# Opposition — BARRY v. NEW YORK (Nos. 83-485, 83-484)

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_0481%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1983

## Text

No3483-485 And 33-484

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THF UNITED STATES

October Term, 1983

JOHN J. BARRY, MARGUERITE
Vv. BARRY and JAMES
GEBHARDT, on their own behaif
and on behaif of ai! others
similariy situatec,

Petitioners,
VS.

CITY OF NEW YORK; NEW YORK
CITY BOARD OF ETHICS;
EDWARD I. KOCH, as Mayer cf
the Citv of New York; and DAVID
N. DINKINS, as City Clerk,

Respondents.

NOW

CAPTION CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

JAMES SLEVIN, MARK SLEVIN,
BRIAN CLINTON, JOAN
CLINTON, DR. STANLEY C.
FELL, and FRANK D'AMICO, on
their own behalf and on behalf of
all others similarly situated,

Petitioners,
vs.

CITY OF NEW YORK; NEW YORK
CITY BOARD OF ETHICS;
EDWARD I. KOCH, as Mayor of
the City of New York; FRANCIS T.
P. PLIMPTON, as Chairman of the
Board of Ethics; POWELL
PIERPOINT and BARBARA SCOTT
PREISKEL as members of the
Board of Ethics; and DAVID N.
Dinkins, as City Clerk,

Respondents.

BRIEF OF THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
TOTHE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR.,
Corporation Counsel of
The City of New York,
Attorney for Respondents,
100 Church Street,
New York, New York 10007
| (212) 566-4289 or
| 566-4338

LEONARD KOERNER,
PAUL T. REPHEN,
Of Counsel.

QUESTION PRESENTED
Does the New York City Financial Disclosure
Law, New York City Administrative Code, §1106-
5.0, as amended by Local Law No. 48 of 1979,
violate any constitutionally protected right of

privacy of the petitioner classes?

Argument

Conclusion

TABLE OF CONTENTS

22

40

TABLE OF CASES

Buckley v. Valeo,

424 U.S. 1(1976) tect ttt tte teees

Califano v. Jobst,

434 US. 47 (1977) ote eeeee

Carey v. Population Services International,

431 U.S. 678 (1977) secret ers sereeees

City of Akron v. Akron Center for

Reproductive Health, 76 L. Ed. 687 (1983) -

County of Nevada v. MacMillen,

522 P. 2d 1345 (Sup. Ct., Calif.,1974) ****°

Duplantier v. United States,
606 F. 24 654 (5th Cir., 1979), cert. den.

449 U.S. 1076 (1981) sess te rst t etree

Fritz v. Gorton,
517 P. 2d 911 (Wash. Sup. Ct., 1974),

app. dism'd 417 U.S. 902 (1974) s******°:

Gideon v. Alabama State Ethics Comm.,

379 So. 2d 570 (Ala. Sup. Ct., 1980) -***°>

Goldtrap v. Askew,

334 So. 2d 20 (Fla. Sup. Ct., 1976) «++++°

Griswold v. Connecticut,

381 U.S. 479 (1965) sss seer rset r eters

34

23

23

23

Page

Greene v. McGuire,
683 F. 2d 32 (2d Cir., 1982) *-++++ereeeees 32

Hunter v. City of New York,

58 AD 2d 136, 396 NYS 2d 186

(1st Dept., 1977), aff'd 44 NY

2d 708 (1977), 376 N.E. 2d 928, 405

NYS2d 455 cece eee ewww wenn een eeecees 9, 10,

Illinois Employees' Assn. v. Walker,

315 N.E. 2d 9 (1974),

cert. den. sub. nom.

Troopers Lodge No. 41 v. Walker,

419 U.S. 1058 (1974) ss eeeererecereeeces 24, 36

Lefkowitz v. Cunningham,
431 U.S. 801 (1977) settee treet te eee eee 29

Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) seer e treet eee enews 23

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) PEO CHCHCOCOEH OOS HCE HO OCC EEE ES 22

Montgomery County v. Walsh,
336 A. 2d 97 (Ct. of Appeals, Md., 1975),
app. dism'd 424 U.S. 901 (1976) ++++++rrs> 24, 35

Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,
433 U.S. 425 (1977) ss eseeecrecreceeces 24, 36

O'Brien v. DiGrazia,

544 F. 2d 543 (1st Cir., 1976),

cert. den. sub. nom.

