# Appendix — Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Public Service Commission

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 469 U.S. 831

## Text

Office - Supreme Court, U.S
FILED

83-2059 JUN 6 1908

ALEXANDER L. STEVAS,
CASE NO. __ CLERK

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
PETITIONER,

V.

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF WYOMING,
RESPONDENT.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE WYOMING
SUPREME COURT

APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI

= _— — ——a —_—— —_- -—

George D. Rives,
Counsel of Record
Leonard A. Girard
Stephen S. Walters
Nancy M. Ganong
Stoel, Rives, Boley,
Fraser & Wyse
900 SW Fifth Avenue
Portland, OR 97204
Telephone: (503) 224-3380

June 6, 1984

TABLE OF CONTENTS
OF APPENDIX

Pacific Power & Light Co.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
677 P2d 799 (Wyo 1983)

Order Denying Rehearing,
No. 83-75, (Wyo March 8, 1984)

Memorandum Opinion and Final
Order, Dkt No. 9454 Sub 17
(Wyo PSC Dec. 2, 1982)

Missouri v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
Case No. CV 183-1064cc
(Mo Cir Ct April 16, 1984)

Ohio Edison Co., Case No.
81-898-EL-AEM (Ohio PUC
July 31, 1981)

Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, No.
79-1929 (Wis Ct App
Dec. 22, 1981)

73

75

126

135

170

PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT
COMPANY, a corporation,
Appellant (Petitioner),

Ve

The PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF WYOMING, Appellee
(Respondent).

LOWER VALLEY POWER & LIGHT
INC., Appellant (Petitioner),

Ve

The PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF WYOMING, Appellee
(Respondent).

CHEMICAL BANK, a New York corpo-
ration, Appellant (Petitioner),

Ve.

The PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF WYOMING, Appellee
(Respondent).

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUP-
PLY SYSTEM, Appellant (Petitioner),

Ve

The PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF WYOMING, Appellee
(Respondent).

Nos. 83-75 to 83-78
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
Feb. 7, 1984
Rehearing Denied March 8, 1984
in No. 83-75

Before ROONEY, C. J., and
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.
ROONEY, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a dis-
trict court ruling affirming an order of
the Wyoming Public Service Commission
(PSC) which denied appellants the right
to recover in rates any and all invest-
ments, expenses or obligations related to
three abandoned nuclear power construc-
tion projects.

We hold the matter to be moot

as to all appellants except Pacific

Power & Light Company (PP&L), and we
affirm the decision of appellee insofar
as it pertains to PP&L.

There are four appellants.
Appellant Lower Valley Power and Light,
Inc. (LV) is a distribution level elec-
tric cooperative. Appellant PP&L is a
publicly held corporation providing elec-
tric service as a regulated public util-
ity. Both LV and PP&L are electric pub-
lic utilities within the regulatory
jurisdiction of the Wyoming PSC. Appel-
lant Washington Public Power Supply Sys-
tem (WPPSS) is a joint operating agency
which builds, owns and operates electric
generation and transmission facilities

and sells electric power to its members

and others. Appellant Chemical Bank (CB)
is a New York corporation which is a
bond-fund trustee.

LV and Fall River (FR), another
distribution level electric cooperative
which is not a party to this appeal,
along with 86 other electric utility
cooperatives, municipalities, and public
utility districts, each signed, on
July 14, 1976, identical Participants'
Agreements (Agreements) which entitled
them to a percentage share of power from
two nuclear power projects (WNP-4 and
WNP-5) which WPPSS was constructing in
the state of Washington and which obli-
gated them each to pay a proportion of
the costs of said projects "whether or
not" the projects were ever completed.

PP&L was a 10% owner of WNP-5, and also

was participating in another nuclear
power project known as Pebble Springs.
WPPSS financed its ownership shares of
WNP-4 and WNP-5 through the sale of
municipal tax exempt bonds. CB is the
bond-fund trustee for said bonds.

The Agreements executed by LV
and FR were not submitted to the PSC for
review or approval prior to their execu-
tion, %r at any time subsequent.

Construction of WNP-4 and WNP-5
was begun in 1976 and abandoned in 1981,
when WNP-4 was 16% complete and WNP-5 was
20% complete. The Pebble Springs project
was terminated in 1982, with no construc-
tion ever being done, but with over $200
million invested in site preparation. No
electric power will ever be generated by

any of these three power plant projects.

The controversy was initiated
by the PSC under its investigative powers
pursuant to § 37-2-117, W.S. 1977}?
through a "Notice and Order Setting Hear-
ing" made and entered on April 22, 1982
and directed to LV, PP&L and FR. The
Commission Staff had previously
petitioned the Commission to investigate

the matter as to LV. Of course, the

+ Section 37-2-117 provides:

"Whenever the commission
shall believe that an investi-
gation of any act or omission
to act, accomplished or pro-
posed, or an investigation of
any rate, service, facility or
service regulation of any pub-
lic utility should be made in
order to secure compliance with
the provisions of this act and
orders of the commission, it
may of its own motion summarily
investigate the same."

Commission could institute the investiga-
tion without such petition "summarily"
and "of its own motion." It did so with
its "Notice and Order Setting Hearing."
The record amply reflects the waiver of
any defect or objection in and to the
investigation by PP&L. The scope of the
investigation was also explored and
understood by the parties, and the hear-
ing proceeded on the issue of whether or
not the investment, expenses and obliga-
tions incurred by PP&L and LV in the
projects could be properly considered in
fixing the rate base for their operation,
and it did not proceed on the issue of
what the rates should be, i.e., a rate
case.

The transcript reflects that

all parties recognized the correct issue

and that it would be pertinent to rates
and the procedure and evidence would be
Similar to that of a rate case. The
following occurred prior to the testimony
of the first PP&L witness:

"MR. ROGERS [Representing
PSC Staff]: *** I do have one
additional matter.

"CHAIRMAN SMYTH: Yes.

"MR. ROGERS: And that is
concerning the filing by the
company made on July 2, 1982,
pursuant to the commission's
order. The commission will
recall that these matters were
Originally set for hearing on
July 16th of 1982, pursuant to
the commission order of
April 22, 1982.

"Upon the motion of the
staff the hearings were contin-
ued until this week, and that
was made pursuant to the
commission's order of May 28,
1982. And contained within
that order was a provision that
all testimony by all parties
was to be filed on or before
July 2, 1982.

"Now, I don't know if the
commission is aware, but as
part of the company's filing on
July 2, on or about July 2,
they filed tariffs, and those
tariffs contain a request for a
change of rates in amounts
variously set at $5,743,000, or
$10,967,000. It was the
staff's understanding at the
beginning that this was to be a
generic matter, that it was not
to be a rate matter. The fil-
ing made by the company has
changed that to a contested
case.

"And the staff has con-
cerns regarding the notice
requirement of the Admin-
istrative Procedures Act, with
regard to this matter. I am
sure that the commission will
recall its own rulings, that a
rate making matter is a con-
tested matter under the act,
and the commission, or the act
is very specific with regard to
the notice required.

"And I think that this
matter should be resolved by
the commission in some way. I
have broached the matter with
Mr. Girard, and we are attempt-
ing to come up with some type
of a solution to the problem,

but I think that the commission
should be made aware of it
prior to the beginning of this
testimony.

"CHAIRMAN SMYTH:
Mr. Girard, do you wish to
respond to that?

"MR. GIRARD: Very
briefly. Mr. Rogers is cor-
rect, he made me aware of this
matter, I think it was five or
six minutes before the hearing
commenced this afternoon, so he
and I didn't really have time
to have a calm lawyer-like dis-
cussion of the problem. He
agreed to raise it to bring it
to your attention. The only
thing I will say is this: The
purpose of the generic proceed-
ing, I believe, was to deter-
mine how to deal with the costs
of the nuclear plants at issue.

"And the question the com-
pany had was: The generic
proceeding presumably will con-
sider how much was spent, why
was it spent, was it reason-
able, who bears the risk of
that and so forth. And let us
assume just for discussion,
that the commission considered
all that, and after deliberat-
ing said, ‘We think the total

10

costs that should be borne by
ratepayers are, say, $10 mil-
lion a year for five years.'

"Then the question would
get to be, ‘What would then
happen?’ Presumably, if the
company hadn't filed rates it
could then file rates designed
to achieve the level of reve-
nues found appropriate by the
commission. And we would then
wonder, would we have a rate
case in which every issue would
be open again, and we would
then retry the question of who
should pay for the nuclear
plants.

"We figured that the
commission likely didn't want
to do that, that this is the
hearing to find out how that
expenditure is going to be
dealt with. There may be a
question as to exactly how the-
-which particular ratepayer
should pay for it, but we would
think that there should be one
time and one time only to
decide, is that a stockholder
responsibility, a ratepayer
responsibility, or anywhere in
between.

"That's all I have to say.

11

Se 28

"CHAIRMAN SMYTH: We will
come back to order.

"The commission feels very
strongly, not just a little
bit, that this was wrong, that
we cannot have a rate case
without giving notice to the
public, and that any issues as
to asking ratepayers to pay for
amounts in the future, will be
taken care of in future rate
cases and will not be taken
care of in this generic hearing
which is to determine whether
Or not any amount should be
involved.

"And therefore, there
being no notice to the public,
and certainly in these cases
significant intervention has
been made by the public in the
past, we will restrict the
hearing to those matters that
have previously been noticed
and that as to what rates you
are required in the future to
pay for any amounts that might
be found will be a matter to be
determined in the future rate
case.

"And perhaps, since you
already have one filed before

12

us, that it might be a more
proper time to discuss those
kinds of issues.

"So, if you will proceed
on that basis, Mr. Girard.

"MR. GIRARD: Fine, thank
you.

"I should have mentioned
that when the revised rate
schedules were filed, notice
was posted, there was not a
mailing made or I don't think a
newspaper publication made. I
wantd [sic] the record to show
that, and I am not arguing it
was adequate or what is not.

"We will present the case
and the only question is,
whether we should try and
strike from it, if you will,
before we ask our questions
that material that might be
offensive.

"One thing I think, Your
Honor, Mr. Chairman, is that
the testimony of witness Sloan,
who is our rate witness, may be
appropriate, and we will have
to allow you of course to make
the ruling when the time comes,
to at least show for illus-
trative purposes the type of

13

impact there would be on the
ratepayers.

"CHAIRMAN SMYTH: I might
express to you that we will be
restrictive and we are talking
what is required rates of
return at this time. That's
matter for rate cases, and I am
sure by the time we get down to
that testimony, we will have
had lots of testimony before
this commission. I do not want
to in any way impair your
presentation of this case.

"However, the ground rules
are those matters that are ger-
mane will be heard, those mat-
ters that are not presumably
staff will object to them and
they will not be heard, and if
staff doesn't object to them,
if I find they are not material
I will certainly advise you,
and as you well know I am not
bashful in this manner.

"MR. GIRARD: I would
stipulate that.

"(Laughter.)

"MR. ROGERS: So will
staff."

14

Again, before presenting the

testimony of PP&L's witness Watson:

"MR. GIRARD: ***

"This case, of course,
based on the ruling of the
Commission will not involve a
contested rate case ***,

zxkker tk

"I discussed this part
with Staff Counsel because the
concern, I'm sure, that Staff
has and the Commission has is

this isn't a general rate case.
kk

a2 2 & &

"eee Tt is the Staff's
position and has been from the
beginning that the issue in
this case is whether or not the
ratepayer should pay. ***"

The Commission's investigation

had for its purpose the determination of

whether or not the investment, expenses

and obligations incurred by PP&L and LV

15

in the projects could be considered in

connection with rates later to be set for
PP&L and LV in Wyoming.
"(a) The term ‘rate,'
when used in this act, shall
mean and include *** every ***
charge or other compensation
for service rendered or to be
rendered *** and every ***
practice, act, requirement or
privilege in any way relating
to such *** charge or other
compensation ***," Section 37-
1-102(a), W.S. 1977.
Section 37-2-117, W.S. 1977, supra,
fn. 1, authorizes investigation of "any
act *** accomplished or proposed, or an
investigation of any rate” which the
Commission believes should be made "to
secure compliance with the provisions of
this act and orders of the commission."
The association of PP&L and of
LV with the projects are certainly acts

and practices "in any way related” to the

16

charges and compensation for services to
be rendered by them. And the Commission
could well believe that an investigation
was proper to determine if the projects
were or could be part of that sub-
sequently to be considered in fixing
rates pursuant to § 37-2-122(a), W.S.
1977, infra, fn. 5.

