# Petition — Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 468 U.S. 883

## Text

Ottice - , US.
8 3 5 5 ~. | TT "a U
— OCT % 1983
oO. Pissemadaenin * |

IN THE
Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

IRVING INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Petitioner,
v.
HENRI AND MARY TATRO, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
NEXT FRIEND OF AMBER TATRO, A MINOR,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

JAMES W. DEATHERAGE
O. GLENN WEAVER

DEATHERAGE & WEAVER, INC.
200-201 InterFirst Building
Irving, Texas 75061

(214) 254-3188

Attorneys for Petitioner

Cee ee ee ee mienneetieeimmiomenmnann
PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

i
STATEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether “medical treatment” such as clean in-
termittent catheterization is a “related service” re-
quired under the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act and, therefore, required to be provided
to the minor Respondent.

Is a public school required to provide and perform the
medical treatment prescribed by the physician of a
handicapped child by the Education of All Handi-
~—ate Children Act or the Rehabilitation Act of.
1973

Whether the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals miscon-
strued the opinions of this Court in Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman, and State Board of
Education v. Rowley.

ii

TABLE OF PARTIES BELOW

This Petition is submitted on behalf of the Irving Inde-
pendent School District and its Board of Trustees. The
parties below are as follows: -

HENRI AND MARY TATRO, Individually and as
Next Friend of Amber Tatro, a Minor, (
: Plaintiffs-Appellees

Cross-Appellants

THE STATE OF TEXAS, TEXAS EDUCATION
AGENCY,
Defendants

STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION AND ITS
MEMBERS: Elizabeth Armstrong, James M. Bin-
ion, Joe Kelly Butler, W. W. Carter, Don H. Cook,
Brian Crouch, Jimmy L. Elrod, W. H. Fetter,
Wayne Frederick, Joseph C. Gathe, E. R. Gregg,
Jr., Rubin E. may pay im Hollingsworth, William
N. Kem Leveridge, Paul Matthews,

Rex dell, William P. , Richard Ten-
cinte, Laura es, sone ickery, James H.
Whiteside; ALTON BO COMMISSIONER
OF EDUCATION, :
Defendants-Appellants

THE IRVING INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIS-
TRICT, ITS BOARD OF TRUSTEES: Roger Hill,

Vickie Tatum, Troy Kelley, Pat N John
i atum elley, Pat Norman, Jo
Stipes; James W. Fillbeck has now replaced Robert
Pierce on the Board,

Defendants-Appellants

ow

- Cross-Appellees

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

STATEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ............ i
TABLE OF PARTIES BELOW ........... hits Sak sdbbases ii
I. OpInIONS OF THE CouRT BELOW ................ 1
TL, JURIGDICTION ......csccccccccccccccecccccccess 2
III. Statutory AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 2
TV, Sravenmar OP THE CASE oo. ccc cccccccccescess 3
V. REASONS For GRANTING THE WRIT ............ ai 2

A. This Case Presents Questions Of Great Publi
Importance Concerning The Scope Or “Non-
educational” Services Required To Be Provided
By State And Local Education Agencies Under

Education For All Handicapped Children

BP. yo hud ahaa cocks = apdeces erases 5

B. The Decision Below Conflicts With Applicable
Decisions Of This Court. ...........seeeee: 10
IN 6 oop X acvokwadsnows evanscdebvandee Vaweks 13

APPENDIX:

Memorandum Opinion of Judge Higginbotham (Filed May
26, 1981) Tatro v. Texas, 516 F.Supp. 968 (1981) . la
COR i. oa 604 eck Te ude vil tena bon’ wee wha 53a

Memorandum Opinion of Judge Higginbotham (Filed
September 8, 1981-Unpublished) ................ 55a
AURORE FOI os 00 cana 6is 6.0 05.0 vik'ns ec cys vhs Gus 62a

Order (J. Gee) Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc

(Filed July.6, 1965) .......ceccccccscscccssvecs 84a

Memorandum Opinion of J Rigesboien, i Tatro I
(Filed December 21, 1979) Tatro v. Texas, 481

F.Supp. 1224 (1970) «.....0c..cecsccoceseccsess 86a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals (5th Circuit) (J. Goldberg)
Tatro (led September 2 1980) Tato Texas,

GES FBS GOT CBU) a vive cc nc cccccccvccsccteiese 94a

iv

Table of Contents Continued

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS: .
y ie toe! re FPR, Ean CL ie 4
Ps Cadabetgtcss poaaceieausanecates
es Os IE vad enccnrentanedanustonaed

Page

110a
110a

¥

TABLE OF CITATIONS
CASES: Page
sori Sesion Ron, — US, ROY,
Pennhurst State School & H. v. Halderman, 451
U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1581 (1981) ........... 4, 11, 12, 13
Scanlon v. Tokarcik, 665 F.2d 443 (8rd Cir. 1981) cert.
denied 2 yoni yt. aap 5, 6
Southeastern Cos Comtnuniiy Ce College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,
| SS IIE. 6. 6 baleen c oct cen ceccdss 9, i2, 13
Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980) TatroI .. 2,4
MISCELLANEOUS:
a MOOD voce cccecccssetcscteseesee 8
Sana MEE. dec ccccciecccececsvvsvcuec 9
a iceiw bones banhevas sone 2, 3, 4, 12
ee os os. vee cenecadeeeeesea 2
20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq.:
Ee Sat be cia cliscecdpewece 2, 5, 6, 7, 11
SECS Salih 3 SE Pe ee 2, 5, 10
Article 4495(b) § 3.06(d)(1), Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann.
(Vernon Supp. 1982-83) .............ceeeeceenes 2,6

at ‘>
weet a —S ss Te eS

38a

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

The questions raised in the Court’s Order of February 6,
1981, are addressed in the sequence of their presentation in
that Order.

Question (1)(a). Whether under the Texas Medical Practice
Act, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., art. 4495, et seg. (Vernon
1978) employees of the school district can only provide CIC
(the provision of CIC is described in the attached stipula-
tion from the pretrial order in this case) if they are under
the control and supervision of a licensed physician and what
the training of such persons must be. These questions. in-

clude the question of whether to furnish CIC without such _ .

supervision would be to engage in the unlawful practice of
medicine. /d., art. 4510, 4510a and 4510b. See also, art. 4518
V.A.T.S. and Op. Tex. Att. Gen. No. H-1295 (Dec. 28, 1978),
H-395 (Sept. 9, 1974).

Under Texas law, a person is regarded as practicing medi-
cine if he (she) professes to be a physician or surgeon and
diagnoses, treats, or offers to treat any disease or disorder,
mental or physical, or any physical deformity or injury, by any
system or method, or seeks to effect cures thereof; or does the
above acts and charges therefor, directly or indirectly, money
or other compensation. (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat., arts. 4510 and
4510a (Vernon 1976)).

Thus, a person professing to be a physician who treats
another for a disease or disorder, such as neurogenic bladder
dysfunction using clear intermittent catheterization (CIC), is
practicing medicine and must have a license to do so under
Texas law. Similarly, a person who treats another for a disease
or disorder and charges for that treatment is also practicing
medicine and must have a license to do so lawfully.

Both the Dallas County Medical Society and the Texas Medi-
cal Association respectfully submit that CIC should not be
administered to a patient except when ordered by a physician.
It is a treatment used for selected patients with
sia and neurogenic bladders. (Enrile and Crooks,

39a

mittent Catheterization for Home Management in Children
with Myclomeningocele,” 19 Clinical Pediatrics, 743 (Nov.
1980)). Even though patients, parents, and others can be
trained to perform the technical aspects of this treatment, this
does not affect the judgment that CIC should be performed
only under a physicians order. However, classification of CIC
as the practice of medicine would not prevent the delegation of
such a procedure by a physician to a nonphysician. The delega-
tion of medical tasks by physicians to nonphysicians has been
an accepted part of the practice of medicine for years. Thomp-
son v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners, 570 S.W.2d
123 (Tex. Civ. App. - Tyler 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).

The parties in this case appear to agree that CIC is a proce-

dure which, if provided by school system personnel, would only
be provided when prescribed or ordered by a physician. The
debate appears to be centered on the fact that physicians can
and do delegate this task to others. However, administering
the treatment itself by a nonphysician under a physician’s
order is not the unlawful practice of medicine even if a charge is
made for the treatment provided. If providing CIC is not
considered to be the unlawful practice of medicine because it is
a treatment which the physician can delegate to others, this
does not mean that it is a treatment which need not be ordered
by a physician. In Texas, a nurse or an unlicensed lay person
may not lawfully decide that a treatment such as CIC is needed
for a particular condition (diagnose), administer treatment,
and “charge therefor, directly or indirectly, money or other
compensation” without a physician’s direction. (Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat., arts. 4510, 4510a, 4510b (Vernon 1976)).

The definitions of the practice of medicine, nursing, and the

other licensed health professions overlap to some extent. This

creates the result that the same act when per-

formed by a nurse under the direction of a physician is con-

sidered to be part of the practice of nursing and when per-

formed by a physician is considered to be the practice of medi-
cine.

40a

The Texas Attorney General recognized this result in 1962
when he defined the practice of nursing prior to the inclusion of
the definition of professional nursing in what is now commonly
referred to as the “Nursing Practice Act,” (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann., art. 4513 et seq. (Vernon 1976 and Vernon Supp. 1980-
1981)). This definition formulated by the Attorney General
included the following statement recognizing the delegation of
medical tasks:

“Generally speaking, the duty of the nurse is to out
.the medical Seestennet ceeneribed by a doctor tor his pa-
tient.” (Tex. Att. Gen. Op. No. -1403 (1962))

The practice of nursing is more precisely defined today.
(Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., art. 4518, sec. 5, (Vernon Supp.
1980-1981)). The statutory definition includes:

“.. . The administration of . . . treatments as prescribed
by a licensed physician. . .”

Thus, nurses can lawfully perform medical functions dele-
gated to them by physicians. When nurses do perform dele-
gated medical tasks, they do so with the knowledge that
administering these delegated treatments is part of the prac-
tice of nursing and recognized as such in the state statutes
defining nursing practice. When performing CIC as ordered by
a physician for a particular patient, the nurse is practicing
nursing as it is contemplated in the statutes.

Question (1)(b). The nature and extent of such supervision.

Once a physician has determined that CIC or any other
treatment modality is appropriate for his or her patient, the
physician may delegate performance of part or all of the treat-
ment to another. The physician continues to monitor the prog-
ress of the patient, making sure that the treatment is being

a parent, or the patient, is a treatment ordered and monitored
by the physician.

4la

The extent of the supervision or control which is proper in
cases where CIC is ordered must be determined by each physi-
cian in each case, taking into consideration (1) the needs and
capabilities of the patient and (2) the training, experience and
competence of the individual (parent, teacher, patient, or
nurse) who will be monitoring or performing the procedure
ordered by the physician. One thing is certain: a patient being
provided CIC by nurses, school teachers, or others under a
physician’s orders will expect that the treatment provided will
conform to the same standard of care as would apply if a
physician were providing the treatment.

Concerning the physical location of the physician, the follow-
ing statement made to the Attorney General by the Texas
State Board of Medical Examiners in a 1973 Attorney General
Opinion Request was referenced with approval in an Attorney
General Opinion involving ambulance attendants not in the
physical presence of a licensed physician.

“Unlicensed persons could legally perform acts which
would constitute the practice of medicine if such persons
were under the reasonable control and supervision of a
licensed physician,” Tex. Att. Gen. Op. No. H-27 (April
12, 1973)

Several Attorney General Opinions have dealt with the
meaning of such terms as “direct” and “on-site” supervision as
those terms are used in describing the supervision required of
the delegating physicians. Tex. Att. Gen. Op. Nos. C-795 (Dec.
30, 1966) and H-368 (Aug. 12, 1974). The degree of instruction
or supervision by the physician was also discussed in a 1978
Attorney General Opinion addressing the scope of lawful prac-
- tice by nurse midwives:

“Thus, even if ‘orming an episiotomy or making su-
tures were held to constitute medical treatment, a reg-
istered nurse could provide these services at the doctor's
direction ... The a te degree of instruction or
supervision by the ician will vary with the nurse’s

rience and q tions . . . These qualifications are
relevant to a determination of the appropriate degree of

42a

instruction and supervision to be provided by a physician.
Tex. Att. Gen. Op. No. H-1293 (1978).

