# Respondents Brief — United States v. Morton

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Respondents Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 467 U.S. 822

## Text

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CORRECTION OF THE
QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the United States Air Force may
take the pay of one of its members and

pay it over to such member's former wife
on the basis of a void judgment of a state
court, the judgment being void for lack of
in personam jurisdiction over such member,
when the Air Force knew the said state
court's judgment was void before it first
took such member's pay, and after taking
such member's pay be immune from suit by

the member against the Air Force for such

member's military pay.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Summary Of Argument .....eeeeeeesnees aes |
Argument:
1. The Court of Appeals' decision

is consistent with the policy of
the United States concerning the
administration of military pay.
The government's position sup-
ports the taking of military pay
without due process of law. The
military's Home of Record State-
ment does not refer to domicile;
the Alabama judgment for alimony
and child support is void. The
Air Force's contention that the
presumption of the proceedings
being “regular on its face" is
superior to actual knowledge

£8 NOC VALLE... cccccccvcccccccese 9

Utilizing the definitions in 42
U.S.C. 659 et seq., as amended,
requires the Court of Appeals
decision to be upheld; immunity
of the government is not abso-
lute; intent of the Congress was
to insulate the government only
when an order was voidable, not
when it is void; support obli-
gations are not debts until
created by a court of competent
jurisdiction; situs of debt is
with creditor. Notice is not
synonymous with service of
PEOCESES. cee esses seseseeeseseees 27

(44)

(iii)

Argument - Continued: Page

Be

The Comptroller General's opin-

ion is not controlling; later
enacted agency regulations cannot

be relied upon to reverse a court
decision; the court decision does
not aa i ee to Col.Morton
CWICR. cccccccccccccccns eovcccncee 53

The Court of Appeals' decision

does not impose on the govern-

ment greater liability than that

on a private garnishee; the ex-
posure of the government is de
minimis........ TELEULECEREEE EE 61

The Court of Appeals' decision

does not place the government

nor the federal courts in the
domestic relations business.
Congress put the federal govern-
ment in the garnishment business. .69

Domestication of a foreign de-

cree requires in personam juris-
diction over a defendant; the
purposes of 42 U.S.C.659 are
supported by the Court Of Appeals'
decision and in accord with Con-
gressional intent.......eeeeeees 72

Amicus has misunderstood the

facts of this case; URESA is a

good law capable of producing
excellent results and at the same
time treating both parties

fairly “ee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 75

Page
CONCLUSION ccccccscccnccccccscccre oosy 97
Certificate of Service .......... cocoe 88
ABMONGIS ccoocccecccccccccccecvcesecee la

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Accord v. Parsons, 551 F.Supp.115
(Dee WD VOcs L082) cccccccsccecs 71
ee eS TaUe Rie 1890 oe... 21
Alexander v. FERC, 609 F.2d 543
Wetion Gis gs ERIOE csr cvveneceves 54

Appice of Beyyrer
. a . 933) eee eene . 24
Argserotd v. Armstrong, 350 U.S.
DSS dc ends B6ee a0 hme 21, 23, 44

Associated Oil Co. v. Mullin
. ) *e eeeneneeeneeeeeeeee 75

Beaufort County v. Maye: 207 N.C.
, - . 753 34) eee eeee 43
Bell v. U.S., 366 U.S. 393 (1961).. 9

Bennett Vv. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039
(D.c.Cir. 1982) e*eneeneeeneeneteeeeeeee 71

Blasecki v. City of Durham, 456 F.2d
87 (4th CaF ABTS) cert.denied
409 U.S.912 (1972) eoeeeeeeeeeeeee 53

(v)

Cases - Continued: Page

Calhoun v. U.S., 557 F.2d 401 (4th
Cir.,1977) cert.denied, 434 U.S.
PES CABT7P. 6 voce aa weeveecdvéses 29, 49

Cherry v. U.S., 640 F.2d 1184
(CI.ct., 1980) and 697 F.2d 1043

(C.A. Fed.Cir., 1983) .w..ceceee 12, 60
City of New Bedford, 20 Fed.57 (1884) 60

Cochran v. Cochran, 353 So.2d 805

as. SOTO) «dsoewdele es bacee 16
Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083 (4th
ee a ener yi |

Cunningham v. Dept.of Navy, 455
F.Supp. 1370(D.C.Conn. Sh were 38, 50
Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541(1948) 41,44

Ex Parte McCardle, 7 Wall.(74 U.S)
509 (1

869) Se Vee Ceweeeeeseeseeeeeeees eS 32
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
73) e*enereenete#enreeente#e#n#ee#keee#e#ee#ee###e#e#*# 6

Greenwood v. Furr, 251 S.W. 332
us SEE RE ca cccdeowens iene oe

Groth v. Ness, 260 N.W. 700 (N.D.,
1935) *enere@enrneteeeee#ee#e#ee#e#e#e#e#e#e#e#e#e#e#e#ee#ee##e#ee# ee 23

Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905)40,86

Herb v. Pitcairn, 51 N.E.2d 277
[518 BoC ce 1943) *eeneneeeeeeeeeeeeee 35

(vi)

Cases - Continued: Page

Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S.352
TRE Silas 5s obese bible 60 Sub b> 44

Howell v. U.S., 195 F.Supp.597(1958) 60
In re Albin, 591 F.2d 94 (9th Cir.

In_re Knuppenburg, et al., 422
F.Supp.274 (Mich 1976) ....eeeeees 70

izmerjian v.Dept.of Air Force

# supp .825 (D., S.C.1978)
Affd. 607 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir.1979);
cert.denied 444 U.S. 1032 (1980);

CicCt. No.364-82C (Feb.1l, 1984) eee 50

Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S.
0) Pr Prrrrrrrrerrr rT rere 51

Mayet v. Kajtazi, 488 F.Supp.15
Bets: BeBitleS ORIG) vescee cococcece ta

Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555
) *e #w@eeeeeee e*eneretieneeeneeee#ee#ee#se# # 44

Laborde v. Ubarri, 214 U.S.173(1909) .20
Lee v. Indep.School Dist., 149 Iowa
345, N. . , N.W. 533
(S.C., Iowa, 1910) e*enereeeneteneteee e#e © @ 43

Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F.Supp.998
D.C., Wisc. 1982) @eeeeseeeoeee@asenseneee? 71

Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908)...... 39

(vii)
Cases - Continued: Page

Louisville and N.R. Co. v. Nash
So. Ala. 21, 41, 42, 46

May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953)..36
Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 288