The PSC concludec that the
Agreements executed by LV and FR con-
stituted a guarantee of securities as
contemplated by § 37-6-101 et seq., W.S.
1977, and that their failure to obtain
PSC authorization rendered the Agreements
void for rate making and other purposes
within the regulatory jurisdiction of the
PSC. Further, that the costs incurred by
LV, FR and PP&L could not be lawfully

passed on to their rate payers, as the

17

projects were not and would not be “used
and useful” for the convenience of the
public.
Appellants LV, PP&L, WPPSS and

CB all filed petitions for review of the
Commission Order, which were ultimately
consolidated. The district court
affirmed the Commission Order without
independent review, whereupon appellants
appealed to this court.

Lower Valley, Washington Public

Power Supply Service,
and Chemical Bank

While all of the litigation
below was going on, litigation was also
progressing in other states. The deci-
sions reached in the state of Washington
are particularly significant to the case

before us presently.

18

The Washington Supreme Court

had before it the case of Chemical Bank,

a New York corporation v. Washington Pub-

lic Power Supply System, 99 Wash.2d 772,

666 P.2d 329 (1983). It involved WNP-4
and WNP-5, wherein CB brought a declara-
tory judgment action against WPPSS and
the pafticipants (those who had signed
Participants' Agreements, including LV
and FR) seeking a determination that the
participants owe to WPPSS sufficient
funds to pay the bonds, of which CB is
trustee, with interest. The Washington
Supreme Court held that the defendants
who were Washington public utility
districts or Washington municipalities
lacked authority to enter into said

agreement and as to them the agreement

19

was ultra vires, void ab initio, invalid,
ineffective and unenforceable.

Subsequently, and pursuant to
mandate from the Washington Supreme
Court, the Superior Court of Washington
for King County, in its Order and Judg-
ment, held that:

"2. Inasmuch as the
Participants’ Agreement is
ultra vires, void ab initio,
invalid, ineffective and unen-
forceable as to the defendants
which are Washington public
utility districts or Washington
municipalities, and by reason
thereof, the Participants'
Agreement is also ineffective
and unenforceable as to all
other moving defendants and all
participant defendants, on the
grounds of (a) contract in-
divisibility and failure of the
condition of substantially 100%
participation, (b) mutual mis-
take as to the authority of
Washington public utility dis-
tricts and municipalities to
enter into the Agreement, and

20

(c) frustration of purpose and
impracticability."*

Further, the Superior Court held that:

"3. For the aforesaid
reasons, none of the moving
defendants or any other
participant defendant is obli-
gated, under or by virtue of
the Participants’ Agreement or
WPPSS Board of Directors
Resolution No. 890, as amended
(the 'Bond Resolution'), to
make any payment to WPPSS, or
to any other defendant, or to
Chemical or any purchaser or
holder of bonds issued by WPPSS
in connection with the
Projects."

We agree with the Washington
Superior Court that because the

Participants’ Agreement is void ab initio

2 Chemical Bank v. Washington Public
Power Supply System, Case No. 82-2-06840-
3, August ll, 1983.

21

as to 68.275% of the participants,’ it is
also ineffective and unenforceable as to
the other participants on the grounds
quoted above. Therefore, we hold that
the case at bar is moot as regards appel-
lant LV. LV has no debt because of the
projects’ failure and the issue is not
pertinent to any rate case now or here-
after filed by LV.
"a*e*k [Wlhen no judgment
rendered can be carried into
effect the cause is moot ***,"

Belondon v. State, Wyo., 379
P.2d 828, 829 (1963).

This being so, we also hold
that this case is moot as to WPPSS and

CB, as their interests were piedicated on

* Namely, the Washington public utility
districts and Washington municipalities.

22

the validity of the Participants’
Agreement.

Pacific Power & Light

The above considerations do not
control the disposition of appellant
PP&L, as PP&L was not a participant under
the Participants’ Agreement, but rather a
10% owner of WNP-5, and 29.4% owner of
Pebble Springs.

PSC founded its decision, rela-
tive to PP&L, on an application of the
provisions of § 37-2-119, W.S. 1977,
which provides in part:

"In conducting any inves-
tigation pursuant to the pro-
visions of this act the commis-
sion may investigate, consider
and determine such matters as
the cost or value, or both, of
the property and business of
any public utility, used and
useful for the convenience of
the public, and all matters

23

affecting or influencing such
cost or value ***,”

Emphasizing the "used and useful” lan-
guage of this section, PSC found the
investment, expenses and obligations
incurred by PP&L could not properly be
considered in fixing the rate base for
PP&L's operation.

If the projects had been
successful and had gone on line for
production of electricity for public
convenience, the cost or value would have
been properly considered in establishing
a rate base. Since they were not
successful and were only partially con-
structed, they could never become
"property" of a "used and useful” nature.
Although the project undertakings might

conceivably be part of the “business” of

24

PP&L,* we need not determine such
inasmuch as the business activity relat-
ing to the projects was not current so as
to meet the “used and useful" require-
ment, as the "used and useful" status
must be as of the time of rate considera-

tion. Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement

Co. v. Public Service Commission of West

Virginia, 262 U.S. 679, 43 S.Ct. 675, 67

L.Ed. 1176 (1923); Boston Gas Company v.

Department of Public Utilities, 367 Mass.

92, 324 N.E.2d 372 (1975); South Dakota

* Business is "‘the habitual or regular
occupation that the party was engaged in
with a view to winning a livelihood or
some gain,'" In re Lamont, 48 Wyo. 56, 41
P.2d 497, 502 (1935). Business is
"'{alny occupation connected with the
operations and details of trade or indus-
try,'" Zurich Insurance Company v.
Friedlander, 261 Md. 612, 276 A.2d 658,
660 (1971).

25

Public Utilities Commission v. Otter Tail

Power Company, S.D., 291 N.W.2d 291

(1980).

Although the investment,
expenses and obligations resulting from
the projects do not conform to the “used
and useful” concept, PP&L contends that
they could still qualify for considera-
tion in establishing a rate base if they
are a prudent, reasonable and proper
expense of operation.*® Other jurisdic-
tions have dealt with the obligations

herein considered as operating expenses

> Section 37-2-122(a), W.S. 1977,
provides:

"In determining what are just
and reasonable rates the com-
mission may take into consid-
eration depreciation of plant,
obsolescence of equipment,
(Footnote continued)

26

and not as property under the "used and

useful" principle.‘

(Footnote 5 continued from previous page)
expense of operation, physical
and other values of the plant,
system, business and properties
of the public utility whose
rates are under consideration."

* See Office of Consumers' Counsel v.
Public Utilities Commission, 67 Ohio
St.2d 153, 21 Ohio Op.3d 96, 423 N.E.2d
820 (1981), dismissed Cleveland Electric
Illuminating Company v. Office of Con-
sumer's Counsel, 455 U.S. 914, 102 S.Ct.
1267, 71 L.Ed.2d 455 (1982), where the
court guoted the commission order as
stating, "'*** [t]hus, we now see the
wisdom of the standard emerging from the
cases from other juzisdictions; if the
expenditures are prudent, amortization
should be permitted.'" Id. 67 Ohio St.2d
153, 423 N.E.2d at 825. The court also
said: "(tlhe core issue *** is whether
the commission lawfully and reasonably
permitted CEI to treat its investment in
the four cancelled nuclear generting sta-
tions as amortizable costs.” Id. at 825.
"There is no question but that the over-
whelming weight of authority from other
jurisdictions supports the position of
the commission." Id. at 826. However,
(Footnote continued)

27

We cannot accept the invest-
ment, expenses, and obligations incurred
in construction, or intended construction
of property which would normally qualify
as “used and useful" for inclusion in a
rate base as an operating expense. An
Operating expense includes:

"In general, various
particular expenses of a public
utility are properly chargeable
to expense of operation,
including any legitimate
expense contributing to the
better management or greater
efficiency of the utility, a
reduction of its investment, or
an increase in its operating
return. ***" 73B C.J.S. Public
Utilities, § 36, p. 234.

Unified systems of accounts prescribed by

most regulatory agencies usually specify

(Footnote 6 continued from previous page)
that court disallowed amortization, based
on its interpretation of the Ohio statute
relating to service-related costs that a

utility may recover from its rate payers.

28

that considered as operating expenses,
i.e. taxes, advertising, salaries,
commodity purchases and similar items.
The PSC recognizes that it cannot ignore
the necessary, fair and reasonable
expenses of operation incurred by a util-
ity in the rendition of service, and also
that there are certain expenses which
should be disallowed, such as the
following:
"1. If the questioned

outlays represent

‘inefficiency' or

‘improvidence,' or

"2. Managerial discretion
has been abused, or

"3. The action taken has
been ‘arbitrary’ or ‘inimical'
to the public interest, or

"4. There has been
‘economic waste,' or

"5. Such outlays were not
legitimate operating expenses

29

because they were ‘in excess of
just and reasonable charges.'"’

In contending that the charges
were "operating expenses," PP&L argues
that a reasonable and prudent test should
be allowed. We need not consider this
test insofar as it applies to "operating
expenses” since these charges were not
"operating expenses" as that term is gen-
erally considered.

It is probable that PP&L would
not contend these expenses to be "operat-

ing" ones if the projects were completed.

7 Brief of the Staff of the Wyoming
Public Service Commission, before the
Public Service Commission of the State of
Wyoming, quoting from 1 A. Priest,
Principles of Public Utility Regulation,
p. 51 (1969).

30

PP&L would then own a percentage of prop-
erty; and it would expect to have the
cost of the project included in the
amount attributed to its "used and use-
ful" property in establishing a rate
base.

The argument in this case
results from the situation in which PP&L
suffers financial loss due to failure of
a project intended to become "used and
useful" in the service of the public.
PP&lL wants to include the loss in its
financial picture whereby an increase in
rates will eventually pay for the loss,
i.e., the loss will be borne by the con-
sumers. P&L believes this proper inas-
much as service rendered by an electric
power utility is limited by the

availability of the supply of the product

31

it furnishes. The same can be said of
some other utilities. A prudent and
reasonable attempt to secure or preserve
such supply could well be considered a
service rendered on behalf of the
consumers.*® When the life of a utility
is limited by such supply, amortization
of an entire plant investment has been

allowed. Pennsylvania Power & Light Com-

pany v. Pennsylvania Public Utility

Commission, 10 Pa.Cmwlth. 328, 311 A.2d

151 (1973); Clarksburg Light & Heat Co.

v. Public Service Commission, 84 W.Va.

638, 100 S.E. 551 (1919); East Ohio Gas

* It should also be noted that utilities
are under a statutory duty to provide
service that is adequate and safe. Sec-
tion 37-3-112, W.S. 1977. This may carry
with it the obligation to take some
action to insure future supplies.

Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 137

Ohio St. 225, 28 N.E.2d 599 (1940). PP&L
contends that successful effort in this
endeavor would redound to the benefit of
the consumers by furnishing a more
abundant and cheaper supply of the prod-
uct and, thus, the failure of the effort
should be at the expense of the
consumers.

On the other hand, PSC consid-
ers the failure of the projects as one of
the risks incurred by PP&L when it
entered into them. PSC would have the
stockholders of PP&L bear the loss since
the decision to embark upon the project
was made by their representatives who had
an opportunity to calculate the risk and
to be governed by such calculation. If

PP&L gauged the risk with the intention

33

that the loss would be borne by the con-
sumers, there would be no risk at all for
PP&L (the stockholders). This fact might
encourage PP&L to venture into activities
having a very small chance of economic
success with the knowledge of no loss to
it should the activity fail and of great
gain should the small chides of success
occur.

If the consumers are to take
the risk, it would seem that they should
have some say as to whether or not the
projects are to be undertaken. Only PSC
is properly in a position to be concerned
with the consumer interest in considera-
tion of the propriety of the risk activ-
ity and to balance the interests of the

consumer and the utility.

34

In McCulloch Gas Transmission

Company v. Public Service Commission of

Wyoming, Wyo., 627 P.2d 173, 179 (1981),

we said:

"As pointed out in Public
Service Commission for the
State of New York v. Federal
Power Commission, D.C. Cir.
1972, 467 F.2d 361, the primary
mission of a regulatory body is
to protect the consumer, it
must ‘strive to reach a balance
between consumer, producer, and
those whose interests fall in
between.' The fixing of just
and reasonable rates by the PSC
involves a balancing of inves-
tor and consumer interests, but
a fair return to investors is
not necessarily fair to con-
sumers. Petition of New
England Tel. & Tel. Co., Supra
(115 vt. 494] 66 A.2d [135] at
147."

