# Appendix — Dyke v. Gulf Oil Corp.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 469 U.S. 852

## Text

84-09 | ‘it
2 0 JUL 5 1984

ALEXANDER L. STEVAS,

WMT ky Uo,

ED

In the Supreme Cowt
of the United States

—_

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

RICHARD W. DYKE, dba Western Stations Co.,
COLVIN OIL COMPANY, and

F. O. FLETCHER, INC., dba Fletcher Oil Company,

Petitioners,
vs.

GULF OIL CORPORATION,
Respondent.

APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE TEMPORARY EMERGENCY
CourT OF APPEALS OF THE UNITED STATES

JOHN L. SCHWABE
Counsel of Record
NEVA T. CAMPBELL

SCHWABE, WILLIAMSON,
WYATT, MOORE & ROBERTS

Suite 1800, PacWest Center
1211 S.W. Fifth Avenue
Portland, Oregon 97204
Telephone: (503) 222-9981

Attorneys for Petitioners

STEVENS-NESS LAW PUB.CO., PORTLAND, OR. 97204 7-84

APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Gulf Oil Corporation v. Richard W.

Dyke, dba Western Stations Co.,

Colvin Oil Company, and F. O.

Fletcher, Inc., dba Fletcher

Oil Company F.2d

(TECA 1964) (SLip OpPinion) ...... 220 1

Gulf Oil Corporation v. Richard W.

Dyke, dba Western Stations Co.,

Colvin Oil Company, and F. O.

Fletcher, Inc., dba Fletcher

Oil Company Nos. 9-80, 9-81

(TECA April 17, 1984) (Judgment) ..... 83

Gulf Oil Corporation v. Richard W.

Dyke, dba Western Stations Co.,

Colvin Oil Company, and F. O.

Fletcher, Inc., dba Fletcher

Oil Company Nos. 9-80, 9-81

(TECA June 4, 1984) (Order

denying petition tor rehearing) ...... 85

Gulf Oil Corporation v. Richard W.

Dyke, dba Western Stations Co.,

Colvin Oil Company, and F. O.

Fletcher, Inc., dba Fletcher

Oil Company Nos. 9-80, 9-81

(TECA May 29, 1984) (Order

denying petition for rehearing

and suggestion for rehearing

Se eee Se eee ee ee ee 87

Richard W. Dyke, dba Western

Stations Co., Colvin Oil

Company, and F. O. Fletcher,

Inc., dba Fletcher Oil

Company v. Gulf Oil Corporation,
"Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law" (D. Or. June 20, 1983) ....... 89

Richard W. Dyke, dba Western

Stations Co., Colvin Oil

Company, and F. O. Fletcher,

Inc., dba Fletcher Oil

Company v. Gulf Oil Corporation,

571 F.Supp. 780 (D. Or. 1983)

(attorney fees) .....--ceeeeseeeeees 127

Richard W. Dyke, dba Western

Stations Co., Colvin Oil

Company, and F. O. Fletcher,

Inc., dba Fletcher Oil

Company v. Gulf Oil Corporation,
"Opinion" (statute of limitations)

(D. Or. March 8, 1982) .....-----e-- 147

ii

TEMPORARY EMERGENCY
COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
UNITED STATES

Nos. 9-80, 9-81

GULF OIL CORPORATION,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT and CROSS-APPELLEE,

Vv.

RICHARD W. DYKE, dba WESTERN STATIONS CO.,

COLVIN OIL COMPANY, and F. O. FLETCHER, INC.,
dba FLETCHER OIL COMPANY,

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES and CROSS-APPELLANTS,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
INTERVENOR

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
(Nos. 77-10-PA, 77-791-PA, 77-849-PA)

(Argued: March 19, 1984 Decided: April 17, 1984)

JACK D. FUDGE and MICHAEL L. HICKOK,
McCutchen, Black, Verleger & Shea, Los
Angeles, California, on the brief for
Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

JOHN L. SCHWABE and NEVA T. CAMPBELL,
Sehyabe, Williamson, Wyatt, Moore &
Roberts, Portland, Oregon, on the brief for
Appellees-Cross-Appellants.

JOHN R. KNIGHT, EDWARD T. COTHAM, JR. and
BRADLEY FORD STUEBING, Gulf Oil
Corporation, Houston, Texas, on the brief
for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Al

LARRY P. ELLSWORTH, Assistant General
Counsel, DAVID ENGELS and MARCIA K. SOWLES,
Office of General Counsel, Department of
Energy, and RICHARD K. WILLARD, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, ANTHONY J.
STEINMEYER and DOUGLAS LETTER, Attorneys,
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., on
the brief for the United States.

WILLIAM H. BODE, JOHN E. VARNUM and

TOBEY B. MARZOUK, Spriggs, Bode &
Hollingsworth, Washington, D.C., on the
brief for Amici Curiae, Independent Oil and
Tire Co., Shepherd Brothers Service
Stations, and U.S. Oil Company, Inc.

JOHN A. EVANS, Marathon Petroleum Company,
Findlay, Ohio; WILLIAM C. STREETS and
GAIL F. SCHULZ, Mobil Oil Corporation,
Fairfax, Virginia; R. BRUCE MCLEAN, P.C.,
DANIEL JOSEPH, P.C., WARREN E.

CONNELLY, P.C., and DAVID A. HOLZWORTH,
Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld,
Washington, D.C. on the brief for Amici
Curiae, Marathon Petroleum Company and
Mobil Oil Corporation.

Before CHRISTENSEN, ESTES, and ZIRPOLI,
Judges.

Majority opinion filed by Judge Estes.

Concurring opinion filed by Judge
Christensen. *

Concurring and dissenting opinion filed by
Judge Zirpoli.*

*Opinions filed April 27, 1984.

A2

ESTES, Judge:

This is an action for overcharges
under § 210(b) of the Economic Stabiliza-
tion Act of 1970 ("ESA"), 12 U.S.C. § 1904
note, as incorporated in the Emergency
Petroleum Allocation Act ("EPAA"), 15
U.S.C. § 751 et seg. brought by Plaintiffs-
Appellees and Cross-Appellants Richard W.
Dyke, dba Western Stations Co., Colvin Oil
Company, and F. O. Fletcher, Inc., dba
Fletcher Oil Company (hereinafter "Dyke"
when referred to collectively; "Richard W.
Dyke" when referring to plaintiff Dyke
singularly), against Defendant-Appellant
and Cross-Appellee Gulf Oil Corporation

(hereinafter "Gulf").+ Gulf also filed a

1 independent Oil and Tire Co.,
Shepherd Brothers Service Stations and U.S.
Oil Company, Inc. have filed a joint brief
as Amici Curiae on the prejudgment interest
and attorneys’ fees questions presented by
this appeal. &

A3

counterclaim for unpaid bills for gasoline
in the sum of $728,753.78 against
Richard W. Dyke only,” which was not

3 Dyke alleged that Gulf

contested.
overcharged it in sales of gasoline from
Gulf to Dyke between January 1974 and
January 1977. An Amended Judgment entered

4 in the United States

on September 12, 1983
District Court for the District of Oregon
was awarded to plaintiffs against Gulf in

amounts as follows:

2Record at Vol. 1, Tab 2.

SRecord at Vol. 1, Tab 3, p. 1.

tRecord at Vol. 11, Tab 161. The
Original Judgment entered August 25, 1983
(Id. at Tab 157) and first Amended Judgment
entered August 26, 1983 (Id. at Tab 158)
were set aside by Order of September 2,
1983 (Id. at Tab 160).

A4

Prejudg-

ment Attorney's
Overcharges Intere: t Fees

Richard W. $1,264,555.Z2 $ 557,588.38 $385,500
Dyke, dba
western
Stations Co.
Colvin Oil 745,000.00 200 ,568.99 173,500
Company
F.O. Fletcher, 790,000.00 408 ,471.69 191,000
Inc., dba
Fletcher Oil
Company

$2,799,555.22 $1,166,629.06 $750,000
In addition to the $4,716,184.28, total of
the above sums, the Amended Judgment also
awarded costs and post-judgment interest to
plaintiffs at the rate of 10.58 percent
against Gulf. Gulf appeals from this
judgment. Dyke has filed a cross-appeal
contending the district court incorrectly
computed the prejudgment interest which
Dyke was awarded.

In October of 1972, Gulf's board of
directors decided to divest Gulf of all its
marketing activities in its San Francisco
Retail Marketing District, which included

northern California, northern Nevada,

A5

Oregon and Washington. The decision to
divest followed losses by Gulf cf $31.7
million in 1971 and $37 million in 1972 in
the Northwest. > The passage of the EPAA,
however, forced Gulf to continue to supply
its customers in the area and to place its
purchasers into classes which would main-
tain the customary price differentials in
existence on May 15, 1973.° Gulf continued
to supply all of its jobber customers in
the area, but converted all of the branded

jobbers’ to unbranded jobbers on January l,

1974. Before 1974, Gulf had supplied only

>Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law ("FFCL"), Record at Vol. 11, Tab 147,

pp. 4-5.

610 C.F.R. § 212.

7Gulf's branded jobbers received free
painting of service stations, hauling
allowances and the privilege of honoring
Gulf credit cards. FFCL, supra, at 4.
Dyke and Colvin were Gulf branded jobbers
before January 1, 1974. Id.

A6

one jobber in the district on an unbranded
basis.®

On May 15, 1973, Richard W. Dyke,
Colvin, and Fletcher all purchased gasoline
from Gulf as resellers-retailers as defined
in 10 C.F.R. § 212.31. Gulf was a refiner
as defined in the same section. Richard W.
Dyke and Colvin were among those purchasers
who were branded jobbers on May 15, 1973
and converted to unbranded jobbers on
January 1, 1974.

The other jobbers in the district who
were reclassified from branded to unbranded
on January 1, 1974, were placed in the
Armour class of purchaser to reflect their
new status. Richard W. Dyke and Colvin,
however, were given base prices reflecting

those published in Platt's Oilgram for

May 15, 1973 for Portland and Eugene,

SEFCL, supra, at 5-6. The unbranded
jobber was Armour Oil Co., which purchased
gasoline from Gulf's northern California
terminals only. Id.

A7

Oregon and Seattle,/Tacoma, Washington.

Gulf reasoned that its jobbers in Oregon
and Washington comprised a substantially
different market from those in northern
California and should constitute a separate
class with a different base price. Gulf
relied on the new item/new market rule? to

justify its use of Platt's Oilgram in

establishing a base price for Richard W.
Dyke and Colvin, which is an exception to
the rule that base prices must correspond
to a price actually charged the most

Similar existing class on May 15, 1973, 19

°FFCL, supra, at ll. The new item-new
market rule, 10 C.F.R. § 212.111, allowed
sellers to use a market price as the base
price for a product in certain instances
rather than the price actually charged the
most similar class of purchasers on May 15,
1973. Gulf later conceded that its use of
the new item-new market rule was improper.
FFCL, supra, at ll.

10pacific Supply Co-Op v. Shell Oil
Co., 697 F.2d 1084 (Em.App. 1982).

A8

Richard W. Dyke filed a complaint on
January 4, 1977 and ceased paying for
gasoline received from Gulf on December 16,
1976, yet continued to receive gasoline
without payment until January 28, 1977.
Colvin's complaint was filed on October 11,
1977. Fletcher filed its complaint on
October 20, 1977. The three cases were

consolidated, with Richard W. Dyke

proceeding to judgment first. The decision

and findings in Richard W. Dyke were

binding on Colvin and Fletcher.

The case was originally assigned to
Chief Judge Skopil.?2 An interlocutory
appeal was filed by the Department of
Energy ("DOE") contesting their joinder in
the cases. The DOE was released from

further participation in the cases by this

Court's decision and mandate and the

llercL, Supra, at iz, fn. 2.

AY

district court crder which followed. 4 On

remand, new Chief Judge Burns granted a
six-month stay in the proceedings before
Judge Owen M. Panner was assigned to the

13 Judge Panner lifted

14

cases in July, 1980.
the stay on July 21, 1980.
Trial before the court began on
November 17, 1981. The trial was conducted
in stages with succeeding orders entered as
follows: In Phase 1, Gulf's use of the

Platt's Oilgram prices as base prices for

the plaintiffs was held improper.
November 17, 1981; Record at Vol. 4,
Tab 47. In Phase 2, the unbranded Armour

class of purchasers and its corresponding

lepecord at Vol. 1, Tab 8, June 29,
1979; Record at Vol. 17, Tab 263,
August 16, 1979. See, Dyke v. Gulf Oil

Corp., 60i F.2d 557 (Em.App. 1979).

13eFcL, supra, at 12, n. 2. Judge
Panner began dut,; as U.S. District Judge on
March 24, 1980.

14

Record at Vol. i, Tab 14.

A1O

base price was held proper for the
plaintiffs. November 20, 1981; Record at
Vol. 4, Tab 49. In Phase 3, the method of
calculating the overcharges was decided,
prejudgment interest was awarded to the
plaintiffs, and the selection of the
appropriate statute of limitations was
made. January 20, 1982; Record at Vol. 7,
Tab 67. In Phase 4, plaintiff Fletcher was
held to be the real party in interest.
April 15, 1982; Record at Vol. 7, Tab 80.
In Phase 5, attorney's fees were awarded
the plaintiffs. May 27, 1982; Record at
Vol. 8, Tab 93.

The calculation of prejudgment
interest was referred to a magistrate on
June 1, 1982.?> The magistrate entered his

Findings and Recommendations on

September 9, 1982, and they were adopted by

lSRecord at Vol. 8, Tab 94.

All

the district court on October 26, 1982.1

The district court entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law on June 20,
198327 and filed a separate opinion on the
issue of attorney's fees on August 23,

1983.28 The Amended Judgment was entered

on September 12, 1963." Gulf filed its
Notice of Appeal in this Court on

October 6, 1983. Dyke filed its Notice of
Cross-Appeal in this Court on October 20,

1983.

16, ova at Vol. 9, Tab 126; Vol. 10,
Tab 129.

17 Record at Vol. 11, Tab 147.

18. aed at Vol. 11, Tee 155-

13, cord at Vol. 11, Tab 161.