Uews 46 9 erie e#eeeeenete#ees#e#e###e#e#e 45
Minton v. First Natl.Exchange Bank

of Virginia, 206 Va.560, £5 S.E.2da

139 (Va.8.C. 1965) .cccccccccccccee 43

Morton v. U.S., 708 F.2d 680 (C.A.,
Paes SUED) 60 bler we ina 680 23, 55

Natl.Metal Co. v. Greene Corsal
Copper Co., 1l Ariz.108, 89 P.535
(S.Ct. Ariz. 1907) .....eees covesee 43

Norris v. Norris, 324 F.2d 826
(Sth Cir.1963) *eneteneneeeneeeneeee#ee#e##e#e#e#e 70

Orr v. Orr, 351 So.2d 904 (Ala.App.,

1977); 351 So.2d 906 (S.C. Ala.
1977) 440 U.S. 268 (1979) eee ee eee 86

Orrox Corp. v. Orr, 364 So.2d 1170
se) Vt) PEL. stare ciate luisa bets Sls >ae

O'Toole v. Helio Products, Inc.
149 N.E. 2d. 795 (C.A., T11. ,1958).. 48

Overman v. U.S., 563 F.2d 1287
(8th Cis. 1977) seer eeevrereeeeneeve 29, 50

Partlow v.Partlow, 20 S.2d 517
(Ala., 1945) se wee eenreneeneeneeeeneee #¢# @ 42

(viii)

Cases - Continued: Page

Popple v. U.S., 416 F. Supp.1227
tS-C.N Ye 1976) wcoo 29, 38, 50

Rock Island Line v. Strum

(L0e Bch TEE CHOONET ccciedeicscccu 208

Rush v. U.S. Agency for Internatl.
Development, 706 F.2d 1229 (D.c.
Cares FSS) No. 82-1853 (Apr.26,1983)

cert.denied USSC No. 83-382,

Jan.9, 1984 oeeeeeee eee eeeeeeeeneene 51

Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.186
SRUVER sks ks db Us wien kee eed kaw 41, 86

Sheffield v. Sheffield, 148 S.E.2d
S.C.Va.1L96060) wescccccccves 45

Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343
(1948) *enereeneenrnrene#e# #@#e#eeee#e#e##e#e#e#e# 5l, 74

Smith v. Smith, 159 Tenn.36, 15 S.W.2d
147 (S.C.Tenn., 1929) ae dats ede waa

Snapp v. U.S.Postal Service-

Texarkana, 004 F.2d 1329, (4th
Cis: 1982) oeeeeeereeeeeeeneeeee 38, 50

Southern eo v. Ward, 26 So.234
a. *enriee@enrtneeteeeeeeee#ee##e#e#e# @ 21, 46

Stephens v. Smith, 10 Wall (77 U.S.)
870) *eneeeeenereeeeeeee eeee#e#ee#e 32

Stewart v. Northern Assurance Co.
EB. 218 (W.Va., 1895) eeeeeeeee 61

(ix)
Cases - Continued: Page

Strode v. Strode, 6 Idaho 67,
I a Saw wm elhe 43

U.S. v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555 (1980)... 52

U.S. v. Harris, 347 U.S.612 (1954)... 52

Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S.
we Ls eben G ab bo 6b 0b we tates 08

Vaughn v. Vaughn, 100 So.2d l
. av eee Se Ce e'o 86 ee e868 8 ee 8 8S. @ 24

Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832
(4th Cir.1982); cert. denied, 103
ER) a eee ae ee |

Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904).70

Wilkinson v. Cohen, 57 So.2d 108
FRE se SOBL) cicceveccccccccesessdQ, al

Williams v. North Carolina I, 317
U.s.287 (1942) eee eevee eeeeeenene eee 26

Williams v. North Carolina II,
oie 226 (1945) *enereneeeeteeeeee#eee#e 26

Statutes and Regulations:
Alabama Code sec. 6.6-461 (1977)..45, 46
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 4:2 (1973) Process ...... 16, 36
Rule 4:B (H) and (I) ener eaeeeeeeenene 37

(x)

Page
California Code of Civil Pro-
SeGere G00. 6L56c60 ccoceccecvsrvecs oe

Debt Collection Act of 1982,
S 8.8.6. BBO. BEAS. Sedvovvidctivecss bh

Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
Bee éac oe

Fifth Amendment, U.S. Constitution .. 9

Military Pay Act, 37 U.S.C.
Ged. 204.6.
“Sy ee ee ols ie a eS hr Pa ee ee se

oa

This case involves only the legal relation-
ship between Col.Morton and the United
States Air Force. The Court of Claims

has not required the government to inter-
vene in the divorce case, nor to enjoin the
suit, nor to modify that judgment in any
way. The Court of Appeals' ruling has

no effect whatsoever on the Alabama judgment.
There is no other necessary party. Patricia
Kay Morton could have been called by the
Air Force as their witness, if in fact her
testimony would have been any different
from that of Col. Morton or his witnesses.
The Air Force did not call her as a witness,
neither in person, nor by deposition, nor
by affidayit. Most of the evidence in the
case was documentary, needing little
evidence by way of testimony. The federal
courts haye ruled that they may not refuse
to entertain suit simply because some facet
of the suit involves intra family aspects.
Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083,(4th Cir.1980).

o§e
6. The Air Forces contention that a judg-
ment of a state court can be moved to any
state and a garnishment writ brought on it
is incorrect. Suit must be brought on a
judgment when it is moved to another state
and valid service of process made on the
defendar.t in the state to which it is
moved, thus bringing the judgment debtor
before the court of the second state before
a writ of garnishment can be brought in the
second state.

The purpose of Congress in the enact-

ment of 42 U.S.C. 659, et seq., as amended

has been carried out by the Court of
Appeals' ruling. It could not have been
the intent of Congress to interpret a law
so that it deprives a person of his
constitutional rights.

7. The amicus has erred as to the facts ’
of this case. Consequently, his arguments.
do not apply to this case. He has also
cited cases that support Col.Morton's con-
tentions.

«Qa
ARGUMENT

The Court of Appeals' decision is consist-
ent with the policy of the United States
concerning the administration of military
pay: The government's position supports
the taking of military pay without due
process of law. The military's Home of
Record Statement does not refer to domicile;
the Alabama judgment for alimony and child
support is void. The Air Force's content-
ion that tlhe presumption of the proceedings
being "regular on its face" is superior to
actual knowledge is not valid.

l. This case was brought against the
United States (Air Force) to recover a
military member's pay pursuant to Title 37,

Sec.204 et seq., United States Code and

the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of

the United States. (Res.App.la).(Pet.App.

