# Petition — Spacefone Corp. v. Johnston

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 465 U.S. 1021

## Text

ottce.
83-631 Pe eat US

No. $0 1983
EV,
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1983 ' >

SPACEFONE CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
vs.
WILLIAM J. JOHNSTON,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT S. JONES, ESO.
COFER, BEAUCHAMP & HAWES
SUITE 200

PEACHTREE & BROAD BUILDING
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30043

(404) 577-6200

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

September 28, 1983

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act are applicable to a
company, formed solely for the development
and eventual manufacture of a single prod-
uct, which never successfully develops and
sells any product?

2. Whether a single unperfected proto-
type produced by a company can be considered
"goods" within the Fair Labor Standards
Act provision of “Production of goods for
commerce” when the company has no other
business other than the unsuccessful de-
velopment of the prototype?

3. Whether the movement of a single
prototype, which was shown to _ investors
out of state who elected not to invest in
the further development of the prototype,

falls within the Fair Labor Standards Act's

(i)

definition of “production of goods for com-

merce"?

PARTIES

Spacefone Corporation ("Spacefone") ap-
peared as a defendant-appellee before the
United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit. William J. Johnston ("“John-
ston") appeared as the plaintiff-appellant

before the Eleventh Circuit.

(ii)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
QUESTIONS PRESENTE ee ]@&.6 © 8 20 @.@ 8 6 8 eee & ee i
NGL Dé. & 006 6.0:6.0% 0 00:6. 6.460:659 686.0 666.0068 ii

TABLE OF CA REE EOS 6. © 60:60 bine 6 00 6000 64:8 set

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. .....00scccccees iv
OPINIONS BELOW. +++ +eeeeueseeseeeeeees 1
I ee re ey pou lct way hee 2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND

STATUTES INVOLVED.......cccccccsscces 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE....cccccccccees 3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT........ 7

I. The Writ Should Be Granted
Because The Eleventh Cir-
cuit's Expansive Interpreta-
tion of “Production Of Goods
For Commerce" Oversteps Pre-
viously Established Limits of
This Court.ccccccccseccccccere 7

II. The Writ Should Be Granted
In Order To Resolve The Con-
flict Below On The Issue Of
Whether Research On A Prod-
uct Never Produced Amounts
SO BR "“PEOGUCCIOR 6c bese eeece 15

CRs 6 6p 4 a 0060 0t06 beens ote eene 16

(iii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S.
517 i \ ) rr nr ey or eee

Krill v. Arma Corp., 76 F.Supp. 14
(Bo DeNeLe DS 6s one ane beamecaeks

Mabee v. White Plains Publishing
Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1964)... 2eee

Shultz v. Merriman, 425 F.2d 228
(lst Cir. Et a na a oS

10 E. 40th St. Bldg., Inc. v.
Callus, 325 U.S. 578 (1945)......

Tormey v. Kiekhaefer Corp., 76
F.Supp. 557 (E.D. Wisc. 1948)....

0.8. ¥, Darby, 312 U.S. 100

BS!) re eres er ee ee ye

Walling v. Jacksonville Paper, 317
U.S. 564 [Lee ahecsaaene dee eeewnes

Wirtz v. A. S. Giometti & Associ-
ates, Inc., 399 F.2d 738, (5th
Git: EO Té ats 00064 b eae ou ae

Statutes and Others

29 U.S.C. §$ 201 et. seg. (1974) .ccee

(iv)

Page

13,

12,

14,

9,

ll,

2,

ll

33

13

10

pe

10

ll

13

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1983

NO.

SPACEFONE CORPORATION,
Petitioner,

Vv.

WILLIAM J. JOHNSTON,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner Spacefone Corporation
("Spacefone") prays that a writ of certio-
rari issue to review the judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals as

amended on rehearing is contained in the

accompanying Appendix and is reported at
706 F.2d 1178 (llth Cir. 1983). The opin-
ion of the United States Court for the
Northern District of Georgia is contained

in the accompanying Appendix.
JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed
the Order of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia
dismissing this case for lack of jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter. Jurisdiction
was predicated under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
STATUTES INVOLVED
The Fair Labor Standard Act, 29 U.S.C.

