# Supplemental Appendix — Campbell v. Department of Transportation

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Supplemental Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 469 U.S. 881

## Text

Office - Supreme Court, U.S.

84:75 FILED

JUL 26 1984

ALEXANDER . STEVAS.
CrERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1983

fy.
Vv

ROBERT L. CAMPBELL, et al.,

Petitioners,
Vs.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION;
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

Respondents.

fy
Vv

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

r -
Vv

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

io)

Kernwetu H. Stern

1763 Franklin Street
Denver, CO 80218
Telephone: (303) 861-8580

Attorney for Petitioner

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 835-7427 Ext. 333

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinion and Order 1
| RRR ERROR ALT SONY a ON 1
II. Prima Facie Case of Strike Participation ............... 4
‘A tees eee 5

B. Continuation of the Strike ...... ‘ 6

III. Unauthorized Absence .................... me ve 13
IV. Readmission teu Ageney’s Facility 2... 14
V. Procedural Error Comtemtiors 2.2... 18
TI I gs hiceeccrancanhionsienancndbaecccnmintpcib 18
I I iar cetacean 20

VI. Suspension 21
i a nT PEE on on Nee rt tee 22
A. Consolidation 22

B. Ex Parte Communications ... 22

C. Adverse Inference P 23

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
ROBERT L. CAMBPELL, ET AL.!

v.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

DOCKET NUMBER:
DE075281F 0674

OPINION AND ORDER
I. Background

Appellants were removed from their positions as Air
Traftie Control Specialists, Denver Air Route Traffic
Control Center, Longmont, Colorado. Their removals
were based on charges of: (1) striking against the United
States Government in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 7311 and 18
U.S.C. $1918; and (2) unauthorized absence (absence
without leave or AWOL). Appellants, 54 in all, petitioned
for appeal of their removals to the Denver Regionai Of-
fice of the Board. The appeals were consolidated by the
presiding official pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 1201.36(b).

With respect to each appellant, the presiding official
found in a consolidated initial decision rendered on Octo-
ber 7, 1982, that the agency charges were supported by a
preponderance of the evidence and that the penalty of re-
moval was appropriate. She therefore sustained the agen-
ey actions. However, as to appellant Russell S. Root, the
presiding official found that because he had notified the
agency that he was ready, willing, and able to return to
work prior to receiving his removal proposal, his place-

1All 54 appellants and their individual docket numbers
are listed on the attached appendix.

1

2

ment by the agency in a non-duty, non-pay status during
the removal notice period constituted an improper suspen-
sion. She ordered the agency to amend its records and to
place appellant Root in a duty and pay status from August
8, 1981, the date he requested to be returned to work, until
September 2, 1981, the effective date of his removal.

Appellants’ petition for review of the initial decision
is based on numerous contentions of harmful error by the
agency and reversible error by the presiding official in
sustaining their removals.? Also, the agency cross-petit-

2Additionally, appellants filed a motion to strike the agen-
cy’s submissions on review on the basis that the agency failed
to file a notice of a change of its designated representative as,
they assert, is required by 5 C.F.R. § 1201.31(a). They further
assert that a February 2, 1982 Prehearing Order by the pre-
siding official stated that the Board would not accept submis-
sions from any person other than the designated representative
or a pro se appellant.

While the Prehearing Order applied only to proceedings
before the presiding official, the Board has held that the pro-
cedures for the designation of representatives as provided in
5 C.F.R. § 1201.31(a) are applicable in petitions for review be-
fore the Board. See Riddick v. Office of Personnel Manage-
ment, 5 MSPB 263 (1981). We consider appellants’ motion to
strike as the equivalent of a request for a sanction against the
agency for failing to comply with section 1201.31(a). Before
imposing a sanction, however, the Board’s practice is to pro-
vide the affected party an opportunity to comply with the reg-
ulation in question. Since, in this case, the agency was not
afforded such an opportunity, the Board finds that the impo-
sition of a sanction would be inappropriate. Moreover, in re-
sponse to appellants’ motion, the agency cured its defective
filing by submitting a proper notice of change of represen-
tative. Also, we note that appellants have not shown any re-
sulting prejudice to their rights. Therefore, appellants’ motion
to strike is denied.

Appellants also filed a motion to dismiss the agency
charges on the basis that the notice of proposed removal was

(Continued on next page)

ions for review from the presiding official’s finding that
it improperly suspended appellant Root. We _ hereby
GRANT review under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(e) (1)3

(Continued from last page)

issued contrary to law. Appellants have cited no authority to
support the granting of that motion on the basis alleged. We
find that the appropriate procedure for challenging any error
in the notice of proposed removal is by petition for review,
as has been filed by appellants. Therefore, appellants’ motion
to dismiss is also hereby denied.

