# Amicus Brief — Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 468 U.S. 883

## Text

FIL I.

No. 83-558 —
IN THE —.—
Supreme dum uf the Anited States

October Term, 1983

Irving Independent School District,
Petitioner,

Ve

Henri and Mary Tatro, Individually and
Next Friend of Amber Tatro, A Minor,

Respondents .

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT
OF PETITIONER

GWENDOLYN H. GREGORY
Counsel of Record

Deputy Legal Counsel

National School Boards Association

1055 Thomas Jefferson Street, N.W., #600
Washington, D.C. 20007

(202) 337-7666

AUGUST W. STEINHILBER

Associate Executive Director and
Legal Counsel

National School, Boards Association

THOMAS A. SHANNON
Executive Director
National School Boards Association

Office Supreme Court, U.S.

5

JAN 19 aa

>

— —

NO. 83-558
IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1983

Irving Independent School District
Petitioner

Ve

Henri and Mary Tatro, Individually and
Next Friend of Amber Tatro, A Minor

Respondents

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT
OF PETITIONER

GWENDOLYN H. GREGORY
Counsel of Record

Deputy Legal Counsel

National School Boards Association

1055 Thomas Jefferson Street, N. M., #600
Washington, D.C. 20007

(202) 337-7666

AUGUST W. STEINHILBER ‘
Associate Executive Director and

Legal Counsel
National School Boards Association

THOMAS A. SHANNON
Executive Director
National School Boards Association

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS e@eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee ee 1

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW eeeeseeoeeaeeeoeeeee8 2
ARGUME NT e@eeeeeeeeeeeoeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeese 3

I.
Il.

III.

IV.

VI.

Int roduct ſon „eee 3

The Lower Court's Requirement
is Contrary to the Statute
and the Intent of Congress ..... 6

The Department of Education
Regulation Under the Act

May Require No More Than

That Schools Provide To
Handicapped Children Those

“Health Services," If Any,
Provided to Non-handicapped
Children eeeeeeeeaeeeeeeeeeeaee ee 15

While State Law Should
Control Questions of
Educational Methodology,
Such Laws Should Not e
Used in Defining Standards
Intended to Apply Nation-

wide @eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 18

Whether or not a Service

is a "Related Service" is

Not Dependent On the Setting

of the Child's Placement ...... 20

This Court's Interpretations

of § 504 do not py

“Health Services" To Be

Provided to Handicapped

Children Unless Provided

to Non-handicapped eeeeeeeeeeee 22

13

„

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS eeeeeeeeeeeeeeee@ 1
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW NW . 2
ARGUME NT — · ae 3

Le Introduction eeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 3

The Lower Court's Requirement
is Contrary to the Statute
and the Intent of Congress .. 6

III. \The Department of Education
egulation Under the Act
Require No More Than
That Schools Provide To
Handicapped Children Those
“Health Services," If Any,
to /Non-handicapped

544 „„%%%%%%%%%„„„„4„„ ĩ) 15

IV. While State Law Should

„„ „„ 18

V. Whether or not a Service
is a “Related Service" is
t Dependent On the Setting
of the Child's Placement ... 20

VI. re Court's Interpretations
§ 504 do not 2 be
Ante Services“ To Be
Provided to Handicapped
ildren Unless Provided
to Non-handicapped . 22

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
Page

VII. The Decision Below was
Designed for a Large
Suburban District, But
Will Affect All Districts,
Regardless of Size and
eee eee 27

VIII. Conclusion @eeeeeeeeseeoeeeeeeeed 36
APPENDIX @eeeeeeeeeeceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 39

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:
Page

Hawaii 50 ne of Education >
V. Vorr, pp.

(0. in 1982), affirmed,

32-4096, s1Tp op Op. (9th Cir.
Nov. 7, 1983) @eeeeoeaeaeoeoee ee eoeee ee 33, 35

Hendrick Hudson v. Rowley, 102
* . 198 „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „„ „ „ * 18
ec State School and Hospital
. Halderman, 451 U.S. 5

Tor J. tt. 1531 (1981) 6629259252554 „4„%!1.ꝓ 24, 25

Southeastern Community College
v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397

eeeeeeeeeeeoeeee ee eee 22, 23, 24 9

Tat ro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557
. 1980) (Tatro I) 3, 11

Tat ro v. Texas, 703 F.2d 823
F. 1983) (Tatro II).. ..v e 3, 11

Tatro v. Texas, 481 F.Supp.
— * Tex. eee eee 36
Statutes:

Education for All Handicapped
Children Act, 20 U.S.C

§ 1401 . 49 passim

Statutes (continued):
Page

Section 504 cf the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(b) @eeeeoeceeoeoe eee eee eeeeee@ passim

Other Authorities:
American Nurses Association,

School Nurses Working with
Handicapped Children (1980) ....... 33

Appendix A, Paragraph 36, Section 504
Regulation, 45 C.F.R. §84, 42
Fed. Reg. 22,676 (May 4, 1977) 19

34 C. F. R. § 104.44(A) e@eeeeeeoeeoeoeeeeeeee ee 23

45 C. F. R. § 121.a13(B) (10)
(now 34 C. F. R. 5300. 13 (b) (10) ....15, 16

121 Cong. Rec. S 10956, 10960
(June 18, 1975) Ceoeeeeeeeseseseeeeces 6,9

41 Fed. Reg. 56,977 (Dec. 30, 1976) 16
42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (May 4, 1977) 27
47 Fed. Reg. 33,836 (Aug. 4, 1982) 27

H. Rep. No. 332, 94th Cong., Ist
Sess. 9 (1975) e@eeeeeeceoeaeoeeaeeeeeoee eee 11

5. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong.,
lst Sess. 12, 13 (1975) cocccccce Ll, 12

W. White, “Are You Ready to Provide
the Health Services Demanded “4
of the School?" American 3
School Board Journal 25

No. 83-558

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1983

Irving Independent School District
Petitioner

Ve

Henri and Mary Tatro, Individually and
Next Friend of Amber ſat ro, A Minor
Respondents

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF
OF THE NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARUS ASSOCIATION

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS
This brief is filed with consent of both
parties. Letters of consent are on file with
the Clerk of this Court.
Amicus curiae, National School Boards

Association (NSBA), is a nonprofit federation
of this nation's state school board
associations, the District of Columbia school
board and the school boards of the offshore
flag areas of the United States. Established

2
in 1940, NSBA is the only major national
educational organization representing school
boards and their anders. Its membership is
responsible for the education of more than
ninety-five percent of this nation's public
school children.

Each of the 16,000 school districts which
NSBA represents receives or is eligible to
receive financial assistance under the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (the Act).

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether defining “related services“ under
the Act to include clean intermittent
catheterization (CIC) is consistent with the
language of the Act and its legislative
history.

3
ARGUMENT
I. INTRODUCTION

The analysis of the Fifth Circuit in both
Tatro I, 625 F.2d 557 (1980) and Tatro II, 703
F.2d 823 (1983) is founded on a premise which
has little or no basis in either the statute
itself or its legislative history.

Under the ruling below, a school district
is responsible for the provision of every
health service required by a handicapped child
if it must be administered during the school
day and if it can be administered by someone
other than a licensed physician. According to
the lower court's rationale, a service is
related“ to the special education of the
child merely if the child needs the service
during the school day, regardless of whether
the service is educational in nature. Amicus
agrees that the Congress intended to require
the provision of all educational services

necessary for the child to benefit from 4

4

special education, even though some of those
educational services have medical or health
overtones. But the Congress also intended to
exempt services which are solely medical or
health services.

20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) defines “related

services” as:

transportation, and such
developmental, corrective, and other
supportive services (including
speech pathology and audiology,
psychological services, physical and
occupational therapy, recreation,
and medical and counseling services,
except that such medical services
shall be for diagnostic and
evaluation purposes only) as may be
required to assist a handicapped
child to benefit from special
education, and includes the early
identification and assessment of
handicapping conditions in children.

In order to avoid the express statutory
exemption of medical services, the lower court
narrowly defines such services as those which
can only be provided by a physician. Thus,
any service which can be provided by someone
other than a physician could come within the

fr
„

5

rubric of the lower court's strained
definition. While the Congress included a
requirement that districts provide diagnostic
and evaluation services (even though such
services can be considered "“medical,") the
primary purpose of this type of medical
service is to assist in the education of the
child rather than to sustain the child's life.

The decision below goes beyond the intent
of Congress in its attempt to fund education
services for handicapped children. It
misapplies the exemption in the Act of
“medical services." It results in a different
standard of compliance in each state, based on
the vagaries of the laws on the practice of
medicine. It confuses the “related services"
requirement with the requirement of “least
restrictive environment." Finally, the
decision below turns the non-discrimination
requirement of the Act into an independent
requirement that schools provide health

services to handicapped children, even when
such services are not available to

non-handicapped children.