PSC is not in a position to
take on any aspect of utility management.
It must restrict its position to "regula-

tion" with management decisions being

a3

entirely that of the utility. The

difficulty surfaces when it is necessary
to distinguish between "regulation" and
"management."

Regulation by means of setting
rates and determining the factors
controlling such by necessity prescribes
the "management" domain. Section 37-2-
121, W.S. 1977, empowers the commission
to act when it determines a rate to be
"inadequate or unremunerative, or to be
unjust, or unreasonable, or unjustly
discriminatory, or unduly preferential”
and it may "fix *** such rate as it shall
determine to be just and reasonable and
in compliance with the provisions of this
act." PSC has authority to "prescribe
and order" changed "any service or serv-

ice regulation" as it shall determine "to

36

be unjustly discriminatory or unduly
preferential," or "any service or facil-
ity" found "to be inadequate or unsafe,"
or “any facility or service regulation"
found "to be unjust or unreasonable."
Section 37-2-122(b), W.S. 1977.

"Regulation" also can be said
to limit "management" aspects in connec-
tion with certain debt acquisitions by
utilities.

"The right of every gas
corporation and of every elec-
trical corporation operating as
a public utility in the state
of Wyoming to issue, assume or
guarantee securities and to
create liens on its property
situated within the state of
Wyoming is a special privilege,
hereby subjected to the super-
vision and control of the pub-
lic service commission of the
state of Wyoming, as herein-
after in this act [§§ 37-6-101
to 37-6-107] set forth. Such
public utility when authorized
by order of the commission and

37

not otherwise, may issue stocks
and stock certificates and may
issue, assume or guarantee
other securities payable at
periods of more than eighteen
(18) months after the date
thereof, for the following pur-
poses: for the acquisition of
property; for the construction,
completion, extension or
improvement of its facilities;
for the improvement or mainte-
nance of its service; for the
discharge or lawful refunding
of its obligations; for the
reimbursement of monies actu-
ally expended for said purposes
from income or from other mon-
ies in the treasury not secured
by or obtained from the issue,
assumption or guarantee of
securities, within five (5)
years next prior to the filing
of an application witn the
commission for the required
authorization; or for any other
purpose approved by the commis-
sion." Section 37-6-101, W.S.
1977.

Section 37-6-102, W.S. 1977,
provides that such securities may be
issued only after application therefor

filed with the PSC and after a hearing

38

is

from which the Commission does not find

that such

"transactions are incon-
sistent with the public
interest; or that the purpose
Or purposes thereof are not
permitted by this act [§§ 37-6-
101 to 37-6-107]; or that the
aggregate amount of the securi-
ties outstanding and proposed
to be outstanding would exceed
the fair value of the prop-
erties and business of the pub-
lic utility."

And § 37-6-106, W.S. 1977, provides that
such securities shall be void if "issued,
assumed or guaranteed without application
to or approval of the commission."
provides in part that:
"Every public utility

shall file with the commission

copies of contracts, agreements

Or arrangements to which it may

be a party, as the commission
may designate. ***"

39

Section 218 of PSC Rules (1979)

requires the filing with it of a copy of
all "special contracts which govern the
sale by the utility of public utility
service or the purchase by the utility of
a utility commodity for resale.”

It is recognized that the fore-
going statutes and rule do not require
PSC approval for PP&L's part ownership of
the terminated projects. The reference
to the statutes and rule is only to exem-
plify the "management" control by PSC in
utility operation. It is a necessary
adjunct to "regulation."

Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed.
1979) defines "regulate" as:

"To fix, establish, or

control; to adjust by rule,

method or established mode; to
direct by rule or restriction;

40

to subject to governing prin-
ciples or laws."

"e*e* Regulation is an
exercise of control while
management is an exercise of
conduct, in carrying on busi-
ness. ***" Cloutier v. State
Milk Control Board, 92 N.H.
199, 28 A.2d 554, 558 (1942).

"xk* 'The word "regulate"
is one of broad import. ***'"
Blumenthal v. City of Cheyenne,
64 Wyo. 75, 186 P.2d 556, 566
(1947), quoting from City of
Owensboro v. Cumberland Tele-
Phone & Telegraph Co., 230 U.S.
58, 33 S.Ct. 988, 992, 57 L.Ed.
1388 (1913).

seee "The power *** to
"regulate" *** implies the
right to prescribe and enforce
all such proper *** rules and
regulations as may be deemed
necessary and wholesome in
conducting such business in a
proper and orderly manner. Og-
den City v. Leo, 54 Utah 556,
182 P. 530, 5 A.L.R. 960.'"
Jensen v. Town of Afton, 59
Wyo. 500, 143 P.2d 190, 201
(1943).

"*** prohibitling] an
incident to or a particular

41

method in connection with busi-
ness. *** is merely regula-
tion. *** [Rlegulation nec-
essarily implies restriction in
some respects and that that
means nothing more or less than
a partial prohibition. ***"
Steffey v. City of Casper,
Wyo., 357 P.2d 456, 461 (1960).

The PSC is vitally concerned
with fixing of rates. If an effort to
obtain a new source of energy supply will
affect rates--potentially lowering them
if successful and potentially raising
them if not successful, PSC has the power
to contrel the effect such project will
have on rates. This does not mean that
it has the power to dictate whether or
not the project should be undertaken or
to concern itself with other aspects of
the conduct relative to the project. The
utility need not consult PSC before

embanking on the project. However, if

42

the utility wishes to involve the con-

sumer in a loss or cost resulting from
failure of the project, i.e., if it
wishes to have such cost or loss con-
sidered in subsequent rates, PSC's prior
approval is necessary.

In briefs and arguments, the
parties make reference to other instances
in which PSC has authorized inclusion in
the rate base of costs of wells for gas
which could turn into dry holes, costs
for early retirement of obsolete (for
environmental reasons) mechanical flue
gas stacks, costs for an abandoned hydro
project as a result of federal legisla-
tion, etc. Usually the activity which
subsequently failed was approved as an

activity prior to its inception by the

43

PSC or it consisted of property with a

used and useful history.

Although we cannot attribute a
consideration by PSC in determining just
and reasonable rates of an investment of
questionable return in a potential prod-
uct producing project to (1) the used and
useful property or business of the util-
ity, or (2) to an operating expense of
it, we do recognize the authority of the
PSC to consider such as a part of the
"other values of the *** system, business
*** of the public utility," § 37-2-
122(a), W.S. 1977 (see fn. 5), if the
consideration, and only if the considera-

tion is given before the investment is

44

made or agreed to be made.*® The require-

ment for prior approval of the PSC is
necessary so that the risk attributable
to the consumers can be evaluated and be
either rejected or accepted--or, perhaps,
the proportion of the risk to be borne by
the consumers, if unsuccessful, can be
set. The conversion computations to a
used and useful property, if successful,
and the period of amortization, if
unsuccessful and such becomes necessary,
can be predetermined. The percentage of
the investment attributable to the
Wyoming operation can be ascertained.

All to be done before the fact of success

* PP&L's project had a book value as
part of its system or business when the
investment was made. After it failed, it
had no value at all.

45

or failure is known. As noted, this con-
sideration and resulting decision will
affect a "management" aspect within
"regulation," but it is a type of regula-
tion necessary and proper for the exer-
cise of the power and duties of the PSC.
In this instance, the PSC was
not consulted prior to the investment
about it. It was not necessary to do so.
But when the investment failed, the onus
of the failure must rest on PP&L, the
only one which considered the risk and,
therefore, the only one accepting it.
Affirmed as to PP&L and dis-
missed as moot as to the other appel-
lants. LV's rate applications are to be
processed without consideration of its

involvement in the projects.

ROSE, Justice, specially
concurring.

I concur with the result
reached by the majority but do not join
in that portion of the opinion which
would allow the consumers to bear all
costs associated with canceled construc-
tion projects so long as the Public Serv-
ice Commission (PSC) had approved the
projects prior to investment by the util-
ity. As I interpret Wyoming's statutory
scheme pertaining to the regulation of
public utilities, the PSC is without
authority to accept or veto proposed con-
struction projects for the purpose of
shifting their cost to ratepayers.
Furthermore, even if the PSC possessed
such authority, the ratemaking principles

embodied in our statutes do not permit

47

the recovery of costs associated with

construction projects which are ter-
mMinated before ever providing service to
utility customers.
I

This court has consistently
held that the PSC possesses only that
power and authority granted to it by the
Wyoming Constitution and statutes. The
enabling statutes must be strictly con-
strued and any reasonable doubt as to the

existence of any power must be resolved

against its exercise. Public Service

Commission v. Formal Complaint of WWZ

Company, Wyo., 641 P.2d 183 (1982); Phil-

lips Petroleum Company v. Public Service

Commission, Wyo., 545 P.2d 1167 (1976);

Tri-County Electric Association, Inc. v.

48

City of Gillette, Wyo., 525 P.2d 3

(1974).
The general powers of the PSC
are set out in § 37-2-112, W.S. 1977:
"The commission shall have
general and exclusive power tc
regulate and supervise every
public utility within the state
in accordance with the pro-
visions of this act.”
This statute, as the majority recognize,
empowers the PSC to regulate and super-
vise utilities, not to manage’ them.
Regulation and supervision, however,
necessarily entail control over the

effects of decisions made by those who

manage public utilities.

1 The American Heritage Dictionary
defines "manage" to mean: "To direct or
administer (the affairs of an organiza-
tion, estate, household, or business‘."

49

The position advocated by the
majority would extend the PSC's sphere of
control to cover not only the effects of
managerial decisions but the decision-
making process itself. In support of
their position, the majority cite and
discuss a number of provisions in our
regulatory scheme as illustrative of the
degree of control that the PSC exerts
over management as a necessary adjunct to
regulation. These statutes, in my judg-
ment, emphasize the supervisory or watch-
dog function of the PSC in protecting the
public interest. Section 37-2-122, W.S.
1977, authorizes the PSC to eliminate
existing services, facilities, and
regulations which are inadequate, unsafe,
unjust, or unreasonable. Section 37-6-

101, W.S. 1977, empowers the PSC to

50

Supervise the issuance of securities and
the creation of liens, activities which
are regulated in competitive as well as
monopolistic enterprises in order to pro-
tect the public investor. Section 37-6-

102, W.S. 1977, mandates PSC approval of

proposed securities transactions unless
such transactions are inconsistent with
the public interest, unlawful, or exceed
the assets of the utility. Finally,

§ 37-3-111, W.S. 1977 and PSC Rule 218
require public utilities to file des-
ignated contracts in order to keep the
PSC informed.

Clearly, these statutes autho-
rize the PSC, in obeying its charge to
guard the public interest, to monitor the
business decisions previously made by

utility executives. Using these statutes

|

as a foothold, however, the majority make

what I consider to be a monumentally
faulty and frighteningly unjustified
logic-leap to the conclusion that the PSC
has the authority to rule on the viabil-
ity of proposed utility projects with
respect to whether consumers will bear
the risk of failure. To deny that such
authority would encompass the power to
dictate whether a particular project
should be undertaken is to deny reality.
Utility executives would be compelled to
consult the PSC and obtain approval
before embarking on any project, or face
possible stockholder suits for mismanage-
ment in the event the project fails. The
PSC would, in effect, be making crucial
decisions concerning utility proposals--

all in the name of regulation and, with

52

all due respect to our Public Service

Commission and its able membership, the
PSC is not required to be qualified and
probably is not qualified to make such
delicate and technical public utility
management decisions.

The function of the PSC is to
protect the consumer through the regula-
tion of public utilities, while taking
into consideration tne legitimate inter-

ests of the utilities. McCulloch Gas

Transmission Company v. Public Service

Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 627 P.2d 173

(1981). In carrying out this function,
the PSC is empowered to control the
effect that new energy projects will have
on rates--but only after the utility
management has assessed the merits and

drawbacks of the proposal and reached a

53

final decision based on sound business

judgment, and only after the project has
become used and useful in providing
energy. It is not the function of the
PSC to provide an insurance policy under
which the ratepayers will protect the
investments of utility stockholders
against all risks. This court recognized

as much in McCulloch Gas Transmission

Company v. Public Service Commission of

Wyoming, supra, 627 P.2d at 179, where we
described the regulatory function of the

PSC and said:

"xk* The public interest
is to be given paramount con-
sideration; desires of a util-
ity are secondary. Big Horn
Rural Electric Co. v. Pacific
Power & Light Co., Wyo. 1964,
397 P.2d 455. The purpose of
the PSC's authority is to pro-
tect the public from utilities

54

affected with a public
interest."