In the case of CIC, the technical aspects of the procedure are
not complicated and can be performed successfully by children
on themselves after appropriate training (boys by age 8 and
girls by age 10). Wyndacle, Oosterlinck and De Sy, “Clean
Intermittent Self-Catheterization in the Chronical Manage-
ment of the Neurogenic Bladder,” 6 European Neurology 107-
110 (1980). Hannigan, in “Teaching Intermittent Self-Cathe-
terization to Young Children with Myelodysplasia,” 21 De-
velopmental Medicine and Child Neurology 365-368 (1979),
describes the successful training by nurses of several five year
old children (one boy, three girls) to perform CIC on them- .
selves. Of course, physician supervision and continuous
monitoring by parents or nurses is vital to minimize the likeli-
hood and severity of complications and to assure proper main-
tenance and sterilization of the equipment used.

CIC appears to be a procedure which can be safely per-
formed while neither a physician or nurse is present. CIC can
be done safely when a patient or other person is trained to
perform it properly and is taught to recognize conditions which
should be brought to the physician’s attention.

Nonphysicians often care for patients under such circum-
stances. Even when relatively sophisticated treatment is
being provided, nonphysicians are commonly placed in a role of
deciding when a physician should be notified or when to in-
stitute treatment prescribed by a physician under standing
medical orders written after the patient has been examined
and diagnosed. The physician need not be present for every
treatment ordered. The activities which commonly take place
in a cardiac intensive care unit provide an illustrative example
of such a situation. In an article by the present Assistant
General Counsel of the American Medicial Association, the
following is recorded:

“When the nurse serves in the cardiac intensive care unit,
she has the advantage of sophisticated equipment that
extends her ability to make evaluations pieuane the

43a

reliability of such evaluations. Her training may be more
highly specialized for the tasks she performs in the unit
than that of the average physician. When the nurse in the
unit institutes treatment measures in emergency situa-
tions, she is instituting treatment prescribed by a physi-
cian in anticipation that such a contingency might arise.”
Anderson, “Orderly Transfer of Procedural Responsibili-
ties from Medical to Nursing Practice,” 5 Nursing Clinics
of North America 311-319 at 318-319 (Jun. 1970).

The nurse is not unlawfully practicing medicine in the situation

described above. He or she is instituting treatment prescribed
under a contingency order and, no doubt, has been placed in

that position of responsibility because of demonstrated train-.

ing, experience, and competence. The same should be true for
any nurse, parent, or teacher who performs the CIC for the
child. Each should have the necessary training to perform the
treatment safely, and to know when the physician should be
called.

Question 2. The conditions under which CIC ought to be
provided consistently with conservative and sound medical
judgment including both technique and with training level
of the person administering it.

CIC should only be provided under the orders of directions
of a licensed physician. Just as in any other treatment,

“. . . a nurse should comprehend the cause and effect of
any order a physician instructs to her execution. As nurs-
ing education and pak have become more sophisti-
cated, and as more medical acts have become technical in
nature in that they are repetitive and are performed under
controlled circumstances re mrey have delegated to

med ae marine haha pew pono mye aye
n ce encom 8 as -
miinisteation of injections wdc at and intramuscu-
of dlagnost procedures Se! the utilization of comple

c n of complex
mechanical devices in the Saad

therapeutic ” Anderson, “Orders Transfer of
Procedural Responsibilities from Medical to Nursin,
Practice,” 5 Nursing Clinics of North America 311-319
314 (June 1970).

x.

doa

The performance of procedures by nurses under a physi-
cian’s order has been called “. . . dependent nursing functions
(which) are those performed under the legal orders and direc-
tion or supervision of licensed physicians.” (See Anderson
supra, at 314). These functions can be distinguished from
recognized independent nursing functions, that is, those per-
formed by virtue of the nurse’s education, training, and experi-
ence, and which properly reflect the nurse’s independent judg-
ment. Such functions might include:

“(T)he evaluation of a patient’s condition for the 1 mal ears of
determining his ability to care for himself or his require-

4and reporting of sym toms and reactions; and the applica-

tion and execution of nursing techniques and p ures.
(See Anderson, supra, at 314).

The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals offers a
voluntary accreditation mechanism for hospitals which is rec-
ognized by the Medicare program for purposes of determining
a hospital’s eligibility for participation. (See Commerce Clear-
ing House Medicare and Medicaid Guide, “Conditions of Par-
ticipation for Hospitals,” para 12,340 (Mar. 1979)). Thus, in the
case of nurses performing dependent functioris outside the
’ hospital or nursing home setting, it may be helpful to review
provisions of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospi-
tals (JCAH) Accreditation Manual for Hospitals (1981 Edi-
tion) relating to home health services.

The section on “Home Care Services,” pp. 57-62 of the JCAH
Manual, provides in part:

“Each patient receiving home care services shall be under
identity of the physician pri primary aprnshinietiaciee
identity o res e for prstes
U yo rral 5 ean each patien

pon to the home core: eres
shall receive an initial evaluation by a physician or can Fe
istered nurse acceptable to the home care

determine the appropriateness of the patients health cae

ments for nursing or medical attendance; the observation |

45a

registered nurse employed by the home care program.

This individual or a similarly qualif ualified designee shall be
available during the operating hours of the program, and
shall participate in activities relevant to the professional
services oe to the oo including the level of
personne! required.” (p.

The JCAH Manual further provides that when services are
to be provided by individuals or by a participating community
agency on an hourly or per-visit basis, a written agreement
must be prepared and must specify:

“e The services to be provided . .

«The manner in which services shall be coordinated,
supervised, and evaluated by the hospital-administered
home care program and its staff;

* The role of the hospital, the participating community
agency, and the responsible physician in the establish-
ment of a patient care plan;

* A statement to the effect that the patient care plan will
not be altered unilaterally;

* The submission, within one week after each service/
visit, of appropriate documentation (such as progress
notes) of services provided;

* The participation in case conferences .

¢ The term of the agreement or contract, in the basis for
its termination or renewal.” (pp. 58-59)

The JCAH Manual also provides that a director of the home
health care program shall be designated. The director’s re-
sponsibilities include written descriptions of the responsibility
of physicians and other professionals in the delivery of health
services. The JCAH Manual also states that:

“Home care services wood nee ype bag ms hone shall
be ee i perrensiss and

thon of paronnel providing come

46a

are to be employed in the provision of — care serv-
ices, such personnel shall be adequately trained and su-
pervised, and their duties shall be specified in writing.
“The medical staff shall assure that the quality of care
provided to home care patients is comparable to that pro-
vided to inpatients, ambulatory care patients, and
emergency care patients. The medical staff may, con-
sistent with hospital policy, ee one or more a ef
cians to carry out this responsib ity, or such responsibil-
ity may be a function of one of the committees of the
me bo a the activites of a — director
emplo’ y the home care program on a full-time or
ne basis include clinical responsibilities, he must
ve achieved and maintained medical staff membershi
through the same procedures provided for all medical s
members. Physician advice and/or consultation must be
Hye to the home care program staff at all times. (pp.
If a physician is not a member of the hospital’s medical staff
and requests the services provided by the home care program,
a special procedure to credential that physician is provided,
including a provision for evaluating the care provided to that
physician’s patients. (p: 60)

Written policies and procedures are required on the delega-
tion of responsibility, as well as the “scope of services to be
offered and the manner in which they are to be provided.” (p.
60) These must be approved by the hospital’s. medical staff,
administration, and governing body. (p. 60) A written patient
care plan that conforms with the physician’s orders must be
developed for each patient, (p. 61) An “accurate medical rec-
ord” shall be maintained which shall include progress notes
including:

“a description of signs, ; treatment, service, or
medication rendered; reaction; in the
patient’s condition; and any wstlontioonig’ inttoustion

given.” (p. 61)

47a

Coordination and evaluation of patient services on a continu-
ing basis are encouraged in this section. The “patient care
plan” must be

“reviewed and evaluated as often as the — condi-
tion required, but not less than once every 60 days.” (p. 62)

Some of the extensive requirements which now exist for
those hospitals seeking accreditation by the JCAH when they
provide home care programs have been described. Should
schools begin providing similar services under a physician’s
order, a similar mechanism will likely evolve. To assure that
the treatment provided by the school will be provided safely,
proper coordination of activities and delineation of responsibi-
lities will be necessary. If history is any guide, should schools
be required to provide treatment as ordered by a pupil’s physi-
cian, the JCAH or some other accrediting body will be called
upon to develop standards for administration of such treat-
ment. These standards will then be recognized by Congress in
legislation and will serve as a reference point for evaluating
eligibility for federal funding.

Question 3. Any additional questions believed to be pre-
sented by this case that impact the practice of medicine or
the medical community’s role in providing chi!dren neces-
sary maintenance while participating in their individual
‘education program.

One question presented by this case concerns the direction
by a physician of an act to be performed by a nurse or another
trained person. Ifthe physician is providing instruction not toa
particular individual, but to an unidentified person selected in
an organized system such as exists in a hospital, nursing home,

rely on an existing system to assure that only those who are
capable of carrying out his instructions do so. In such a situa-
tion, the physician is not necessarily liable for the acts of those
carrying out his directions if the person to whom responsibility
is delegated is selected by another upon whose judgment the
physician can reasonably rely.

48a

In an Amarillo case, a sponge had been left in the abdominal
cavity of a patient during surgery. The patient sued the
surgeon and the hospital which employed the nurses involved
in the procedure.

The jury’s verdict absolved the operating surgeon of any
negligence of his own. The jury did find negligence on the part
of the operating room nurses who were hospital employees,
but declined to find that these employees were “borrowed
servants” of the surgeon. On this verdict the trial court ren- -
dered judgment against the hospital only, not against the
surgeon. —

The Amarillo Court of Civil Appeals, in reviewing the trial -
court decision, reversed the judgment of the trial couy* and
held the surgeon liable for the nurses’ negligence under the
“captain of the ship” doctrine. (Worley Hospital v. Caldwell,
529 S.W.2d 639 (Amarillo Civ. App. 1975)). On appeal the
Texas Supreme Court set aside the Ararillo appeals court’s
judgment and remanded the case back to that court. (Sparger
v. Worley Hospital, 547 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1977)).

The Texas Supreme Court noted that an employee of one
employer may be the borrowed servant of another under Texas
law. (See Sparger v. Worley Hospital, supra, at 583). The
right to control is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury to
decide. In this case the Supreme Court concluded that physi-
cians should be subject to the usual rules applicable to bor-
rowed servants. It held that the heavy burden of vicarious
liability imposed by the “captain of the ship” doctrine as it has
come to be applied in professional liability actions should no
longer be applied in Texas. (Sparger v. Worley Hospital, su-
pra, at 585).

The Supreme Court mentioned that in this case the nurses

were assigned to the operating room by the hospital, their
employer. The duties of the nurses were detailed in the hospi-

Pee
s PA art
Spee Sey Aw

49a

tal’s Policy and Procedures Manual. Specific duties were
assigned by the hospital to each nurse:

“The procedures for the sponge count were intended for
use re less of the surgeon who was to perform the
ty) “Suing ...” Sparger v. Worley Hospital, supra, at
The physician was “in charge, medically speaking, of the
nurses” (Worley Hospital v. Caldwell, 552 S.W.2d 534 at 535
(Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1977)). Testimony at trial demon-
strated that the physician had the right to control the nurses
assigned to the operating room and in fact did direct them to
take a second sponge count as the wound was being closed. (See
Justice Johnson’s opinion, dissenting from the opinion of the
Supreme Court, 547 S. W. at 586-589). However, this degree of
control did not persuade the appeals court on remand that the
jury’s refusal to find that the nurses were the borrowed em-
ployees of the doctor was against the great and overwhelming
weight of the evidence. (Worley Hospital v. Caldwell, supra,
552 S.W.2d at 536).

The Texas Supreme Court in this case found that this physi-
cian was not necessarily liable for the acts of those who are

selected by another person when those acts are performed _-

under his direction for his patient. The right of the hospital to
assign their employed nurses and determine their qualifica-
tions was not questioned.

Thus, a home health care agency, nursing home, or hospital
with an estabished system to assign qualified persons to carry
out a physician’s instructions can properly select the agent to
carry out the orders of a physician. However, when no such
system exists, the physician may be held to have improperly
delegated a treatment unless he selects specific individuals to
carry out his treatment orders.