II. THE LOWER COURT'S REQUIREMENT IS CONTRARY
TO THE STATUTE AND THE INTENT OF
CONGRESS .

Mandating that schools provide CIC,
and other services related exclusively to the
health of the child as “related services"
under the Act is contrary to the intent of
Congress in passing the Act.

Senator Jennings Randolph, the Senate
sponsor of the Act, in his opening remarks
during Senate debate on the Act, summarizes
the purposes of the Act:

First, all handicapped children
living in a State who are in need of
- special education are identified,
located, and evaluated; second, a
goal is established to provide full
educational opportunities to all
handicapped children; third,
priorities for services are
established first with respect to
handicapped children not receiving
an education and second with respect
to severely handicapped children

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7

receiving an inadequate education;
fourth, procedures are established
to safeguard the rights of
handicapped children and their
parents in decisions relating to
identification, evaluation, and
educational placement; fifth, a free
appropriate public education be
available for all handicapped
children between the ages of 3 and
18 within a State. 121 Cong. Rec. S
10960 (June 18, 1975).

Senator Randolph's remarks evidence the
intent of Congress to tie all requirements in

the Act to the educational needs of

handicapped children. It was not designed to
address all the needs of handicapped children.
As this Court stated in the landmark case

under the Act of Hendrick Hudson v. Rowley,
102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982):

We therefore conclude that the
‘basic floor of opportunity
provided by the Act consists of
access to specialized instruction
and related services which are
individually designed to provide
educational benefit to the
handicapped child.

Respondents have not contended that Amber

Tatro is not receiving an educational benefit

N * 10 l ee

8
from the specialized instruction provided to
her. Demands for CIC, a health service, are
completely extraneous to the quality of
Amber's education.

The Act defines “handicapped children” as
those who “because of their impairments
require special education and related
services." Thus, if Amber's only handicap“
were her neurogenic bladder condition, she
would not be “handicapped” under the Act
because that condition alone does not give
rise to a need for specialized instruction.
The only reason the Act applies here at all is
because of Amber's additional handicap which
results in her need for specialized
educational services. Congress was not
attempting in the Act to fund or to require
school districts to fund, any services for
handicapped children other than those
directly related to the special educational
needs of the child.

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In order to discern the intent of
Congress, the Court's attention is directed to
the original version of the Act as passed by
the Senate. 121 Cong. Rec. S 10956 (June 18,
1975). That version did not, in its
definition of “related services," include
either medical or counseling services. The
House version, however, did include such
services but provided that the services were
limited to those required for diagnosis and
evaluation purposes only. The final version
includes the House requirement and the
limitation on the requirements.

Thus, Congress clearly expressed its
intent to require the provision of medical
services only where they are necessary for
diagnosis or evaluation of the child.
Apparently it was felt that diagnostic and
evaluation services might not be provided by
school districts unless expressly included in
the statute. However, to clarify its intent

*

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10
the Congress stated explicitly that the
“medical” requirement goes no further than
just diagnosis and evaluation.

The lower courts' attempt to avoid the
express statutory limitation by defining
“medical” in terms of who provides the service
rather than the nature of the service, has no
basis in the statute. The term medical“ in
the statute was intended by the Congress to do
nothing more than differentiate between
services which are educational (although
including health components) and services
which are strictly health services. There is
nothing in the statute or its history to
support an argument that the Congress used the
term “medical” to differentiate between health
services provided by someone other than a

physician and health services provided by a

5 physician.
We direct this Court's attention to the
description in the lower court's opinion of

3
the CIC procedures, 703 F.2d 823, 829. See
Appendix. The description clearly shows that
the procedure is à2 “medical procedure"
designed solely to meet physical health needs
rather than a diagnostic or evaluation device.

The lower court points out in a footnote,
625 F.2d at 564, n. 17, that the statutory
definition of "related services" includes
“physical and occupational therapy and
recreation" as examples of “related services."
The court states that it fails “to see how
these services ‘arise from the effort to
educate any more than CIC'." A reading of the
legislative history will elucidate.

In the debate on the Act, Congress
expressed its concern that handicapped
children have an opportunity to receive
extra-curricular services, in addition to the
curriculum designed to meet their unique
educational needs. 8. Rep. No. 168, 94th
Cong., Ist Sess. 12 (1975); H. Rep. No. 332,

12

94th Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1975). Thus, for
example, the legislative history discusses
physical education courses and the fact that
such courses should be modified so that
handicapped children can participate either
along with non-handicapped children or, if |
appropriate, participate in a separate
setting. Id. It also discusses the fact that
handicapped children have a right to “health
screening, transportation services and all
other services which are provided to all
children within the school system." S. Rep.
No. 168, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 12 (1975).