Not only is the participation
by a state agency in a utility's business
decisions unnecessary to regulation, it
is impermissible. The United States

_—_—_—_o oo ee ee 8

rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company

Vv. Public Service Commission of Missouri,
262 U.S. 276, 289, 43 S.Ct. 544, 547, 67
L.Ed. 981, 985 (1923), said:

"**k* Tt must never be
forgotten that while the State
may regulate, with a view to
enforcing reasonable rates and
charges, it is not the owner of
the property of public utility
companies, and is not clothed
with the general power of
management incident to owner-
Ship. The applicable general
rule is well expressed in State
Public Utilities Commission ex
rel. Springfield v. Springfield
Gas_and Electric Company, 291
Ill. 209, 234 [125 N.E. 891].

55

"'The commission is not

the financial manager of the
corporation, and it is not
empowered to substitute its
judgment for that of the direc-
tors of the corporation ***,'"
(Emphasis added.)

The proper relationship between regu-
lators and regulated enterprises was
described by 1 Priest, Principles of Pub-
lic Utility Regulation, p. 23:

"Where inefficiency or
improvide..ce or economic waste
or abuse of discretion or
action inimical to the public
interest have been dem-
onstrated, the agency having
jurisdiction may intervene.
Business decisions are, how-
ever, the prerogative of
management. Regulators are not
the masters of public utility
enterprises. They may, and
often should, breathe down the
executive's neck, but the basic
responsibility is his, not
theirs."

The majority opinion would per-

mit utility companies to recover their

56

investments in terminated construction
projects, ineligible for inclusion in
rate base: or operation expenses, if the
proposal is first submitted to the PSC
for approval. I conclude that the exer-
cise of such power by the PSC would
exceed the scope of the enabling statutes
and implicate constitutional proscrip-
tions concerning private property.
II

The majority conclude, and I
agree, that Pacific Power & Light
Company's capital investment in the now
terminated nuclear plants cannot properly
be included in the rate base as used and
useful property or be amortized as an
Operating expense. However, the majority
would permit the PSC, in determining just

and reasonable rates, to consider the

57

costs associated with such investments
under the "other values" language of
§ 37-2-122(a), W.S. 1977. That statute
provides:
"In determining what are

just and reasonable rates the

commission may take into con-

sideration depreciation of

plant, obsolescence of equip-

ment, expense of operation,

physical and other values of

the plant, system, business and

properties of the public util-

ity whose rates are under con-

sideration."
Under this statute, the decisive question
is whether "an investment of questionable
return in a potential product producing
project" (majority opinion 677 P.2d at
808) is one of the "other values of the
plant, system, business and properties of
the public utility," which may properly
be considered for ratemaking purposes. I

conclude that it is not, because to allow

58

the PSC to consider the value of a con-
struction project which ultimately fails
is to circumvent the used and useful
principle of § 37-2-119, W.S. 1977.2? I
would interpret the physical and other--

presumably nonphysical--values specified

* Section 37-2-119, W.S. 1977, provides
as follows:

"In conducting any investiga-
tion pursuant to the provisions
of this act the commission may
investigate, consider and
determine such matters as the
cost or value, or both, of the
property and business of any
public utility, used and useful
for the convenience of the pub-
lic, and all matters affecting
Or influencing such cost or
value, the operating statistics
for any public utility both as
to revenues and expenses and as
to the physical features of
operation in such detail as the
commission may deem advisable;
the earnings, investment and
expenditures of any such corpo-
(Footnote continued)

59

Sioa

in § 37-2-122(a), supra, as encompassing

Only the values of those items properly
includable in the rate base. That is,

§ 37-2-122(a) empowers the PSC to con-
Sider for ratemaking purposes only the
property and business of the public util-
ity which is used and useful in producing
the product. I cannot attribute to the

legislature the intent to embody in the

(Footnote 2 continued from previous page)
ration as a whole within this
state, and as to rates in local
exchanges or plants of any
telephone, telegraph, water,
electrical or gas corporations,
the geographical location
thereof shall be considered as
well as the population of the
municipality in which such
plant or exchange is located."

60

ratemaking formula both the used and use-
ful principle and the means to annihilate

that principle.’

* See Office of Consumers' Counsel v.
Public Utilities Commission, 67 Ohio
St.2d 153, 423 N.E.2d 820 (1981), where
the Ohio Supreme Court refused to inter-
pret a catch-all statute so as to permit
the commission to consider the utility's
investment in four terminated nuclear
power plants as amortizable costs. The
court said:

"*** The commission views [the
pertinent statute] as a virtual
wild card to be played whenever
the commission in its discre-
tion sees fit. We interpret
the statute less sweepingly,
first because the provisions
are linked inextricably with
the ratemaking factors con-
tained in [the statute specify-
ing permissible considerations
in ratesetting proceedings],
and secondly because the
General Assembly undoubtedly
did not intend to build into
its recently revised (1976)
ratemaking formula a means by
which the commission may
effortlessly abrogate that very
formula." 423 N.E.2d at 828.

61

The majority cite several

instances in which the PSC has considered
for ratemaking purposes the costs of
projects not currently useful in supply-
ing the product. Such consideration was
permissible, according to the majority,
since the terminated activity had
received the prior approval of the PSC or
had a used and useful history. I wouid
have held that our statutory scheme,
including the used and useful principle,
contemplates the consideration of the
costs attributable to the cited projects,
without expanding the meaning of the
"other values" language of § 37-2-122(a)
and notwithstanding a lack of prior
approval by the PSC.

Pursuant to § 37-2-122(a),

supra, obsolescence of previously useful

62

equipment is a proper factor to be
considered in setting just and reasonable
rates. The cost of drilling a dry gas
well is properly categorized as an
operating expense, since gas, unlike
electricity, is a commodity for which the
utility must search in order to provide
service. The search for gas necessarily
includes the drilling of a certain
percentage of dry holes, whereas the
production of electricity does not nec-
essarily include the building of a cer-
tain percentage of defunct plants. I
agree with the pronouncement of the Ohio

Supreme Court in East Ohio Gas Co. v.

Public Utilities Commission, 137 Ohio St.

225, 28 N.E.2d 599, 609 (1940), concern-

ing the propriety of considering the cost

of gas leaseholds which turn out to be

unproductive:
"It must be apparent that

the cost of acquiring, holding

for a time during which delay

rentals must be paid, testing

and finally canceling unproduc-

tive acres is the only method

by which productive gas acres

can be found and developed, and

it is equally apparent that

this expense must ce borne by

the consumer who ultimately

uses the gas from the produc-

tive acres."
It is not necessary to expand our exist-
ing statutory scheme in order to justify
the recovery of these types of costs

through rates.

I conclude that the statutory
formula for setting just and reasonable
rates does not permit the consideration
of utility investments which are not
attributable to the rate base and which

are not properly designated as costs of

64

operation. I would adopt the position
reiterated by the Ohio Supreme Court when
faced with a question of statutory
interpretation under circumstances simi-
lar to the instant case:

saee 'ee*e Tt is only
proper that their [the inves-
tors] venture be found oper-
ational before they commence to
recoup their capital outlays
from the consumers.' ***"
Office of Consumers’ Counsel v.
Public Utilities Commission, 67
Ohio St.2d 153, 423 N.E.2d 820,
829 (1981), quoting from Office
of Consumers’ Counsel v. Public
Utilities Commission, 58 Ohio
St.2d 449, 456-457, 391 N.E.2d
311 (1979).

THOMAS, Justice, dissenting.

I must dissent in part from the
decision reached by the majority of the
court in this case. I am in accord that
the case must be dismissed as to Lower

Valley Power & Light, Inc., Chemical Bank

65

and Washington Public Power Supply System

because it is moot. With respect to
Pacific Power & Light Company, however, I
would hold that the Public Service
Commission had no authority to enter the
order which it entered, and I would
remand the case with directions that it
be dismissed.

The remarkable thing in connec-
tion with the disposition of this case by
this court is that the majority opinion
and the concurring opinion refer to and
discuss the correct legal propositions,
but they apply them in an erroneous man-
ner. In Justice Rose's special concur-
ring opinion he very ably articulates the
proposition that the Public Service
Commission has only that power and

authority granted to it by the Wyoming

66

Constitution and statutes, and that the

statutory powers must be strictly con-
strued. There is no need to again cite
the authorities which encompass those
holdings. At page 808 of the majority
Slip opinion the court aptly says:
"It is recognized that the
foregoing statutes and rule do
not require PSC approval for
PP&L's part ownership of the
terminated projects."
The document which initiated
Pacific Power & Light Company's involve-
ment in this proceeding was a notice and
order setting hearing which was entered
on April 22, 1982, and that document did
not reflect the justification for the

investigation by the Public Service

Commission. It is clear, however, that

67

the commission did proceed pursuant to
§ 37-2-117, W.S. 1977, which provides:

"Whenever the commission
shall believe that an investi-
gation of any act or omission
to act, accomplished or pro-
posed, or an investigation of
any rate, service, facility or
service regulation of any pub-
lic utility should be made in
order to secure compliance with
the provisions of this act and
orders of the commission, it
may of its own motion summarily
investigate the same." (Empha-
sis added.)

While I might rely simply upon
the concession in the majority opinion to
the effect that no investigation was
needed to secure compliance with the pro-
visions of the act or the orders of the
commission, I will point out that this
record and the arguments of counsel for
the commission are devoid of any ref-

erence to any statute or order of the

68

commission with which compliance by
Pacific Power & Light Company needed to
be secured. I am prepared to concede
that the commission might investigate in
Order to determine if such a situation
existed, but once it determined that
there was no justification for the inves-
tigation I cannot perceive any authority
which would permit the Public Service
Commission to enter the order that it did
in this instance.

I recognize that it is popular
to ride on the judicial steam roller
which has flattened Washington Public
Power Supply System. While I might be in
sympathy with the result which the Public
Service Commission and this court
reaches, I find I have no empathy for

what I believe to be an abuse of the

69

commission's authority which this court
has sustained.

I understand that the Public
Service Commission has told Pacific
Power & Light Company that if Pacific
Power & Light Company should wish to
include its investment costs in these
abandoned nuclear power plants in any
future rate to be applied to Wyoming con-
sumers that the Public Service Commission
of Wyoming will not permit that. Purely
and simply that is an advisory order from
the Public Service Commission, and our
statutory scneme does not justify such an
approach. This court has said that it
does not render advisory opinions, and we
dismiss cases in which an advisory opin-

ion is sought. Aetna Casualty and Surety

Company v. Langdon, Wyo., 624 P.2d 240

70

(1981); Kwallek v. State, Wyo., 596 P.2d

tion of Casper v. City of Casper, Wyo.,

575 P.2d 1146 (1978); State v. Rosachi,

Wyo., 549 P.2d 318 (1976); Knudson v.

Hilzer, Wyo., 551 P.2d 680 (1976); and

Tobin v. Pursel, Wyo., 539 P.2d 361

(1975). In part the fact that this court
does eschew advisory opinions is premised
upon the proposition that there is no way
in which the judgment which is rendered
may be carried into effect. Perhaps the
result is to make the case moot as dis-
cussed on page 802 of the majority slip
Opinion. The point, however, is that the
Public Service Commission, without statu-
tory authority, does not have any busi-
ness entering an order such as this; and

yet, by affirming what the Public Service

71

Commission has done, this court has, in
effect, and contrary to a longstanding
jurisprudential discipline, joined in an
advisory opinion. No matter how much the
parties want an answer to this question
we should not so casually abandon that
rule of jurisprudence.

As indicated, I would reverse
the order of the Public Service Commis-
sion because this court has the duty to
hold unlawful and set aside agency action
which is in excess of statutory author-
ity. Section 16-3-114(c) (ii), W.S. 1977
(Oct. 1982 Rev.).