Al2

ISSUES

The issues on appeal, as stated by
Gulf in its brief filed November 14, 1983,
are as follows:

| Whether overcharges can be
refunded under the EPAA without any
determination that sales exceeJed the
"maximum allowable prices" permitted under
the governing Refiner Price Rule;

Ze Whether prejudgment interest can
ever be awarded on overcharge refunds under
the EPAA;

x If such prejudgment interest is
ever recoverable, whether it can be awarded
where the amount of overcharges to be
refunded was unliquidated and became
certain only by trial;

4. Whether attorney's fees may be
awarded under the EPAA where the

overcharges were found to be unintentional;

Al3

Ss. Whether attorney's fees awardable
under the EPAA may substantially exceed
those actually charged;

6. Whether appellee Fletcher lacks
standing as an indirect purchaser to sue
Gulf for overcharges under the EPAA;

Fx Whether application of the
two-year Washington statute of limitations
to Fletcher frustrates national policy
under the EPAA;

8. Whether the passing-on defense is
available in this EPAA case because all
parties were subject to Federal Price
Regulations, and the trial court
specifically quantified the amount of
overcharges actually passed through; and

9. Whether the trial court abused
its discretion by making a class of
purchaser determination contrary to the

Pretrial Order without considering evidence

Al4

offered in support of a motion toc reopen
; 20
trial of that issue.

Dyke states in its brief that the
issue on the cross-appeal is: Whether the
Trial Court erred in its calculation of
21

prejudgment interest.

Gulf's Motion to Dismiss

Gulf, without raising the question in
the lower court, was given leave to file
an untimely Motion to Dismiss the Cross
Appeal of Dyke, which challenges the
subject-matter jurisdiction of this Court
following the recent Supreme Court decision

in I.N.S. v. Chadha, U.S. , 103

S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). Dyke
has opposed the motion and contended that

the Chadha decision did not invalidate the

20nrief of Defendant-Appellant and
Cross-Appellee Gulf ("Gulf's Br.") at 3-4.

2lerief of Plaintiffs-Appellees and
Cross-Appellants Dyke, et al. ("Dyke's
es oe a

A15

statutes. The United States has filed a
motion to intervene on the question of the
constitutionality of the statutes pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2403 and has also argued
that the statutes remain valid. ?? Gulf
contends that because the applicable
statutes granting jurisdiction to this
Court contain inseverable and
unconstitutional legislative veto
provisions, the legislation is void and
this Court has no jurisdiction over the

cross-appeal. It has been determined that

Gulf's motion raises a jurisdicticnal

22warathon Petroleum Company and Mobil
Oil Corporation have filed a joint brief as
Amici Curiae in support of Gulf's position
that this case should be dismissed for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Al16

question which we must decide. 7? After

23culf has placed itself in the

anomalous position of moving to dismiss
only Dyke's cross-appeal on the basis that
the statutory authority for the
cross-appeal is unconstitutional. Since
Gulf's appeal also depends on the validity
of the EPAA and EPCA, any holding of this
Court dismissing the cross-appeal because
of the unconstitutionality of the EPAA or
EPCA would also necessitate the dismissal
of Gulf's appeal. Dyke has maintained that
the constitutional issues raised by Gulf
are not in reality directed at the
subject-matter jurisdiction of this Court,
but rather at the decision on the merits of
the District Court below. See, Memorandum
filed by Dyke, et al., December 28, 1983
and Memorandum filed by Dyke, et al.,
January 10, 1984. Dyke maintains that such
an argument must first be raised in the
District Court below. See, United States
v. Empire Gas Corp. 547 F.2d 1147, 1153
(Em.App. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 915,
97 $.Ct. 1326, Si L.Eé.26 592. Guift*s
motion does have such bearing on the
subject-matter jurisdiction and the very
Viability of this Court as to mandate
consideration here. We have a "duty to
observe questions relating to jurisdiction
whenever they may appear." McWhirter
Distributing Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 668 F.2d
S11, 525 n. 22 (Em.App. 1981), citing
Condor Operating Co. v. Sawhill, 514 F.2d
351, 354 (Em.App., cert. denied, 421 U.S.
976, 95 S.Ct. 1975, 44 L.Ed.2d 467 (1975)).
see also, Exxon Corp. v. F.E.A., 516 F.2d
1397 (Em.App. 1975).

Al7

examination of the statutes, their
legislative histories, prior decisions and
the arguments of counsel, we conclude that
the unconstitutional legislative vetoes
contained in the EPAA and EPCA are
severable, leaving the remaining sections
of the legislation intact and operable,
including the sections conferring
jurisdiction of this appeal upon this

Court.

Als

Neither the EPAA nor the EPCA contains

a severability clause.**

The absence of
such a clause, however, is in no way
dispositive of the question of

severability. E.E.0.C. v. Hernando Bank,

Inc., 724 F.2d 1188, 1190 (Sth Cir. 1984).
Indeed, "the ultimate determination of
severability will rarely turn on the
presence or absence of such a clause."

United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585

n. 27, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 1218, 20 L.Ed. 138

24 owever, the ESA, which was the

precursor of the EPAA and EPCA, does
contain a severability clause at

Section 220. We are also most persuaded by
the language of Section 21l(g) of the ESA
that Congress intended this Court to sever
unconstitutional portions of the statutes
and leave the remainder intact: "[T}he
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, and
the Supreme Court upon review of judgments
and orders of the Temporary Emergency Court
of Appeals, shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the
constitutional validity of any provision of
this title or of any regulation issued
under this title. (Emphasis Added.) This
Court was given full authority to determine
the unconstitutionality of one provision of
a statute without the requirement of
invalidating the whole statute as a result.

Alg

(1968). The proper test is that "[uJ]nless
it is evident that the legislature would
not have enacted those provisions which are
within its power, independently of that
which is not, the invalid part may be
dropped if what is left is fully operative
as a law." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
108, 96 S.Ct. 612, 677, 46 L.Ed.2d 659

(1976), quoting Champlin Refining Co. v.

Corporation Commission, 286 U.S. 210, 234,

52 S.Ct. 559, 565, 76 L.Ed. 1062 (1932).

In order to determine whether Congress
would have enacted the remainder of the
EPAA and EPCA had it known that the
one-house veto provisions were
unconstitutional, we must examine the
language and legislative history of the

Acts. E.E.0O.C. v. Hernando Bank, supra,

at 1190; Muller Cptical Co. v. E.E.0O.C.,

574 F.Supp. 946 (W.D. Tenn. 1983).
"Congressional intent and purpose are

best determined by an analysis of the

A20

language of the statute in question.”

E.E.O.C. v. Hernando Bank, supra, at 1190.

The stated purpose of the EPAA is as
follows:
See. 2s+s2+

(b) The purpose of this Act
is to grant to the President of
the United States and direct him
to exercise specific temporary
authority to deal with shortages
of crude oil, residual fuel oil,
and refined petroleum products or
dislocations in their national
distribution system. The
authority granted under this Act
shall be exercised for the
purpose of minimizing the adverse
impacts of such shortages or
dislocations on the American
people and the domestic economy.

The EPAA also states that it was
enacted in the midst of circumstances which
"constitute a national crisis which is a
threat to the public health, safety, and
welfare," EPAA § 2(1), and that its purpose
is to provide for "equitable distribution
of crude oil, residual fuel oil, and

refined petroleum products at equitable

prices among all... . sectors of the

A21

petroleum industry." EPAA, as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 753(b)(1)(F) quoted in United
States v. Heller, 726 F.2d 756 (Em.App.
1983). (Emphasis added. ]

The purpose of the EPCA is stated, in
part, in the Act as follows:

Sec. 2. The purposes of
this Act are <--

(1) to grant specific
standby authority to the
President, subject to
congressional review, to impose
rationing, to reduce demand for
energy through the implementation
of energy conservation plans, and
to fulfill obligations of the
United States under the
international energy
program.

While the stated purposes of the EPCA
include a reference to the conyressional
veto, it does not follow that the veto
provisions are inseverable. The intention
of Congress to review the President's
actions through the veto is obvious from
the face of the legislation. Our task is
to determine "whether Congress would have

enacted the remainder of the statute([s]

A22

without the unconstitutional [veto]

provisions." Consumer Energy Council of

America v. F.E.R.C., 673 F.2d 425, 442

(D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd sub non, U.S.

6 aoe &.Ct. 3556, 77 L.84.24 1402
(1983).

Gulf cites numerous portions of the
legislative history in an attempt to prove
that the compromise between the flexibility
desired by the Executive and the oversight
demanded by Congress was an extremely
fragile one which could not have been
enacted absent the legislative veto
provisions. In none of these references,
however, do we find a clear indication that
the EPAA or EPCA would not have been passed

without such vetoes. E.E.0.C. v. Hernando

bank, supra, at 1191. The mere presence of

continued and heated debates prior to the
passage of the Acts cannot provide the
evidence necessary for us to conclude that

the legislative vetoes are inseverable and

A23

that the sections in which they appear, as
well as the sections conferring
jurisdiction on this Court, must be

invalidated. See, Allen v. Carmen,

F.Supp. , No. 83-3099 (D.D.C., Dec. 30,

1983), and United States v. Sutton,

F.Supp. _, No. 82-C-1069-BT (N.D. Okla.
Apr. 4, 1984).

We also are not persuaded by the
reference to the veto provisions in the
legislative history which describe their
operation. Such descriptions are not
helpful in determining what Congress would
have intended had it known the iegislative

vetoes were invalid. Consumer Energy

Council of America v. F.E.R.C., supra, 673

F.2d at 442. We therefore conclude that it
is not evident that Congress would have
declined to enact the EPAA and EPCA without
the legislative veto provisions.

We reach this conclusion because,

contrary to Gulf's contention, the question

A24

is not whether Congress would have enacted
these exact statutes had it known at the
time of enactment that the legislative veto
provisions were invalid, but rather,
whether Congress would have preferred these
statutes, after severance of the
legislative veto provisions, to no statutes
at all.

We must next determine if what remains
in the Acts is "fully operative as a law."

Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. at 109,

96 S.Ct. at 564. The legislative veto

provision of the EPAA appears in

A25

Section 4(g)(2).7> Once the veto is

severed, the remainder of Section 4(9g)(2)
gives the President limited decontrol
authority over crude oil, residual fuel
oil, or any refined petroleum product after
making specific findings that regulation of
such oil or product is no longer necessary
under the Act, that no shortage exists and
that exempting such oil or product will not
have an adverse impact on the supply of

other oil or products. Without the veto,

a ae
The veto provision of
Section 4(g)(2) of the EPAA is as follows:

Such as amendment shall take effect on
a date specified in the amendment, but
in no case sooner than the close of
the earliest period which begins after
the submission of such amendment to
the Congress and which includes at
least five days during which the House
was in session and at least five days
during which the Senate was in
session; except that such amendment
shall not take effect if before the
expiration of such period either House
of Congress approves a resolution of
that House stating in substance that
such House disapproves such amendment.
(Emphasis added. )

A26

Section 4(g)(2) is "fully operative as a

law." Id.

Similarly, the legislative veto
provisions contained in the EPCA, once
removed, leave the remainder of the Act
"fully operative as «| lew." id... in. fact,
the hard-fought compromise between the
Executive and Congress over pricing and
decontrol, which Gulf contends demonstrates
the inseverability of the vetoes, is
maintained after severance. Without the

vetoes, Sections 401 and 455 of the EPCA

resemble "report and wait" procedures

A27

specifically approved in Chadha. 7° I .N.3.

v. Chadha, supra, 103 S.Ct. at 2776 n. 9,

and Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 61

S.Ct. 422, 85 L.Ed. 479 (1941).

From the beginning of price controls
under federal statutes and regulations,
courts have resolved challenges to their

constitutionality. See, Amalgamated Meat

Cutters and Butcher Workers of North

America v. Connally, 336 F.Supp. 737

26F i ther House of Congress could
unilaterally veto an amendment proposed by
the President by following the procedures
for congressional review contained in § 551
of the EPCA. When the legislative veto in
§ 551(c)(1) is excised from the section a
fully workable "report and wait" procedure
is preserved. The President could still
propose an amendment to the Congress, but
Congress would be able to prevent its
effectiveness by passing legislation
contrary to the amendment within specified
time periods. Thus, Congress would still
retain the opportunity to review
Presidential proposals, but would only be
able to disapprove of such actions through
use of the constitutional legislative
process. Such a procedure is not only
workable, but preserves to the greatest
extent possible the compromise between
Congress and the Executive intended in the
leqislation.

A28

(D.D.C. 1971); Consumers Union of U.S.,

Inc., v. Sawhill, 525 F.2d 1068 (Em.App.
1975). These challenges have escalated
enormously since the enactment of the EPAA

and EPCA. See, Condor Operating Co. v.

Sawhill, 514 F.2d 351 (Em.App.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 976, 95 S.Ct. 1975, 44

L.Ed.2d 467 (1975); Cities Service Co. v.

F.E.A., 529 F.2d 1016 (Em.App. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 947 (1976), the
authorities therein, and their progeny.

The scope of these attacks has been
unreasonably broad. The statutes have been
upheld because "[a] limit in time, to tide
over a passing trouble, well may justify a
law that could not be upheld as a permanent
change." Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 65
L.Ed. 865 (1921). As the program under the
law winds down in th? wake of decontrol,
this latest and broadest attack also is

without merit.

A29

Therefore, we conclude that the
unconstitutional legislative veto
provisions of the EPAA and EPCA are
severable, leaving the remainder of the
Acts intact and with no effect on this
Court's jurisdiction. Gulf's Motion to

Dismiss the Cross-Appeal is DENIED.

Computation of Maximum Allowable Price in

Determining Overcharges

Gulf contends that the District Court
did not determine that its prices charged
to Dyke exceeded the "maximum allowable
price." Such a finding, Gulf states, is
necessary before concluding that
overcharges have occurred. "Maximum
aliowable price" is defined in the

regulations as:
wa the weighted average
price at which the covered
product was lawfully priced on
May 15, 1973, computed in
accordance with the provision of
[10 C.F.R.] § 212.83(a), plus
increased product costs and
increased non=-product costs

A30

incurred between the month of
measurement and the month of May
2973..". 36 6.2:2: Jc22e ee:

See also, Wellven, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp.,

F.2d , Nos. 3-35, 3-36 (Em.App.
Feb. 10, 1984).