Members of both houses expressed concern
that handicapped children be provided the
opportunity to participate in extra-curricular
activities, particularly physical education.
"The Committee is concerned, although these
services are available to and required of all
children in our school system, they are often
viewed as a luxury for handicapped children.”

13

S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 12
(1975). They cite the Special Olympics, the
dance and drama programs at Gallaudet College
and other examples of the arts and physical
education as viable teaching tools. Id. at
13. Nothing in the legislative history
implies, however, that health services nat
provided to non-handicapped children and not_
educationally necessary must be provided to
handicapped children. All of the discussion
on extra-curricular activities and physical
education and health services (not evaluative
or diagnostic) revolves around the
non-discrimination core of the Act. These
requirements do not stand alone.

Further, the definition of “special
education” includes “instruction in physical
education” so it is certainly appropriate to
include a reference to “physical therapy" in
the definition of “related services" to
conform to the special education definition.

L

All of the services set forth in the
definition of “related services" are required
because they have a direct relationship to the
education of the child, either as a teaching
tool or as a means of evaluating the child to
determine his educational needs.

To the same extent, as discussed below,
where school health services are provided to
non-handicapped children they should also be
provided to handicapped children, even though
some modifications may have to be made to

accommodate the unique needs of the

handicapped child. However, the average:

school health service is nothing more than
basic first aid and in some instances, simple
physical examinations and immnization shots.
The existence of such a health clinic should
not automatically give rise to a requirement
that the school mst provide to handicapped
children every health service which a school
nurse is qualified to provide under

4

15

supervision of a physician. Further, not
every school has a full-time health clinic or
even a part-time nurse and yet, under the
decision below, life-saving services which are
capable of being provided by a nurse must be
provided.

III. THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION REGULATION
UNDER THE ACT MAY REQUIRE NO MORE THAN
THAT SCHOOLS PROVIDE TO HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN THOSE “HEALTH SERVICES,” IF ANY,
PROVIDED TO NON-HANDICAPPED CHILDREN.
The lower court sets forth its standards

as to when a “life support“ service must be

provided as a “related service": (1) the
child must be handicapped so as to require
special education; (2) the services must be

required by the child during the school day;

and (3) it must be one which a nurse or other

qualified person can perform.
The lower court cites Department of

Education regulation 45 C. F. K. 121.a13(8)(10)
(now 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(b)(10)) as authority
for the third part of its test. That

s
3
-

16

provision defines “related services" and
states in part: “the term also includes
school health services, social work services
in schools, and parent counseling and
training." The Department's regulation
defines “school health services" as those
which are “provided by a qualified school
nurse or other qualified person.“ 34 C. F. R. 5
300. 1305) (10).

It is unclear from the commentary in the
regulation why the Department chose to add
“school health services" to the statutory
definition of "related services." Such
services were not included in the earlier
proposed regulation, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,977
(dec. 30, 1976), 1 and the Department of
Education removed the services from the

definition in its proposed regulatory changes.

: Further, the proposed regulation
defined “medical services": as “procedures
af a Ne agg physician to determine

‘eon education and

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4

17
47 Fed. Reg. 33,836 (Aug. 4, 1982). (That
propos al was subsequently withdrawn.)

As discussed earlier, Congress intended
to require school districts to provide to
handicapped children services which are being
provided to non-handicapped children, even
though in the former instance it may be sore
difficult or more expensive. Thus, if the
Department intended by its regulatory
reference to “school health services" merely
to assure that handicapped children would have
access to school health services, that
requirement is authorized by the statute.

However, the effect of the lower court
interpretation of the regulation is to make an
independent requirement that school districts
must provide health services to handicapped
children regardless of whether those services
are also provided to non-handicapped children.
If that interpretation is correct, the K
Department s regulation is ultra vires. 4

, 44 § N * ö sigs * 1
e 4 * 3 3 5 et a ts

18
IV. WHILE STATE LAW SHOULD CONTROL QUESTIONS
OF EDUCATIONAL METHODOLOGY, SUCH LAWS

SHOULD NOT BE USED IN DEFINING STANDARDS
INTENDED TO APPLY NATIONWIDE.