72

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 1983

PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT )
COMPANY, a corporation, )
)

Appellant )

(Petitioner), )

)

)

THE PUBLIC SERVICE )
COMMISSION OF WYOMING, )
)

Appellee )

(Respondent). )

ORDER DENYING REHEARING

Pacific Power & Light Company
having made application for rehearing in
this matter, and the court being fully
advised, it is

ORDERED that Pacific Power &

Light Company's Application for

73

Rehearing be, and the same hereby is,

denied.
Dated March 8, 1984.
By the Court

ss/John J. Rooney

John J. Rooney
Chief Justice

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF WYOMING

IN THE MATTER OF THE ) DOCKET NO. 9617
INVESTIGATION OF LOWER ) SUB 1l

VALLEY POWER AND LIGHT,)

INC.

DOCKET NO. 9628
SUB 6

IN THE MATTER OF THE
INVESTIGATION OF FALL
RIVER RURAL ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC.

DOCKET NO. 9454
SUB 17

IN THE MATTER OF THE
INVESTIGATION OF
PACIFIC POWER &
LIGHT COMPANY

ee eee eee oe eee

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND FINAL ORDER

The Commission initiated this
investigation of the participation by
Wyoming jurisdictional public utilities
in the Washington Public Power Supply
System (WPPSS) nuclear generation plant
construction projects known as WNP 4 and

-

75

The Commission having consid-
ered the evidence adduced at public hear-
ings and being advised in the premises,
FINDS and CONCLUDES that:

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING

JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE FINDINGS
OF FACT

l. Lower Valley Power and Light,
Inc. (Lower Valley) is a distribution
level electric cooperative providing
service in Afton, Jackson and the
surrounding communities and areas in
Lincoln and Teton counties in Wyoming.
Fall River Rural Electric Cooperative,
Inc. (Fall River) is also a distribution
level electric cooperative serving
approximately 114 Wyoming consumers and

approximately 6600 consumers in Idaho and

Montana. Pacific Power & Light Company

(Pacific Power) is a publicly held corpo-
ration providing electric service as a
regulated public utility in Wyoming,
Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington and
California. Communities served by
Pacific Power in Wyoming include Casper,
Laramie, Lander, Rawlins, Riverton,
Worland, and Rock Springs. Pacific Power
also wholesales electric power to Wyoming
utilities (e.g., Cheyenne Light, Fuel &
Power Co.) and municipalities which have
their own distribution systems (e.g.
Basin and Powell).

The Independent Staff of the
Commission acted separate and apart from
the Commission in investigating and
examining these matters from a consumer
interest viewpoint. The Independent

Staff was permitted to intervene and

77

participate as a party pursuant to W.S.
9-4-111 and 9-4-112(c) of the Wyoming
Administrative Procedure Act and Commis-
sion Rule Section 103(c). The assigned
Independent Staff had no contact with the
Commission except in the public proceed-
ings in this matter.

2. On November 4, 1981, the Inde-
pendent Staff of the Public Service
Commission brought a Petition in Docket
No. 9617 Sub 11 for authority to conduct
an investigation concerning the
participation by Lower Valley Power and
Light Company in the Washington Public
Power Supply System's construction of
Units 1 through 5. On November 13, i981,
an Order was entered granting the Peti-
tion. On November 19, 1981, Lower Valley

filed its Petition which also requested

78

that the Commission Staff investigate
Lower Valley's involvement with the WPPSS
projects. On the 10th day of December,
1981, the Commission again reaffirmed its
prior Order requiring an investigation of
the matter. Subsequently, on April 19,
1982, the Commission entered its Notice

and Order Setting Hearing in this docket.

Hearing was set for June 16, 1982 in
Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Three days after the Commission
set the matter for hearing concerning
Lower Valley's participation in these
projects, the Commission entered another

Notice and Order Setting Hearing which

required a consolidated hearing for Lower
Valley in Docket No. 9617 Sub 1l, Fall
River Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. in

Docket No. 9628 Sub 6, and Pacific Power

79

and Light Company in Docket No. 9454 Sub

17. The consolidated investigation was
for the purpose of considering the par-
ticipation by these three electric util-
ities in the WPPSS nuclear power
projects. The consolideted hearings were
to commence on June 16, 1982 in Cheyenne,
Wyoming.

3. On May 26, 1982, the Indepen-

dent Staff filed its Motion for Continu-

ance which was unopposed, and on May 28,
1982 the Commission granted that Motion.
Those persons seeking to intervene were
required by the Commission's Order to
present their petitions to intervene
before July 2, 1982, and hearings were
scheduled to commence on July 12, 1982 in

Cheyenne, Wyoming.

80

4. Publication of the change of

hearing date and the Commission's Order
was accomplished by publishing the Order
in the newspapers of general circulation
in the communities of Casper, Laramie,
Lander, Rawlins, Riverton, Worland, Rock
Springs, Jackson and Afton. No party
intervened within the time period
required by the Commission's Order. How-
ever, on September 1, 1982 the Commission
received a Petition to Intervene by FMC
Corporation which was denied by the
Commission since hearings had already
been had.

5. Hearings were conducted from
July 12th through the 16th, 1982 in
Cheyenne, Wyoming. Protest statements
were received in conjunction with another

hearing held in Afton on July 20, 1982

81

and in Jackson on July 22, 1982 in Docket
9617 Sub 12. Briefs were filed by the
Companies and the Independent Staff on
September 3, 1982.

6. During the hearings Pacific
Power presented evidence without
objection concerning its participation in
another nuclear power project known as
Pebble Springs. Pebble Springs is not in
any way connected with the WPPSS
projects. Neither the Commission nor any
participant made note of the fact that
the investigation of Pebble Springs was
not noticed to the public or required to
be investigated by the Commission's

Notice and Order Setting Hearing. While

the Commission realizes that such a
procedural defect should cause us to

reset the inquiry into Pebble Springs for

82

hearing after public notice, we believe
that the public interest will not be
served by withholding a decision relating
to Pebble Springs and that no harm will
be done. We come to this conclusion
after considering the following: a) the
facts upon which we rely in making our
decision are straight forward and there
can be no dispute over these facts; b)
the principles upon which we base our
decision are as applicable to Pebble
Springs as they are to the WPPSS
projects; c) the parties in their
presentation, briefs, and arguments,
carefully and fully developed the law,
and competing theories and arguments for
Our considerations; and d) our decision

will not cause rates to increase. The

83

Commission therefore finds that the pub-
lic interest will not be served by
withholding a decision in this matter.

7 Lower Valley Power and Light
Company, Fall River Rural Electric Coop-
erative, Inc., and Pacific Power and
Light Company are public utilities within
the jurisdiction of the Commission.

8. The Commission has the power to
investigate and determine whether costs
associated with capital expenditures in
abandoned or cancelled power projects
shall be passed on to ratepayers in the
form of increased rates. See W. S. 37-2-
112, 37-2-116, 37-2-119, 37-2-127.

FINDINGS ON WPPSS POWER PROJECTS

9. The Washington Public Power
Supply System is a Joint Operating Agency

organized in 1957 under Washington law

84

for the purpose of building, owning and
Operating electric generation and trans-
mission facilities and for the purpose of
selling electric power to its members and
others from those facilities. Tr. Vol.
IV p. 904. WPPSS is composed of 23 menm-
bers consisting of four Washington cities
and 19 Washington public utility
districts. Tr. Vol. III p. 676. Between
1970 and 1975 WPPSS decided to undertake
the construction of five nuclear power
piants known as WNP 1 through 5. Tr.
Vol. III pgs. 676-679.

WNP 1, 2, and 3 were financed
by WPPSS through an arrangement with the
Bonneville Power Administration known as—
the "net billing agreement." Under this
agreement WPPSS would construct plants

and would provide to BPA the output of

85

the plants at cost in return for an equal
credit on power bills they received from
BPA. This resulted in BPA averaging the
higher cost nuclear power with the lower
priced hydro power, and with the BPA
indirectly backing the plant construc-
tion, the result was the highest possible
ratings for the project's bond issues.
Tr. Vol. IV p. 906-7.

WNP 4 and 5 were financed dif-
ferently because BPA could not provide
the backing for these additional units
through the net billing agreement. WPPSS
enlisted 88 electric utility cooperatives
and public utility districts in its
efforts to gather the financial backing
needed for these additional projects.
Among the 88 participants were Lower Val-

ley with a 0/837% participant's share in

86

ee

WNP 4 and 5, and Fall River with a 0.648%
participant's share in these two units.
In addition, Pacific Power was a 10%
owner Of WNP 5. Tr. Vol. IV p. 907, 956;
Vol. IV p. 451. While Pacific Power
financed its 10% ownership share of WNP
5, WPPSS financed its ownership of WNP 4
and its 90% ownership of WNP 5 through
the sale of municipal tax-exempt bonds.
In turn the 88 participants each signed a
Participant's Agreement which entitled
them to a percentage share of WPPSS power
from units 4 and 5 at cost, and obligated
each utility to pay this same proportion
of total WPPSS costs "whether or not" the
projects were completed. Tr. Vol. IV p.
956; Fall River Exhibit 10 Tr. Vol. I p.
98; Lower Valley Exhibit 15. These

Participants’ Agreements were executed on

87

July 14, 1976 by Lower Valley and Fall
River. Pacific Power also entered into
its ownership agreement with WPPSS on WNP
5 on July 14, 1976. LV Exhibit 15; FR
Exhibit 10; Tr. Vol. IV p. 678.

FINDINGS CONCERNING GUARANTEE
OF WPPSS BONDS

10. The provisions of the Partici-
pant's Agreements that both Lower Valley
and Fall River executed are identical (FR
Exhibit No. 10 and LV Exhibit No. 15).
Section 4 of the Participant's Agreement
requires WPPSS to issue and sell bonds to
finance the cost of construction of the
projects, and to pay or provide for the
payment of the principal, interest, and
premium on the outstanding bonds. In

Section 5 of the Participant's Agreement,

88

Lower Valley and Fall River agree to pur-
chase a share of the project's capabil-
ity. The purchase price to be paid by
Lower Valley and Fall River each year for
its Participant's share is the amount
specified in the billing statement pro-
vides by WPPSS.

ll. Section 6(d) of the Partici-
pant's Agreement provides:

"The participant shall make
the payments to be made to supply
system under this agreement
whether or not any of the
projects are completed, operable
Or operating and notwithstanding
the suspension, interruption,
interference, reduction or
curtailment of the output of
either project for any reason
whatsoever in whole or in part.
Such payments shall not be sub-
ject to any reduction, whether by
offset or otherwise, and shall be
conditioned upon the performance
Or nonperformance by supply sys-
tem or any other participant or
entity under this or any other
agreement or instrument, the

89

remedy for any performance being
limited to mandamus, specific
performance or other legal or
equitable remedy."

Because participants agreed to
make payments to WPPSS regardless of
whether the projects were ever completed;
and because the payments that Lower Val-
ley and Fall River must make to WPPSS for
WNP 4/5, aside from termination costs,
are directly tied to the principal and
interest payments on WPPSS bonds, the
Participant's Agreement Section 6(d) is
for all intents and purposes a guarantee
of the WPPSS bonds which financed the
projects.

12. The Participant's Agreements
executed by Lower Valley and Fall River

were not submitted to the Public Service

Commission for its review or approval at

90

the time of their execution or at any
subsequent time prior to these proceed-
ings. Tr. Vol. I p. 107, 203; Vol. IV p.
908.
13. Wyoming Statute 37-6-101 pro-
vides in pertinent part that
"a public utility when
authorized by order of the
Commission and not otherwise, may
issue stocks and stock certifi-
cates and may issue, assume or
guarantee other securities pay-
able at periods of more than 18
months after the date thereof for
the purposes of acquisition of
property, or the construction of
facilities..."
The WPPSS bonds that were issued are pay-
able at periods more than 18 months after
issuance and were for the purpose of
acquisition of property and the construc-

tion of facilities.

91

Wyoming Statute 37-6-106 pro-
vides that "all zecurities issued,
assumed or guaranteed without application
to or approval of the Commission...shall
be void.”

CONCLUSIONS OF FACT AND LAW ON
GUARANTEE OF WPPSS BONDS

14. The Participant's Agreements
entered into by Fall River and Lower Val-
ley with the Washington Public Power Sup-
ply System constitute a guarantee of
securities as contemplated by Wyoming
Statute 37-6-101 and Wyoming Statute
37-6-106.

