# Opposition — Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Secretary of the Interior

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1983
- **Citation:** 464 U.S. 960

## Text

| L i
| OCT 5 1983
No. 83-180 i BLEXAS; iL. STEvas
IN THE Je oe ue

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term 1983

SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,

Petitioner,
Vv.

JAMES G. WATT, et al., and the WALKER
RIVER PAIUTE TRIBE OF NEVADA,

Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To
The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF THE WALKER RIVER PAIUTE TRIBE
IN OPPOSITION

Yvonne T. Knight

Counsel of Record
Jeanne S. Whiteing
Native American Rights Fund
1506 Broadway
Boulder, Colorado 80302
(303) 447-8760

Attorneys for Respondent
The Walker River Paiute Tribe

October, 1983

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether pursuant to the Act of March 2,
1899, 30 Stat. 990, 25 U.S.C. §§$312-318,
the Secretary of the Interior can require
tribal consent as a precondition to the
filing and processing of an application for
a railroad right-of-way across tribal trust
lands of the Walker River Paiute Tribe of

Nevada.

whe

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
QUESTION PRESENTED . . . . «= - i
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . - « ~~ ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . ~ iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . « «= + 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. . . + «+ + 4

ARGUMENT

I. The Decision Below Gives Effect
To Longstanding, Congressionally
Approved Regulations Governing
Rights of Way Across Tribal
Land tl kt Ge i ee, ee 6

II. The Decision is Consistent With
Decisions of This Court and the

Courts of Appeal... « - 16

III. Review is Otherwise
Inappropriate . . +6 + « -« 20

A. Authority of the
Secretary . + + « « e 21
B. Delegation Sl ide a ee ae 26

IV. The Court's Judgment Can Also

Be Sustained on Other Grounds. 32
CONCLUSION ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° 36

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Pag

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) . «+ « + 16

Clarke v. Boysen, 39 F.2d
800 (10th Cir. 1930) . -« «© » «© « 20

Escondido Mutual Water Co. v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm.,
698 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1982) .. .» 18,29

Helvering v. Reynolds Co.,

306 U.S. 110 (1939) . . - . . . . 12,18
Helvering v. Winmill,

305 U.S. 79 (1938) x. Gress eee 12
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache

Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) or car ye 13
Montana v. United States,

450 U.S. 544 (1981) a? a aan 17
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S.

199 (1974) eee ‘ 12
Nance v. Environmental Protection

Agency, 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.

1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W.

3447 (Dec. 7, 1981) .. - Kk whee eee

New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache
Tribe, U.S. , 51 U.S.L.W.
4741 (June 14, 1983) ..+-+-+es-s 13,17

New York Indians (Fellows v.
Denniston), 72 U.S. (5 Wall.)
761 (1867) + ee elrete 16

iii

Table of Authorities (cont.) Page
Cases:

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
aoa Us8. 366 (1935) .. -« «© «© « «© 26,27

Plains Electric Generation and
Transmission Cooperative, Inc.
v. Pueblo of Laguna, 542 F.2d

Beem eemem Gar. L976) « « « © «© 10
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau

of Revenue, U.S. _,

Daememmeee an7e (1982) ....-- 13

Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49 (1978) ia a 6 «© 17

Sioux Tribe of Indians v. U.S.,
316 U.S. 317 (1942) Pits - «@ 12

Southern Pacific Transportation
Co. v. Watt (Southern Pacific II),
700 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1983) .. 4,18,29

Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. l
6s. | roe. . 6 © « e 22

United States v. Ft. Smith &
W.R. Co., 195 F. 211 (8th Cir.
1912) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19,20

United States v. 43 Gallons of
Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188 (1876) ... 16

United States v. Mazurie,
OPPs . « 4 6 « «© « 26,88

United States v. Midwest Oil
Ge., 2206 U.8. 639 (1915) . . +. - 12

iv

Table of Authorities (cont.) Page
Cases:

United States v. Santa Fe Pacific
Railroad Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941) . 17

United States v. Sheffield Board
of Commissioners, 435 U.S. 110
(1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

United States v. Shoshone Tribe,
206 .0.,8. 122 (2330) «+ 6 #& 6 ee % 8 17

United States v. Southern Pacific
Transportation Co. (Southern

Pacific I), 543 F.2d 676 (9th

Cis. I9T6) « «se 6 ws be 6Bphe yee

Vigil v. Andrus, 667 F.2a 931
oh Gis. BOURY bc se 6 12

White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) ... 13

Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe,
442 0.8. 653 (1979) . 2 «

Statutes and Other Laws:

25 U.S.C. §§ 312-318 ....-. i,2,4,20
25 U.S.C. § 322 “AE Oo. At et ee ot 10,25

25 U.S.C. §§ 323 et seg. ... 2,33,34

25 U.S.C. § 326 ASP Gk ee ee On Oe te 35
25 U.S.C. § 407 Mee he eee? Ene Se 29
25 U.S.C. § 476 e220 + 6 Rgbaeae

Table of Authorities (cont.) Page

Statutes and Other Laws:

ae eee oes ie ga ae eur a ae
Aa 0.8.0. § 2401-76462 SS a
43 U.S.C. §§ 934 et seg. . ~~ + - - 25
59-000. 8 24 eo a oe eee
Fees SO cn es sie Sterne
54 Gtk. 2005 6 6 Sees ee
SG WAGES AAO 2s uv: 6 ela BRS
ay) Ae |; Sem narra teres Ga tA c
ae Stato MR ec ee ee
46 bunt. 1560- sss os we ee
oe Beek. 2788 Gree ee wee ee
aS C.7.R Peet Ih oe es
<6 CR. 6263.0) DN ee ee
i G,9.8. § 80959956 56 ks ee .
25 C.F.R. § 256.63 . . . . « + « «© 78,33

40 C.F «Rs

§
§

25 C.F.R. $ 211626 « we we wo ee ss 30
§
OS SRcSR 4 6s 6 8 4 oe 30
§

43 C.F.R. C208 a 6 8 se eee

1976 Pueblo Lands Act ...+ 2+ « « 34

vi

Table of Authorities (cont.) Page

Other Authorities:

S. Rep. No. 823, 80th Cong.,

2d Sess. (1948), reprinted in

1948 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm.

News 1033 ke ee eee eT 8 we 34

H.R. Rep. No. 78, 9lst Cong.,
ist Sess. (1969) ..«e«eeerese 34

H.R. Rep. No. 1896, 55th Cong.,
34 Sess. 2 (1899) . « « «© « «© «© « «© 15,282

H. Rep. No. 91-78, 91st Cong.,
aae Bese: 2° (2067). 2 es ew ee te 6S

H.R. Rep. No. 94-800, 94th Cong.,

2d Sess. 34 (1976), reprinted

in 1976 U.S. Code & Adm. News

2370 a a rr ee se ae ee 31

Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Indian Affairs on S.217, 94th
Cong., lst Sess. 4 (1975) .... -~ 26

Conf. Rep. No. 94-1439, 94th
Cong., 24 Sess. 3 (1976) ...e«-« « 10,32

3 Federal Register 984 ...... 7
32 Federal Register 5512 ..... 9

1A Sutherland, Statutory
Construction Section 22.13 .... 35

Cohen, Original Indian Title,
32 Minn. L. R. 28 (1947/7) . . « « « 17

vil

Table of Authorities (cont.) Page

Other Authorities:

Prucha, American Indian Policy
in the Formative Years (Harvard
Univ. Press, 1962) ‘ . . . . . . . 16

R. Collins, Implied Limitations
on the Jurisdiction of Indian
Tribes, 54 Wash. L. R. (1979) .. .« 28

1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation
Law § 5.28 at 81-82 (1982) ... . 29

viii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The issue in this case grows out of a
decision by the Secretary of the Interior
to reject an application by Southern Paci-
fic Transportation Company for a right-
of-way across lands held in trust for the
Walker River Paiute Tribe of Nevada.l/ The
application was rejected because it lacked
tribal consent.

Southern Pacific filed the application
on April 28, 1977 because a 1976 decision
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that Southern Pacific had never complied
with applicable federal laws governing the

acquisition of railroad rights-of-way

1/ The Walker River Paiute Tribe of
Nevada is the governing body of the Walker
River Indian Reservation and is organized
pursuant to § 16 of the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act, 25 U.S.C. §476.

ale

across Indian lands and therefore the rail-
road was a trespasser on tribal and
allotted lands 2/ of the Walker River

Indian Reservation. United States v.

Southern Pacific Transportation Company,

543 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1976) (nereinafter

Southern Pacific I). Pet. App. B iil.

The Superintendent for the Western
Nevada Agency of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs initially rejected the application
because it lacked any evidence of tribal

3/

consent. = The Superintendant's

2/ The right-of-way application at
issue, however, involves only tribal trust
lands and not allotted lands.