Gulf cites our decision in Longview

Refining Co. v. Shore, 554 F.2d 1006

(Em.App. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 836,

98 S.Ct. 126, 54 L.Ed.2d 98 (1977), as
requiring specific findings by the district
court establishing the existence of
overcharges in a sum certain before a
plaintiff may recover. 554 F.2d at 1012.
While such specific findings are indeed

required by Longview, the findings which

sunposedly established the maximum

allowable price in Longview were

"defectively general and all-inclusive."
Id. at 1018. We hold that the District

Court's findings and method of computing
overcharges in this case, although

erroneous as to class of purchaser base

A31

price for reasons hereafter to be
discussed, were otherwise sufficient under
the regulations.

The District Judge used the following
formula to compute overcharges:

"The proper method in this
case for calculating the
overcharges is to subtract the
court-ordered May 15, 1973 prices
to Dyke from the May 15, 1973
prices imputed to Dyke based on
Platt's Oilgram. If Gulf did not
actually pass through its full
cost increment to Dyke in a
month, the cost increment
difference is to be subtracted
from the overcharge calculated on
May 15 prices. The difference
shall be multiplied by the volume
of each grade of gasoline sold to

Dyke in each month. .. ." FECL,
Record at Vol. 11, Tab 147,
p. 19.

Using this formula, the parties then
stipulated the amount of the overcharges.
Id. at p. 20.

This method employs both May 15, 1973
base prices and Gulf's stated increased
costs to arrive at the maximum allowable

price. Using the figures provided oy Gulf,

A32

the district court was able to determine
the costs Gulf elected to pass through each

27

month as well as the dates on which Gulf

did not charge Dyke the full amount of

28 Gulf was

increased costs available.
given credit for these undercharges to Dyke
in computing total overcharges. Thus the
findings sufficiently found all of the
elements of the maximum allowable price
calculations as a basis for determining
that sales exceeded the "maximum allowable

prices” permitted under the governing

Refiner Price Rule.

Prejudgment Interest

We hold that this case is not an
appropriate one in which to award
prejudgment interest. Accordingly, we need

not reach the question of whether

27Record at Vol. 17, Tab 292.

2814.

A33

prejudgment interest may ever be awarded in
an overcharge case under the EPAA.
Recently, we declined to award prejudgment
interest in two cases because the amount
claimed was not for a “liquidated or

readily liquidatable sum." Eastern Air

Lines, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 712

F.2d 1402, 1410 (Em.App.), cert. denied,

U.S. , 104 S.Ct. 278, 78 L.Ed.2d

258 (1983); Zahir v. Shell Oil Co., 718

F.2d 1567, 1573 (Em.App. 1983). In
addition, prejudgment interest is not
appropriate in this case b::cause the
ultimate amount of the overcharge was the
"subject of great uncertainty, "*? requiring
extensive testimony and arguments from
counsel before the court could select even
a method for calculating the alleged

overcharges. Following our decision in

Eastern Air Lines, supra, Gulf filed a

29%eastern Air Lines, supra, at 1410.

A34

motion to amend the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law to delete the award of
prejudgment interest. °° In an Order dated
August 24, 1983, Judge Panner denied the
motion, stating only, "The motion to deny
an award of prejudgment interest is DENIED
because Magistrate Juba was able to

determine appropriate amounts with

certainty. Therefore, Eastern Air Lines
n3l

does not control. While it is true that
the magistrate was able to ultimately
determine an amount certain to be applied
as prejudgment interest following the
judge's ruling, certainty in calculating
interest on a definite sum is not what
Zahir and Eastern require. Rather, we

again, hold that in this case, where the

amount claimed to be due varied and was

30necord at Vol. 16, Tab 254.

Slrecord at Vol. 16, Tab 256, p. 2.

A35

uncertain, it is "inequitable and unjust"

to award prejudgment interest. °*

Attorney's Fees

The district judge awarded Dyke
$750,000 in attorney's fees, °* finding that

our recent decision of Eastern Air Lines,

supra, was not controlling. In Eastern Air

Lines, we conducted an extensive study of

§ 210(b) of the ESA°* and the limitations

on a judge's discretion in awarding

attorney's fees imposed by that section:

; [T]o deprive the
court of its discretionary power

32 eastern Air Lines, supra, at 1410.
33 Record at Vol. il, Taw 164.
34

Although the district judge stated
that "TECA was not required in [Eastern Air
Lines] to carefully analyze the language of
the statute authorizing attorneys’ fees"
(Record at Vol. 11, Tab 155, p. 3), we
believe our analysis in Eastern was
thorough and is controlling.

A36

to award treble damages and
attorney's fees, the defendant
making the overcharge must prove
thac (1) the overcharge was not
intentional, and (2) the
overcharge resulted from a bona
fide error notwithstanding

(3) the maintenance by the
defendant of procedures
reasonably adapted to the
avoidance of such error.

"In the absence of such
proof by the defendant the court
in its discretion may award
treble damages and attorney's
fees if it finds the overcharge
was intentional or resulted from
reprehensible or criminal
conduct, or lack of procedures
reasonably adapted to the
avoidance of erroneous
overcharges, or bad faith, or
where required by equity and the
ends of justice." Eastern Air
Lines, supra, at 1412; second
paragraph quoted in, Wellven,
Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., supra.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law contain the express finding that any
overcharges by Gulf were not intentional.
4 In light of the circumstances and

lack of guidelines at the time Gulf's

decision was made, I find that the

A37

overcharges were not intenticnal." FFCL,
Record at Vol. 11, Tab 147, pp. 21-22.°>
In view of the findings made by the
district judge that the overcharge was not
intentional and, although not in the

"precise language"*°

of § 210(b), the
finding that Gulf maintained "procedures
reasonably adapted to the avoidance” of an
overcharge, >” as well as our conclusion
upon examination of the record that any

overcharges were the result of a bona fide

error, we hold that it was plain error to

award any attorney's fees in this case. In

3350 also, Record at Vol. 25,

Tab 329, p. 1158, 1.17. In Longview
Refining Co. v. Shore, supra, at 1014,
n. 20 (Em.App. 1977), this Court warned,
"Fundamental fairness requires that the
regulations be clear so that men of common
intelligence need not guess at the meaning
and differ as to the application. Boyce
Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337,
72 S.Ct. 319, 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952);" also
Standard Oil Co. v. D.O.E., 596 F.2d 1029,
10en, OG. G7.

365 astern Air Lines, supra, at 1412.

3714.

A38

any event, the amount of attorney's fees

awarded here was so excessive as to

constitute a clear abuse of ei eivetion.””

ne The attorney's fees awarded in
this case were grossly excessive anda
clear abuse of the judge's discretion. The
last-submitted affidavit of plaintiff's
counsel in support of the motion for
attorney's fees included in the record
reflects a requested bonus payment of
$84,600.00. The requested fees were
$397,641.60 and stated expenses were
$17,289.76 The total of submitted fees,
expenses and bonus through March 10, 1983
was $499,531.36. Record at Vol. ll,
Tab 144. Judge Panner made an award of
attorney's fees in the amount of
$750,000.00, supra, and Record at Vol. ll,
Tab 161, representing a bonus payment of
$250,468.84 more than the total of fees,
expenses and bonus in the affidavit.
Including the bonus of $84,600.00 which was
requested in the affidavit, the total bonus
to plaintiffs' attorneys was $335,068.64.
Additionally, the itemized billing
statements submitted by plaintiffs' counsel
include substantial charges made for the
Amici Curiae brief filed on behalf of these
plaintiffs on January 12, 1983 in Eastern
Air Lines v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra,
before this Court. The Amici brief urged
the same positions on the prejudgment
interest and attorney's fees issues as
plaintiffs have argued in the present case.
In Eastern Air Lines, these positions were
rejected by this Court.

A39

Plaintiff Fletcher's Standing to Sue

Gulf claims that Plaintiff Fletcher
has no standing to sue under ESA § 210 for
overcharges because Fletcher was an
indirect purchaser from Gulf. The contract
for sale of gasoline was between Gulf and
Tesoro Petroleum Corporation. Tesoro then
resold the gasoline to Fletcher.°”
Section 210(b) of the ESA authorizes suits

for overcharges ".

against any person
renting or selling goods or services who is

found to hav. overcharged the plaintiff."

[Emphasis added.] We hold that, on the
basis of our examination of the record and
as a matter of law, Fletcher was an
indirect purchaser from Gulf. Indeed,

plaintiffs' counsel classified Fletcher in

3° etcher paid Tesoro Gulf's sales
price plus a fixed markup of $.00375 per
gallon. FFCL, supra, at 14. We are not
convinced that the “unique relationship"
the district court found between Gulf,
Tesoro and Fletcher (Id. at 12-15) requires
a determination that Fletcher was anything
other than an indirect purchaser from Gulf.

A40

this statement to Judge Panner: "That's a
question of whether Fletcher is entitled as
a subjobber and has standing to bring this
matter in the first place." Record at
VGA 2a 7 SO: See, @. 223,44. #1.

Fletcher was an indirect purchaser
with no standing to sue for overcharges,

and we so hold. See, Palazzo v. Gulf Oil

Corp., 4 Energy Mgt. 7 26,448 (Em.App.

1983), cert. denied, Ui

(No. 83-6145, 52 U.S.L.W. 3631, Feb. 27,

1984); Arnson v. General Motors Corp., 377

F.Supp. 209 (N.D. Ohio 1974). When
Congress created the Temporary Emergency
Court of Appeals as "a court of special and

"40

limited jurisdiction which should

"Strictly construe [its] statutory grants

Micuecn, ne... ¥

1193, 1196 (Em.App. 197
cited therein.

D,.O.8.,; 626 F.46
9), and authorities

A4l1

na it did not authorize

of jurisdiction,
recovery of overcharges by indirect
purchasers. The EPAA expired by its own
terms in September 1981. We will not
expand the statutes while exercising our

jurisdiction under the savings clause. 15

U.S.C. § 7GGg.

Statute of Limitations

In addition to our foregoing holding
that Plaintiff Fletcher does not have
standing to sue Gulf, we hold that any
claim by Fletcher would also be barred by

the applicable statute of limitations.

tlunited States v. Cooper, 482 F.2d

1393, 1398 (Em.App. 1973), approved by the
Supreme Court in Bray v. United States, 423

U.S. 73, 96 S.Ct. 307, 309, 46 L.Ed.2d 215
(1975).

A42

Because the ESA, EPAA and EPCA do not
contain specific statutes of limitation, we
must apply the most closely analogous state
statute of limitation to causes of action

arising under the Acts. Ashland Oil Co. of

California v. Union Oil Co. of California,

367 F.2d 984 (Em.App. 1977), cert. denied,

435 U.S. 997 (1978); Colorado Petroleum

Preducts Co. v. Husky Oil Co., 646 F.2d 555

(Em.App. 1981).

The district judge applied the Oregon
six-year statute of limitations to
Plaintiff Fletcher. *? We hold that this
was plain error and that the Washington
two-year statute of limitations** should be

applied to Fletcher.

425; Rev. Stat. § 12.080 (1983).

43wash. Rev. Code § 12.16.130 (1962).

A43

Plaintiff Fletcher is a Washington

44 'Fletcher purchased 60 percent

resident.
of its gasoline in Washington and 40
percent in Oregon. *” All of Fletcher's
gasoline was sold in Washington. 7° Gulf is

a Pennsylvania corporation. *’ Under

Oregon's “borrowing statute," Or. Rev.
Stat. § 12.260, when two nonresidents bring

a cause of action in an Oregon court whi--h

arose in another state, the Oregon court
will apply the foreign state's statute of
limitations if it is shorter than Oregon's.
The district judge held that although
the "borrowing statute" might be
applicable, his decision should also be

governed by general Oregon choice of law

445FCL, Record at Volume li, Tab 147,
App. A, p. 2.

4354.

4674.

47g.

eH

A44

standards. *® Under Oregon law, when more

than one state has an interest ina
controversy, the law of the state which has
the "most significant relationship" to the
controversy will be applied. *” The
district judge found that Washington had no
true interest in the controversy.~° We
disagree. Plaintiff Fletcher is a
Washington resident. Most of the gasoline
was purchased in Washington, and all of it
was sold there. We hold that, as between
Washington and Oregon, Washington had the
more significant relationship to the
controversy. Oregon's "borrowing statute"
is applicable, and the shorter Washington

two-year statute of limitations should

apply to Fletcher.

4854. at 4.

49.8 citing Fisher v. Huck, 50 Or.

App. 635, 624 P.2da 177 (1981).

9054. at 6.

A45

The district judge also declined to
apply Washington's two-year statute of

limitations because he found that
two-year limitation places a bar on
recovery inconsistent with federal

31 we have already held that "/a]

policy."
two-year statute is certainly not

inconsistent with national energy policy
seeking to wind up regulation of the oil

industry -- ‘temporary’ ab initio."

Johnson Oil Co. v. DOE, 690 F.2d 191, 196

(Em.App. 1982). See also, Ashland Oil Co.

v. Union Oil Co. of California, supra;

Siegel Oil Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 701 F.2d

149, 152 (Em.App. 1983).

Therefore, Washington's two-year
statute of limitations should be applied to
plaintiff Fletcher. Fletcher's claim was
brought in 1977 for overcharges beginning

in 1974. In a case such as this, where any

51

A46

overcharges incurred resulted from an
initial improper base price, the statute of
limitations begins to run from the date of

the first overcharge. Western Mountain

Oil, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 726 F.2d 765

(Em.App. 1983); Fleetwing Corp. v. Mobil

Oil Corp., 726 F.2d 768 (Em.App. 1983);

Lerner v. Atlantic Richfield Co., F.2d

No. 9-78 (Em.App. March 13, 1984),

rehearing en banc denied, April 10, 1984.

Fletcher's claim for overcharges is barred

by Wash. Rev. Code § 12.16.130.

