L. Ed. 2d | RE eee 12, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29 Jones v. Wolf, 241 Ga. 208, 243 S.E. 2d 860 (1978) ...... 20-21 Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 73 S. Ct. "Me. Oe... ee 22 Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 80 S. Ct. 1037, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1140 (1960) 2.2... ee eeeeceeeeees 22 Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 74 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1982) Sharpsburg, 249 Md. 650, 241 A. 2d 691 (1968), vac. 393 U.S. 528 (1969), reaff’d, 254 Md. 162 (1969) 19 Presbyterian Church in the United States, et al., v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Church, et al., 398 U.S. 440, 21 L. Ed. 2d 658, 89 S. Ct. 601 (1969) ...19-20 Presbytery of Riverside v. Community Church of Palm Springs, 89 Cal. App. 3rd 910, 152 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Ct. App., 4th Dist. 2nd Div., 1979), cert. den. 444 U.S. 974, 100 S. Ct. 469, 62 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1979) ...12, 13 14, 15 Piletich, et al. v. Deretich, et al., Minn., 328 N.W. 2d Be I eccttistecahinewstcsrsecuicbhieiiapniniihiaaiadnsilaa cei tial 21, 22 Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 49 L. Ed. 2d 151, 96 S. Ct. 2372 (1976) 21 No. 83- In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1983 BABCOCK MEMORIAL PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, a body corporate, et al., Petitioners,' vs. THE PRESBYTERY OF BALTIMORE OF THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Respondents.” PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND 1. Petitioners are: Robert B. Louthan, Howard E. Hill as Pastor and Assistant Pastor of Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church; Donald J. Dean, Jr., R. Dale Mershon, Forrest H. Wil- liams, S. Ralph Reed, Jr., Raymond R. Baker, Bruce B. Burns, John J. Vanko, Donald P. Childs, Mirvin H. Metzger, Charles H. Masters, James D. Foote, William E. Cole, James B. Pfeiffer as members of Session of Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church; Kathleen M. Brown, Donald L. Evans, J. Fred Maienshein, Richard S. Myer, Craig S. Habicht, Donald B. Munro, Robert D. Fagan, Charles G. Walker, John E. Cyphers, and Marvin H. Stever as members of Board of Trustees of Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church; and Mark E. Werner II, Lawrence P. Steele, Jr., Gary Armstrong, Harry Fisher, Howard M. Flynn, and Roy Pauley as members of Session and Board of Trustees of Merritt Boulevard Presbyterian Church of Dundalk, Inc. 2. Respondents are: The Presbytery of Baltimore of The United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, an unincorporated association; and Richard L. Werley, George R. Demass, Joseph Hsu, Robert S. Baird, H. Burke Carr, William R. Hildebrand, Arthur H. Joslin, Jr.. Mary R. Lawrence, Marshal McCord, W. Bruce Shoemaker, Steven Stevens and Russell C. Walters, constituting an Administrative Commission of The Pres- bytery of Baltimore of The United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. 2 Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church, a body corpo- rate, et al., respectfully petition for a Writ of Certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in the above entitled case. OPINION BELOW The Opinion of The Court of Appeals of Maryland is reported at 464 A. 2d 1008 (Md. 1983) (App. A p. Al). The Order of The Court of Appeals of Maryland denying reconsideration is not reported (App. B p. AlQ). JURISDICTION The judgment of The Court of Appeals of Maryland was entered on August 17, 1983. The Order of The Court of Appeals of Maryland denying a timely Petition for Re- consideration was entered on September 27, 1983. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. Sec- tion 1257(3) and 28 U.S.C. Section 2101(c). CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED U. S. Const., Amend. I: Congress shall make no law respecting an establish- ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof * **. U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, Sec. 1: * * * nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law * * *. STATEMENT OF THE CASE On June 25, 1891, the Park Presbyterian Church of Baltimore City (later re-named Babcock Memorial Pres- byterian Church-hereinafter Babcock) was incorporated under the General Religious Corporations Law of the State of Maryland. The original Charter contained the following articles: Article I: The object of this Corporation shall be the establishment and maintenance of a Presbyterian Church in the City of Baltimore. Article VI: The Park Presbyterian Church of Balti- more City shall forever remain a Presbyterian Church in accordance with the Standards of the Presbyterian Church of the United States. Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church’s charter has been amended several times, including the deletion of Article VI on March 23, 1981. All the real and personal property of Babcock is titled in the corporation without any reference to any denominational affiliation. Other than certain spe- cific minor donations, all funds used to acquire and maintain Babcock’s property (both real and personal) resulted from the efforts and donations of the local congregation and no funds were given to Babcock by any higher United judi- catories. In 1893, the Park Presbyterian Church was enrolled as a member of the Presbytery of Baltimore of the Pres- byterian Church in the United States of America (one of the predecessors of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America-hereincalled United). United is an association of local United Presbyterian 4 churches organized into and governed by an ecclesiastical connectional, hierarchical structure consisting of four dis- trict bodies known as judicatories. The composition, struc- ture and powers of these judicatories, as well as other pro- visions relating to the government of and relations within United are found in the Constitution referred to as the Book of Order. The judicatories of United in ascending order of authority according to the powers given or re- served to them by The Book of Order, are: (1) the Session of the local church; (2) the Presbytery, composed of all the United Presbyterian Churches in a geographical area; (3) the Synod, generally composed of the presbyteries in a given state or region; and (4) the General Assembly, the highest governing body within United. The Book of Order contains several provisions relating to the powers of the governing bodies of the local church. These bodies are the Session, the body charged with having authority over all the affairs of the local church, and the Trustees, who in Maryland are the members of the corpora- tion which is the legal residuary of title to the property of the local church. There are also some provisions in the Book of Order relating to the ownership of property, both real and personal, by local churches, and the relation- ship to such property by the higher judicatories of the United Presbyterian Church. A brief review of some of these sections will be instrumental in the Court’s under- standing of the case. Section 41.08 (App. F) accords authority over all af- fairs and activities of the local church to the Session “ex- cept such matters as may, by this Form of Government, be specifically accorded to the pastor, to the congregation, or to a higher judicatory.” This section also places the Board of Trustees directly under the authority of the Session. 5 Section 62.04 (App. F) grants to the Board of Trustees the authority to “receive, hold, encumber, manage and transfer property, and to facilitate the management of its civil affairs in such manner as may be directed by the session of the particular church from time to time and ac- cording to the Constitution”. The authority granted to the Board of Trustees is limited by the provisions of Section 62.08 (App. F) which requires that “they shall deal with such property only as they may be authorized or directed by the session, and their authority in respect to the selling, mortgaging, and leasing of real property shall be subject also to any rights reserved to the congregation by civil law or by the by-laws of the particular church and to the permission of presbytery as herein provided. The Trustees of a particular church shall exercise any other powers or authorities vested in them by civil law in con- formity with the actions of the session as conveyed to them from time to time.” The circumstances requiring the permission of the Presbytery referred to in Section 62.08 are enumerated in Section 62.12, which states: A particular church shall not sell, mortgage or other- wise encumber any of its real property . . . without the written permission of the presbytery transmitted through the session of the particular church. A particular church shall not lease its real property used for purposes of worship, or lease for more than five years any of its other real property, without the written permission of the presbytery transmitted through the session of the particular church. A final section dealing with the property of a local church is Section 62.11 which provides as follows: Whenever hereafter a particular church is formally dissolved by the presbytery, or has become extinct by reason of the dispersal of its members, the abandon- ment of its work, or other cause, such property as it may have, both real and personal, shall be held, used and applied for such uses, purposes, and trusts as the presbytery may direct, limit and appoint, or such property may be sold or disposed of as the presbytery may direct, in conformity with the Constitution of The United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. In the Trial Court this case was submitted on an “Agreed Statement of Facts” stipulated by the parties. In this Stipulation the following facts were agreed not to be in dispute and were deemed admitted by the parties, to wit: 1. Except for 62.11 quoted above, there is no specific provision in the Constitution of UNITED or any rel- evant document of title involved in the case at Bar, which gives the Presbytery of Baltimore or any higher judicatory in UNITED, any proprietary or contractual interests in the real or personal property involved in this lawsuit. Likewise, on March 14, 1981, and prior to that date, there was no specific provision in the Consti- tution of UNITED imposing an express trust on local church property for the benefit of the presbytery, the synod, the General Assembly or the denomination as a whole. 2. On March 14, 1981, and to the present date, Bab- cock has not been dissolved by the Presbytery or be- come extinct by reason of the dispersal of the church’s members, the abandonment of the church’s work or other cause. Nor has Babcock’s Board of Trustees been dissolved or its members removed by any action of the Presbytery. 7 3. There are no express provisions in the Constitution of UNITED outlining any method or procedure for a local UNITED Church to change its denominational affiliation, nor is there any express provision per- mitting or prohibiting a local church to withdraw from UNITED. Except as Section 62.11 may apply, there are no specific provisions in the Book of Order im- posing a penalty or forfeiture of property upon such a withdrawal. 4. Both on June 25, 1891, when Park Presbyterian Church was originally incorporated, and at present, there was and is no specific provision in the Constitu- tion of the denomination mandating that a local church include language in its corporate charter or deeds re- quiring the local church or its property to always re- main a part of UNITED. 5. The Board of National Mission of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America loaned Bab- cock $5,000.00 secured by a mortgage dated September 26, 1951. This mortgage contains the following pro- vision: “Whereas this mortgage and the obligation which it secures shall become due and payable im- mediately upon the mortgagor’s severing its denom- inational connection with the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, ceasing to exist as an organization, failure to use the structure erected on the premises described herein as a church building, or divesting itself to the title to the premises.” (App. G) (Emphasis supplied). Certain disputes, ecclesiastical in nature, arose be- tween Babcock and United, culminating in a decision by the Session of Babcock that affirmative action be taken. On March 14, 1981, Babcock’s Session determined that ap- propriate actions be taken to sever Babcock’s relationship with United and its constituent bodies. On March 23, 1981 at a duly constituted meeting called by the Session and Board of Trustees on March 14, 1981, the membership of the Babcock congregation voted by an overwhelming majority (228 to 6) to withdraw from United and its con- stituent judicatories. At that same meeting, the member- ship of the congregation approved, ratified and adopted as their action the actions taken by the Session and Board of Trustees which included the severing of Babcock’s rela- tion with United and Babcock’s conveying all of its real and personal property as gifts to Merritt Boulevard Presby- terian Church of Dundalk, Inc. (hereinafter called Merritt). Merritt was incorporated in Maryland on April 15, 1980 as an unaffiliated Presbyterian Church. On March 22, 1981, the Administrative Commission of United, which was appointed by Presbytery to replace the Session at Babcock, took control of the Babcock main church building and chapel by placing security guards in one or both buildings. On March 23, 1981, with the assistance of those security guards, these representatives of United re- quired certain Babcock congregants to leave the premises and then changed the locks to the Babcock Church build- ings. Requests to United for possession of the Babcock buildings were denied. Merritt then filed suit in ejectment and trespass to regain possession of the property against United and its representatives. United and its representative then filed a suit in equity inst Babcock, its former »astor, its former associate or, a number of persons who were members of the deposed Session of Babcock, the various individual members of the Board of Trustees of Babcock, Merritt, and the members of the Session of Merritt. It sought an interlocutory and permanent injunction against interference with United and its representatives in the exercise of its authority over the affairs of Babcock, that 9 Merritt and the members of its Session be ordered to trans- fer and convey to Babcock the real and personal property received by it from Babcock, an accounting, and other