§ 206(a) provides in pertinent part:

Every employer shall pay to each of
his employees who in any workweek is
engaged in commerce or in the produc-
tion of goods for commerce, or is
employed in an enterprise engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce, wages at the following
rates.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. FACTS

Spacefone was incorporated for the pur-
pose of doing research and development work
on a state of the art cordless telephone
with the eventual plan of marketing and
manufacturing this product. The work be-
gan in February, 1980, and has continued
to date, with no cordless telephone unit
having been produced or sold anywhere.
Spacefone has never manufactured, produced
or sold products of any kind, and is cur-
rently continuing in its attempts to final-

ize development of an experimental cordless

extension telephone. It has no other busi-
ness other than the attempted development
of this product. 4

Johnston was hired by Spacefone to work
as a designer and draftsman toward the even-
tual creating of a package in which to
house the Spacefone cordless telephone.
Pursuant to these duties, he was required
to build dyes for the vacuum form machine,
to trim plastic, and to do some testing of
materials and circuit boards.

Johnston was infrequently called upon
to order sample parts for an experimental
prototype; these interstate telephone calls
were not part of his regular duties, were
incidental to his primary employment, and
did not constitute a substantial portion
of appellant's time.

No products of any kind were ever pro-

duced, sold, or moved in interstate commerce
a“

o4-

while Johnston worked with Spacefone. One
unperfected prototype was twice taken out
of state to show potential investors, but
none of the investors ever invested funds

in the company.
B. OPINIONS RELOW

This suit instituted by Johnston a-
gainst Spacefone to recover wages allegedly
due by reason of Spacefone's failure to
pay him the minimum wage and premium pay of
time and one-half his regular rate for hours
he worked in excess of forty hours pursuant
to the provisions of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 1938, as amended (29 U.S.C.
§ 201 et seq.).

The case was tried in the District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia,
Newnan Division, the Honorable G. Ernest

Tidwell presiding without a jury. The trial

court elected to hear initially only evi-
dence relating to the question of the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction of the court. Af-
ter the close of the evidence of this is-
sue, the trial court granted Spacefone's
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction
Over the Subject Matter.

Johnston appealed to the Eleventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. The Eleventh Circuit
reversed (Judge Roney dissenting) finding
that the facts showed that Johnston had
been engaged in the production of goods for
commerce, thereby subjecting Spacefone to
the application of the Fair Labor Standards

Act.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.

I. The Writ Should Be Granted Because The
Eleventh Circuit's Expansive Interpre-
tation of “Production Of Goods For Com-
merce" Oversteps Previously Established
Limits of This Court.

A. THE “FOR COMMERCE” REQUIREMENT

Johnston had the burden of proving that
he had a role in “producing goods", and
that these “goods” had to be “for commerce",
Yet the evidence was undisputed that while
Spacefone had hopes and dreams of eventually
marketing and manufacturing a cordless tele-
phone, it had failed in its attempts to do
so. No phones were ever made or sold by
Spacefone. Spacefone never got into busi-
ness and thus never entered “commerce”.

The Eleventh Circuit found that the
two unsuccessful attempts to solicit in-
vestors interstate combined with Spacefone's

eventual intent to market the product was

~

sufficient to meet the “for commerce" re-
quirement. This interpretation conflicts
with the Supreme Court's opinion in Mabee

v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178

(1946). After first reviewing the first
legislative history of the Act, the Supreme
Court in Mabee observed:

By § 15(a)(1) it had made unlawful the
shipment in commerce of “any goods in
the production of which any employee
was employed in violation of" the over-
time and minimum wage requirements of
the Act. Though we assume that sporad-
dic or occasional shipments of insub-
Stantial amounts of goods were not
intended to be included in that prohi-
bition, there is no warrant for assum-
ing that regular shipments in commerce
are to be included or excluded depend-
ing on their size.

327 U.S. at 181, 182 (emphasis added). Un-
der this interpretation of legislative in-
tent, a court must look to “regularity”
and not size to determine if the "commerce"

provision is fulfilled. In the present

case, two trips in twelve months to unsuc-
cessfully demonstrate an unperfected proto-
type can hardly be called “regular ship-
ments". Moreover, the evidence clearly sup-
ports a finding that if the prototype it-
self could be classified as "“goods", its
limited movement interstate was an "“occa-
sional” shipment of an “insubstantial a-
mount of goods".

The Eleventh Circuit's reliance on
Spacefone's eventual intent to manufacture
and market the product is the result of an
overly broad reading of what this Court

said in U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1940).

There the Court's analysis of the legisla-
tive history of the Act was:

[T]hat the “production for commerce"
intended includes at least production
of goods, which, at the time of produc-
tion, the employer, according to the
normal course of his business, intends
Or expects to move in interstate com-
merce, although, through the exigencies
of the business, all of the goods may

-9-

not thereafter actually enter inter-
state commerce,

312 U.S. at 118 (emphasis added). While
this standard may have an application to
an on-going multiproduct manufacturing con-
cern, it can not be applied to a company
in the embryonic stage of Spacefone. How
can one judge Spacefone's intent according
to its "normal course of its business", when
Spacefone has never been in business? What
Standards does a Court use to analyze the
"exigencies of the business" when the busi-
ness is non-existent? Unless the Eleventh
Circuit's decision is reversed, future
courts must engage in unwarranted specula-
tion.