Passing On Defense

Gulf claims that those overcharges
which were passed through to the plain-
tiff's service station customers should not
be refunded because the plaintiffs suffered

no economic injury from overcharges which

A47

were passed down the stream of commerce.”

Although such use of a passing on defense
has been denied because of difficulty of
proof in the past,” Gulf argues that in
determining the sum on which to award
prejudgment interest, the trial court
sufficiently found the amounts which the
plaintiffs had passed through to their
customers, and therefore, no difficulty of
proof problem exists which would prevent
the use of passing on as an affirmative
54

defense.

In Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Atlantic

Richfield Co., 609 F.2d 497 (Em.App. 1979)

92culf's Brief at 21.

5313:inois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 52 L.Ed.2d 707
(1977); Eastern Air Lines v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 609 F.2d 497 (Em.App. 1979)
("ARCO I").

5

4culf's Brief at 21-23.

A48

("ARCO I"), this Court refused to allow a
passing on defense in an overcharge action.
In ARCO I, we held that, in order to be
excepted from the general rule disallowing
the affirmative pass on defense, >> the
defendant must establish that a preexisting
functional equivalent of a cost-plus
contract>° existed in which plaintiffs
would necessarily pass through any
overcharge received, and that the effect of
the overcharge to plaintiffs must be
capable of determination in advance. Id.
at 498.

Therefore, Gulf's assertion that the
overcharges passed on by plaintiffs were

determined by the magistrate at trial, thus

obviating any difficulty of proof problem,

>See, Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United

Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 88
S.Ct. 2224, 20 L.Ed. 1231 (1968).

ot In re Beef Industry Antitrust

Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979).

A493

misses the point. In order for Gulf to
successfully assert the passing on defense,
the impact of any overcharges made by it to
plaintiffs must be determinable before the
overcharges occurred. Such was not the
case here. There was no certainty about
how plaintiffs would price their gasoline
at the service station in response to the
amount charged by Gulf. Because the
exception to the general rule disallowing
passing on as a defense is narrow, we hold
that Gulf may not use the passing on
defense in this case where no preexisting
functional equivalent of a cost-plus

contract existed.

Class of Purchaser Determination

Gulf asks us to overturn the district
judge's order denying Gulf's motion to

reopen the trial on the class of purchaser

A50

issue.”? Gulf sought to introduce

additional evidence to show that the San
Francisco Bay oan. where Armour is
located, is a distinct market from the
Seattle-Tacoma-Portland area, where
plaintiffs are located, and thus it would
be inappropriate to use the same
classification and base price for Armour
and the plaintiffs.

Judge Panner denied the motion to
reopen the trial during a telephone
conference on May 12, 1982, °° sixteen
months before a final judgment was entered
on September 12, 1983. It is apparent from
the transcript of that conference that the

judge had not fully considered the

memorandum and affidavit accompanying

"’oulf's Brief at 24.

>BRecord at Vol. 19, Tab 323.

A51

59

Gulf's motion. Although the grant or

denial of a motion to reopen the trial is
within the district judge's discretion, °°
we hold that the refusal to reopen the
trial in this case was an abuse of
discretion and clear error.

The district judge's ruling on the
motion to reopen the trial without
considering the supporting documents filed

by Gulf was an abuse of discretion. See,

Sertic v. Cayahoga Counties Carpenters

Dist. Council, 459 F.2d 579 (6th Cir.

1972). The Pretrial Order in this case was

extremely vague as to the issues framed for

60s anders v. Int'l. Ass'a. of Bridge
Workers, 546 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1976).

A52

trial, °! and we hold that Gulf did not have

a full and fair opportunity to present
evidence on its most similar existing class
of purchaser after the ruling denying the

use of Platt's Oilgram as a base price

determinant. Therefore, we reverse and
remand the district judge's ruling on the
motion to reopen trial and direct him to
consider Gulf's evidence and make a new
determination of the proper class of

purchaser and base price for the

plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
Gulf's Motion to Dismiss is
DENIED.
61

Although the Pretrial Order
contained references to the Armour class of
purchaser, the record reflects that the
idea of using the Armour base price for
plaintiffs was first seriously considered
at trial.

A53

- ¥ The district court's Order
determining the proper class of purchaser
for Plaintiffs is REVERSED and REMANDED
with directions to reopen the trial to
consider Gulf's evidence on the class of
purchaser issue. Any award of overcharges
must be recalculated to reflect any change
in base price.

°F The Orders of the district court
granting attorney's fees and prejudgment
interest are REVERSED.

4. That portion of the judgment of
the district court awarding overcharges to
Plaintiff Fletcher is REVERSED.

The judgment of the district court is
REVERSED and REMANDED for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A54

CHRISTENSEN, Judge, concurring:

The prevailing opinion has my full
concurrence but I wish to add a few words
to clarify an unaddressed misconception
relating to the wording of the controlling
Statute which might otherwise appear on its
face to carry weight.

The contention has been made that if,

as held in Eastern Airlines, a court's

discretion to award attorney's fees under
section 210(b) of the ESA is limited to
cases of willful overcharges, mention of
"costs" would not have been included in the
phrase "reasonable attorney's fees and

costs,"

Since under the general rule
taxable costs are recoverable by prevailing
parties in any event. The contention fails
to recognize the distinction between
taxable costs awardable as of course to a

prevailing party apart from adjudged

liability and "reasonable attorney's fees

A55

ana costs" as a liability authorized in
departure from tme American Rule as to
attorney's fees because of certain
recognized equitable considerations or, as
here, by express statutory provision under
specified conditions. If the term "costs"
in line with the argument had been
eliminated from the phrase, a more
plausible contention could have been made
that even taxable costs could not be
recovered at all in case of willful
overcharges whereas they would have been if
the overcharges were not willful. Senerinn
did not need to invite the latter
unreasonable construction by omitting the
mention of costs in connection with its
reference to attorney's fees. It plainly
indicated its intention to the contrary and
it would be quite unreasonable to hold that
in so doing it granted carte blanche
discretion to award "attorney's fees and

costs" in disregard of the limitations it

A56

specified merely because taxable costs
otherwise may have been awardable to a

prevailing party without reference to those

limitations.

A57

ZIRPOLI, Judge, concurring in part and

dissenting in part:

While I am in accord with the opinion
of the majority on the issues of
jurisdiction, remand for further trial on
the class of purchasers determination, and
the statute of limitations applicable to
Fletcher, I cannot agree with the
majority's conclusions on the issues of
prejudgment interest, attorney's fees, and
Fletcher's standing. Accordingly, I must
respectfully dissent.

A. Prejudgment Interest

The majority concludes that it was
improper for the district court to award
prejudgment interest in this case because
the amount of overcharges by Gulf were not
certain until after trial. The majority

relies on Zahir v. Shell Oil Co., 718 F.2d

1567, 1573 (TECA 1983), and Eastern Air

Lines, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 712

A58

F.2d 1402, 1410 (TECA), cert. denied,

U.S. _, 104 §.Ct. 278 (1983). Neither
of these cases bars an award of prejudgment
interest in the present case. Because I
find no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's award of prejudgment interest in
this case, I would affirm that portion of
the decision.

"In the absence of an unequivocal
prohibition of interest, and where the
statute imposes a money obligation, the
power of the court to award interest is
dependent on an appraisal of the
congressional purpose of imposing the
obligation and on the relative equities of

the parties." Hodgson v. American Can Co.,

440 F.2d 916, 922 (8th Cir. 1971). The
statute authorizing suits to collect
overcharges is remedial in nature and
designed to compensate those who have been
overcharged for the losses that they

sustained as a result of the overcharges.

A59

See Minnesota v. Standard Oil Co., 516

F.Supp. 682, 687 (D. Minn. 1981); Ashland

Oil Co. of California v. Union Oil Co., 567

F.2d 984, 990 n. 12 (TECA 1977). An award
of prejudgment interest to compensate
plaintiffs for the loss of the use of money
is consistent with the congressional
purpose of this statute.

The relative equities of the parties
in this case do not tip so strongly towards
Gulf as to render the award of prejudgment
interest to plaintiffs an abuse of

discretion. While it may be true that Gulf

had financial difficulties in the Pacific
Northwest where plaintiffs operate, this is
not a proper factor to consider in deciding
whether or not to award prejudgment
interest, nor does it appear that the
majority considers this to be a relevant
consideration, since it is not mentioned in
the opinion. What is a relevant factor, is

that Gulf conceded its use of spot purchase

A60

prices reported in Platt's Oilgram for

establishing plaintiffs’ base price was
unjustified. In deciding to award
prejudgment interest, the trial court
expressed its “concern that there wasn't a
more serious effort [by Gulf] .. . to
correct the overcharge” (Tr. 1159).
Although the trial court did find that
Gulf's overcharges were not intentional,
and so did not award treble damages, I
think that it was well within its
discretion to award prejudgment interest to
plaintiffs on overcharges which they did
not pass through to their customers.

The majority bases its reversal of the
award of prejudgment interest on the fact
that the principal amount of the overcharge
was the "subject of a great amount of
uncertainty" because the parties were in
disagreement as to what was the most
appropriate class of purchasers for

plaintiffs. Until the trial court had

A61

ruled on the appropriate class of
purchasers question, the principal amount
of overcharges could not be computed.
Because this uncertainty as to a legal

issue is not the type which is

traditionally held to preclude an award of
prejudgment interest, I would defer to the
trial court's determination that the
relative equities of the parties, as well
as the remedial purpose of the statute,
warranted the award. Neither Zahir or

Eastern Airlines dictates otherwise.

In both Zahir and Eastern, this court

affirmed the trial court's denial of

prejudgment interest. In Zahir it was held
that "the trial court did not abwse its
discretion” in declining to award
prejudgment interest where the plaintiff's
claim was "not for a liquidated or readily
liquidatable sum." 718 F.2d at 1573. In
that case, the plaintiff's claim upon which

he sought prejudgment interest was for lost

A62

profits due to the defendant's failure to
supply him with gasoline. A claim for lost
profits is a highly speculative type of
injury which must be estimated, rather than
one which is capable of determination with
mathematical precision. It has long been
the rule that awards of prejudgment
interest are not given on claims of injury
which are not of the type capable of
reasonably precise determination. Thus,
the refusal of the trial court to award
prejudgment interest in Zahir was clearly
correct.

In the present case, on the other
hand, the injury suffered by plaintiffs was
one capable of mathematical computation.
The “uncertainty” involved was due to the
parties’ dispute as to which was the proper
class of purchasers for determining plain-

tiffs' base price. Once the trial court

had made its ruling on the class of

purchasers question, the principal amount

of the overcharge was one capable of
mathematical computation. 2

Courts’ have traditionally had
discretion to award prejudgment interest in
cases where the damages are liquidated or
capable of mathematical computation. Thus,
it has been said that "interest is allowed
on all claims that are liquidated or
readily ascertainable by mathematical
computations . . . in other words where it
is not necessary to rely upon opinion or

discretion." Nelse Mortensen & Co. v.

14 great deal of time was spent in
determining what portion of the overcharges
plaintiffs had passed through to their
customers. The trial court had ruled that
it would be inequitable to award plaintiffs
prejudgment interest on overcharges that
they had passed through, since to the
extent of such pass-throughs, plaintiffs
had not been deprived of the use of the
money. Gulf should not be heard to
complain about any "uncertainty" involved
in determining the amount passed through,
since this equitable determination to limit
the award of prejudgment interest on
overcharges was to Gulf's benefit.

A64

United States, 305 F.Supp. 470, 471 (E.D.

Wash. 1969) (quoting from Caterpillar

Tractor v. Collins Machinery Co., 286 F.2d

446 (9th Cir. 1960)). A disputed claim is
not rendered unliquidated or incapable of
precise valuation merely because the
parties disagree as to the proper method
for calculating the principal amount due.

Thus, in American Enka Co. v. Wicaco Mach.

Corp., 686 F.2d 1050, 1057 (3rd Cir. 1962),
where the parties were in disagreement over
the correct date to be used for an award of
the market value of goods lost by a bailee,
the court held that the dispute concerned a
liquidated amount "capable of ascertainment
with mathematical precision" (once it was
determined which was the proper date for
purposes of vaiuing the property) and the
trial court had discretion to award

prejudgment interest. See also, Mortensen,

305 F.Supp. at 471 ("Mere difference of

opinion as to amount is, however, no more a

A65

reason to excuse him from interest than
difference of opinion whether he legally
ought to pay at all, which has never been
held an excuse." [Emphasis deleted;

quoting from Prier v. Refrigeration

Engineering Co., 442 P.2d 621, 627 (Wash.

1968). )

Nor does Eastern Airlines dictate any

deviation from the traditional principle

that the trial court has discretion to

award prejudgment interest on sums which
are liquidated or "capable of ascertainment

with mathematical precision." American

Enka, 686 F.2d at 1057. In Eastern, as
noted above, the trial court did not award
prejudgment interest, and this decision was
affirmed. In the present case, on the
other hand, the trial court, in its
discretion, did award prejudgment interest.
The majority, with no discussion of the
relative equities of the parties or the

remedial purpose of the statute, holds that

A66

the trial court abused its discretion in
awarding prejudgment interest in this case.
The majority apparently relies on the
broad language in Eastern that "prejudgment
interest is not available where the amount
of damages claimed to be due is uncertain."
712 F.2d at 1410. However, as noted above,
it is not every type of "uncertainty" which
will preclude an award of prejudgment
interest. An examination of the case cited
in Eastern in support of the quoted
language shows the relevant type of
uncertainty to be that due to inherent
difficulty in measuring the extent of
injury, such as that involved in Zahir.

The case cited in Eastern, Belcher v.

Birmingham National Bank, 488 F.2d 474, 478

(Sth Cir. 1973), was an action to recover
the value of services rendered. In
determining the reasonable value of
services rendered, the court must rely upon

"opinion or discretion" to estimate the

A67

principal amount to be awarded. Mortensen,

305 F.Supp. at 471. Such an estimate
necessarily means that the amount is not
"readily ascertainable by mathematical
computations." Id. Thus, the authority
cited in Eastern does not support any broad
rule that a dispute as to the legal issue
of the most appropriate class of purchasers
for plaintiffs will preclude an award of
prejudgment interest. Furthermore, any
such broad rule would be contrary to the
remedial purposes of the statute. Thus, I
do not read Eastern as holding that the

trial court would have abused its

discretion if it had awarded prejudgment
interest in that case. Rather, as was made
clear in Zahir, the trial court had

discretion to deny prejudgment interest in

Eastern, depending upon the equities, and
there was no indication that it had abused

its discretion in that case.