relief. Former members of Babcock filed a counterclaim for release of its personal property. The cases were consolidated and submitted to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on the Agreed State- ment of Facts. The Trial Court found that United main- tained a congregational polity with respect to the use and ownership of local church property and that the original Babcock Session and its Board of Trustees were legally entitled to make absolute and irrevocable gifts of that church’s real and personal property to Merritt (App. D). An appeal was filed with the Court of Special Appeals of the State of Maryland, which reversed the decision of the Trial Court 52 Md. App. 428, 449 A. 2d 1190 (1982). The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted a Writ of Cer- tiorari. On hearing the Court of Appeals confirmed the decision of the Court of Special Appeals (App. A). On September 27, 1983, the Court of Appeals denied Peti- tioners’ timely Petition for Reconsideration (App. B). This Petition for Writ of Certiorari followed. The federal questions here sought by Petitioners to be reviewed were raised as follows: 1. In oral argument by Counsel for Petitioners be- fore the Trial Court, it was stated “Now then, having dealt then with a little bit of the nature of the church, this Court is well aware that the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States states that Congress shall, in part, make no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free ex- ercise thereof. And since now in our system of ju- risprudence the Fourteenth Amendment has made that First Amendment applicable to the states, it is ap- plicable to Maryland, and you might as well say Mary- 10 land can make no law respecting the establishment of religion nor deny the free exercise thereof. Therefore, since the parties to this present litigation are religous organizations, any resolution of the issue in this case must stand the scrutiny by this civil court of the pro- hibitions of the First Amendment litigation. So I want to now spend a little time with this Court dis- cussing the prohibitions that are developed in the First Amendment litigation as they apply to this case”. Then followed a long argument concerning these fed- eral questions. 2. In Petitioners’ Brief in the Court of Special Ap- peals of Maryland, the first statement relates to these federal questions, as follows: “Since the parties to this litigation are religious organizations, the Trial Court recognized that any resolution of the issues must withstand the scrutiny of the judicial principles and restraints developed in First Amendment litigation regerding the establishment and free exercise of re- ligion clauses”. Then follows a long discussion of these federal questions as they relate to the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 3. Petitioners raised as one of the Questions presented in their brief to the Court of Appeals as follows: “Whether the Court of Special Appeals violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. . .” 4. In each of the briefs submitted by Petitioners to the Trial Court, the Court of Special Appeals and the Court of Appeals, Amendments 1 and 14 to the Con- stitution of the United States were mentioned as con- stitutional provisions involved in this case. 5. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration in the Court of Appeals of Maryland (App. C) raised these federal questions throughout. ll REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT I THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND HAS DECIDED A FEDERAL QUESTION IN A WAY IN CONFLICT WITH COURTS OF LAST RESORT IN CALIFORNIA AND SOUTH DAKOTA INVOLVING THE WITHDRAWAL OF A LOCAL CONGREGATION FROM THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. On March 23, 1981 Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church (Babcock), by a vote of 228 to 6, in a congrega- tional meeting duly called for that purpose, voted to with- draw from the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America (United) and its constituent judicatories, including the Presbytery of Baltimore (Presbytery) and sought to retain its local church property after the sever- ance. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that United had an interest in the Babcock property and thus refused to allow the local congregation at Babcock to withdraw and retain its local church property. Thus the Court of Appeals of Maryland has awarded an interest in local church prop- erty titled in Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church, a body corporate, to the Presbytery of Baltimore, a judi- catory of United, after a due severance of the denomina- tional connection by the local church even though in the United Constitution there was no provision prohibiting such a severance or imposing any penalty or forfeiture of prop- erty upon such action, and no provision imposing an ex- press trust on the local property on behalf of United; and there was no language in the instrument by which the local church acquired the property showing any connection with United or expressing any trust therein for the denomina- tion. 12 In the case of Presbytery of Riverside v. Community Church of Palm Springs, 89 Cal. App. 3rd 910, 152 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Ct. App., 4th Dist., 2nd Div., 1979), cert. den. 444 U.S. 974, 100 S. Ct. 469, 60 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1979) (Com- munity Church) the appellate courts of California were faced with a factual situation almost identical to that in the case at bar. That case also involved the question of ownership of local church property by a church which had formerly been a member of United and withdrawn. The same Book of Order (church constitution) was presented to both the California and Maryland courts. The California Appellate Court held that the local church was the abso- lute owner of its property, that the local church had a right to withdraw from United, and that United did not have any interest in the local church’s property. The Maryland Court reached the exact opposite conclusion in Babcock although both Courts were using the neutral prin- ciples of law approach. More recently, the South Dakota Supreme Court has decided, under the neutral principles of law approach de- veloped in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979), that a local congregation could withdraw from United and keep its local church property. The South Dakota Court initially adopted the neutral principles approach in the case of Foss v. Dykstra, S.D., 319 N.W. 2d 499 (1982). After that case had been remanded to the Trial Court for a review in light of the adoption of the neutral principles approach, the South Dakota Supreme Court re-examined the same church constitution presented to the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Babcock and rendered an opinion on November 23, 1983 (App. E) that this constitution did not contain any language granting to the denomination any interest in the local church property and that the local church had a right to withdraw from United, by majority vote, and keep its local church property. 13 A comparison of the facts in the California case of Community Church, and the Maryland case of Babcock will show the factual similarities between the cases. The facts in Babcock have been previously set out in the Statement of the Case. In Community Church we see the following: 1. “It is undisputed, of course, that Community Church has title to and possession of all the property in dis- pute both, real and personal”. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 931. 2. “The original Articles of Incorporation of Com- munity Church recited that it was ‘a church organized under and adhering to the doctrines and disciplines of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America’ and provided that the corporation ‘shall be | at all times subject and adhere to the doctrines and disciplines of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America’...”. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 929. 3. “Community Church unilaterally terminated its af- filiation with UPCUSA”. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 914. 4. “UPCUSA claims ownership and the right to pos- session of all the real and personal property standing in the name of Community Church and possessed by it on the date it terminated its affiliation with UPCUSA”. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 914. 5. United “is organized in a hierarchical structure of ascending representation levels of ecclesiastical autho- rity called judicatories. That part of its constitution dealing with the system of government is designated ‘the Book of Order’”’. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 915. 6. “The congregants of Community Church, by an overwhelming majority, voted to withdraw from United. Then, United appointed an Administrative Commission to take over Community Church”. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 918-919. 14 7. “With the exception of a small amount of money received from the Presbytery of Riverside early in Com- munity Church’s history, all funds used to purchase and improve properties of Community Church came from its members or non-member individuals residing in or visiting the desert area of Riverside County and not from or through the efforts of Plaintiffs (UPCUSA)”. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 929. Likewise a comparison of the facts in the South Dakota case of Foss v. Dykstra, and the Maryland case of Babcock will show the factual similarities between these cases. In Foss v. Dykstra we see the following: 1. “Record title is vested in local church corporation, organized and existing under the laws of South Dakota”. (App. E p. A60). 2. “On November 24, 1980, due to doctrinal differ- ences, a majority of the members of a Local Church by vote of 198 to 32 adopted a ‘Resolution of Seces- sion’ to sever affiliation with UPCUSA”. (App. E pp. A58). 3. “National Church responded by initiating this action to obtain, use, control and possession of a Local Church’s real and personal property”. (App. E p. A58). 4. “The parties agree that the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America is a hierar- chical organization as distinguished from congrega- tional form of church associations”. 319 N.W. 2d at 499. 5. Local Church borrowed money from United and gave a mortgage as security. This mortgage contained a provision that: “This mortgage and the obligation which it secures shall become due and payable immediately upon the 15 mortgagor’s severing its denominational connection with the General Assembly of United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. . .”. (App. E p. A61). The conclusions reached by the Maryland, California and South Dakota Courts based on similar factual situa- tions as they scrutinized and applied neutral principles to the Constitution of United, are as follows: A. In Babcock the Maryland Court concluded: 1. ... “that Babcock is not a congregational church but the relationship here is one that is hierarchical in nature. Accordingly the Presbytery has an interest in this property”. (App. A p. Al6). 2. By failing to rule on Babcock’s right-to-withdraw in its initial opinion (App. A) and denying Babcock’s Motion for Reconsideration (App. C), the Court in effect denied Babcock the right, by majority vote, to withdraw from the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of United and maintain the ownership and right to control its local church property. B. In Community Church the California Court con- cluded: 1. “It is undisputed that a local church within UPCUSA may withdraw and terminate its affiliation”. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 924. 2. “The property of a local church, even one that is part of a general church organization of a hierarchical structure, is held in trust by a religious non-profit cor- poration for the benefit of the local church congrega- tion”. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 927. C. In Foss v. Dykstra the South Dakota Court con- cluded: ae SE ET 16 1. “We determined that Local Church is entitled to control over this local church property and that Na- tional Church has no interest therein”. (App. E p. A68). 2. “Here, the majority of members of Ebenezer United Presbyterian Church voted to withdraw from UPCUSA. Since there are no express provisions to overcome this presumption of majority representation, this majority represents Ebenezer United Presby- terian Church. Accordingly, we affirm Trial Court’s decision awarding control of local church property to a Local Church”. (App. E p. A67). It is obvious that these State Courts have differing opinions as to the exact meaning of this Court’s instructions in Jones v. Wolf, and consequently have rendered conflict- ing decisions affecting local churches of the same denom- ination. It is clear that in Jones v. Wolf this Court stated that unless there is express language of trust in legally cognizable form in the instruments of title or in the con- stitution of the denomination, then no such trust can be inferred or implied through a searching inquiry into the church constitution. But State Courts continue to render conflicting opinions on this Federal Question. Not only have the courts of last resort of the jurisdictions of Mary- land, California and South Dakota issued contrary opinions involving the same denomination; but litigation is also pending at various stages involving local congregations who have withdrawn from United or The Presbyterian Church in the United States in the States of New York,’ 3. First Presbyterian Church of Schenectady, et al. v. United Presbyterian Church in the United States and Presbytery of Albany. This case involves a United church and the United denomination. Judgment rendered February 12, 1981 in Supreme Court of New York, Saratoga County awarding property to local church that had withdrawn from United. Order reversing en- tered by Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division of the Third Judicial Department on March 21, 1983. Case now on appeal to Court of Appeals of New York. 17 Ohio,‘ Michigan,’ Pennsylvania,’ Missouri,’ Tennessee,* 4. Bernadine Christensen, et al. v. Richard Roumfort, et al. Opinion and Judgment entered on September 13, 1983 in the Court of Common Pleas, Case No. C.V. 983, in Mahoning County, Ohio. This case involves Tabernacle United Presbyterian Church which voted to withdraw from Eastminster Presbytery of United. Trial Court concluded that local church could withdraw and keep its property. Case is on appeal. 