# Supplemental Appendix — Faulkner v. Wellman > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_0924%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Supplemental Appendix - **Published:** January 1, 1984 - **Citation:** 468 U.S. 1217 ## Text 83-768 NOW 7 1983 No. IN THE Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1983 GORDON H. FAULKNER, et al., Petitioners, VS. BRUCE D. WELLMAN, et al., Respondents. SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT LINLEY E. PEARSON Attorney General of Indiana DAVID A. ARTHUR Deputy Attorney General Office of Attorney General 219 State House Indianapolis, Indiana 46204 Telephone: (317) 232-6332 Attorneys for Petitioner Central Publishing Company, Inc., Indianapolis, IN 46206 James Odis HENDRIX, Grady Thomas Bobbitt, Melon Carrol!, Donald R. Sceiffers, James Blackburn, Plaintiffs, Vv Gordon H. FAULKNER, Edward Jones, Jack Duckworth, Charles Adkins, Defendants. Bill R. ADAMS, Plaintiff, v Jack DUCKWORTH, J. F. Kozlowski, P.G. Youngblood, Bob Glaney, R. Shriner, Rodney Keith, Ronald Batchelor, Byron Glick, G. Wilkins, Defendants. Bruce C. WELLMAN, Dwight Walker, Douglas Shackelford a/k/a/ Achebe H. Lateef, Raymond Hurt, Richard Colvin, Stewart Brooks, Plaintiffs, v. Gordon H. FAULKNER, Norman Hunt, Cloid L. Shuler, Dean Neitzke, Jack Duckworth, Edward Jones, Major Gothel D. Wilkins, Ronald Freake, M.D., Roger D. Saylors, M.D., Captain Eugene Koziatek, Sgt. Byron Glick, St Robert McKee, Officer John M. Sharp, Lt. John Riggs, Officer Bill J. Kennedy, Lt. David G. Oden, Defendants. Nos. S 76-187, S 77-35 and S 79-32. United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend, Division. Oct. 21, 1981. A civil rights action was brought by prison inmates challenging the conditions of confinement at a state prison. The District Court, Sharp, J., held that: (1) proposed class consisting of inmates who are or may be in future confined at the state prison was certified; (2) claims of individual in- mates for damages would be dismissed where no specific B-1 named defendant was alleged to be responsible for claimed deprivations; (3) inmates who had registered medical complaints between two and five years before receiving treatment for ailments which, while not life-threatening, involved considerable discomfort and were exacerbated by delay in treatment were entitled to damages for violation of their Eighth Amendment right to medical treatment; (4) prison provided inmates with minimally adequate level of health care which was not so deficient as to show deliberate indifference to inmates’ serious medical needs; (5) prison which had inmate population 20% over capacity unconstitu- tionally deprived inmates of Eighth Amendment rights where such overcrowding subjected inmates in in- adequately sized cells to inadequate recreation time out of cells; and (6) totality of circumstances at prison did not deprive inmates of Eighth Amendment rights. Order accordingly. 1. Federal Civil Procedure 161 Threshold requirement for class certification is existence of class which requires representation; class as well as its members must be clearly defined and identified with particularity. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 23(a), (b\2), 28 U.S.C.A. 2. Federal Civil Procedure 161 Every potential member of class in class action is not re- quired to be identifiable, but merely circumscribed by some objective set of criteria. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 23(a), (bX2), 28 U.S.C.A. 3. Federal Civil Procedure 164 Second threshold requirement for class certification is that representatives are members of that class. Fed. Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 23(a), (b2), 28 U.S.C.A. 4. Federal Civil Procedure 186.10 It is appropriate to include future inmates in class action challenging prison conditions. B-2 5. Federal Civil Procedure 163 While numbers alone do not satisfy numerosity require- ment of class action, they are relevant consideration. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 23(a), (b\(2), 28 U.S.C.A. 6. Federal Civil Procedure 164 Standard for adequacy of representatives under class ac- tion rule is that representatives must be of such character as to assure vigorous protection of class action so that absent class members’ rights are certain to be protected. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 23(aX4), 28 U.S.C.A. 7. Federal Civil Procedure 164 Second element of adequate representation under class action rule is that named plaintiffs’ counsel be sufficiently competent to conduct proposed litigation. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 23(a)4), 28 U.S.C.A. 8. Federal Civil Procedure 161.1 Two elements which must be present for action to fall within class action rule are that defendants’ conduct or refusal to act must be generally applicable to class and that final injunctive of corresponding declaratory relief must be requested for class. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 23(a), (b)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. 9. Federal Civil Procedure 186.10 Where class consisting of prisoners who are or may be in future confined in state prison was circumscribed by some objective set of criteria, representatives were members of that class, both size of class and its fluid, indeterminable nature rendered joinder of individual claims impractical, questions of law and fact in prison’s violation of prisoners’ constitutional rights were common to class, claims of class representatives were not only typical but also actually coextensive with that of class, representatives would fairly and adequately protect interests of class, representatives’ attorneys had adequate resources to pursue action and were experienced in conducting such litigation, and party B-3 opposing class acted on grounds generally applicable to class thereby making appropriate final injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to class as whole, proposed class would be certified. ‘Fed. Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 23(a), (b\(2), 28 U.S.C.A. 10. Constitutional Law 272(2) Prison’s conduct adjustment board denied inmate due process by failing to grant his request to call inmate witnesses at disciplinary hearing without individually examining witnesses for relative danger or benefit of their testimony, without offering any rationale for support of denial of request, and without providing basis for meaning- ful judicial review to insure that inmate was protected from arbitrary government action. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14. 11. Prisons 13(8) Inmate’s complaint of being denied lay assistance of his choice at disciplinary hearing did not rise to constitutional level where prison's conduct adjustment board complied with lay assistance requirements and inmate did not criticize ability of lay assistance provided him. 12. Civil Rights 13.13(1) Defendant's direct personal responsibility for claimed deprivation of constitutional right must be established in order for liability to arise under Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C.A. §1983. 13. Federal Civil Procedure 1788.10 Where prison inmate failed to identify prison employee or inmate who was responsible for preventing inmate from seeing dentist for broken tooth for nine months, inmate’s claim for damages under Civil Rights Act would be dismissed. 42 U.S.C.A. §1983. 14. Prisons 13(9) Prison officials were immune from damages for denying B-4 without reasons prisoner’s request for inmate witnesses to appear at his disciplinary hearing where court opinion clearly establishing that due process required documented support in administrative record for decision not to permit calling witnesses was not rendered until approximately three years after officials had denied inmate’s request. 42 U.S.C.A. §1983. 15. Searches and Seizures 7(1) Reasonableness under Fourth Amendment requires balancing of need for particular search against invasion of personal rights that search entails. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 4 16. Criminal Law 1213 In order to establish violation of Eighth Amendment, plaintiff must show that prison officials intentionally inflicted excessive or grossly severe punishment on him or knowingly maintained conditions so harsh as to shock general conscience. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 8. 17. Criminal Law 1213 Use of force by prison guards in conducting strip search of prison inmate upon inmate’s return from outside institu- tion was not so severe as to shock conscience and thus violate Eighth Amendment where guards applied only enough force to bend inmate over to view rectal area for contraband after inmate had refused search, officers’ action was good-faith effort to maintain institutional security, and inmate’s testimony was conflicting on injuries. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 8. 18. Prisons 13(5) Inmate’s claim of being locked in segregation without notice of reasons failed to state claim where there was only general uncorroborated testimony that lockups occurred and there was no evidence identifying any of named prison officials as actor responsible for alleged violation. 42 U.S.C.A. §1983. B-5 19. Prisons 13.5(1) Prison inmate’s claim for damages based on allegation that his transfer among various state institutions was solely for purpose of personal harassment and punishment would be denied where evidence showed that transfers were not disciplinary in nature but were result of confrontations between inmate and prison officials, and state statutes did not restrict prison officials’ decisions to transfer inmates. 20. Civil Rights 13.12(6) Prison inmate’s civil rights action against prison for loss of personal property while in custody of prison official failed to state claim where, even though official acted under color of state law, clothing and personal effects fell within definition of property, and loss of property amounted to deprivation, inmate had remedy under state Tort Claims Act to redress property loss. 42 U.S.C.A. §1983; U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14; IC 34-4-15.4-1 et seq. (1976 Ed.). 21. Criminal Law 1213 Under Eighth Amendment proscription against un- necessary and wanton infliction of pain by deliberate in- difference to “serious medical needs” of prisoners, medical need is serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even lay person would easily recognize necessity for doctor’s attention. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 8. _ See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions. 22. Criminal Law 1213 Under Eighth Amendment proscription against unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain by deliberate in- difference to serious medical needs of prisoners, plaintiff must show not only that defendant was callously in- different to his medical needs, but that those needs were B-6 serious, and that failure to treat them resulted in personal injury. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 8. 23. Criminal Law 1213 Inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim alleging prison’s deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs would be denied where, even though inmate was denied medica- tion on one occasion and had difficulty obtaining it on other occasions, situation failed to support requisite gravity. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 8. 24. Civil Rights 13.12(6) Inmate’s claim of being denied witnesses and lay advocate at disciplinary proceeding by his receipt of six- month disciplinary action in mail before hearing date failed to state claim where inmate failed to allege that any of defendants were involved in incident and alleged wrong had been remedied by state tribunal. 25. Prisons 4(9) Prison inmate’s claim against prison for opening mail from his attorney did not rise to constitutional level where there was no evidence to indicate pattern or practice on part of prison of opening of interfering with delivery of legal mail and where opening of legal mail was inadvertent or negligent. 26. Criminal Law 1213 Prison official's use of mace on inmate who was locked in his cell was good-faith effort to restore discipline and was not excessive or severe in Eighth Amendment sense where use of mace was provoked by inmate’s throwing glass jars through cell bars at official. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 8. 27. Criminal Law 1213 Prison inmate’s claim of use of excessive force in giving him haircut was not so excessive or severe as to shock conscience in violation of Eighth Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 8. B-7 28. Prisons 17 Prison inmate’s claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical need based on denial of use of backboard for his back problem would be dismissed where disagree- ment between patient and physician who considered re- quest for backboard unnecessary did not rise to constitu- tional level. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 8. 29. Criminal Law 1213 Prison inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim against prison based on dietary practice in prison’s serving pork three times a week which prisoner would not eat because of his Moslem faith would be dismissed where it did not rise to constitutional level because protein level of diet, subtract- ing pork portion, met dietary allowances and where inmates of Moslem faith received additional vegetable portions on days pork was served. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 8. 30. Prisons 10 Prison inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim for mistreat- ment of broken hand would be dismissed where there was no evidence to implicate prison hospital administrators’ direct personal responsibility for inmate’s treatment by prisoner nurse. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 8. 31. Prisons 10 Prison inmate’s claim of interference with his oppor- tunity to secure lay assistance in disciplinary proceeding would be dismissed where inmate failed to establish named defendants’ direct personal responsibility for claimed deprivation. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 8. 32. Constitutional Law 278(1.2) Prisons 10 Prison inmate’s claim for loss of personal property would be dismissed where no named defendant was claimed to be responsible for seizure of any of inmate’s property and where state law proided adequate remedy in Tort Claims B-8 Act; thus there was no constitutional deprivation of property without due process of law. 42 U.S.C.A. §1983; U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14; IC 34-4-16.5-1 et seq. (1976 Ed.). 