3By notice published in the Federal Register, 48 Fed. Reg.
2235-36 (1983), the Board solicited amicus briefs on issues of
law common to numerous appeals of former air traffic control-
lers. In response to that notice, a total of some 11 amicus briefs
were filed, and all have been duly considered by the Board
in its decision-making process.

In a letter to the Board dated March 7, 1983, Rex B. Camp-
bell, the designated representative for appellant Robert L.
Campbell, et al., alleged that Special Presiding Official Kenneth
Goshorn and agency representative Diane R. Liff engaged in an
ex parte communication regarding the agency’s motion to file
a response to the amicus briefs. Because the charge involved
a Board employee, it has been carefully investigated by the
Board’s Designated Agency Ethics Officer, Evangeline W. Swift.
See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.103(b) (2).

Having examined Mr. Campbell’s correspondence, Special!
Presiding Official Goshorn’s Summary of Telephone Calls of
February 23-24, 1983, and the Board order of March 17, 1983,
granting the agency motion, the Ethics Officer has determined
that the subject of the telephone communication in question
was procedural in nature, and did not relate to the merits of a
Board appeal or otherwise violate Board rules. She therefore
concluded that it did not constitute a prohibited ex parte com-
munication under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.102. This conclusion was
conveyed to Mr. Campbell by letter dated April 14, 1983. We
concur in that determination. Thus, no sanctions under 5
C.F.R. § 1201.103(b) are warranted under these circumstances.
All of the documentation relating to this charge of ex parte
communication is included in the official administrative record
of this case.

II. Prima Facie Case of Strike Participation

In Schapansky v. Department of Transportation,
MSPB Docket No. DA075281F1130 at 6 n.2 (October 28,
1982), the Board stated that ‘‘[i]n a ease, such as this one,
in which the existence of a strike is a matter of general
knowledge, the agency may establish a prima facie case of
an employee’s voluntary participation therein by present-
ing evidence of his unauthorized absence from duty during
the strike.”* The Board further stated that the burden of
going forward would then shift to the appellant to present
evidence showing that he was without knowledge of the
strike or that his absence from duty was due to some other
factor. However, the agency bears the burden of ultimate-
ly proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
appellant had participated in the strike. Jd.

In the instant case, appellants contend in their peti.
tion that the agency lailed to establish a prima facie case
of their participation in a strike against the United States
Government. The presiding official found that the agen-
cy presented both documentary and testimonial evidence
that appellants were AWOL during the strike and failed
to report for their first regularly scheduled shifts subse-
quent to a 48-hour grace period granted by President Rea-
gan on August 3, 1981.5 She found that, except for appel-

4This Board has previously taken official notice that a strike
by air traffic controllers commenced on August 3, 1981, and
continued through August 6, 1981. Ketchem v. Department of
Transportation, MSPB Docket No. DA075281F0713 at 9 (May 28,
1982). Also, the Board found that the strike was unlawful un-
der 5 U.S.C. § 7311 and 18 U.S.C. § 1918. Id. at 5.

S5On August 3, 1981, at approximately 11:00 a.m., E.D.T.,
President Reagan announced that striking air traffic controllers

(Continued on next page)

5

lant Root, appellants made no request to be returned to
work. Further, the presiding official found that appel-
lants failed to even allege a legitimate nonstrike-related
reason for their absence. Therefore, she eoncluded that
the agency had sustained its burden of proving strike par-
ticipation and absence without leave.

A. Hearsay Evidence

In arriving at that determination, the presiding ofti-
cial noted that the testimonial evidence on appellants’
strike participation was presented by the Chief of the
Denver Air Traffie Control Center, Ralph Kiss, who was
without ‘‘iirsthand knowledge’’ of the facts to which he
testified, and that other agency officials with personal
knowledge of the facts were present at the hearing. Nev-
ertheless, relying on a line of Board cases holding that
hearsay evidence may be admitted in proceedings before
the Board,° the presiding official determined that the tes-

(Continued from last page)

who failed to return to work within 48 hours would be termi-
nated. The agency interpreted the announcement to allow a
“grace period” during which those who reported for work at
their first scheduled shifts after August 5, 1981, were not re-
moved. See Schapansky, supra, at 11 n.9, citing Air Traffic
Controllers Strike, 17 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 845 (August 3,
1981); and PATCO v. United States Department of Transporta-
tion, 529 F. Supp. 614 (D. Minn. 1982). In a series of General
Notices (GENOTS), the agency alsc allowed for regular days off
and absence for other legitimate reasons which could have af-
fected the deadline for returning. GENOT 128 (August 5,
1981); and GENOT 141 (August 10, 1981).