The district court below recognized the
anomaly caused by the reliance on state law in
determining whether a medical procedure is a
“related service“ or an exempt “medical
service.“ 516 F. Supp. 968, 975 (1981). In
matters of educational methodology we would
certainly agree that state law should control.
The “courts must be careful to avoid imposing
their view of preferable educational methods
upon the States." Rowley, 102 S. Ct. at 3051.
However, in matters involving basic rights of
the handicapped, there should be but one
judicial standard. This is particularly true
since the state laws on which the courts are
to rely in this case are designed to guide
medical practitioners and others as to what is
or is not the practice of medicine. They are
not designed to confer substantive rights.

State law should govern as to who

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19

provides a “related service." See Comment to
Department of Education Regulation 34 C. F. R. 5
300.13. However, the question as to the
nature of the service, I. e:, whether it is a
health or educational service, and, thus,
whether it is required to be provided, should
be answered through resort to the statute
itself or its legislative history.

The identification process may even be
affected if the reasoning of the lower court
is to become the law of the land. At the
present time handicapped children are
identified by their need for specialized
education. If they are now to be identified
by their need for a medical service as
defined by state medical statutes - the number
of handicapped children will be increased and
the quality of the education services to be

provided to all children may decrease.
Additionally, even though their child is
being provided with an “appropriate” education

. * * 3
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20
as defined in Rowley, parents may move from
state-to-state depending on which state's
regulation of the practice of medicine results
in more free health services being provided by
school districts in the state.

There are only so many responsibilities
which society can place on school systems
before their main mission - to educate -
begins to be seriously jeopardized.

V. WHETHER A SERVICE IS A “RELATED SERVICE"

IS NOT DEPENDENT ON THE SETTING OF THE
CHILD'S PLACEMENT.

The lower court resorts to the
tautological argument that because Amber
Tatro's Individual ized Education Program (IEP)
calls for her education in the regular
classroom and because she needs CIC during the
school day, the school district must provide
the CIC.

Since Amber needs CIC during the school

day regardless of where she is placed, the
issue is not where she is educated but who

EC ĩ 5i—s?7' ß. r

21

pays for the CIC. Amber Tatro does not need
CIC in order to be educated in a regular
class room. She needs CIC in order to live,
regardless of the setting of the education.

Although Congress did evidence a
preference in the Act for mainstreaming (i.e.
education in the least restrictive
environment, preferably the regular
classroom) of handicapped children, the
question of what is a "related service” does
not depend on whether the child is in a
regular classroom or in a separate setting.
Even if the school district had determined
that the appropriate setting for Amber was in
a special school or institution, the district
would remain liable for assuring that the
child receives special education and related
services, either by providing the services
itself or by remaining financially responsible
for the education and "related services."

22

VI. THIS COURT'S INTERPRETATIONS OF 5 504 DO
NOT REQUIRE ‘HEALTH SERVICES’ TO KE
PROVIDED TO HANDICAPPED CHILDREN UNLESS
PROVIDED TO NON-HANDICAPPED.

The courts below, in order to allow
attorneys ' fees to the “prevailing”
plaintiffs, also found a violation of § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. That Act
provides:

No otherwise qualified handicapped
individual in the United States ...
shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or de subjected
to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance ... 29 U.S.C. §
794,

In the case of Southeastern Community
College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979), this

Court considered its first case brought under
§ 504. The question in that case was how far
an institution of higher education must go to
accommodate the handicap of a deaf applicant

to its nursing program. The Fourth Circuit ;
had ruled that § 504 required “affirmative 1

23
conduct" on the part of Southeastern to modify
its program to accommodate the disabilities of
applicants, “even when such modifications
become expensive."

The Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, in its regulation implementing
§ 504, requires “modifications to (a
college's] academic requirements * are
necessary to ensure that such requirements do
not discriminate on the basis of handicap
coos” 34 C. F. R. § 104. 44 (A). But this Court,
in Davis, held that:

[ir these regulations were to
require substantial adjustments in
existing programs beyond those
necessary to eliminate
discrimination against otherwise
qualified individuals, they would do
more than clarify the meaning of §
504. Instead, they would constitute
an unauthorized extension of the
obligations imposed by that statute.

The language and structure of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 reflect a
recognition by Congress of the
distinction between the evenhanded
treatment of qualified handicapped
persons and affirmative efforts to
overcome the disabilities caused by
handicaps. Id. at 410.