33. Constitutional Law 272(2) Denial of prison inmate’s request to call inmate witnesses and officer who wrote conduct report to testify at disciplinary hearing did not violate inmate’s limited pro- cedural due process right to call witnesses where testimony of inmates would have been repetitive and calling of officer would have created unnecessary confrontation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 34. Prisons 10 Prison inmate’s claim of deprivation of procedural due process by being locked up for investigation without being given reasons for lockup would be dismissed where defendant failed to prove that any named defendant was personally responsible for claimed deprivation and where decision of Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals prohibiting segregation for investigation was rendered after inmate's lockup, remedying violations. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14. 35. Federal Civil Procedure 186.10 Even though some members of class of inmates at state prisons may have stated individual claims against specific individuals, members’ claims were not properly before court where members were not named plaintiffs, specific individuals were not defendants, and it was not theory of named plaintiffs’ case to try individual incidents as separate claims. 36. Prisons 17 To prove individual claim of unconstitutional denial of medical care by prison to prison inmate, it is necessary to show either denial or unreasonably delayed access to physician for diagnosis or treatment of discomfort-causing ailment, or failure to provide prescribed treatment. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 8. B-9 37. Criminal Law 1213 Prison inmate’s Eighth Amendment right to medical care was violated where inmates had registered medical complaints two years to five years before receiving treat- ment, medical conditions, while not life-threatening, involved considerable discomfort, and routine medical complaints were exacerbated by delay in treatment and inmate’s discomfort was prolonged. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 8. 38. Criminal Law 1213 Delay in medical treatment of prison inmate for chest pain for two days after which inmate was taken to prison hospital und treated, although inmate never saw physician, did not rise to level of constitutional violation of inmate’s Eighth Amendment right to medical care. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 8. 39. Criminal Law 1213 Systemwide deliberate indifference to Eighth Amend- ment right of prison inmates to medical care can be demonstrated by showing of pattern of individual incidents of medical care or by pointing to systematic deficiencies in delivery of medical care which make unnecessary suffering inevitable. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 8. 40. Criminal Law 1213 Included in general Eighth Amendment principles relating to provision of minimally adequate medical care to prison inmates is right of mentally disturbed inmates to receive appropriate psychiatric care. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 8. 41. Prisons 17 State prison which provided three full-time licensed physicians, five medical technicians with positions available for four more, current medical equipment and supplies, medical specialists, space at nearby hospital B-10 security ward for serious cases, comprehensive intake physical, 96 hours of on-site dental coverage, psychologist and part-time behavioral clinicians, position for psychiatrist (although unfilled for two years), on-site psychiatric unit for grossly disturbed inmates, and intake program for screening and evaluating inmates to identify those who require mental health care provided inmates with minimally adequate level of health care and was not so deficient as to show deliberate, unconstitutional indifference to serious medical needs of inmates. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 8. 42. Criminal Law 1213 Prison which maintained cells ranging in size from 37.3 to 38.3 square feet for prisoners who were confined 22 to 23 and one-half hours a day and who were not provided with proper physical exercise and recreation violated those prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 8. 43. Prisons 17 State prison with inmate population 20% over its design capacity was unconstitutionally overcrowded where large number of inmates contributed to inadequate time allowed out of cells for recreation. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 8. 44. Prisons 17 It is incumbent on incarcerating body to provide individual inmates with healthy environment; necessary corollary to this is that state must provide within such living space reasonably adequate ventilation, sanitation, bedding, hygienic materials and utilities; in short, shelter must be such that it does not cause inmate’s degeneration or threaten his mental and physical well-being. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 8. 45. Prisons 17 State’s obligation to provide prison inmates with health environment includes providing nutritionally adequate B-11 food that is prepared and served under conditions which do not present immediate danger to health and well-being of inmates who consume it. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 8. 46. Criminal Law 1213 Where prisoners were adequately sheltered, fed, protected and provided with opportunities for education, cumulative impact of conditions of incarceration from rodent and insect infestation, leaking pipes and defective plumbing, and overcrowding did not violate Eighth Amendment. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 8. 47. Prisons 17 Lack of financing is not defense to failure to provide minimum constitutional standards for inmates of prisons. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 8.U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 8. William Marsh, Patricia Brown, Michael Milsap, Legal Services Program of Northern Indiana, Inc., Indianapolis, Ind., Edward L. Volk, Marsha Shatz, Newby, Lewis, Kaminiski & Jones, LaPorte, Ind., for plaintiffs. Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen. of State of Ind., David A. Arthur, Sabra A. Weliever, Bruce L. Kamplain, Deputy Attys. Gen., Indianapolis, Ind., for defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION, FINDINGS OF F.\CT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER SHARP, District Judge. This action is a suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 challenging conditions of confinement at the Indiana State Prison (hereinafter I.S.P.) at Michigan City, Indiana. The I.S.P. is an all male maximum security correctional facility, which has been in existence at the present location approximately 120 years. Jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. §1343(3) and (4). B-12 The Court has consolidated herein three actions, cause numbers S 76-187, S 77-35 and S 79-32, wherein the plaintiffs seek individual damages and injunctive and de- claratory relief on behalf of all inmates confined at the I.S.P. A class certification is sought and will be dealt with herein. Specifically, plaintiffs ask that the Court find, upon consideration of the totality of the conditions at the I.S.P., that those conditions violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Plaintiffs in S 76-187 whose claims have not been dis- missed or severed are James Odis Hendrix, Grady Thomas Bobbitt, Melon Carroll, Donald R. Sceifers, and James Blackburn. Each is an offender incarcerated at the Prison. Defendants in S 76-187 are Gordon Faulkner, Commissioner, Jack Duckworth, Warden, and Edward Jones, Director of Classification and Treatment at the Prison. Plaintiff in S 77-35 is Billie R. Adams, who is an offender incarcerated at the Prison. Defendants in S 77-35 are Jack Duckworth, J. F. Kozlowski, P. G. Youngblood, Bob Glaney, R. Shriver, Rodney Keith, Ronald Batchelor, Byron Glick and G. Wilkins. J.F. Kozlowski is no longer employed at the Prison. Plaintiffs in S 79-32 are Bruce Wellman, Dwight Walker, Douglas Shackelford a/k/a/ Achebe H. Lateef, Raymond Hurt, Richard Colvin and Stewart Brooks. Walker, Shackelford and Colvin are offenders in- carcerated at the Prison. Wellman, Hurt and Brooks were previously incarcerated at the Prison. Defendants in S 79- 32 are Gordon Faulkner, Norman Hunt. Cloid L. Shuler, Dean Nietzke, Jack Duckworth, Edward Jones, Major Gothel D. Wilkins, Ronald Freake, M.D., Roger D. Saylors, M.D., Captain Eugene Koziatek, Sgt. Byron Glick, Lt. Robert McKee, Officer John M. Sharp, Lt. John Riggs, Officer Bill J. Kennedy, and Lt. David G. Oden. Riggs is deceased. Saylors is no longer employed at the Prison and is not serving the Prison under contract. Kennedy is no longer employed at the Prison. B-13 In cases of this kind, this Judge is every mindful of the limited right the federal courts have to adjudicate claims that arise from state prison confinement. Noted opinions have been handed down from every level of the federal court system that advise extreme caution in adjudicating claims that essentially involve the general administration of a state prison and do not reach, as they must, the level of constitutional violations. Justice Powell of the Supreme Court of the United States set forth the reason for this principle in striking and memorable language: ‘(TJhe problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most re- quire expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons, courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism.” Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 at 405, 94 S.Ct. 1800 at 1807, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1979). The Supreme Court of the United States has continuously expressed its adherence to this doctrine of restraint from undu> interference in the administration of state prisons unless federal constitutional violations and deprivation are clearly evident. The principle has been enunciated again and again with a variety in the language. The dominant thought remains clear. The most recent statement of this settled principle is contained in Rhodes v. Chapman, —— U.S. —__, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed2d 59 (1981), stating that courts must bear in mind that their inquires “spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather than a court’s idea of how best to operate a detention facility.” Rhodes, supra, at __., 101 S.Ct. at 2401, citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1874, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). Federal judges B-14 must be circumspect not to interfere without warrant and subject themselves to the suspicion that “it is the office of the good judge to enlarge his jurisdiction.” 1 Works of Thomas Jefferson 121-22 (Federal ed. 1904). This Judge has indicated from the beginning of this case to the present time, acomplete and utter distaste for having to cross that Rubicon which separates the federal govern- ment from the state government and enter into the morass of the day to day operation of the prison. THE PLAINTIFF CLASS Plaintiffs have moved the Court to determine that this action should be maintained as a class action under Rules 23(a) and 23(b\2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. {1] A threshold requirement for class certification is the existence of a class which requires representation. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), summary judgment rev’d, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971); Ridgeway v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 74 F.R.D. 597, 602 (D.IIl. 1977). The class, as well as its members, must be clearly defined and identified with particularity. Williams v. Page, 60 F.R.D. 29, 34 (N.D.I11.1973); Inmates of Lycoming County Prison v. Strode, 79 F.R.D. 228, 231 (M.D.pa. 1978). The proposed class consists of “those prisoners who are, or may be in the future, confined at the Indiana State Prison, Michigan City, Indiana, in the custody of the Indiana Department of Correction.” This type of class has been described as “obviously definable and identifiable.” Inmates of Lycoming County Prison v. Strode, supra. In this context, it has further been said that: “The use of the class action form is a desirable and logical way to challenge prison conditions and it only makes sense to include future inmates. See Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 72 F.R.D. 619 (E.D.Pa.1976); B-15 Miller v. Carson, 401 F.Supp. 835 (M.D.Fla.1975); Dillard v. Pitchess, 399 F.Supp. 1225 (C.D.Cal.1975).” Inmates of Lycoming County Prison v. Strode, supra. [2] Each potential member of the class is not required to be identifiable, but merely “circumscribed by some objective set of criteria.” Ridgeway v. 1.B.E.W., supra; Carpenter v. Davis, 424 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1970). Plaintiffs’ definition of the class for which certification is now being sought clearly meets this requirement. See, generally, Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 565 F.2d 975, 977- 978 (7th Cir. 1977). [3] A second threshold requirement for class certifica- tion is that the representatives are members of that class. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm. v. Whirlpool Corp., 80 F.R.D. 10, 14 (N.D.Ind.1978); Inmates of Lycoming v. Strode, supra. This prerequisite has been described as “the most fundamental requirement of Rule 23(a).” E.E.0.C. v. Whirlpool Corp., supra. The named plaintiffs here are prisoners who are confined at the Indiana State Prison, Michigan City, Indiana, in custody of the Indiana Department of Correction. Complaint at 2 and 4 (Pars. 1 and 7), and, therefore, these representatives are members of the proposed class. A. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. [4] The proposed class consists of the current prisoner population at the Prison, numbering approximately 1900 persons. The class would also include all those persons who, in the future, are incarcerated at I.S.P., potentially hundreds or thousands of additional class members. It is appropriate to include future inmates in a class action challenging prison conditions. Ahrens v. Thomas, 570 F.2d 286, 288 (8th Cir. 1978); Jnmates of Lycoming County Prison v. Strode, supra, at 231. [5] While numbers alone do not satisfy the numerosity B-16 requirement, they are a relevant consideration. In Swanson v. American Consumer Industries, Inc., 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969), it was held that 151 class members was a sufficient number to satisfy the requirement of F.R.Civ.P. 23(a\1). Joinder of 1008 class members has also been held to be impracticable. Hopson v. Schilling, 418 F.Supp. 1223 at 1236-1237, as it has when the class included “hundreds of persons,” Ridgeway v. 1.B.E.W., supra, at 603. The inclusion within the class of persons who will, in the future, be incarcerated at I.S.P. makes the class even more numerous, and makes joinder of all class members totally impracticable. It has been said that “the term ‘impracticable’ within the meaning of Rule 23(a\1) does not refer to impossibility but only to difficulty or inconvenience.” Vernon J. Rockler and Co. v. Graphic Enterprises, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 335, 339 (D.Minn.1971). Both the size of the proposed class here and its fluid, in- determinable nature render joinder unwise, imprudent and impractical, the essential elements of impracticability. 