‘See Borninkoff v. Department of Justice, 5 MSPB 150
(1981), and federal court cases cited therein. See also Kunick
v. Department of the Navy, MSPB Docket No. SE07528110102
(January 19, 1982); Lee v. Department of the Interior, 6 MSPB
561 (1981); Davies v. Department of Agriculture, 5 MSPB 291
(1981); Green v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 MSPB 403 (1980).

timony provided by Mr. Kiss was worthy of evidentiary
weight since it ‘‘was generally consistent, was corrobo-
rated by documents within the appeal record, was subject
to cross-examination, and was uncontradicted by appel-
lants.’’ Initial Decision at 14-15. Further, the presiding
official noted that appellants failed to object to the hear-
say testimony proffered at the hearing.

In their petition for review, appellants now challenge
the presiding official’s admission of the hearsay testi-
mony. Appellants assert that they requested the agency
to produce a witness, John Schinidt, who allegedly had
first-hand knowledge of the leave cancellation procedures
utilized by the agency, but that the agency failed to do so.
Appellants also allege that the presiding official failed to
order the agency to produce the witness. The record
shows, however, that Mr. Schmidt did testify at the ap-
pellants’ request. Hearing Transcript (Tr.) at 805-813.
On consideration of the record, we find no error in the
presiding official’s decision to assign probative value to
the hearsay testimony.

B. Continuation of the Strike

Two appellants, David Gold and Thaddeus W. Wal-
lace, were charged with strike partici ation commencing
subsequent to August 6, 1981. The agency had initially
charged appellant Gold with striking from August 13 to
August 18, 1981, the date of the notice of his proposed re-
moval, but thereafter conceded that appellant Gold was on
a combination of approved annual leave, regular days off,
and spot leave through August 16, 1981. Therefore, the
agency amended the commencement date of appellant
Gold’s alleged strike participation to August 17, 1981. Ap-

a

‘

pellant did not dispute the corrected ayency deadline. He
failed to report for his August 17, 1981 deadline.

Appellant Wallace was on approved annual leave and
regular days off through August 12, 1981. His stated
agency deadline was August 13, 1981. Appellant Wallace
also failed to report for his ageney deadline and was
charged with strike participation from August 13, 1981, to
August 19, 1981, the date of the notice of his proposed
removal.

Both appellants chalienge the presiding official’s
finding that the strike continued beyond August 6, 1981.
The presiding official based her finding upon the follow-
ing unrebutted evidence presented by the agency: media
excerpts showing that leaders of the Professional Air
Traffie Controllers Organization (PATCO) regarded the
strike as continuing until as late as October 31, 1981; an
October 28, 1981 submission made by PATCO before the
Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) concerning
discontinuation of the strike;’ and testimony by Mr. Kiss
that picketing at the Denver facility continued until Sep-
tember 24, 1981, subsequent to the removal dates of all the
appellants to this action. Tr. at 37.

In Ketchem, supra, at 9, the Board held that when an
employee is charged with participation in the strike on
dates subsequent to August 6, 1981, the agency bears the
burden of proving by direct evidence that the strike was in
fact in progress on the date charged and that the employee
could have returned to work on that date. We also held in

?See Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization and
Federal Aviation Administration, 7 F.L.R.A. No. 10 at 2, footnote
(November 3, 1981) (Supplemental Opinion of Ronald H.
Haughton, Chairman).

Noa v. Department of Transportation, MSPB Docket No.
NY075281F0697 at 14-16 (April 25, 1983), that in order to
show continuation of the strike, the agency need not neces-
sarily present evidence proving that on the charged date
or dates there was a certain number of co-workers mutual-
ly withholding their services.

In consideration of the record, and in light of our dis-
cussion in Noa, supra, at 14-16, we find that it is more
likely true than not true that the strike continued at least
until August 17, 1981, when the last of three appellants
(Wallace) could have returned to work. Ketchem, supra,
at 9.

Further, the agency showed by testimonial evidence,
as well as documentary evidence consisting of leave and
attendance records, that both of these appellants were
absent without authorization from the dates of their
agency deadlines and had neither contacted the agency
nor attempted to report for duty. Tr. at 373-80, 766-78.
Therefore, we find that the agency established a prima
facie case of strike participation by appellants Goid and
Wallace on August 17 and 13, respectively. See Schapan-
sky, supra, at 6 n.2. These appellants have failed to offer
any evidence to rebut the ageucy’s prima facie case by
showing that they were without knowledge of the strike
or that there was some other legitimate nonstrike-related
reason for their absence. Jd. Therefore, we find that the
agency sustained its brvden of proving by prepunderant
evidence strike participation by appellants Gold and Wal-
lace.

It has been held that participation in a strike against
the United States Government, however, “short-lived,”

justifies removal under 5 U.S.C. § 7311. See American
Postal Workers Union v. United States Pestal Service,
682 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. dented, 51 U.S.
L.W. 3606 (February 22, 1983) (No. 82-575). Thus, hav-
ing found that the agency showed by preponderant evi-
dence strike participation by these appellants on August
13 and 17, we need not address allegations of their strike
participation on subsequent dates.