5. Calvary Presbyterian Church v. Presbytery of Lake Huron of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. This case involves a local church in Flint, Michigan, which withdrew from the United denomination. On February 28, 1983, the Trial Court, the Circuit Court for the County of Gen- essee, entered a judgment for the United. Case is now on appeal. 6. The Presbytery of Beaver-Butler of the United Presby- terian Church in the United States, et al. v. Middlesex Presby- terian Church, et al. This case involves a United local church which withdrew from the United denomination. The Trial Court, the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County, Pa. awarded the property to the local church. The case is now on appeal in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, Docket No. 1740-CD-1982. The Presbytery of Philadelphia of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, et al. v. The Tenth Presbyterian Church, et al. This case involves a United local church which withdrew from the United denomination. By Judgment entered July 26, 1983, the Trial Court ruled that the local church could not withdraw from United and retain control of its property. Case is on appeal in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. The Presbytery of Donegal v. Wayne Wheatley, et al. in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, Pa., Docket No. 1456 (In Equity, 1981). This case involves Faggs’ Manor Pres- byterian Church of Cochranville, Pa. which withdrew from the United denomination. Case being held in Trial Court awaiting outcome of other similar cases. The Presbytery of Donegal v. S. Reed Calhoun, et al. in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, Pa., Docket No. 78-80 (In Equity). This case involves Coatesville Presbyterian Church, a local church, which withdrew from the United de- nomination. Case being held in Trial Court awaiting outcome of other similar cases. Presbytery of Philadelphia, et al. v. J. R. Miller Memorial Presbyterian Church, et al. in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, Pa., Docket No. 80-12077. This case involves a local Presbyterian church which withdrew from the United denomination. Case is being held in Trial Court awaiting outcome of other similar cases. Printer’s Note: Due to the length of the footnotes and the page, footnotes 7 and 8 can be found on p. 18. 18 Texas.’ Additionally there are many cases pending involv- ing other denominations on these same issues. It is of the utmost importance that the First Amend- ment rights guaranteed under the Constitution be uni- formly applied throughout the nation. Consequently a further clarifying opinion from this Court is required. II THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND IN- CORRECTLY INTERPRETED THIS COURT’S RUL- ING IN JONES V. WOLF, IN GRANTING UNITED AN INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY OF A WITH- DRAWN..LOCAL CHURCH IN THE ABSENCE OF TRUST LANGUAGE IN SOME “LEGALLY COG- NIZABLE FORM” IN FAVOR OF THE DENOMINA- TION. In Jones v. Wolf this Court cautioned denominations, such as United, that they should modify deeds, corporate charters, or church constitutions to recite an express trust 7. Presbytery of Eligah Parish Lovejoy, et al. v. Memorial Presbyterian Church of St. Louis, et al. This case involves a local church which withdrew from the United denomination. The Trial Court the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri on December 16, 1982 held that under the rule of deference of Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871), which has been followed by Missouri, the denomination was entitled to the local church’s property. Case is now on appeal in the Missouri Court of Ap- peals, Eastern District, Docket No. 46810. 8. Presbytery of Middle Tennessee, et al. v. The Madison Presbyterian Church, Inc., et al. This case involves a local church which withdrew from the PCUS denomination (same de- nomination in Jones v. Wolf case). On August 5, 1983 the Trial Court in the Chancery Court for the State of Tennessee, 9th Division, Davidson County, rendered an opinion awarding the property to the local church under the Jones v. Wolf decision. Case is on appeal to Supreme Court of Tennessee. 9. Grace Union Presbytery, Inc. v. Casa Linda Presbyter- ian Church, Cause No. 81-3584J in the 191st District Court of Dallas, Texas. This case involves UPCUSA-PCUS Union Pres- bytery and church. Case is pending on motion for summary judgment in the Trial Court. 19 if the denomination expected to exert control over local church property; and therein this Court stated that if such trust language existed, civil courts would be bound to enforce it provided it was contained in some “legally cognizable form”. 443 U.S. at 606. In Jones v. Wolf this Court continued by cautioning state courts that adopted the neutral principles approach for resolving church prop- erty disputes to review religious documents using “special care to scrutinize the document in purely secular terms” to determine if the parties intended to create a trust. 443 U.S. at 604. The Courts of the State of Maryland were one of the originators of the neutral principles approach in such disputes, Maryland and Virginia Eldership v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, 249 Md. 650, 241 A. 2d 691 (1968), vacated 393 U.S. 528, reaff’d, 254 Md. 162, 254 A. 2d 162 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 367 (1970), and the Court of Appeals of Maryland acknowledged the continued use of that approach in the present case (App. A p. Al7). How- ever it is obvious that the Court of Appeals of Maryland erred in its attempt to apply the neutral principles analy- sis, as refined by this Court in Jones v. Wolf, to the facts presented in the present case. The Court of Appeals of Maryland apparently held that United, or its affiliate the Presbytery of Baltimore, had an interest in this local church property for two separate reasons. First, the Court held that because United was “hierarchical in nature” the Presbytery had an interest in the local church property. The Court noted as follows: ... that Babcock is not a congregational church but the relationship here is one that is hierarchial [sic] in nature. Accordingly, the Presbytery has an interest in this property (App. A p. Al6). This reasoning is diametrically opposed to that contained in this Court’s opinions in Presbyterian Church v. Hull 20 Church, 398 U.S. 440, 21 L. Ed. 2d 658, 89 S. Ct. 601 (1969) and in Jones v. Wolf. In this Court’s initial enunciation of the neutral principles approach in Hull, the Court noted that the denomination there involved, Presbyterian Church in the United States (PCUS), was “hierarchical”. 21 L. Ed. 2d at 661. Also, in Jones v. Wolf, this Court noted in its initial paragraph that the denomination there involved, PCUS, was a “hierarchical church organization”. 443 U.S. at 597. The denominational similarities between PCUS and United were demonstrated by their merger in June 1983 to form the denomination known as the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America (PCUSA). In neither Hull nor Jones v. Wolf was the mere fact that the denomination was “hierarchical” alone sufficient to de- termine that the presbyteries there involved had any in- terest in the local church property. For a court to make such a determination without a review of the particular portions of the church constitution involving property would be a clear violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In the very first sentence of Jones v. Wolf, this Court wrote: This case involves a dispute over the ownership of church property following a schism in a local church affiliated with a hierarchical church organization. 443 U.S. at 597 (emphasis added). If the mere fact that the structure of the denomination was “hierarchical” had been sufficient to give the denomi- nation an interest in the property, then Jones v. Wolf would have ended with that first sentence. If this Court had applied the judicial principle in Jones v. Wolf that the Maryland Court applied in the case at bar, then the local church property would have been awarded to the denomi- nation rather than to the majority faction of the local church. But when Jones v. Wolf was remanded to the Su- 21 preme Court of Georgia in the light of this Court’s decision, the Supreme Court of Georgia held: The Trial Court found that the Vineville Presbyterian Church had been a connectional church within the Augusta-Macon Presbytery and the Presbyterian Church in the United States but correctly held that more than a mere connectional relationship between the local church and the general church must exist to give rise to property rights in the general church. 243 S.E. 2d at page 864. The Court of Appeals of Maryland obviously violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and mis- applied the neutral principles approach by granting to the Presbytery an interest in this local church property sim- ply because the denomination was “hierarchial [sic] in nature”. The dangers of such an approach were pointed out in the recent case of Piletich v. Deretich, Minn., 328 N.W. 2d 696, decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota on De- cember 30, 1982. That case involved the same Serbian Eastern Orthodox denomination that was involved in the case of Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) decided by this Court. In Piletich the factual situation is similar to the case at bar; and there the Minnesota Court warned against deciding these types of cases on structure alone. After recognizing that mere structure alone is insufficient to give the denomination an interest in the property, the Minnesota Court then looked at the majority rule principle as set out in Jones v. Wolf. The Minnesota Court found that the Constitution of the denom- ination gave church congregations the power to “acquire and hold either personal or real properties, and have all the rights and obligations in that capacity.” 328 N.W. 2d at 702. That Court then found that the presumptive rule of 22 majority representation must result in a judgment for the majority in the local church under the deeds, local charter, and the Constitution of the denomination following the directions of this Court in Jones v. Wolf. In speaking of the reasons the neutral principles approach is a better approach than other approaches, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated: This approach obviates consideration of what litigants belong to a “hierarchical church”, an area fraught with constitutional pitfalls and provides a forum even for members of a hierarchical church which has not developed effective rules for settling property disputes among members. 328 N.W. 2d at 701. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Piletich unanimously rejected the mi- nority’s trust argument and held that the local church cor- poration could retain its property. The Court recognized that judicial resolution of church property disputes must be “contract-based” with courts “deferring to decisions of church hierarchy only when the church rules or constitu- tion. . . specifically require.” 328 N.W. 2d at 701. Thus to give a denomination an interest in local church property simply on the basis that the denomination is “hierarchical” is to “establish a religion” in direct violation of the prohibition in the First Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. Such would violate the mandates of this Court in the cases of Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) and Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960) which held that a State cannot do, by either legislative action or judicial fiat, for the parties what the parties have not first provided for between them- selves in their contract with each other. Hence in the case at bar, the binding of the local property to the denomination is solely by virtue of state action (judicial in this instance) 23 and clearly constitutes an establishment of religion of the denomination and denial of the free exercise of religion to the members of the local congregation. Secondly, the Court of Appeals of Maryland appar- ently refused to let this local church withdraw from this denomination and retain its property because: The Trustees of Babcock were bound by their own by-laws to follow the established mandates of United (App. A p. Al7). Indeed, both Article I, Section 2 and Article V, Section 3 of Babcock’s corporate by-laws acknowledge the affiliation of this local church corporation with United and that the corporation was “subject to” and “subordinate to” the Con- stitution of United. Obviously, all these by-law provisions do is refer the parties and the courts back to the Consti- tution of United to determine the respective rights of the parties in this local church property. It is undisputed that all parties in this church property dispute are bound by the terms of United’s Constitution as contained in its Book of Order. However, your Petitioners respectfully show that it was stipulated by the parties in this case that noth- ing in that Book of Order prohibits this local church from withdrawing from this denomination and retaining its local church property, and there was no express trust lan- guage in United’s Constitution that grants to the denomina- tion any interest in this property under the facts pre- sented in the case at bar. Six sections of United’s Constitution are cited in the Maryland Court of Appeals’ decision. These are Sections 41.08, 41.15, 62.04, 62.08, 62.11 and 62.12. (Sections com- parable to 41.08, 41.15, 62.04, 62.08 and 62.11 were in the PCUS Constitution which was before this Court in Jones v. Wolf and are contained in Appendix F.) Section 62.11 and 62.12 deal specifically with property and were the 24 ones most relied upon by the Maryland Court. These sec- tions must be read in the light of the stipulations in this case. The parties stipulated as follows: Except for 62.11 quoted above, there is no specific provision in the constitution of United or any relevant document of title involved in the case at bar, which gives the Presbytery of Baltimore or any higher judi- catory in United, any proprietary or contractual in- terest in the real or personal property involved in this lawsuit. Likewise, on March 14, 1981, and prior to that date, there was no specific provision in the Constitution of United imposing an express trust on local church property for the benefit of the presbytery, the synod, the General Assembly or the denomination as a whole. There are no express provisions in the Constitution of United outlining any method or procedure for a local United Church to change its denominational af- filiation, nor