A-la). It is well settled that the United
States may not circumvent the unambiguous
financial obligation which the law imposes
on the United States to pay to a member

of the Armed Services, his military pay,
without valid, legal justification for
doing so. Bell v. U.S., 366 U.S.393 (1961).

-10-
The strict rules regarding the sanctity of

a military member's right to his military
pay is a well settled principle of the law.
Even in the extreme case of Otho Bell, who
was a turn-coat prisoner-of-war during the
hostilities in Korea in the 1950s, who show-
ed utter disloyalty to his comrades and to
his country, who consorted, fraternized,

and cooperated with the enemy, sought favors
for himself causing hardship to his fellow
prisoners and who refused repatriation and
went to Communist China after the hostilit-
ies ceased, the military service was required
to pay him his military pay for the period
he was a prisoner-of-war because he was not
absent without leave or in any other status
permitting involuntary withholding of pay.
If the military services could withhold

the pay of one of its members on any
principle no matter how seemingly compell-
ing, other than on a strict legal basis,

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-ll-
surely Otho Bell's case was one. It must be
noted that the Congress in 1982 enacted
legislation providing that the military may
not even withhold a member's pay for a debt
owed to the United States (for the most
part over payments of allowances, claims
for damage to household goods in shipment,
etc.), unless it gives the member (a) 30
days written notice, (b) an opportunity to
inspect the records of the alleged debt,
(c) an opportunity to enter into a written
agreement to establish a schedule for
repayment and (d) an opportunity for a
hearing before an impartial person (to
include an Administrative Law Judge.)

Debt Collection Act of 1982, 5 U.S.C., 5514.

(Res.App.to Brief 1 a). The duty of any
person administering the funds of another
owes that other person the highest fidelity.
The obligation of the military to its
member concerning the military pay is even

— ’ : " —. | . ae a oo ill

-12 ie ee Gs Wide be i.

-20-
There was no affidavit filed among
the Alabama suit papers concerning Col.
Morton's military status, and no guardian
ad litem was appointed for him in accordance

with The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief

Act, 50 U.S.C.A.§520. (Pet.App. 89a).

The Air Force contends, however, that
its actual knowledge of the fact that the
judgment upon which the garnishment writ was
predicated was void, is of less import in
legal effect in the administration of 42 U.S.C.

659 et seq., as amended, than the presumption

that the garnishment and judgment was "regular
on its face". This is an absurd contention.
Garnishment is an ancilliary or auxil-
iary proceeding, growing out of and dependent
on another original or primary action or
proceeding. Accordingly, where the principal
action is void, the garnishment is also void.

38 C.J.S. Garnishment, §2(4); Wilkinson v.

Cohen, 57 So.2d 108, (Ala.1951); Laborde v.

@2le@
Ubarri, 214 U.S.173,174(1909). A valid
judgment against a defendant in the original
suit is a prerequisite of the validity of a

judgment against a garnishee. Wilkinson v.

Cohen, (supra). A judgment, writ, order, and

the like, cannot be regular on its face if
the underpinnings of that judgment, the
proceedings that support it, are void no
matter what the judgment itself declares

itself to be. 46 Am.Jur.2d,Judgments, §663;

Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S.568 (1952);

Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S.416 (1957).

In Alabama, the state of the garnishment in
the case at bar, the garnishee has a duty to
see that there has been valid service of
process upon the defendant in the original
action (the divorce action in this case),

and that a valid judgment has been entered.
Southern Ry.Co. v. Ward, 26 So.234 (Ala.1898) ;

Alabama G.S.R.Co.v.Chumley, 9 So.286 (1890);
Louisville and N.R.Co.v. Nash,23 So.825

(1897). This same duty is written into the

-22-

Code of Federal Regulations implementing

42 U.S.C.659 et seq., as amended (5 C.F.R.

§581.102(f)). This is necessary to protect

the serviceman who, because of the exigencies
of the service, is not free to leave his
military post to litigate a divorce case.
Under the position espoused by the defendant
if the member of the service didn't do just
that, at the time the case was filed, his
property would be taken without due process
and contra to all the laws. The Air Force would
have given it away no matter how void it knew

the judgment to be. The statute 42 U.S.C.§659,

et seq., as amended, which is intended to

cure one wrong, would be perpetrating another
wrong, the more serious because it is a
danger to the rights created in our Constitut-
ion. The government contends that Col.Morton
must return to Alabama and litigate this
matter. In addition to being an exceptional

problem to the military member, this court

° “]
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{ i” ae meer ED y * ee ok ae oh ee

=230
summarily rejected such an argument in

Armstrong v. Armstrong, (supra). The

military member, contra to the civilian,
is not free to move about physically where-
ever and whenever he chooses.

The Court of Appeals did not feel
the need to address the issue of whether the
writ and judgment were "regular on their
face" (708 F.2d 680). The only reference
in this regard was made by the Court of
Claims (Claims Court) in its Findings of
Fact that the writ was on a "regular form"
used in Alabama. (Pet.App.90a).

The term "regular on its face" or
its opposite, "void on its face", is a legal
term of art having a definite meaning in the
law. The "face" of a judgment or writ is
not, as the Air Force contends, the last

document filed in a cause, it is the entire

record of the case. (Groth v. Ness, 260 N.W.

700 (N.D.1935). A judgment is “void on its

face" when its invalidity appears upon

=24-

inspection of the judgment roll. Application

of Behymer, 19 P.2d 829 (Calif.1933);

Vaughn v. Vaughn, 100 So.2d 1 (Ala.1957).

The Air Force's use of the term indicates

it is defining "regular on its face" to

mean only the last document in the file.

The definition supplied by the Air Force is
not calculated to weed out any void judgments.
Under the Air Force's definition of "regular
on its face" it would have to be said that
when the Congress felt the need to clarify
this Act, 42 U.S.C.§659 et.seq., in 1977,

it was indulging in useless direction and
definitions and doing a useless act.

Nowhere on a writ of garnishment alone can

it be determined that it was issued pursuant
to legal process by a court of competent

jurisdiction, as required by 42 U.S.C.662(e).

(Pet.App.98a,99a).
It is necessary to look at the

return of process in the original suit and

XY

)
=a28e

look at the state law to determine whether

the process is legal and whether it comes from
a court of competent jurisdiction.Nowhere on

a garnishment writ alone can it be determined
whether the decree, order or judgment was
issued in accordance with applicable state
laws by a court of competent¢jurisdiction so
that it meets the definition of alimony and

child support as is required by 42 U.S.C.