The remaining appellants were charged with strike
participation for all or a portion of the August 3-6, 1981
official notice period’ until the issuance of their notices
of proposed removal.’ The agency presented testimonial
and documentary evidence showing that each of these ap-
pellants was absent without authorization during the of-
ficial notice period. See Tr. at 187-801. (These pages in-
clude the extensive testimony presented by the agency
to show unauthorized absence by these appellants). Thus,
under Schapansky, supra, at 6 n.2, the agency established
a prima facie case of strike participation by these appel-
lants.

Several appellants sought to rebut the agency’s prima
facie case of strike participation by contending that they
were on approved annual leave for at least a portion of
the period for which they were charged with striking and
AWOL. With respect to those appellants, the agency pre-
sented documentary and testimonial evidence of their

8See Ketchem, supra, at 9.

%In light of the court’s holding in American Postal Workers
Union v. U.S. Postal Service, supra, at 1284, we also find it un-
necessary to address roy ps“ of these appellants’ strike par-
ticipation subsequent to the official notice period.

10

annual leave cancellation prior to the commencement of
the August 3, 1981 strike as follows:

Michael A. Nord

The agency submitted a “Record of Conversation”
indicating that on August 2, 1981, appellant’s supervisor
left a message with appellant’s wife that appellant’s an-
nual leave was cancelled. This evidence was buttressed
by Mr. Kiss’ testimony to that effect. Tr. at 629-633. Ap-
pellant has not denied he received notice of the leave
cancellation. Appellant failed to report for his August
6, 1981 deadline.

Shannon K. Redding

The agency submitted a “Record of Conversation”
by appellant’s supervisor, indicating that appellant was
personally notified on July 31, 1981, of her annual leave
cancellation. See Tr. at 680. Appellant failed to report
for her August 6, 1981 deadline.

Russell S. Root

The agency submitted a “Record of Conversation”
signed by appellant’s supervisor. The document stated
that a telephonic notification of appellant’s leave can-
cellation was communicated to appellant’s wife on August
2, 1981, and that she agreed to forward the message to
appellant. At no time has appellant denied receiving the
message from his wife. Appellant simply alleges that the
agency failed to prove that his wife had relayed the mes-
sage of cancellation to him.

We note, though, that Mr. Kiss telephoned appellant
on August 4, 1981, and requested that he return to work

11

but that appellant refused. It is undisputed that annual
leave cancellation was not discussed on that occasion. We
find that Mr. Kiss’ explanation that he did not mention
leave cancellation because he was aware appellant had
already been notified of the cancellation and that he was
merely encouraging appellant to return to work was
plausible. See Tr. at 688, 692-93. Appellant failed to re-
port for his August 5, 1981 deadline. He called the agency
on August 8, 1981, requesting to be returned to work. He
was informed that he had missed his deadline and would
not be allowed to return.

Darrell L. Taylor

The agency submitted a “Record of Conversation”
showing appellant’s wife was informed telephonically on
August 2, 1981, of appellant’s leave cancellation and that
she agreed to notify him.'’® Appellant has not alleged that
his wife failed to notify him that his annual leave was
cancelled. Appellant failed to report for his August 6,
1981 deadline.

Thomas G. Weimer

The agency submitted a “Record of Conversation”
indicating that on August 1, 1981, appellant was notified
in person by his supervisor that his annual leave was
cancelled. See Tr. at 790-91. Appellant does not deny
that his leave was cancelled. Appellant failed to report
for his August 5, 1981 deadline.

\0Appellant challenges an agency statement in his file con-
cerning cancellation of annual leave and regularly scheduled
days off in the event of a strike as unsigned and undated. Ap-
pellant has not further identified that statement, and it is not
evident from review of appellant’s file.

12

Further, the record shows that all of those appellants,
as well as the other appellants in this consolidation, had
been informed by the agency that all annual leave would
be cancelled in the event of a strike, and each appellant’s
file contains a July 31, 1981 memorandum of annual leave
cancellation. Appellants have not denied receiving those
general notices of leave cancellation. Thus, we find that
the agency showed by preponderant evidence that appel-
lants’ leave was effectively cancelled. See McPartland
v. Department of Transportation, MSPB Docket No. DA-
075281F1018 at 2-4 (February 8, 1983).

Except for appellant Russell S. Root, none of the
appellants, including those who alleged that they were
on scheduled annual leave for a portion of the period
during which they were charged with striking, even
claimed that they attempted to contact the agency re-
garding their job status or to return to work pursuant to
the Presidential amnesty offer. Further, none of the
appellants charged with striking during the August 3 to
August 6, 1981 period has alleged lack of knowledge of
the strike or absence from duty due to some other factor.
See Schapansky, supra, at 6 n.2. Therefore, we find that
the agency met its burden of proving by preponderant evi-
dence strike participation by these appellants. Jd. See
also Ketchem, supra, at 9.