is there any express provision permitting or prohibiting a local church to withdraw from United: Except as Section 62.11 may apply, there are no spe- cific provisions in the Book of Order imposing a pen- alty or forfeiture of property upon such a withdrawal. * * * On March 14, 1981, and until the present date, Bab- cock has not been dissolved by the Presbytery, or become extinct by reason of the dispersal of the church’s members, the abandonment of the church’s work or other cause. From these stipulations it can be seen that United admits that no express trust is contained in its Constitution, with the possible exception of 62.11, and that United’s Consti- tution gives no proprietary or contractual interest in the 25 local church’s property to the Presbytery of Baltimore or any higher church court of United. When read in light of these stipulations, it is clear that Section 62.12 is a permissive rather than a proprietary grant. The denomi- nation received no property interest through this section nor has the denomination claimed that this section granted them any property interest in the local church property. It was merely a provision included in the Book of Order to prevent a local church from becoming financially over- burdened by overencumbering its real property. It grants to the Presbytery a veto over certain situations but does not grant the Presbytery any property interest. Fur- ther, it is to be noted that Section 62.12 does not purport to deal with all local church property. For example, it deals only with the real property and does not deal with personal property. It does not restrict a local church in buying real property not subject to an encumbrance, nor does it entitle Presbytery to any money or proceeds of a sale when local church property is sold. Additionally, it does not cause Presbytery to incur legal obligations to pay the debt of the local church simply by granting permission to the local church to mortgage its property. Accordingly, Section 62.12 is permissive and supervisory only. If any trust interest is created in the Book of Order it must be found in Section 62.11. While Section 62.11 of the Book of Order does provide for a trust in favor of United in the property of a local church, far from creating a general trust, it does so only in the very limited circumstances set out in the section. In order to invoke the trust powers of this section it is necessary that there either be a formal dis- solution of the local church by the Presbytery or the ex- tinction of the local church by reason of the dispersal of its members, the abandonment of the local church’s work or other cause. As the foregoing stipulation clearly in- dicates, the criteria required for the operation of Section 26 62.11 are not present in the case at bar. It is specifically stipulated that Babcock has not been dissolved by the Presbytery nor has it become extinct by reason of the dispersal of its members, the abandonment of its work or for other cause. Therefore, since it was expressly stipu- lated that when Babcock withdrew from United there was no express trust on local church property in favor of the denomination nor did United have any proprietary interest in Babcock’s property, either express or implied, except by virtue of Section 62.11, and it is further stipulated that the factors necessary to invoke Section 62.11 have not oc- curred in the case at bar, it is clear that neither United nor any of its constituent judicatories have any property interest in this local church property. As was pointed out in the case at bar, United attempted to pass an amendment to its Constitution in 1929 which would have imposed an express trust on local church property for the denomination. This amendment failed. It is the only time in the history of United that an attempt was made to impose such an express trust until after Jones v. Wolf. Recognizing that it had not developed effective rules for settling property disputes among its members, United then went to work to propose such a property amendment to its Constitution which would im- pose an express trust on local church property for the denomination. This amendment did pass and became a part of United’s Constitution in May 1981, after the con- troversy in the subject case arose. So at the time the dispute arose in the instant case, there was no trust in local church property for the denomination as has been stipulated by the parties in the Agreed Statement of Facts. Hence, it is clear that there is no language in “legally cognizable form” in the documents affecting the title to the property of Babcock nor in the documents affecting 27 the relationship of Babcock to United that create any interest for United in the property of Babcock. By grant- ing such an interest to United, the Maryland Court is in direct conflict with this Court’s decision in Jones v. Wolf. Two main questions were before the Maryland Court, to wit: 1. Could Babcock give its property to Merritt? 2. When a majority of the members of Babcock severed their ecclesiastical affiliation with United, did this majority retain the right to the ownership, use and possession of the property belonging to Babcock? (App. C p. A22). The Maryland Court answered the first question by stating that the gift from Babcock to Merritt was void. At this point we do not wish to argue with this conclusion. It is the Maryland Court’s answer to the second question that we raise specifically in this Petition. There the Maryland Court denied the majority of the members of Babcock their right to sever their ecclesiastical affiliation with United and retain the ownership, use and possession of Babcock’s property. This judgment by the Maryland Court was in spite of Stipulations in the Agreed Statement of Facts by the parties, to which we have previously pointed, that there was no method or procedure in United’s Con- stitution outlining any specific way or procedure for a local United church to change its denominational af- filiation nor was there any express provision permitting or prohibiting a local church from withdrawing from United nor was there any specific provision imposing a penalty or forfeiture of property upon such withdrawal, except as might be found in Section 62.11. We have further pointed to the mortgage on the disputed property given by Babcock in 1951 to the Board of National Missions of United (App. G) specifically stating that “this mortgage 28 and the obligation which it secures shall become due and payable immediately upon the mortgagor’s severing its denominational connection with the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of Amer- ica...” In Jones v. Wolf, this Court stated that in order for a civil court to enforce a trust on local church prop- erty on behalf of a denomination there must be language in some document in a “legally cognizable form”. We submit that this same reasoning would apply to the right of a local church to withdraw from a denomination. We submit that the above language clearly shows that the parties recognized the right of the local church to withdraw from the denomination and the right of the local church to its property upon a withdrawal. We believe this language should be as binding in favor of the local church as would language of trust in the documents be binding in favor of the denomination. The Maryland Court therefore incorrectly interpreted this Court’s ruling in Jones v. Wolf in denying Babcock the right to withdraw and keep its property in the light of this clear language “in legally cognizable form” as a part of the contract between the parties. Finally, we believe this Court’s reasoning in Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 74 L. Ed. 2d 297 (decided De- cember 13, 1982) applies to the case at bar. Therein, this Court made an excellent analysis of the prohibitions of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. One such prohibition is to avoid “an excessive government entanglement with religion’. In discussion of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment Chief Justice Burger wrote: As these and other cases make clear, the core rationale underlying the Establishment Clause is preventing “a fusion of governmental and religious functions.” 29 The Framers did not set up a system of government in which important, discretionary governmental powers would be delegated to or shared with religious institutions. 74 L. Ed. 2d at 307. The Maryland Court’s ruling in favor of United violates the test applied in Larkin. The unrebutted evidence shows that United’s internal laws did not give United a trust in Babcock’s property at the time Babcock disaffiliated; nor did those laws give any organ of United power to arbi- trate property disputes with disaffiliating churches. The Maryland Court’s decision would strip the members of Babcock of their property, regardless of whether the con- tract from which United draws its rights-the Book of Order- gives it such power. Giving a religious body civil power over members beyond those powers assented to by the members is nothing but a pro tanto delegation of govern- mental powers to that religious body. Such a delegation of power is flatly forbidden by Larkin. Such a delegation is even more indefensible, when as is the case here, the per- sons over whom the religious body seeks to assert power are no longer members of the religious body. Indeed, the Maryland Court’s ruling in this case would be even more egregiously violative of the Establishment Clause than the statute in Larkin for there is not even a colorable secular interest in so ruling. There can be no secular reason for a court to interfere with the contract formed by the in- ternal laws of United for all to read in the Book of Or- der. Larkin thus confirms that the Maryland Court vio- lated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in granting to United an interest in this local church’s property. For all these reasons, we submit that the Court of Appeals of Maryland incorrectly interpreted this Court’s ruling in Jones v. Wolf in granting United an interest in 30 the property of a withdrawn local church in the absence of trust language in some “legally cognizable form” in the favor of the denomination and in denying the right of a local church to withdraw and keep its property in the absence of the “legally cognizable” language prohibiting the same in the contract between the parties. CONCLUSION We respectfully urge the Court, for all of the reasons set forth above, to grant a Writ of Certiorari and to re- verse the decision below. Respectfully submitted, WARREN JACKSON WILLIAMSON (Counsel of Record) P.O. Box 467 Greenville, Alabama 36037 (205) 382-2635 Mark E, WERNER, II 1102 Court Square Building Baltimore, Maryland 21202 Davin S. PEARL 1209 Court Square Building Baltimore, Maryland 21202 Attorneys for Petitioners Al APPENDIX APPENDIX A Filed: August 17, 1983 OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND September Term, 1982 Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church, et al. v. The Presbytery of Baltimore of The United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, et al. Docket No. 102 Reported - 464 A.2d 1008 Opinion by Smith, J. In this case involving a dispute as to ownership and control of church property we shall affirm the decision of the Court of Special Appeals in Presbytery v. Babcock Mem. Pres. Ch., 52 Md. App. 428, 449 A.2d 1190 (1982). Judge Thompson stated for the Court of Special Appeals: “Certain disputes, ecclesiastical in nature, arose between Babcock [Memorial Presbyterian Church] and the higher judicatories of [The] United [Presby- terian Church in the United States of America], and A2 at an August 5, 1980 meeting, the Session [of Bab- cock] voted to recommend to the congregation that ap- propriate actions be taken to sever Babcock’s relation- ship with [the] Presbytery [of Baltimore] and United. On September 18, 1980, the Presbytery, at its regular monthly meeting, established an Administrative Com- mission to investigate the alleged disorders at Bab- cock and to recommend to the Presbytery whether Babcock’s Session should be dissolved and replaced with the Administrative Commission as provided in The Book of Order.* Meetings were held between the Commission and leadership and congregation of Bab- cock without resolution of the problem. The Session, on March 14, 1981, made an ‘absolute and irrevocable gift’ of the subject property to Merritt.‘ On March 16, 1981, after the deed of the real property had been recorded in the Land Records of Baltimore County, a letter advising of the gift transfers was hand delivered to Presbytery. On March 23, 1981, at a meeting called by the Session and Board of Trustees of Babcock, the membership voted by a majority of those present (228-6) to withdraw from United and its constituent judicatories. The membership further ratified and adopted as their action, the acts of the Session and the Board of Trustees in conveying the property as gifts to Merritt. “In late March 1981, the Administrative Commis- sion assumed possession of the Babcock property and required Babcock congregants to leave the premises. On several occasions thereafter, members of Merritt attempted to gain access to the church for purposes of a congregational meeting, but were denied by the ap- pellants. Merritt thereafter filed suit in ejectment and trespass to regain possession of the property and ee A3 the Presbytery and members of the Commission brought suit to have the deeds to Merritt set aside.” “3. Section 41.15 of The Book of Order provides: “*15. Whenever, after a thorough investigation, and after full opportunity to be heard has been ac- corded to the session in question, the presbytery of jurisdiction shall determine that the session of a par- ticular church is unable or unwilling to manage wisely the affairs of its church, the presbytery may appoint a commission composed of ministers and ruling elders, with the full power of a session. This commission shall take the place of the existing session, if any, which shall cease to act until such time as the presbytery shall otherwise direct.’ “4. Merritt Boulevard Presbyterian Church of Dundalk, Inc., was incorporated on April 15, 1980 as an unaffiliated Presbyterian Church. It has fourteen members and its principal place of worship is in Dun- dalk, Maryland.” 