=a
2 OS Se ae

24 4
The court dismissed the contention of the
Government which argued in its amicus brief
that § 504 requires affirmative action.

[IR is undisputed that respondent
could not participate in
Southeastern's nursing program
unless the standards were
substantially lowered. Section 504
imposes no requirements upon an
educational institution to lower or
effect substantial moodifications of
standards to accommodate a
handicapped person. Id. at 413.

On April 20, 1981, this Court handed down

an opinion in the case of Pennhurst State

School_and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1.
101 S. ct. 1531 (1981), which © although

interpreting a law which is distinguishable
from the Act at issue here, contains important
language relating to interpreting the intent
of Congress in passing such laws. |
Plaintiffs sought the closing of
Pennsylvania's Pennhurst State School and

treatment of the mental ly retarded, and urged
that “community living arene, de

25

estab] ished for its residents. The district
court held that conditions at Pennhurst
violated the federal constitutional right to
be provided with “minimally adequate
habilitation” in the “least restrictive
environment," and also found violations of the
Equal Protection Clause, the Eighth Amendment
and § 504. Pennhurst was ordered closed and
suitable “community living arrangements"
provided for all Pennhurst residents. A
Special Master was appointed to supervise the
implementation of the order.

The court of appeals affirmed the
appointment of a Special Master, but declined
to reach the constitutional claims, instead
resting its order on its construction of the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and 38111
of Rights Act. This Act was raised on the
court's own initiative; none of the Plaintiffs
having raised it.

This Court in Pennhurst noted that the

26
Act in question was passed by the Congress
pursuant to its Spending Power rather than
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus,
the legitimacy of the Congress
power to legislate ... rests on

whether the State voluntarily and
. accepts the terms of the

‘contr „ 0 There can, of

course, be no knowing acceptance if

a State is unaware of the conditions

or is unable to ascertain what is

expected of it. Accordingly, if

Congress intends to impose a

condition on the grant of federal

moneys, it must do so unambiguously.

101 S. Ct. at 1539-40.

When the State of Texas and the Irving
School District accepted funding under P.L.
94-142 and the requirement of providing a
“free appropriate education,” they did not
knowingly accept a requirement that they must
provide life-saving devices needed by each
handicapped child during the school day.

The question is not, as opined by the

court below, whether or not it would be

burdensome for the school district to provide — 7
the service - but whether it 1s discrtmtnetory 1

27
not to provide it. Should handicapped
children have more rights than
non-handicapped?

The comment in the Department of
Education regulation under § 504 provides an
interesting analysis of the duties of health
institutions under § 504.

One common misconception about the
regulation is that it would require
specialized hospitals and other
health care providers to treat al!
handicapped persons. The regulation
makes no such requirement. Thus, a
burn treatment center need not
provide other types of medical
treatment to handicapped persons
unless it provides such medical
services to nonhandicapped persons.
It could not, however, refuse to
treat the burns of a deaf person
because of his or her deafness.
Appendix A, Paragraph 36, Section
504 Regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 84, 42
Fed. Reg. 22,676 (May 4, 1977).

VII. THE DECISION BELOW WAS DESIGNED FOR A
LARGE SUBURBAN DISTRICT, BUT WILL AFFECT
ALL DISTRICTS, REGARDLESS OF SIZE AND
RESOURCES.

In the fall of 1982, the Department of
Education published for comment a Notice of

28
Proposed Rulemaking uner the Act. 47 Fed.
Reg. 33,836. Section 300.4(b)(10) of that
notice suggested that the provision of related
services be limited to non-medical services as
designated by state law. In response to that
notice, amicus surveyed its member school
districts in order to provide the Department
with a clear picture of the problems school
districts are having with the regulations as
they presently stand. School districts in 19
states, with student populations ranging from
nearly one million to less than 700,
een. One main theme soon became
apparent in their comments : — nearly all
districts expressed their dismay that, given
their limited educational budgets, they are

being required to take on responsibilities

better placed with other social agencies. As
one survey respondent stated, “Schools in
{this state] have become, by default, the
major social agency servicing the health, 3

. $i —
> s 4 ~ — 4 4 x
Pees, * al aS

29
psychological, respite and custodial care
needs of children."

Should the school districts be forced to
take on these multiple roles? The answer is a
most definite no. It is impossible for one
body to be all things to all people. In
trying to solve one portion of a problem, it
is important not to overlook the needs and
constraints of the whole. Judicially
formulated requirements pertaining to related
services are one of the most difficult, if not
the single most difficult, expenditure to
justify to those who are complaining about the
dwindling funds available for the education of
all. public school children.