3B Moore's Federal Practice, 923.05, pp. 271, 272 (1976); Swanson v. American Consumer Industries, Inc., supra, at 1333. Therefore, a class action is the procedural vehicle of choice in the present litigation. B. There exist questions of law and fact common to the class. The questions of law and fact common to the class in this action are: Whether the conditions, practices, and policies of the Indiana Department of Correction and the I.S.P. deprive plaintiffs and the class of their right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment as guaranteed to them by the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitu- tion of the United States; Whether the conditions, practices and policies of the Indiana Department of Correction and the I.S.P. deprive plaintiffs and the class of due process of law as guaranteed B-17 to them by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; Whether the conditions, practices and policies of the Indiana Department of Correction and the I.S.P. deprive plaintiffs and the class of their right to free speech as guaranteed to them by the First and the Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States; and Whether the conditions, practices, and policies of the Indiana Department of Correction and the I.S.P. deprive plaintiffs and the class of the rights to educational and rehabilitative programs, as guaranteed to them by Article I §18 of the Constitution of the State of Indiana and by I.C. 11-1-1.1-26 and 11-1-1.1-27 of the laws of the State of Indiana. A class action is particularly well-suited to this civil rights case alleging that certain conditions, practices, and procedures of defendants violate constitutional guarantees. Newman v. Alabama, 349 F.Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1°72), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. den., 421 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1680, 44 L.Ed.2d 102 (1975); Bishop v. Stoneman, 508 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1974); Battle v. Anderson, 376 F.Supp. 402 (E.D.Ok1.1974). Courts have unhesitatingly certified classes when confronted with similar problems involving prisoners. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968): Johnson v. Rockefeller, 58 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y.1973); Washington v. Lee, 263 F.Supp. 327 (M.D.Ala. 1966), aff'd sub nom., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 88 S.Ct. 994, 19 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1968); Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971). C. The claims of the class representatives are typical of the claims of the class. The named plaintiffs have alleged deprivation of this statutory and constitutional rights by operation of challenged policies, practices and conditions of defendants. B-18 All of the named plaintiffs have an interest not only typical of but actually coextensive with that of the class. Each and every inmate of I.S.P. has an identical interest in seeing that the defendants are required to operate the I.S.P. so as not to deprive them of the rights guaranteed to them by the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The claims of the representative parties and those of the class are based upon alleged violations of these same constitutional provisions. D. The class representative will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. [6] Thestandard for adequacy of representatives under Rule 23(a)4) is that the representatives must be of such a character as to assure the vigorous protection of the action so that the absent class members rights are certain to be protected. Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1968). The first requirement is plainly met in this case. Named plaintiffs’ interests in securing their statutory and constitutional rights is co-extensive with the similar interests of all class members. Secondly, the named plaintiffs have a vital personal stake in the outcome of the case so as to insure zealous pursuit of the action. Rodriquez v. Swank, 318 F.Supp. 289 (N.D.II1.1970), aff'd, 403 U.S. 901, 91 S.Ct. 2202, 29 L.Ed.2d 677 (1971). [7] The second element of adequate representation is that the named plaintiffs’ counsel by sufficiently competent to conduct the proposed litigation. Sullivan v. Chase Invest- ment Services, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 246 (N.D.Cal. 1978); Jenson v. Continental Financial Corp., 404 F.Supp. 806 (D.Minn. 1975). Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys from Legal Services Organization of Indiana, Inc., and Legal Services Program of Northern Indiana, Inc., both being legal services programs which have extensive experience in prison law and in protecting the rights of group litigants. Legal Services Organization has adequate resources B-19 available to fully pursue this action. The attorneys who are counsel of record in this case are experienced in conducting litigation of this type. Thus, plaintiffs’ counsel has the experience and the resources to protect and forward the interests of not only the named plaintiffs but also each member of the class. THE PRESENT CASE FALLS WITHIN THE CATE- GORY OF CLASS ACTIONSIN WHICH THE PARTY OPPOSING THE CLASS HAS ACTED OR FAILED TO ACT ON GROUNDS GENERALLY APPLICABLE TO THE CLASS, THEREBY MAKING APPRO- PRIATE FINAL INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF WITH RESPECT TO THE CLASS AS A WHOLE. [8] In addition to satisfying the requirements of Rule 23(a), the present actions falls within the criteria of Rule 23(b)(2). The Notes of the Advisory Committee, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1976), suggest that subsection 23(b)(2) is uniquely suited to civil rights actions to redress constitutional deprivations of large classes of persons. See also, Fujishima v. Board of Education, 460 F.2d 1355, 1360 (7th Cir. 1972); Inmates of Lycoming County Prison v. Strode, supra, at 234; Hopson v. Schilling, supra, at 234; Hopson v. Schilling, supra, at 1237; Diron v. Quern, 76 F.R.D. 617 (N.D.IIL. 1977). These are two elements which must be present for an action to fall within 23(b)2): “the defendants’ conduct or refusal to act must be ‘generally applicable’ to the class”; and, “final injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief must be requested for the class.” Kornbluh v. Stearns & Foster Co., 73 F.R.D. 307, 310. Both elements are met in the instant case. [9] As has been previously set out in this memorandum, all class members in this case are being subjected to the conditions, policies and practices about which the named plaintiffs complain. In that light, it is clear that class relief would be the appropriate vehicle for resolution of this action, since the conditions, policies and practices will B-20 continue to apply to those who do not come within the scope of any final order. Since the constitutional violations complained of herein are based on practices, policies and conditions applicable to each and every member of the class, declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the class as a whole may be appropriate. Therefore, the proposed class is certified pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and 23(b\2). Il. INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS A. Bruce Wellman Plaintiff Wellman was incarcerated at the I.S.P. from October 1976 to June 8, 1979. Approximately seven months of this period was spent outside the institution on court order. At the time of trial Wellman was not an inmate at the I.S.P. Wellman’s deposition was introduced into evidence and his claim is based on evidence found in that C2position. Plaintiff Wellman first condents that he was denied due process before the Conduct Adjustment Board (hereinafter C.A.B.), when they denied his request to have witnesses appear on his behalf and refused him the lay advocate of his choice. Plaintiff Wellman had requested that Albert Cornell be permitted to represent him but the C.A.B. provided inmate Arthur Wilson as lay advocate. {10} The uncontradicted evidence is that Wellman appeared before the C.A.B. in December 1977 and asked that he be allowed to call three witnesses, all inmates. This request was denied without comment. Plaintiff Wellman contends this denial of his right to call witnesses violated procedural due process as required by Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Wolff, supra, recognized that prison inmates are entitled to a degree of the protections afforded by the due process B-21 clause in prison disciplinary proceedings. ld. at 555-556, 94 S.Ct. at 2974. The Supreme Court stated therein: We are also of the opinion that the inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correc- tional goals. Ordinarily, the right to present evidence is basic to a fair hearing; but the restricted right to call witnesses from the prison population carries obvious potential for disruption and for interference with the swift punishment that in individual cases may be essential to carrying out the correctional program of the institution. We should not be too ready to exercise oversight and put aside the judgment of prison administrators. It may be that an individual threatened with serious sanctions would normally be entitled to present witnesses and relevant documentary evidence; but here we must balance the inmate’s interest in avoiding loss of good time against the needs of the prison, and some amount of flexibility and accommodation is required. Prison officials must have the necessary discretion to keep the hearing within reasonable limits and to refuse to call witnesses that may create a risk of reprisal or undermine authority, as well as to limit access to other inmates to collect statements or to compile other documentary evidence. Although we do not prescribe it, it would be useful for the Committee to state its reason for refusing to call a witness, whether it be for irrelevance, lack of necessity, or the hazards presented in individual cases. Wolff, supra, at 565-566, 94 S.Ct. at 2979. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed the limited right of inmates to call witnesses at disciplinary hearings. See Hayes v. Walker, 555 F.2d 625(7th Cir. 1977) (hereinafter Hayes J). In Hayes J, the Courtof Appeals held that the district court erroneously dismissed the witness denial portion of Hayes’ complaint because the record B-22 before the court did not permit “even limited review” of the disciplinary committee’s decision. The court stated: The Institutional Adjustment Committee offered in justification of its action only broad conclusory findings of possible hazard both to potential witnesses and to institutional security which applied to all of the proposed witnesses on plaintiff's list. There is no indication in the record that the Institutional Adjust- ment Committee examined each proposed witness for the relative benefit or danger in his testimony. Similarly, this court cannot determine whether the broad conclusion applicable to all of the witnesses was improper as to individual witnesses. Since the record is barren of support for these broad conclusions, we find that the case must be returned to the district court for a determination of whether the Institutional Adjustment Committee’s decision was a proper exercise of discretion. We are not requiring that a statement of reasons be given to support the denial ofa request for witnesses. We hold only that some support for the denial of a request for witnesses appear in the record. Hayes I, supra, at 630 (emphasis added) The Court of Appeals in Hayes ] reversed and remanded the cause to the district court to determine if the complete administrative record justified the decision not to call witnesses. At trial the district court heard testimony from the Institutional Adjustment Committee members as to their basis for reaching their decision on Hayes’ request for witnesses. This testimony formed the basis for the district court’s decision that the Committee’s denial of Hayes’ request for witnesses was a proper exercise of discretion. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed this decision in Hayes v. Thompson, 637 F.2d 483 (7th Cir. 1980) (hereinafter Hayes JJ.) The court stated: Although it may be relevant to other issues in this case, it is clear that under Hayes 7] this subsequent testimony may not be considered in reviewing the Committee’s decision. The requirement of support in B-23 the administrative record is central to the effectiveness of judicial review in insuring that a prisoner has not be subjected to arbitrary action by prison officials. If sub- sequent testimony is allowed to substitute for support in the record, the Court can no longer assure itself that the Committee made a reasoned, well-founded decision. Such post-hoc rationalizations are to be viewed with suspicion, and are not a proper basis for meaningful judicial review. Support in the adminis- trative record is necessary to protect the prisoner from arbitrary official action, and is a minimum require- =e due process. Hayes II, supra, at 488. (emphasis ) The Court then concluded that the broad conclusory findings of the Committee in denying the request for witnesses were not adequate to allow judicial review. Therefore, the denial constituted an abridgement of Hayes’ due process rights. Here the conclusions must be the same. There is no evidence that plaintiff Wellman’s proposed witnesses were examined individually for the relative danger or benefit of their testimony. Nor is there any support in the record for the denial of Wellman’s request for witnesses. There is only a blank denial, barren of any rationale for support. This record provides no basis for meaningful judicial review so as to insure that a prisoner is protected from arbitrary government action. Hayes IJ, supra, at 488; Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609, 619(7th Cir. 1980). Therefore, the Court must conclude that the denial of Wellman’s request for witnesses violated his due process rights. This circuit in Bono, supra, at 619, approved the district court’s order which required the hearing officer to document his reasons for not calling witnesses or intro- ducing documentary information. The district court required in Bono v. Saxbe, 462 F.Supp. 146 (E.D.IIl.1978), that: © An inmate will be permitted to have witnesses appear and to present documentary evidence, provided that B-24 calling of witnesses or disclosure of documentary evidence would not jeopardize or threaten institutional security or individual safety, and further provided that the witnesses are available at the institution where the hearing is being conducted. The evidence must be material and relevant to the issue... Where a witness is not available within the institution, nor per- mitted to appear, the inmate may submit a written statement by that witness. The hearing administrator shall, upon the inmate’s request, postpone the hearing to permit the obtaining of written statements. Repetitive witnesses