O'Brien v. Jordon,

431 U.S. 914 (1977) sere eee eee eee wees 35

Opinion of the Justices to the Senate,

376 N.E. 2d 810 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., 1978) ->

Paul v. Davis,

424 U.S. 693 (1976) sere reer reece eeees

Pesale v. Beekman,

81 AD 2d 590, 437 NYS 2d 448
(1st Dept., 1981),

aff'd 54 NY 2d 707 426 NE 2d 483,

442 NYS2d 989 (1981) «+++ seer eee eens

Pierce v. Society of Sisters,

268 U.S. 510 (1925) sere t tee e eee e ee

Plante v. Gonzalez,
575 F. 2d 1119 (5th Cir., 1978),

cert. den. 439 U.S. 1009 (1979) «++ssseeeers

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) -+++++>:>

Roe v. Wade,

410 U.S. 113 (1973) sc ccercrerccccveece

Skinner v. Oklahoma,

316 U.S. 535 (1942) sere rt ee eee eee eee

Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816 (1977) «settee teeter eens

Snider v. Thornburgh,

436 A. 2d 593 (Pa. Sup. Ct., 1981) -+*+++>+>

-iii-

Page

36

23

32

23

23

23

24

ty

Page

Stein v. Howlett,
289 N.E. 2d 409 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1972),

app. dism'd 412 U.S. 925 (1973) «+++++eee> 35

Whalen v. Roe,

429 U.S. 589 (1977) see errr eee ee secens 24, 34,
36

Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1978) oo... 0:9 ao. 36 6 0.8 .6.6.6.6 8.8.6 23

-iv-

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1983

Nos. 83-485 and 83-484

JOHN J. BARRY, MARGUERITE
V. BARRY and JAMES
GEBHARDT, on their own behalf
and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,

Petitioners,

vs.
CITY OF NEW YORK; NEW YORK
CITY BOARD OF __ ETHICS;
EDWARD I. KOCH, as Mayor of

the City of New York; and DAVID
N. DINKINS, as City Clerk,

Respondents.

CAPTION CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

JAMES SLEVIN, MARK SLEVIN,
BRIAN CLINTON, JOAN
CLINTON, DR. STANLEY C.
FELL, and FRANK D'AMICO, on
their own behalf and on behalf of
all others similarly situated,

Petitioners,
vs.

CITY OF NEW YORK; NEW YORK
CITY BOARD OF ETHICS;
EDWARD I. KOCH, as Mayor of
the City of New York; FRANCIS T.
P. PLIMPTON, as Chairman of the
Board of Ethics; POWELL
PIERPOINT and BARBARA SCOTT
PREISKEL as members of the
Board of Ethics; and DAVID N.
DINKINS, as City Clerk,

Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
IN OPPOSITION TO THE PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

oj-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(1)
These cases are class actions brought pursuant
to 42 USC §1983 by New York City police officers

(Barry v. City of New York), fire officers (Slevin v.

City of New York), and their spouses challenging the

constitutionality of New York City Administrative
Code, §1106-5.0, as amended by Local Law No. 48
of 1979. The law requires candidates for City
office, elected officials, agency heads, members of
City boards and commissions who receive
compensation, employees in the City's managerial
pay plan and all other City employees earning
annual salaries of $30,000 or more to file with the
City Clerk annual reports disclosing certain
financial interests, and makes such reports available
for public inspection. The statute also contains a
procedure by which a person required to file a
financial disclosure report can assert a privacy
claim against public disclosure of a portion or all of

the information contained in the report.

«Qo

The petitioner class in Barry consists of police
officers of the rank of captain and above and their
spouses. This class, out of a total force of 25,000
police officers, includes approximately 250 captains,
80 deputy inspectors, 40 inspectors, 20 deputy
chiefs, 10 assistant chiefs, 5 bureau chiefs and 1
chief of operations. All ranks above the rank of
captain are non-civil service and are appointees of
the police commissioner. The Barry class also
includes lieutenants designated as supervisors of
detective squads and/or special assignment, and
police surgeons. Police surgeons are physicians who
are members of the uniformed force and treat
police officers and determine their fitness for duty.

The petitioner class in Slevin consists of
battalion chiefs, deputy chiefs and medical officers
of the Fire Department and their spouses. At the
time the litigation was commenced, the Fire
Department employed approximately 80 deputy
chiefs, 280 battalion chiefs and 10 medical officers

out of a total force of 9,500 firefighters. The

-3-

primary duty of deputy chiefs and battalion chiefs
is to supervise firefighting operations. Battalion
chiefs supervise five to eight fire companies, and
deputy chiefs supervise three or four battalions.
Medical officers, like their counterparts in the
Police Department, supervise the treatment of
firefighters and determine their fitness for duty.

In addition to their firefighting
responsibilities, battalion chiefs and deputy chiefs
have broad responsibility for supervising fire
inspections within the areas of their commands
(Slevin, Joint Appendix, pp. 391-393, 399-404). In
addition, chiefs hold important supervisory positions
in the Fire Department's Bureau of Fire Prevention,
which inspects major buildings and structures, and in
its Maintenance and Communications Divisions,
whose responsibilities include the purchase of new
equipment and spare parts (Slevin, Joint Appendix,

pp. 377-381, 396-399).

Facts
(1)
Legislative History of §1106-5.0

Administrative Code, §1106-5.0 was initially
enacted by the City Council in 1975 (Local Law No.
1 of 1975). As originally enacted, §1106-5.0
required the Mayor, the City Council President, the
members of the City Council, the five Borough
Presidents, the City Comptroller and declared
candidates for those positions, as well as each
commissioner or agency head, assistant
commissioner or assistant agency head, board
member, and city employee whose salary was
$25,000 or more, to file with the City Clerk not
later than June thirtieth of each year a report
disclosing certain financial interests.