3/ Southern Pacific cited the Act of
March 2, 1899, 30 Stat. 990, 25 U.S.C. §§
312-318 (the 1899 Act), as the sole
authority for the application. A
supplemental response from the Super-
intendent informed Southern Pacific that
the application should have been filed
under the 1948 Indian Rights of Way Act, 62
Stat. 17, 25 U.S.C. § 323 et seq. (the 1948
Act), which expressly requires tribal con-
sent for right-of-way grants.

ota

decision was subsequently affirmed by the
Assistant Area Director for the Phoenix
Area Office of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, and by the Assistant Secretary of
the Interior for Indian Affairs. Pet. App.
B iii.

Southern Pacific sought review of the
Secretary's decision in the district court
for the District of Nevada claiming that
tribal consent was not necessary for rail-
road right-of-way grants under the 1899
Act. The Walker River Paiute Tribe inter-
vened as a party defendant, and argued,
along with the United States, that tribal
consent was required. Judgment was entered
by the district court in favor of Southern
Pacific on August 14, 1980, and amended on
August 28, 1980. Pet. App. B iv. and v.

The district court held that tribal consent

could not be a condition precedent to 4
railroad right-of-way grant pursuant to the
1899 Act.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed
and held that "(tjJhe Secretary acted within
his power in requiring by regulation that
tribal consent be obtained for the acquisi-
tion of rights-of-way pursuant to the 1899
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 312 (1976)." Southern

Pacific ‘ransportation Co. v. Watt, 700

F.2a 550, 556 (9th Cir. 1983) (hereinafter

Southern Pacific II). Southern Pacific

seeks review of this decision.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The tribal consent precondition
required by the Secretary for the right-
of-way at issue is a longstanding, congres~
sionally approved requirement which is

rooted in and consistent with principles

whoa

governing tribal sovereignty and with
federal Indian policy. Both preserve and
protect the right of Indian tribes to
consent to and control the use of their
lands.

The decision below gives full effect to
these principles and policies and is con-
sistent with decisions of this Court and
the Courts of Appeals. There are no con-
flicts with decisions of any court.

The consent precondition is also in
accord with the Secretary's broad authority
under the 1899 Act, and is supported by
provisions in the 1934 Indian Reor-
ganization Act and the 1948 Indian Rights
of Way Act which require tribal consent for
all right-of-way grants and other disposi-

tions of tribal land.

ARGUMENT

I. The Decision Below Gives Effect to
Longstanding, Congressionally
Approved Regulations Governing
Rights of Way Across Tribal Land.

Tribal consent has been a part of the
Secretary of the Interior's right of way
regulations since at least 1928 - a period
of 55 years. The 1928 regulations
specifically require tribal consent for
railroad rights-of-way. Section 79 of the
regulations states:

Where tribal lands are involved, all
railroad and other right-of-way
applications of more than ordinary
importance should be presented to the
tribe in general council assembled. A
record of the proceedings shall be kept
and a duly authenticated copy of such
minutes should be attached. Except in
the case of railroads the approval of
the Secretary of the Interior may be
given in his discretion, even though no
amicable settlement has been reached
with the Indians. However, it is
required that every effort be made to
bring about an amicable agreement
whenever reasonably possible.

(Emphasis added).

aGn

Regulations of the U.S. Department of
Interior Concerning Rights of Way Over
Indian Lands, U.S. Govt. Printing Office,
1929. Subsequently, regulations in 1938
provided:

256.83 Consent of allottees or
TEibS.cee Where tribal lands are
involved, belonging to a tribe which is
Organized under the Act of June 18,
1934 ..., all right-of-way applications
must be presented to the tribal council
or other authorized representative
body; and, in the case of unorganized
tribes, all railroad rights-of-way and
others of more than ordinary import-
ance, should likewise be thus submitted
to the council or representative body
of the tribe. A record of the pro-
ceedings should be kept and a duly
authenticated copy attached to the
schedule.

25 C.F.R. §256.83 (1939-40), 3 Fed. Reg.

984, 985 (May 24, 1938) .4/ The consent

4/ Southern Pacific's assertion that
the consent requirement was first
promulgated in 1951 (Petition at 33, n.1l)
is incorrect. The 1951 regulations amended
the 1938 regulations and were intended to
implement the 1948 Act. Ignoring the
earlier regulations, Gouthern Pacific

provision has appeared in all subsequent
regulations governing rights-of-way. See
25 C.F.R. §256.3(a) (1951) (the 1951
regulations); and 25 C.F.R. §161.3(a),

redesignated 25 C.F.R. §169.3(a) (1982).