With respect to the propriety of the penalty, appel-
lants have not appealed from the presiding official’s find-
ing that removal was appropriate for their strike partici-
pation. In any event, in Schapansky, supra, at 10-11, the
Board found that under Douglas v. Veterans Administra-
tion, 5 MSPB 313 (1981), the agency’s imposition of a re-
moval penalty on an air traffic controller cannot be deem-

13

ed clearly excessive or disproportionate to a sustained
charge of striking against the Federal government.

III. Unauthorized Absence

Appellants contend that the agency charge of unau-
thorized absence lacks specificity. They contend that the
language, which they allege is identical in all cases except
for the dates and times concerned, fails to clearly specify
the period of AWOL.

Under 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b) (1), an employee against
whom an adverse action is proposed is entitled to be in-
formed of the specific reasons for the agency’s proposed
action. The information provided by the agency must
be sufficiently specific to permit the appellant an oppor-
tunity to properly respond to the agency charge. See
Young v. Department of the Navy, 7 MSPB 7, 10-11 (1981).

In this case, the AWOL charge as to each appellant
alleges that, commencing on a specific date, the appellant
failed to report tor his scheduled tour of duty and has
since remained absent without authorization. We find that
the charge as alleged was sufficiently specific to apprise
appellants of the reason for the charge and to provide
them an opportunity to properly respond thereto. Fur-
ther, as the presiding official noted, and the record clear-
ly indicates, appellants’ presentation at the hearing dem-
onstrated that they understood the charges against them.
See Pinto v. Department of Labor, MSPB Docket No.
DE07528010140 (May 11, 1982); Bize v. Department of
the Treasury, 3 MSPB 261 (1980). In view of the court’s
holding in American Postal Workers Umon v. United
States, swpra, at 1284, that striking for any period of time

14

is cause for removal under 5 U.S.C. 47311, we deem it
unnecessary to address the agency’s allegations of AWOL
subsequent to the period for which we have found appel-
lant’s strike participation based on AWOL during the
strike. We find that the evidence of unauthorized ab-
sence presented by the agency to establish appellants’
strike participation likewise supports by preponderant
evidence the charges of unauthorized absence for the
same period.

IV. Readmission to Agency’s Facility

Appellants allege that the agency’s failure to inform
them of their individual deadlines and ambiguities gen-
erated by the President’s announcement and statements
by the Secretary of Transportation’! misled them into be-
lieving that they had already been discharged after the
expiration of the Presidential grace period. They con-
tend that under NLRB v. Park Edge Sheridan Meat, Inc.,
323 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1963), they were therefore not re-
quired to make a futile request to return to work. Appel-
lants also rely on Pennypower Shopping News, Inc., 253
N.L.R.B. 11, 105 L.R.R.M. 1433 (1980), and Winn-Dixie
Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 1151 (4th Cir. 1974), in
support of their contention. These cases address the le-
gality of an employer’s actions in “locking out” or dis-
charging private sector employees engaged in protected

11Indeed in Ketchem, supra, at 7-8, the Board quoted from
Judge Green’s holding in United States v. PATCO, 524 F. Supp.
160, 164 n.6 (D.D.C. 1981), noting the conflicting information
resulting from “the multiplicity of the statements issuing from
government officials and the contradictions and ambiguities
that they involved.”

15

strike activities under section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act.!?

In the private sector, a “lockout,” generally defined
as “an employer’s withholding of work from his employees
in order to gain a concession from them,’ is unlawful
when it “interfere[s] with, restrain[s], or coerce[s] em-
ployees in the exercise of some right protected by section
7 of the [National Labor Relations] <Act.”!* American
Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 308 (1965). One
of the rights conferred by section 7 of the Act upon pri-
vate employees is the right to strike.'’ In circumstances
where unlawful lockouts or discharges of private em-
ployees exercising the right to strike occur, the employers
concerned have consistently been ordered to reinstate the
affected employees with back pay. See Pennypower Shop-
ping News, Inc., supra, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1433-34; Abilities
& Goodwill, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 5, 100 L.R.R.M. 1470, 1472
(1979); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, supra, at 1151-
52; NLRB v. Park Edge Sheridan Meats, Inc., supra, at
959; NLRB v. Valley Die Cast Corp., 303 F.2d 64, 66-67
(6th Cir. 1962); and National Labor Relations Board v.
Sunrise Lumber & Trim Corp., 241 F.2d 620, 625 (2d Cir.
1957).

12See 29 U.S.C. § 158.

13Brandenburg v. Capital Distributors Corp., 353 F. Supp.
115, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), quoting from Restatement of Torts
§ 787 comment a. See also Laclede Gas Co. v. NLRB, 421 F.2d
610, 615 n.9 (8th Cir. 1970).