This Court has recognized numerous
times that Congress did not intend to go
to the full limits of its commerce power
in the Fair Labor Standards Act. E.g., 10

E. 40th St. Bldg., Inc. v. Callus, 325 U.S.

-10-

578 (1945); Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S.

517 (1942); Walling v. Jacksonville Paper,

317 U.S. 564 (1943). By necessity linedraw-
ing on a case-by-case basis is required of
the trial court. After hearing the evi-
dence, the district court below drew the
line in favor of Spacefone. This Court is
asked to consider the Eleventh Circuit's
analysis of the commerce requirement in
light of the Supreme Court's guidelines in
this regard and to adopt Judge Roney's
dissenting opinion and the district court's

conclusion on this issue.

B. THE REQUIREMENT OF "GOODS"

Since Spacefone never manufactured a
finished product, the Eleventh Circuit had
to rely on the one unperfected prototype
as “goods” within the meaning of the Act.

Citing Wirtz v. A. S. Giometti & Associates,

lle

Inc., 399 F.2d 738, 739 (Sth Cir. 1968)

and Shultz v. Merriman, 425 F.2d 228 (lst

Cir. 1970), the decision below classifies
the one prototype as "goods". Even ignor-
ing the grammatical problem with plurality
in the statute, this Court should grant a
writ of certiorari to review the conclusion
below on this issue in light of the evidence
of Spacefone's intent for use of this proto-
type. The prototype was an experimental
model. Even though unperfected, the proto-
type was shown to two potential investors,
but it was never Spacefone's intent to sell
the prototype to the investors. Spacefone
was tying to induce the investors to buy
stock in the company to finance an eventual
manufacturing plan. There is no evidence
to suggest that Spacefone was in the busi-
ness of selling prototypes as "goods". Even

the Eleventh Circuit's opinion recognizes

-12-

that Spacefone's intent was to be a manufac-
turer.

The evidence is vastly different from
that in the Giometti and Merriman cases as
those companies were surveying companies
which were in the business of selling maps
as their “goods".

Upon reconsideration the Court is. ask-
ed to review the undisputed evidence below
as to Spacefone's intent for the use of
the prototype, and to conclude that because
of this intent the prototype could not be

Classified as “goods”.
C. THE “PRODUCTION” REQUIREMENT

In order to decide this case, it was
not necessary for the Court to resolve the
conflict between the two district court de-

cisions in Krill v. Arma Corp., 76 F.Supp.

-13-

14, 17 (E.D.N.Y. 1948) and Tormey v. Kiek=-

haefer Corp., 76 F.Supp. 557, 559 (E.D.

Wis. 1948), as to the issue of whether
research on products never making the pro-
duction line was part of the production
process. Unlike the present case, both of
those cases dealt with companies that were
already in production with numerous prod-
ucts.

The Tormey decision is not persuasive
on the more narrow issue of whether a
single product company who wishes to get
into the manufacturing of a product but
fails to even get through the product de-
velopment stage, can be said to have been
in "production". In other words, if the
company's goal is to manufacture a cordless
telephone and no product is ever manufac-
tured and the company is never in business,

can the company be classified as being in

@l4e

"production"? Judge Roney's dissenting

opinion provides the most reasoned answer

to these questions, and should be adopted

by the Court.

II. The Writ Should Be Granted In Order To
Resolve The Conflict Below On The Issue

Of Whether Research On A Product Never
Produced Amounts To A “Production”.

Assuming arguendo that this Court
should find the Tormey decision not to be
distinguishable on its facts, this Court
should take this opportunity to resolve
the conflict between the Krill and Tormey
decisions. This Court ‘is urged to adopt
the Krill rationale and to accept the more
limited interpretation of "production" con-
tained in Judge Roney's dissenting opinion

below.

-15=

|

CONCLUSION

For all of the within and foregoing
reasons the Petition for Writ of Certiorari

should be grented.

Respectfully submitted,

COFER, BEAYCH & HAWES

1 ROBERT Ss. J NES
ATTORNEY F PETITIONER

Suite 200

Peachtree & Broad Building
Atlanta, Georgia 30043
(404) 577-6200

-16-

:
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5

IN THE UNITED STATES orstareeresten®
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GZORGIA
NEWNAN DIVISION

iWILLIAM J. JSOmNSTON
Plaintif?

v. CIVIL ACTION PILE O. CS1-35N

SPACEFONE CORPORATION

Defendant

—~—~ ~~ ewe

ORDER OISMISSING ACTION FOR LACK OF

Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to the provisions
lof the Pair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended (29 0.S.¢.