(footnote 4 contined) contends that the
tribal consent requirement applies only to
grants under the 1948 Act. It points to
the reference in section 256.3(c) of the
1951 regulations that the 1948 Act is the
authority for the consent provision. But
section 256.3(c) applies only to allotted
lands, not tribal lands. Moreover, the
1951 regulations recite the 1948 Act as
authority for all sections, including
section 256.23 which implements the
specific provisions of the 1899 Act.

Southern Pacific also relies on the
statement in the current regulations, 25
C.F.R. § 169.23, that railroad rights-
of-way granted under the 1899 Act are sub-
ject to "pertinent sections of this Part
169," and argues that tribal consent is not
one of the pertinent sections. But the
present regulations contain provisions
dealing with other existing special
right-of-way statutes, and these provisions
would not be pertinent to railroad
rights-of-way. See, e.g., §169.25 (oil and
gas pipeline); sTES. 30 Uhelechous and
telegraph lines) and §169.28 (public
highways).

i

Congress has twice expressly approved
the tribal consent provision in the regu-
lations. In 1967, a House Committee recom-
mended against proposed regulations, 32
Fed. Reg. 5512 (1967), which would have
eliminated the consent requirement for
rights-of-way across tribal lands of
non-IRA tribes. The House Committee in-
vestigated the matter and concluded that:

e+. the Secretary's proposal for grant-

ing rights-of-way over tribal land
without the consent of the tribe which
owns it violates property rights, demo-
cratic principles, and the pattern of
modern Indian legislation.

The committee believes that the
Secretary's assertion of power to act
in disregard of his own regulation and
issue rights-of-way over lands of
tribes that have withheld their consent
to such grants is contrary to law, as
well as to good government, and should
not be entertained.

H. Rep. No 91-78, 91st Cong., lst Sess. 3
(1967). The Committee cited "one of the

oldest principles of jurisprudence in

=9=

America - that Indian tribes should not be
deprived of rights in their land without
their consent." Id. at 17.

In 1976, Congress repealed a 1926 act
which authorized condemnation of Pueblo
tribal lands and made applicable to the
Pueblos the 1899 Act, the 1948 Act and
other special rights of way acts. Act of
Sept. 17, 1976, 90 Stat. 1275, 25 U.S.C.

§322. See Plains Electric Generation and

Transmission Cooperative, Inc., V-. Pueblo

of Laguna, 542 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1976).

In so doing, Congress authorized the Pueblo
tribes to consent to right-of-way grants
across their lands, thereby placing them
“in the same position ... as other
federally recognized Indian tribes." Conf.
Rep. No. 94-1439, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 3

(1976). The necessity for this was that:

-10-

.e. the 1926 Act denies the Pueblos the
right of consent in considering
applications for rights-of-way across
their lands for whatever purpose. On
the other hand, those tribes that
organized constitutional governments
pursuant to the Act of June 18, 1934
(48 Stat. 987), clearly, were provided
the right of consent in considering
rights-of-way applications. Moreover,
the balance of federally recognized
tribes have been granted the privilege
of consent through Secretarial
regulations.

Id. Obviously, Congress would not have
repealed the 1926 condemnation statute on
the one hand, and made the 1899 Act appli-
cable on the other hand, unless it believed
that Pueblo consent was necessary for
grants under the 1899 Act.

In reenacting the right-of-way statutes
in 1976, the above legislative history
shows that Congress explicitly approved the
Secretary's regulations which contained a
tribal consent requirement for right-of-way

grants including those made pursuant to the

alle

1899 Act. See, United States v. Sheffield

Board of Commissioners, 435 U.S. 110,

134-35 (1978); Helvering v. Reynolds Co.,

306 U.S. 110, 116 (1939); Helvering v.

Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938). Such
approval also confirms the Secretary's
authority to require tribal consent for all
types of right-of-way grants for all tribes
whether IRA or non-IRA. See e.g., Morton
v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 214, 229-30 (1974);

Vigil v. Andrus, 667 F.2d 931, 934-35 (10th

Cir. 1982). 2/

5/ Congress' longstanding acquiescence
in the Secretary's regulatory scheme also
evinces an implied delegation by Congress
to the Secretary of the authority to
establish tribal consent as a pre-
condition. See, United States v. Midwest
Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 472-75 (1915); Sioux
Tribe of Indians v. U.S., 316 U.S. 317, 327
(1942); Southern Pacific I, supra at 686,
689.

ale

The Secretary's regulatory scheme is
fully consistent with current federal
Indian policy of encouraging tribal self-
sufficiency and economic development. See,

New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,

U.S. , 51 U.S.L.W. 4741, 4744 (June 24,

1983); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,

455 U.S. 130, 138 n.5 (1982); White

Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S.