Each person filing a report was, and after
subsequent amendments to the statute still is,
required to list the following items on behalf of
himself or herself and his or her spouse (§1106-5.0,
subd. b):

The mame, address and type of
practice of any professional
organization in which the person
reporting or his spouse was an
officer, director, partner,
proprietor, employee or advisor
from which income of $1,000 or
more was derived during the
preceding calendar year.

The source of any income of $1,000
or more received during the
preceding calendar year (for
services rendered.

Any capital gain from a single
source of $1,000 or more other
than from the sale of a residence
occupied by the filer.

Reimbursement for expenditures of
$1,000 or more in each instance.

Honoraria from a single source in
an aggregate amount of $500 or
more and any gift in the aggregate
amount of $500 or more from any
single source received during the
preceding year.

Each creditor to whom the person
reporting or his spouse was
indebted for a period of ninety
consecutive days or more during
the preceding calendar year in an
amount equal to or exceeding
$5,000.

Each investment or parcel of real

estate in which a value of $20,000
or more was held at any time

during the preceding calendar year

based on its cost or if acquired by

means other than purchase, its

estimated value at the time of

receipt.

The identity of each trust or other

fiduciary relation in which a

beneficial interest was held during

the preceding calendar year having

a value of $20,000 or more.

The statute does not require the filer to
disclose the precise amount of the income,
investments and indebtedness items required to be
disclosed. Rather, it requires only approximate
disclosure within broad dollar ranges. (§1106-5.0,
subd. b (6)(a)(b)(c)) Thus, with respect to income
derived from services rendered, including services
rendered to professional organizations,
reimbursements or capital gains other than from the
sale of a personal residence, the filer checks an
appropriate box on the report indicating whether the
income received by him or his spouse was at least
$1,000 but less than $5,000, at least $5,000 but less
than $25,000, at least $25,000 but less than

$100,000, or in excess of $100,000. Similar

-7-

categories are provided for gifts and honoraria with
the addition that the filer can check a box
indicating that the gift or honoraria was between
$500 and $1,000. With respect to indebtedness, the
person filing the report checks the appropriate box
indicating whether his or his spouse's debt was at
least $5,000 but less than $25,000, at least $25,000
but less than $100,000, at least $100,000 but less
than $500,000 or was $500,000 or greater. Lastly,
with respect to investments, trusts and fiduciary
relationships, and real property holdings, the
categories are: at least $20,000 but less than
$100,000, at least $100,000 but less than $500,000
and $500,000 or greater. Intentional violations of
§1106-5.0 constitute a misdemeanor punishable by
imprisonment for not more than one year or a fine
not to exceed $1,000 or both (§1106-5.0, subd. g).
Local Law No. 1 of 1975 made the financial
disclosure reports available to taxpayers. Unlike
the law now being challenged, however, it did not

establish a procedure by which a person making a

report could claim that its public disclosure would
invade his or her privacy.
(2)

In June 1975 a class action was commenced in
the Supreme Court of the State of New York on
behalf of all individuals in the competitive and non-
competitive classes of the civil service of the City
earning annual salaries of $25,000 or more,
challenging the constitutionality of Local Law No. 1
of 1975, inter alia, on the ground that it violated the
privacy rights of the class under the United States
Constitution. That action was rejected by the State

Supreme Court in Hunter v. City of New York, 88

Mise. 2d 562 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co., 1976). On appeal,
the Appellate Division, First Department of the
Supreme Court held that the City Council could
enact a provision requiring that class of employees
and their spouses to make public disclosure of their
financial interests, but held Administrative Code,
§1106-5.0 infirm on the ground that it did not afford

a covered employee the opportunity to present a

claim that the public disclosure of an item
contained in the report would unnecessarily intrude

upon the employee's privacy. Hunter v. City of New

York, 58 AD 2d 136, 396 NYS2d 186 (1977). The
New York Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed
the order of the Appellate Division, First
Department on the opinion of that Court. 44 NY 2d
708, 376 N.E.2d 928, 405 NYS2d 455 (1977).

In 1979 the City Council acted to correct the
constitutional infirmity in §1106-5.0 which was
found to exist by the Court in Hunter. in addition,
it made other changes with respect to its scope of
coverage (Local Law No. 48 of 1979). The Council
adopted a procedure whereby an employee could
assert a privacy claim with respect
to any items contained in his or her financial
disclosure report. Any person required to file a
report is permitted, at the time the report is filed
or at anytime thereafter, except when a request for
public inspection is pending, to submit a request to

withhold any item disclosed therein from public

-10-

inspection on the grounds that such inspection would
constitute an "unwarranted invasion of his or her
privacy" (§1106-5.0, subd. d[1]). Privacy requests
must be made in writing and must set forth the basis
for the claim. The financial disclosure report form
provides space for an individual to make a privacy
claim and to set forth the basis for that claim
(JA29-32).1 Privacy requests are evaluated by the
public members of the New York City Board of
Ethics, a board consisting of three public members,
in addition to the Corporation Counsel and City
Personnel Director. The Board of Ethics is
established by New York City Charter, Chapter 68
($2600 et seq.) to render advisory opinions to City
officers and employees with respect to questions of
ethical conduct, conflicts of interest and other
matters arising under that chapter of the City

Charter (Charter, §2602, subd. [a]). In determining

+Numbers in parentheses preceded by "JA" refer to
the pages of the joint appendix in Barry. Other
numbers in parentheses refer to the appendix to the

Barry petition.