Alternately, should it be found necessary
for the schools to take on these many tasks,
the decision is one best made by the state,
not the judiciary. Only the state and local

governments are fully aware of the myriad

considerations that go into allocating scarce

30

fiscal resources. Judicial tampering with
this allocation of responsibility and
resources will only serve to upset the careful
balance that states have reached, and
ultimately, do more harm than good to those it
is attempting to help.

Though the Irving School District is a
moderately large district with about 22,000
students, and might be able to muster the
necessary resources to undertake the lower
court's mandate, it must be noted that it is
not a typical school district. Eighty-seven
percent of the 16,000 school districts in this
country neve less than 5,000 students, and 25%
have less than 300 students. These school |
districts are also under the mandate of the
circuit courts that have ruled that CIC and

other non-educational services mst be

provided to students within their bounds.
‘Although the lower court describes CIC as

a “simple procedure, assuredly non-health

31

personnel such as teachers and administrators
will not be inclined to willingly take on such
a procedure which can result in serious
illness if improperly carried out. It is
difficult for personnel not trained in the
health professions to recognize symptoms and
the failure to do so could have dire results.
Further, unless all personnel in the school
are trained to perform the service, the child
would not have the service available when the
teacher or teacher's aide is absent from
school. Thus, school districts would have to
assure that health professionals are available
at all times. That is an expensive
proposition given the fact that many schools
do not have full-time nurses on staff, and,
given budget cuts, many other schools are
cutting back in the number of non-teaching
personnel, including school nurses.

More than 86,000 facilities are currently
being used in the U.S. to educate public

7

* .

183

* 1 : 8 baat
vi, See * 1 * 4 99 ei a as 1 1 8 — * 1
r J ye

32
school students. Meanwhile, only about 30,000
schoal nurses are employed by public school
systems. In Oconomwoco, Wisconsin for example
one nurse serves 4,900 student in nine
schools. 3 Quincy, Massachusetts has 14
full-time nurses, but they must serve 12,500
students in 26 schools. Some school districts
have no full-time nurses on staff and obtain
emergency care from public health service
agencies. W. White, “Are You Ready to Provide
the Health Services Demanded of the Schools?"
American School Board Journal 25 (June 1981).

These smaller districts, which lack the
specialized staff to perform such tasks, will
incur even higher costs than those faced by
Petitioner. When one considers the full range
of medical services that schools, if the N
decision below is taken to its logical :

conclusion, may soon be forced to provide, the

costs begin to multiply rapidly. Under the
lower court decision, schools would be x

>
Wr r Cs ˙— OOP

33
obligated to provide insulin § injections,
kidney dialysis, and maintain tracheostomies.
Colostomy, ileostomy, and uretherostomy care
may be needed by students. Students may also
require naso-gastric tube feedings, treatment
for pressure sores, or use of a respirator
during the course of the day. American Nurses
Association School Nurses Working with

Handicapped Children 3, (1980). In fact,

courts are requiring such services at the

present time. Hawaii Department of Education

Ve Dorr, F. 2d * No. C. A. 82-4096 slip
op. (9th Cir. Nov. 7, 1983). Because of

decisions such as that below, schools of
education are incorporating instruction in
suctioning, CIC and dispensation of medicine
in special education curricula. Education
should not be forced to take on roles better
assumed by school nurses. School Nurses

Working with Handicapped Children, supra at 4.
Yet, given the dearth of school nurses, and

34

funds to hire them, that may be the only
alternative. To provide these services, other
programs -- educational programs -- will have
to be sacrificed, and the original intent of
the Act, to provide an education for
handicapped children, will ultimately suffer.

It is not just the direct costs of
providing the related services, but also the
indirect burdens that attend then that
concern school districts. School boards today
are wide open to tort liability claims. With
insurance costs already sky high, districts
will now be faced with adding an additional
risk — medical services -- to the policies
which try to protect them. Many may find in
the long term that it is more expedient to
hire medical personnel — thus stretching
tight budgets even further -- rather than face
this potential liability.