136, 143 n.10 (1980). It is also
consistent with the rule that federal
Indian statutes and regulations must be
“construed generously in order to comport
with ... traditional notions of sovereignty
and with the federal policy of encouraging

tribal independence." Ramah Navajo Sch.

Bad. v. Bureau of Revenue, U.S. a Fe

L.Ed.2d 1174, 1175 (1982).
Southern Pacific argues that the
federal policy of encouraging railroad

=] 3<

expansion in the late 1800's controls and
divested tribes of the power to consent.
The history of railroad expansion vis a vis
Indian reservations does not bear this out,
however, and in any case, the national in-
terest in protecting tribal lands is para-
nount .£/
Until 1899, railroad right-of-way

grants across tribal lands were authorized
only by special acts of Congress. When

self-executing railroad right-of-way grants

across public lands were authorized in

1875, Indian reservations were expressly

excepted. Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat.

6/ In right-of-way statutes prior to
and after 1899, Congress apparently did not
find tribal consent to be inconsistent with
the promotion, growth and expansion of an
interstate railroad system. See Act of
August 5, 1882, 22 Stat. 299; Act of May
30, 1888, 25 Stat. 160; Act of May 8, 1890,
26 Stat. 102, Act of Feb. 18, 1895, 28
Stat. 665, all cited in Pet. at 56 n.36.

@l4-

482, 43 U.S.C. § 938. See Southern Pacific

I, supra at 687-89. 2/ Later, the 1899

Act authorized administrative grants of
railroad rights-of-way across tribal lands
to eliminate the need for special acts and
to achieve uniformity, but in a manner
which would “fully pres?2rve and protect the
rights and interests of Indians." H.R.
Rep. No. 1896, 55th Cong., 3d Sess. 2
(1899). If railroad expansion had been
paramount, Congress could have simply
amended the 1875 Act to include Indian
reservations rather than enacting a special

statute protective of Indian lands.

77 The 1875 Act was repealed in 1976,
90 Stat. 2793. Presently rights-of-way for
public utility purposes including railroads
can be acquired over public lands through a
rant from the Secretary. See 43 U.S.C.
1761.

<{ =

II. The Decision is Consistent With
Decisions of this Court and the
Courts of Appeal

Congress has always respected, and this
Court has upheld, the right of Indians to
consent to and control the use of their

lands.2/ Thus this Court has required

8/ This policy was articulated early in
history in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,
ratified by the First Congress, 1 Stat. 50,
52:

The utmost good faith shall always be
observed toward the Indians. Their
lands and property shall never be taken
from them without their consent; and in
their property, rights and liberty they
shall never be invaded or disturbed
unless in just and lawful wars
authorized by Congress ..-«-.

The policy is relied on in numerous Supreme
Court decisions, e.g., Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. Pet.) 1, 17 (1831);
United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93
U.S. 188, 197 (1876); New York Indians
(Fellows v. Deniston), 72 U.S. (5 Wall.)
761, 768 (1867); Wilson v. Omaha Indian
Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 665 (1979). See also,
Prucha, American Indian Policy in the
Formative Years (Harvard University Press,
1962),p. 40.

-16-

that any congressional intent to deprive a
Tribe of its rights or interests in or over
its land without its consent be clear and

unequivocal. United States v. Santa Fe

Pacific Railroad Co., 314 U.S. 339, 353

(1941); United States v. Shoshone Tribe,

304 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1938); cf. Santa

Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60

(1978). See also, Cohen, "Original Indian

Title," 32 Minn. L.R. 28, 36-37 (1947).

Most recently this Court has stated
that "(a] tribe's power to exclude non-
members entirely or to condition their
presence on the reservation is ... well

established." New Mexico v. Mescalero

Apache Tribe, supra 51 U.S.L.W. at 4743.

See also Mcntana v. United States, 450 U.S.

544, 557 (1981). The power derives from

the dual role of a tribe as a landowner and

ol 7-

a local government, see e.g., Merrion v.

Jicarilla Apache Tribe, supra, 455 U.S. at

145 n.12, and includes the "sovereign power
of determining the conditions upon which
persons shall be permitted to enter its
domain, to reside therein, and to do
business...." Id. The right to condition
a right-of-way grant on the consent of a
tribe is certainly in accordance with these

principles. See Escondido Mutual Water Co.

v. F.E.R.C., 692 F.2d 1223, 1231-1233 (9th

Cir. 1982).

Southern Pacific suggests that there is
a conflict in the circuits as to whether
the 1899 Act is an eminent domain statute.
See discussion infra at 24-26. However, as
recognized by the court below, the
purported conflict involves only dicta.