A68

In the present case, the trial court
considered the equities and the remedial
purposes of the statute and concluded that
an award of prejudgment interest was
appropriate. I find no reason to overturn
this decision.

B. Attorney's Fees

I must dissent from the majority's
determination that it was "plain error" to
award attorney's fees in this case. While
I find the majority opinion somewhat
ambiguous as to the basis for its holding
on this question, I assume that the opinion
is intended to hold that an award of
attorney's fees is never authorized under
section 210(b) of the Economic
Stabilization Act if the defendant proves
that the overcharge was "not intentional
and resulted from a bona fide error
notwithstanding the maintenance of
procedures reasonably adapted to the

avoidance of such error." 12 U.S.C. § 1904

A69

note. I do not think that a close
examination of the statute supports this
interpretation.

As a preliminary matter, it should be
noted that although the trial court did
expressly find that the overcharges in this
case were not intentional, there was no
express finding that they were the result
of a "bona fide error notwithstanding the
maintenance of [adequate procedures
designed to prevent such errors]." The
majority's statement that the "finding that
Gulf maintained ‘procedures reasonably
adapted to the avoidance’ of an overcharge"
was not in the "precise language" of the
statute (see opinion at 15) is somewhat
misleading, since not only was such a
finding not in the "precise language" of
the statute, it was not made at all.
Nevertheless, since I think it is clear
that such a finding was impliedly made, I

do not take issue with the majority's

A70

conclusion that Gulf had proven that the
overcharges were the result of a bona fide
error. I make this observation only to
make absolutely clear that this court was
not under the erroneous impression that the
trial court had made some express finding,
even though not in the "precise language”
of the statute. The basis for my
conclusion that the trial court had made an
implied finding that Gulf had made the
overcharges in good faith notwithstanding
the maintenance of adequate procedures is
that the trial court went to the trouble of
deciding a difficult statutory
interpretation question as to whether
attorney's fees were awardable even in
cases where treble damages are not. Treble
damages are clearly not awardable under
section 210(b) where the defendant proves
that the overcharge was unintentional and
the result of a bona fide error

notwithstanding the maintenance of adequate

A71

procedures. If the trial court had not
made an implied finding that Gulf's
overcharc s were the result of a good faith
error, it would not have been necessary for
it to decide the statutory interpretation
question.

Unlike the majority, I agree with the
district court's conclusion that
section 210(b) authorizes an award of
attorney's fees in this case even though
Gulf had satisfied the court that its error
was unintentional and the result of a good
faith error. Section 210(b) provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:

{[T})he court may, in its

discretion, award the plaintiff

reasonable attorney's fees and

costs, plus whichever of the

following sums is greater:

(1) an amount not more than
three times the amount of the
overcharge upon which the action
is based, or

(2) not less than $100 or
more than $1,000; except that in
any case where the defendant

establishes that the overcharge
was not intentional and resulted

A72

from a bona fide error

notwithstanding the maintenance

of procedures reasonably adapted

to the avoidance of such error

the liability of the defendant

shall be limited to the amount of

the overcharge.

12 U.S.C. § 1904 note.

Upon close examination of the statute,
the district court concluded that "the
language of exception beginning with the
word 'except' modifies only the language
that follows the word 'plus.'" Thus, the
court concluded that it had discretion to
award attorney's fees in this case. I
agree. Under the interpretation of this
statute adopted by the majority, the award
of costs, as well as attorney's fees, would
not be authorized in cases where the
defendant proves that the overcharge was
unintentional. Such an interpretation
clearly would run counter to the remedial
purpose of the statute and to Congress'

intent that private actions should play a

"critical" role in the enforcement of the

A73

price regulations. See Ashland Oil, 567

F.2d at 290 n.1l. While the opinion in
Eastern does include dicta which supports
the majority's interpretation, the holding
in that case was merely that the trial
court had not erred in denying an award of
attorney's fees and treble damages, and
there is no indication that the court in
that case was called upon to closely
examine the statute.

Thus, I conclude that section 210(b)
authorizes the court, in its discretion, to
award “attorney's fees and costs" to a
successful plaintiff in an action to
recover overcharges even in cases where the
defendant makes a showing that would pre-
clude an award of treble damages. Since

there is no indication that it would be an

A74

abuse of discretion to award any amount of
attorney's fees, I respectfully dissent.”

C. Fletcher's Standing

Although I concur in the majority's
holding that the two-year Washington
statute of limitations bars Fletcher's
claims, and so do not believe it is
necessary for the court to rule on the
issue of Fletcher's standing, because the

majority has expressed its views on this

2since I concur in the holding that
this case should be remanded to permit Gulf
to introduce new evidence on the class of
purchasers issue, I express no opinion as
to whether the amount of attorney's fees
awarded in this case was reasonable. I
would note, however, that plaintiffs are
entitled to recover a "reasonable fee"
based upon the "prevailing market rates" in
the community, and are not restricted to
recovery of the fees actually billed. Blum
v. Stenson, U.S. , 52 U.S.L.W.
4377, 4379 (March 21, 1984). It appears
that a substantial portion of the "bonus"
referred to by the majority (see opinion
note 38) may be attributable to the fact
that the fees actually billed plaintiffs
were lower than the market rate.

A75

issue, I feel constrained to state my
views.

Fletcher was a retail seller of
gasoline under the Gulf brand in Washington
and Oregon until Gulf withdrew its brand
from the region in 1974. Gulf continued to
supply gasoline to Fletcher and the other
plaintiffs after 1974, on an unbranded
basis, as required by the mandatory
allocation regulations. The gasoline sold
by Fletcher under the Gulf brand was
purchased under a cost-plus contract
between Fletcher and Tesoro Petroleum
Corporation. Tesoro, in turn, had a
gasoline supply contract with Gulf. Thus,
on a superficial basis, it might appear
that Fletcher was not a direct purchaser
from Gulf; however, an examination of all
the facts supports the district court's
finding that "the sale [by Gulf] in
substance was to Fletcher." Fletcher had

substantial direct dealings with Gulf.

A76

Fletcher took delivery of the gasoline
directly from Gulf. Gulf established a
procedure by which Fletcher transmitted its
credit card slips directly to Gulf, which
in turn would credit Tesoro's account.

Gulf included Fletcher in meetings held
with all of Gulf's branded jobbers, and
notices of price changes came directly from
Gulf to Fletcher, not through Tesoro.

Prior to the execution of both the
Gulf-Tesoro and the Tesoro-Fletcher
contracts, Gulf was informed that Fletcher
would be the party receiving and retailing
the gasoline, and Gulf representatives
investigated Fletcher's station locations,
and explained the ramifications of
Fletcher's anticipated use of the Gulf
brand. The contract between Tesoro and
Fletcher provided that Fletcher would pay
Gulf's price plus a fixed markup of $.00375
per gallon. When Gulf applied to the DOE

to withdraw as a supplier from certain West

A77

Coast locations, Gulf referred to its
supply obligation to "Tesoro Fletcher."
Section 210(b) of the ESA authorizes

suits for overcharges ".

against any
person . . . who is found to have

overcharged the plaintiff." This statute
has been interpreted as limiting standing

in overcharge suits to "direct purchasers."

Thus, in Arnson v. General Motors Corp.,

377 F.Supp. 209, 211-12 (N.D. Ohio, 1974),
the court held that a purchaser of an
automobile from a dealer did not have
standing to sue the manufacturer for
alleged overcharges by the manufacturer to
the dealer. In reaching this conclusion,
however, the court noted "there is no
allegation that [the defendant} dealt
directly with the plaintiff in any manner.
Thus absent any privity between plaintiff
and defendant, it is apparent that
defendant is not a seller within the scope

of the Act as it relates to this

A78

ii Rae ai

transaction." 377 F.Supp. at 212.
Furthermore, the court in Arnson
specifically found that there was no agency
relationship between the manufacturer and
the dealer by which price increases of the
manufacturer were automatically passed on
to the ultimate consumer. In fact, such
price increases were not passed on by the
dealer in five percent of the cases. Id.
at 214. In the present case, on the other
hand, there were substantially direct
dealings between Gulf and Fletcher, and the
price paid by Fletcher was directly tied to
the price charged by Gulf through a
cost-plus contract. Thus, Arnson, relied
on by the majority, by no means establishes
that Fletcher lacks standing to sue Gulf
for overcharges.

Nor does Palazzo v. Gulf Oil Corp.,

the other case cited by the majority, stand
for the proposition that an "indirect"

purchaser such as Fletcher had no standing

A79

to sue. In Palazzo, the plaintiff was an
officer and stockholder of the entity which
made the purchases from the defendant.
Thus, the overcharges by Gulf had no direct
and mathematically certain impact on
Falazzo. Overcharges by Gulf in the
present case, on the other hand, had a
direct and ascertainable impact on
Fletcher, due to the cost-plus contract
between Tesoro and Fletcher.

It is the general rule under the
antitrust laws that an indirect purchaser
has no standing to sue, yet there is an
exception to this rule which permits such
suits where the plaintiff makes purchases

under a cost-plus contract. See Illinois

Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736

(1976); In re Beef Industry Antitrust

Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1163-64 (5th

Cir. 1979). I see no reason why such an
exception should not also exist for suits

to recover overcharges under

A80

section 210(b). This is especially true in
view of Congress' intent that private suits
to recover overcharges would serve both
remedial and policing functions. To hold
that Tesoro, not Fletcher, is the only
party which would have standing to sue for
these overcharges would not serve any
remedial purpose, since Tesoro was not
harmed by Gulf's overcharges. Tesoro
received its $.00375 per gallon no matter
what Gulf charged. Nor would such a
holding advance the enforcement purposes of
the statute, since Gulf would be permitted
to raise the defense that Tesoro passed on
all of Gulf's overcharges to Fletcher. See

Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery

Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968); Eastern

Airlines, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,

609 F.2d 497 (TECA 1979); and majority
opinion at 19. Tesoro obviously would have

no motivation to bring suit for overcharges

A81

by Gulf for which it could not recover due
to the passing-on defense.
D. Remand

In joining the majority ruling that
the case be remanded to reopen the trial
to censider Gulf's evidence on the class of
purchasers issue, I am satisfied that the
court expresses no view on what the proper
class of purchasers will ultimately be
found to be. I do not understand the
majority's statement that the district
court's findings were "erroneous as to the
class of purchaser base price" (opinion
at 12) to be a determination as to the

proper class of purchaser.

A82

TEMPORARY EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE UNITED STATES

Nos. 9-80 and 9-81

GULF OIL CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

Vv.

RICHARD W. DYKE, dba Western Stations Co.,
COLVIN OIL COMPANY, and
F. O. FLETCHER, INC., dba Fletcher
Oil Company,

Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants,

and

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor.

Before CHRISTENSEN, ESTES and ZIRPOLI,
Judges.

JUDGMENT

This cause came on to be heard on the
record on appeal from the United States
District Court for the District of Oregon
and was argued by counsel. In considera-
tion whereof, It is

ORDERED that (1) Gulf's Motion to

Dismiss is Denied; (2) the district court's

A83

Order determining the proper class of
purchase for Plaintiffs is REVERSED and
REMANDED with directions to reopen the
trial to consider Gulf's evidence on the
class of purchaser issue. Any award of
overcharges must Se recalculated to reflect
any change in base price; (3) the Orders of
the district court granting attorney's fees
and prejudgment interest are REVERSED; and
(4) that portion of the judgment of the
district court awarding overcharges to
Plaintiff Fletcher is REVERSED. And it is,
FURTHER ORDERED that the judgment of
the district court is REVERSED and REMANDED
for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
FOR THE COURT:
Donna M. Bold, Clerk
by: /s/ Patricia L. Krosel
Patricia L. Krosel
Chief Deputy Clerk

April 17, 1984

A84

a a a es “

TEMPORARY EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE UNITED STATES

Nos. 9-80 and 9-81

GULF OIL CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

Vv.

RICHARD W. DYKE, dba Western Stations Co.,
COLVIN OIL COMPANY, and
F. O. FLETCHER, INC., dba Fletcher
Oil Company,

Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants,

and

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor.

Before CHRISTENSEN, ESTES and ZIRPOLI,
Judges.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the Petition for
Rehearing filed by Appellant/Cross-
Appellee, Gulf Oil Corporation, it is

ORDERED that said petition is DENIED.
The mandate shall issue on June 5, 1984, as
set forth in the Order of this Court dated

May 29, 1984.

A85

FOR THE COURT:

Donna M. Bold
Clerk

by: /s/ Patricia Krosel
Patricia Krosel
Chief Deputy Clerk

June 4, 1984

A86

TEMPORARY EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE UNITED STATES

Nos. 9-80 and 9-81

GULF OIL CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

Vv.

RICHARD W. DYKE, dba Western Stations Co.,
COLVIN OIL COMPANY, and
F. O. FLETCHER, INC., dba Fletcher
Oil Company,

Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants,

and

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor.

Before CHRISTENSEN, ESTES and ZIRPOLI,
Judges.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Plaintiffs-
Appellees/Cross-Appellants' Petition for
rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en
banc, it is

ORDERED trat the petition for

rehearing is DENIED.

A87

It is FURTHER ORDERED that the
suggestion for rehearing en banc is DENIED.
The mandate shall issue on June 5, 1984.
FOR THE COURT:
Donna M. Bold
Clerk

May 29, 1984

A88

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

RICHARD W. DYKE,
dba Western
Stations Co.,

ivil No. 77-10-PA

Plaintiff,
Vv.

GULF OIL CORPORA-
TION, a
Pennsylvania
corporation

COLVIN OIL COMPANY,
an Oregon
corporation,

Civil No. 77-791-PA

Plaintiff,
Vv.