52 Md. App. 431-33. Merritt Boulevard Presbyterian Church of Dundalk, Inc., filed a suit in ejectment against the Presbytery of Baltimore of The United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America and the Administrative Commission des- ignated by it relative to Babcock. The suit sought to gain possession of real property at 8240 Loch Raven Boulevard in Baltimore County, said to have been conveyed to Mer- ritt by the Session and the Board of Trustees of Babcock. The Presbytery and its Administrative Commission than filed a suit in equity against Babcock, its former pastor, its former associate pastor, a number of persons who were members of the deposed Session of Babcock, the various A4 individual members of the Board of Trustees of Babcock, Merritt, and the members of the Session of Merritt. It sought an interlocutory and permanent injunction against interference with the Administrative Commission in the exercise of its authority over the affairs of Babcock, that Merritt and the members of its Session be ordered to trans- fer and convey to Babcock the real and personal property received by it from Babcock, an accounting, and other relief. Former members of Babcock filed a counterclaim for release of its personal property. The cases were sub- mitted to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on an agreed statement of facts. We are further informed by the agreed statement of facts: “Approximately 50 to 75 members of the Babcock congregation who remain members of UNITED met at Faith Presbyterian Church, 5400 Loch Raven Boule- vard, until June 21, at which time they resumed UNITED worship services and other related activities in the church building at 8240 Loch Raven Boulevard. Approximately 250 to 300 of those who have with- drawn from UNITED are meeting at the Loch Raven Elementary School. Babcock has not been dissolved by the Presbytery or become extinct by reason of the dispersal of its members, the abandonment of its work or other cause.” The trial court found “that ‘United’ maintains a con- gregational polity with respect to the use and ownership of local church property” and that the original Babcock Session and its Board of Trustees were legally entitled to make absolute and irrevocable gifts of that church’s real and personal property to Merritt. An appeal followed to the Court of Special Appeals which reversed. We granted a writ of certiorari. A5 I The Park Presbyterian Church of Baltimore City was incorporated in 1891. Art. VI of its charter provided that it should “forever remain a Presbyterian Church in ac- cordance with the Standards of the Presbyterian Church of the United States.” It began as a mission of Brown Memorial Presbyterian Church, a member of the Presby- tery of Baltimore, under the leadership of that church’s pastor, the Rev. Maltbie D. Babcock. It was originally located at North and Madison Avenues in Baltimore City on a lot purchased by funds provided as a part of Brown Memorial’s mission effort. Assistance in the erection of its church building was provided by friends of Dr. Babcock at Brown Memorial and by Brick Presbyterian Church in New York City. Virtually from its inception Park was a member of the Presbytery of Baltimore. The Presbytery of Baltimore was part of The Presbyterian Church in the United States of America which later merged with The United Presbyterian Church of North America to form the church now known as The United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. Park was incorporated under our general religious corporation law now embodied in Maryland Code (1975) $§ 5-301 to -313, Corporations and Associations Article.' Relative to what was then Code (1957) Art. 23, §§ 256 to 270, upon which those sections are based, Judge Barnes commented for the Court in Md. & Va. Eldership v. Sharps- burg, 249 Md. 650, 657, 241 A.2d 691 (1968) (Eldership I), 1. At the time of Park’s incorporation the General Assembly had not enacted legislation relative to Presbyterian churches such as that relative to the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America now found in Code (1975, 1982 Cum. Supp.) §§ 5-329 to -332, Corporations and Associations Article. We do not consider those sections in reaching our decision here. If we were to do so it would reinforce our conclusions. A6 vacated, 393 U.S. 528, reaff’d, 254 Md. 162, 254 A.2d 162 (1969) (Eldership II), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 367 (1970), that the statute “is based upon and largely follows the original legislation on this subject, ie., the Act of 1802, chapter 111.” We know not what the law of the Church was at the time of Park’s incorporation but today § 62.04 of United’s Book of Order requires each local church to be incorporated unless forbidden by state law. Despite inferences to the contrary which may be drawn from corporate names of some churches, “[u]nder the Maryland system of incorporating religious societies the trustees and not the congregation constitute the corpora- tion.” Phillips v. Insley, 113 Md. 341, 349, 77 A. 850 (1910), citing Bethel Church v. Carmack, 2 Md. Ch. 143 (1849), and Stubbs v. Vestry of St. John’s, 96 Md. 267, 275, 53 A. 917 (1902). Phillips was quoted in Gildenhorn v. Columbia R.E. Title, 271 Md. 387, 404, 317 A.2d 836 (1974). Numerous other states follow a similar procedure for church corporations. See C. Zollmann, American Church Law § 106 (1933). In 1901 the name of Park was changed to Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church of Baltimore City. That name, after relocation at 8240 Loch Raven Boulevard, was changed to Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church. At the time of the move to Loch Raven Boulevard the Presbytery made available to Babcock residual funds of Olivet Presbyterian Church of Canton. A plaque me- morializing that fact appears in the narthex of Babcock. In 1968 Babcock adopted a set of by-laws, Article 1, § 2 of which provides: “This church is affiliated with the United Presby- terian Church in the United States of America and is under the care of and subject to the jurisdiction A7 of the Presbytery of Baltimore. These By-Laws shall be subordinate to the Constitution of the United Pres- byterian Church and nothing contained herein shall be interpreted to the contrary.” The original deed to Babcock for the Loch Raven Boulevard land is to “The Babcock Memorial Presbyter- ian Church of Baltimore City, a corporation of the State of Maryland ....” Neither in the granting clause nor in the habendum clause is there any restriction of any kind. On May 15, 1980, the Board of Trustees and the Session of Babcock conveyed the land in question, without consideration, to Conduit, Inc., which in turn reconveyed the land in question to the named trustees of Babcock “for the uses and purposes and with the powers and subject to the limitations hereinafter set forth ....” In the habendum clause it is specified that the conveyance to the trustees is “in trust for the following uses and trust purposes and with the powers and subject to the limita- tions hereinafter set forth’ which include that they are to “hold title to the property .. . for the use and benefit of the majority of the active communicant members of that congregation presently identified as the congregation of the [sic] The Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church,” with further provisions as to who shall be members, for election of trustees, and notices of meetings. The trustees joined in the deed from Conduit “for the purpose of evi- dencing the assent of said church to the provisions [t]here- of” and also “for the express purpose of consenting to and accepting the trust and confidence imposed upon them.” No consent of the Presbytery was obtained for the deed to Conduit or the deed to Merritt although § 62.12 of The Book of Order of United provides that a church shall not sell, mortgage or encumber its real property without the Presbytery’s consent. A8 II In arguing for a reversal of the decision of the Court of Special Appeals, Babcock and Merritt contend that the latter court failed to employ the neutral principles of law doctrine as enunciated by this Court in Eldership I and II, that in awarding the property of the local church to the denomination the court followed the theory of im- plied trust declared by this Court in Eldership I “as not being the law of this state,” that it erred in awarding the property to the Presbytery “in the absence of a spe- cific finding that the deeds, local church charter, or constitution of the United Presbyterian Church contained language in a ‘legally cognizable form’ expressing a trust or causing a reverter or forfeiture of the property of the local church to United in the event of a schism or withdrawal by the local church,” and that it failed to comply with Maryland Rule 1086 in reviewing the findings of fact of the trial court. Since there was a stipulation between the parties as to the facts, there was no error on the latter point. III In Eldership I, 249 Md. 650, Judge Barnes said for the Court: “In considering questions in regard to the use of church property it is usually important, in the absence of express language in the deed conveying the prop- erty or making the gift, to consider the ‘polity’ or form of church government which the particular de- nomination has. In the note in 75 Harv. L. Rev., at pages 1143-4, the three general types of church polity are defined as follows: ‘At least three kinds of internal structure, or “polity,” may be discerned; congregational, pres- A9 byterial, and episcopal. In the congregational form, each local congregation is self-governing. The presbyterial polities are representative, au- thority being exercised by laymen and ministers organized in an ascending succession of judica- tories - presbytery over the session of the local church, synod over presbytery, and general as- sembly over all. In ‘the episcopal form power reposes in clerical superiors, such as bishops. Roughly, presbyterial and episcopal polities may be considered hierarchical, as opposed to congre- gational polities, in which the autonomy of the local congregation is the central principle.’ (Foot- notes omitted. ) “In many of the hierarchical churches there may be provisions in their Constitutions, Canon Law or other controlling documents or statutes which make it clear that the property is held in trust for the uses of the parent church and its discipline and appoint- ments. See, for example, Article 23, Section 313 (e) in regard to the holding of property-in the Methodist Church. There may be a requirement that the local church include provisions in the deeds to its property that it is held in trust for the parent church in con- formity to its worship, doctrine and discipline and, upon a departure therefrom, the property will revert to the hierarchical body. Even in the absence of such an express provision in the deeds to the local church property, there may be an implied consent by the local church that the local property is so held if the constitution, by-laws, canon law or statute provide to that effect. It thus appears that there are three methods by which a hierarchical denomination may maintain control of local church property: Al0 “1. It may require reverter clauses in the deeds to the property of the local churches. “2. It may provide in its constitution or by some other authoritative source for the reverting of the local church property to the hierarchical body upon withdrawal by a local congregation with an implied consent by tne local church to this provision. “3. It may obtain from the General Assembly an act providing for such a result.” 249 Md. at 662-63. Judge Thompson stated for the Court of Special Ap- peals: “United is organized and operated under a con- stitution which consists of two parts: ‘The Book of Confession’ and ‘The Book of Order.’ The Book of Order contains three parts, namely: the ‘Directory of Worship,’ the ‘Form of Government,’ and the ‘Book of Church Discipline.’ That part of the constitution at issue is the ‘Form of Government.’ United is an association of local United Presbyterian churches or- ganized into a hierarchical structure consisting of four distinct bodies known as judicatories (tribunals of ec- clesiastical authority). These tribunals in ascending order of authority, according to the powers given or reserved to them by The Book of Order, are: (1) the Session, which has authority over all the affairs and activities of the particular church, (2) the Presbytery, composed of all of the United Presbyterian Churches in a geographic area, (3) the Synod, generally com- posed of the Presbyteries in a given state or region, and (4) the General Assembly, the highest governing body within United. “The Presbytery of Baltimore is a non-profit, un- incorporated association, its principal office being in All the City of Baltimore. Its jurisdiction entails the su- pervision and care of those United Presbyterian Churches located in the City of Baltimore, central and western Maryland.” 52 Md. App. at 430-31. “The relationship of the hierarchical format of the Presbyterian form of government to ownership of church property was discussed in Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d (1973) where it was stated at 417: ‘Although the Presbyterian form of church government is without question hierarchical, there has been a considerable amount of litigation over the right of local Presbyterian churches to with- draw from the general church and retain the use and control of loca’ church property.... [T]his right is uniformly denied, on the ground that the local Presbyterian Church stands in a hierarchical relationship to the general church, with respect to property matters as in other areas.’ (footnote omitted). “United’s hierarchical structure is set out in The Book of Order. The tribunals are organized in as- cending order into (1) the church Session, composed of the elders of local church, (2) the Presbytery, composed of several churches in a geographical area, (3) the Synod, generally composed of all presbyteries within a state, and (4) the General Assembly, the highest governing body. See, Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 621, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979). “In Chapter XI of Section 41.08 of ‘Form of Gov- ernment’ it is provided, in pertinent part: ‘8. The church session shall have authority over all of the affairs and activities of the par- Al2 ticular church, except such matters as may, by this Form of Government, be specifically accorded to ...a higher judicatory. The session may from time to time delegate administrative responsi- bilities in respect to the care and management of church properties and in respect to the financial affairs of the church either to the board of trustees or to the board of deacons or in part to one and in part to the other, subject always to the su- perior authority and direction of the session.’ “Thus, the Session is the overseer of the church property subject to a higher judicatory if The Book of Order extends that authority to the higher judicatory. Calvary Pres. Church v. Presbytery, 39 Md. App. 405, 386 A.2d 357, cert. denied, 283 Md. 731 (1978). That the Presbytery is given this superior authority with respect to church property is shown by the following provisions of The Book of Order: ‘62.11 11. Whenever hereafter a_ particular church is formally dissolved by the presbytery, or has become extinct by reason of the dispersal of its members, the abandonment of its work, or other cause, such property as it may have, both real and personal, shall be held, used, and applied for such uses, purposes, and trusts as the presby- tery may direct, limit, and appoint, or such prop- erty may be sold or disposed of as the presbytery may direct, in conformity with the Constitution of The United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. ‘62.12 12. A particular church shall not sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber any of its real property and it shall not acquire real property Al3 subject to an encumbrance or condition without the written permission of the presbytery trans- mitted through the session of the particular church. ‘A particular church shall not lease its real property used for purposes of worship, or lease for more than five years any of its other real property, without the written permission of the presbytery transmitted through the session of the particular church.’ “These provisions establish that while many mat- ters, including the management of church property are initially committed to the Session and congregation of the local church, the actions on this local level remain subject to review by the Presbytery. Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. at 621.” 52 Md. App. 434-36. As was observed by the Supreme Court of Delaware in Pencader P. Church v. Gibson et al., 26 Del. Ch. 375, 385, 22 A.2d 782 (1941), “The denominational character of the religious society or congregation was plainly intended to affect the legal nature of the corporation authorized to be formed.” The Supreme Court of Illinois said in Lowe v. First Presbyterian Church, 56 Ill. 2d 404, 308 N.E.2d 801, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974): “The United Presbyterian Church is one of two substantial Presbyterian church bodies in this country. (Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 324, 418 n. 20, citing G. Weigel, Churches in North America (Schocken Books 1965, p. 34).) There are other smaller Presbyterian church bodies, all of similar governmental structure. That structure consists of a series of ascending bodies called Judicatories. At the lowest level is the Session com- posed of trustees, deacons and other members of the local congregation. At the secondary level is a Pres- 666 Al4 bytery made up of many local Presbyterian churches such as the Presbytery of Chicago, one of the plain- tiffs here. At the third level is a Synod comprised of a number of Presbyteries, and the supreme govern- ing body is the General Assembly, the actions of which are controlling at all lower levels. Plaintiffs’ allega- tion that this is the structure of the United Presby- terian Church is not contested, and the nature of the Presbyterian church governmental structure has been demonstrated in a series of cases collected in the annotation in 52 A.L.R.3d 324, at 417-423. It is clear that the United Presbyterian Church is hierarchical in governmental form in that each judicatory has control of those below it. The significance here of this struc- ture is that each member Presbyterian church is subject to the rules and directions of its Presbytery, Synod and Assembly.” 56 Ill.2d 411-12. In Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 20 L. Ed. (1872), the Supreme Court said: “The questions which have come before the civil courts concerning the rights to property held by ec- clesiastical bodies, may, so far as we have been able to examine them, be profitably classified under three general heads, which of course do not include cases governed by considerations applicable to a church es- tablished and supported by law as the religion of the state. “1, The first of these is when the property which is the subject of controversy has been, by the deed or will of the donor, or other instrument by which the property is held, by the express terms of the instru- ment devoted to the teaching, support, or spread of some specific form of religious doctrine of belief. “2. The second is when the property is held by a religious congregation which, by the nature of its Al5 organization, is strictly independent of other ecclesi- astical associations, and so far as church government is concerned, owes no fealty or obligation to any higher authority. “3. The third is where the religious congregation or ecclesiastical body holding the property is but a subordinate member of some general church organiza- tion in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a general and ultimate power of control more or less complete, in some supreme judicatory over the whole membership of that general organization.” 80 U.S. at 722-23. Article V, § 3 of Babcock’s by-laws provides: “The Board of Trustees shall be the body politic or corporate to act as Trustees in the name and behalf of the Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church to man- age the estate, property, interest and inheritance of the same, and to exercise all powers granted to religious corporations by the laws of the State of Maryland sub- ject to the provisions of the Constitution of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.” It is obvious that the case at bar falls in the third class set forth in Watson. Babcock was organized as a Presbyterian Church. Virtually from its inception it has continued as an integral part of a larger church body. It has been the recipient as a Presbyterian Church of gifts by virtue of its affiliation. It has recognized the authority and control of the higher judicatories of United. In Elder- ship I, 249 Md. 650, Judge Barnes said for the Court: “What was intended was to provide for the formation of religious corporations for local congregations which would hold, control and have power to dispose of the property of the religious corporations. The Act of 1802 and its successor acts in no way sought to establish ee Al6 any ecclesiastical polity. This was left to the corpora- tions themselves. By the nature of the law in regard to the formation of corporations generally, the religious corporation formed under it is controlled by trustees elected by the local membership. This is true of all member corporations. This does not mean that the religious corporation thus formed may not by contract - express or implied - adopt a presbyterial or episcopal polity and, if this is done, may provide for the holding of the local church property subject to the provisions of the constitution, charter or by-laws of a denomina- tion and the action of the authoritative agencies of such a denomination. This, however, is accomplished by the will and action of the local corporation and is in no way imposed by the State through its General Religious Corporation Law.” 249 Md. 673-74 (em- phasis in original). In Art. I, § 2 of its by-laws Babcock recognized its af- filiation with The United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. In that section and in Art. V, § 3 it recognized that it is subject to the constitution of United and its trustees are to exercise their powers subject to that constitution. In Art. I, § 2 of those by-laws Babcock recognized that it is “under the care of and subject to the jurisdiction of the Presbytery of Baltimore.” Thus by contract Babcock has adopted a presbyterial polity. We conclude, therefore, that the Court of Special Appeals Po did not err in its determination that Babcock is not a con- gregational church but the relationship here is one that is hierarchical in nature. Accordingly, the Presbytery has an interest in this property. Eldership I, 249 Md. 650, has been recognized or noted as the key neutral principles of law doctrine case. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-03, 99 S. Ct. 3020, 61 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1979). Under it we are obliged to apply neu- Al7 tral principles of law in determining the outcome of this controversy. Under the neutral principles of law doctrine we are not concerned with any dispute as to church doc- trine. Under the neutral principles of law doctrine in Eldership I and II the Court examined the deed, the local church charter, the State statutes governing the holding of church property, and the provisions in the constitution of the general church concerning the ownership and control of church property. In Eldership I, 249 Md. at 664, the Court noted that the constitution of the parent church body there contained no provision relative to control of local church property by the parent church. Here there is such a provision. Zollman, op. cit., § 154 states relative to by-laws: “Since by-laws validly passed are a part of the law governing the corporation and its members, they must be obeyed by all concerned. Where a committee, therefore, is empowered only to expend such sums of money as the society shall place at its disposal, such committee cannot incur large obligations in employ- ing counsel to unmask the unfitness of its pastor. “A person who voluntarily joins a church, tacitly agrees to be bound by all the rules and regulations of such church, and will not afterwards be allowed wholly to ignore and disregard such rules and regula- tions. As to all matters pertaining to the church, he is clearly bound by the rules and regulations of the church, unless the same are clearly illegal.” Id. at 157. The trustees of Babcock were bound by their own by-laws to follow the established mandates of United. It will be recalled that under § 62.12 of the Book of Order of United a church may not sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber any of its real property without the written permission Als of the Presbytery transmitted through the Session of the particular church nor may it lease its real property used for the purposes of worship or lease for more than five years any of its other real property without the written permission of the Presbytery transmitted through the Session of the particular church. Section 62.08 also refers to obtaining permission from the Presbytery to sell, mort- gage, or lease church property. We regard the restriction as equivalent to saying that property could not be alien- ated by a local church without permission of the Presby- tery. To hold otherwise is to permit accomplishing by subterfuge what could not be done directly. We conclude that if the local church under United’s Book of Order could not sell property without permission, it could not give it away. More importantly, however, applying neutral prin- ciples of law, the church corporation lacked power under Maryland corporation law to make the gift. It is ele- mentary that a corporation has only such powers as are expressly granted by its chapter or by statute and such as may impliedly be derived from its corporate purposes. Babcock was granted no power by its charter to dispose of all or any part of its assets by gift. The attempted gift here was not in accord with the corporate purpose of Babcock. The action here is analogous to that referred to in a somewhat different context in Fairmount Pres. Ch. v. Presbytery of Holston, 531 S.W.2d 301, 306 (Tenn. App. 1975), of “a corporation, for example, .. . chartered for the purpose of promoting the interest of boys, in accord with the standards of the Boy Scouts of America” which might attempt to divert its property “to the use of Boys’ Clubs or Girl Scouts, or any other organization.” Cf. Polen v. Cox, 259 Md. 25, 267 A.2d 201 (1970). It follows that the Court of Special Appeals was correct in its decision. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; APPELLANTS TO PAY THE COSTS. Alg APPENDIX B [Dated: September 27, 1983] ORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Denying Motion for Reconsideration. COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Courts of Appeal Building Annapolis, Md. 21401-1699 269-3341 Washington Area 261-2999 September 28, 1983 Mark E. Werner, II, Esquire Attorney ati ” 1102 Court Sx, uare Building Baltimore, Maryland 21202 Re: Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church et al. v. The Presbytery of Baltimore of the United Presby- terian Church in the United States of America et al. No. 102 - September Term, 1982 Dear Mr. Werner: This is to advise that your motion for reconsideration filed in the above entitled case was denied by the Court on September 27, 1983. A20 A copy of the mandate is enclosed herewith and the record is being returned to the Court of Special Appeals this date. Very truly yours, /s/ Alexander L. Cummings Clerk ALC/mjm Encl. ce. David S. Pearl, Esq. W. J. Williamson, Esq. Richard W. Kiefer, Esq. In The Court of Appeals of Maryland No. 102 September Term, 1982 BABCOCK MEMORIAL PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH et al. and MERRITT BOULEVARD PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF DUNDALK, INC. Vv. THE PRESBYTERY OF BALTIMORE OF THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al. MANDATE TO THE HONORABLE THE JUDGES OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND: WHEREAS the case of Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church et al. and Merritt Boulevard Presbyterian Church of Dundalk, Inc. v. The Presbytery of Baltimore of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of Amer- ica et al. came before you and wherein the judgment of the said Court of Special Appeals of Maryland was duly en- A21 tered on the eighth day of September, 1982 as appears from the transcript of the record of the said Court of Special Appeals of Maryland which was brought into the Court of Appeals of Maryland by virtue of a writ of certiorari dated October 26, 1982; and WHEREAS in the September Term, 1982 the said cause came on to be heard before the Court of Appeals of Mary- land; ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it was ordered and adjudged on August 17, 1983 by this Court that the judg- ment be affirmed; appellants to pay the costs. NOW, THEREFORE, THIS CAUSE IS REMANDED to you in order that such proceedings may be had in the said cause in conformity with the judgment of this Court above stated as accord with right and justice, and the Constitution and laws of Maryland, the said writ notwith- standing. WITNESS the Honorable Robert C. Murphy, Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, this twenty- eighth day of September, 1983. /s/ Alexander L. Cummings Clerk Court of Appeals of Maryland Costs: Petition filing fee $ 20.00 Appellants’ brief 1,205.86 Appellees’ brief 996.48 Appellants’ reply brief 171.03 Motion for reconsideration 10.00 September 16, 1983: Motion for reconsideration filed by appellants. September 27, 1983: Motion for reconsideration denied. A22 APPENDIX C MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND September Term, 1982 NO.: 102 BABCOCK MEMORIAL PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, et al., Appellants, V. THE PRESBYTERY OF BALTIMORE OF THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Appellees. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Appellants, BABCOCK MEMORIAL PRESBYTER- IAN CHURCH, et al., by MARK E. WERNER II, their at- torney, and THE MERRITT BOULEVARD PRESBYTER- IAN CHURCH OF DUNDALK, INC., et al., by DAVID S. PEARL and W.J. WILLIAMSON, their attorneys, pur- suant to Maryland Rule 850, move this Honorable Court for Reconsideration of its Opinion filed August 17, 1983, and as for grounds therefor, present the following: POINT 1 Two main questions were before this Court on this Appeal, to wit: 1. Could Babcock give its property to Merritt? A23 2. When a majority of the members of Babcock sev- ered their ecclesiastical affiliation with United, did this majority retain the right to the ownership, use and posses- sion of the property belonging to Babcock? The Court answered the first of these questions but failed to answer the second. The Court dealt with the right of Babcock to give the property to Merritt and held: We regard the restriction as equivalent to saying the property could not be alienated by a local church without the permission of the Presbytery. To hold otherwise is to permit accomplishing by subterfuge what could not be done directly. We conclude that if the local church under United’s Book of Order could not sell property without permission, it could not give it away... . the attempted gift here was not in accord with the corporate purposes of Babcock. (Opin- ion page 18). The second question, which the Court failed to answer, is whether or not Babcock had the right, by majority vote, to withdraw from the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of United and maintain the ownership and right to control its local church property. A decision on this issue is necessary in order to resolve the issues between the parties raised by this lawsuit, especially since the net effect of the Court’s decision is to place full ownership and control of the disputed property back in the hands of the corporation Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church, and there are still two groups (Appellants, Babcock, and Appellees, Presby- tery) claiming ownership and control of that corporation. As this Court has consistently recognized, resort must be had tc the various documents of title and to the docu- ments (contracts) defining the relationships of the denomi- nation (United) and local church (Babcock), both as to A24 each other and as to the property disputed. Therefore, the Court must scrutinize the deeds, corporate charter, and Constitution of United to see how the parties structured those relationships. See, for example, Maryland and Vir- ginia Eldership V. The Church of God at Sharpsburg, (El- dership), 249 Md. 650, 241 A. 2d 691 (1968), vac & remanded 393 U.S. 528 (1969), reaff’d 254 Md. 162, 254 A. 2d 162 (1969); Polen V. Cox, (Polen), 259 Md. 25, 267 A. 2d 201 (1970); and Smith V. Church of God at Locust Valley, etc. Maryland, (Smith), D.C. M.D. 1971, 326 F.Supp. 6. The documents needed are before the Court in this Appeal and the parties have made various stipulations of facts as to what those documents do and do not say and do, as found in the Agreed Statement of Facts and its two Supplements. Both Appellants and Appellees agree that at the time this controversy arose they were both bound by the Con- stitution of United. The question is what inquiry can this Court make into that Constitution without violating the rights and prohibitions guaranteed by the First Amend- ment to the Constitution of the United States. In its last expression on this subject the Supreme Court of the United States in Jones V. Wolf, (Jones), 443 U.S. 595, 99 S. Ct. 3020, 61 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1979) reaffirmed its position: It is also clear, however, that the First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property issues, 443 USS. at 602. In a number of decisions over the past decade, the United States Supreme Court has clearly defined some of the areas in which the First Amendment severely cir- cumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes. One of these areas is the de- gree of inquiry which a civil court may make into the A25 constitution of a denomination. The United States Su- preme Court has clearly held that if a civil court makes a searching or extensive inquiry into church polity, such civil court violates the prohibition of the First Amendment, Justice Blackmun, for the Court, reaffirmed this rule in Jones, supra: In such cases, the suggested rule would appear to require a searching and therefore impermissible inquiry into church polity. 443 U.S. at 605. In Jones, supra, the United States Supreme Court de- fined the limits of such an inquiry as follows: The neutral-principles method, at least as it has evolved in Georgia, requires a civil court to examine certain religious documents, such as a church con- stitution, for language of trust in favor of the general church. In undertaking such an examination, a civil court must take special care to scrutinize the docu- ment in purely secular terms, and not to rely on religious precepts in determining whether the docu- ment indicates that the parties have intended to create a trust. 443 U.S. at 604. (Emphasis added) Even the four dissenting justices in Jones, agreed with this rule of inquiry. Mr. Justice Powell writing for them stated the rule: The object of the inquiry where the title to the property is in a local church is to determine whether there is any basis for a trust in favor of the general church. Thus, where religious documents such as church constitutions or Books of Order must be ex- amined ‘for language of trust in favor of the general church’, ‘a civil court must take special care to scru- tinize the document in purely secular terms and not A26 to rely on religious precepts in determining whether the document indicates that the parties have intended to create a trust.’ It follows that the civil courts using this analysis may consider the form of religious gov- ernment adopted by the church members for the resolution of intra-church disputes only if that polity has been stated, in express relation to church prop- erty, in the language of trust and property law. 443 U.S, at 611-012 This Court can and should look at the Constitution of United to determine what vote it takes to control in decisions made by a constituent body within the de- nomination. United’s Book of Order provides under Chapter V, entitled “Of Church Government” at Section 35.01: “... that a majority shall govern....”’ Likewise, Section 98.58 is also instructive, stating that: Members ought not, without weighty reasons, to decline to vote, as this practice might leave the de- cision of very interesting questions to a small propor- tion of the judiciary. Silent members, unless ex- cused from voting, must be considered as acquiescing with the majority. At a duly called congregational meeting of Babcock in March, 1981 “a majority of those present voted to withdraw from UNITED and renounced the jurisdiction of Presbytery by a vote of 228-6” (E.87). This fact was a part of the Agreed Statement of Facts by the parties. This is as far as this Court should and needs to go in its inquiry relating to the Constitution of United in order to settle this issue between the parties. This Court properly held that, as it scrutinized the deeds in purely secular terms, it found no property interest stated therein for United: A27 The original deed to Babcock for the Loch Raven Boulevard land is to “The Babcock Memorial Pres- byterian Church of Baltimore City, a corporation of the State of Maryland. . .”. Neither in the granting clauses nor in the habendum clause is there any restriction of any kind. (Opinion page 7). This Court properly found that “under the Maryland system of incorporating religious societies the trustees and not the congregation constitute the corporation.” (Opinion page 6) By definition, the trustees are holding the property in trust for someone or for some body and the question that still must be answered is for whom the Trustees of the Corporation hold the property in trust? The fact that it was not held in trust for United is settled in the Agreed Statement of Facts where the parties stipulated: Likewise, on March 14, 1981, and prior to that date, there was no specific provision in the Constitu- tion of UNITED imposing an express trust on local church property for the benefit of the Presbytery, the Synod, the General Assembly or the denomination as a whole. (E-74) Since the Constitution gives United no trust in the property, it must be held in trust for the local members of Babcock. This exact same question came up in the case of Presbytery of Riverside V. Community Church of Palm Springs, 89 Cal. App. 3rd 910, 152 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Ct. App., 4th Dist., 2nd Div., 1979), Cert, den. 444 U.S. 974, 100 S. Ct. 469, 62 L. Ed 2d 389 (1979) which was also a dispute over withdrawal and retention of property by a local church of this same denomination, UNITED. There, the California Court stated at pages 926-927 of Cal. App. 3rd: A28 The present dispute concerns the uses for which the property is held, the identity of the beneficiaries of the trust - the congregants of the local church, or the general church and/or perhaps, its congregants. ., . the property of a local church, even one that is part of a general church organization of hierarchical structure, is held in trust by the religious nonprofit corporation for the benefit of the local church con- gregation. Thus the question still remains: Did not the majority members of Babcock have a right to take the action they took in March, 1981 in severing their ecclesiastical juris- diction with United? If so, United lost all its jurisdiction over Babcock. The title to the property is in Babcock. The majority of the members of Babcock are entitled to control the property. As to the right of Babcock to sever its ecclesiastical affiliation with United, the parties’ Agreed Statement of Facts stipulated: There are no express provisions in the Constitution of UNITED outlining any method or procedure for a local UNITED Church to change its denomination af- filiation, nor is there any express provision permitting or prohibiting a local church to withdraw from United. (E-75) The issues of the right of a local church to withdraw from United has been conclusively decided by the Cali- fornia Court of Appeals in the case of Presbytery of River- side V. Community Church of Palm Springs, 89 Cal. App. 3rd 910, 152 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Ct. App., 4th Dist., 2nd Div.., 1979), Cert. den 444 U.S. 974, 100 S. Ct. 469, 62 L.Ed.2nd 389 (1979). There, the Court held: A29 It is undisputed that a local church within UPCUSA may withdraw and terminate its affiliation (89 Cal. App. 3d at page 24). Since the two Eldership decisions cited above, in this State, following the dictates of this Court in Eldership, it is required that there be an express provision prohibiting withdrawal or the local church has that right. Likewise, since Eldership, it is required in this State that there be an express provision imposing a forfeiture or penalty of property (or imposing a trust in favor of the denomination ) in the event of schism or withdrawal or the local church (here, Babcock) retains ownership, use and possession of its property upon withdrawal. The parties stipulated that: Except for 62.11 quoted above, there is no specific provision in the Constitution of UNITED or any rele- vant document of title involved in the case at Bar, which gives the Presbytery of Baltimore or any higher judicatory in UNITED, any proprietary or contractual interests in the real or personal property involved in this lawsuit. Likewise, on March 14, 1981, and prior to that date, there was no specific provision in the Constitution of UNITED imposing an express trust on local church property for the benefit of the presby- tery, the synod, the General Assembly or the denomi- nation as a whole. (E-74) There are no express provisions in the Constitu- tion of UNITED outlining any method or procedure for a local UNITED Church to change its denomina- tional affiliation, nor is there any express provision permitting or prohibiting a local church to withdraw from UNITED. Except as Section 62.11 may apply, there are no specific provisions in the Book of Order imposing a penalty or forfeiture of property upon such a withdrawal. (E-75) A30 Thus, if there is no express trust in the property for the denomination as stipulated by the parties and no re- striction in the deed to Babcock as found by this Court, then the Trustees of the Babcock Corporation hold the property in trust for the benefit of the members of the local church. The majority members of the local church have severed their connection from United; and United has no more authority or jurisdiction over them. Since the majority controls, the majority have the right to con- trol and possession of the subject property. To deny the majority this right would be a clear denial to them of their right of free exercise of their religion as protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. In order to resolve the issues involved in this litiga- tion, this Court must address and resolve this question of the right of Babcock to withdraw and to retain the owner- ship, use and possession of its property. POINT 2 This Court held that “the Presbytery has an interest in this property” (Opinion page 16). This holding is in diametric opposition to the Agreed Statement of Facts by the parties and the law of the State of Maryland. In the Agreed Statement of Facts, the parties stip- ulated: Except for 62.11 quoted above, there is no specific provision in the Constitution of UNITED or any rele- vant document of title involved in the case at bar, which gives the Presbytery of Baltimore or any higher judicatory in UNITED any proprietary or contractual interests in the real or personal property involved in this lawsuit. (E-74) A31 §62.11 mentioned is a provision which provides that a Presbytery