On November 21, 1980, an Attorney General Opinion was
issued addressing the delegation of functions by a physician to
an optician outside the physician’s office. (Tex. Att. Gen. Op.
No. MW-275 (Nov. 21, 1980)). The Attorney General opined

50a

that a physician’s orders in such a situation must be directed to
a particular optician or opticians and cannot lawfully be dele-
gated to an unnamed optician of the patient’s choice. The
Attorney General reasoned:

“Where a physician delegates a medical task to another
person, he must provide adequate instruction consistent
with that person’s skill and knowledge. . . Since opticians
are not licensed in Texas, he (the physician) cannot rely on
a particular level of ability in the profession.” (p. 2)
The Opinion also states that the delegation by a physician
must be to a natural person, not to a corporation or other group
since: :

“. . . only natural persons can be subject to the control or
supervision of the physician.” (p. 3)
The Opinion concludes that the physician is legally liable for
the negligence of the optician in performing services under his
direction.

However, in this case the Attorney General was faced with a
fact situation of unlicensed opticians in Texas. Since no particu-
lar minimum level of ability of these unlicensed persons exists,
the Attorney General could only conclude that the physician
must delegate to a particular optician or opticians, and provide
instructions appropriate to the ability of particular persons.
Therefore, although this Attorney General Opinion concluded
that physicians can only delegate properly to designated natu-
ral persons in the fact situation before him, there is no reason to
believe that the Attorney General intended to suggest a
change in the common practice of delegation to undesignated
nurses and others in hospitals, skilled nursing homes, and
home health care agencies. These individuals typically are

- assigned duties by the organizations which employ them under
systems designed to assure that only competent persons carry
out any physician’s order.

If an institution such as a school has no system to assure that
only qualified individuals will carry out a physician’s order, we
respectfully submit that the physician would be required to

5la

tailor his instructions to the individual who would carry them
out just as the Attorney General concluded in MW-275, supra.
The physician would need to satisfy himself that the individual
who is to perform the task would be qualified to do so and that
his instructions were sufficient to match the individual’s train-
ing. On the other hand, if the school has in place of a mechanism
to assure safe delivery of the treatment prescribed and proper
coordination of activities and responsibilities such as is de-
scribed in the JCAH Accreditation Manual for Hospitals
(1981) for home health services, the physician would be able to
reasonably rely on the mechanism available and could tailor his
instructions to a pre-established level of training for a person
to be designated by the school system.

CONCLUSION

All parties in this litigation appear to support the view that
diagnosing a patient’s condition and concluding that CIC treat-
ment is appropriate are functions which only licensed physi-
cians should perform. The Texas statutes support this view.
However, consistent with this view is the accepted practice in
Texas of nonphysicians performing acts which, if performed
independent of a physician, would constitute the unlawful.
practice of medicine, but when performed under a physician’s
direction, are considered to be lawful and proper.

The extent to which a physician may properly delegate medi-
cal treatment to a nonphysician is conditioned in each case by
the needs of the patient and by the experience and training of
the nonphysician to perform the functions delegated. The
Nursing Practice Act contemplates such a delegation of depen-
dent nursing functions. The physician need not be physically
present during administration of all treatments. The physician
should, however, monitor the treatment rendered even though
some of the treatment might be simple enough that children
can perform certain technical aspects on themselves. The
potential for harm, should all the steps in treatment not be
adhered to or should an adverse reaction occur, warrants over-
all physician supervision of the treatment provided.

52a

If a school system undertakes to provide CIC to its pupils
under a physician’s supervision, the responsibility for daily
administration of CIC treatment will be delegated by the
physician either (1) to persons the physician reasonably be-
lieves are capable of discharging them in a competent manner,
or (2) to an organization which has in place a mechanism to
assure safe delivery of the treatment prescribed. In either
case, the physician would tailor his instructions to the individ-
ual providing the care or would write orders for those selected
by the school system to provide the treatment based on a
pre-established level of training for those individuals.

DALLAS COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY AND
TEXAS MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
/s/ By Durwood E. Neal, M.D.
Durwoop E. NEAL M.D., President
Texas Medical Association
/s/ By Joseph C. Ogle, M.D.
JOSEPH C. OGLE, M.D., President
Dallas County Medical Society
/s/ By Richard Gray, Jr.
RICHARD GRAY, JR.
THOMPSON AND KNIGHT
/s/ By Donald P. Wilcox
DONALD P. WILcox, General Counsel
Texas Medical Association
/s/ By Michael G. Young
MICHAEL G. YounG, Staff Attorney
Texas Medical Association

53a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. CA-3-79-1281-G

HENRI and Mary TATRO, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Ve

STATE OF TEXAS, et al.,
Defendants. |

U.S. DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FILED

MAY 26 1981

JOSEPH V'CEROY, JR, CLERK

By 777?
Deputy

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the accompanying Memorandum Opin-
ion, itis ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
State Board of Education and the Irving Independent School
District modify the Individual Education Program of Amber
Tatro to include the provision of Clean Intermittent
Catheterization in accordance with and as prescribed by a valid
medical prescription provided by Amber Tatro. It also is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs
recover of the Irving Independent School District their dam-
ages and reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses in the sum of

54a

$28,502, plus interest on such sum from the date of judgment
until finally paid at the rate of 9% per annum. Court costs are
taxed against defendants.

/s/ Patrick E. Higginbotham
PaTRIcK E. HIGGINBOTHAM
United States District Judge

55a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. CA-3-79-1281-G

HENRI and Mary TAtTRO, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Vv.

STATE OF TEXAS, et al.,
; P Defendants.

U.S. DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FILED

MAY 26 1981

JOSEPH VICEROY, JR. CLERK
By 2777777?

Deputy

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendant Irving Independent School District (“school dis-
trict”) has moved to amend the Memorandum Opinion and
Judgment entered May 26, 1981. Upon reviewing the motion,
this court makes the following amendments. The motion is
DENIED in all other respects.

This court finds that of the 336 billable hours devoted to this
case by plaintiff's counsel, 62 hours were devoted tc the admin-
istrative proceedings provided by defendants pursuant to 20

56a

U.S.C. § 1415, and 33.6 hours were devoted to the issue of
compensatory damages.’

Il.

The school district asks this court to hold the State Board of
Education liable for plaintiffs’ damages and attorneys’ fees. As
explained in the Memorandum Opinions of December 31, 1980,
and May 26, 1981, the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the
State Board of Education precludes any award of compensato-
ry damages. The immunity is not applicable, of course, to
reasonable attorneys’ fees awarded pursuant to 28 U.S.C..
§ 1988: See Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 406 (5th
Cir. 1980). This court did not, however, award attorneys’ fees
under § 1988, to which it held plaintiffs to be unentitled, but
awarded the fees under § 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. § 794a.*

This court held in its Memorandum Opinion of December 31,
1980, that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does not abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States. See Jones v.
Illinois Dep’t of Rehabilitation Services, 504 F.Supp. 1244,
1257-58 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Stubbs v. Kline, 463 F.Supp. 110,
115-16 (W.D. Pa. 1976); cf., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332
(1979). The question to be answered here is whether § 505
abrogates that immunity as to attorneys’ fees.

| Plaintiffs’ counsel testified that 20 more than 10% of his time was
devoted to compensatory damages. This court construes his testi-
mony as stating that approximately 10% of his total billable hours
(336 hours) was devoted to compensatory damages. If this court’s
construction is incorrect, plaintiffs’ counsel is to file an appropriate
affidavit within ten (10) days of this Opinion.

* The section provides in pertinent part:

In any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a violation of a
provision of this subchapter, the court, in its oe, may
—aeminbsdicak ,

57a

The starting point of any analysis of the applicability of the
Eleventh Amendment immunity to attorneys’ fees provisions
is Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 677 (1978). In Hutto, the Supreme
Court held that States cannot assert the Eleventh Amendment
to defeat the attorneys’ fees provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The
Court’s reasoning rested on two pillars.’ First, the Court noted
that § 1988 imposes attorneys’ fees “as part of the costs.” Jd. at
695. Costs can be taxed against a State regardless of its immun-
ity. Id. at 696-97. The Court concluded that by authorizing
attorneys’ fees as an item of cost, Congress brought attorneys’.
fees under the judicially created “litigation costs” exemption to
the Eleventh Amendment. /d. at 697-98.‘

The second pillar was Congress’ intent that the States be
subject to the attorneys’ fees provision. Jd. at 694, 698 n.31. As
noted by the Court, “Congress considered and firmly rejected
the suggestion that States should be immune from fee
awards.” Id. at 698 n.31.

Over time, it is the second pillar—the existence of con-
gressional inter. .o subject the States to § 1988 attorneys’ fees
awards—that appears to have become the primary analytical
foundation laid by Hutto. Thus, in Supreme Court of Virginia
v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719,
737-39 (1980), the Court held that although Congress intended
to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, there was no
similar indication that Congress intended § 1988 to overcome

* The State defendants did not act in bad faith or violate a judicial
decree. The portion of Hutto upholding an award of attorneys’ fees as
“ancillary” remedial relief, therefore, is inapplicable to this case. See
437 U.S. at 698-93.

‘ As this court reads Hutto, the authority to tax costs against State
litigants derives from some sort of inherent constitutional power of
the federal judiciary that may be redefined or even eliminated by
Congress. 437 U.S. 695-98. The Court was somewhat equivocal,
however, on precisely where it found this power. Jd. at 696 n.25
(citing § 254 of the Judicial Code); see also 28 U.S.C. $§ 1911, 1913,
1920.

58a

legislative immunity. The Court made no mention of the alter-
native holding in Hutto that attorneys’ fees are part of recover-
able costs. See also New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447
U.S. 54, 67 (1980). In Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980), the
Court was faced with the issue of whether attorneys’ fees may
be awarded pursuant § 1988 for a purely statutory, non-civil-
rights violation. Jd. at 130-33. The Court did not, however,
reach the question. It held that although no constitutional
violation had been found, because the plaintiffs’ allegation of a
Fourteenth Amendment violation had been sufficiently color-
able to maintain federal jurisdiction, the awarded fees fell
within Congress’ § 5 power to enforce the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Jd. Only in footnote did the Court -
mention that Congress may define “costs” to include reason-
able attorneys’ fees. Jd. at 131 n.14; see also Maine v. Thi-
boutot, 488 U.S. 1, 9n.7 (1980). Similarly, in Familias Unidas
v. Briscoe, supra, at 406, the Fifth Circuit, in explaining why
the Eleventh Amendment does not bar an award of § 1988
attorneys’ fees against the Texas State Board of Education,
cited Hutto for the proposition that Congress abrogated the
immunity pursuant to its plenary powers under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. As in Supreme Court of Virginia, no
mention was made of Congress’ redfinition of recoverable
costs. In Corpus v. Estelle, 605 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1979), in
holding that the Eleventh Amendment waiver applies to cases
pending at the time § 1988 was enacted, the Circuit prop-
ounded at some length on Congress intent to abrogate the
immunity, with virtually no discussion of Congress’ power to
define taxable costs.

Unlike § 1988, it is not at all clear that Congress focused
directly on the question of State liability when it enacted § 505
of the Rehabilitation Act, or that it firmly rejected a sugges-
tion that States should be immune from fee awards. None of
the three Committee Reports make any direct reference to
State immunity. See S. Rep. No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
18-20 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21
(1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-1780 (Conferences Report), 95th

59a

Cong., 2d Sess. 93 (1978) (latter two Reports reprinted in
[1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7312). That is not to say,
however, that there is no indication of congressional intent. In
giving his understanding of the attorneys’ fees provision in the
Senate bill, Senator Cranston made the following remark:

(With respect to State and local bodies, or State and local
officials, attorney’s fees, similar to other items of cost,
would be collected from the official, in his official capacit
from funds of his or her agency or under his or her control;
or from the State or local government—regardless of
whether the such agency or Government is a named party.
The authorization of attorney’s fees under A en sec-
tion 505(b) in cases brought to enforce title V is within the
power of Congress under among other things, section 5 of
the 14th amendment. Thus, in accordance with the Su-

reme Court’s decision in Hutto v. Finney, No. 77-1660,

une 23, 1978, the 11th amendment is no bar to the recov-
ery of attorney’s fees under proposed section 505(b) from
State government as a result of an action or | em to
enforce or change a violation under title V of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973.

124 Cong. Rec. $15,591 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1978). These senti-
ments were echoed by Senator Stafford, ranking member of
the Senate Subcommittee on the Handicapped and chief co-
sponsor of the Senate bill, in his discussion of the Conference
bill. 124 Cong. Rec. $19,000 (daily ed. October 14, 1978).