6 201 et seq.), seeking to recover wages he alleged vere due to

him by reason of the failure.of defendant to pay him the sinisuz
wage for each hour he worked and the premium pay of time and cne-hali
his regular rate of pay for hours he worked in excess of 40 hours.
Defendant contends that plaintiff was not covered sy she
provisions of the Pair Labor Standards Act, and that the case
should be dismissed fur lack of jurisdiction cover the subject satter.
At the nson-jury trial of the satter, the court elected
first to hear evidence only as to the question of coverage under
the Pair Labor Standards Act. At the close of the evidence the
defendant aoved for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject satter arguing that plaintiff did not carry his burden of
proof as to the question of coverage under the Fair Labor Stancards
Act. The court hereby grants defendant's aotion and dismisses

this action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Pindings of Pact
1.

Spacefone Corporation was incorporated for the surpose
of doing research and development work on a state of the art cord-
‘less telephone. This work began in Pebruary, 1980, and has con-
tinued to date, with no cordless telephone unit having been pro-
duced cor sold. The company has never sanufactured, produced,

er sold products of any kind, but continues the development sf an
experimental cordless extension telephone.
2.

Plainctif’ was hired by defendant to work as a desicner
and draftsman toward the eventual creation of a package in which
to house the Spacefone cordless telephone.

3.

Plaintiff's primary duties with defendant consisted of
designing plastic housing for a prototype telephone, drafting
lay-outs of electronic schematics and some printed circuit Soard
\ay~outs. in conmection with these duties he was called upon to
build dyes for the vacuum form machine, to trim plastic, and to
@o some testing of the product and printed circuit boards ‘from
negatives.

4.

While plaintiff! was infrequently called upon to order
sample parts for an experimental prototype. such interstate ctele-
phone calls were not part of his regular duties, were incidential
to his primary employment, and did not constitute a substantial
portion of plaintiff's time.

Conclusions of Law
i.

Plaintiff has the burden of proving that he is covered

under the Pair Labor Standards Act.
2.

Defendant is not an enterprise gaged in sce or ia

the production of goods for commerce within the meaning cf 29 U.S$.C.a.

$8 203(s) since it has never sold any products whatsoever.

| 3.

: Plaintiff’ failed to carry his burden of proving that he
je engaged in commerce or in the production of goods {for commerce:
jconsequently, this court finds it has no jurisdiction over the sub-

{ject matter of this action.
|

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o2e

i i le ll sl

4.

Based upon the foregoing, the court finds that there is
mo jurisdiction over the subiect matter in this case, and the
defendant's sotion to dismiss is granted with prejudice with all
costs to be taxed to the plaintif!.

SO ORDERED, this l { day of February, 1982.

OF Bh ocmacrmend

Saas. Gees tae UNITED STATES OLISTRICT COURT

706 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES

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7. Labor Relations e= 1122

Although Fair Labor Standards Act re-
quires ion of “goods,” Act would not
be interpreted literally to require produc-
tion of “goods” as opposed to “good,” and
employer was within Act though it produc-
ed only one Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 1938, § Xi), @ USCA
§ 2%i).

Word, Cook & Word, Reuben M. Word,
James F. McNamara, Carroilton, Ga, for
plaintiff-eppeilant.

Cofer, Beauchamp, Hawes & Brown, Rob-
ert S. Jones, Atlanta, Ga, for defendant-ap-
peilee.

Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia

Before GODBOLD, Chief Judge, RO-
NEY, Circuit Judge, and PITTMAN *, Dis-
trict Judge.

GODBOLD, Chief Judge:

Virgil
for the Southern District of Alabama, sitting by

706 FEDERAL REPORTER, 24 SERIES

interstate in an attempt to solicit investors
for the project, it had not yet begun mass
production of a finished product. Whether
such production will ever occur is a matter
of uncertainty.

as a part-time employee but he soon began
to work full-time. Despite the absence of a
formal written contract, the parties agreed
that Johnston was to receive $250 per week
for his services. While Johnston sometimes

now seeks to invoke FLSA to recover mini-
mum wages and overtime pay. The only
issué on appeal is whether Johnston meets
the FLSA’s jurisdictional requirements be-
cause he was either “engaged in production
of goods for commerce” or “engaged in
commerce” while employed by Spacefone.
{1} As the statute's language suggests,
Johnston can demonstrate FLSA's applica
bility by showing that he was engaged in
(1) “production” of (2) “goods” (3) “for com-
merce.” In determining whether Johnston

(1959).