Southern Pacific II, supra at 555 n.2.

-198-

In United States v. Ft. Smith & W.R.

Co., 195 F. 211 (8th Cir. 1912), the
statute involved was an eminent domain
statute, 30 Stat. 1368, passed one day
after the 1899 Act. At issue, was a
rignt-of-way across individual allotted
lands. In dictum, the Eighth Circuit
compared the speciai act with certain
provisions of the 1899 Act and stated that
the 1899 Act also granted eminent domain
power over tribal and allotted lands. But
the Eighth Circuit obviously was not
required to make, nor did it make, a
careful analysis of the 1899 Act. If it
had, it would have found that Congress
passed the special act granting the
Railroad condemnation power precisely
because it believed that the 1899 Act did

not grant such power. Furthermore, the

=) Go

court would have discovered that the
condemnation provisions of the 1899 Act it
cites apply only to allotted lands. See
section 3 of the Act, 25 U.S.C. $314.

The decision of the Tenth Circuit in

Clarke v. Boysen, 39 F.2d 800 (lOth Cir.

1930) likewise did not turn on whether the
1899 Act is an eminent domain statute. The
Tenth Circuit did not independently analyze
the 1899 Act, but simply cited and relied
upon the erroneous findings of the Eighth

Circuit in United States v. Ft. Smith &

W.R. Co., supra.

III. Review is Otherwise Inappropriate

Southern Pacific raises additional
questions regarding the authority of the
Secretary to require tribal consent as a
precondition for a railroad right-of-way.

None of these issues warrant review.

-20-

A. Authority of the Secretary.

The tribal consent precondition is
within the Secretary's authority. The 1899
Act on its face authorizes the Secretary to
establish grant preconditions by
regulation. Section 1 provides that a
right-of-way:

is hereby granted to any railroad

company ... which shall comply with the

provisions of this Act and such rules

and regulations as may be prescribed
thereunder. (Emphasis added).

This provision requires compliance with the
act and administrative rules and
regulations, and constitutes a grant of
broad authority to the Secretary which by
its terms contemplates regulations which go
beyond the specific conditions enumerated
in the Act. Thus tribal consent, although

not specifically provided for in the 1899

aia

Act, is authorized by the Act and has been
required by the Secretary for grants under
the Act since at least 1928.

It is by now a fundamental rule that
substantial deference shall be given to the
construction of a statute by the agency
charged with its administration. Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). The stan-
dard for reviewing the agency's con-
struction is whether it is reasonable. Id.

The Secretary's regulation requiring
tribal consent as a grant precondition is
entirely consistent with the purpose of the
1899 Act to allow administrative grants of
railroad rights-of-way in a manner which
would "fully preserve and protect the
rights and interests of the Indians." H.R.
Rep. No. 1896, supra at 2. The tribal con-
sent regulation is a reasonable means of
achieving this purpose. Indeed, as

@22=

Southern Pacific points out in its
Petition at 31-33, the protective effect of
a tribal consent requirement to
administrative conveyances of tribal land
prompted Congress to require consent for
all such conveyances as part of section 16
of the IRA, 25 U.S.C. §476.

The consent provision is based on a
long history of federal policies and legal
principles which respect the right of
Indians to control the use of their land,
see discussion supra at 16-18. These basic
principles and policies, along with the
purpose of the 1899 Act as set out in its
terms and legislative history, provide the
standards by which the Secretary exercises
his authority. These standards govern many
aspects of Indian affairs, see note /|
supra, and guard against any arbitrary
action by the Secretary.

@23@

Southern Pacific argues that tribal
consent is inconsistent with the 1899 Act
because the 1899 Act is "in the nature of
an eminent domain statute." Pet. at 40.
But the specific language of the statute
Supports a different conclusion. On its
face, the statute requires that the
railroad comply with conditions in the Act,
as well as the Secretary's rules and
regulations in order for a right-of-way to
issue. This is in contrast to the
right-of-way granted to the Fort Smith and
Western Railroad Company the day after the
1899 Act, where the Railroad was:

invested and empowered with the right

of locating, constructing, owning,

equipping, operating, using, and
maintaining a railway and telegraph and
telephone line through the Choctaw and

Creek nations....

Section 1 of the Act of March 3, 1899, 30

Stat. 1368. It is also in contrast with

-24-

the earlier 1875 statute granting
rights-of-way across public domain land.
Section 1 of this Act provides that:

eee @ right of way through the public
lands ... is hereby granted to any
railroad company ... which shall have
filed with the Secretary of the
Interior a copy of its articles of
incorporation, and due proofs of its
Organization ... to the extent of one
hundred feet on each side of the
control line of said road. ...