can dissolve a local church or a local church can become extinct by reason of the dispersal of its mem- bers, the abandonment of its work, or other cause. In such event, the property of the local church will be applied as the Presbytery may direct. But twice in the Agreed State- ment of Facts, the parties stipulated that 62.11 was not applicable to the case at Bar: On March 14, 1981, and to the present date, Bab- cock has not been dissolved by Presbytery or become extinct by reason of the dispersal of the church’s mem- bers, the abandonment of the church’s work or other cause. (E-75) Babcock has not been dissolved by the Presby- tery or become extinct by reason of dispersal of its members, the abandonment of its work or other cause. (E-88) Thus the parties stipulated that the Presbytery of Baltimore had no interest in the subject property; and this Court found such an interest in direct contravention of the facts in this case. POINT 3 This Court found that Presbytery has an interest in this property even though the parties stipulated to the con- trary. This Court found that this interest arose because “Babcock is not a congregational church but the relation- ship is one that is hierarchical in nature” (Opinion page 16). Thus this Court concluded that the structure of United, not by express provision but by implication, cre- ated a property interest in local church property in the denomination. To do so it made an extensive, searching inquiry into the polity of United in clear violation of the A32 premier prohibition of the First Amendment to the Con- stitution of the United States. The United States Supreme Court in Jones V. Wolf, supra, clearly found that “structure alone” is insufficient to create a property interest. The property interest must be created in the documents in language of trust in “legally cognizable form”. As has been pointed out, the parties to this litigation stipulated in the Agreed Statement of Facts that no such language existed in the documents affecting this property. In the very first sentence of Jones V. Wolf, supra, Mr. Justice Black- mun wrote: This case involves the dispute over the owner- ship of church property following a schism in a local church affiliated with a hierarchical church organiza- tion. (440 U.S. at 597) If the mere fact that the structure of the denomination was “hierarchical”, as Justice Blackmun stated, had been sufficient to give the Presbytery an interest in the property, then the case would have ended with that first sentence. But to give the denomination an interest in the local church property simply on the basis that the denomination is “hierarchical” is to “establish a religion” in direct violation of the prohibition in the First Amendment to the U.S. Con- stitution. In Jones, supra, both the structure of the denomination and the facts are almost identical to the case at Bar. It is true that the local church in Jones was a member of PCUS and not United. But these two denominations are so similar in their Constitutions that in June 1983 they united to form one denomination. As a matter of fact, the PCUS Book of Church Order contains almost identical pro- visions with all those provisions of the United Book of Order cited by this Court in its opinion. Justice Black- A33 mun sets out in his opinion those facts which clearly show the identical character of the two denominations. In Jones, he wrote: In the same year it was organized, the Vineville church was established as a member church of the Augusta-Macon Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church in the United States (PCUS). The PCUS has a generally hierarchical or connectional form of gov- ernment, as contrasted with a congregational form. Under the polity of the PCUS, the government of the local church is committed to its Session in the first instance, but the actions of this assembly or “court” are subject to the review and control of the higher church courts, the Presbytery, Synod, and General As- sembly, respectively. The powers and duties of each level of the hierarchy are set forth in the constitution of the PCUS, the Book of Church Order, which is part of the record in the present case. (443 U.S. at 597-598). A reading of the description of the structure of United in this Court’s opinion, when compared to the above re- citation by Justice Blackmun, shows clearly the identical structure of the two denominations, Look at the facts in Jones as recited by Justice Black- mun in his opinion: On May 27, 1973, at a congregational meeting of the Vineville Church attended by a quorum of its duly enrolled members, 164 of them, including the pastor, voted to separate from the PCUS. Ninety-four mem- bers opposed the resolution. The majority immedi- ately informed the PCUS of the action, and then united with another denomination, the Presbyterian Church in America. Although the minority remained on the church rolls for three years, they ceased to A34 participate in the affairs of the Vineville church and and conducted their religious activities elsewhere. In response to the schism within the Vineville con- gregation, the Augusta-Macon Presbytery appointed a commission to investigate the dispute and, if possible, to resolve it. The commission eventually issued a written ruling declaring that the minority faction con- stituted “the true congregation of Vineville Presby- terian Church,” and withdrawing from the majority faction “all authority to exercise office derived from the PCUS.” (443 U.S. at 598) It can thus be seen that both the structure and the facts in Jones are identical to the structure and the facts in the case at Bar. If the United States Supreme Court had applied the judicial principle that this Court applied in the case at Bar to Jones, then the local church property would have been awarded to the denomination rather than to the majority faction of the local church. But when the Jones case was remanded to the Supreme Court of Georgia in the light of this U.S. Supreme Court decision, the Supreme Court of Georgia held: The Trial Court found that the Vineville Presby- terian Church had been a connectional church within the Augusta-Macon Presbytery and the Presbyterian Church in the United States but correctly held that more than a mere connectional relationship between the local church and the general church must exist to give rise to property rights in the general church. (243 S.E. 2d at page 864) This issue has been further clarified in the recent case of Piletich V. Deretich, 328 N.W. 2d 696, decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota on December 30, 1982, with the rehearing denied on February 14, 1983. Inter- estingly involved in that case is the same Serbian Eastern A35 Orthodox denomination that was involved in the case of Serbian Orthodox Diecese V. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) cited by both sides to this litigation numerous occasions. The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the U. S. Supreme Court decision in Serbian, supra, holding as follows: The First Amendment requires that civil courts defer to adjudications by the highest tribunal in a “hierarchical” church organization on issues of religi- ous doctrine or polity (form of government) .... A later decision of the highest court reiterates the prin- ciple that matters clearly committed by church law or state law to tribunals of hierarchical churches may not be reviewed by civil courts. 328 N.W.2d at 699 (Emphasis added) It is this principle which this Court of Appeals had sought to invoke in its opinion when it quoted at length from Watson V. Jones, 80 U.S. 679. But what Serbian held is that this principle applies “on the issues of religious doctrine or polity”; but it does not apply to issues of the civil rights of ownership and control of real and personal property. In the case at Bar, this Court then concluded that ‘‘the Trustees of Babcock were bound by their own By-Laws to follow the established mandates of United.” (Opinion page 17) (Emphasis added). This Court obvi- ously concluded that due to the mere structure of United, Babcock was then bound to follow the “mandates” of the denomination. The charter of Babcock provided that it would remain in accordance with the “standards” of United. The By-Laws of Babcock provided that Babcock would be subject to the provisions of the Constitution of United. No one denies these facts. But there is nothing in the Constitution of United that says that the denomination may mandate the right to ownership and control of local church property. While Babcock was a member of United A36 it complied with and was subject to all of the provisions of the Constitution. There is no contention here that Babcock violated the Constitution. Now that Babcock has severed its ecclesiastical affiliation with United, it is no longer subject to its jurisdiction. There is a vast difference between following the provisions of the Constitution of United and following its mandates. It is the contract be- tween Babcock and United that controls. That contract is the Constitution, United cannot mandate that it has an interest in local church property when the Constitution does not give it such an interest in “legally cognizable terms”. After recognizing that mere structure alone is insuf- ficient to give the denomination an interest in property, the Minnesota Court in Piletich V. Deretich, supra, looked at the majority rule principle as set out in Jones, supra, and stated: The Court in Jones also observed that “majority rule is generally employed in the governance of reli- gious societies ... Furthermore, the majority faction generally can be identified without resolving any ques- tion of religious polity. (328 N.W.2d at 702) The Minnesota Supreme Court found that the Consti- tution of the Mother Church gave church congregations the power to “acquire and hold either personal or real properties, and have all the rights and obligations in that capacity”. (328 N.W. 2d at 702). That Court then found that the presumptive rule of majority representation must result in a judgment for the majority in the local church under the deeds, the local charter and By-Laws and the Constitution of the Mother Church. In speaking of the reasons the neutral principles ap- proach is a better approach than other approaches, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated: es, A37 This approach obviates consideration of whether the litigants belonged to a “Hierarchical church”, an area fraught with constitutional pitfalls and provides a forum ever for members of a hierarchical church which has not developed effective rules for settling property disputes among members. 328 N.W. 2d at page 701. As has been pointed out in the case at Bar, United attempted to pass an amendment to its Constitution in 1929 which would have imposed an express trust on local church property for the denomination. This amendment failed. It is the only time United in its history has at- tempted to impose such an express trust until after Jones V. Wolf, supra. Recognizing that it had not developed effective rules for settling property disputes among its members, United then went to work to propose such a property amendment to its Constitution which would im- pose an express trust on local church property for the denomination. This amendment did become a part of its Constitution in May, 1981, after the controversy in the subject case arose. So, at the time the dispute erupted in the instant case, there was no trust or property interest in local church property for the denomination, as has been stipulated by the parties in the Agreed Statement of Facts. To hold that simply because this Court has determined that United was a “hierarchical church” gives the Pres- bytery a property interest is to “establish a religion” in violation of the First Amendment prohibition that the State must not “establish a religion.” To award this property to the Presbytery or the de- nomination in the case at Bar on the basis of the “hier- archical” structure of United, based on an extensive and searching inquiry into its Constitution, is a clear violation of both the “free exercise” clause and the “establishment A38 of religion” clause of the First Amendment to the Consti- tution of the United States. WHEREFORE, Appellants pray that this Honorable Court reconsider its opinion filed on August 17, 1983, mod- ifying it as needed and expanding it to resolve all the issues involved in the case, or that, in the alternative, the case be remanded to the Trial Court on the question of right to withdrawal and retention by Babcock of the own- ership, use and possession of its property and the corpora- tion for further proceedings and findings of fact. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Mark E. Werner II Mark E. Werner, II Attorney for Appellants, Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church, et. al /s/ David S. Pearl David S. Pearl and /s/ W. J. Williamson W. J. Williamson Attorneys for Appellants, The Merritt Boulevard Presbyterian Church of Dundalk, Inc., et. al. I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of Septem- ber, 1983, copies of the aforegoing Motion for Reconsid- eration were hand-delivered to Richard W. Kiefer, Esquire and Dorothy M. Beaman, Esquire, Hooper, Kiefer & Cor- nell, 343 North Charles Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201, Attorneys for Appellees. /s/ Mark E. Werner II Mark E. Werner, II A39 APPENDIX D Filed: November 17, 1981 OPINION OF CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church, et al. v. The Presbytery of Baltimore of The United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, et al. Case No. 108725 Opinion by William R. Buchanan, Sr., Judge IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AT LAW CASE NO. 106725 THE MERRITT BOULEVARD PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF DUNDALK, INC. VS THE PRESBYTERY OF BALTIMORE OF THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, an unincorporated association, et al A40 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY IN EQUITY CASE NO. 108725 THE PRESBYTERY OF BALTIMORE OF THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, an unincorporated association, et al Vs BABCOCK MEMORIAL PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, a body corporate, et al CROSS BILL | BABCOCK MEMORIAL PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, a body corporate, et al VS THE PRESBYTERY OF BALTIMORE OF THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al MEMORANDUM OPINION The above captioned cases came before the Court on October [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_0998%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.