A court may not conclude that Congress intended to abro-
gate the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity unless it finds
a clear statement of legislative intent to that effect. See Quern
v. Jordan, supra, at 340-45. These remarks by two Senators,
isolated from any real debate on the issue, do not, by them-
selves, meet that test. But in the context of Hutto v. Finney,
supra, and with the presumption that Congress understood
the significance of its languge when it made the award of
reasonable attorneys’ fees a part of recoverable costs, this

’ ’ “Qe ai *
' , : " ys ih a mo Meee e

60a

court concludes that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a
§ 505 award of attorneys’ fees against State defendants.’

In that plaintiffs obtained injunctive relief against the State
Board of Education, the Judginent will be amended to make
the Board jointly and severally liable for plaintiffs’ reasonable
attorneys’ fees.

Ill.

The school district suggests in its motion that plaintiffs did
not establish a § 504 violation because they failed to show that
Amber Tatro was excluded from a school district program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance. See Brown v.
Sibley, 650 F.2d 760, 766-71 (5th Cir. 1981).

As this court noted in its earlier Memorandum Opinion:

As for the school district’s earlier su tion that there
has been no showing that the school district receives
federal funds, the superintendent of the school district

5 From time to time, the State Board of Education has contended
that it enjoys an absolute judicial or legislative immunity. Arguably,
if such immunity exists, the Board may be immune from attorneys’
fees awards. See Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of
the United States, Inc., supra, at 737-39. But as this court noted in its
Se eee the State Board of Education is under

a statutory obligation to supervise Amber’s Individual Education
Program. 516 F.Supp. at 972; See S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342,
350 (5th Cir. 1981); Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642
F.2d 687, 696-98 (3d Cir. 1981). In this regard, the Board’s role is akin
to that of an administrative agency charged with enforcing a statute.
As the Supreme Court noted in Supreme Court of Virginia, “{flee
awards against enforcement officials are run-of-the-mill occurr-
ences.” 446 U.S. at 739. This court does not, however, hold that the

immunity. It only holds that the awarded injunctive relief goes to the
Board's “direct enforcement role,” see id., and that the Board thus is
unentitled to any judicial or legislative immunity as to the duty it 4

6la

conceded that the school district receives federal funds
allocated for special education. 516 F.Supp. at 977, n.17.

This court has reviewed the transcript, and is persuaded
that superintendent Townley conceded that the school district
receives federal financial assistance for special education.* As
the record stands, plaintiffs have met their burden of proof.
But because Townley’s concession arguably is somewhat ambi-
guous, in the interests of justice this court will consider
reopening the record as to the issue if within ten (10) days of
this Opinion the school district files an affidavit setting forth
the federal funds received and the programs and activities on
which such funds are spent. The affidavit is to be accompanied
by a legal memorandum dealing with what constitutes a “pro-
gram or activity” within the meaning of § 504. See generally
Brown v. Sibley, supra."

IV.

An Amended Judgment reflecting this court’s amended find-
ings and conclusions is filed herewith by separate instrument.

/s/ Patrick E. Higginbotham
PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

* The school district appears to assume that plaintiffs must show
that federal funds are allocated specifically for the school district’s
Early Childhood Development Program. All plaintiffs must show is
that Amber was excluded from any program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance. In this regard, had Amber been enrolled
by the school district she would have been entitled to participate in
the school district’s physical therapy program. See 516 F.Supp. at
979. Physical therapy is a type of “special education.”

"Specifically, the school district is to address the issue of the
administrative level at which such funds must be allocated before a
person is excluded from a “program or activity.” That is, if the school
district receives federal financial assistance, is every program or
activity provided by the school district a § 504 “program or activity,”
or must the funds be targeted to the precise types of education
Amber would have received by attending the school district?

; ie , . cA 2 mp Ege! AS Oe
\ ee Stee (OE e y sy .* ae ‘ae YO See : eS ce prs a A

62a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. CA-3-79-1281-G

HENRI and Mary TaTRO, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Vv.

STATE OF TEXasS, et al.,
Defendants.

U.S. DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS.
FILED

MAY 26 1981

JOSEPH VICEROY, JR. CLERK

AMENDED JUDGMENT

It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
State Board of Education and the Irvirig Independent School
District modify the Individual Education Program of Amber
Tatro to include the provision of Clean Intermittent
Catheterization in accordance with and as prescribed by a valid
medical precription provided by Amber Tatro. It also is
ORDERED, ANJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs
recover of the Irving Independent School District their dam-
ages in the sum of $1,271, and of the Irving Independent School
District and the State Board of Education, jointly and several-
ly, their reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses in the sum of

68a

$27,231, plus interest on such sums from May 26, 1981, until
finally paid at the rate of 9% per annum. Court costs are taxed
against defendants.

/s/ Patrick E. Higginbotham
PaTRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM
United States District Judge

64a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT.
April 25, 1983.

NO. 81-1454.

Henri and Mary TatTro, Individually,
and as Next Friend of Amber Tatro, A Minor,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants,
v.
The STaTE OF TEXas, et al.,
Defendants,

State Board of Education,
Defendant-Appellant,

The Irving Independent School District,
~ Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.

Parents of handicapped child brought action seeking injunc-
tion requiring school district to provide child with special serv-
ices and to recover compensatory damages and attorney fees.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, Patrick E. Higginbotham, J., 481 F.Supp. 1224, denied
preliminary injunction and appeal was taken. The Court of
Appeals, 625 F.2d 557, vacated and remanded. On remand,
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, Patrick E. Higginbotham, J., 516 F.Supp. 968, entered
injunction requiring school district to provide child with re-
quested special services and authorized award of reasonable
attorney fees to parents, and school board appealed. The Court
of Gee, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) clean in-

catheterization required for handicapped child was

“related service” within meaning of Education of All Handi-
Children Act; (2) school district was required to pro-

with clean intermittent catheterization;

65a

(3) injunction requiring state board to act in supervisory capac-
ity to assure that handicapped child’s individual education
program conformed to Act was proper; and (4) state board’s
violation of Rehabilitation Act supported award of attorney
fees.

Affirmed.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas.

Before BROWN, GEE and JOLLY, Circuit Judges.
GEE, Circuit Judge:

This is Amber Tatro’s second appearance before this court.
The facts and procedural history of her case are reported in
detail in our prior opinion, 625 F.2d 557 (1980) (Tatro J), and in
those of the district court. 516 F.Supp. 968 (1981); 481 F.Supp.
1224 (1979). To aid the reader, we will briefly summarize them
here. Amber is a seven year old gir] afflicted with myelomenin-
gocele, a birth defect commonly known as spina bifida. As a
result of this handicap, she suffers from speech and orthopedic
impediments and a neurogenic bladder. Because this last con-
dition prevents voluntary emptying of the bladder, Amber
must be catheterized several times daily to prevent injury to
her health. The method chosen by Amber’s doctors, the most
widely accepted procedure, is Clean rr Catheteri-
zation (“CIC”).

In early 1979, when Amber was three and one-half years old,
her mother asked the Irving Independent School District
(“school district”) to provide special education for Amber. The
school district agreed, and in a series of meetings with the
Tatros, developed an Individual Education Program (“IEP”)
for Amber as required by the Education of All ped
Children Act (“EAHCA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(19), 1414(aX5)
(1976). The IEP provided for Amber’s placement in the school
district’s Early Childhood Development (“ECD”) classes and
for the provision of various other services to Amber, including
physical and occupational therapy. The IEP did not provide for

66a

CIC and the school district maintained that it had no legal
obligation to administer it.

Amber’s parents next pursued an administrative appeal
from the school district’s decision not to provide CIC. See 20
U.S.C. § 1415 (1976) (setting out procedures). Pursuant to 20
U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2), an impartial hearing officer conducted a
hearing and determined that the EAHCA required the school
district to provide CIC. The Texas Commissioner of Education
adopted the hearing officer’s decision. Amber T., bnf Mary T.
v. Irving Independent School District, TEA Docket No. 115-
SE-579 (August 6, 1979). The Texas State Board of Education
' (“State Board”) reversed the decision of the Commissioner and
hearing officer and reinstated the school board’s decision not to
provide CIC. After thus exhausting state remedies as required
by the EAHCA, the Tatros brought the present action in
federal district court pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1416(e)(2) (1976),
naming the school board, the State Board, and others as
defendants.’

The Tatros contended that the school district violated the
EAHCA by failing to provide Amber with a “free appropriate
public education,” id. § 1412(1), which is defined in part as
“special education and related services.” Jd. § 1401(18). Specif-
ically, they argued that CIC is a “related service” the state
must provide to fulfill its duty to Amber under the EAHCA.
The Tatros also argued that the school district’s refusal to
provide CIC violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 which prohibits discrimination against the handicapped in
federally funded programs. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1981).

The district court denied the Tatros’ motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction to require the school board to provide CIC. 481
F.Supp. at 1229. That court concluded that CIC is not a “re-

'. All defendants save the school board and the State Board were
dismissed by the district court, 516 F.Supp. at 972-73; the Tatros do
not contest these dismissa!s. The propriety of the State Board’s
action is discussed in Part III, infra.

CE ea ee Tk nde AC ce 8k OSE Dh Re a tee ee

67a

lated service” within the meaning of the EAHCA because the
need for it does not arise from the effort to educate Jd. at 1227.
The district court further concluded that section 504’s prohibi-
tion of discrimination does not impose a duty upon the school
board to take affirmative action such as the provision of CIC.
Id. at 1228-29.

The Tatros appealed from the district court’s order, and
based upon facts that were assumed for purposes of the appeal,
this court reversed. Tatro /, 624 F.2d at 558 n. 1, 562. This
’ court held that CIC falls within the literal terms of the statuto-
ry definition of “related services,” which includes “supportive
services. . . as may be required to assist a handicapped child to
benefit from special education.” Jd. at 564 (citing 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(17) (1976)). Because, under the assumed facts, Amber
would be unable to attend ECD classes without provision of
CIC during the school day, this court concluded that CIC was
essential if she was to benefit from special education, and that
CIC was therefore a “related service” in her case. The district
court had thought it necessary to limit the statutory language
to services arising from the effort to educate in the absence of
any evidence of Congressional intent to require provision of life
support services through and education statute. 481 F.Supp.
at 1227. This court concluded that the district court’s limiting
construction of the EAHCA’s literal language was erroneous
because the EAHCA contained its own limitations on the types
of life support services falling within the ambit of “related
services.” 625 F.2d at 562. This court further held that the
school district’s refusal to provide CIC violated section 504.

I. THE EAHCA CLAIM

Were we writing on a clean slate, we would share the district
court’s reluctance to read a statute designed to aid education to
require provision of medical necessities of life which are re-
quired by a child whether or not she participates in the state’s
educational program. Nevertheless, Tatro J is the authorita-
tive interpretation of the EAHCA in this circuit, and under
“law of the case” principles, must be followed by us in this

68a

subsequent appeal “unless (1) the evidence on a subsequent

trial was substantially different, (2) controlling authority has
since made a contrary decision of the icable to such
issues, or (3) the decision was clearly erro would

work a manifest injustice,” White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 432
(5th Cir.1967) (footnote omitted; enumeration added); see
Goodpasture, Inc. v. M/V Pollux, 688 F.2d 1008, 1005-06 (5th
Cir. 1982); United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 593 F.2d 658,
664 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 444 U.S. 918, 100 S.Ct. 234, 62
L.Ed.2d 173 (1979). None of these considerations justifies
departure from Tatro I by this panel.

Although we perhaps would have taken a different view of
the EAHCA upon de novo consideration, we cannot say that
the well-documented Tatro I decision was not also a principled
interpretation of that undeniably Delphic statute. It is not
clearly erroneous and certainly does not work manifest in-
justice. Further, neither the parties’ briefs nor our own re-
search has revealed any supervening authority.? Thus, the
only remaining issue under the EAHCA in this case is whether
the evidence adduced on remand from Tatro I is so different
from the assumed factual basis for that decision that its legal
conclusions no longer apply. The school district argues that
such is the case.