662 (b)g(c). (Res.App.3a-5a). Unless these

definitions are met, the Air Force would be
withholding the member's pay, and paying it
over to the Alabama Court in this case, for
something other than alimony and child
support. Assuming, however, the Air Force's
definition of "regular on its face" means
only the writ received by them, in this
case that writ showed the garvishnent was
| not “regular”. The writ served on the Air
Force, included a copy of the divorce
judgment which was attached, as it should

=26e
be. The divorce judgment, however, stated
that the defendant had been "duly served"
and failed to appear. (Pet.App.38a). Such
language as “duly served" is ambiguous in an
action for divorce because it fails to say
duly served for what purpose. Divorce suits
have been different in nature from other
forms of action since 1942 when this Court

decided the cases of Williams v. North

Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) and

Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S.226

(1945), in that they are divisible. That is,
the court in a divorce suit may very well
have jurisdiction to terminate the marital
status if one party is domiciled in the
state but have no jurisdiction whatsoever
to award a money decree for alimony or
child support. Therefore, even under the
Air Force's definition of “regular on its
face", the portion of the writ that was the
judgment was ambiguous. This put the Air

_ > : ae ee

-27-
Force on notice that a further check of the

proceedings was necessary. In this case,
however, the Air Porce already knew the
Alabama judgment was void.

The arbitrariness of the United States
in the administration of Col.Morton's pay,

is amply and repeatedly shown from the record.

2. Utilizing the definitions in 42 U.S.C.
659 et seq.,as amended, requires the Court
of Appeals' decision to be upheld; immunity
of the government is not absolute; intent
of Congress was to insulate the government
only when an order was voidable, not when

it is void; support obligations are not
debts until created by a court of competent
jurisdiction; situs of debt is with credit-
or. Notice is not synonymous with service
of process.

(a) The clear language used in 42 U.S.C.
659, effective January 1, 1975, stated
that the obligations that could

we

-28-
be honored by the United States had to be

"..-legal obligations to provide child

support or make alimony payments.” (Emphasis
added). The statute was initially silent

as to the immunity of the government for
wrongful and illegal taking of the property

of a military member or employee. (Res.App.2a).

In 1975, the Department of Defense

Pay Manual Section 70710. Garnishment of Pay

for Enforcement of Child Support and Alimony

Obligations, (Res.App.3a), made it clear to

all military personnel that garnishment of a
member's pay had to be based on an order by

a court of competent jurisdiction. The Air

Force cannot claim ignoranc? of its own
Regulations, Department of Defense Regulations
being binding on the Air Force.

Between the time of the initial
enactment of 42 U.S.C.659 in 1975 and the

amendment of it in 1977 there had already
been at least one suit against the United

-29-

States concerning this statute, Popple v.

U.S. 416 F.Supp.1227 (1976) and at least
two more cases filed and ready for decision,

Overman v. U.S. 563 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir.1977)

and Calhoun v. U.S. 557 F.2d 401 (4th Cir.

1977). Congress had the opportunity to
completely exempt the government from any
liability by merely saying any order received
by the government for garnishment of a
member's pay will be honored by the govern-
ment and there shall be no liability on the
part of the government for honoring any
order for alimony and child support.
Congress did not do that. It added
subsection (f) (Pet.App.98a) which is very
clear that the United States shall enjoy
immunity with respect to these payments
",...made from moneys due or payable from
the United States to any individual

pursuant to legal process regular on its

face, if such payment is made in accordance

@30@
with this section and the regulations

issued to carry out this section.”
(Emphasis added). When Congress amended

42 U.S.C.659 in 1977, it also repeated and

reiterated the phrase, "...legal obligations

to provide child support or make alimony
payments." (Emphasis added). (Pet.App.99a).
It added Definitions in Section 662, (b) defin-

ing child support and (c) defining alimony.
(Res. App.3a). The Congress again made it
quite clear that the government may only

honor “legal obligations", as a result of a

"judgment issued in accordance with applic-

able State law by a court of competent

jurisdiction." (Emphasis added). The Congress

also defined "legal process" used in 42 U.S.C.
659 (a) in subsection (e) (Pet.App.98a-99a)
as that process issuing from a court of

competent jurisdiction.

The statute by its own terms defines

what "alimony" and "child support” are, for

a
PL.
can.

the purposes of this Act. No matter what
other definitions there may be, in garnish-
ment proceedings pursuant to this statute,
we are limited to these definitions. Pur-

suant to 42 U.S.C.659 et seq., as amended,

there is no “alimony” or "child support"

unless it issues from a court of competent

jurisdiction. The Act also requires that the

alimony and child support be issued in accord-

ance with applicable state law. 42 U.S.C.

§662(e)(1). In order to insulate the

government from liability, orders and decrees
honored by the government must be from a

court of competent jurisdiction and must be

legal process regular on its face, issued from

a court of competent jurisdiction and issued

in_ accordance with applicable State law. The

immunity of the United States for taking a
member's pay is, therefore, by clear terms
of the statute, a limited immunity. In

stating very clearly in what situations the fe

,> ‘o ‘ ’ y Pi dal $
Pl. ae sai nie oe eA ae ae a ae *

@32=
United States could not be sued, Congress
obviously rejected any contention that it
could never be sued for its long established
legal obligations to pay a service member
his pay. The specific enumerations of
exclusions from liability set forth in the
statute indicate that no other immunity is

granted. Ex Parte McCardle, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.)

509 (1869); Stephens v. Smith, 10 Wall.(77

U.S.) 321 (1870). The legislative history of
the 1977 amendments to 42 U.S.C.659 made it

quite clear that the amendments were to
clarify the act. Section 501 of Public Law

95-30 contained the amendments. Public Law
95-30 was the Tax Reduction and Simplification

Act of 1977. As introduced, it contained no

provisions concerning garnishment H.R.Rep.3477

95th Cong. lst Sess., 1977; 91 Stat. 126,

Section 501 of the act was added to the
amendments on the floor of the Senate

-33-

(125 Cong.Rec. 6722 April 29,1977) by
Senator Nunn who said,

"The intent of these amend-

ments that I am introducing

today will be to clarify the

garnishment provisions to

provide for administrative

improvements and to aid in

the evaluation of the program."
A general explanation was included in the
Congressional Record, Part A., "Clarification
of Garnishment Provisions" stated the object

of Section 501 (the amendments to 42 U.S.C.

659) was to clarify existing law. (125 Cong.