Additionally, unions across the country
are already beginning efforts to have

35
handicapped children "“triple-counted" for
purposes of determining class size, because of
the extra time and effort these children need.
Faced with the prospect of having to provide
medical services, they may seek to raise this
figure even higher, if indeed, their contracts
will even allow them to perform medical
services, a question yet to be answered. Such
fears are not groundiess. In at least one
case, it was noted that school personnel had
filed grievances charging "violation of their
contracts of employment by being required to
perform duties of a medical nature outside the
scope of their contractual duties." See

of Education v. Dorr, 531 F.
Supp. 517 (D. Hawaii 1982). These concerns do

not reflect cold hearted callousness on the
part of school districts and their employees,
but rather legitimate fears --"fears that they
could not perform the medical procedure
correctly ... fear of the personal aspects of

36
the procedure ... and fear of being sued if
something untoward occurred during the

procedure." Id.

VIII. CONCLUSION

As stated by District Judge Higginbotham
in the first district court opinion in this
case,

there is a temptation here to
achieve a humane result. Despite
the limited number of times school
boards may be faced with a child
requiring CIC, the interpretation of
these federal statutes has wide
consequences because it involves
definitions of the duty of hundreds
of school districts to be discharged
in myriad factual patterns. e
limits on this court's institutional
role here gives little play for this
court's humanitarian concern for
Amber and her parents." 481 F. Supp.
1224, 1226.

Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit, in
reversing Judge Higginbotham, stepped out of
its role as interpreter of the law and into
the role of policymaker. Whatever the merits

of the state providing free CIC services to

. : N 8 *

9 a 9 4 + ae ek
iS 3 . K r (( 333 82
F 8 R

37

Amber Tatro, there is no werit in a court
twisting the language of the statute to
achieve that result. The conclusion of the
court of appeals to the effect that the school
district is responsible under federal law for
the provision of any and all health services,
which c ve provided by someone other than a
phySician and which are needed by a
_ handicapped child during the school day,
whether or not the services are educational in
nature, simply has no support under either the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act or

§ 504,
If indeed the court below had requested
policy arguments on the merits of the school
district providing this service, the school
4 district may have convinced the court on
pelicy merits alone that its precedent is
inadvisable. There are limited funds
aveilable for the education of al! children,

handtcanped and non-handtcapped alike. Schoc!

7
4
;
4

™

—

—

38
districts must use great care in deciding
whether to increase educational options for
the children they are charged to educate or to
-step into other fields and attempt to use
limited funds to meet other needs, such as
health needs. Whatever the policy arguments
may be, there is no support for the legal

interpretation devised below.
Respectfully submitted,

GWENDOLYN NM. GREGORY
Counsel of Record

Deputy Legal Counsel
National School Boards Association 1
1055 Thomas Jefferson Street, N. M., #600 q
Washington, D.C. 20007
(202) 337-7666

AUGUST W. STEINHILBER
Associate Executive Director and
1 Counsel
National School Boards Association

THOMAS A. SHANNON
Executive Director
National School Boards Association

39
APPENDIX

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CATHETERIZATION OF FEMALE
PURPOSE :

To completely empty the bladder at scheduled
intervals in order to decrease the incidence
of urinary tract infection.

Urine that stays stagnant in the bladder is
more likely to become infected. A bladder
that stays full becomes enlarged and

Scheduled emptying of the bladder allows the
patient to become familiar with the difference
in the sensation of a full bladder and an

empty bladder. \

EQUIPMENT NEEDED: |

Clean catheter, metal or rubber. (Metal is
best since it can be boiled repeatedly without
deterioration.)

Soap and Water.

Dish to catch the urine, for example, a

re-usable jar.
Large underpad, to prevent soaking bed linens.

*

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:
1. Wash hands with soap and water.

2. Get all of the equipment ready.

3. Get a ready. se oS
at

2 it acer. ‘t tht
height.) Place child on her back.

aah 1

40
GENERAL INSTRUCTION (continued):

3. Spread labia apart with one hand and
wash genitalia with soap and water
with the other hand, al movi
in a downward direction. ver was
in an upward direction since this
will move germs from around the
rectum up yinto the area of the
bladder opesing.)

5. Insert catheter in urethra and let
all urine drain out of the bladder.
“This may ve onger than you think,
30 ve cat het er unt i] the
urine has draining.

6. f you are unable to catheterize,
contact your local Public Health
Nurse or call Texas Scottish Rite
Hospital.

7. Discard urine.

8. Clean catheter. Clean with soap and
warm water after each use. Allow to
dry and place in a clean, dry
envelope.

At least once a day after the catheter has
been washed with soap and water, place it in a 1
pot of water and boil for 20 minutes. Allow
the catheter to air dry and place it in a
clean dry envelope.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_0553%3A10. Public record. Not legal advice.