Tatro I did not hold that all life support services are “related
services” under the EAHCA, nor that school districts must

* The school district argues t!:at after Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694
(1981), federal statutes that grant funds to state programs cannot be
read to confer judicially enforceable substantive rights on the pro-
grams’ beneficiaries. This argument misreads Pennhurst, which only
requires that funding statutes must by their terms create such
rights. That the EAHCA creates enforceable rights to “special edu- #
cation and related services” was clearly established in Board of A
Education v. Rowley, U.S. —_, 102 S.Ct. 3084, 3048-49, 78
L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). The issue in the present case is the scope of those *

69a

always provide CIC to children who need it. Derived from the
statute and its regulations were three conditions that must
obtain before a school board must provide services such as
CIC:

+s in vty uh nae fee to any related epihen a all, a
ild must ica so as to require speci uca-
tion. 45 C.F.R. § ita 14 (1979) (comment one); see 20
U.S.C.A. § 1401(1). . . . Second, the life support service
must be geome ot to aid a handicapped child to benefit
from the special education to be provided. See id.
§ 1401(17). Thus, a life support service would not be a
related service if it did not have to be provided during
school hours, but instead could be performed at some
other time. Taird, in order to be a related service, the life
ro jl service must be one which a nurse or other qual-
ified person can perform. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.13(b)(10)
(1979). Excluded from the term “related services” are
those health-related activities which must be performed
by a licensed physician that are not provided “to deter-
mine a child’s medically related icapping condition
which results in the child’s need for ial education and
related services.” Jd. § 121a.13(4). Thus, even under a
literal interpretation of the statutory definition, the types
of life support services needed by a child which can be
related services are limited.

625 F.2d at 562-68 (footnotes omitted).

All parties agree that Amber is handicapped and in need of
special education. The school district argues that the district
court erred in finding the other two Tatro J conditions met in
this case. It is argued first that under Texas law, CIC may not
be performed by a nurse or other qualified person unless a
physician is physically present to control and supervise the
procedure. The argument concludes that such participation by
a physician transforms CIC into “medical treatment” which
the school district need not provide under Tatro I. Id. at 563; 20
U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976) (medical treatment is a related serv-
ice only if provided for diagnostic and evaluation purposes).
The district court, guided by its extensive experience in upply-

70a

ing Texas law, and with the aid of able amicus curiae,’ rejected
the school district’s view of state law. 516 F.Supp. at 975-76.
We cannot say that the district court was wrong.

As the district court found, it has been long settled that
physicians in Texas may prescribe treatment and delegate its
administration to others. Thompson v. Texas State Board of
Medical Examiners, 570 S.W.2d 123, 129-30 (Tex.Civ.App.—
Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); McKinney v. Tromly, 386
S.W.2d 564 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see
‘ also Op.Tex.Atty.Gen. No. WW-1403 (1962). Subsequent to
the district court’s decision on remand, this principle was codi-
fied in Texas’ new Medical Practice Act:

a person licensed to practice medicine shall have the au-
thority to delegate to Mh wae and properly trained
person or persons acting under the physician’s supervision
any medical act which a reasonable and prudent pe eam
eer
to de if, in the opinion o i ysician,
the act can be riyand safely performed by the person
to whom the ical act is delegated and the act is per-
formed in its customary manner, not in violation of any
other statute, and the person does not hold himself out to
the public as being authorized to practice medicine. The

delegating physician shall remain responsible for the med-

ical acts of the person performing the delegated medical
acts.

Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4495b § 3.06(d)(1) (Vernon
Supp. 1982-1983). The Texas Nursing Practice Act defines ad-
ministration of treatments prescribed by a licensed physician
as a “professional nursing act” and hence not unlawful practice
of medicine. Jd., art. 4518 § 5. However, consistent with the
district court’s finding, 516 F.Supp. at 976, the new Medical
Practice Act also allows delegation to any qualified person, not

3. The joint brief of the Texas Medical Association and the Dallas

County Medical Society as amicus curiae is reprinted as an appendix
to the district court’s opinion on remand. 516 F.Supp. at 987.

is
n

;

J
bt
4
B..
ee

Tla

only to nurses. The Medical Practice Act goes on to clarify the
legal status of a physician’s delegatee:

A person to whom a physician has delegated a medical act
to perform is not guilty of practicing medicine without a
license unless the person acts with knowledge that the
delegation and action thereunder is a violation of this Act.

Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4495b § 3.07(i) (Vernon
Supp. 1982-1983).

The Medical Practice Act’s requirement that a physician
supervise those to whom he delegates a medical act has
appeared in a number of prior statutes, and has been construed
by the Texas Attorney General “not [to] require the constant
physical presence of a physician to authorize the performance
of professional nursing acts by one not otherwise licensed to
perform them, so long as the responsible physician personally
assumes control and supervision of the employee or instructs
him in what is to be done, and remains reasonably available to
see that the nursing acts are properly performed.” Op.Tex. At-
ty.Gen. No. H-395 (Sept. 9, 1974). See also Op.Tex. Atty. Gen.
No. H-1295 (Dec. 19, 1978) (nurses may administer treatment
without direct supervision by doctor); Op.Tex. Atty.Gen. No.
H-368 (Aug. 12, 1974) (physical therapy may be administered
pursuant to doctor’s directions without any requirement of
constant physical presence of doctor); Op.Tex.Atty.Gen. No.
H-27 (Apr. 12, 1973) (ambulance attendants not in physical
presence of doctor may provide emergency care if in telephone
communicai.on with him).‘

;

* These interpretations remain good law under the Medical Prac-

No supstantive aA ay ooo prior
re ee mes Ra ofa Ds ho
wien the At ay

wphryorey her rn
te oe eter

Medical Practice Act of 1981, 67th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 1, § 6(c).

72a

We think the prescription and instructions for CIC that the
district court required the Tatros to provide to the school
district fulfill the requirements of Texas law and allow school
district employees legally to administer CIC to Amber.’ We
have fully reproduced these documents in the margin to
emphasize that a shcool district is entilted to require a detailed
prescription and instructions tailored to the particular needs of
each individual child for whom it is asked to provide health-
related services under the EAHCA. It should not be required
to exercise medical discretion. The prescription should make
clear, as Amber’s does, that the child is under the continuing
care of the prescribing physician who will monitor the child’s
continuing need for the services and modify the prescription

5 The school district also was provided with the Tatros’ written
consent to its provision of CIC to Amber. Amber’s doctor’s prescrip-
tion was in letter form as follows:

Mr. John Townley
Irving Independent School District
901 O’Connor Rd.
Irving; Texas . :
. Re: C.1.C. instructions for
Amber Tatro—Prescription

Dear Sir:

Amber Tatro has been placed on a schedule of Clean Intermittent
Catheterization every three to four hours during the waking day.
Amber is to be catheterized at the times listed:

6:30 A.M. 3:30 P.M.
9:30A.M. 6:30 P.M.
12:30 P.M. 9:30 P.M.

If Amber’s diaper is wet at the time for the scheduled catheteriza-
tion, this should be reported to me or Dr. George Hurt at the Spina
Bifida Clinic at The Scottish Rite Hospital as the above schedule may
need to be modified.

A qualified school nurse or other qualified person can perform
C.1.C. and attached to these instructions are the Scottish Rite Hospi-

73a

accordingly. Further, the prescription should identify the cir-
cumstances in which the school district personnel should seek
further guidance from the physician. Since in this case the
school district has been provided these assurarices, we con-

tal instructions for catheterization of a female which are to be fol-
lowed.

A #10 or # 12 catheter should be used to start out.

' The above schedule for catheterization and size of catheter may be
altered upon the direction of myself or Dr. Hurt from time to time
according to Amber’s needs.

If there are any questions, I or Dr. Hurt may be reached through
the Spina Bifida Clinic at Scottish 7 ene

[The doctor’s signature, as t us to expect,
was illegible. venison tes Or oe aan

Name
3/17/81

Date

Attached to the prescription were detailed instructions for adminis-

tration of CIC:

TEXAS SCOTTISH RITE HOSPITAL FOR CRIPPLED CHIL-
DREN INSTRUCTIONS FOR PARENTS ON
CATHETERIZATION OF FEMALE

Purpose:

To completely empty the bladder at scheduled intervals in order to

decrease the incidence of urinary tract infection.

Urine that stays stagnant in the bladder is more likely to become

infected. A bladder that stays full becomes enlarged and thickened.

Scheduled emptying of the bladder allows the patient to become

familiar with the difference in the sensation of a full bladder and an

empty bladder.

Equipment Needed:

Clean catheter, metal or rubber. (Metal is best since it can be boiled

repeatedly without deterioration.)

Soap and water.

7 bi 4 : ~ eat 2 ’
ne 7 a as an St hen Fata et hee We i gap

: oe.
bhigs\ fou

‘da

cluded that the requirement of Tatro J that CIC be a service
that a nurse or other qualified person can perform is satisified.

The school district’s second argument is that CIC is not a
related service in Amber’s case because it is not “required to
assist [her] to benefit from special education.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(17) (1976); Tatro I, 525 F.2d at 563. The school district
does not contest the district court’s finding, consistent with the
facts assumed in Tatro J, that CIC is required for Amber to
attend the school district’s half-day ECD classes. 516 F.Supp.
at 977. Rather, it contends for the first time in its reply brief in
this appeal that the ECD classes themselves are not necessary
for Amber to benefit from special education. -

The EAHCA defines “special education” as “specially de-
signed instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet

Dish to catch the urine, for example, a re-usable jar.
Large underpad, to prevent soaking bed linens.
General Instructions:

1. Wash hands with soap and water.

2. Get all of the equipment ready.
‘8. Get child ready. (If possible, put at table height since it is easier
to do this procedure at this height.) Place child on her back.

4. Spread labia apart with one hand and wash genitalia with soap
and water with the other hand, always moving in a downward direc-
tion. (Never wash in an upward direction since this will move germs
from around the rectum up into the area of the bladder opening.)
5. Insert catheter in urethra and let all urine drain out of the
bladder. This may take longer than you think, so do not remove
catheter until the urine has stopped draining. r
6. Ifyou are unable to catheterize, contact your local Public Health
Nurse or call Texas Scottish Rite Hospital. :

7. Discard urine.

8. Clean catheter. Clean with soap and warm water after each use.
Allow to dry and place in a clean, dry envelope.

At least once a day after the catheter has been washed with soap and
water, place it in a pot of water and boil for 20 minutes. Allow the
catheter to air dry and place it in a clean dry envelope.

T5a

the unique needs of a handicapped child, including classroom
instruction, instruction in physical education, home instruc-
tion, and instruction in hospitals and institutions.” 20 U.S.C.
$1401(16) (1976). The school district contends that before Am-
ber is entitled to CIC, she must allege and prove that she could
not benefit from special education provided to her by the school
district at home or in another institution where CIC is already
being provided. If she could benefit from special education in
these alternatives placements, the argument goes, provision of
CIC by the school district would not be required to fulfill the
requirements of the EAHCA. We cannot agree that the Tatros
must make such a showing in this case.

In its first case considering the EAHCA, the Supreme Court —

recently held that the statute provides a “basic floor of oppor-
tunity” consisting of personalized instruction and related serv-
ices designed to enable handicapped children to benefit from
education. Board of Education v. Rowley, __. U.S. —_,
——, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3048, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). Although
the state is accorded wide discretion to choose educational
means, id. 102 S.Ct. at 3051-52, and need not maximaze each
child’s potential, id. 102 S.Ct. at 3048, the required instruction
and related services must meet certain standards. “Such in-
struction and services must be provided at public expense,
must meet the State’s educational standards, must approxi-
mate the grade levels used in the State’s regular education,
and must comport with the child’s IEP.” Id. 102 S.Ct. at 3049
(emphasis added). Similarly, the regulations under the
EAHCA require that each handicapped child’s placement be
based upon his or her IEP. 34 C.F.R. § 300.552(a)(2) & (b)
(1982).