need not be called. Reasons for declining to permit a witness or documentation shall be documented. Id., at 150. The circuit court further explained in Hayes // that the prison disciplinary committee must examine each proposed witness for the relative benefit or danger of his testimony. Hayes II, supra, at 486. The defendants shall comply with these aforementioned guidelines enunciated by the Court of Aypeals in regard to an inmate’s right to call witnesses at a disciplinary hearing. Further, the conduct report at issue here shall be stricken from plaintiff Wellman’s institutional packet regardless of where he is incarcerated. {11] Plaintiff Wellman secondly complains that he was denied the lay assistant of his choice at the displinary hearing. The Supreme Court in Wolff, supra, 418 U.S. at 570, 94 S.Ct. at 2981, stated that: [an inmate], “should be free to seek the aid of a fellow inmate, or if that is forbidden, to have adequate substitute aid in the form of help from the staff or from a sufficiently competent inmate designated by the staff”. Plaintiff Wellman has not criticized the ability of the lay advocate provided him in any way. Rather, he complains of not getting the advocate of his choice. This does not rise to a constitutional level because the C.A.B. fully complied with the requirements of Wolff in regard to lay assistance. This allegation is therefore without merit. B-25 Plaintiff Wellman’s third complaint is that in January 1978 he broke a tooth on a rock in the beans at the prison dining hall. Wellman allegedly asked to see the dentist a number of times but was told by an unnamed source that lockup people did not go to the hospital and to put aspirin in the tooth. Then nine months after the injury Wellman claims to have paid an inmate clerk three boxes of cigarettes for an appointment with the dentist. He saw the dentist immediately. This evidence was elicited by the defendant's own attorney and stands uncontradicted. [12] However, plaintiff Wellman’s proof on this issue lacks a critical element. There is no identified actor in this chain of events, neither guard, nor doctor or dentist, nor prison administrator, nor inmate. Plaintiff Wellman here seeks damages. A defendant’s direct personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right must be established in order for liability to arise under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Stringer v. Rowe, 616 F.2d 993, 1000-1001 (7th Cir. 1980); Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105, 108 (7th Cir. 1971). Nor is this a situation where a pro se pleading is being considered. See, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); Duncan v. Duckworth, 644 F.2d 653 (7th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff Wellman was represented by able trial counsel who had named 17 defendants at the time of trial. Not one of those defendants is even mentioned in Wellman’s testimony; in fact, no individual is ever named or described. [13] The trial of a lawsuit is the main event, the arena where the evidence must be put on. This Court heard one hundred and eleven witnesses and no one testified as to who the participants were in this scenario. The claim, if true, may state a claim under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), but plaintiff Wellman, with able counsel, has failed to put on any proof showing that any of the defendants were in any way personally responsible for the delay in his treatment. Therefore, the B-26 defendant has failed to prove his claimed denial of medical treatment and it is accordingly dismissed. {14] Finally, the prison officials contend they acted in good faith on a belief that their actions conformed to the procedural requirements of Wolff, supra, and they should therefore be immune from damages. The Supreme Court has recognized a qualified good-faith immunity for state prison officials acting within the scope of their official responsibilities when damages are sought for constitu- tional violations under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 98 S.Ct. 855, 55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978). Accord, Knell v. Bensinger, 522 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1975). In Navarette, a state prisoner brought a §1983 action against prison officials charging wrongful interference with his outgoing mail, a violation of his First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court held that the qualified immunity it had outlined for school officials in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed2d 214 (1975), was applicable to state prison officials as well. The test enunciated in Navarette consists of two parts: Under the first part of the Wood v. Strickland rule, the immunity defense would be unavailing to [the prison officials] if the constitutional right allegedly infringed by them was clearly established at the time of their challenged conduct, if they knew or should have known of that right and if they knew or should have known that their conduct violated the constitutional norm. [T]he second branch of the Wood v. Strickland standard...would authorize liability where the official has acted with “malicious intention” to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right or to cause him “other injury.” Navarette, 434 U.S. at 562, 566, 98 S.Ct. at 862, quoted in Chapman v. Pickett, 586 F.2d 22, 25 (7th Cir. 1978). It is this two-pronged test which we apply here. B-27 This denial of witnesses occurred in December 1977. The Wolff decision provided only that a request for witnesses may be denied if it will be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals. Wolff, supra, 418 U.S. at 565, 94 S.Ct. at 2979. Not until this circuit decided Hayes J] in December 1980 and Bono v. Saxbe in April 1980 was it “clearly established” that due process required documented support in the administrative record for a decision not to call witnesses. Thus, these defendants could not have reasonably known that Wolff could be read to require an administrative record more specific than the reasons - enumerated in the Wolff decision. Therefore, the defendants are immune from damages for their denial of the witness request. B. Dwight Walker Plaintiff Walker has been incarcerated at the I.S.P. for seven years. He has raised two separate individual claims for damages. First, plaintiff Walker contends that exces- sive force was used to effectuate a strip search of his person, and second, that during his incarceration he was placed in segregation units without any notice as to why he was being locked up. In December 1978 plaintiff Walker was summoned to testify in a criminal matter in Pulaski County, Indiana. Captain Koziatek informed Walker that he would have to be strip searched before leaving the prison. Walker refused to be strip searched and was warned he would have a conduct report if he did not comply. Walker still refused to submit to the search. On his return to the prison Walker was taken to I.D.U. lockup unit by Lt. Oden. Walker was then asked to step out of his clothes for a strip search and he did so. Lt. Oden then ordered Walker to stick his finger in his mouth, lift his genitals, and bend over and spread his buttocks for a visual rectal inspection. Walker refused to submit to this portion of the search. Lt. Oden then grabbed Walker around his neck and Officer Kennedy grabbed Walker’s arm and twisted it up behind his back in an B-28 attempt to bend Walker over to subject him to the visual cavity search. Plaintiff Walker contends that Sergeant Riggs (deceased at the time of trial) rammed him with his knees in this altercation. Lt. Oden testified that Sgt. Riggs was about six feet away from Walker making the visual examination of the rectal area. It is extremely convenient that the person alleged to have used the most force, Sgt. Riggg, is unable to testify on his own behalf. Nor is this claim supported by any witness other than the plaintiff. For those reasons this Court discredits this allegation against Sgt. Riggs that he struck Walker with his knee. Plaintiff Walker further contends that the force employed was so excessive as to cause him personal injury. The uncontradicted facts establish that all inmates when returning from outside the institution are strip searched. [15] The Supreme Court of the United States addressed the issue of strip searching inmates with the visual inspection of body cavities in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1978). The court recognized that these searches were necessary not only to discover but also deter the smuggling of weapons, drugs, and other contraband into a prison. In Wolfish, the court concluded that strip searches, including the exposure of body cavities for visual inspection, did not violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches. /d., at 558, 99 S.Ct., at 1884. However, the court went on to say that the searches must be conducted in a reasonable manner. Reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Wolfish, supra, at 558, 99 S.Ct., at 1884. The evidence here indicates that the smuggling of contraband is a serious problem in this institution, just as it is in other correctional facilities. See, e.g., Daughtery v. Harris, 476 F.2d 292 (10th Cir.), cert. den., 414 U.S. 872, 94 S.Ct. 112, 38 L.Ed.2d 91 (1973). The Supreme Court, in B-29 balancing this institutional interest in security against the privacy interest of the inmates, determined that such a search was constitutional. The question here is whether the force used to administer this search was so excessive as to become actionable under §1983. See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. den. sub. nom., Employee-Officer John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S.Ct. 462, 38 L.Ed.2d 32 (1973). Johnson, supra, clearly establishes that prison officials violate due process upon making an unprovoked attack on a pretrial detainee. Id., at 1033; Lock v. Jenkins, 641 F.2d 488, 495 (7th Cir. 1981). Judge Friendly, speaking for the court in Johnson, provided this structure for analysis: Although “the least touching of another in anger is a battery,” [citation omitted], it is not in violation of a constitutional right actionable under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The management by a few guards of large number of prisoners, not usually the most gentle or tractable of men and women, may require and justify the occa- sional use of a degree of intentional force. Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates a prisoner's constitutionai rights. In determining whether the constitutional line has been crossed, a court must look to such factors as the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. Johnson, supra, at 1033. [emphasis added] [16] The Seventh Circuit has applied this same analytic framework to the treatment of convicted persons which thus invoked the Eighth Amendment rather than the Due Process Clause. Stringer v. Rowe, 616 F.2d 993, 998-999 (7th Cir. 1980); Lock, supra, at 496, n.13. In order to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that prison officials intentionally inflicted excessive or B-30 grossly severe punishment on him or knowingly main- tained conditions so harsh as to shock the general conscience. Stringer, supra, at 998; United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 719-2 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. den. sub nom. Gutierrez v. Dept. of Public Safety, 414 U.S. 1146, 94 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed.2d 102 (1974). The essential question then becomes whether this use of a force constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Stringer, supra, at 999; see also, Meredith v. Arizona, 523 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1975). {17] This Court is well aware of the demanding and often dangerous position of prison guards in the institu- tional society. Here the guards, when faced with a recalci- trant inmate, applied physical force. They laid hands on plaintiff Walker but there is no claim of the use of gas, mace, fists, or clubs. In this situation where Walker had been outside the institution, possibly unsupervised at times, the strip search becomes a necessity. To allow the inmate to thwart the rectal inspection by mere refusal would be to provide a conduct for contraband. Legion are the cases in which inmates have attempted to smuggle contraband into an institution by concealing it in body cavities. See, e.g., United States v. Ferraro, 590 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Park, 521 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1975). Here the officers applied only enough force to bend Walker over to view his rectal area. This was a good faith effort to maintain institutional security. And although Walker claims he was injured, his testimony is conflicting. At one point he complains of a back injury and at another it is a neck injury. However, on January 3, 1981 he registered no complaint about his back or neck, instead he complained of his thumb. Accordingly, his hand was x- rayed on January 5, 1981 and shown to be normal. In light of these considerations the Court must find that the force used in conducting this involuntary visual rectal inspection was not excessive. It was not so severe or excessive as to shock the conscience in violation of the Eight Amendment. B-31 In fact, it was reasonable under the circumstances. There- fore, this claim is without merit. [18] Plaintiff Walker’s second claim is that he was locked up in segregation on several occasions without any notice as to why he was being locked up. Walker testified he had been locked up without a hearing in March or April of 1975, and periodically through the years of 1977, 1978 and 1979. His contention is that he never received notice within 24 hours as to why he was locked up. Further, plaintiff Walker alleges he was denied the right to consult with his lay advocate in January 1979 until the day of the hearing. Walker also contends Acting C.A.B. Chairman Penfold gave him 60 days in lockup after he was found not guilty of all charges because “he had to be guilty of something”. (R. 139). Unfortunately, Mr. Penfold is not a defendant in any of these consolidated actions. Finally, plaintiff Walker contends he was put on administrative segregation status on April 4, 1978 without any notice as to the reason for it. and, he was subsequently released from A.S. without signing a conduct contract. This Court is aware that inmates often feel they are moved about by hidden forces beyond their control. How- ever, to establish liability for any of these alleged procedural due process violations evidence which at least implicates any defendant is required. That evidence is lacking here. There is only general uncorroborated testimony that these lockups occurred. Yet no specific actor is ever named as responsible. This portion of plaintiff Walker’s claims suffers the same failure of specific proof as plaintiff Wellman’s allegation of denial of medical