According to the Act, an employee

shall be deemed to have been engaged in
the production of goods if such employee
was employed in producing, manufactur-
ing, mining, handling, transporting; or in
any other manner working on such goods,
or in any closely related process or occu-

process” that it “directly essential to” actu-
al production.
(2] Equating actual production with
physical work on the employer's final prod-
dengnation.

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1182

did not mearure up to expectations and
was eventually abandoned before any of
the product designed was shipped across
State lines.
See also Wirtz v. Koch, 301 F.Supp. 957
(D.S.D.1969) (architectural plans, drawings
and blueprints sent out-of-state constituted
“goods” even though plans were not ulti-

congressional
Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Associates,

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706 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES

an instrumentality of commerce. See
Mitchell v. Owen, 292 F.2d 71, 75 (6th Cir.
1961) (“It is settled law that the production
of materials for use in the improvement

. of ... instrumentalities of interstate

struction Co. v. Durkin, 45 U.S. 13, 73 SCt
565, 97 LEd 745 (1963)). Second, Space-
fone used its unperfected prototype to solic-

hold on these facts that it is not necessary

adopted in Wirtz v. Ray

if
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be a regular and recurrent part of the em-
ployee's ibilities under Montalvo and
2 CFR § 77610(b) (1961) The vial
court's ‘inding of fact is not clearly errone-
ous. Johaswca failed to prove be was “en-
gaged in commerce.” 2 USCA §§ 26
my. -

1 would affirm.

CIVIL DEFENSE CORPS, et al, De-
fendants-Appellees, Croes- Appellants.
Ne. 81-7282.

Re
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_ 106 FEDERAL REPORTER, 24 SERIES

L Labor Relations = 1521

Prima facie violation of Equal Pay Act
is established when it is shown that empioy-
er pays different wages to employees of
opposite sex~for equal work on jobs per-
formance of which requires equal skill, ef-
fort, and responsibility, and which are per-
formed under similar working conditions.
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § &d),
as amended, 29 US.CA § 206(d).

2 Civil Rights 445) .
Labor Reiations «= 1522 :
District court in suit under Equal Pay
Act and Title VII was not clearly erroneous
im finding that female agency empioyee did
work substantially equal to that of the
“Shelter Officer,” a male, on s job requiring

ed, 42 US.CA. § 2000e et seq.

constitute a merit system and did not justi-
fy male employees receiving pay higher

Cott bint tates Sata wh oy ys
’ R THE ELEVENTH CIRCL

Neg2.3143

D.C Docket Noc81-85N

WILLIAM J. JOHNSTON,

Plainciff-Appellanct,
versus
SPACEFONE CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northera Disiciss 2b 5sataia.

Before GopsoLD, Chief Judge, RONEY, Circuit Judge, and PITTMAN®, District Judge.
JUOGMENT

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia, and vas argued by counsel;

ON CONS.DERATION WHEREOF, it is now here ordered and adjudged
by this Court that the judgment of the said District Court in this
cause be and the same is hereby REVERSED; and that this cause be, and the
same is hereby, REMANDED to said District Court in accordance with the opinion
of this Court;

It is further ordered that deféndant-appellee pay to plainciff-appellanc,
the costs on appeal to be taxed by the Clerk of this Court.

June 9, 1983
ROMNEY, Circuit Judge, dissencing.

‘Honorable Virgil Pittman, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Alatana,
sitting by designacion.

ISSUFD AS MANnATF:

JOHNSTON v. SPACEFONE CORP.

William J. JOHNSTON,
Plaintiff-Appeilant.

SPACEFONE CORPORATION,
Th .7 it

A i

vr

No. 82-8143.

United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.

Aug. 22, 1983.

Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING
EN BANC

(Opinion June 9, 1983, 11 Cir., 1983,
706 F.2d 1178).

Before GODBOLD, Chief Judge, RO-
NEY, Circuit Judge, and PITTMAN *, Dis-
trict Judge.

* Honorable Virg Pittman. US. District Judge for
ihe Southern District: of Alabama, sitting by

In all other respects the petition for
rehearing is DENIED.

No member of this panei nor judge in
regular active service on the court having
requested that the court be polled on
rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure; Eleventh Circuit
Rule 26), the suggestion for rehearing en
banc is DENIED.

dengnauon.

Adm. Office, U.S. Courts—West Publishing Company, Saint Paul, Minn.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_0814%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.