The EAHCA provides that each handicapped child’s IEP
will be jointly developed by the school officials, the child’s
teacher, his or her parents and, when appropriate, the child. 20
U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1976). The IEP is the educational blueprint
that specifies how the child is to be taught, sets goals and
determines how progress is to be measured. Id.; see Helms v.
McDaniel, 657 F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied 455

76a

U.S. 946, 102 S.Ct. 1443, 71 L.Ed.2d 658 (1982). As such, the
IEP is the primary vehicie for implementing the requirements
of the EAHCA. In requiring that special education and related
services be provided in conformity with a child’s IEP, the
Supreme Court recognized the central role played by the IEP
in a statutory scheme like the EAHCA, which has placed
primary responsibility for formulating handicapped children’s
education in the hands of state and local school agencies in
cooperation with each child’s parents. Rowley, 102 S.Ct. at
1051-52; McDaniel, 657 F.2d at 802.:

Amber’s IEP explicitly calls for her placement i in the school
district’s ECD classes. See Plaintiffs’ Proprosed Stipulation of
Facts, exhibit A.’ The IEP states that its justification for
characterizing this setting as the most appropriate as well as
the least restrictive is that “(testing indicates the need for
{Early Childhood] placement,” Jd. Moreover, the “instruction-_
al/learning strategies” established by Amber’s IEP inelude
provision for a “structured atmosphere,” immediate feedback
and “small group instruction,” id., all of which are consistent
with ECD placement.

We are convinced that the central role of the IEP in the
educational scheme ‘contemplated by the EAHCA and in the
standard of review developed in Rowley gives rise to a
presumption in favor of the educational placement estabished
by Amber’s IEP. Moreover, because the IEP is jointly de-
veloped by the school district and the parents, fairness re-
quires that the party attacking its terms should bear the bur-
den of showing why the educational setting established by the
IEP is not appropriate. Since the school district has not even
attempted to do so, its argument must be rejected and we need
not reach the thorny issue of what circumstances might call for
judicial modification of an IEP. See Rowley, 102 S.Ct. at 3061 :
(setting out general standard of review).' In Amber’scase,by = =

do not place an undue burden on the school district; the IEPis %
not etched in stone. The EAHCA and its attendant regulations
provide for periodic review and modification of IEP’s by school

Tla

virtue of the provisions of her IEP, the “special education”
required by the EAHCA consists of her participation in the
school district’s ECD classes.’ Since the district court found as
a fact that provision of CIC during the school day is necessary
for Amber to attend ECD classes, and since that finding has
not been shown to be clearly erroneous, CIC is therefore
“required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special
education” and is a “related service” under the EAHCA. 20
U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976); Tatro I, 625 F.2d at 563. The school
district must provide it to Amber Tatro. :

II, THE SECTION 504 CLAIM AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES

The EAHCA does not provide for attorneys’ fees awards.
The district court awarded attorneys’ fees to the Tatros under
section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1972, as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 794a(b) (Supp. V 1981), which authorizes such awards
to prevailing parties in actions to enforce provisions of the

authorities and parents. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(4), 1414(a)(5) (1976); 34

v C.F.R. § 300.343(d) (1982).
?The school district also asserted in its reply brief that ECD
classes are for handicapped students only. The court in Tatro J
apparently assumed that ECD classes also included nonhandicapped
children because it rested its decision in part upon its conviction that
Amber’s exclusion from ECD classes would violate the “mainstream-
ing” mandate of the EAHCA. 625 F.2d at 563. The statute requires
¢ that “to the maximum extent appropriate,” handicapped children will
De non-handicapped children, and that removal of
from regular classes will occur only when their
handicaps cannot be accommodated by “supplementary aids and
services.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (1976); Rowley, 102 S.Ct. at 3049. The
record does not clearly establish whether, in fact, the school district’s

8
am
ig
by

>

78a

Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seg. (1976). Tatro I had
held that section 504 of that Act imposed an obligation on the
school district to provide CIC to Amber. 624 F.2d at 564-65.
The school district now argues that the Supreme Court’s sub-
sequent decision in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 57 L.Ed. 2d 594 (1981)
precludes a finding that section 504 imposed such affirmative
duties on state agenices, and that therefore, no Rehabilitation
Act violation has been established to sean an er fees
award.°

In Pinitinies; the a Court was asked to decide
whether section 6010 of the Developmentally Disabled Assist-
ance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.’ § 6010, conferred en-
forceable substantive rights on the beneficiaries of the Act. In
deciding that it did not, the Court referred to Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 60
L.Ed.2d 980 (1979), its only major case involving section 504,
as illustrating the failure of the lower court.

to recognize the well-settled distinction between Con-

ional “encouragement” of state programs and the
ae of binding obligations on the States... . . Rely-
ing on that distinction, this Court in. Southeastern Com-
munity College v. Davis, por pa te 397, 60 L. Ed.2d 980, 99
S.Ct. 2361 (1979), rejected a claim that § 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973, which bars discrimination against
handicapped persons in federally funded programs, obli-

8 As the district court correctly observed, the question whether
Section 504 imposes affirmative obligations on the states is logically
antecedent to the question of whether such obligations are enforce-
able by an implied right of action. 516 F Supp. at 984. If such obliga-
tions exist after Pennhurst, there is a private right of action to
enforce them in this circuit. Helms v. McDaniel, 657 F.2d 800, 806 n.
10 (5th Cir. 1981) cert. denied 455 U.S. 946, 102 S.Ct. 1443, 71
L.Ed.2d 658 (1982); Baker v. Bell, 630 F.2d 1046, 1055 (5th Cir.
1980); Tatro I, supra (implicit); see also Camenisch v. University of
Texas, 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated as moot, 451 U.S. 390,
101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981).

79a

men schools to take affirmative steps to eliminate prob-

ems raised by an applicant’s hearing disability. Finding

that “state agencies such as Southeastern are only ‘en-

yam a . . . to adopt and implement such policies and

»” Id., at 410, 60 L.Ed.2d 980, 99 S.Ct. 2361

f5369] (quoting the Act), we stressed [that] “Congress

understood [that] accommodation of the needs of handi-

capped individuals may require affirmative action and

knew how to provide for it in those instances where it

wished to do so.” Jd., at 411, 60 L.Ed.2d 980, 99 S.Ct. 2361

[2369]. )

451 U.S. at 27, 101 S.Ct. at 1544-45, 67 L.Ed.2d at 713 (citation
omitted).

Although Pennhurst reinforced the district court’s doubts
that section 504 requires provision of CIC, the court concluded
that the Supreme Court had not spoken with sufficient clarity
to allow it to depart from prior decisions of this court squarely
on point. 516 F.Supp. at 985. As a single panel of the court, we
find ourselves similarly constrained. Tatro J, binding upon us
to the extent that it is law of the case, clearly held that CIC is
within section 504’s nondiscrimination mandate. 625 F.2d at
564. Moreover, two other panels of our court have held that
states must take some affirmative action to provide “services
and accomodations” under section 504, notwithstanding the
Davis decision. Majors v. Housing Authority, 652 F.2d 454,
457 (5th Cir.1981); Camenisch v. University of Texas, 616
F.2d 127 (5th Cir.1980). Although Camenisch, relied upon in
Tatro I, was vacated as moot without reaching the merits ofthe
section 504 issue, 451 U.S. 390, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175
(1981), Majors remains good law in our circuit. A recent deci-
sion of a sister circuit has reached the same result. New Mexico
Ass’n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847 (10th
Cir. 1982).

As we have seen, a prior decision does not bind us as law of
the case if it is supervened by ccntrolling authority. White v.
Murtha, supra. Similarly, the general rule that one panel of
our court does not overrule:another panel does not prevent us
from overriding a prior decision “based entirely on [a] theory”

80a

subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court. Hanson v.
Town of Flower Mound, 679 F.2d 497, 501 (5th Cir.1982). We
do not think Pennhurst goes so far. In Majors, this court
recognized that Davis generally disapproved of affirmative
action requirements under section 504. 652 F.2d at 456. How-
ever, the court went on to emphasize the following caveat from
Davis:

We do not suggest that the line between a lawful refusal to
extend affirmative action and illegal discrimination
against handicapped persons always will be clear. It: is
possible to pone situations where an insistence on con-
tinuing past nmr te and dnd anes might arbitrarily

deprive genuinely qualified persons of the
opportunity to participate i ina yr pla . Techno-
logical advances can be expected to pan etm, re opportunities

to rehabilitate the handicapped or otherwise to qualify
them for some useful employment. Such advances also
= enable attainment of these goals without im

ue financial an administrative burdens upon a
Thus, situations may arise where a refusal to Sediy on
existing Pp might become unreasonable and dis-
criminatory. Identification of those instances where a re-
fusal to accommodate the needs of a disabled person

ee Ee ee
tinues to be an important responsibility of
Davis, 442 U.S. at 412-13, 99S.Ct. at 2370; Majors, 652 F.2d at
456. This court concluded, as had the panels in Camenisch and
Tatro I, that where a plaintiff, unlike the plaintiff in Davis,
could receive the full benefits of a state program if reasonable
accomodations were provided, refusal to provide them would
constitute discrimination and would not fall within the Davis
affirmative action exception. Majors, 652 F.2d at 457-58; Tatro
I, 625 F.2d at 564; Camenisch, 616 F.2d at 132-33; accord, New
Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, supra.

Although Pennhurst undoubtedly emphasized the compo-
_ nent of the Davis decision that disapproved judicial recognition
of affirmative obligations under section 504, it did not overrule
the portion of Davis relied upon in our earlier decisions. Pen-
nhurst therefore forms an insufficient basis upon which to —
justify a departure from prior law by this panel.

8la

The school board’s additional objections to its liability under
section 504 are groundless and merit little discussion. The
district court found that given our prior decision that refusal to
provide CIC is discriminatory under section 504, Amber had
been thereby excluded from a “program of activity receiving
federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1981);
516 F.Supp. at 977 n. 17. That finding, necessary to establish a
cause of action under section 504, is amply supported by the
record.’ The school board’s other suggested errors are likewise
refuted by the record.

Ill, THE STATE BOARD

The district court enjoined the school board and State Board
to “modify the Individual Education Program of Amber Tatro
to include the provision” of CIC. Upon the motion of the school
district, the court’s original judgment was amended to hold the
State Board jointly and severally liable with the school board
for attorneys’ fees. The State Board argues that it should not
have been included in the injunction and that it is not liable for
attorney’s fees.

The EAHCA places primary responsibility for development
and revision of IEP’s upon local school boards. 20 U.S.C:
§ 1414(aX(5) (1976). The state educational agency, here the
State Board, is given supervisory responsibility to assure that
local agencies carry out their responsibilities. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(6) (1976). The State Board argues that the district court
erred in ordering it to modify Amber’s IEP because the
EAHCA places that duty on the local school board. The State

* See Tatro v. Texas, No. CA-3-79-1281-G (N.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 1981)
(unpublished memorandum opinion) in which after entry of the judg-
ment below, the district court afforded the school board an opportun-
ity to reopen the record to rebut the school superintendent’s con-
cession that the school district received federal assistance for pro-
grams from which Amber had been excluded. The record reveals no
attempt by the school district to do so.

82a

Board’s argument is based on an unduly scholastic reading of
the district court’s judgment. Although the words of the judg-
ment standing alone perhaps suggest that the State Board
should itself engage in the revision of Ami er’s IEP, the district
court’s opinion makes clear that the State Board has only been
enjoined to act in the supervisory capacity required of it by the
EAHCA. 516 F.Supp. at 972 (“Because the State Board of
Education has supervisory responsibilities for assuring that
Amber is educated in accordance with the EAHCA ... the
members. . . will be retained in their official capacities for the
purpose of injunctive relief.”). See Kruelle v. New Castle
County School District, 642 F.2d 687, 697 (3d Cir. 1981) (in-
terpreting district court's order to state agency to require only
the supervisory action contemplated by the EAHCA); see also
S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 454 U.S.
1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981). The State Board
need only “assure” that Amber’s IEP conforms to the EAHCA
as interpreted by this court. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(6) (1976). Given
the State Board’s prior action preventing administration of
CIC in Amber’s case, it was within the district court’s discre-
tion to enjoin the State Board to fulfill its statutory duty in
order to insure complete prospective relief to the plaintiffs.

The State Board’s second argument is that even if it was
properly enjoined under the EAHCA, the district court did not
make a specific finding that it had violated section 504 and that
it was therfore improper for the district court to hold it liable
for attorneys’ fees under the Rehabilitation Act. We have held
already that under Tatro / the district court properly held that
by refusing to provide CIC, the school board denied Amber the
benefits of a federally assisted program or activity in violation
of section 504. The record established that after the school
board’s decision not to provide CIC was reversed by an inde-
pendent hearing officer and the state Commissioner of Educa-
tion, the State Board acted to reinstate the school board’s
original decision. See Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 5a and attachments
(Order of the State Board of Education, Sept. 8, 1979). That
action, Which the State Board does not deny that it took, had

83a

the effect of denying the benefits of a federally funded program
to Amber Tatro just as the school board’s action had. For the
same reasons, the State Board’s action violated section 504 and
supported an award of attorneys’ fees under section 505."