treat- ment. The Court refers to and incorporates by reference that analysis here. There is no evidence identifying any of the named defendants as the actor responsible for any part of ths alleged violation. Therefore, these allegations must fail for lack of proof under Adams v. Pate, supra, at 108. B-32 C. Achebe Habib Lateef [19] Plaintiff Lateef is currently an inmate at the L.S.P. and was first incarcerated there on September 5, 1975. He was assigned to a job in the I.S.P. library in 1975 and was employed there continuously until June 27, 1980. The library was considered to be a desirable place to work. On June 27, 1980 plaintiff Lateef was transferred from the I.S.P. to the Indiana Reformatory. This was the first ina series of four institutional transfers for Lateef in a four month period. Plaintiff Lateef contends that this series of transfers were solely for the purpose of personal harass- ment. Plaintiff Lateef was transferred to the Indiana Reforma- tory on June 27, 1980. On that date he received a notice from the Director of Classification informing him that effective immediately he was being transferred to the reformatory where he would enter the general population. The notice stated that this was an administrative transfer in Lateef’s best interest as well as that of the institution and that this was not a disciplinary transfer. Lateef was confined at the Indiana Reformatory from June 27, 1980 until August 12, 1980 at which time he was transferred to the Indiana Department of Correction’s Reception and Diagnostic Center. At the Reception and Diagnostic Center plaintiff Lateef was interviewed by a psychologist on one occasion for about an hour and the classification director a number of times. Lateef did not undergo any tests. On September 3, 1980, after approximately 21 days at the Reception and Diagnostic Center, plaintiff Lateef was transferred back to the Indiana Reformatory where he was assigned to the general population.Then on October 29, 1980 Lateef was re- turned to the I.S.P. and assigned to the N.S.B. lockup unit. Plaintiff Lateef contends that this series of transfers were for the purpose of harassment and retailiation. As a result of these transfers Lateef alleges as damages that his B-33 contacts outside the prison have been disrupted, that he lost property, including clothing and books, and that he developed assorted medical conditions. On November 17, 1980, plaintiff Lateef was advised by the I.S.P. Classification Committee that unless he signed a behavior modification contract he would be placed on indefinite administrative segregation and confined to a lockup unit. Lateef, (Tr. 70). At the hearing of the Classification Committee on November 17, 1980, the committee gave plaintiff Lateef several reasons why he was being assigned to administrative segregation. The contract which was proposed to plaintiff Lateef would have required that he work in the soap shop for approximately a year, he not receive a conduct report for 12 months, he be denied evening recreation for a period of six months, and other miscellaneous restrictions. The job in the soap shop which was required by the behavior modification contract was not as desirable a job as plaintiff Lateef held in the prison library prior to his transfer to the Indiana Reforma- tory and plaintiff Lateef considered it to be a form of punishment. At this meeting of the Classification Committee on November 17, 1980, plaintiff Lateef was presented with a memorandum from the Director of Classification outlining the reasons why he believed a behavior contract was appropriate. This document referred to Lateef’s involve- ment in the takeover of C cell house in April 1980, which included the taking of hostages and his involvement with the planning of a work stoppage while at the Indiana Reformatory. This later incident was the stated reason for Lateef’s transfer back to the I.S.P. Based on this past conduct, the Director of Classification determined that Lateef’s behavior needed modification and recommended this contract in population. Plaintiff Lateef refused this contract and has remained in N.S.B. lockup or administra- tive segregation. On N.S.B. lockup Lateef is confined to his B-34 cell 22 hours a day and allowed out two hours a day for recreation in the walkway in front of the cells. The Executive Director of Adult Authority, Indiana Department of Corrections, Mr. Schuler, testified that he was aware of the reasons for the transfers of plaintiff Lateef. This testimony essentially expands the written reasons provided to Lateef, particularly in regard to the takeover of C cell house and the work stoppage at the Indiana Reformatory. Additionally, Mr. Schuler was briefed in regard to the previous conduct of Lateef while incarcerated prior to these transfers. Further, Mr. Schuler received a report from the Reception and Diagnostic Center after Lateef's evaluation, that there was no assistance they could provide there. And finally, Schuler testified that no prisoner had ever been sent to the Diagnostic Center to punish or harass him. The threshold question regarding Lateef’s complaint must be whether these transfers between institutions within the same state infringed a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. In Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976), and Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976), the Supreme Court considered the conditions that must be present for a prisoner to be entitled to a hearing before his transfer from one state prison to another prison within the same state. The court “held in Meachum v. Fano, that no due process liberty interest of a duly convicted prison inmate is infringed when he is transferred..., whether with or without a hearing, absent some right or justifiable exception rooted in state law that he will not be transferred except for misbehavior or upon occurrence of other specified events.” Montanye, supra, at 243, 96 S.Ct. at 2547. In adopting this standard the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that a prisoner may have due process rights as a result of entitlements created by prison regulations and by official policies or practices. Arsberry v. Sielaff, 586 F.2d 37, 47 (7th Cir. 1978); see also, Stringer v. B-35 Rowe, 616 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1980); Anthony v. Wilkinson, 637 F.2d 1130 (7th Cir. 1980). Critical in this anaylsis is plaintiff Lateef’s claim that these transfers were punitive in nature. This is important because Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, is undisturbed by Meachum and Montanye, and disciplinary measures which represent a change in conditions of confinement give rise to procedural due process requirements. Thus, if Lateef could establish that his transfer was disciplinary, he has stated a valid claim. Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281, 1290 (7th Cir. 1981); Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365, 1369 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. den., 489 U.S. 1121, 99 S.Ct. 1033, 59 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979). However, there is no evidence of that in this case. The transfers to other institutions were not followed by any disciplinary punishment or loss of good time. Rather, the transfers appear to be the result of confrontations between Lateef and individuals in the institutions in which he was incarcerated. The Executive Director of the Adult Authority testified that it was their approach to remove such individuals from the scene of the confrontation to a neutral environment to better enable them to adjust to their confinement. He further testified that this was one of the principal reasons behind Lateef’s transfer and that these transfers were not disciplinary in nature. This testimony is fully supported by the record of Lateef’s involvement in the takeover and hostage seizure of C cell house at the I.S.P. Nor does the Indiana Code restrict prison officials’ deci- sions to transfer an inmate from one institution to another in any way. This Court can find no statutory or regulatory creation of a right for a prisoner to serve in any particular institution or be entitled to a hearing of any kind prior toa transfer to another institution. Therefore, plaintiff Lateef’s claim is without merit and is hereby denied. (20] Plaintiff Lateef also alleges that he lost a laundry bag full of clothing and personal items which he last saw in the hand of defendant Officer Bill Kennedy. After losing this property on December 15, 1977, Lateef filed a B-36 greivance with respect to this lost property but contends he has not received a response to the grievance nor been compensated for his lost property. This property is alleged to consist of clothing, personal pictures, a picture album, a watch, and a pair of eyeglasses. The essence of this claim is that plaintiff Lateef has been deprived of his property without due process of law. This evidence stands uncontra- dicted. The Supreme Court has recently addressed this identical issue in Parratt v. Taylor, U.S , 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), citing with approval Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1975), mod. en banc, 545 F.2d 565 (1976), cert. den., 435 U.S. 932, 98 S.Ct. 1507, 55 L.Ed.2d 529 (1978). In Parratt an inmate of a Nebraska prison ordered by mail certain hobby materials. After being delivered to the prison, the packages containing the materials were lost when the normal procedure for receipt of mail packages was not followed. Parratt brought a §1983 action against the prison officials to recover the value of the hobby materials, claiming that the officials had negligently lost the materials and thereby deprived him of property without due process of law inviolation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The value of the items in Parratt was $23.50. Accordingly, the initial inquiry in Parratt and here must focus on two elements to a §1983 action: (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. It is unquestionable that the alleged conduct by the corrections officer in this case satisfies the “under color of law” requirement. Parratt, supra, at 1913. Officer Kennedy was a state employee in a position of considerable authority. Nor is it contended otherwise. The inquiry must therefore turn to the second requirement. The claim here refers to no other right, privilege or B-37 immunity secured by the Constitution or federal laws other than the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend- ment. Unquestionably, Lateef’s claim satisfies three pre- requisites of a valid due process claim: the defendant acted under color of state law; the previously listed items fall within the definition of property; and the alleged loss amounted to a deprivation. However, the Supreme Court held in Parratt that standing alone these three elements do not establish a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Parratt, supra, at 1913. The court reasoned as follows: Although he has been deprived of property under color of state law, the deprivation did not occur as a result of some established state procedure. Indeed, the depriva- tion occurred as a result of the unauthorized failure of agents of the State to follow established state procedures. There is no contention that the procedures themselves are inadequate nor is there any contention that it was practicable for the State to provide a predeprivation hearing. Moreover the State of Nebraska has provided respondent with the means by which he can receive redress for the deprivation. The State provides a remedy to persons who believe they have suffered a tortious loss at the hands of the State. See Neb.Rev.Stat. §81-8,209 et seg. (Reissue 1976). Through this tort claims procedure the state hears and pays claims of prisoners housed in its penal institu- tions. This procedure was in existence at the time of the loss here in question but respondent did not use it. It is argued that the State does not adequately protect the respondent’s interests because it provides only for an action against the State as opposed to its individual employees, it contains no provisions for punitive damages, and there is no right to a trial by jury. Although the state remedies may not provide the respondent with all the relief which may have been available if he could have proceeded under §1983, that does not mean that the state remedies are not adequate to satisfy the requirements of due process. The remedies provided could have fully compensated the respondent for the property loss he suffered, and we B-38 hold that they are sufficient to satisfy the require- ments of due process. This analysis cited above is the proper manner to approach a case such as this. Here a guard took the plaintiffs personal property and while we do not know what happened to it, we know that it was not properly pre- served for Lateef. Likewise, the State of Indiana provides a remedy to rederess property loss or damage inflicted by a state officer through the Indiana Tort Claims Act, I.C. 34-4- 16.5-1 et seq. This act became effective February 19, 1974 and was therefore in effect when plaintiff Lateef’s loss occurred. It may reasonably be concluded, therefore, that the existence of an adequate state remedy for property damage inflicted by a state officer avoids the conclusion that there has been any constitutional deprivation of property without the due process of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Parratt, supra, at 1916. For the foregoing reasons this claim is denied. D. Raymond Hurt Plaintiff Hurt was incarcerated at the I.S.P. from 1973 until November 1980, except for approximately six months in 1974 when he was on parole. Plaintiff Hurt did not per- sonally testify in this action, the evidence of his claims is based solely on his deposition which was admitted into evidence. Hurt was confined to N.S.B. and I.D.U. lockup units from 1976 to April 1979. He complained that in 1976 and prior to then he received food with roaches in it. No more specific evidence was provided and no foreign objects had been found in his food since 1976. There is no allegation of personal injury stemming from this evidence. It will be further considered herein with the food services. Plaintiff Hurt contends that approximately $300.00 worth of his personal property was lost in April 1979. The specific items included a radio, books, and clothing. How- ever, no defendant is named in this allegation so it must fail for lack of proof under Adams v. Pate, supra, and the Court refers to and incorporates here the same analysis as B-39 previously applied to Plaintiff Wellman’s claim for denial of medical treatment. Further, the Court refers to and incorporates here the analysis under Parratt, supra, as previously applied to plaintiff Lateef’s claim for lost personal property. In light of those aforementioned cases, this claim is denied. Next Hurt alleges that he was denied his medication for asthma and had a difficult time obtaining that same medication in the lockup units. Hurt testified that he asked Dr. Saylors and Lt. Oden for his medication and was informed one time that the Warden had instructed them not to give out any medication in the lockup units. No date was ever established for these events. Dr. Mai, one of the staff physicians at the I.S.P., testified that sometimes there had been a delay in receiving supplies but that it had never interfered with the activity of the hospital. Mr. Freake, the Hospital Administrator, also testified that there was some delay in receiving medical supplies on orders of over $200.00 because they required approval of the Purchasing Department in Indianapolis. However, during these delays any shortages were filled by Memorial Hospital without delay. Finally, the Warden testified that he has not attempted to influence the medical staff in the administra- tion of any medication to any particular inmate, and, that he has never overruled a prescription. (21, 22] In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), the Supreme Court held that “deliberated indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, at 173, 96 S.Ct. 2909, at 2925, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (joint opinion), proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” “This is true,” said the Court, “whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treat- ment once prescribed.” Jd., 429 U.S. at 104-105, 97 S.Ct. at B-40 291. This standard is two-pronged. It requires deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials and it requires the prisoners medical needs to be serious. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980); West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1978). A medical need is serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treat- ment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention. Laaman v.Helgemoe, 437 F.Supp. 269, 311 (D.N.H. 1977). Traditionally, a plaintiff must show not only that the defendant was callously indifferent to his medical needs, but that those needs were serious, and that the failure to treat them resulted in personal injury. Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1081 (3d Cir. 1976). {23} Here plaintiff Hurt alleges only that he was denied his medication on one occasion and that he had difficulty obtaining it on other occasions. Giving the plaintiff all favorable inferences this one denial may constitute deliberate indifference but the evidence of this situation fails to support the requisite gravity. It is not every injury or illness that invokes the constitutional protection, only those that are serious and have that effect. Hampton, supra, at 1081. Due to this failure of proof on the second prong of the test, this claim must be denied. [24] Plaintiff Hurt next alleges that on one occasion he appeared by the C.A.B. and asked for witnesses and a lay advocate. He was told he could have them and the case was continued. However, before the next hearing date on this matter, plaintiff Hurt received a six month disciplinary action in the mail. This was prior to Hurt’s opportunity to appear with assistance and present evidence. Inmate Brooks, on Hurt’s request, appealed this to an Indiana State Court which resulted in the C.A.B. dismissing the charge altogether. Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the defendants were involved inthis incident or when it occurred. Nor has any B-41 damage been alleged. In fact, by Hurt’s own admission the alleged wrong has already been remedied by a state tribunal. Therefore, this claim is without merit and is accordingly denied. [25] Plaintiff Hurt next complains that in August 1979 he received one item of legal mail which had been opened outside of his presence. Further evidence indicated that mail is delivered five days a week and is delivered to inmates by 2:30 o’clock P.M., except for heavy days when first class mail is given priority. No mail is censored and only non-legal mail is opened to inspect for contraband. Non-legal mail is opened by the clerk outside of the presence of the inmate. If legal mail is suspected of having contraband in it, it is opened in the presence of the inmate. Legal mail is from time to time opened by accident due to the volume of the mail or the failure of the sender toclearly mark it as legal mail. On those occasions the legal mail is usually hand delivered to the inmate and he is told it was opened by mistake. The testimony of plaintiff Walker bears this out. The Supreme Court of the United States first addressed the issue of censorship and regulation of inmate mail in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974). In Procunier, supra, the court found that prison mail regulations providing for censorship were properly invalidated by the district court since they autho- rized prison officials and employees to apply their own per- sonal prejudices and opinions as standards. Then in Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, the court held that mail between an attorney and a client, who was an inmate, was protected by the Sixth Amendment and could not be read by the prison officials. Further, if such legal mail is suspected of contain- ing contraband that mail must be opened in the presence of the inmate. 418 U.S. at 577, 94 S.Ct. at 2985. The court also stated that “by acceding to a rule whereby the inmate is present when mail from attorneys is inspected [the petitioners] have done all, and perhaps even more, than the Constitution requires.” Jd. B-42 The mail regulations as developed here fully comply with these standards. What the plaintiff contends and the defendants concede is that through inadvertence or negligence legal mail is opened on occasion. However, the official in charge of the mail delivery, in that situation, takes the added precaution of individual delivery and explanation to the inmate to assure the confidentiality of the mail in question. This is a salutary practice which insures confidentiality and avoids misunderstanding. At worst, Hurt’s claim of receiving opened legal mail indicates negligence on the part of prison officials or employees. There is no evidence in the entire case to indicate a pattern or practice of opening or interfering with the delivery of legal mail. Therefore, this claim does not rise to a constitu- tional level and it is accordingly denied. Plaintiff Hurt next alleges that he was sitting quietly in his cell on I.D.U. writing a letter when Officer Konkey sprayed mace in his face. The prisoners on the cell block were creating a disturbance at that time but Hurt contends he was not involved. Subsequently an inmate nurse on the unit came to Hurt’s cell and put something in his eyes, presumably to counteract the mace. The testimony of Officer Konkey paints quite a different picture of the incident involving plaintiff Hurt. According to his testimony Hurt was upstairs in his cell yelling, screaming and disrupting the other inmates. Hurt was asked to be quiet several! times and refused. Later the same day, while Officer Konkey was walking past Hurt’s cell, Hurt threw a glass jar through the bars which shattered and cut Konkey on the hand. Konkey continued to pass out medication and when finished came back to talk to Hurt. When Konkey returned to Hurt’s cell, Hurt threw another glass jar through the bars at which time Konkey used mace on Hurt. Konkey did not use any more mace on Hurt. That concluded the evidence in regard to this incident in 1976. Next on May 3, 1977 plaintiff Hurt alleges he was beaten three times. At approximately noon Hurt testified he was B-43 in the shower area when Officers Morris and Wysong destroyed his commissary items. When he asked the officers why they did this, Morris allegedly took out his handcuffs and ordered Hurt into his cell. Hurt contends he believed Morris was going to hit him, so he swung first and hit Wysong in the face. Then, according to Hurt, Morris and Wysong both took out their handcuffs and chased him to the end of the range. Hurt alleges he was caught, knocked down, and beat with fists and handcuffs. After this scuffle he was again ordered to go into his cell, and this time complied. Then approximately five minutes later, according to Hurt, Captain Koziatek, Bachelor, Lt. McKee and several other officers came to his cell and ordered him out, stating that they were taking him to lockup. Hurt’s hands were handcuffed behind his back, and he alleges that Captain Koziatek slammed him into the wal! face first. Then when they got on the I.D.U. elevator Hurt alleges Captain Koziatek told him he would kill him if he hit one of his officers again and kicked his legs out from under him and hit him on the back of the head with handcuffs. Once at I.D.U. Hurt alleges Koziatek said he would kill him if he didn’t get his hair cut. Hurt responded that he wouldn't get his hair cut because it was against his religion based upon his Cherokee Indian ancestry. Koziatek allegedly replied that he would get it cut and took Hurt to his cel! and started hitting and punching him. Hurt then asked Captain Bachelor to go to the doctor because his chest and head hurt. Hurt was then escorted to the hospital by Officer Sharp, hands still cuffed behind his back, and received x- rays. Hurt was then taken back to I.D.U. On his arrival at I.D.U. Hurt alleges there was a barber chair sitting there, an inmate barber, and five or six officers including Lt. McKee and Officer Sharp. An unidentified person allegedly told Hurt he was going to get a haircut. Hurt again refused. Officer McKee then allegedly grabbed Hurt’s arm and Hurt kicked Officers B-44 Sharp and McKee. Then according to Hurt, three or four people grabbed him and slammed him into the chair. All this time Hurt alleges there were officers twisting his legs and arms and beating him so that he passed out. Hurt’s hair was cut. Afterwards, Hurt alleges he was taken to his cell, thrown on the floor on his face and was beaten on his back and kidneys while the officers supposedly removed the handcuffs from him. After the handcuffs were removed, Hurt was left in his cell. Hurt contends he could hardly walk for the next two or three days. Individuals allegedly involved in the barber chair incident include Koziatek, Glick, Swiger, Sharp and McKee, and two other officers Hurt did not know. This testimony was elicited at the deposition by defense counsel. Captain Koziatek, a principal actor in this scenario, testified in person at the trial of this cause. It was his testi- mony that Hurt’s hair was below the shoulders in length which was in violation of the Department of Correction’s policy. The written policy at that time was that the hair not hang lower than the top of or touch around the collar. Wear- ing the hair up in braids or other fashion was acceptable so long as it was sanitary. Hurt’s hair was in an unsanitary condition, matted, tangled, and unwashed. Koziatek also testified that he had never kicked the legs out from under any inmate in the elevator going up to I.D.U. Finally, Koziatek testified that he had not assaulted Hurt or ever threatened to kill him, or threaten him in any way. Officer Sharp also testified that he was present at the time Hurt received his haircut and that Hurt had to be physically held in the chair. Sharp remembered Hurt kicking one of the officers present but had no memory of Hurt being hit or punched in any way. Officer Swiger was also present at the haircut, and testified essentially that Hurt was unwilling to have his hair cut, had to be physically restrained, but did not see Hurt hit anybody, or anyone hit Hurt. Plaintiff Hurt, by counsel, has stated this is not a challenge to this hair length regulation, rather it is a B-45 challenge to the procedure used in the involuntary cutting of Hurt’s hair. Plaintiff Hurt contends that the amount of force used was so excessive as to be actionable under Johnson v. Glick, supra. This is a situation where an inmate insisted on having hair which was maintained so as to violate the prison regulations. The record shows that Hurt was asked and cautioned to have his hair cut, and written up several times because the fashion in which he maintained it violated prison regulations. Unfortunately for all concerned plaintiff Hurt refused to comply. Plaintiff Hurt did not testify in person at this trial. Officers Konkey, Koziatek, Sharp and Swiger did testify in person about these incidents and their demeanor and bearing causes this Court to credit their testimony. [26] In Lock v. Jenkins, supra, the Seventh Circuit Court of appeals adopted the position that “only in rare circumstances would it be appropriate for tear gas to be used to control inmates already confined in their cells.” /d., at 496. The amount of as used was reasonable and it was needed under the circumstances to restore order. Under Johnson v. Glock, supra, standards, as previously enunciated in regard to plaintiff Walker, Officer Konkey’s use of mace on Hurt was a reasonable application of force used in a good faith effort to restore discipline. There is no showing that this was excessive or severe in the Eighth Amendment sense. The Court must conclude that this was one of the rate instances when the use of gas against a person locked in a cell was justified. {27] In regard to the series of events which culminated in piaintiff Hurt receiving a haircut, the Court notes that neither Officer Morris or Wysong, who allegedly beat Hurt severely, are named as defendants in this case. Therefore, their conduct becomes extraneous because there is no allegation or evidence that any named defendant should have known of, knew of, or directed their conduct. The absence of these alleged principal actors as defendants B-46 casts doubt on the veracity of plaintiff Hurt’s story. Officer Koziatek is a named defendant and is accused by Hurt of numerous acts of brutality. However, witnesses at the scene do not recall this alleged abuse by Koziatek, and the officer denies it ever occurred. Also, plaintiff Hurt failed to answer the question as to whether he suffered any cuts or abrasions from these alleged beatings with metal hand- cuffs. There is an obvious lack of documentation of any injuries which would be concurrent with the alleged severity of these assaults. Therefore, this Court must accept Captain Koziatek’s version of these events. While other assaults are alleged no individuals are named as the perpetrators. These claims suffer from a failure to prove a defendant’s direct personal responsibility and are there- fore without merit. See Stringer, supra; Adams v. Pate, supra. In regard to the actual giving of the haircut, the allega- tions of excessive force by unidentified officers are without proof, and must fail for that reason. The court is sure this was an unpleasant incident for all involved. However, the force used throughout this incident was not so excessive or severe so as to chock the conscience in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Stringer, supra. In light of all the foregoing, the Court must find that none of plaintiff Hurt’s