-ll-

whether public inspection of an item would
constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy, the
Board of Ethics must consider the following factors
(§1106-5.0, subd. d[2]):

"(a) whether the item is of a
highly personal nature;

(b) whether the item in any way
relates to the duties of the
position held by such person
[making the privacy request];

(c) whether the item involves an
actual or potential conflict
of interest."

The Board of Ethics is empowered to establish
procedures for consideration of privacy requests.
The procedure, inter alia, permits the filer to
appear before the Board in person or by writing to
state the basis for the claim that the information
should be withheld from the public (§1106-5.0, subd.
d(3]).

In instances where a person has asserted a
privacy claim, the disclosure report is sealed and

kept in the office of the City Clerk. A privacy

claim is not evaluated by the Board of Ethics unless

-12-

a member of the public requests permission in
writing to inspect an item contained therein (JA
345). At that time, the City Clerk refers the
request for public inspection and the financial
disclosure report, including tnat portion of the
report in which the filer states the basis for his
privacy request, to the Board of Ethics for
evaluation (JA 345). The City Clerk also notifies
the employee that a request has been made to
inspect his report and that the matter has been
referred to the Board of Ethics (JA 346).2 The
employee is reminded of his right to appear before
the Board, and is offered the opportunity to submit
additional material in support of his claim (JA 346).
Determinations by the Board of Ethics are in writing
and set forth the reasons for the determination

($1106-5.0, subd. d[4]).

“Persons filing financial disclosure report forms are
always notified when a member of the public seeks
to inspect his or her report regardless of whether a
privacy request has been claimed by the employee.

If the privacy claim is sustained, the parties
are notified, and the disclosure report, with the
item or items adjudged to warrant privacy
protection deleted from the report, is returned to
the City Clerk (JA 346). If the privacy request is
not upheid, the person filing the privacy claim is so
notified by the Board of Ethics and is afforded the
opportunity to request a rehearing by the Board and
to submit additional material (JA 347). He is also
advised of his right to seek judicial review of the
Board's determination (JA 347). The employee is
allowed ten days to determine his course of action,
thus affording hirm the opportunity to seek judicial
relief, including injunctive relief, by way of a
proceeding in state court. If the Board does not
hear from the employee within ten days, the report
is returned to the City Clerk and made available for
public inspection without deletion (JA 347). That
portion of the financial disclosure report in which

the filer discusses the basis for the assertion of the

-14-

privacy claim is never made available for public
inspection (347).

In addition to establishing a privacy procedure,
Local Law No. 48 of 1979 contained several other
amendments. Employees in the City's managerial
pay plan were made subject to §1106-5.0 regardless
of their salary, and the minimum salary level at
which other City employees are required to file
reports was increased from $25,000 to $30,000.3

The Board of Ethics has been called upon to
make twenty-six determinations of privacy claims
since the enactment of Local Law No. 48. Sixteen
of those claims were sustained by the Board of
Ethics, six were withdrawn by the employees and
one was otherwise disposed of (JA 347). Only three
privacy requests have been denied by the Board (JA
347). Those three requests were denied because the

filers failed to provide the Board of Ethics with

*The City administration has recently transmitted
to the City Council a bill which, if enacted, would
increase the filing threshold from $30,000 to
$42,000.

-15-

additional information supporting their claims (JA
349).
(3)

The Litigation Challenging Local Law No. 48 of

1979

On September 4, 1979, plaintiffs commenced
the instant action on their own behalf and on behalf
of others similarly situated. District Court Judge
Abraham Sofaer granted a preliminary injunction
prohibiting the City from enforcing §1106-5.0, as
amended by Local Law No. 48 of 1979, with respect
to the plaintiff classes.

Following hearings on these cases, the District
Court concluded that §1106-5.0 was constitutional
insofar as it required disclosure to City government,
but unconstitutional with respect to _ public
inspection of the plaintiffs' reports (4la-103a). It
held that government access to the reports would
help to root out corruption and conflicts of interest.

The Court observed (70a):

-16-

"Corruption and more subtle

conflicts of interest are possible in

each group of plaintiff employees.

That no corruption has been proven

among several groups of plaintiffs

does not establish that

improprieties have not occurred or

would never be deterred or

uncovered by the filings."

The Court also rejected the argument that the
inclusion of information relating to the spouse's
activity would significantly affect decisions to
marry, procreate or to make other intimate family
decisions protected by the Constitution (67a).