Section 1 of the Act of March 3, 1875, 18
Stat. 482, 43 U.S.C. §934 et seq. This
language has been interpreted as a grant in

praesenti, Southern Pacific I, supra at 691.

Congress obviously has not interpreted
the 1899 Act as an eminent domain statute.
In 1976, when it repealed the 1926 Pueblo
lands railroad condemnation statute, and
made the 1899 Act applicable, the purpose
was to abolish condemnation of Pueblo
lands. Act of Sept. 17, 1976, 90 Stat.
1275. See Hearings Before the

=25<

Subcommittee on Indian Affairs on S. 217,
94th Cong. lst Sess. 4 (1975). It would
have made no sense for Congress to repeal
one railroad condemnation statute and in
the same breath make another condemnation
Statute applicable. Thus Congress’ inter-
pretation of the 1899 Act rejects its
characterization as an eminent domain
statute, and supports the authority of the
Secretary to require tribal consent.

B. Delegation

Southern Pacific also argues that
requirement of tribal consent is an
unconstitutional delegation of authority to
Indian tribes. However, such delegation is
fully consistent with this Court's decision

in United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544

(1975). In Mazurie, the limitations on the
power to delegate recognized in Panama

Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935),

=26<

were found to be "less stringent in cases
where the entity exercising the delegated
authority itself possesses independent
authority over the subject matter." Id. at
556-57. The underlying rationale was that
the delegatee tribe is required to afford
due process to non-members under the Indian
Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. Section 1302,
and that the Fifth Amendment may also be
available to protect against arbitrary
tribal action. Id. at 558 n.12. 2/

These are the standards by which the Tribe

must exercise its authority. See Nance v.

Environmental Protection Agency, 645 F.2d

701, 714-16 (9th Cir. 1981)(upholding the

9/ Of course, any issue of whether the
Tribe's exercise of its delegated authority
denied Southern Pacific any rights of due
process is not properly before this Court.
The only issue squarely presented by this
case is whether the delegation itself is
valid.

a2F=

constitutionality of the delegation to
tribes of the power to redesignate air
quality even where it affects areas off the
reservation). See R. Collins, "Implied
limitations On The Jurisdiction of Indian

Thus to the extent that the Secretary's
tribal consent regulation constitutes a
delegation of his power to regulate rail-
road right-of-way grants, the delegation is

10/

valid under Mazurie. In fact, if

10/ In any case, it is arguable that
the tribal consent regulation is a
delegation of the Secretary's regulatory
power under the 1899 Act. Rather, the
regulations merely confirm that the
Secretary in exercising his power under the
1899 Act will defer action until the Tribe
exercises its inherent power as landowner
and consents to a conveyance of its
property. Statutes requiring consent of
persons as a precondition to government
action have generally been upheld against
claims of unconstitutional delegation of
power. The reasoning is that the power to

-28-

the delegation of power to regulate liquor
is valid then the delegation of power to
regulate the use of tribal lands is a
fortiori valid because it is an even more
basic attribute of tribal sovereignty. See

Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. F.E.R.C,
11/

Supra, 698 F.2d at 1233 n.6.

(footnote 10 continued)consent to the
exercise of regulatory authority is not
power to regulate where the ultimate power
to take action remains in the government.
See generally, 1 Antieau, Municipal
Corporation Law, Section 5.28 at 81-82
(1982). Here, the ultimate power to
approve a railroad right of way remains in
the Secretary. Southern Pacific II, supra,
700 F.2d at 556.

11/ The Secretary has delegated power
to tribes in many other instances, even
where no express legislative authorization
exists. See e.g., 25 C.F.R. Part ll
establishing Courts of Indian Offenses and
authorizing tribes in Section 1l.l(e) to
preempt certain regulations through the
passage of inconsistent tribal ordinances;
25 C.F.R. §163.7 promulgated under 25
U.S.C. § 407, authorizing tribal consent to
sale of timber on tribal lands; 43 C.F.R.