Rec.6722(supra)). The question thus arises

why Congress felt the need to clarify
42 U.S.C.659 by these amendments if the

government's position is correct; that is

that even if the government knows the judgment
of the State Court which issued the writ is
void, the government owes no duty to its .
military member and is obligated to take
his property and give it to the wife or

former wife of such member upon receipt of

-34-

J
a copy of this void writ because it is on a

“regular form” issued by the State Court. For
such a position as that of the government,

no interpretation or clarification by amend-
ment of the statute to read that the govern-
ment would not be liable when it honored a
State Court Order if the writ was legal
process regular on its face, issued by a
court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to
applicable State law. Those conditions set

by Congress were intended to insulate the
government from suit when it honored a
"voidable" judgment as opposed to a "void"
judgment, void because the Court issuing it
had no jurisdiction over the defendant to
enter such an order. The fact that the
amendments to 42 U.S.C.659(f) fail to state
that the government is totally, unequivocally
and completely immune from liability for the gj
taking of a military member's or its civilian

employee's pay is not error or ommission on

! Se as ——

yn be ih wy ee ee, 4 Thy ee at Nias
NA ee ee AS re i PR, te Sete yh

@33e
the part of Congress. The amendment was
clearly an attempt to make the statute,

42 U.S.C. 659, constitutional in its appli-

cation by assuring that the military member
or its employee is afforded due process of
law. To accept the government's position is
to license the denial of due process of law
by the United States. No such intent should
or could be attributed to the Congress. The

Illinois Supreme Court in Herb v. Pitcairn,

G84 I111.237,51 N.E.2d 277,280 (111.8.C.1943))
explains the distinction between "void" and
"voidable" judgments as follows:

"It is the element of jurisdiction
that differentiates a void from

a voidable judgment; both the

subject matter and the parties must
be before the court, and jurisdiction
of the one without the other will

not suffice; the two must concur

or the judgment will be void in any
case in which the court assumes to
act. Rabbitt v. Weber & Co., 297
111.451, 130 N.E.787. And we have
further held that even a court of
general jurisdiction has no power

to do any act or render any judgment
affecting persons or property, unless
the particular act or judgment is

te

-36=

brought within its jurisdiction
according to law. People ex rel.
Brundage v. Righeimer, 298 Ill.
611, 133 N. IEEE These are general

principles upon which substantially
all courts are in agreement.”

Although Alabama had long-armed statutes
based on torts committed in Alabama and
actions arising from doing business in

Alabama, the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 4, Process (C) (1) (B) (1973) (Res.App.5a),

permitted substituted service of process
(by mail) on a non-resident of Alabama for
divorce only. When a statute says "divorce"
and does not include the terms alimony and
child support, process pursuant to such a
statute is limited to termination of status
and does not permit in personam judgments

based onsuch process. May v. Anderson, 345

U.S. 528 (1953). As previously noted,
divorce has long Been severable from alimony,
custody and child support. Alabama had no
long-arm statute for alimony and child © 4
support in 1974, (Pet.App.93a931-94a). The :

/
-37]=

Alabama judgment would not have been valid
even under the long-arm statute that became

effective in 1977. Alabama Rules of Civil

Procedure, Rule 4.B(H) required that the

parties have last lived in the marital
relationship in Alabama and one party to

have continued to live in Alabama in order

for the court to exercise jurisdiction over

a non-resident and Rule 4:B(I) required that

a wrong had to be committed in Alabama against
the marital relationship for the court to
exercise such jurisdiction. These are not the
facts in ths instant case.

None of the requirements of 42 U.S.C.

659 et seq., as amended, so that the Air

Force is insulated from liability, exist in
this case. It is not immune from suit for
military pay if only one of these require-
ments is missing, much less when all of
them are missing.

The Air Force argues from both sides

of the coin. It argues it is under

4

~ ;
-39-

compulsion to withhold Col.Morton'‘s pay and

pay it into the Alabama Court or be subject

to contempt proceedings and it would be

subject to default judgments if it failed

to honor a state court writ. On the other

hand, the Air Force has argued since the di

inception of this suit that 42 U.S.C. 659 et

seg., as amended, did not grant a cause of

action against the government. Cunningham v.

Department of the Navy, 455 F.Supp.1370

(D.C.Conn.1978); Popple v. U.S., 416 F.Supp.

1227 (D.C.N.¥.1976); Snapp v. U.S.Postal

Service - Texarkana, 664 F.2d 1329 (4th Cir.

1982). Col. Morton has never denied that
contention. Col. Morton's cause of action

in this suit was not based on 42 U.S.C.659,

but was an action to recover his military

pay pursuant to 37 U.S.C.204, et seq. |

It is the subject matter of the
Petition, Complaint, Declaration, Motion
for Judgment, or whatever it may be called

- 39.
in the various courts that determines the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter of the lawsuit and not the subject

matter of the defense. Louisville &

Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149

(1908).

In any event, the Air Force is immune
from contempt proceedings, default judgments
and the like in state courts, except for
negligence acts that may be brought under

the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 1346. To refuse to honor a writ of
garnishment because the state court pro-
. ceedings do not conform to the require-

ments of 42 U.S.C. 662 (e) (1), will not

create legal difficulties for the Air Force.
The Air Force argues that where a

defendant has been given notice by the

garnishee this satisfies the due process

requirement because such a defendant will

have an opportunity to defend himself in

-40-

the attachment suit and cites Harris v.

Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905). There is

a distinction however, between the attach-

ment of a debt that exists before the
necessity of a court judgment to create it
and alimony and child: support obligations

© which do not exist until they are created
by a court that has in personam jurisdiction
over a defendant. Until a court of com-
petent jurisdiction rules that a defendant
is obligated to make alimony and child
support payments, until such a court fixes
the amount of such alimony and child
support, and until such a defendant is in
arrears in the orders of a court of com-
petent jurisdiction, there is no debt to
be condemned. The principle that the Air
Force cites does not apply when there is
no debt. ‘

The other principle of Harris v.

Balk, (supra) that the intangible debt may
be attached in a state in which the creditor

-41-
has no minimun contacts has been overruled

by this court in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433

U.S. 186 (1977). Under Alabama law, the
situs of the debt has always followed the

creditor, not the debtor. Louisville and

Nashville Ry. Co. v. Nash, (supra). This

court has also found the situs of the debt
to be where the creditor is. Estin v.
Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948). It is logical
that the situs of a debt be with the
creditor because the creditor owns the
cause of action for the debt. The Air
Force's argument that the Alabama court had
both the subject matter and personal jur-
isdiction in the suit by Patricia Kay Morton
against the United States is erroneous.

The debt (subject matter) owed by the
United States to Col. Morton was not
located in Alabama. It was located where
Col. Morton was,in Alaska.