The District Court held that the public
disclosure of the reports in the case of persons who
are neither elected officials nor "policymakers" did
not serve any useful public purpose (80a-93a). It
also concluded that the financial disclosure reports
would be made readily available to members of the
public, including salesmen, neighbors, relatives,

former spouses, and business and charitable

organizations (74a).

<gf-

The Court of Appeals

In addition to the appeal by the City, the
petitioners in Slevin cross-appealed from that
portion of the District Court's judgment which held
that financial disclosure to the government was
permissible. The Court of Appeals in unanimously
upholding the statute in all respects, stated (12a):

"We think the statute as a whole
plainly furthers a _ substantial,
possibly even a compelling, state
interest. The purpose of the
statute is to deter corruption and
conflicts of interest among City
officers and employees, and to
enhance public confidence in the
integrity of its government. * * *
Whatever one may think of the
intrusiveness of financial
disclosure laws, they are
widespread, see Slevin v. City of
New York, supra 557 F. Supp. at
919 mn. 1, and reflect the not
unreasonable judgment of many
legislatures that disclosure will
help reveal and deter corruption
and conflicts of interest."

The Court rejected the Slevin petitioners’
contention that because of the Fire Department's
corruption-free history, financial disclosure serves
no legitimate purpose as applied to them, noting

(14a):
~18-

"In our view, the City Council
could reasonably conclude that LL
48 [Local Law No. 48 of 1979,
which amended Administrative
Code, §1106-5.0] would help deter
corruption and conflicts of interest
in the Fire Department, despite its
‘virtually corruption-free history."

With respect to the issue of public inspection
of the reports, the Court stated (16a):

" We do not think that the right to
privacy protects public employees
from the release of financial
information that is related to their
employment or indicative of a
possible conflict of interest. Nor
do we think the release of
information that is not ‘highly
personal’ rises to the level of a
constitutional violation."

After analyzing the statute's procedure for allowing
an employee to assert a privacy claim with respect
to any items contained in his or her report, the
Court concluded (15a):

"Unlike the — district court,

however, we think that the

statute's privacy mechanism

adequately protects plaintiffs’
constitutional privacy interests."

It noted, moreover, that the City's interest in public
disclosure of the reports "outweighs the possible
infringement of plaintiffs' privacy interests."

The Court of Appeals agreed with the City's
argument that public disclosure of the reports will
encourage City agencies "to be aggressive in their
efforts to police corruption" and will enhance public
confidence in government. In this regard the Court
found (20a):

"In this case, we cannot say that it

was unreasonable for the City

Council to conclude that public

disclosure would materially

advance the City's attempt to

prevent corruption and conflicts of

interests."

The Court also held that public disclosure need
not be limited to elected officials and those
occupying "policymaking" positions. It also
sustained the $30,000 threshold for filing, observing

cps

*** the burden imposed by an
imprecise classification, and by the
broad nature of the required
disclosure, is mitigated by the

statute's privacy mechanism, which
permits covered employees to
challenge the proposed release of
irrelevant "highly personal
information. Accordingly, we
cannot say that the law is
unconstitutionally overbroad or
that it violates the constitutional
right to privacy."

-21-

“=

ARGUMENT

NEW YORK CITY ADMINI-
STRATIVE CODE, §1106-5.0
SERVES THE VITAL GOVERN-
MENTAL PURPOSE OF DIS-
COURAGING AND_- EXPOSING
CORRUPTION AND CONFLICTS
OF INTEREST. THE STATUTE
DOES NOT VIOLATE ANY
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECT-
ED RIGHT OF THE MEMBERS OF
THE PETITIONER CLASSES. THE
CHALLENGED STATUTE SPECI-
FICALLY ESTABLISHES A
PROCEDURE WHEREBY ANY
EMPLOYEE REQUIRED TO FILE
A FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE
REPORT MAY AVOID PUBLIC
INSPECTION OF ANY ITEM
CONTAINED THEREIN BY
DEMONSTRATING THAT THE
ITEM IS OF A HIGHLY PERSONAL
NATURE, IS NOT INDICATIVE OF
A CONFLICT OF INTEREST, AND
IS UNRELATED TO HIS OR HER
DUTIES.

The New York City financial disclosure
Statute does not violate any constitutionally
protected privacy right of the petitioner classes.
This Court has long recognized a protected interest

in being free from improper state action which

directly impacts on personal autonomy or decision

-22-

making in the area of marriage, procreation,
contraception, abortion and the creation
maintenance and termination of the family

relationship. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for

Reproductive Health Inc., U.S. , 76 L. Ed.
687, 700-701 (1983); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.

374, 386, 387 n. 12 (1978); Califano v. Jobst, 434

U.S. 47, 54 (1977); Carey v. Population Services

International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Smith v.

Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816

(1977), Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Roe v.

Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 338

U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479

(1965); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158

(1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942);

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925);

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Financial

disclosure laws, however, do not implicate this
aspect of privacy because they do not directly or

substantially effect intimate family and personal

-23-

matters such as a decision to marry, beget children
or maintain a family relationship. Plante v,
Gonzalez, 575 F. 2d 1119, 1131-1132 (5th Cir.,
1979), cert. den. 439 U.S. 1009 (1979); Duplantier v.
United States, 606 F. 2d 654, 669-670 (5th Cir.,

1979), cert. den. 449 U.S. 1076 (1981); Montgomery
Co. v. Walsh, 336 A. 2d 97 (Ct. of Appeals, Md.,

1975), app. dism'd 424 U.S. 901 (1976); Illinois

Employees Assn. v. Walker, 315 N.E. 2d 9 (Sup. Ct.,

Ill., 1974), cert. den. sub. nom. Troopers Lodge No.

41 v. Walker, 419 U.S. 1058 (1974); Snider v.

Thornburgh, 436 A. 2d 593, 598 (Sup. Ct., Penn.,

1981); Gideon v. Alabama State Ethics Commission,

379 So. 2d 570, 572 (Sup. Ct., Ala., 1980).
In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605

(1977), and Nixon vs Administrator of General

Services, 433 U.S. 425, 457-465 (1977), this Court
appeared to recognize a protected privacy interest
in avoiding "unwarranted disclosures" of personal
matters. In considering whether public inspection of

the financial disclosure reports would violate this

-24-

confidentiality aspect of the privacy right, the
Court of Appeals correctly observed (16a):
"We do not think that the right to
privacy protects public employees
from the release of financial
information that is related to their
employment or indicative of a
possible conflict of interest. Nor
do we think the release of
information that is not ‘highly
personal’ rises to the level of a
constitutional violation."
Highly personal information contained in
a financial disclosure report which is unrelated to
the duties of the filer and which is not indicative of
a conflict of interest is protected from public
disclosure under the _ statute. Specifically,
subdivision d(1) of §1106-5.0 permits an employee at
the time the disclosure report is filed or at anytime
thereafter, except when a request by a member of
the public for inspection is pending, to assert that
the public disclosure of any item or items contained
in the report would constitute an unwarranted

invasion of privacy. In determining whether the

public disclosure of an item would constitute }r~~

unwarranted invasion of privacy, subdivision d(2) of
§1106-5.0 requires the Board of Ethics to consider:

"(a) whether the item is of a
highly personal nature;

(b) whether the item in any way
relates to the duties of the position
held by such person;

(c) whether the item involves an
actual or potential conflict of
interest."

The Court of Appeals concluded that this
statutory procedure affords covered employees
adequate protection from unwarranted disclosures,
and noted that out of the twenty-six privacy
requests that have come before the Board of Ethics
for review since 1979 (16a):

"***(slixteen were granted, six
were withdrawn, and one was
‘otherwise disposed of’. Only three
privacy claims were denied,
apparently because insufficient
information was provided in
support of the claims."
In view of the fact that the statute

contains a procedure which protects against the

unwarranted disclosure of highly personal
information and has been construed administratively
in the great majority of cases in favor of employee
requests for privacy, we respectfully submit that
this case does not present any issue concerning the
right of privacy which is worthy of review by this
Court.

Moreover, public disclosure of financial
interests is accomplished by a method which is least
intrusive to the privacy interests of the covered
officers and employees. The provision is narrowly
drawn to serve only its intended purpose. Precise
disclosure of every aspect of the financial status of
an employee or his spouse is not required. The
provision requires disclosure only with respect to
those financial transactions which may be indicative
of wrongdoing or conflicts of interest, i.e., gifts,
loans, reimbursement of expenditures, income from
services rendered, etc. In addition, disclosure must
be made only when a particular transaction or

interest exceeds a specified minimum amount.

-27-

Thus, for example, an investment need not be
reported unless it is valued at $20,000 or more. The
disclosure report is not a net worth statement, and
the specific amount of a reportable transaction or
interest need not be noted. A covered employee
makes disclosure only within fairly broad dollar
ranges.

The Court of Appeals further held that
the City's interest in public disclosure "outweighs
the possible infringement of plaintiffs’ privacy

interests" (19a). In Hunter v. City of New York,

supra, 58 AD2d 136, 396 NYS2d 186, aff'd 44 NY2d
708, 376 N.E.2d 928, the Appellate Division of the
State Supreme Court stated (at 57 AD2d 137) that
the purpose of §1106-5.0 is to:

"*** discourage and _ detect

corruption and the appearance of

corruption, avoid conflicts of

interest and instill in the public a

sense of confidence in the integrity

and impartiality of its public

servants."
The United States Court of Appeals held that the

statute "plainly furthers a substantial, possibly even

a compelling, state interest" (12a). This Court has
recognized a compelling state interest in the
maintenance of an honest police force and civil

service. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801,

808 (1977).4

Publie disclosure of financial reports is
particularly appropriate in the case of superior
officers of police and fire departments. The

members of the petitioner classes occupy the very

*The Court of Appeals ruled that §1106-5.0 must be
analyzed under an intermediate standard of review
or balancing approach, noting (11a):

"***on intermediate standard of review seems in
keeping both with the Supreme Court's reluctance to
recognize new fundamental interests requiring a
high degree of scrutiny for alleged infringements,
and the Court's recognition that some form of
scrutiny beyond rational relation is necessary to
safeguard the confidentiality aspect."