15. Fall River and Lower Valley did
not comply with Wyoming Statute 37-6-101
and 37-6-106 by failing to apply for or

obtain the Commission's authorization to

92

vee

i ee ee

issue the guarantee contained in the
Participant's Agreements.

16. The failure of Fall River and
Lower Valley to obtain the Commission's
authorization to guarantee the WPPSS
securities renders the Participant's
Agreement void for rate making and other
purposes within the regulatory jurisdic-
tion of the Commission. W.S. 37-6-106.

17. Because the Participant's
Agreement is void for ratemaking and
other purposes within the regulatory
jurisdiction of the Commission, the costs
incurred by these public utilities
because of the guarantee in the Partici-
pants’ Agreements cannot and should not
be lawfully passed on to Fall River or

Lower Valley ratepayers.

93

FINDINGS CONCERNING WPPSS TERMINATION

18. Construction of WNP 4 and 5 was
terminated by WPPSS in January 1982. WNP
4 was approximately 20% complete and WNP
5 was approximately 16% complete when
terminated. Tr. Vol. III p. 709; Tr.
Vol. IV p. 914. These projects are being
terminated through contractor settlements
and negotiations to avoid lawsuits and
ensure that the termination of these
projects proceeds with some degree of
efficiency. This has been termed
‘controlled termination.’ Tr. Vol. IV p.
913. Termination costs estimated for WNP
4 and 5 during 1982 are $94,639,000. For
1983-84 final termination and settlement
costs are estimated to be an additional
$120,360,000. Tr. Vol. IV p. 955; Staff

Exhibit 3. Lower Valley and Fall River

94

voluntarily advanced 'loans' to WPPSS to
assist in WPPSS cash flow for this con-
trolled termination. Lower Valley
‘loaned' WPPSS $305,618, and Fall River
‘loaned' WPPSS $236,710; amounts which
the utilities claim wili be credited back
at a later date against monies owed to
WPPSS. Tr. Vol. I pgs. 425-428; Vol. IV
p. 957.

19. The payments that Lower Valley
and Fall River must make to WPPSS for WNP
4/5, aside from termination costs, are
directly tied to the principal and
interest payments on WPPSS bonds which
financed the projects. The principal and
interest payments, together with the
prorata share of antic. sated termination
costs for Lower Valley and Fall River,

will continue under the Participant's

95

Agreement through the year 2018 A.D. In
total Lower Valley would ultimately pay
approximately $62,250,000 and Fall River
would ultimately pay WPPSS approximately
$48,193,000. Tr. Vol. IV p. 956; Staff
Exhibit 4. Placed in the perspective of
all WPPSS costs for WNP 4/5, even these
large amounts of money seem small. As
previously noted WPPSS termination costs
through 1984 are anticipated to be
$214,999,000. Bond principal payments
from 1989 to 2018 will amount to
$2,250,000,000. Interest payments from
1982 to 2018 will amount to
$4,972,282,000. Incredibly enough, the
total bill for WNP 4/5 comes to
$7,437,281,000. Tr. Vol. IV pgs. 955-
960; Staff Exhibits 3 and 4. These are

not estimates of what it would cost to

96

complete the projects, but actual costs
associated with these two WPPSS projects
which were only 16 to 20 percent complete
when terminated. The estimated cost of
completing WNP 5 alone was over $6 bil-
lion in December 1981. Tr. Vol. III p.
718.

20. Pacific Power financed its own
participation in WNP 5. Through December
31, 1981, Pacific Power had an actual
before tax investment of $99,092,000 in
WNP 5. Tr. Vol. III p. 719; Pacific
Exhibit 7, Table 7-1.

21. It is clear that no electric
power has been generated or can be
expected to be generated by these can-
celled power plant projects. We cannot
find any present or future benefit that

will flow from the massive investment in

97

these projects to the consumers of
Pacific Power, Lower Valley or Fall
River.

THE USED AND USEFUL PRINCIPLE

The used and useful principle
provides that only that utility plant
which is currently used and useful in
rendering utility service to the public
shall be included in computing rate base
and expenses recoverable in rates from
the public.

W.S. 37-2-119 requires that the

Commission consider “the property and

business of any public utility, used and

useful for the convenience of the
public..." We understand this to mean
that by law the Commission must focus on
the assets used and useful in rendering

service to the public, rather than the

98

capital invested in utility assets. We
have concluded that in any case the prin-
ciple ought to be applied by focusing on
the assets involved in rendering service
to the public. Otherwise utility con-
sumers might find themselves supporting
non-utility investments as well as util-
ity investments - clearly a result which
the law was enacted to avoid.

We reject the notion thet the
thing which is truly used and useful to
consumers is the capital investment in
the form of funds which require a return
and not the capital assets which are used
to provide the utility service. Union

Electric Co., Docket No. U-558 (Iowa Com-

merce Commission (1975)). While it is

true that a utility plant does cost money

and that money is provided by investors,

99

it is the utility plant and not the money

which generates electricity. By focusing
on the capital rather than the asset side
of the balance sheet, we would make an
unfounded assumption that the assets pur-
chased by the capital are used and use-
ful, or we would be compelled to assume
that investor owned public utilities are
not subject to the same risks of loss
that exist in the competitive arena. We
will not make either of these assump-
tions.

Since no Commission should
assume that all capital invested was for
plant used and useful in rendering serv-
ice to the public, testing such an
assumption would always lead back to the
asset or left-hand side of the balance

sheet anyway. We prefer not to make such

100

an assumption and we find that the sim-

plest, most direct way to apply the used
and useful concept is to focus on the
asset side of the balance sheet in the
first instance. Policy and the law
require focusing on utility facilities.

It appears, however, that a
more fundamental reason we are asked to
focus on the right-hand side of the bal-
ance sheet (a method known as the
invested-capital or prudent-investment
rate base) may be to allow a means of
accommodating the assumption that inves-
tor owned public utilities should only
bear the risk of loss from imprudent or
fraudulent capital investments. For rea-
sons which will be set out below we

reject this assumption also. Our focus

101

then is upon the asset side of the bal-
ance sheet because this is the simplest,
most direct and logical method for
identifying those assets which are used
and useful in rendering service to the
public. If logic did not dictate that we
focus on the assets in applying the prin-
ciple then we believe W.S. 37-2-119 would
require such a focus in the public
interest.

The second element of the con-
cept revolves around the requirement that
the plant or property be ‘used and useful
for the convenience of the public.' We
understand these words to refer to those
capital assets which directly or indi-
rectly are actually and currently used in

providing utility service to the public.

102

ee veatinsial a

a ee

In summary, the concept is best
expressed by the question: “Are particu-
lar items of property used and useful in
rendering service to the public?" The
emphasis in the application of the con-
cept is upon the identification and valu-
ation of property and assets, and upon
the determination whether those assets
are currently used and useful in render-
ing service to the public. We believe
our understanding of this basic public
utility principle is one to which the
parties to these proceedings subscribe.
Tr. Vol. III p. 572-573.

CONSEQUENCES OF APPLYING THE
USED AND USEFUL PRINCIPLE

22. If utility plant is used and
useful in rendering service to the public

then that plant will be included in rate

103

base and the utility will be allowed to
earn a rate of return on that investment.
Plant included in rate base is allowed to
be depreciated or expensed over a period
of years. Maintenance and other expenses
related to capital plant are expensed as
they occur. Conversely, if utility plant
is not used and useful in rendering serv-
ice to the public then application of

the used and useful principle has the
following consequences for rate making
purposes:

l. Exclusion of the investment
from rate base upon which rate of return
is computed;

2 Denial of an amortized recovery

of the investment; and

104

36 Denial of recovery of termina-
tion, maintenance, and other expenses
related to the property in question.

Investors do not only risk an
Opportunity to earn a return on invest-
ment, but also any return of the
investment itself and of those expenses
related to the capital investment.

REASONS FOR APPLYING THE USED AND
USEFUL PRINCIPLE

23. There are a number of reasons
for applying this principle. First we
believe the legislature has required its
application. W.S. 37--2-119 provides that
in conducting any investigation the
Commission “may investigate, consider and

determine such matters as the cost or

105

value, or both, of the property and busi-
ness of any public utility, used and use-
ful for the convenience of the public
***," The issue is raised whether the
application of the "used and useful”
principle is mandated by this statute or
whether the use of the word "may" indi-
cates that application of the principle
is a matter of discretion with the
Commission. We believe that the dis-
cretion given to the Commission by the
Legislature is with respect to whether
the Commission will use a cost or a fair
value method or both for the valuation of
rate base, and not whether the Commission
will apply the used and useful principle.
While the Commission believes

that the Legislature has mandated

106

application of the used and useful prin-
ciple, we do not apply that principle
here solely because of this reading and
understanding of W.S. 37-2-119. We also
apply this principle to the abandoned
construction projects in question because
we believe it is appropriate in the pub-
lic interest. If we have discretion to
apply the used and useful principle we
exercise that discretion by applying the
principle because the consuming public
has not and will not receive any elec-
trical service from these cancelled power
projects. Regulation in the public
interest requires that rates reflect only
those costs and expenses related to
facilities which serve the public. Tr.
Vol. IV p. 962-966. The risk of loss

from a failed investment falls upon the

107

investor, not the consumers of these

utilities, and the risk taking by inves-
tor utilities does not shift because of a
showing of management prudence. Losses
may occur when management is prudent as
well as when management is imprudent. We
do not accept the proposition that
because a public utility has a service
Obligation and its rates are regulated,
it takes on a quasi-governmental role and
immunizes itself from a risk of loss
which investors in non-regulated compa-
nies incur.

The risk of loss to public
utility investors is not lessened by the
fact that a public utility incurs a serv-
ice obligation. The service obligation
merely recognizes the fact that an elec-

tric public utility, for all intents and

108

purposes, has a monopoly within a service

area and it provides an essential modern
service. The grant of a certificate of
public convenience for a service area
carries with it the obligation that serv-
ice will be provided to those in the area
which require it. The service obligation
flows from the monopoly position the
utility enjoys in providing an essential
service to the public.

Regulation of rates also flows
from the fact that public utilities oper-
ate more efficiently as monopolies, and
the public interest thus requires both
the most efficient method of providing
essential services and protection from
monopoly abuse. It does not follow that
because utilities have a public service

obligation and their rates are regulated,

109

public utility investors only incur the
risk of capital investment loss when
management is imprudent or engages in
fraudulent activities.

24. We conclude that under the
circumstances the application of the used
and useful principle will result in the
setting of just and reasonable rates
because ratepayers should not be required
to pay for facilities and related
expenses which will not directly or indi-
rectly provide electric service.

25. Pacific Power & Light is a pub-
licly held corporation which is traded on
the New York Stock Exchange. Lower Val-
ley and Fall River are distribution level
electric cooperatives whose membership is

composed of its ratepayers. Despite the

110

differences between a publicly held cor-
poration and a cooperative, the burden of
risk bearing in these enterprises remains
upon the investor, whether that investor
is a stockholder or a cooperative
member/ratepayer. Given the fact that
electricity is an essential modern serv-
ice it should also be observed that coop-
erative membership in Lower Valley or
Fall River is not a purely voluntary mat-
ter as it is with Pacific Power & Light's
stock and bond holders. Nevertheless a
cooperative member's capital credits are
at risk here.

26. In examining the reasons why we
should exercise any discretion we may
have in applying this principle, we have
not relied solely upon the record.

Whether or not as a matter of fact a

lll

capital investment is used and useful is

a matter which must be supported by the
record. However, our understanding of
the meaning and reasons why certain
established utility principles exist,
such as the used and useful principle, is
not wholly dependent for its application
upon an explanatory recitation in the
record by one or more of the parties.

The Commission believes it can, should,
and sometimes must be able to draw upon
its more than 22 years of collective
experience, expertise, and regulatory
judgment in defining and applying certain
general and long established utility

principles.

112

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON WPPSS PROJECTS

27. It is clear that no electric
power has been generated or can presently
be expected to be generated by WNP 4 and
5. The investment by WPPSS and Pacific
in these projects is not and cannot be
expected tc be used and useful for the
convenience of the public. We believe
that each of these three public utilities
must agree that this is the case. Tr.
Vol. I p. 1323 Tr. Vol. I p.j 193, lines
2-5; Tr. Vol. III p.j 572-579. We there-
fore conclude that Pacific's investment
in WNP 5 should not be included in rate
base for rate of return purposes, should
not be recovered in rates through any
period of investment amortization; and no
termination costs or other costs asso-

Ciated with the WNP 5 should be included

113

in utility expenses recoverable from its

Wyoming ratepayers.