»c
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Defendant. )
)
)
)
)
)
)
.
GULF OIL CORPORA- )
TION, a )
Pennsylvania )
corporation, )
)
)

Defendant.

A89

F.O. FLETCHER,
INC., dba FLETCHER
OIL COMPANY,

Civil No. 77-849-PA

Plaintiff,

Vv. FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF
GULF OIL CORPORA- LAW
TION, a
Pennsylvania
corporation,
Defendant.

me ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee

John L. Schwabe, Esquire

Neva T. Campbell, Esquire

Mary E. Egan, Esquire

Schwabe, Williamson, Wyatt,
Moore & Roberts

1200 Standard Plaza

Portland, Oregon 97204

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

John R. Brooke, Esquire

Wood, Tatum, Mosser, Brooke
& Holden

1001 S.W. Fifth - Suite 1300

Portland, Oregon 97204

Jack D. Fudge, Esquire

Michael L. Hickok, Esquire
Douglas J. Del Tondo, Esquire
McCutchen, Black, Verleger & Shea
600 Wilshire Boulevard

Los Angeles, California 90017

Attorneys for Defendant

A90

PANNER, J.

These are actions under the Emergency
Petroleum Allocation Act ("EPAA"), 15
U.S.C. § 751 et seg., to recover
overcharges in the price of gasoline. The
parties agreed that the three cases would
be consolidated for trial. They further
agreed that Dyke would be tried first and
that the court's findings and conclusions
in that case would also apply to Colvin and
Fletcher.

This court has subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to sections 210 and
21l(a) of the Economic Stabilization Act of
1970 ("ESA"), 84 Stat. 799, as amended, as
so incorporated by reference into
section 5(a)(1) of the EPPA. See 12
U.S.C.A. § 1904, Note (1979 Pocket Part).
This court has pendent subject matter

jurisdiction over Gulf's counterclaim

AQ91

against Dyke arising out of the same
nucleus of operative facts as Dyke's claim.
Herewith follow findings of fact and

conclusions of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.

52(a).
I. FINDINGS OF FACT
A. Description of Parties.
Ae Dyke, Colvin and Fletcher are

unbranded independent marketers of motor
gasoline and are reseller-retailers as
defined in the EPAA. 10 C.F.R. § 212.31.

2. Gulf is a refiner as defined in
the EPAA. 10C.F.R. § 212.31.

: Fe (a) Dyke marketed gasoline in
western Oregon and Longview, Washington
beginning in 1971. He received Gulf
product from 1971 to January 1977 via
terminals located in Portland and Eugene,
Oregon and Crescent City, California. From

1975 to January 1977 he marketed gasoline

in the Seattic-Tacoma, Washington area,
receiving Gulf product at the Tacoma,
Washington terminal.

(b) Colvin markets gasoline in
southwest Oregon. It received Gulf product
via terminals located at Crescent City,
California and Eugene, Oregon from 1967
until January 1977.

{c) Fletcher markets gasoline in
Washington and Oregon. It received Gulf
product via terminals locaced at Tacoma,
Washington and Portland, Oregon from 1970
until January 1977.

4. (a) In 1972 Dyke, Colvin and
Fletcher purchased Gulf branded gasoline on
contract and sold that gasoline under
Gulf's brand name.

(b) Product was delivered by
Gulf to Dyke's stations or Dyke received a
hauling allowance for transporting the

gasoline from the terminals to Dyke's

A93

stations. Colvin and Fletcher received
hauling allowances.

(c) Dyke as a branded jobber had
the right to honor Gulf credit cards,
obtain free painting of service station
facilities, and received reimbursement for
expenses paid by Gulf in lieu of other
delivery expenses. Each of those
above-mentioned penefits enjoyed by Dyke
while operating as a Gulf-branded jobber
and service station operator have
historically been provided by Gulf solely
in conjunction with the use of its brand.

B. Divesv.iture Area.

a (a) In October 1972 Gulf adopted
a divestiture program for the northwestern
United States. Under this program Gulf
disposed of approximately 2.5 percent of
its assets including approximately 3,500
service stations and 275 bulk plants and
terminals. Also encompassed in the

divestiture plan was the termination of

A94

Gulf's branded gasoline relationships.
Gulf intended to withdraw from its
marketing operations in northern
California, northern Nevada, Oregon and
Washington. This area has been described
as Gulf's San Francisco Retail Marketing
District.

(b) Gulf's branded operations
throughout the divestiture area had
produced consistent and substantial losses.
Prior to the divestiture decision, Gulf
incurred losses in those marketing areas of
$31.7 million in 1971 and $37 million in
1972. Gulf's management decision to divest
was made before the adoption of the EPAA.

(c) Part of Gulf's divestiture
program implemented in the Pacific
Northwest was the withdrawal of the Gulf
brand.

(d) Following the divestiture
decision, Gulf was required by mandatory

allocation regulations to continue to make

A95

gascline available to its jobbers in the
area that it supplied during 1972. 10
C.2.8. § Bia:
(e) Effective January 1, 1974

Gulf continued to supply gasoline but
withdrew its brand from purchasers in the
San Francisco Retail Marketing District.

ma Within this area Gulf had
terminals at:

Tacoma, Washington

Portland, Oregon

Eugene, Oregon

Crescent City, California

Bradshaw (Sacramento), California

Hercules (San Francisco), California

Brisbane, California

San Jose, California

Stockton, California

Fresno, California

Reno, Nevada

3. All but one of Gulf's jobbers in
this area were branded jobbers on May 15,
1973.

4. The only unbranded jobber in this
area as of May 15, 1973 was Armour Oil Co.,

which picked up product at several

terminals in northern California.

A96

CG. May 15, 1973 Branded Jobbers.

An Gulf sold branded gasoline to
Dyke on May 15, 1973 from the following
terminals at the following prices:

Good Gulf No Nox

Terminal Destination (Regular) (Premium)
Portland Portland 1495 . 1820
Eugene Cottage Grove .1495 . 1820
Crescent City/

Eugene Roseburg . 1595 . 1920
Crescent City/

Eugene Eisewhere . 1695 . 2020

a Gulf sold branded gasoline to

Tesoro/Fletcher in Tacoma, Washington on
May 15, 1973 at the following prices:

Good Gulf No Nox
(Regular) (Premium)

Tacoma .1445 ee et
a Gulf suid branded gasoline to
these northern California jobbers on

May 15, 1973 at the following prices:

line relationship between Gulf, Tesoro
Petroleum Corporation ("Tesoro") and
Fletcher is discussed infra.

A97

Good Gulf No Nox

Jobber (Regular) (Premium)
Caldo Oil Co. .1495 . 1820
Curtesy Oil, Inc. .1495 . 1820
Major Oil Co. .1495 . 1820
Miles Oil Co. 1495 . 1820
Olympian Oil .1495 . 1820
Ramco Oil Co. .1495 . 1820
Red Triangle Oil Co. .1495 . 1820
Rinehart .1595 . 1920
Sierra Petroleum . 1695 . 2020
Sturdy Oil Co. .1495 . 1820
Tom's Sierra Oil Co. .1495 . 1820
4. The prices extended to branded

jobbers on May 15, 1973 included certain
price-related amenities such as the use of
Gulf's credit cards, brand name and
advertising. The branded jobbers also
received hauling allowances. When these
branded jobbers were converted to unbranded
status, the hauling allowances and
amenities were eliminated.

wa Dyke purchased gasoline from Gulf
under a ten-year written contract obliging
him to make minimum purchases and providing

for credit terms net within 10 to 25 days.

A98

6. Armour purchased gasoline on a
spot basis with no written contract and
with credit terms net within 30 to 60 days.

ra Location. In pricing its

products on May 15, 1973 Gulf did not treat
its Northwest purchasers significantly
different from its northern California
purchasers, as indicated in Dyke's

Exhibit 69, summarized below:

A99

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A100

8. Type of Purchaser. The type of

purchaser, branded versus unbranded, is
exactly the same for all the branded
jobbers who were placed in the unbranded
categories.

9. Volume. The volume, while larger
in the case of Armour, is not significantly
different. There is no showing of price
differential made by Gulf based on volume
differences between branded jobbers.
Olympian and the other northern California
Gulf branded jobbers who became unbranded
were placed in the same classes of
purchaser as Armour even though they had
substantially less volume than Armour.

10. Terms and Conditions. The terms

and conditions extended to the northern
California purchasers were just the same as
extended to Dyke, with the possible
exception of two that were unknown. Gulf
did not offer any indication that they were

different.

A101

D. January 1, 1974.

Ae The May 15, 1973 prices Gulf
utilized to compute unbranded prices to
California jobbers in the divestiture area
after December 31, 1973 were unbrarnded
prices at which Gulf had sold unbranded
gasoline to Armour on May 15, 1973.

a Gulf applied the following
May 15, 1973 Armour prices at the Hercules,
San Jose, and Bradshaw (Sacramento)
terminals for the formulation of unbranded
prices to the California jobbers picking up

at those terminals after December 31, 1973:

Terminal Regular Premium
Hercules .1320 . 1495
San Jose .1355 . 1530
Bradshaw .1370 . 1545

Be Gulf utilized the following
May 15, 1973 prices for the formulation of
unbranded gasoline prices to Dyke after

December 31, 1973:

A102

Terminal Regular Premium

Tacoma -1720 . 1895
Portland . 1730 .1915
Eugene . 1730 .1915
Crescent City .1730 .1915

4. (a) Gulf used Platt's Oilgram to

determine the May 15, 1973 unbranded prices
for the former Gulf branded jobbers at the
Tacoma, Washington; Portland, Oregon;
Eugene, Oregon; and Crescent City,
California terminals.

(b) The edition of Platt's
Oilgram utilized by Gulf to determine
unbranded jobber May 15, 1973 gasoline
selling prices was dated May 15, 1973,
vol. 51, No. 94, page 5-A. The following

were reported as the West Coast Terminal

prices:
Los Angeles/ Seattle/
San Francisco Tacoma Portland
100 Oct Prem. 15.6-18.95 18.95 19.15
95 Oct Prem. 14.5-17.85 17.30 17.50
91 Oct Prem. 13.4-16.75 16.75 16.95

(c) The gasoline prices in

Platt's for Seattle/Tacoma and Portland

A103

were based on spot purchases by a small

refiner, Powerine.

(ad) In order to determine a
price for its 93 octane (regular) gasoline
from Platt's 91 octane price, Gulf used the
difference between Gulf's prices to Armour
for 91 and for 93 octane and added that
differential to the Platt's 91 octane
price.

(e) Mr. Gilchrist of Gulf talked
to general counsel and spoke with others
within Gulf about the use of trade journals
to establish prices.

De (a) Gulf originally relied on
the new item - new market rule, 10 C.F.R.
§ 212.111, as the basis for its use of

Platt's Oilgram to determine May 15, 1973

unbranded prices to Dyke. Gulf later
conceded that the rule was inapplicable.
(b) On and after January 1, 1974

Duke continued to receive product from Gulf

A104

at the same terminals and to market it at

the same locations as before.

(c) There was no difference
between the quality of gasoline which was
sold by Gulf to Dyke prior to January l,
1974 and that sold after.

E. Submission of Claims.

As Dyke was first aware of Gulf's
overcharges when he was contacted by a DOE
auditor investigating Gulf's prices.

ye Dyke claims that Gulf overcharged
him in a series of gasoline sales from
January 1, 1974 through January 31, 1977 in
violation of the EPAA and its price
regulations.

. Dyke submitted a 90-day demand
letter to Gulf. Gulf did not respond to
the letter.

4. Dyke's complaint was filed

January 4, 1977.

Colvin's complaint was
filed October 11, 1977. Fletcher's

complaint was filed October 20, 1977.

A105

De Gulf counterclaims against Dyke

for his failure to pay Gulf $735,444.78 for
gasoline purchases from December 16, 1976
through January 28, 1977.

y. Fletcher's Standing.

A In late September or early
October 1970, Tesoro entered into a
gasoline supply contract with Gulf. Tesoro

and Fletcher thereupon entered into an

-This case was originally assigned to
Chief Judge Skopil who was appointed to the
Ninth Circuit in 1979. There was also an
interlocutory appeal by the DOE. Dyke v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 557 (TECA 1979).
On remand, Chief Judge Burns granted a
six-month stay of proceedings and assigned
the case to me. I lifted the stay in July
1980. The trial was conducted in stages
from November 1981 to April 1982. MI
assigned Magistrate Juba to determine the
amount of prejudgment interest to be
awarded and adopted his findings and
recommendations on October 26, 1982.

— ss

7
’
.
/
:
1

agreement whereby Fletcher received the
gasoline Tesoro purchased from Gulf.

y Fletcher and Tesoro agreed prior
to execution of any of these agreements

that Fletcher's gasoline requirements would

A106

be supplied by Gulf through a separate
contract between Tesoro and Gulf.
Accordingly, Gulf agreed to contract with
Tesoro for the sale of branded gasoline on
a wholesale basis in the states of
Washington, Oregon and Idaho. It was
understood that the prices for those sales
would be at a level low enough to permit
Tesoro a small margin on resales at prices
competitive for its customers. When
Fletcher entered into its agreement with
Tesoro, it was aware of and relied on
Gulf's agreement to supply.

Si Prior to execution of the
contract between Tesoro and Gulf, Tesoro
explained that the product to be supplied
by Gulf under the contract was to go to
Fletcher, and Gulf agreed to that
arrangement.

4. Gulf's representatives
investigated Fletcher's station locations

before executing the contract with Tesoro.

A107

Gulf's representatives explained to
Fletcher's representatives and sales
employees the ramifications of Fletcher's
change to the Gulf brand, including price
supports, hauling allowance, use of Gulf
credit cards, Gulf signs and Gulf station
painting.

Ss Fletcher did not approach Gulf
directly as a supplier. One of Fletcher's
goals was to obtain a long-term, fixed rent
lessor for all of Fletcher's service
station properties. Following Gulf's
acknowledgement of the agreement to supply
branded product to be delivered to Fletcher
service stations, Tesoro offered to lease
all the stations, pay a guaranteed rental
sum and extend the lease through eight
years. Fletcher was permitted to lease
back the properties on a year-to-year
basis, providing Fletcher with maximum

flexibility and security. Since Tesoro had

A108

the long-term lease, it was left to Tesoro
to locate a suitable supplier.