The Air Force acknowledges that

=-42-
state courts have held garnishees liable to
reimbursement to, the principal debtor where
the underlying judgment was void and
acknowledges Alabama is one of the those

states. Lousiville & Nashville R.R. Co.

v. Nash, (supra). But, it argues that

this is because the principal defendant
had been given no actual notice of the ~—
underlying action. The Air Force's position
is that "service of process" and "notice"
are synonymous. This is erroneous. Know-
ledge of the pendency of a suit against

a defendant does not give the court in
which the suit is pending jurisdiction over
the defendant. In the Alabama case of

Partlow v. Partlow, 20 So. 2d 517 (Ala.

1945) the court said, "The mere fact that
the defendant (non-resident) has actual
knowledge or notice of the institution of
the proceedings against him is not suffi-

8k
o*
a

cient to give the court jurisdiction."

o4 3a
It is essential to the proper
renditon of a judgment in personam that
the Court have jurisdiction of the parties,
even though such parties have knowledge as
distinguished from notice, of the action,
and, indeed, even though they are present

at the trial. 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments,

Sec. 25 p. 330. Minton v. First National

Exchange Bank of Virginia, 145 S.E. 2d

139 (Va. 1935). National Metal Co. v.

Greene Corsal Copper Co., 89 P.535, (1907).

Strode v. Strode, 6 Idaho 67, 52 P.16l

(1895}; Lee v. Indep. School Dist., 149

Iowa 345, 128 N.W. 533 (1910); Beaufort
County v. Mayo, 207 N.C. 211, 176 S.E.

753 (1934); Smith v. Smith, 159 Tenn. 36,

15 S.W. 2d 747; Greenwood v. Furr 251

S.W. 332 (Tex.1923).
"A personal judgment rendered without such
jurisdiction is in violation of the due

process clause of the United States .

~

* ‘a ae ok
o. rt 4 “ >. ’ ba Re Fp. Viptep ke ty 2 ve ait ie oe +
Fe ES Se STS PAE IEE or ee eg RARE OY gy Meee
Re arr, vee aorta se A a eae tae NOT GS Gre ee, he 4

-44-

Constitution and is not merely voidable

but is void." (Emphasis added). 46 Am.

Jur. 2d Judgments § 25 (supra). The
citations for this proposition are too

numerous to quote but the case of Hess

v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 71 L.Ed.1091(1927),

47 S.Ct. 632, accurately sets forth the
law. Clearly knowledge is not a legal
substitute for service of process and
cannot give a Court in personam jurisdic-

tion over a person. Estin v. Estin (supra);

Kreiger v. Kreiger 334 U.S. 555 (1948);

Armstrong v. Armstrong (supra); Vanderbilt

v. Vanderbilt (supra). It is the lack of

proper service of process that makes the
judgment void.

Had there been legal service of
process on Col. “asec in the divorce suit, |
it would have given the Alabama Court ii
continuing jurisdiction over him to enforce
the court's judgment by garnishment on the -

strength of mere notice to him prior to

OP ARI aed: be os ualtcult teh Jaa)

-45-"

the garnishment. Michigan Trust Co. v.

Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913); Sheffield v.
Sheffield, 148 S.E. 2d 771 (S.C.Va.1966) ;

Orrox Corp. v. Orr, 364 So. 2d 1170 (Ala.

1978). Garnishment being only ancilliary
to the Fbdeitints, the jurisdiction continues.
(b) Many state court statutes are
cited by the Air Force which provide gen-
erally the same ot Musbown’ a: that *.|
applied retroactively because it would be

direct legislative or executive reversal sq
f / |

3 ; : - ws x . F oy - - =e be _
ae Peon Se hag Paes eo ee 4 aca ass “wis Renee oe ried go SF
Phe, RE Ra ek oe es es Bite: ee eS. cs See tie Mate eet ate

«Se
of a court- decision and such is per se

objectionable. Sutherland Statutory

Construction IV ed. C. Dallas Sands, Vol.2

(1972) 1983 pocket supplement, §41.08.

It was obviously an attempt by the
government to overturn the decision in this
case when the government promulgated a new
set of regulations which were published in

the Federal Register, Vol.48, No.110,

Tuesday, June 7, 1983. The said publication
stated: "This revision expressly provides
that agencies will not be required to
ascertain whether the court or other author-
ity which issued the garnishment order had
obtained personal jurisdiction over the
obligor prior to its issuance of the order.”
And, "Two Federal agencies submitted comments
concerning the amendment to 5 CFR 581.305(f£),
which state that when a governmental entity

receives legal process that appears to con-

form to the laws of the jurisdiction from
which it was issued, the entity shall not

= 58-
be required to ascertain whether the
authority which issued legal process had
obtained personal jurisdiction over the

obligor. The amendment is consistent with

the position that the government has taken

in litigation concerning the issue.”

Legislation may not be enacted by an
administrative agency under the guise of its
exercise of the power to make rules and
regulations by issuing a rule or regulation
which is inconsistent or out of harmony with
or which alters, adds to, extends or enlarges,
subverts, or impairs, limits or restricts

the act being administered. 1 Am.Jur.2d

Administrative Law, §132. The 1983 amend-

ments to 5 C.F.R.581, promulgateiafter the

Court of Claims' decision, attempts to insu-

late the government from all liability when

such is in direct conflict with 42 U.S.C.

659 et seq., as amended. The statute is

clear that unless the judgment for alimony a

sis

- 5% |
and child support is in conformity with the
laws of the state which renders the judgment,
it is not alimony and child support. In
order to determine whether the judgment
conforms to local state law, the government
has to look into it, at least where it is
put on notice of the defect. Otherwise,
the government is paying out the pay of its
employees for purposes other than child
support and alimeny. The government has
attempted to expand the statute on its
immunity and impair the right of the
employee or member to his pay.
The Air Force contends it should not’
have to pay twice. It's not paying Col.
Morton twice because it never paid Col.
Morton the first time. There was no
valid debt for alimony and child support due
from him to Patricia Kay Morton and, there-
fore, the Air Force has not discharged an ;
ohligation of Col. Morton's which is what P|

- 60-

occurred in The City of New Bedford, 20 Fed.

57 (1884). That case is distinguishable in
that there was a pre-existing debt which was
discharged by the garnishee. However, the
legality of the proceedings could not with-
stand todays legal scrutiny.

The Air Force is required to make
payment to a party legally due the money
even if it has previously paid the money

to someone else. Howell v. U.S. 195 F.Supp.

597 (1958). If the Air Force has been
arbitrary and capricious in the admini-
stration of a military member's pay and

pays it to the wrong party, it must pay

the member his pay. Cherry y. U.S., (supra).

-6l
military pay. The fact that it arose from
a garnishment based on a claim for alimony
and child support does not make it a
domestic relations case nor put the court

in the domestic relations business.