claims rise to the level of a constitutional violation. They are, therefore, dismissed. E. Richard Colvin Plaintiff Colvin has been incarcerated at the I.S.P. from December 1974 to the present time except for the period of September 1979 to November 1980, during which time he was at another institution within the Department of Correction. Colvin lived in C Cellhouse from December 1974 through September 1979, and has lived in D Cellhouse since his return to I.S.P. on November 4,1980. There are two principal issues raised by plaintiff Colvin, the first being a medical complaint and the second a dietary complaint. B-47 (28] Plaintiff Colvin first contends that he has a back problem which requires a backboard. While at the I.S.P. the plaintiff contends that he has had a backboard approximately four and one-half years. Plaintiff also had a backboard while he was located at the Westville Correc- tional Center. He further alleges that his backboard was prescribed by a physician and that since his return to the I.S.P. he has been denied the use of a backboard. Colvin further testified that he was told by Dr. Mai, a prison physician that a backboard was not necessary. The Medical Services Audit Review Committee also considered this request for a backboard and decided that it was unneces- sary. Under Estelle v. Gamble, supra, as previously discussed in regard to plaintiff Hurt, a plaintiff must show deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. The evidence here fails on both points. Dr. Mai and the Medical Services Audit Review Committee considered this request for a backboard and found it unnecessary. Nor is there any showing of the requisite gravity. Rather, this is a disagree- ment between the patient and the doctor over the course of treatment. Here the doctor simply did not feel a backboard was necessary. Such disagreement does not rise to a constitutional level. Therefore, this claim is accordingly dismissed. {[29] Plaintiff Colvin’s second complaint is that he has difficulty obtaining a pork-free diet. Colvin is of the Moslem faith which prohibits the eating of pork. The dietician who testified on behalf of the plaintiff found that pork products were used generally about three times a week. It was her conclusion that those persons not eating pork would not be getting any proteins at their mealtimes. The Food Service Director of the Department of Correc- tion, Mr. Prill, testified that he makes 12 or 13 trips a year to the I.S.P. to examine the food services. Master menus are prepared by his office and the nutritional values calculated for them. Then, if a substitution occurs on any particular B-48 menu at any institution that as served menu is sent to Prill’s office to determine the nutritional values. Prill also testified that he was aware Moslems could not eat pork and that it was his opinion that Moslems still re- ceived adequate nutrition from the foods served. According to the National Research Council on dietary allowances a male person need only receive 56 grams of protein per day. According to Prill, the average diet at the I.S.P. contained 100 grams of protein per day, subtacting the 41 to45grams in the average pork serving left 55 grams of protein in that day’s diet. Pork is only served three times a week and on those days the inmates are allowed to receive extra portions of vegetables. In order to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, plaintiffs must show either that the actions of the defendant intentionally inflicted excessive or grossly severe punish- ment upon them or conditions so harsh as to shock the conscience were maintained. LaBatt v. Twomey, 513 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975). There can be no doubt that the Constitu- tion requires that diet be adequate to maintain the health of the inmates. Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503, 508 (8th Cir. 1980). However, this is not a case such as Holt v. Sarver, 300 F.Supp. 825, 832 (E.D.Ark. 1969), where the prisoners were receiving fewer than 1000 calories a day and their meals consisted primarily of 4-inch squares of “grue”. Rather, this is situation where reasonable accommodations have been made to insure that those inmates of the Moslem faith receive adequate nutrition without eating pork. The evidence shows that without eating the pork on those occa- sions when it is served an inmate still receives the recommended minimum allowance of protein for the day and is allowed to have additional helpings of another item. This complaint in regard to the dietary practice does not rise to a constitutional level and is therefore dismissed. F. Stewart Brooks Plaintiff Brooks was incarcerated at the 1.8.P. from September 24, 1975 to February 28, 1979. On July 27, 1977, B-49 Brooks injured his hand in an altercation with another prisoner. The medical treatment he received is the basis of one of his complaints. Brooks’ second complaint arises out of the procedures employed by the Conduct Adjustment Board in regard to the selection of lay advocates. {30} On July 27, 1977 when Brooks injured his hand he was taken to the prison hospital. At the hospital an x-ray was taken of the injured hand and a prisoner taped four tongue depressors on the hand. Brooks was then sent back to his cell with Tylenol capsules for pain. The next day the hand was swollen and painful so Brooks was returned to the prison hospital. Brooks saw the same prisoner again, an inmate named Archie Burr, who put a cast on the hand without any supervision. Burr testified he was instructed to put a cast on Brooks’ hand by the written order of physician’s assistant Kasprzak. Kasprzak is not named herein as a defendant. Burr further testified that though this was the first time he had ever put a cast on, it was a common practice for prisoner nurses to apply casts to other inmates. Brooks complains that the bones were improperly aligned by this cast which caused the little finger of his hand to heal sticking out to the side. Approximately six months after the injury occurred Brooks was taken to see a bone specialist who told him the hand had healed improperly and would require surgery to be reset. Since leaving the prison Brooks has not sought further treatment of his hand. The plaintiff's witness Dr. Shansky, testified that under no circ nistances would it be appropriate for an untrained prisoner to set a fracture by placing a cast. This Court is acutely sympathetic to the apparent medical mistreatment suffered by plaintiff Brooks. It would appear to state a claim under Estelle v. Gamble, supro. However, Brooks fails to allege that any defendant was involved with, or had knowledge of this course of treat- ment ordered by physician's assistant Kasprzak. There is no evidence to implicate Hospital Administrator Freake or Warden Duckworth or any other named defendant. B-50 Plaintiff Brooks has failed to prove any defendant’s direct personal responsibility for the claimed depreviation as required by Adams v. Pate, supra. Therefore, this claim must be and is dismissed. [31] Plaintiff Brooks second allegation is in regard toa January 1979 appearance before the C.A.B. Brooks was given a list of four prisoners’ names from which to select a lay advocate to represent him. Brooks informed the screen- ing officer Richard Day, that he did not want any of those four, that there was an inmate in population whom he wanted to represent him. The prison rule at that time was that anyone in population was eligible to serve as a lay advocate. Day indicated on the report that Brooks did not want a lay advocate since he had refused the four offered. Brooks appeared at the hearing without representation and the C.A.B. chairman inquired about this. Brooks explained the prior events and Day denied that it happened. After the hearing Brooks attempted to discuss the matter with Day. Day ordered Brooks to be quiet and wrote him up for refusing a direct order for which Brooks got 60 days in lockup. The procedure of providing a list of inmates versed in the procedures of the C.A.B. is one which finds its origin in Wolff v. McDonnell, supra. The Supreme Court stated in Wolff that an inmate “should be free to seek the aid of a fellow inmate, or if that is forbidden, to have adequate substitute aid in the form of help from the staff or from a sufticiently competent inmate designated by the staff.” Jd. at 570, 94 S.Ct. at 2982. The C.A.B. fully complied with this procedure by supplying a list of inmate lay assistants designated by the staff. This provided Brooks the requisite opportunity to secure assistance which he chose to forgo. However, the C.A.B. having heard Brook’s explanation allowed him to submit written evidence on the merits of his claim after the hearing. This procedure followed by the C.A.B. did not violate plaintiff Brook's due process rights. It was the conduct of Officer Day that interfered with B-51 Brooks’ access to a lay assistant. However, Officer Day is not a defendant in this case so this claim suffers from the now familiar infirmity under Adams v. Pate, supra, at 108, of failure to establish a defendant’s direct personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation. Therefore, this claim must be dismissed. G. Billie R. Adams Plaintiff Adams, the sole plaintiff in S. 77-35, has been an inmate at the I.S.P. since October 1972 to the present. From April 1975 to July 1978 Adams was subjected to a series of lockups on segregation. It is these lockups he complains of and some lost personal property and a C.A.B. procedure regarding the calling of witnesses. [32] Property belonging to Plaintiff Adams and registered with the I.S.P. was seized during a shakedown on January 28, 1977. The property seized included a tele- vision, a guitar, leather tools and supplies, stereo head- phone, three pair of shoes, smoking pipes, a hot pot, and jewelry. This property was never returned. The property was alleged seized by ten unnamed officials. Next in September 1979, plaintiff Adams contends that two purses, and five or six billfolds belonging to him were confiscated by prison officials from the car of Dr. Higgins, the I.S.P. dentist. Adams had been given permission by Assistant Warden Cohen to have Dr. Higgins take the leather goods to a church display and sell them. These items were confiscated when Dr. Higgins’ car was searched in connection with a suspicion that it was bringing contraband into the institution. Plaintiff Adams sought the return of his leather goods for over a year at which time Assistant Warden Cohen ordered their return. One purse was returned to Adams but he was informed by Investigator Penefold that the rest of it had come up missing. The Court incorporates here by reference the prior lost property analysis made in regard to plaintiff Lateef. The B-52 Supreme Court in Parratt v. Taylor, supra, stated the inquiry must focus on two elements of a §1983 action: (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Here, these claims are deficient in both respects. First, no individual is ever named as responsible for the seizure of any of this property. No defendant is ever implicated in the actual taking which resulted in the loss. Second, the State of Indiana provides an adequate state remedy, the Indiana Tort Claims Act, I.C. 34-4-16.5-1 et seq., for property lost by a state officer. The availability of this remedy avoids the conclusion that there has been any constitutional deprivation of property without due process of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, this Court notes with chagrin the regularlity of such lost property claims and hopes the prison administra- tion would address the situation. In light of the foregoing, this claim does not rise to a constitutional level and is dismissed. [33] When plaintiff Adams was locked up on January 28, 1977 he was charged with possession of 14 marijuana cigarettes and $90.00 of United States currency which was found in a common area of his dormitory housing about 60 men. The locker in which the contraband was found was shared by Adams with two other inmates for the storage of property. Those two inmates did not receive conduct reports. At the hearing before the C.A.B. on this charge Adams requested the testimony of four inmate witnesses, Olsterhouse, Ware, Smith and Fetters. Ware and Olsterhouse were the two who shared this area with Adams and they testified at the hearing. Olsterhouse testified that ten different inmates used the cabinet where the contraband was found for the storage of leather goods and that the cabinet did not havea lock on it. The C.A.B. refused B-53 to hear testimony from inmates Smith and Fetters. Plaintiff Adams contends Smith and Fetters would have testified that they and other frequently used the cabinet and that area. Adams also requested that the officer who wrote the conduct report testify at the hearing. The C.A.B. refused to call Officer Keith to testify. This hearing before the C.A.B. was concluded on February 3, 1977. Adams was found guilty of possession of contraband and sentenced to six months on I.D.U. disciplinary lockup. He served five months and 22 days of that sentence. The Court refers to, and incorporates by reference here, the prior analysis of an inmate’s right to call witnesses under Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, and its progeny, as dis- cussed in regard to plaintiff Wellman. The testimony of inmates Smith and Fetters, according to what plaintiff Adams contends they would have said, would have been cumulative on the point that this area and cabinet were used by a number of inmates. That fact was established by the testimony of inmate Olsterhouse. The denial of the request to call the officer who wrote the conduct report was premised on a policy of not calling the officers to testify at the hearings. The basis of this policy being to avoid an addi- tional confrontation between the staff member and the person that is being reported. The rationale of the C.A.B. in denying the requests for these witnesses is drawn directly from Wolff, supra, at 565-566, 94 S.Ct. at 2979. The testi- mony of the two other inmates would have been repetitive and the calling of the officer would have created an unnecessary confrontation. This procedure did not violate plaintiff Adams’ limited procedural due process right to call witnesses. Therefore this claim is dismissed. [34] Plaintiff Adams finally contends that he was subjected to a series of lockups which failed to conform to procedural due process requirements. In April 1975 plaintiff Adams was confined to I.D.U., a lockup unit at the I.S.P., for a period of 11 days for “investigation.” When plaintiff Adams was locked up in B-54 I.D.U. in April 1975, he was not told the reason he was being locked up, he was not given a conduct report and he was not given a hearing in connection with the lockup. From August 1, 1975 until August 11, 1975, Adams was confined to I.D.U. lockup unit for “investigation.” He was not given ary reason for his confinement to I.D.U. on August 1, 1975, nor was he given a hearing of any