-29-

Southern Pacific and amici raise the
spectre that tribes will unreasonably with-
hold their consent. However Congress has
considered this argument on several occa-
sions and has expressly rejected it as a
reason for divesting tribes of the right to
consent. In 1976 when Congress applied the
1899 Act and other right-of-way acts to the

Pueblo tribes, see discussion Supra at 10-ll

(footnote 11 continued) §4.200 promulgated
under various statutory authority
authorizing tribal preemption of the
Secretary's regulations establishing rules
governing the settlement of trust estates
of deceased Indians; and 25 C.F.R. § 211.28
promulgated under various Indian mineral
leasing statutes authorizing tribes to
supersede the Secretary's regulations
governing leasing of tribal lands for
mining purposes See also 40 C.F.R.
§52.21(g)(1) promulgated under the Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642, authorizing
tribes to redesignate the air quality on
their reservations from that already
established by the Environmental Protection
Agency. This authority was upheld in Nance
v. Environmental Protection Agency, supra.

-30-

it responded to the argument by stating:
"Should public necessity require rights-
of-way across the lands of the Pueblo not-
withstanding the lack of consent of the
Pueblos, the Congress retains its authority
to grant such rights-of-way." H.R. Rep.
No. 94-800, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1976)

reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.

News 2370.

Again, in 1969, when Congress rejected
proposed regulations which would have di-
vested non-IRA tribes of the right to con-
sent to rights-of-way, the argument was
also rejected. The House Committee which
reviewed the regulations recognized that
"CtJhere may be cases where overwhelming
public necessity will justify the con-
demnation of rights-of-way over tribal
Indian land despite the opposition of the
Indian landowners.” It nevertheless

=Zle-

believed that “involuntary disposal of the
Indians' property rights ought not to be
done by administrative action of the
Interior Department." Instead, the
Committee stated that such cases ought to
be left to resolution by Congress. H.R.
Rep. No. 91-78, supra at 9. Clearly
Congress has never believed that the issue
raised by Southern Pacific and amici war-
rants divesting tribes of the power to con-
sent (or withhold consent) for rights-
of-way across their lands.

IV. The Court's Judgment Can Also Be
Sustained On Other Grounds

The Ninth Circuit's decision rests
solely on construction of the 1899 Act, but
it also may be sustained on other grounds.
Both section 16 of the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act, 25 U.S.C. Section 476, and
section 2 of the 1948 Indian Rights of Way

=32<

Act, 25 U.S.C. Section 324, require tribal
consent for rights-of-way across Indian
lands and would apply to the railroad
right-of-way at issue.

Section 16 of the IRA empowers tribes
Organized under the Act "to prevent the
sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance of
tribal lands ...." The right-of-way regu- :
lations issued by the Secretary in 1938
implement the tribal consent condition re-
quired by the IRA, 25 C.F.R. §256.83 (lst
ed. 1939-40), and apply to railroad
right-of-way grants across tribal lands as
well as other dispositions of tribal
lands.

<

When Congress enacted the 1948 Indian
Rights of Way Act, it believed that IRA ,
tribes already possessed the power to con-
sent to dispositions of their land for oad
rights-of-way under the various existing

o33e

special acts. See S. Rep. No. 823, 80th

Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), reprinted in 1948

U.S. Code.Cong. & Adm. News 1033, 1036.

Thus Congress sought to "preserve the
powers" of IRA tribes to consent to right-
of-way grants by expressly providing for
such consent in the 1948 Act. See section
2 of the 1948 Act, 25 U.s.c. §324, 12/
Alternatively, the 1899 Act and all
other special right-of-way statutes auth-

orizing secretarial grants were implicitly

amended in 1948 to require tribal consent

when they were incorporated into the com-

prehensive and uniform scheme for granting
rights-of-way contemplated by the 1948
Act. See, S. Rep. No. 823, supra.

Congress specifically considered the

12/ See also discussion of the 1976
Pueblo Lands Act supra at 10-1ll, and H.R.
Rep. No. 78, 9lst Cong. lst Sess. (1969)
discussed supra.at 9-10.

o3f<

treatment of special right- of-way statutes
in the 1948 Act's comprehensive scheme and
decided to preserve them as parts of the
scheme. 25 U.S.C. §326. It is reasonable
‘to infer that the same Congress which so
carefully preserved the power of IRA tribes
to consent to rights-of-way, intended that
this power apply to those special
right-of-way acts preserved under the same
act. In instances where Congress knowingly
includes pre-existing statues as parts of
an overall legislative scheme, implied
amendment of such statutes is 4m keeping
with Congress' intent in enacting the

comprehensive scheme. iA Sutherland,

Statutory Sesnt cambios Weation y > i

ft

o3$~

CONCLUSION
The writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Yvonne T. Knight

Counsel of Record
Jeanne S. Whiteing
Native American Rights Fund
1506 Broadway
Boulder, Colorado 80302
(303) 447-8760

Attorneys for the Walker River
Paiute Tribe of Nevada

October 1983

-36-

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385011_0182%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