28. We also conclude that Lower
Valley and Fall River should not be
permitted to recover in rates any pay-
ments due to WPPSS under the
Participant's Agreement because any such
payments would be for facilities which
are not and will not be used and useful
for the convenience of the public. The
application of the used and useful prin-
Ciple of public utility ratemaking is not
dependent upon the particular form of
financial agreement to which the utility
has committed itself. If this were the
case the legislature's intent to have the
used and useful principle applied would

be easily circumvented. For ratemaking

114

be edi she

F
3
3
4

purposes we are concerned with one essen-

tial question in this case. Is the
facility for which the utility has guar-
anteed payment of a pro rata share of
costs used and useful for the convenience
of the public? The answer in this case
is no. Therefore, application of the
principle properly precludes the recovery
from ratepayers of expenditures related
to these cancelled power projects.

We recognize that there is a
difference between Pacific Power which
entered into an Ownership Agreement with
WPPSS, and Lower Valley and Fall River
which entered into a Participant's Agree-
ment with WPPSS. Had WNP 5 become oper-
ational we would have allowed Pacific

Power's ten percent ownership interest to

115

be included in rate base, and deprecia-

tion and other expenses would have been
allowed. Under the Participant's Agree-
ment WPPSS remained the owner and the
participants would have expensed the cost
of electricity purchased from WPPSS.

This cost, however, would have included
an amortization of the investment,
interest payments on WPPSS bonds, and all
operations and maintenance expenses.
Since WNP 4/5 were not completed, how-
ever, Lower Valley and Fall River are
obligated to WPPSS under the
Participant's Agreement to make payments
for termination expenses, and bond prin-
cipal and interest payments. Their
financial obligation is no different

under the Participant's Agreement than it

116

would have been under an ownership agree-

ment. While we recognize that there is a
distinction between the financial
arrangement entered into by Lower Valley
and Fall River and that entered into by
Pacific Power, we believe that for pur-
poses of applying the used and useful
principle it is a distinction without a
difference. The intent of the legisla-
ture to have the principle applied, and
our belief that it should be applied,
ought not be affected by the form of the
financing agreement when the ultimate
financial obligation is the same. Rural

Electric Co. v. State Board of Equaliza-

tion, 120 P.2d 741, reh. den. 122 P.2d

189 (Wyo. 1942); Tri-County Electric

Association v. City of Gillette, 584 P.2d

995 (Wyo. 1978).

117

29. Pebble Springs was to be a two-
unit nuclear generating station with a
net electrical rating for each unit of
1260 megawatts. It was to be located in
Gilliam County, Oregon, approximately
four miles southeast of Arlington.
Ownership was divided among Portland Gen-
eral Electric Company (PGE), Puget Sound
Power and Light Company, and Pacific, in
47.1 percent, 23.5 percent and 29.4 per-
cent shares respectively. Tr. Vol. II
p. 450. In October 1974 Pacific agreed
to participate in the Pebble Springs
project. Seven and one-half years later
in April 1982, PGE announced the termina-
tion of the project by withdrawing its
site certificate application. Tr. Vol.

III p. 673. The estimated cost of

118

completion of Pebble Springs had risen
from $650 million in May 1973 to more
than $5 billion at the time of hearing in
July 1982. Tr. Vol. III p. 673-675.
Although more than $200 million was
invested in this project no actual con-
struction other than site preparation
ever commenced. Tr. Vol. III p. 531. No
electric power has been generated or can
presently be expected to be generated by
this cancelled power plant project. The
investment by Pacific and its partners in
the Pebble Springs project is not used
and useful for the convenience of the
public. We believe that Pacific must
agree that this is the case. Tr. Vol.
III p. 572-579. Our prior discussion of

the reasons for applying the used and

119

useful principle is incorporated by ref-
erence here. In summary, the legislative
mandate of W.S. 37-2-119 requires, and
the unanimous judgment of the Commission
compels the application of the used and
useful principle in establishing just and
reasonable rates under these circum-
stances. We therefore conclude that
Pacific's investment in this cancelled
power project should not be included in
rate base for rate of return purposes,
and should not be recovered in rates
through any period of investment
amortization. Neither should any ter-
mination costs or other costs associated
with the project be included in utility
expenses recoverable from Pacific's

Wyoming ratepayers.

120

OTHER FINDINGS

30. The utilities contend that if
they were prudent they should be permit-
ted to recover from ratepayers their
investment and related financial obliga-
tions. We have indicated why we believe
that application of the used and useful
principle is required and appropriate.
Application of this principle makes it
unnecessary to decide whether or not
these utilities were prudent in their
decision making, participation, and
management of these cancelled power plant
projects.

31. To the extent any that prior
decisions of the Commission are in con-
flict with this decision, this decision
should be considered controlling and

definitive. Never before have we been

121

asked to thoroughly explore the meaning
and application of the used and useful
principle in such depth. In this case we
have not been asked to consider the
application of the principle to power
plants or capital facilities which have
been operational but are abandoned or
superceded before being fully depre-
ciated. That is a different factual
situation which might require a different
result, as was the case in Docket 9454
Sub 11 when we allowed Pacific Power to
recover the unamortized balance of its
extraordinary property losses from the
early retirement of the Dave Johnson
Plant mechanical flue gas stacks. The
premature retirement in that case was

required by changes in Wyoming's

122

environmental air quality standards which
forced replacement of the stacks.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
THAT:

1. Pacific Power & Light Company
is hereby denied, now and in the future,
the opportunity to recover in rates from
its Wyoming jurisdictional consumers its
investment and expenses related to the
cancelled and abandoned power plant
projects known as WNP 5 and Pebble
Springs. These investments shall be
excluded from the computation of rate
base in any future rate proceeding before
this Commission.

Ze Lower Valley Power & Light Com-
pany and Fall River Rural Electric Com-
pany are hereby denied, now and in the

future, the opportunity to recover in

123

rates from their Wyoming jurisdictional
consumers any expenses related to their
obligations under the Participant's
Agreement with the Washington Public
Power Supply System for the cancelled and
abandcned power plant projects known as
WNP 4 and WNP 5.
36 This order is effective

immediately.

MADE and ENTERED at Cheyenne,
Wyoming this 2nd day of December, 1982.

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
WYOMING

JOHN KR. SMYTH

John R. Smyth, Chairman

G. KEITH OSBORN

G. Keith Osborn, Commissioner

124

C. E. JOHNSON

—_—- - - eSe eer er re eK FO Or

C. E. Johnson, Commissioner

(SEAL)
ATTEST:

ALEX J. ELIOPULOS

ALEX J. ELIOPULOS, Secretary

125

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COLE COUNTY
MISSOURI

STATE OF MISSOURI, ex rel.

UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY,

A Missouri corporation,
Relator,

Vs.

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI,

Respondent,
and 183-1064cc
Division No.
PUBLIC COUNSEL FOR THE II

STATE OF MISSOURI
and
MISSOURI PUBLIC INTEREST

RESEARCH GROUP,
Intervenor-Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) Case No. CV
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
ORDER

This case has been submitted to
the Court on transcript and exhibits
before the Missouri Public Service

Commission ("Commission"), in Commission

Case No. ER-83-163.

126

The parties hereto have filed
with the Court briefs and suggested find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law, and
the arguments of counsel having been
heard, now therefore, on the 16th day of
April 1984, the Court having considered
this matter and being fully advised in
the premises, finds and determines as
follows:

TINDINGS OF FACT

On December 3, 1982, Union
Electric Company ("Company") filed
revised tariffs with the Commission for
an annual increase in electric rates of
approximately $122,000,000. Before the
effective date of the new rates, the
Commission duly suspended the proposed
tariffs and set the matter for formal

hearings. Various groups were parties to

127

the proceedings before the Commission

including the Missouri Public Interest
Research Group ("MoPirg") and the Office
of the Public Counsel ("Public Counsel").
A Stipulation and Agreement was
approved by the Commission on July 6,
1983, providing for an increase in gross
annual revenues of $30,500,000. The
Stipulation and Agreement provided in
part that it was intentionally silent as
to rate of return and that the issue of
the recovery of the costs associated with
the cancelled Callaway II nuclear facil-
ity was not resolved but was left to be
resolved after hearing by the Commission.
Hearings on the issue of the
recovery of the costs associated with the
cancelled Callaway II nuclear facility

were held in Jefferson City beginning

128

August 24 and concluding on August 29,

1983. The Company and the Commission
Staff submitted testimony and exhibits
and were subject to cross examination by
all parties.

Union Electric is an electrical
corporation doing business as a public
utility within the State of Missouri.
Union Electric cancelled the Callaway II
nuclear plant in October of 1981. There
is no dispute among the parties to this
review that the Callaway II nuclear
facility has not provided, is not now
providing, and will never provide elec-
trical service to Union Electric's
Missouri customers.

In its Report and Order dated

October 21, 1983, the Commission ruled

129

that Section 393.135, RSMo 1978 (Propo-
sition 1) barred the recovery through the
rates to be charged by Union Electric of
the costs associated with the construc-
tion of the Callaway II nuclear facility.
The Commission did not reach the issues
of whether under the facts of the case,
recovery of the Callaway II costs was
desirable and reasonable under general
ratemaking principles, the amount of
cancellation costs attributable to
Callaway II, the amortization period, if
any, Or proposed adjustments with respect
to APUDC settlements and deferred taxes.
Thereafter, Relator timely filed an
Application for Rehearing with the

Commission, alleging that the Commission

130

erred in denying the costs. The Applica-
tion for Rehearing was denied by the
Commission.

The only issues presented to
this Court are whether Union Electric is
prohibited from recovering the costs
associated with the construction of the
Callaway II nuclear facility by Section
393.135, RSMo 1978, and, if so, whether
the operation of that statute denying
recovery is permitted under the United
States and the Missouri constitutions and
whether the Commission properly excluded
Exhibit 42 offered by Union Electric.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Court has jurisdiction in
this case pursuant to Section 386.510

RSMo 1978.

131

2. The Court concludes that Section
393.135 RSMo 1978, prohibits Union Elec-
tric from recovering the costs associated
with the construction of the cancelled
Callaway II nuclear facility through its
rates charged to Missouri customers.

That section of the Revised Statutes of
Missouri clearly and unambiguously
prohibits any charge based on the costs
of construction in progress and, dispos-
itive of this issue, any charge based on

"... any other cost associated with own-

ing, Operating, maintaining, or financing

any property before it is fully oper-

ational and used for service."

3. The Court concludes that the
operation of Section 393.135 in prohibit-
ing the recovery by Union Eiectric of the

costs associated with the construction of

132

the cancelled Callaway II nuclear facil-
ity does not violate the due process
clauses of the United States and Missouri

constitutions. Cleveland Electric Illu-

Minating Company v. Public Utilities

Commission of Ohio, 104 S Ct 47 (1983).

4. The Court concludes that the
Order of the Public Service Commission
does not violate the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 2 of the Constitution of

Missouri. Williamson v. Lee Optical Com-

pany, 348 US 483 (1955); City of St.

Louis v. Liberman, 547 SW2d 452 (Mo banc

1977); McClellan v. Kansas City, 379 SW2d

500 (Mo banc 1964).
5. The Court concludes that the

Order of the Public Service Commission

£33

properly excluded from evidence Exhibit
42, proffered by Union Electric.

6. The Court concludes that the
Order of the Public Service Commission is
supported by competent and substantial
evidence and is reasonable and lawful in
all respects.

WHEREFORE, it is Ordered, Ad-
judged, and Decreed, that the October 21,
1983, Order of the Commission is affirmed

in all respects.

ss/Bryron L. Kinder

Byron L. Kinder

Circuit Judge, Division II
Dated: April 16, 1984

134

BEFORE

THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO

In the Matter of the
Application of Ohio
Edison Company for an
Emergency Increase in
Rates and Charges for
Electric Service

Case No. 81-898-
EL-~ AEM

~— "i Oe

OPINION AND ORDER

The Commission, coming now to
consider the application for emergency
rate relief filed by Ohio Edison Company
on July 30, 1981, pursuant to Section
4909.16, Revised Code, the exhibits filed
therewith, and the Stipulation and Recom-
mendation signed by its Staff and by
other parties as described below; and
being otherwise fully advised in the
premises, hereby issues its Opinion and

Order.