14See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1), (3).
1SSee 29 U.S.C. § 157.

16

Further, in the private sector, where ambiguities in
the employment status of legally striking employees have
been generated by illegal acts of the employers, the un-
certainties have been resolved in favor of the striking
employees. See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., supra, at 1151-
52; NLRB v. Park Edge Sheridan Meats, Inc., supra, at
957-59; and NLRB v. Valley Die Cast Corp., supra, at 66-
67. These cases stand for the proposition that, where the
private sector employees reasonably believed they had
been unlawfully discharged, they were not required to
engage in the futile act of notifying their employers of
their intent to abandon the strike and their desire to re-
turn to work. However, where no illegal acts had heen
committed by the private sector employers, such notifi-
eation was required by the striking employees. Abilities
& Goodwill, Inc., supra, 100 L.R.R.M. at 1471.

In contrast, Federal employees have no similar stat-
utorily conferred right to strike, but rather are express-
ly prohibited from striking by 5 U.S.C. $7311 and 18
U.S.C. § 1918. See Ketchem, supra, at 5. Similarly, in
United Federation of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp.
879, 882 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 404 U.S. 802 (1971), the Court
noted the difference in treatment accorded public and
private employers by Congress. The Blount court stressed
that in the National Labor Relations Act of 1937, as well
as the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-
Hartley), the term “employer” was defined “as not in-
cluding any governmental or political subdivisions, and
therefore, indirectly withheld the protections of section
7 from governmental employees.” Indeed, the Board is
unaware of any instances in which the lockout principle,
as applied in private sector cases, has been similarly ap-

17

plied in eases of prohibited striking under 5 U.S.C. § 7311
and 18 U.S.C. § 1918.

We find the private sector cases, upon which appel-
lants rely to support their contentions of confusion and
futility of notification, inapplicable to Federal employees
engaged in an illegal strike under 5 U.S.C. § 7311 and 18
U.S.C. ¢ 1918.'!° Any right by appellants, as illegally strik-
ing employces, to be readmitted to the agency’s facility
was specifically limited by the terms and conditions of the
Presidential amnesty offer and subsequent interpretive
directives issued by the agency. Thus, in order to be re-
adinitted to duty, the appellants in this case were required
to timely notify the agency of their availability and their
desire to return to work on or before their next regularly
scheduled tour of duty. Appellants could not properly
have unilaterally expanded that limited right to include
the right accorded legally striking employees to reason-
ably rely on confusion and the futility rule to relieve
themselves of their responsibility of timely notification.

In any event, the futility rule employed in the private
sector would nevertheless not apply in the instant case
since the alleged confusion generated by the agency was
not caused by any illegal acts on the part of the agency.
Abilities & Goodwill, Inc., supra, 100 L.R.R.M. at 1471-72.
Thus, we hold that despite any ambiguities and uncertain-

16See Bullock v. Mumford, 509 F.2d 384, 388 (D.C. Cir.
1974), which holds that irrespective of ‘‘however valid the
charge [by the strikers] may be, it does not excuse illegal and
disruptive behavior.” See also Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F.
Supp. 203 (D. Md.), aff’d, 451 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1971), cert.
dismissed, 407 U.S. 917 (1972), disapproved on other grounds,
Sethy v. Alameda Co. Water District, 545 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir.
1976).

18

ties caused by the President’s announcement or statements
by agency officials regarding appellants’ employment
status, it was incumbent upon appellants to timely notify
the agency of their readiness and desire to return to work
and to inquire as to their individual deadlines in order
to qualify for returning to work during the President’s
grace period. Since appellants failed to so notify the
agency, they were properly subject to removal.

V. Procedural Error Contentions

Under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(¢) (2) (A), the agency charges,
although found supported by preponderant evidence, can-
not be sustained where the appellant shows harmful pro-
cedural error by the agency in arriving at its decision.
See Parker v. Defense Logistics Agency, 1 MSPB 489,
492-99 (1980). Appellants contend that the agency com-
mitted harmful procedural error in failing to provide
them with 7 days for presenting an oral response to the
agency charges as is required by 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b) (2).
Appellants also contend that the oral reply process was
rendered meaningless because the decision by the agency
deciding official to remove them was based, not on his
own independent judgment, but on the “command influ-
ence” of President Reagan and other high-level agency
officials.

A. Oral Reply

Appellants contend that because the agency in its
notice of proposed removal required them to respond to
the charges “within 7 calendar days,” they were afforded
less than 7 days to respond in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 7513
(b) (2), which requires “not less than 7 days” to respond

19

orally and in writing.’’” Appellants also contend that they
were given less than 7 days for oral response because of
the agency’s denial of their request for an extension of
time. However, apyellants failed to raise these conten-
tions before the presiding official. Therefore, they can-
not be considered on review. See 5 C.F.R. $115; Banks
v. Department of the Air Force, 4 MSPB 342, 343 (1980).