While we believe that §1106-5.0 meets any
constitutional test, including the compelling state
interest test, this Court, in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 217-218 (1982), has indicated that legislation will
be sustained under the intermediate standard of
review if it "may fairly be viewed as furthering a
substantial interest of the state." This would
suggest that a balancing of the interests is not
required under the intermediate level of review.

-29-

highest positions in their uniformed services and are
responsible for making decisions, enforcing laws,
and taking action which directly effects the lives,
safety, and property of every person who lives and
works in New York City. The Court of Appeals
agreed with the District Court's finding that
"{eJorruption and more subtie conflicts of interest
are possible in each group of plaintiff employees"
(14a). The concern addressed by §1106-5.0 is not
limited to the blatant bribe, but relates also to
other forms of inappropriate behavior or conflicts of
interest. For example, a supervisor or his or her
spouse may have investments or a
mortgage in the area of his or her command. A
police surgeon or Fire Department medical officer
may receive payments from insurance companies
hoping to sell injured or disabled officers policies to
supplement their benefits. A person covered by the
provision or his or her spouse may be receiving gifts,
loans, honoraria or reimbursements for expenses

from those he or she must police, regulate or

-30-

otherwise protect, or may have joint business
interests or investments with such persons.

Publie disclosure of financial reports
acts as a prod to City government to be continually
aggressive in its anti-corruption and conflicts of
interest efforts. Agencies will be aware that if they
do not’ vigorously investigate evidence of
misconduct revealed by a report, then a newspaper,
a public interest group or a concerned citizen that
has access to the information can hold them
accountable for their failure to act. Thus, public
disclosure makes it more difficult for an agency to
refuse to confront the problems of employee
misconduct. The public, on the - other
hand, has a means by which to judge whether City
government is making sincere efforts to guard
against corruption and misconduct. More
importantly, public confidence in its servants will be
greatly enhanced because the _ reports. will
demonstrate that the vast majority of the officers

and employees are honest. Dishonest officers and

-31-

employees may no longer rely on agency inaction to
protect them from disclosure of misconduct.
Intentional failure to report the information called
for by the report constitutes a crime which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment. A conviction
for a violation of the reporting requirements of
§1106-5.0 would likely result in an automatic
vacatur of a police or fire officer's employment,
pursuant to N.Y. Public Officers Law, §30, subd.

l(e). See Greene v. McGuire, 683 F. 2d 32 (2nd Cir.,

1982); Pesale v. Beekman, 81 AD2d 590, 437 NYS2d

448 (1st Dept., 1981), aff'd 54 NY2d 707, 426 NE2d
483, 442 NYS2d 989 (1981). Thus, the prospect of
criminal prosecution for intentional violations of the
law and the consequential loss of employment upon
conviction will tend to deter individuals who might
have otherwise engaged in wrongful or questionable
conduct, and can help insure that governmental
services wil be provided (and, in the case of police
officers and firefighters, the law will be enforced)

in an even-handed and nondiscriminatory manner.

<$2-

The Court of Appeals agreed with the
City that public disclosure of the reports would have
this salutary effect, holding (20a):

"In this case, we cannot say that it
was unreasonable for the City
Council to conclude that public
disclosure would materially
advance the City's attempt to
prevent corruption and conflicts of
interest."

Financial disclosure need not, as
petitioners maintain, be limited to those persons
holding elective office or occupying "policymaking"
positions. The threat of corruption and conflicts of
interest are obviously not limited to persons
exercising policymaking authority, and the public's
concern with misconduct extends beyond elected
and policymaking officials. The use of a specific
salary threshold to trigger disclosure is not
improper. In general, salary is directly related to
the importance of the functions of an employee,
and, therefore, unfaithful conduct by persons
earning higher salaries is usually more damaging to

society's interests than misconduct by those earning

-33-

low salaries. Significant numbers of New York City
employees at the $30,000 level (and even below)
occupy positions of great public trust.®

The determination whether financial
disclosure should be required and the categories of
employees to be covered by such a statute should be
left to the appropriate legislative body. In Whalen

v. Roe, supra, this Court stated at 429 U.S. 597:

"State legislation which has some
effect on individual liberty or
privacy may not_ be held
unconstitutional simply because a
court finds it unnecessary, in whole
or in part. For we have frequently
recognized that individual States
have broad latitude in
experimenting with possible
solutions to problems of vital local
concern."

°The petitioners in the instant cases earn salaries
which are substantially in excess of the $30,000
threshold. For example, deputy fire chiefs and
deputy police inspectors earn between
approximately $48,000 to $58,000, exclusive of
overtime and fringe benefits. Police captains and
Fire Department battalion chiefs earn between
approximately $43,500 and $51,500, exclusive of
overtime and fringe benefits.