6. While there was a contract
between Gulf and Tesoro and a contract
between Tesoro and Fletcher, the sale in
substance was to Fletcher. Gulf knew that
before entering into the contracts. A term
of the sublease was a gasoline sales
agreement between Tesoro and Fletcher.
Under this sales agreement, Tesoro was
obligated to supply Fletcher's requirements
for gasoline through the subleased
premises.

: For all grades of gasoline
supplied under Fletcher's sales agreement
with Tesoro, Fletcher paid Gulf's price
plus a fixed markup of $.00375/gal.

8. Tesoro was invoiced by Gulf and
made payment to Gulf.

9. As part of the transaction, Gulf
established a special procedure for

Fletcher to transmit its Gulf credit card

A109

sales invoices directly to Gulf, for which
Gulf allowed Tesoro credit on Tesoro's open
account. Fletcher was informed that this
special procedure was set up "[d]Jue to the
unique relationship between Fletcher 0il
Company, Tesoro and Gulf."

10. A notice dated June 9, 1971 from
E.R. Eisemann, Jr., Vice President of Gulf,
addressed and sent directly to Fletcher to
notify it of product substitution, refers
to "the contract(s) currently in effect
between us concerning the sale of Gulf
gasolines."

11. At all times material to this
case Gulf authorized Fletcher to take
delivery of product directly from terminals
in Oregon and Washington designated by
Gulf.

12. Gulf granted Fletcher "jobber
assistance" upon proper request from

Fletcher.

A110

13. Gulf included Fletcher in
meetings held for Gulf Western Region
Jobbers, which Mr. Hirschburg, president of
Fletcher, attended.

14. Notices of price changes came
directly from Gulf to Fletcher, not from
Tesoro.

15. In 1975, when Gulf applied to the
DOE? to withdraw as a supplier from
certain West Coast locations, Fletcher
received a copy of Gulf's application in

which Gulf's Legal Department requested the

3References to the Department of
Energy ("DOE") include references, in
appropriate time periods, to the
predecessor agencies: Federal Energy
Administration, Federal Energy Office, and
the Cost of Living Council.
DOE to terminate its supply obligation to
"Tesoro Fletcher."

16. The unique relationship between

Fletcher, Tesoro and Gulf continued

throughout all relevant times in this case.

Alll

G. Statute of Limitations.

During the course of the trial, I
decided which statutes of limitations
would apply to the various transactions.

My opinion is attached as Appendix A.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Maximum Allowable Selling Prices.

* Gulf was not allowed to charge
prices for its covered products in excess
of a maximum allowable price. Maximum
allowable price means the weighted average
price at which the covered product was
priced for sale on May 15, 1973 plus any
allowable increased product costs and
increased non-product costs incurred after
that date. 10 C.F .8. 8

a. To arrive at a maximum allowable
price, Gulf was required to establish
appropriate classes of purchasers. Class

of purchaser under the regulations means

All2

purchasers to whom a person has charged a
comparable price for comparable product or
service pursuant to customary price
differentials between those purchasers and
other purchasers. 1OC.F.R. § 212.31.

oe Customary price differentials
include price distinctions based on
discount allowances, add-on, premium, and
an extra based on a difference in volume,
grade, quality or location or type of
purchaser or a term or condition of sale or
delivery. Id.

4. In ruling 1975-2, 3 Energy Mgt.
(CCH) 47 16,042, the DOE explained the
application of the class of purchaser
concept. In doing so it defined the term
"customary price differential" and pointed
to illustrative factors which may account
for price distinctions. These important
factors, aside from grade and quality, are

(a) location, (b) type of purchaser,

All13

(c) volume and (d) term or condition of
sale or delivery.

B. Class of Purchaser.

Rx The change from a branded to
unbranded relationship between the
supplier and the purchaser calls for a
change in the purchaser's classification.
Administrative decisions support this

conclusion. Greenbelt Consumer Services,

Inc., 1 FEA @@ 20,211 (Dec. 17, 1974); State

of New Hampshire, 2 FEA 4 80,574 (Apr. 16,

1975).

2. The parties do not dispute Gulf's
legal right to change Dyke from a branded
to unbranded status. Gulf's withdrawal of
various services including hauling
allowances, service station painting
allowances, and credit card programs in
conjunction with withdrawal of its brand
did not violate former 10 C.F.R. § 210.62.

a. Gulf was obligated to place Dyke

in Gulf's most similar existing class of

A114

purchaser. * Saber Petroleum Corp., 5 FEA

§ 80,544 (Feb. 4, 1977). See also Atlantic

Richfieid Co., 4 FEA § 80,550 (Oct.8,

1976); Mid Continent, Inc., 3 FEA 9% 80,507

(Nov. 14, 1975); Western Jobbers Alliance,

4 FEA 9 87,010 (Sept. 10, 1976).

4. Guif did not have the right to
rely on the new item - new market rule.
Although Gulf initially raised this
possibility, Gulf conceded that it did not

have the right to rely on this rule. By

4this is consistent with a primary

purpose of the regulations, and the law
establishing the regulations, which is to
maintain the price differentials that
existed on May 15, 1973 between groups of
purchasers. This goal cannot be reached if
suppliers such as Gulf are allowed to
create new classes of purchasers anc set
new prices when business relationships
change.

selecting a price based on reported sales

in Platt's Oilgram, Gulf improperly created

a new class of purchaser for Dyke.

A115

C. Selection of Existing Class of

Purchaser.

1. (a) Dyke should have been placed
in the Armour classes of purchaser.

(b) Armour consisted of several
classes of purchaser, one for each terminal
where it picked up product.

(c) Dyke is assigned to three
pricing zones emanating out from the
Seattle-Tacoma refinery complex, reflecting
the three stipulated Armour prices
emanating out from the San Francisco
complex. The terminals farthest from the
Seattle/Taxoma refinery complexes receive
the Armour prices at the terminal farthest
from the San Francisco area refinery and
the terminals closest to the Seattle
refinery receive the Armour prices at the
San Francisc. sefinery. The assignment of

May 15, 1973 Armour prices to the

A116

terminals where Dyke lifted product is

summarized in the following table:

Regular Zone Price
Tacoma 1 . 1320
Portland 2 .1355
Eugene 3 .1370
Crescent City 3 .1370
Premium

Tacoma 1 .1495
Portland 2 .1530
Eugene 3 .1545
Crescent City 3 .1545
# Gulf's other existing classes of

purchaser in the divestiture area on

May 15, 1973 were its branded classes.
Under the circumstances of this case, the
branded classes were inappropriate for Dyke
without a price adjustment for loss of
branded benefits. Under the regulations,
however, it is not proper to apply such
price adjustments to an existing class of
purchaser. For this additional reason,
Dyke should have been placed in the
existing Armour unbranded classes of

purchaser.

All?7

D. Overcharge Calculation Methodologies.

Be The proper method in this case
for calculating the overcharges is to
subtract the court-ordered May 15, 1973
prices to Dyke from the May 15, 1973 prices

imputed to Dyke based on Platt's Oilgram.

If Gulf did not actually pass through its
full cost increment to Dyke in a month, the
cost increment difference is to be
subtracted from the overcharge calculated
on May 15 prices. The difference shall be
multiplied by the volume of each grade of
gasoline sold to Dyke in each month. This
method is appropriate under the regulations
and is the most fair to th» parties.”
y 2 Gulf advocates use of the refiner
price formula to calculate overcharges in |
this case.° The parties’ various refiner ;
price rule calculations, described as

"Refiner's Price formula - Ex. #95B";

"Deemed Recovery After 9/1/74"; “Leener's

Equal Application - Ex. #137" (“equal

This calculation follows the same

format used by the DOE in its proposed
remedial order to Gulf dated December 21,
1981. But, in addition, it gives Gulf
credit for the difference between the cost
pass-through increment Gulf charged to
other customers and the increment it
charged to Dyke. These cost pass through
increments were also used by Gulf to add to
May 15, 1973 prices to calculate maximum
allowable prices in Gulf's original answers
to plaintiffs’ interrogatories.

Scult contends that Longview Refining
Co. v. Shore, 554 F.2d 1006 (TECA), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977), requires use
of the refiner price formula to calculate
overcharges resulting from May 15, 1973
base price error. The refiner price
formulas presented by the parties to
compute overcharges in this case are not
required by Longview.

application/deemed recovery approach"); and
as “Leener's Unit Proportional Bank -
Ex. #136" ("proportional bank approach") in
Dyke's Exhibit 113 are inappropriate.

3. Under Dyke's equal application/
deemed recovery approach, Gulf's bank of
unrecouped costs would be destroyed. It
would be totally inequitable to destroy

Gulf's bank by utilizing that formula.

A119

4. Gulf's proportional bank approach
is not fair or equitable. That formula
would permit Gulf to apply additional costs
to Dyke that were not charged to any other
purchaser. Gulf argues, in effect, that if
it makes an error, it should be allowed to
assess additional costs that it did not
elect to assess to anyone else. It would
permit Gulf to benefit by its own error
without any charge against its bank other
than the charge for this particular
purchaser. Under the circumstances of this
case, this approach is inappropriate.

Si The parties stipulated to the
gallons, prices and other factors in the
court's methodology to arrive at the
overcharge figures: $2,000,000 for Dyke,
$745,000 for Colvin and $790,000 for

Fletcher.

A120

- Affirmative Defenses.

‘i Gulf's affirmative defense that
any Gulf overcharges should be reduced to
the extent Dyke was able to pass on the
overcharges in his own prices is denied.
This ruling is based on difficulty of proof
and the lack of a pre-existing cost-plus
contract or its functional equivalent.

Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.

7120, 97 $. Ct. 2061, S2 UL. Ed. 2@ /07

(1977); Eastern Airlines v. Arco, 609 F.2d

497 (TECA 1979); Go-Tane Service Stations,

Inc. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 200

(N.D. Tid. 1962).

as Gulf's affirmative defense of
laches is denied. The parties brought
their claims against Gulf within a
reasonable time.

3. Gulf's affirmative defenses of
estoppel and alleged failure to report the
overcharges to the DOE are denied. Dyke

purchased from Gulf because it was Dyke's

Al21

base period supplier under the regulations.
Dyke first became aware of the overcharges
when contacted by a DOE auditor
investigating Gulf's prices.

F. Treble Damages.

Be The 90-day notices sent by the
plaintiffs were sufficient, within the
meaning of the statute.

Be When a 90-day notice has been
sent and overcharges have been determined,
the burden is on the defendant to prove the
overcharges were not intentional and that
reasonable priactices were established to
prevent overcharges. If that burden is
met, defendant avoids imposition of treble
damages.

as Treble damages will not be
awarded in this case. In light of the
circumstances and lack of guidelines at the
time Gulf's decision was made, I find that

the overcharges were not intentional.

A122

SS SETS te

G. Statute of Limitations.

The court's opinion of March 8, 1982
contains the conclusions on this issue.
See Appendix A.

H. Prejudgment Interest.

a. Dyke is entitled to prejudgment
interest to the extent he is able to prove
that he lost the use of money attributable
to Gulf's overcharge.

a. The rate of interest as
established by the DOE is the appropriate
rate. This is a federal case involving
federal regulations and statutes. In
addition, the DOE rate would more nearly
recompense Dyke for his loss than the
Oregon statutory rate of interest over this
period.

: ee Calculation of prejudgment
interest was assigned to Magistrate Juba.

His "FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION" was

adopted by the court and contains its

findings and conclusions on this issue.
See Appendices B and C.

4. (a) Based on the court's
prejudgment interest rulings, the parties
stipulated to the following interest as of

December 1982 for each plaintiff:

Richard W. Dyke $499,199.34
Fletcher Oil Company 350,900.68
Colvin Oil Company ,73,216.248

(b) The parties also stipulated

to the amounts on which interest is to be

determined beginning January 1, 1983:

Richard W. Dyke $705,788.29

Fletcher Oil Company 695,900.68

Colvin Oil Company 305,730.58
i Fletcher Standing.

Based on the relationship between Gulf
and Fletcher as reflected in the Findings
of Fact, the court concludes that Fletcher
has standing to sue under section 210(b) of
the Economic Stabilization Act as
incorporated into the EPAA. The court
rejects Gulf's argument that Fletcher was

an indirect purchaser and thus has no

A124

et Ee Sea
Py

standing to sue. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S.

720 (1977), does not compel a contrary

result.

CONCLUSION

Separate judgments will be entered for
each plaintiff.

Dyke will be awarded $1,364,555.22 for
overcharges (the setoff of $2,000,000.00
minus $735,444.78) / plus appropriate

prejudgment interest and attorneys’ fees.

Dyke does not contest Gulf's
counterclaim for breach of the Gulf-Dyke
gasoline sales contract. Gulf is therefore
entitled to recover from Dyke the sum of
$735,444.78 which amount is to be offset
against overcharges which Dyke would
otherwise recover from Gulf.

Colvin will be awarded $745,000.00 for
overcharges plus prejudgment interest and

attorneys' fees.

A125

Fletcher will be awarded $790,000.00
for overcharges plus prejudgment interest
and attorneys’ fees.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 20th day of June 1983.

/s/ Owen M. Panner
OWEN M. PANNER
United States District Judge

A126

Richard W. DYKE, dba Western
Stations Co., Plaintiff,

Vv.

GULF OIL CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania
corporation, Defendant.

COLVIN OIL COMPANY, an Oregon
corporation, Plaintiff,

Vv.

GULF OIL CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania
corporation, Defendant.

F.O. FLETCHER, INC., dba Fletcher Oil
Company, Plaintiff,

ee

GULF OIL CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania
corporation, Defendant.

Civ. Nos. 77-10-PA, 77=-791-PA
and 77-849-PA.

United States District Court,
D. Oregon.

Aug. 23, 1983.

John L. Schwabe

Neva T. Campbell

Mary E. Egan

Schwabe, Williamson, Wyatt,
Moore & Roberts

Portland, Oregon for plaintiff.