6. Domestication of a foreign decree
requires in personam jurisdiction over a
defendant; the purposes of 42 U.S.C.659
are supported by the Court of Appeals’
decision and in accord with congressional
intent.

The Air Force further contends that
if Patricia K. Morton had obtained her
divorce in Virginia, she could have filed
a garnishment action on it in Alabama and

then the term "Legal process *** issued by

*** a court of competent jurisdiction"
| would refer to the Alabama proceedings not “4
. to the prior Virginia proceedings. The Air a
‘ | Force is operating under a false concept as a

to how these procedures work. One cannot.

Vv
me
Lt

i> 9 Bit

bring a garnishment proceeding in a state
different from the state where the judgment
upon which the garnishment is based was
granted, without first domesticating the
judgment. It is true all states must give
full faith and credit to a valid judgment
of a sister state but the procedure for
doing that requires that a new law suit be
filed for such purpose in the state where
the judgment is going to be domesticated.
In personam service of process in such new
law suit must be made on the defendant in
the new cause to domesticate the foreign

decree. 47 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, §9.30.

This being the case, the defendant, when
legally served in the domestication suit,
can raise jurisdictional questions concern-
ing the original judgment as well as claim =
other defenses in the forum which is foreign

to the state of the judgment. Thus, any

jurisdictional problem that there may be _ .

o7qe~
in the original judgment becomes res judicata .
if not raised in the latter proceedings.

Sherrer v. Sherrer, (supra). The under-

pinnings of a garnishment from a state,

other than that from which the original

judgment was entered, also must be from a

court of competent jurisdiction.
Contrary to the Air Force's argument

that the majority's opinion destroys the

intended purposes of 42 U.S.C. 659 et seq.,

the majority decision applies the statute

so that it is not constitutionally suspect |
by an interpretation that condones the

taking of property without due process of

law. Such an application is in accord

with the intent of the 1977 amendment to

the statute.

_;=

Y Amicus has misunderstood the facts of
this case; URESA is a good law capable of
producing excellent results and at the same
time treating both parties fairly.

The amicus has misunderstood the facts

in this case. FPirst, he cites Associated

Oil Co. v. Mullin, 294 P.421 (1930) for the

proposition that neither the parties nor
their privies, not strangers, can attack a
judgment of a domestic court of record on
jurisdictional grounds unless the want of

"jurisdiction appears on the face of the

record. He concludes that the appropriate-
ness of this suit is questionable. He is
apparently unaware that the purported
service in the Morton suit shows that

Col. Morton was a non-resident of Alabama.
Alabama haying no long-arm statute for
alimony and child support claims at that
time, the jurisdictional defect appears on
the record, Interestingly enough, the iy

-76-

California Court in using the term "court
of record" lends corroboration to Col.
Morton's position that "court of competent
jurisdiction" means jurisdiction of the
parties as well as the subject matter
because if Congress had meant “court of
record", that court which has subject
matter jurisdiction, it would have said so.

Second, although the Air Force concedes
the Alabama judgment was void for alimony
and child support, the amicus differs and
argues that after the date of the service’
of process on September 17, 1974, it
doesn't matter what Col. Morton did. The
amicus was unaware that Col. Morton had the
intent to be domiciled in Alaska in May of
1974 and he was in Alaska in May of 1974 and
had contracted to buy a home there.

Third, he argues that Col.Morton told
the Air Force he was an Alabamian so he
could avoid the expense in moving his wife

i

ov%.
and children to Alabama. Col.Morton never
told the Air Force he was an Alabamian.
(Pet.App.27 a). Col. Morton was not
obligated to move Patricia Kay Morton any-
where. Col. Morton merely permitted her
to use his moving benefit. They were still
married. Patricia Kay Morton unilaterally
left Col. Morton in Virginia in the marital
home where he remained for nearly nine
months. She refused to accompany him to
Alaska. (Pet.App. ll a). Col.Morton didn't
"ship" Patricia Kay Morton anywhere.

Fourth, and most grieyous, is the amicus’
statement that "...Col.Morton did not simply
comply with one of those civilities of a
divorce too often ohserved in the breach,
visitation." The minor Morton child was i

living with Col. Morton in Alaska. (See.

Res.App.to Brief 9a). Apparently the
amicus also does not think children go to
the visiting parent's home instead of baa si

~96-

visiting parent going to the child's home.
Such assumption as the amicus made is erron-
eous.

Fifth, Col. Morton never anticipated
that his wife or the state of Alabama would
support his children. Col.Morton voluntarily
provided support for his children in an
amount that had been agreed upon by the
Mortons. Col.Morton provided support when
he had no legal obligation to do so.

Sixth, there is no evidence that Col.
Morton's conduct forced Patricia Kay Morton
to leave Col. Morton. She didn't wish to
live with him in Alaska. (Pet.App.1l a).
Too, the doors of the Virginia court were
open to her for almost nine months after
she left Col.Morton prior to his leaving:
See Section 20-72 of 1950 Code of Virginia,

as amended. (Res.App. 19 a). She chose
not to use them.

Seventh, the amicus’ position that a

- litigation. Why should Col. Morton do that a

-79-
fair forum is based on the economic circun-

stances of the parties has no application

‘to the fact in this case. If Patricia Kay

Morton had no funds, it seems absurd to
say she would have moved to Alabama and
only hegun proceedings a year later when
she could have gone into the Virginia
Courts for immediate funds in either a
pendente lite hearing in a divorce suit
or a suit for separate maintenance.

Eighth, the amicus'statement that Col.
Morton couldn't have voluntarily paid
Patricia Kay Morton because the garnish-
ment is based on an order for that amount,
is tantamount to saying a man can't be
charged with a crime because he is
innocent. The fact is, Col. Morton
voluntarily paid Mrs. Morton. (Pet.App.21 a).

Ninth, the amicus states Col.Morton had
defenses that could control the Alabama —

-80-
when the Air Force Judge Adyocate advised
him that the Alabama court had no authority
to enter an in personam judgment against
him? Too, a military man can only fly space
available if he is free to leave his duties.
At the time he was acting Commander at
Elmendorf Air Base, Alaska, (Res.App. to
Brief 10a) which is the Air Base between
the continental United States and Russia.
Tenth, Patricia Kay Morton did not have
to file in Alaska to litigate Her right to
alimony and child support. She can do that
through URESA (supra). URESA is a very
effective law. The amicus is obviously
biased and in favor of a system that permits
unilateral deduction of pay of a serviceman
without benefit of a hearing as opposed to 3
one that would permit both parties to be -
heard. Such a position also may result in
double payments to a spouse. URESA and ce
42 U.S.C. 659 et seq., as mended can
; ee: J ee

ae”

-81-
exist side by side. Garnishment is fine
when the member has been afforded a hearing
but URESA should be used when the member has
not been given a hearing. The machinery is
present in both statutes to provide excellent
satisfaction in reaching the object for which
they were enacted. However, neither law can
eliminate the human factor in the admini-
stration of the law.