For the reasons we have stated, the judgment of the district
court is in all respects AFFIRMED.

© The district court found that an attorneys’ fees award against the
State Board was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Tatro v.
Texas, No. CA-3-79-1281-G (N.D.Tex. Sept. 8, 1981) (unpublished
memorandum opinion). The State Board has not appealed that de-
cision; however it has suggested that its action reversing the deci-
sions of the hearing officer and Commissioner of Education was taken
in its judicial capacity and is entitled to immunity on that basis. We
need not decide whether judicial immunity might bar attorneys’ fees
awards under § 505, see Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers
Union, 446 U.S. 719, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980), because
this court has held that the EAHCA denies to state educational
agencies the judicial power to review the decisions of an independent
hearing officer. Helms v. McDaniel, 657 F.2d 800, 805-06 & n. 9 (5th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 946, 102 S.Ct. 1443, 71 L.Ed.2d 658
ee ee ee

Sda

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.

NO. 81-1454.

Henri and Mary TatTro, Individually,
and as Next Friend of Amber Tatro, A Minor,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants,
. &
The State or Texas, et al.,
Defendants,

State Board of Education,
Defendant-Appellant,

The Irving Independent School District,
Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.

Appeal From The United States District Court For The
Northern District Of. Texas

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
JUL 5 1988

GILBERT F. GANUCHEAU
CLERK

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTION FOR
REHEARING EN BANC
(Opinion 4/25/83, 5 Cir., 198_, __ F.2d __).
(JULY 5, 1983)
Before BROWN, GEE and JOLLY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

( ) The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED and no member
of this panel nor Judge in regular active service on the Court

85a

having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en

banc, (Rule 35 Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; Local

Fifth Circuit Rule 16) the Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc is
“ DENIED.

( ) The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED and the Court
having been polled at the request of one of the members of the
Court and a majority of the Circuit Judges who are in regular
active service not having voted in favor of it, (Rule 35 Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure; Local Fifth Circuit Rule 16) the
Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc is also DENIED.

( ) A member of the Court in active service having re-
quested a poll on the reconsideration of this cause en banc, and
a majority of the judges in active service not having voted in
favor of it, rehearing en banc is DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

/e/ 2777?
United State Circuit Judge

CLERK’S NOTE:

SEE RULE 41 FRAP AND LOCAL
RULE 17 FOR STAY OF THE
MANDATE

86a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. CA-3-79-1281-G

HENRI and Mary TatTro, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
a

STATE OF TEXAS, et al.,
Defendants.

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FILED

MAY 26 1981

JOSEPH McELROY, JR. CLERK

By JosePH MEELROY, JR. \
Deputy

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Amber Tatro is a 3% year old female suffering from myel-
omenengocele, commonly referred to as spina bifida. As a
result of this handicap, Amber not only suffers from orthopedic
and speech impediments, but also from what is called a
neurogenic bladder. Because of the neurogenic bladder condi-
tion, she must be “catheterized” approximately every three of
four hours each day, the method of choice being Clean In-
termittent Catherization (“CIC”). This procedure involes
washing a little metal tube, the catheter, insertingthecatheter .
in the bladder to allow the urine to drain out, pulling the
catheter out, and then wiping the bladder region. This proce-
dure can be performed by laymen after proper training, but
because of the child’s age, she is unable to perform CIC upon
herself. This suit is rooted in the decision of the Irving Inde-

87a

pendent School District that were Amber to attend its early
childhood development program, the school would not provide
CIC to Amber during her school day.

Henri and Mary Tatro, individually and as next friend of
Amber Tatro, brought this action for injunctive relief and
money damages against the State of Texas, the State Board of
Education, the Texas Education, the Texas Education Agen-
cy, the Board of Trustees for the Irving Independent School
District, andJ. F. Townley, individually, as Superintendent of
the Irving Independent School District. Plaintiffs allege that
provision of CIC to Amber is required by the Education of All
Haridicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401, et seg., the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and the stated
policy of the Irving Independent School District, Treatment of
Students by School Personnel, Policy No. 5157. Plaintiffs have
applied for a preliminary injunction ordering defendants to
provide catheterization for Amber during the pendency of this
suit. Defendant Townley filed a motion to dismiss the com-
plaint as against him.

A parent is indeed a “hostage to fate.” Caring for a child
under the best of circumstances taxes financial and emotional
reserves—here, most heavily. Amber’s plight tugs at the
heartstrings, and given the relative rarity of spina bifida, there
is a temptation to here achieve a “humane” result. Despite the
limited number of times school boards may be faced with a child
requiring CIC, the interpretation of these federal statutes has
wide consequences because it involves definitions of the duty of
hundreds of school districts to be discharged in myriad factual
patterns. The limits on this court’s institutional role here gives
little play for this court’s humanitarian concern for Amber and
her parents. This court instead is called on to engage in the
relatively emotionally barren task of providing the interstitial
stuffing to acts of Congress against a background of its intent
and purpose in enactment. Doing so, the court concludes that
the application for preliminary injunction must be denied and

88a

the motion to dismiss the complaint as against Townley must
be granted. '

To assist the states in educating the handicapped, federal
grants are made available to them under the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act. Grants are conditional on the
states establishing “a policy that assures all handicapped chil-
dren the right to a free appropriate public education.” 20
U.S.C. § 1412(1). See also, Lora v. Board of Education of City
of New York, 456 F.Supp. 1211, 1226 (E.D. N.Y. 1978); 20
U.S.C. §§ 1414(a)(6)-(7). Plaintiffs assert that the Act is to be
interpreted in this case as requiring provision of CIC to
Andrea, This court disagrees.

Free appropriate public education is statutorily defined as
“special education” and “related services” which meet certain
requirements. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18). Plaintiffs assert that the
provision of CIC to Amber is a related service. The term
“related service” is defined as:

.. . transportation, and such snk cocyaranns corrective,
and other supportive services (including speech pathology
and audiology, pboweas 0 services, physical and occu-
pational therapy, recreation, and medical and counseling
pnb except - such medical prt 9. shall “4 for
diagnostic and evaluation purposes as may be re-
quired to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special
education, and includes the early identification and assess-
ment of handicapping conditions in children.

20 U.S.C. § 1401(17).

Free appropriate public education refers to special educa-
tion and related services which meet various conditions. The
services required to be provided must be “related” to the
special education. Amber suffers from a physical condition
which unfortunately necessitates that she receive CIC every

' While no legal duty is owed by the District and the other defend-
ants, one hopes that they will, out of compassion within the limits of
their institutions, attempt to ease the burdens on Amber’s parents.

: Ps

89a

three or four hours. CIC is required whether or not she is
attending school. CIC is not any more related to “special edu-
cation” than other requisite to her existence, such as food or
water. Provision of CIC, unlike such listed “relates services”
as “special pathology and audiology, psychological services,
physical and occupational therapy, [and] recreation,” is not
directly related to the provision of “special education.”

The definition of “related services” has only two categories:
(1) transportation as may be required top assist a handicapped
child to benefit from special education, and (2) supportive
services as may be required to assist a handicapped child to
benefit from special education. The transportation provision is
not applicable and while it makes possible the continued health
of Amber, CIC does not enhance the benefits of a particular
form of special education. If CIC be deemed a medical service,
it would stillnot be a medical service for “diagnostic and evalua-
tion purposes.” CIC is not developmental or corrective.

CIC is supportive of Amber’s education in the sense that it is
required at sufficiently frequent intervals that her education
and CIC must proceed apace. One can argue that read literally,
every necessary life support system must be furnished. But
the court has found no congressional intent to sweep broadly in
its usage of the word “related.” Instead the court finds that to
be related in the statutory sense the service requirement must
arise from the effort to educate. There is a difference between
maintenance of life systems and enhancing a handicapped per-
son’s ability to learn. The CIC is essential to Amber’s life but
once that life maintenance service is provided, it is unrelated to

her learning skills.

This court has not been presented with any evidence in the
legislative hisotry which would indicate that the term “related

: services” can be construed as broadly as plaintiffs urge. To the
contrary, the languge used while evincing a broad purpose
carefully limits the means of achieving the. For example, medi-
cal services while illustrated by a listing of a variety of services
is carefully limited to diagnostic and evaluation purposes. That

:
‘

4 hte Nias 19

ee Bee ED te Se OY

90a

qualification is inconsistent with finding a congressional intent
to furnish all support services needed by persons during school
not because of the schooling but because that care is always
required. The notion of related services as being those services
that make more beneficial the special education being provided
was contained even in the original Senate Bill; the term “re-
lated services” was originally defined as:

. transportation, developmental, corrective, and
sup) — services (specifi ny ineluding at least speech
gy an —ee a ological services, counsel-

ing te Fo physica cons ronson therapy, and
recreation) necessary for a han child to fully
benefit from special dues, 2 ~ including early
identification and assessment of handicapping conditions
in — and provision of such services to such children.

(Emphasis added). S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., Ist Sess.,
reprinted in [1975] U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 1424, 1466.

Plaintiffs point to regulations implementing 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(17) which include among “related services,” “school
health services.” The regulation in turn define the latter as
“services provided by a qualified school nurse or other qual-
ified person. . .,” 45 C.F.R. § 121a.18(b)(10) (1978). Because
CIC’s can be performed by nurses, plaintiffs argue it is a
permissible “school health service.”

But the statute does not require provision of CIC, and the
implementing regulation obviously can only implement duty; it
cannot create duty. Nevertheless, we examine this argument
to correct a possible misinterpretation of these delphic regula-
tions. Though § 121a.13(10) on its face purports to define

“school health services,” looking at it closely should make it
clear that it is not a complete definition. After all, “services
provided by a qualified school nurse or other qualified person”
covers an enormous array of services having nothing to do with
the education of handicapped children. Section 121a.13(a) of
the regulations defines “related services” as:

tion such corrective,
ora Seas

9la

handicapped child to benefit from special education, and
includes speech pathology and audiology, psychological
services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation,
early iden tion and assessment of disabilities in chil-
dren, counseling services, and medical services for di-
ostic or evaluation purposes. The term also includes
ool health services, social work services in schools, and
parent counseling and training.

The most logical interpretation of the regulations is that
“school health services” mean those services which not only
meet the requirements of § 121a.13(b)(10) but also are “related
services” as defined in the first sentence of § 121a.13(a). The
_ definition in the statute. It follows that provision of CIC cannot
be a “related service” by the terms of the regulations. And thus

provision of CIC here is not a “school health service.”

Plaintiffs also allege violation of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, specifically, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Section 794 provides in
part: .

No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the
United States, as defined in section 707(7) of the title,
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
the —— on in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance or under any pro-
or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by
e United States Postal Service.

Plaintiffs allege that defendants, in refusing to provide CIC to
Amber, are effectively denying Amber the benefits of, and
effectively excluding Amber from a federally-funded program

and so are violating § 794.

The court finds otherwise even assuming that plaintiffs have
a right of action under this Act. Here the defendants are
merely refusing to affirmatively provide catheterization. The
Rehabilitation Act cannot be interpreted as requiring a school
to furnish catheterization that Amber would need regardless
whether she is taking advantage of any educational programs
or not. Plaintiffs assert that local defendants with the agree-
ment of state defendants “have refused to provide

92a

[catheterization]. No alternative was given to Amber’s parents
other than for one of them to attend to Amber’s needs during
the school day.” Brief for Plaintiffs at 10. The latter half of this
assertion is ambig ous. In light of the complaint, the plaintiffs’
brief taken as a whole, plaintiffs’ proposed stipulation of facts,
and a conference held in chambers, the most reasonable in-
terpretation of that assertion is that Amber’s participation in
the program is conditioned on either her parents or her par-
ents’ agents providing catheterization. This is simply the
corollary to the decision to not provide CIC to Amber, and is
permissible under the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiffs cannot
convert a statute prohibiting discrimination in certain gov-
ernmental programs to a statute requiring, in essence, the
setting up governmental health care for people seeking to

participate in such programs.