A127

John R. Brooke
Wood, Tatum, Mosser,
Brooke & Holden
Portland, Oregon
Jack D. Fudge
Michael L. Hickok
Douglas J. Del Tondo
McCutchen, Black, Verleger & Shea
Los Angeles, California for defendant.

PANNER, District Judge.

[1] The remaining issue in these
consolidated cases is the award of
attorneys’ fees. I previously ruled that
such an award was appropriate pursuant to
section 210(b) of the Economic
Stabilization Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1904, note.
Defendant argues that a recent decision of
the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals

' fees

precludes me from awarding attorneys
in the circumstances of this case.

Although TECA's decision in Eastern Air

Lines, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield, 712 F.2d

1402, (Em. App. 1983), contains strong
dicta on the subject, I find the decision

is not controlling.

A128

7 haar ee
; ‘
ee Ml Ree ge ee

In Eastern Air Lines, TECA upheld the

decision of a district court not to award
attorneys' fees. The appeals court based
its decision partly on what it regarded as
the trial court's “sound application of
discretion." Id. at 1413. TECA was not
required in that opinion to carefully
analyze the language of the statute
authorizing attorneys' fees. Such an
analysis reveals that Congress did not
specify that attorneys' fees could only be
awarded in cases of intentional
overcharges.

The relevant statute provides:

the court may, in its discretion,

award the plaintiff reasonable

attorney's fees and costs, plus

whichever of the following sums

is greater:

(1) an amount not more than
three times the amount of the
overcharge upon which the action

is based, or

(2) not less than $100 or
more than $1000;

except that in any case where the
defendant establishes that the

A129

overcharge was not intentional

and resulted from a bona fide

error notwithstanding the

maintenance of procedures

reasonably adapted to the

avoidance of such error the

liability of the defendant shall

be limited to the amount of the

overcharge.

12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1980).

It seems quite clear that the language
of exception beginning with the word
"except" modifies only the language that
follows the word "plus." That is, a court
may discretionarily award attorney's fees.
In addition, the court may award treble
damages or damages in an amount between
$100 and $1,000, unless the defendant
establishes the overcharge was
unintentional and resulted from a bona fide
error.

I hold that a reasonable award of

attorneys’ fees in these cases is

$75C,000.00.

A130

BACKGROUND

These actions were brought in 1977
against Gulf Oil Corporation ("Gulf")
pursuant to the Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act, 15 U.S.C. § 751, et seq.
and various U.S. Department of Energy
regulations. Plaintiffs sought to recover
overcharges for gasoline sold by Gulf.
There were years of extensive discovery and
pretrial proceedings before the case was
set for trial. Because of the complexity
of the issues involved, the trial was split
into several phases. In phase I, I held
that Gulf's method of setting plaintiffs’
May 15, 1973 base price was improper. In
phase II, I ruled that a reasonable
existing May 15, 1973 classification for
plaintiffs was the three-tier geographic

prices paid by a nonbranded distributor in

California. In phase III, I selected the

theory and means of calculating plaintiffs

Al31

ieee

damages. As a result of that ruling the
parties stipulated to an amount of damages
of $2,000,000.00 for Dyke, $745,000.00 for
Colvin, and $790,000.00 for Fletcher. In
phase IV, I held that Fletcher was a
real-party-in-interest. Finally, in

phase V, I ruled that an award of
attorneys’ fees in these cases was
appropriate. The trial proceedings were

spread over a period of seven months.

DISCUSSION

A. Standards.

{2,3} The amount of reasonable
attorneys’ fees is within the court's

discretion. Sapper v. Lenco Blade, Inc.,

704 F.2d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir.1983). While
the statute is silent on what is

"reasonable, "

many courts have enumerated
factors for consideration. The Ninth

Circuit has adopted the twelve factors

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recited in Johnson v. Georgia Highway

Express, Inc., #88 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.1974).

Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d

67, 70 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied sub

nom., Perkins v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc.,

425 U.S. 951, 96 S.Ct. 1726, 58 L.Ed.2d 195
(1976). Although it is not necessary for
the court to specifically discuss each
factor, Sapper, 704 F.2d at 1073, the court
may abuse its discretion in setting fees if
it does not at least consider the various
factors and discuss the relevant ones.

Harmon v. San Diego County, 664 F.2d 770,

772 (9th Cir. 1981); O'Neil v. City of Lake
8

Oswego, 642 F.2d 367, 370 (9th Cir.19

-

A court may rely upon a single factor if it
appears to be controlling and so long as

the remaining factors are considered.

Vanelli v. Reynolds School District # 7,

667 F.2d 773, 781 (9th Cir. 1982).
{4} The twelve Johnson factors are:

(1) the time and labor required; (2) the

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novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved; (3) the skill necessary to
perform the legal services properly;
(4) the preclusion of other employment by
the attorney due to the acceptance of the
case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether
the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time
limitations imposed by the client or
circumstances; (8) the amount involved and
the results obtained; (9) the experience,
reputation and ability of the attorneys;
(10) the undesirability of the case;
(11) the nature and length of the
professional relations with the client; and
(12) awards in similar cases. Johnson, 488
F.2d at 717-19. To these factors I add
another: the attorneys' efforts to bring
the matter to a prompt and reasonable
ccenclusion.

Before turning to the relevant factors
in these cases I note that this circuit has

warned against inflexible application of

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the Johnson factors. In Moore v. Jas.

‘

Matthews & Co., 682 F.2d 830 (9th

Cir.1982), the court reviewed the
"lodestar" method of setting fees utilized

in several other circuits. E.g., Copeland

v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880 (D.C.Cir.1980);

Furtado v. Bishop, 635 F.2d 915 (lst

Cir.1980); Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560

F.2d 1093 (2d Cir.1977); Lindy Bros.

Builders, Inc. of Philadelphia v. American

Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487

F.2d 161 (3d Cir.1973). Lodestar analysis
involves the calculation of a "lodestar"
figure by multiplying the number of
attorney hours times the prevailing billing
rate for comparable legal services. That
lodestar figure is then adjusted based on
the quality of work and the risk taken by
the attorney. Moore, 682 F.2d at 840.

The Moore panel noted with approval
the increased use by district courts of a

combined Johnson and lodestar approach.

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Id. While the technique varies from case
to case, this "blended" approach involves

"a

use of the lodestar analysis as
procedure for ordering the examination of
[the] factors listed in [Kerr]." Moore,

682 F.2d at 840, citing In re Capital

Underwriters, Inc. Securities Litigation,

519 F.Supp. 92, 100 (N.D.Cal.1981), aff'd

in part, remanded in part, 705 F.2d 466

(9th Cir.1983), and Knutson v. Daily

Review, Inc., 479 F.Supp. 1263, 1270 n. 10

(N.D.Cal.1979). Typically, a court
utilizing the blended approach would
examine the first element of the lodestar
formula, “hours spent," just as it would
examine the Johnson element of "time and
labor required." The remaining Johnson
elements would then be used to determine
the second lodestar factor, "hourly rate,"
and to augment or decrease the overall
award based on quality or contingency

consideration. Moore, 682 F.2d at 840-41.

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[5] While there is obvious merit to
this blended method, I prefer not to give
undue emphasis to mechanical, mathematical
calculations. In most cases, the work
product of an attorney is not easily
quantified. Use of the Johnson factors to
establish the lodestar elements creates the
unjustified appearance of reliability and
"scientific" methodology. The setting of
fees by the district court necessarily
requires the use of subjective analysis.
Such analysis is imprecise and is therefore
entrusted to the discretion of the district
court because of that court's intimate
knowledge of the proceedings. Hensley v.

Eckerhart, je eawe @.6¢. 1933,

1941, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983).

[6] The number of hours expended by
the attorneys and the prevailing hourly
rate must, of course, be examined and
considered by the court. I am not

required, however, to make precise

A137

calculations on the record. Hensley, 103
S.Ct. at 1940. The requirements
established by Kerr can be met by a review
of the relevant factors and disclosure of

the court's reasoning. Harmon v. San Diego

County, 664 F.2d at 772.

B. Application.

Time and Labor Required.

These were difficult, complex cases
involving an area of the law that has
received very little exploration. The
"Quiding" regulations were often tortuously
constructed and contradictory. Combining
these circumstances with defendant's
aggressive and persistent defense,
plaintiffs' attorneys necessarily expended
considerable time and effort.
Specifically, plaintiffs' attorneys have
submitted affidavits showing that they
spent 228 hours in trial and approximately

7437 hours in research and nontrial work.

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Additionally, they claim 1543 hours of
paralegal work.

[7] I find that the submitted
attorney hours were reasonably expended in
the prosecution of these cases. While I am
not bound by the hours claimed by an

attorney, e.g., Seymour v. Hull & Moreland

Engineering, 605 F.2d 1105, 1117 (9th

Cir.1979), I find that the hours claimed
here were reasonably within the range of
time needed to achieve the successful
results. No hours were spent on unrelated

claims upon which plaintiffs did not

prevail. See Sethy v. Alameda County Water

District, 602 F.2@ 894, 898 (9th Cir.1979),

cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046, 100 S.Ct. 734,

62 L.Ed.2d 731 (1980).

[8]) I reject, however. inclusion of
secretarial time within the paralegal
classification. The approximately 1000
hours of such secretarial time constitute

an overhead expense which is recoverable

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only as a part of the attorneys’ time.

E.g., Kania v. United States, 650 F.2d 264,

269, 227 Ct.Cl. 458, cert. denied, 454 U.S.

895, 102 S.Ct. 393, 70 L.Ed.2@ 230 (ivea).
ie Novelty and Difficulty of
Questions Raised.

[9] These were complex cases that
raised significant questions of both law
and fact. Novel issues of law were
presented. The ever changing regulatory
scheme presented an interpretive challenge
to both counsel and court. The compiexity
of these cases support a substantial award
of attorneys’ fees to the plaintiffs.

- Skill Necessary to Perform Legal

Services Properly.

It is clear that the novelty and
difficulty of the questions raised by these
cases required commensurate skill and

talent.

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4. Preclusion of Other Work.

I do not find preclusion of other work
to be a significant factor in these cases.
Accordingly, I give it no weight.

7 Customary Fee.

Plaintiffs suggest an hourly trial fee
ranging from $66 to $165 for the various
attorneys. The range for nontrial time is
$60 to $150 per hour. Clerk time and other
paralegal time is billed at $35 per hour.
The suggested ranges reflect the relative
value cf experienced attorney time in
contrast to inexperienced associate time.

The suggested rate structure is higher
than fees customarily awarded in this
district. The subject matter of these
cases justifies higher than usual hourly
fees. A survey of awards in this court
illustrate the court's general reluctance
to award fees in excess of $100 per hour.

A substantial portion of these awards were

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based on hourly fees ranging from $50 to
$80.

Accordingly, I hold that a range of
$80 to $100 for all attorney time is
appropriate in these cases. Plaintiffs'
suggested rate of $35 per hour for
paralegal work is within the range of
acceptable levels. Considerable expertise
was required of the paralegals in these
cases.

6. Contingent or Fixed Fee

Arrangement.

[10] Plaintiffs' fees were not ona
contingent fee basis. Hourly rates were
fixed and predetermined. Defendant argues
that an award in excess of that actually
billed to the plaintiffs is excessive and
punitive in nature. I reject that
argument. At the time the fee arrangement
was made, neither the client nor the
attorneys had the opportunity to determine

a reasonable fee in light of the various

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factors that I can now evaluate. No one
could speculate as to the amount of the
recovery. It is the court's responsibility
to set a reasonable fee award. The statute
provides for the award of a reasonable fee,
not the fee agreed upon by the parties and

their attorneys. See Johnson, 488 F.2d

at 718 (fee arrangement not decisive in
court's determination of reasonable
attorney fee award).

Ue Time Limitations Imposed by the

Client.

I know of no limitations placed upon
the attorneys by the clients.

8. Amount of Damages.

Plaintiffs were highly successful.
The damages, coupled with the award of
prejudgment interest, constitute a
substantial figure. The amount recovered,
though not bearing directly on the
determination of a reasonable attorney fee

award, is an important factor in measuring

A143

the effectiveness and competency of the
attorneys. The recovery in these cases
supports a substantial fee award.

9. Experience, Reputation and

Ability of the Attorneys.

Each of plaintiffs’ four principal
attorneys has demonstrated ability in these
cases and in other cases before the court.
Lead counsel, Ms. Campbell, has engaged in
extensive business and business-related
litigation and has particular expertise in
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act
litigation.

10. Desirability of the Case.

These cases were not undesirable and
therefore this factor is not significant.

11. Nature of Professional

Relationship with Client.

Plaintiffs have been represented by
these attorneys for a substantial period
of time. Dyke has been a client since

1971.

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12. Award in Similar Cases.
An award of fees under the Economic
Stabilization Act is of first impression

in this district. In Evanson v. Union Oil

of California, 4 C.C.H. Energy Management

q 26,417 (D. Minn. 1980), the court
approved a settlement of $2,750,000.00 plus
$800,000.00 in attorneys’ fees. While
there was no discussion of the
reasonableness of the fee award, the
figures are illustrative of proportional
relationship in an overcharge case.

13. Efforts to Bring the Matter to a

Prompt and Reasonable Conclusion.

A lawyer has a continuing duty to
analyze positions taken and to determine
whether they are legally sound. A lawyer
must evaluate whether positions are
unfairly taken and will unreasonably
prolong litigation. The effort a lawyer

expends to expeditiously accomplish a

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result for the client is an important
consideration.

Although resolution of these cases did
not come swiftly, plaintiffs’ attorneys
worked efficiently and expeditiously and in
a timely and cooperative manner. Such
attributes should be awarded when combined

with successful results.

CONCLUSION
I hold that reasonable awards of fees

in these cases, allocated pro rata accord-

ing to plaintiffs' counsels’ affidavits of

requested fees, are as follows:

Dyke -- $385,500
Colvin -- $173,500
Fletcher -- $191,000

The clérk is directed to enter
judgment for these amounts. Plaintiffs
shall submit their cost bills to the Clerk.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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IN THE UNITED ST

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_3089%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