Appellants further contend that the oral response
process was reduced to a mockery since, they assert, the
agency was aware that it would have been logistically im-
possible for it to accommodate the numerous oral replies
contemplated. In this regard, appellants have not shown
that the oral reply process was defective because of the
agency’s inability to fully consider or hear the large num-
ber of oral responses presented. Appellants merely assert
that the agency committed procedural error in failing io
schedule the response of each appellant, requesting in-
stead that appellants’ representative undertake that task.

Neither 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b) (2), which confers upon
appellants the right to an oral reply to the agency charges,
nor its implementing regulation, 5 C.F.R. ¢ 752.404(c) (2),
requires the agency to schedule oral responses. Appel-
lants’ representative failed to schedule the responses as
requested. Agency official Kiss, designated to hear the

17In Schapansky, supra, at 7-8, the Board held that, in light
of the felony provision of 18 U.S.C. § 1918, the agency could
invoke the crime exception of 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b) (2) to waive
the 30-day notice period otherwise required by 5 U.S.C.
§ 7513(b) (1) where the agency had reasonable cause to believe
that the employee had engaged in strike participation prohib-
ited under 5 U.S.C. § 7311 and 18 U.S.C. § 1918. Appellants
have not appealed from the pending official’s finding that the
crime exception was properly invoked in the present case.

20

oral replies, testified that the agency would have extend-
ed the oral reply period to hear appellants’ responses.
Since appellants failed to exercise their statutory right
to an oral response by refusing to schedule the response
time, appellants have failed to show procedural error by
the agency in its handling of the oral response process.
See Parker, swpra, at 492-99.

B. Command Influence

Appellants also contend that the “command influ-
ence” of President Reagan’s announcement regarding the
dismissal of air traffic controllers, who failed to report
for duty during the grace period, precluded a meaningful
consideration by the agency of appellants’ responses to
the agency charges. Appellants also allege “command
influence” from the Secretary of Transportation and the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.
Appellants assert that the statements by those officials
resulted in harmful procedural error since they precluded
Mr. Ralph Kiss, the agency’s deciding official, from acting
independently in removing appellants.

In Anderson v. Department of Transportation, MSPB
Docke; No. SL075281F0347 at 8-13 (Apri! 25, 1983), the
Board held that neither the public statements of President
Reagan and high level agency officials regarding the
strike, nor the written communications from agency head-
quarters to the various facilities, impinged on the ability
of deciding officials to exercise independent judgment re-
garding whether the charges in individual cases should
be sustained, or in any manner deprived the appellants
of a meaningful opportunity to reply to the charges on
which their removals were based. Thus, appellants have
not shown procedural error by the agency in this respect.

21

VI. Suspension

Appellants have not appealed from the presiding of-
ficial’s finding that, except as to appellant Root, appel-
lants were not suspended during the notice period. There-
fore, that contention will not be addressed on review.

The agency, however, cross-petitions for review of
the presiding official’s determination that appellant Root
was improperly suspended because, prior to receiving the
notice of proposed removal, he notified the agency that
he was ready, willing, and able to report for duty but was
not allowed to return.

The Board held in Martel v. Department of Trans-
portation, MSPB Docket No. BN075281F0558 at 11 (April
25, 1983), that in order to meet his burden of establishing
jurisdiction over an alleged constructive suspension dur-
ing the notice period under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(a) (2), an
appellant must show by preponderant evidence that he
contacted an agency official with decision-making author-
ity and unequivocally communicated his availability and
desire to return to work. The Board held that such a
showing would establish that the appellant was ready,
willing, and able to return to work. 7d. The Board further
held that the agency’s admission that it nevertheless re-
fused to readmit the appellant would be sufficient to show
that the appellant’s absence after his attempted return
was involuntary and disciplinary in nature. Jd.

It is uncontested that appellant Root telephoned his
supervisor on August 8, 1981, prior to the issuance of the
notice of his proposed removal and clearly requested to
be returned to work. Tr. at 689, 691-92. It is also undis-
puted that appellant was informed by his supervisor that

22

appellant had missed his deadline and would not be al-
lowed to return. Jd. Thus, under Martel, supra, we find
that appellant Root was erroneously suspended by the
agency from August 8, 1981, until September 2, 1981, the
effective date of his removal.