Analysis of the regulations which implement both the Reha-
bilitation Act and the Education Act leads to the same con-
clusion. Section 84.33 of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions requires certain provision of free appropriate public edu-
cation. The definition of appropriate public education is analo-
gous to that definition in the Education Act, appropriate edu-
cation here being composed of “regular or special education”
and related “aids and services.” 45 C.F.R. § 84.33(b) (1978).
The relatedness requirement would prevent provision of CIC
here as well. In addition, plaintiffs cannot rely on a require-
ment that defendants provide “nonacademic and extracur-
ricular services and activities in such manner as is necessary to
afford handicapped students an equal opportunity for partici-
pation in such services and activities.” 45 C.F.R. § 84.37(a)(1)
(1978). Though nonacademic and extracurricular services and
activities may include health services, the connection between
provision of CIC and an equal opportunity to participate in
nonacademic and extracurricular services is far from clear to
this court.

Plaintiffs also argue that provision of CIC by the Irving
Independent School District would be the provision of a life-
saving service, already authorized by its policy number 5157,

98a

Treatment of Students By School Personnel. Section B of the
policy states:
B. Hypodermic injections may be given at school, but
only on an emergency (life saving) basis. For example: for

individuals who are highly allergic to insect bites, diabetes
or other conditions this shall be done under the following

The use of the word “emergency” would preclude regular CIC
“injections.” Moreover, catheterizations are not “injections.”

Defendant Townley’s motion to dismiss as to him is granted:

and plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.

/s/ Patrick E. Higginbotham
PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

94a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT.
Sept. 2, 1980.

No. 81-1069.

Henri and Mary TaTro, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.

The STATE OF TEXAS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

Parents of child with neurogenic bladder condition caused by
myelomeningocele brought action against school district for
alleged violation of Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975 and Rehabilitation Act of 1973 arising from failure
to include scheduling of clean instrument catheterization in the
child’s individual education plan. The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas, Patrick E. Higgin-
botham, J., 481 F.Supp. 1224, entered judgment denying par-
ents’ motion or preliminary injunction, and appeal was taken.
The Court of Appeals, Goldberg, Circuit Judge, held that: (1)
clean instrument catheterization necessary for the child to be
able to be present in classroom at all was “supportive service”
required to assist handicapped child to benefits from special
education for purposes of Education for All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act of 1975, and thus clean instrument catheterization
was “related service” for purposes of provision of the Act
mandating that recipients of federal funds must assure all
handicapped children right to special education and related
services, and ‘2) failure to include in individualized education
plan devised for the child schedule of clean instrument
catheterization violated provision of Rehabilitation Act of 1973
mandating that no otherwise qualified handicapped individual
shall be excluded from participation in or be subjected to

-

95a
discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance by reason of his handicap.
Vacated and remanded.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Texas.

Before GOLDBERG, TATE, and SAM D. JOHNSON, Cir-
cuit Judges.

GOLDBERG, Circuit J udge: |
Amber Tatro is a four-year-old child who suffers from sialas

meningocele, a birth defect commonly known as spina bifida.’

' We caution that we recite the “facts” here only to place the case in
context and that we really have no facts to speak of. Following a
conference between the parties and the district court, the court
invited stipulated facts. Plaintiffs submitted their proposed stipula-
tion; defendants failed to respond. Instead of compelling such a
response or making its own findings, the district court issued a
memorandum opinion denying plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary
injunction. Thus, we have no findings upon which to rely for our
review.

Obviously, the preferable course would have been for the district
court to find facts so that its disposition of plaintiffs’ motion would be
more fully amenable to appellate review. Nevertheless, we are riot
powerless on this appeal. Since the district court’s denial of plaintiffs’
motion for a preliminary injunction rested on its legal interpretation
of the Acts under consideration, we can review the district court’s
legal conclusion. Furthermore, in order to provide meaningful guid-
ance to the district court for its consideration of plaintiffs’ motion on
remand, we shall assume that the facts, which we detail in this
opinion and base on plaintiffs’ proposal, are true. On remand, of
course, the district court should make the appropriate findings. Ifthe
district court finds the facts to be different from those we state, it
must then determine whether these factual deviations are material
80 as to alter the conclusion we reach.

Additionally, since the district court denied plaintiffs’ motion on
the ground that there was no likelihood of success on the merits, we
shall discuss only that factor for a preliminary injunction. On remand,

96a

As a result of this congenital defect, Amber suffers from
orthopedic and speech handicaps and from a neurogenic blad-
der. This latter condition prevents Amber from being able to
empty her bladder voluntarily. As a result, Amber must be
catheterized every three to four hours in order to function
normally without the danger of developing chronic kidney
infection.

In 1979, Amber became eligible for participation in the early
childhood development program provided by defendant Irving
Independent School District (“the school district”). After a
series of meetings with Amber’s mother, the school district’s

Admission, Review and Dismissal Committee developed an -

Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) for Amber as required
by the Education for All Hxndicapped Children Act of 1975
(“the EAHCA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5).* The IEP stipulates

the district court should consider the other relevant critevia, to-wit,
the irreparable harm to plaintiffs from failure to issue the injunction,
the harm to the defendant from issuance of the injunction, and the
public interest. See Canal Authority v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567 (5th
Cir. 1974). For its consideration of these factors, we direct the
district court’s particular attention to our recent decision in Came-
nisch v. University of Texas, 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980).

*20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(a)X(5) (West 1978), provides the following:

(a) A local educational or an intermediate education-
al unit which desires to ve nts under section 1411(d)
of this title for any fiscal year submit an application to the
appropriste Stabe edmedionsl cumin. Gate j shall—

(5) provide assurances that the local educational or

intermediate educational unit will establish, or revise,

whichever is , an individualized education
gram for cach Lantcnpped shld ot the beghantng of teat
school year and will then review and, if appropriate revise, its
poevislean periodically, but not less than annually.

An individualized education program is defined as

or supervise the provision of, specially instruction to

97a

that physical and speech therapy is to be provided to Amber.
However, the IEP fails to specify the provicion of any services
to Amber that may be necessary due to her neurogenic blad-
der. More particularly, the IEP fails to specify that Clean
Intermittent Chatheterization (CIC) will be administered to
Amber during the school day.’

Following the fruitless pursuit of the state remedies re-
quired by the EAHCA,‘ Amber’s parents, plaintiffs, sued in

meet the unique needs of handica children, the teacher, the
parents or guardian of such child, and, whenever appropriate,

such child, which statement shall include (A) a statement of the .

present levels of educational performance of such child, (B) a

statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional
objectives, (C) a statement of the specific educational services to
be provided to such child, and the extent to which such child will

be ‘able to pate in regular educational programs, (D) the
projected ite fe initiation and anticipated duration of such
pbs and (E) ot objective criteria and evaluation

rocedures and schedules for determining, on at least an annual
basis, whether instructional objectives are being achieved.

Id. § 1401(19).

5CIC is a very simple procedure which can be performed within
five minutes. The catheter is washed with soap and water; the
urethral area is wiped clear.; the catheter is introduced approximate-
ly one and one-half inches into the urethra and the bladder contents
drained; the catheter is withdrawn; and the amount of urine collected
is measured and noted. The procedure can be taught to anyone after a
training session of approximately thirty minutes, and it need not be
performed by a doctor or nurse. Currently, Amber is catheterized at
home by her parents, teenage sibling, and babysitter. However,
when Amber is eight or nine years-old, she will be able to perform
CIC upon herself.

‘These procedures are detailed in 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(aX(c) (West
1978):
(a) Any ee educational fermedite edvattnal tn y local educational

agency, and unit which receives
seein ual Ghee and maintain

bs cosevdnaee enh abneinte subsection
e) of this section to assure that and their
parents or are guaranteed procedural safeguards with

98a

res to the provision of free appropriate public education by
su

agencies and units.
(bX1) The procedures required by this section shall include,

but shall not be limited to—

(A) an opportunity for the parents or guardian of a handi-
capped child to examine all relevant records with respect to
the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of
the child, and the provision of a free appropriate public educa-
tion to such child, and to obtain an independent educational
evaluation of the child;

(B) procedures to the rights of the child whenever
the parents or ian of the are not known, unavail-
able, or the child is 2 ward of the State, including the assi

ment of an individual (who shall not be an employee of the
State educational agency, local educational agency, or in-
termediate educational unit involved in the education or care
of the child) to act as a surrogate for the parents or guardian.

(C) written prior notice to the parents or guardian of the

child whenever such agency or unit—

(i) proposes to initiate or change, or

(ii) refuses to initiate or the identification, evalua-
nt of th

tion, or educational placeme e child or the provision of a
free appropriate public education to the child;

(D) procedures desi to assure that the notice i
or _sreeetaras eaten tnceng Sad So'satas sognind

nts’ or ’s native language, unless it clearly is not
easible to do so, of all procedures available pursuant to this
section; and (E) an opportunity to present complaints with
respect to any matter relating to the identi on, evalua-
tion, or educational ment of the child, or the provision ofa
free appropriate ic education to such child.

an an im due process hearing which
conducted by the educational agency or by the
local Z termediate An

No hearing conducted to the requirements of thts
shall be of such
paragraph all be conducted by an employee of sch gee

(c) Ifthe in (2) of subsection (b)
O shin section a ceabeted bye or an
intermediate

99a

district court in accordance with 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(2).° They
contend that because the IEP contains no provision for CIC,
the school district has violated the EAHCA, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(1), by failing to provide a free appropriate public educa-
tion to Amber.* They also contend that the school district has

the State educational agency which shall conduct an impartial
review of such hearing. The officer conducting such review
shall make an independent decision upon completion of such
review.

520 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e)(2)(West 1978) provides the following:

Any part ieved by the findings and decision made under
subsection tb) af this section who does not have the right to an
appeal under subsection (c) of this section, and any party
aoe by the findings and decision under subsection (c) of

section, shall have the right to bring a civil action with
respect to the complaint presented — to this section,
which action may be brought in any State court of competent
jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States without
to the amount in controversy. In any action brought
this paragraph the court shall receive the records of the
administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the
es ey, oS ion on the preponderance
of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is
appropriate.

$20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(1) (West 1978) provides that “(ijn order to
qualify for assistance under this subchapter in any fiscal year, a State
shall demonstrate to the Commissioner that the following conditions
are met: (1) The State has in effect a policy that assures all handi-

capped children the right to a free appropriate public education.”
Free appropriate public education is defined as

at public expense, under ic supervision and direction,
and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educn’

school education in the State involv rand (D) are

or
provided in conformity with the individualized education
gram required under section 1414(a)(5) of this title. 4

Id. § 1401(18).

100a

violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, (“section
504”), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 794.’ The case reaches us from
the district court’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary
injunction to require the school district to provide CIC.* For
the reasons detailed below, we vacate and remand.

I. The EAHCA

The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 89
Stat. 773 (1975), was sparked by an “[iJncreased awareness of
the educational needs of handicapped children and landmark

dians, to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, including
classroom instruction, instruction in physical education, home
instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions.” Jd.
§ 1401(16). Related services are defined as follows:

The term “related services” transportation, and such

and audiology, psychological
pyc! in ocupaional therapy, retention, and media! ad

f diegnetie and evaluatio nly) be required
or e n purposes only) as ma:

to assist a handicapped child to benefit from spol pe
and includes the early identification and assessment of

handicapping conditions in children.
Id. § 1401(17).

*Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29
U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1980), in pertinent part, provides the
following:

No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United
Sinton. . . shall, solely iy tena of hie handienn, bo ontiated
—— i Serial chides tay oxstmvosser pativiie amie

er or rece
any program y

® In its opinion denying plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion, the district court also granted the motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction of defendant Townley, Superintendent of the
Irving Independent School District. This ruling is not before us on
this

appeal.

10la

court decisions establishing the right to education for handi-
capped children. . ..”S.Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5,
reprinted in [1975] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 1425,
1429. The Congress found that handicapped children were
receiving inadequate services, were not being properly identi-
fied and evaluated, and were being subjected to unnecessary
exclusion from the regular educational environment.* To reme-

* The congressional findings are contained in section 3(a) of the
EAHCA:

The Congress finds that—

(1) there are more than eight million handica children in
the United States today; Fe . open

ae the special educational needs of such children are not being
y met;
(3) more than half of the handicapped children in the United

_ States do not receive appropriate educational services which
would enable them to have full equality of opportunity;

(4) one million of sy ee children in the United States
are excluded entirely from the public school system and will not
go through the educational process with their peers;

(5) there are many handicapped children throughout the
United States participating in regular ea whose
handicaps prevent them from having a educational
experience because their handicaps are undetected;

(6) because of the lack of adequate services within the pub

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_0553%3A01. Public record. Not legal advice.