Legislative classifications of this nature are
controlling unless very wide of any reasonable mark.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 83, 103 (1976). The

Court of Appeals concluded that both the categories
of employees required to disclose and the nature of
the disclosure itself is "mitigated by the statute's
privacy mechanism, which permits covered
employees to challenge the proposed release of
irrelevant ‘highly personal' information" (21a).
Financial disclosure provisions have
withstood constitutional challenge because they
serve an important public need for efficient and
ethical conduct among public employees and instill
public trust and confidence in government by
assuring citizens of the impartiality and honesty of

their servants. See Duplantier v. United States,

supra, 606 F.2d at 671-673; Plante v. Gonzalez,

supra, 575 F.2d at 1135; O'Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.
2d 543 (1st Cir., 1976), cert. den. sub, nom. O'Brien
v. Jordon, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Montgomery Co. v.
Walsh, supra, 336 A.2d 97, (Ct. of Apps., Md., 1975)

-35-

app. dism'd 424 U.S. 901 (1976); Fritz v. Gorton,

517 P.2d 911 (Sup. Ct., Wash., 1974) app. dism'd 417
U.S. 902 (1974); Stein v. Howlett, 289 N.E.2d 409

(Sup. Ct., Ill., 1972) app. dism'd 412 U.S. 925 (1973);

Illinois State Employees' Assn. v. Walker, supra, 315

N.E. 2d 9 (Sup. Ct., Ill., 1974), cert. den. 419 U.S.

1058 (1974); Gideon v. Alabama State Ethics

Commission, 379 So. 2d 570 (Sup. Ct., Ala., 1980);

Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 376 N.E.2d

810, 818 (Sup. Jud. Ct., Mass., 1978); Goldtrap v.
Askew, 334 So. 2d 20 (Sup. Ct., Fla., 1976); County
of Nevada v. MacMillen, 522 P. 2d 1345 (Sup. Ct.,

Calif., 1974).

As noted in the above citations, this
Court has consistently declined to review decisions
upholding financial disclosure laws. At page 29 of
the petition in Slevin, it is stated that a number of
those denials took place prior to this Court's
recognition of the confidentiality aspect of privacy
discussed in Whalen v. Roe, supra, 429 U.S. 589 and

Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, supra,

433 U.S. 425. They fail to note, however, that the
denials of the petitions for certiorari in Plante v.

Gonzalez and Duplantier v. United States took place

after the decisions in Whalen and Nixon.

Duplantier is particularly noteworthy. In
that case, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit sustained the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-521, which is set
forth in 5 USC App. §201 et seq.; 2 USC §701 et
seq.; 28 USC App. $301 et seq.). Duplantier
concerned the application of that law to federal
judges. The Ethics in Government Act requires that
certain members of the executive, legislative and
judicial branches of the federal government file
annual financial disclosure reports:

"***containing a full statement of

assets, income, and liabilities, and
those of their spouses and

dependent children." (Duplantier v.
United States, 606 F. 2d at 659)
The federal act makes the reports

available for public inspection (28 USC App. $305; 5

-37-

USC App. §205; 2 USC §704), but unlike the statute
challenged in the instant case, it does not require
that the person filing the disclosure report be
notified prior to public disclosure, nor may such a
person assert a claim that the public disclosure of
an item contained in the report would constitute an
unwarranted invasion of privacy. The Court of
Appeals in the instant case relied on Duplantier in
stating (18a):

"We note by way of comparison

that courts have upheld financial

disclosure laws that hit much

closer to home and do not have any

similiarly broad privacy

mechanism."

At page 30 of the petition in Slevin, the

petitioners incorrectly state that the issue:

"*** presented in this case is

whether every public employee and

his/her spouse may be required,

consistently with the Constitution,

to reveal at large all personal

information as a condition of
employment." (Emphasis added.)

All that is at issue in this case is whether §1106-5.0
is constitutional as applied to the members of the
petitioner classes, high ranking uniformed officers
of the Police and Fire departments (Slevin petition,
p. 2; Barry petition, p. 3). The provision does not
mandate that "all personal information" be revealed,
but rather only certain specified financial
transactions by them and their spouses which might
be used as covers for wrongdoing or conflicts of
interest. Nor must all the information contained in
the reports be "revealed at large". We have stressed
throughout that a covered employee may avoid
public disclosure of any highly personal item
contained in the report which is unrelated to his or
her duties and which does not indicate a conflict of
interest, and that the vast majority of privacy
applications which have come before the Board of
Ethics for review have been decided in favor of the
employee.

In view of the findings by the Court of

Appeals that the statute serves very important

-39-

governmental interests and is sensitive to the
legitimate privacy interests of the employees to
whom it applies, we respectfully submit that review

by this court is unwarranted.

CONCLUSION

The petitions for certiorari should be denied.

November 18, 1983
Respectfully submitted,

FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR.,
Corporation Counsel of the

City of New York,

Attorney for the Respondents

100 Church Street,

New York, New York 10007

LEONARD KOERNER,
PAUL T. REPHEN,
of Counsel.

-40-

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_0481%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