Eleventh, the Amicus laments that
Patricia Kay Morton must support herself and
two minor children on $500 a month. The
amicus is assuming facts not in evidence
because he doesn't know how much Patricia
Kay Morton earns. If we are going to
assume facts not in evidence, let us assume

for the purpose of argument alone, that

Patricia Kay Morton left Col.Morton in
Virginia in order to gq live with her high
school sweetheart who is also in the military;
that the eldest child married before he was

7

% rma

-82-
18 and the minor child was living with

Col. Morton in Alaska and that she didn't

marry her childhood sweetheart until the

Air Force stopped sending Col. Morton's

money to Alabama, although the Air Force
continues to withhold his pay, even after

both court decisions, which withholdings

are now in excess of $31,000.00. The fore-
going statements are not all in the record,

just as the amicus’ are not in the record.

(The portion of the claim of Col.Morton

finding how much is owed to him in back-

pay is not final in this cause.) Would

the amicus in assuming the hypothetical

posed take the same position he has under

his assumed facts? The hypothetical is

used merely to point out that not all ;
women are good and being taken advantage
of and not all men are had and take 4

advantage. The law must never operate on

that assumption. Neither should court |

-83-
briefs be written on assumptions. We do not
haye to assume, however, that the Alabama
court, in an ex-parte proceeding in which
there was no defense to voice an objection
to whatever amount the Alabama court decided
was appropriate, awarded Patricia Kay Morton
$500.00 per month as alimony and partial
child support. What the other part of
child support is, counsel cannot possibly
speculate. Certainly no defendant would
know what to comply with in such an order.
Its definition does not appear in the record.
Mrs. Morton has been paid three times for
the same thing, once when the case was

| settled in Loudoun County, Virginia, once
when Col.Morton voluntarily paid her and

s once when the Air Force took his pay and ‘

gave it to her. :

4 Twelfth, the amicus fails to understand j

the divisible nature of the proceeding to as

terminate the marital status and the

-84-
proceedings for alimony and child support
when he argues the theory of estoppel.
Thirteenth, the amicus also suggests
that Col. Morton did not submit himself to
the jurisdiction of the Alabama Court
because he says the Air Force would have
ordered Col.Morton to pay more money to
Patricia Kay Morton or he would be discharged
from the service. He says Col.Morton has
avoided a claim of non-support and prevented
an investigation by the Air Force in this
manner. The amicus has his facts all
wrong again. The Air Force has no authority
to set alimony and child support nor order
any member to pay any of his debts. In

citing Air Force Regulation 35-18, para-
graphs 3 and 5 (b),the amicus neglects to

mention the paragraph that explains the
limitations on the authority of the Air
Force and which merely defines policy.

The relevant portions of Air Force Regu-

-85-

lation 35-18 A.(1) states as follows:

"1. Air Force Policy. The Air Force
expects its members tc pay their

debts on time. Within the limits of
available resources, the Air Force
provides financial management inform-
ation, opportunities for education and
personal counseling designed to
enhance management of personal
finances, and takes administrative

or disciplinary action in cases

of continued financial irresponsi-

bility. Such action is taken to
improve discipline and maintain the
standards of conduct expected of
Air Porce personne’. but cannot be
used to enforce private civil
Obligations.” Cieshasts atice).
"2. Indebtedness.

a) Air Force Enforcement of
Private Obligations. The Air Force
does not aeetecets disputed debts,
admit or deny whether or not the
eens oF tes Beebe

ty o ts ers.

nder no circumstances does the
Air Force communicate to complain-
ants, whether any action has been
taken against members as a result
of complaints. Except for debts owed
to the Federal Government, including
its instrumentalities (for example,
nonappropriated fund activities),
the Air Force is not authorized to
require a member to pay a private
debt or to usé any part of his or
her earnings to pay the debt, even
though the indebtedness may have
been reduced to judgment by a civil
court. The enforcement of private

obligations of Air Force members is q
a matter for civil authorities.” «Gam
(Emphasis added). : ye

é86 ha .

10a

28 Oct 1975
Mrs.Patricia K. Morton
849 Sherwood Forest Drive
Birmingham, Alabama 35275

Dear Mrs .Morton:

I have received your letter of 19 September
1975, along with a copy of Final Judgment
of Divorce, dissolving your marriage to
Colonel Allan W. Morton of this organization.
Please accept my apology for not having
replied before now, But the delay was due
to the fact that I have been away on
temporary duty elsewhere; and in my
absence, Colonel Morton, being the next
ranking officer in the 21 Air Base Group,
assumed my role as Base Commander.

In regard to your request for help in the
matter of Colonel Morton not furnishing

the entire $500.00 per month set forth in
the divorce decree, I referred the question
to my Staff Judge Advocate for advice, and
after thorough study, he informs me that
he does not have enough information to

give me an absolutely definitive answer.
Specifically, he states that he would need
a copy of the petition for divorce; whether
personal service was obtained on Colonel
Morton within the State of Alabama; and,

if not, whether Colonel Morton waived in
writing, personal service; and finally,

a copy of any separation agreement or
property settlement agreement that may
have been entered into.

In spite of the above, Colonel Morton is
obligated to provide support for his two
sons. I am advised that this is so not .
withstanding that one son is presently

lla

residing with him in the absence of an
amended decree or agreement between you
and Colonel Morton, allowing him to assume
full custody of the child residing with
him. By not having the additional informat-
ion described in the above paragraph it is
difficult to determine exactly the amount
appropriate. Hence, I must rely on a
yardstick using terms such as "ability to
provide,” “reasonableness,” and “station
in life." Accordingly, I feel that you
are entitled to more than $250.00 per
month. and have advised Colonel Morton of
such. Also, I have informed him of his
obligation to furnish you with the
appropriate documents to obtain a new ID
card for your son, Allan.

It is possible to make support payments by
allotment, however, that would have to be
done on Colonel Morton's personal
initiative as I Have no authority to compel
him to do so.

Iamgsorry I do not have the information to
be more succinct in my answer, but trust
this fully explains the Air Force position
in such matters. Too, I sincerely hope that
the hardship which you recited will be
promptly alleviated to the satisfaction of
all concerned.

Sincerely,

JAMES D. DUNN, Colonel USAF
Commander

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_0704%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