kind in connection with the lockup and he was never told why he was released. Adams was again confined to I.D.U. from August 22, 1975 to August 27, 1975 for “investigation.” In connection with the lockup on August 22, 1975, nodisciplinary charges were filed against Adams, and he did not at any time receive a hearing connected with the confinement. Adams was again confined to I.D.U. for investigation on October 15, 1975 and was confined at the N.S.B. disciplinary lockup unit until October 31, 1975. When Adams was locked up on October 15, 1975, he was told only that it was for “investigation,” and was given no other reason for the lockup. About ten days after being locked up, Adams was givena conduct report charging him with possession of marijuana because two seeds and some flakes of marijuana were found in an envelope belonging to Adams in the electric shop where he was employed. At a hearing before the C.A.B. in connection with the charge of possession of marijuana, the charge was dismissed. Adams then submitted to the chair- man of the C.A.B. a request that the charge of possession of marijuana which had been dismissed be expunged from his packet. Sgt. Kozlowski advised Adams that the dismissed charge would not be removed from his packet and some time later, Adams’ counselor told him that it was still there. At the time Adams testified in the trial of this action on January 6, 1981, the charge of possession of marijuana which had been dismissed by the C.A.B. in October of 1975 still appeared in his packet. On February 4, 1981, Warden Duckworth removed from the packet of Adams the conduct B-55 report charging him with possession of marijuana which had been dismissed by the C.A.B. in October 1975. Adams was again locked up on I.D.U. on April 8, 1976 and was confined on I.D.U. until June 6, 1976. Adams was told only that he was being held for investigation and was not given any other reason for his confinement until he was given a conduct report about three weeks after he had been locked up on I.D.U. on April 8, 1976. The:conduct report charged Adams with violation of institutional rules because a package mailed to him from Tandy Leather Co. in Florida contained marijuana. Following the filing of the conduct report, Adams was given a hearing on the charges and they were dismissed. Adams was again locked up on January 28, 1977 pursuant to a conduct report. The lockup on January 28, 1977 was the seventh time Adams had been locked up ina disciplinary isolation unit in a period of 21 months but this was the first occasion on which he had received a conduct report prior to the time he was locked up. Prior to the lockup on January 28, 1977 Adams had never been found by the C.A.B. to have violated the rules of the institution. Here Adams received a hearing before the C.A.B. on the charge of possesion of contraband and was sentenced to six months on I.D.U. disciplinary lockup. Adams was again locked up for investigation on June 29, 1978, for a period of 13 days in B Seclusion. At the time he was locked up Adams was not served with a conduct report and was told that he was being locked up for investigation. During the time he was locked up Adams was served witha conduct report charging him with possession of narcotic paraphernalia, specifically an alligator clip. The alligator clip was found in a box of junk in Adams’ cell by officers who were cleaning out his cell following Adams’ lockup for investigation on June 29, 1978. The possession of the alligator clip was not discovered until after Adams was locked up. At no time did Adams receive a hearing in B-56 connection with the lockup on June 19, 1978, and the conduct report was ultimately dismissed. In only one of these instances were disciplinary charges filed against plaintiff Adams. On every other occasion Adams was locked up for investigation he was not given any reason for his confinement, he was not given any kind of hearing in connection with the lockup, nor was he told why he was being released. Each of these six incidents set forth a violation of Wolff v. McDonnell, supra. Specifically, plaintiff Adams was not given any reason for his lockupora hearing. Adams seeks damages for this confinement without the benefit of due process. However, as disturbing as it is to the Court, plaintiff Adams has failed to named or even implicate one of the defendants as being responsible for these deprivations. Adams testimony reveals a series of lockups but never names an actor as responsible. Rather, Adams contends only that this was a pattern of harassment perpetrated upon him by the defendants and institution. The defendants contend only that no inmate has been locked up on a general charge of investigation since mid- 1980. This would coincide with the decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Sargeant v. Jenkins, 631 F.2d 734, an unpublished order which this Court took judicial notice of during this trial. In Sargeant, this Court granted summary judgment for the defendants at the district court level. The Seventh Circuit then held that segregation due to “investigation” provided insufficient notice of the reason why the inmate was being locked up. The Court of Appeals went on to note that the prison rules provided the precise safeguards that were missing from the actual practice. The Seventh Circuit declined, however, to order a mandatory injunction requiring the defendants to follow their pro- cedure but did put them on notice that their practice was unconstitutional. Further, the Court held that the defendants were immune from personal liability under Procunier v. Navarette, supra. B-57 These incidents here all occurred prior to this Seventh Circuit ruling. The Sargeant opinion expressly intended to put an end to the complained of practice prospectively. It was not intended to be retroactive. The defendants contend that their current practice comports with the guidance of Sargeant and the plaintiffs do not contest that. This failure by some unnamed persons to give plaintiff Adams sufficient notice of the reason for his segregation occurred within the time frame of the Sargeant case and has been remedied by that decision. In regard to the remaining allegations of due process violations those claims must fail due to a failure to prove that any defendant was personally responsible for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right. Stringer, supra, at 1000-1001; Adams v. Pate, supra, at 107. Therefore, this claim is dismissed. The individual claims of the following plaintiffs all relate to the delivery of medical services: James Odis Hendrix; Mellon Carroll; Grady Thomas Bobbitt; and James Edwin Blackburn. These claims will be considered in conjunction with the analysis of the prison medical services. The individual claim of plaintiff Donald Ray Sciefers goes to the condition of the cells in which he has been housed. This evidence will be considered in conjunction with the analysis of the prison physical plant. Ill. The Prison: An Overview The I.S.P. is a maximum security penitentiary for male felons over the age of thirty. The original legislative authority for its construction was passed in 1859. The prison is enclosed by a forty foot wall which encompasses twenty-four acres of land. Enclosed are the housing units, industrial shops, prisoners’ dining facilities, infirmary, chapel, and other related facilities including a six acre recreation area. The inmate population at the time of trial was approximately 1900, by the time of oral argument it was approaching 2000. B-58 Inmates in the general! population are housed in A, B, C, and D and I Cell Houses. Newly arrived inmates are housed in the Admission and Orientation Unit (A & O). Inmates in disciplinary segregation are housed in the New Service Building (N.S.B.), B Cell House Seclusion, D Cell House Detention Unit, I Cell House Dention Unit (I.D.U.), and in (A & O). Inmates in protective custody are housed in A & O and in a ward in the infirmary. Inmates on administrative segregation are housed in N.S.B. Inmates on self-lockup are housed in I.D.U. and A & O. The individual plaintiffs in this action have been housed at different times in the various cell houses as well as the detention units. Addi- tionally, all members of the class a/v all housed in units of the prison. Cells in A, B,C, and D Cell Houses are 40 to 48 square feet in size. Cells in I Cell House are 56 square feet in size. Cells in A & Oare 38 square feet in size. Inmates housed at A & O are confined there 23 and one-half hours per day. Inmates confined to N.S.B. lockup unit, the I.D.U. lockup unit and B Cell House Seclusion are in their cells 23 and one-half hours a day. Inmates on administrative segregation are in their cells 22 hours a day. IV. The Experts Mr. Joseph G. Cannon. Mr. Cannon called as plaintiffs’ first expert witness is presently employed as a Professor at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. He received his B.S. degree in Social Administration with specialization in corrections from Ohio State University in 1950 and his Master of Social Work degree with specialization in Correctional Administration from the same university in 1956. Mr. Cannon has worked in the Illinois Department of Correction, the Minnesota Department of Correction, and the Maryland Department of Correction. It must be noted B-59 that he was in charge of Adult Correctional Institutions for the State of Minnesota and left that position to become the Warden of the Illinois State Penitentiary. His experience in corrections is extensive. Mr. Cannon toured the facilities of the Indiana State Prison on March 21, 1980. During the tour, he interviewed inmates, staff and administration of I.S.P. He has testified as an expert witness in prison conditions cases in United States District Courts in the districts of West Virginia, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and Massachusetts over the past ten years. The following are his opinions and observations regard- ing the conditions of confinement at I.S.P.: General references have already been made relative to the extreme conditions of the physical plant. The interest here is to focus on specific conditions that deserve special mention. The lack of hot water in the cell houses is unconscionable and unjust treatment of the prisoners, in his opinion. The word is out among the population that in some cell houses hot water taps may be secured for a price. This situation can only ferment trouble. Another aspect of the physical plant that needs attention is the dried food that he found on the front of several cells in Cell House I, detention unit. It appeared that food had been splashed on the cell fronts when meals were served to men in their cells. While it is understandable that this might occur during the serving of trays and that some of the spillage may be caused by the prisoners, it is the responsi- bility of the administration to see that the housing units are maintained. The kitchen and dining room were visisted for two meals and an observation of procedures. Supervision was lacking. The staff that were present in the kitchen tended to stand around and talk to each other. Cannon observed a serving line and noticed that some prisoners were receiving two B-60 and three pork chops while others received one or none, even though requests were made for additional servings. Calling the matter to the attention of one of the staff in the kitchen Cannon was informed that it didn’t happen. During his two visits to the kitchen and dining rooms the serving lines were not being properly supervised. In the kitchen, large containers of food were uncovered and sitting under broken windows where something could fall into them. Cannon found the educational program understaffed, undersupervised and underattended among other apparent areas of difficulty. Cannon visited the school on two occasions. In an academic classroom area designed to accommodate at least 100 students, Cannon found 18 men involved in classroom activities the first day and 22 the second day. He also found small groups of completely unsupervised prisoners in small secluded offices that had the windows covered or painted over in order to avoid proper supervi- sion by an officer or teacher. The academic area of the school and especially those secluded offices were not being properly supervised and thus were potentially dangerous areas for most prisoners. One reason the school fails to attract more students is this lack of supervision. In a population of 1600 there will be 500 functional illiterates. When Cannon inquired regarding the number of classes that were available to deal with this problem, he was told that there were two classes and that they met only in the mornings. A high percentage (80 to 90%) of the illiterate population have the potential and capacity to achieve educationally at the high school and college level, if given the opportunity. The men in this prison are not being given the opportunity and are forced to live in an atmosphere that discourages such potential. This contrib- utes to the propensity toward future criminal behavior. The recreation program with its 5 P.M. to9 P.M. nightly, B-61 year round, yard activity is very commendable. Cannon stated this was the first prison that he had worked in or visited that has had this degree of yard availability. Cannon visited the yard area and field house during his first visit and again found supervision to be inadequate. It was a rainy evening and even with the rain some men were inthe open yard area while most were in the field house. Cannon circulated through the field house among some two to three hundred men. He only found three officers and this is an inadequate number in such a situation. During a tour of the industrial shops, Cannon was impressed with the potential for on-the-job training, especially in the machine shop and to a lesser degree the auto tag shop. During Cannon’s two visits to the shops, he found much idleness and little productive activity. Again he was impressed with the potential for meaningful production and training but at the same time frustrated with the lack of interest and concern for this potential on behalf of those responsible. This concluded the testimony of Dr. Cannon. Dr. Herbert T. Wood. Dr. Wood, called as plaintiffs’ expert witness, presently serves as Chief of the Bureau of Occupational and Institu- tional Hygiene for the District of Columbia Government. He has a Bachelor’s Degree in Chemical Engineering, magna cum laude, Catholic University of America, 1961, and his Doctorate in Physical Chemistry from the University of Wisconsin in 1965. Dr. Wood has been a consultant for the United States Department of Justice inspecting the vocational industrial areas of state reformatories for occupational safety and health-hazards since 1978. His further consultations and publications in this area are too numerous to mention. Suffice it to say that he is eminently [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_0924%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.