VII. Other Contentions
A. Consolidation

Appellants contend that the presiding official im-
properly consolidated these appeals despite their objec-
tions thereto. Under 5 U.S.C. §7701(f) and 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.36(b), the presiding official is authorized to con-
solidate cases on his or her own motion where to do so
would result in more expeditious processing of the cases
and would not adversely affect the rights of the parties.
Appellants have contended neither that the consolidation
failed to expedite processing nor that their rights were
harmed thereby. Therefore, appellants have not shown
error by the presiding official in this respect. See Noa,
supra, at 3-5,

B. Ex Parte Communications

Appellants also contend that the presiding official
erred in refusing to find prohibited ex parte communica-
tions in public statements made by President Reagan and
FAA Administrator Helms to agency officials with deci-
sion-making authority in these adverse actions. Appel-
lants rely on 5 U.S.C. §554(d) and Camero v. United
States, 375 F.2d 177 (Ct. Cl. 1967), in support of this con-
tention. Those authorities prohibit ex parte communica-
tions on facts in issue between decision-making officials
and a party to the action.

23

The Board finds that the public statements made by
President Reagan and FAA Administrator Helms cannot
be deemed ex parte communications. Our regulations at
5 C.F.R. § 1201.101(a) explain that an ex parte communi-
cation is one made “between decision-making personnel

. and an interested party to... [an adverse action]
without providing the other parties a chance to partici-
pate.” Since the statements in this case were public state-
ments, appellants were not thereby excluded from par-
ticipating fully in defending against their removal actions
before the agency.'®

C. Adverse Inference

Appellants further contend that the presiding official
erred in drawing an adverse inference from their failure
to testify at the hearing. ..ppellanis assert that the pre-
siding official’s reliance on Book v. U.S. Postal Service,
6 MSPB 322 (1981), aff’d, 675 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1982),
was misplaced. Appellants argue that under Book, supra,
the presiding official is required to request that the ap-
pellant testify; then, if the appellant declines, caution
him that his silence could affect the credibility of his ar-
guments even though he is not obligated to testify. Ap-
pellants allege that since they were not so warned, the
presiding official erred in drawing an adverse inference
from their failure to testify. There is no requirement in
Book that the presiding official first warn an appellant

18To the extent that appellants’ argument in this record
may relate to the issue of the effect of these public statements
on adverse action procedures pefore the agency, the Board
notes that Anderson v. Department of Transportation, MSPB
Docket No. $L075281F0347 at 8-13 (April 25, 1983), resolves
that issue adverse to appellants’ position.

24

regarding the consequences of his failure to testify, and
we find no error by the presiding official under Book,
supra. See Adams v. Department of Transportation,
MSPB Docket No. NY0O75281F0424 at 14-15 (April 25,
1983) .!°

Accordingly, the initial decision of the presiding of-
ficial is hereby AFFIRMED.

The agency is hereby ORDERED to amend its rec-
ords so as to place appellant Root in a pay status from
August 8, 1981, to September 2, 1981, the effective date
of his removal. Proof of compliance with this Order shall
be submitted by the agency to the Office of the Secretary
of the Board within 20 days of the date of issuance of this
Opinion. Any petition for enforcement of this Order

191n their petition for review, and in a subsequent submis-
sion dated March 15, 1983, appellants allude to an April 21,
1982 research assistance memorandum from the Board’s Office
of General Counsel to the Board’s then Acting Assistant Man-
aging Director for Regional Operations. Appellants suggest
that Board proceedings relating to the air traffic controller strike
which commenced on August 3, 1982, were merely pro forma.
The record in this case simply does not support this allegation.

The memorandum in question sep ore stated that it was
not intended to influence presiding officials’ decisions. Pre-
siding officials were not obligated to adopt the mode of analy-
sis or the conclusions in the memorandum. In fact, presiding
officials were cautioned to conduct their own legal research
and to exercise independent fact-finding responsibility and
judgment. The different findings on similar issues in the air
traffic controller appeals evidence that presiding officials did
undertake their own legal research and made independent fact
findings. Nor can the memorandum be properly deemed to
have been an ‘advisory opinion” issued by the Board in viola-
tion of 5 U.S.C. § 1205(g). The Board members did not con-
sider or vote on the memorandum, and it can not in any way
be construed as an expression of their views, collectively or in-
dividually. Nothing in 5 U.S.C. § 1205(g), or elsewhere, bars
the Office of General Counsel from preparing research assis-
tance memoranda.

25

shall be made to the Denver Regional Office in accordance
with 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(a).

This is the final order of the Merit Systems Protec-
tion Board in these appeals. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(c).

Appellants are hereby notified of the right to seek
judicial review of the Board’s action by filing a petition
for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, 717 Madison Place, N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20439. The petition for judicial review must be filed
no later than thirty (30) days after the appellants’ re-
ceipt of this order.

FOR THE BOARD:

April 25, 1983 /8/ Herpert EK. Evitrncwoop
(Date) Chairman

April 25, 1983 /s/ Ersa H. Poston
(Date) Vice Chair

April 25, 1983 /s/ Dennis M. Devaney
(Date) Member
Washington, D. C.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_3136%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