135

APPEARANCES

Under the provisions of the
Stipulation and Recommendation discussed
below, the parties to the Company's
permanent rate application (Case No. 80-
1139-EL-AIR) and the applicant for inter-
vention, E. Ray Davis et al., wish to be
treated as intervenors in this emergency
case. Those parties, as well as the
Staff of this Commission, make the
following appearances:

Mr. Russell J. Spetrino,

Miss Frances McGovern and Mr. Anthony J.
Alexander, 76 South Main Street, Akron,
Ohio 44308, on behalf of Ohio Edison
Company.

Mr. William J. Brown, Attorney
General, by Mr. Marvin I. Rosnik and

Mr. James R. Bacha, Assistant Attorneys

136

General, 180 East Broad Street, Columbus,
Ohio 43215, on behalf of the Staff of the
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio.

Mr. Richard M. Fanelly, Special
Legal Counsel, for the City of Akron. 521
Centran Building, Akron, Ohio 44308, on
behalf of the City of Akron.

Mr. Edward M. Zaleski, Lorain
Law Director, by Mr. Stephen B. Angel,
Special Utilities Counsel, 200 West Erie
Avenue, Lorain, Ohio 44052, on behalf of
the City of Lorain.

Mr. William A. Spratley, Con-
sumers' Counsel, by Mr. Richard P.
Rosenberry, Associate Consumers' Counsel,
137 East State Street, Columbus, Ohio
43215, on behalf of the Residential Con-

sumers of Ohio Edison Company.

137

Messrs. Steer, Strauss, White &
Tobias, by Mr. Theodore K. High, 2208
Central Trust Tower, Cincinnati, Ohio
45202 and Mr. John A. DiNardo, Assistant
Counsel, P.O. Box 600, Middietown, Ohio
45042, on behalf of Armco Inc.

Mr. Wayne L. Emery and
Mr. Kenneth R. Pepperney, 600 Grant
Street - Room 1569, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania 15230, on behalf of United
States Steel Corporation.

Bell & Clevenger Co., L.P.A.,
by Mr. Langdon D. Bell, 21 East State
Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, on behalf
of General Motors Corporation and PPG
Industries, Inc.

Messrs. Muldoon, Pemberton &

Ferris, by Mr. Boyd B. Morris, 50 West

138

Broad Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, on
behalf of Ray Davis et al.

Introduction:

Ohio Edison Company (herein-
after referred to as the applicant, the
company, or Ohio Edison) is an Ohio cor-
poration engaged in the generation,
transmission and distribution of electric
energy and is a public utility and an
electric light company within the defi-
nitions of Sections 4905.02 and
4905.03(A) (4), Revised Code. On July 30,
1981, the company filed the instant
application pursuant to Section 4909.16,
Revised Code, praying that the Commission
find an emergency exists as to the com-
pany, and, to prevent injury to the busi-
ness or interests of the public or of the

company, that the company be authorized

139

to place into effect on bills rendered on
and after August 1, 1981, an increase of
$90,000,000 on an annualized basis over
the revenue at current rates, including
the provision for recovery of fuel costs,
based on the six months actual-six months
estimated billing determinants as set out
in the company's E-4 schedules in its
application for a permanent rate increase
in Case No. 80-1139-EL-AIR. The tem-
porary rate would apply to all current
customer classes.

On December 1, 1980, the com-
pany began the statutory process of seek-
ing permanent rate increases by giving
notice of its intention to file an
application for an increase in rates
pursuant to Section 4909.43(B), Revised

Code. The notices were docketed under

140

Case No. 80-113S9-EL-AIR. The increase
sought in the permanent rate case amounts
to approximately $138,000,000 over
currently authorized revenues based on a
test year ending August 31, 1981, or
approximately $139,000,000 based on a
fully forecasted test year ending

June 30, 1982. Ohio Edison proposed that
the temporary increase remain in effect
until a permanent increase is authorized
by the Commission. An Opinion and Order
in the permanent case is expected to he
issued on or about December 1, 1981.

Ohio Edison alleges that its
poor financial condition was unexpectedly
and extensively exacerbated by the
prospective need to write off $52,495,829
as of September 30, 1981, as a result of

the decision on July 15, 1981, of the

141

Ohio Supreme Court in Consumers’ Counsel

v. Pub. Util. Comm., 67 Ohio St. 2d 153,

that, while the Court did not disturb the
finding of the Commission that the deci-
sion of the CAPCD companies to embark on
the construction of the nuclear units and
the decision to terminate construction
were reasonable, given the uncertainties
that now attend the construction of
nuclear units and the intervening decline
in growth expectations, the costs
incurred by The Cleveland Electric Illu-
minating Company in conjunction with the
termination of construction of the four
units were not properly includable for
rate purposes as ordinary operating
expenses under Section 4909.15(A) (4),
Revised Code. Pursuant to this Commis-

sion's Opinion and Order in Case No.

142

80-141-EL-AIR, Ohio Edison is currently
recovering an amount required to permit
amortization of 1/10 of the estimated
jurisdictional cost, net of tax, incurred
by Ohio Edison in conjunction with ter-
mination of the same four units. The

circumstances in the Consumers' Counsel

decision, supra, are so similar as to
suggest that allowance to Ohio Edison,
the principal owner of the four units, of
its share of the costs of the units will
also be disallowed. Its independent
auditors, which have already qualified
their opinion with respect to the Com-
pany's earnings as of June 30, 1981, have
advised that, in accordance with gen-
erally accepted accounting principles,
the entire unamortized loss to Ohio Edi-

son must be written off if the decision

143

stands. As far as the investment commu-
nity is concerned, this imminent loss has
already taken place.

The company also alleges that

following the decision in Consumers'

Counsel, supra, it was obliged to with-
draw its offering of $75,000,000 in first
mortgage bonds which had already been
priced at a 16-7/8% coupon rate to aid it
in paying off $150,000,000 in 10% bonds
due August 1, 1981. The company was also
forced to cancel a scheduled August sale
of 7,000,000 shares of common stock
intended to produce approximately
$84,000,000. The write-off of the loss
will immediately reduce, dollar for dol-
lar, the unrestricted retained earnings
of the company available to pay common

stock dividends and further reduce the

144

company's already low common equity
component of permanent capitalization
which is already increasing the risk to
common stock investors and the cost of
common capital to the company. In its
present circumstances the company is
virtually precluded from gaining any
access to the market for the permanent
capital financings and is forced to rely
on costly short-term bank borrowings.
The amount of such borrowings is limited
by the company's charter and will be at
the limit by the end of 1981 if emergency
relief is not granted. Access to perma-
nent capital is critical to the ability
of the company to provide adequate and
reliable service to customers and
something approaching $235,000,000 in

proceeds from external financing with

145

permanent capital is needed still in |

1981. Given the company's ongoing need

for access to the public markets for
capital and the practical inability to
"catch-up" with deferred financings added
to what will be required to be scheduled
in 1982, the company must receive
substantial emergency relief if it is to
be able to attempt to issue new permanent
capital in 1981 before short-term unse-
cured capital limitations are reached.
While it is not so much indenture and
charter limitations limiting access to
the capital market as the perception of
the market of the unsettling effect on
Ohio Edison of having to write off an
immense loss immediately instead of
amortization of the amount over ten

years, the company also states that it

146

has no interest and dividend coverage
leeway uncer its charter that will permit
issuance of preferred stock and that its
interest coverage required under its
indenture to be at least 2X including
coverage of interest on any new issue, is
currently 2.07. Perceiving the potential
impact on the company of its inability to
gain access to the market for permanent
capital, the intervenors in the company's
pending permanent rate case, Case No. 80-
1139-EL-AIR, recognized that accelerated
recovery of an agreed sum of $90,000,009
to settle issues as to revenue in the
pending permanent rate case, might serve
to alleviate the company's financial
circumstances.

Attached to the company's

application for temporary emergency rate

147

relief, as Exhibit A, is a Stipulation

and Recommendation signed by all parties 4
who are intervenors in the company's

permanent rate case, as well as by a

party applying to intervene. The
Stipulation and Recommendation is also
Signed on behalf of the Staff of this
Commission respecting certain matters
stipulated and recommended therein.
The Stipulation recommends,

inter alia, that Ohio Edison be permitted

to recover on bills rendered on and after
August 1, 1981, the sum of $90,000,000,
which does not include any continued
amortization of costs associated with the
censtruction and subsequent termination
of the four generating units, in full
settlement of issues as to revenue

requirements in the company’s pending

148

permanent rate case. Since, however, it
was judged that the permanent rate case
cannot be finally adjudged until after
issuance in that case of a Staff Report
of Investigation, service of the report,
a thirty day period to receive objections
and a hearing, the parties also agreed
that the company should file an applica-
tion for emergency relief to effectuate
the Stipulation and Recommendation, that
the emergency increase should be effec-
tive on bills rendered on and after
August 1, 1981, that, as evidenced by
information and data provided in the com-
pany's emergency application (previewed
by parties), the compary is in a finan-
cial emergency as that term has been used
by the Commission in prior decisions,

that the magnitude of relief agreed to is

149

not unreasonable as emergency relief,
given the company's present situation and
further financing requirements and is
less than the company states it otherwise
would have requested in the absence of
agreement of the parties, and that the
emergency rates should be the rates set
out in Exhibit No. 1 to the Stipulation
and Recommendation.

The Stipulation also recommends
the severing and separate determination
of issues of revenue distribution and
rate design in Case No. 80-1139-EL-AIR
ému, as between the Office of Consumers’
Counsel and Ohio Edison, calls for sever-
ing and separately determining, after a
special hearing, whether the Commission
should order a management audit pursuant

to Section 4909.154, Revised Code, as

150

requested by the Consumers' Counsel in a
pending motion in Case No. 80-1139-EL-
AIR.

The Stipulation further pro-
vides that it is not to be binding upon
the parties in any other proceedings than
those which are required to effectuate
the Stipulation.

Finally, it was agreed that
should the Commission reject all or any
part of the agreement and recommendations
offered therein, the Stipulation and
Recommendation shall be of no force and
effect.

Commission Review and Discussion:

The Commission's authority to
order modifications of existing rates on

a temporary basis arises under Section

151

4909.16, Revised Code, which provides as
follows:

When the public utilities
commission deems it necessary
to prevent injury to the busi-
ness or interests of the public
or of any public utility of
this state in case of any
emergency to be judged by che
commission, it may temporarily
alter, amend, or, with the con-
sent of the public utility con-
cerned, suspend any existing
rates, schedules, or order
relating to or affecting any
public utility or part of any
public utility in this state.
Rates so made by the commission
shall apply to one or more of
the public utilities in this
state, or to any portion
thereof, as is directed by the
commission, and shall take
effect at such time as the
commission prescribes.

The Supreme Court of Ohio has
consistently construed this statute as
vesting the Commission with broad dis-
cretionary power in determining when an

emergency exists and in tailoring a

152

remedy which will enable the public
utility concerned to meet that emergency.

Cambridge v. PUCO (1953), 159 Ohio St.

88; Manufacturer's Light & Heat Co. v.

PuCO (1955), 163 Ohio St. 78.

The Commission is guided by the
following considerations when confronted
with a request for emergency rate relief:
(a) emergency rate relief is "extraor-
dinary" in nature; (b) the existence of
an "emergency" is a condition precedent
to temporary rate relief; (c) temporary
rate relief will be granted only at the
"minimum level" necessary to avert or
relieve the emergency; (d) the
applicant's evidence will be reviewed
with the "strictest scrutiny" and that

evidence must "clearly and convincingly”

153

demonstrate the presence of "extraor-
dinary circumstances" which constitute a
genuine emergency situation; and

(e) emergency rate relief will not be
granted under Sectiun 4909.16, Revised
Code, if the emergency request was filed
merely to circumvent and as a substitute
for permanent rate relief under Section
4909.18, Revised Code.

The primary question is simply
whether, absent temporary rate relief,
the utility's ability to render service
will be impaired or the utility will be
financially imperiled. If the utility
fails to sustain its burden of proof on
this issue, the Commission's inquiry is
at an end. See Toledo Edison, Case No.
76-439-EL-AEM (Opinion and Order,

September 8, 1976).

154

The Commission is persuaded and
finds that the requisite considerations
have been met in this case. Moreover, it
has never had before it a case in which
the timing of relief was of such grave
importance and in which parties
representing a diversity of interests
and viewpoints and the Staff of the
Commission have all agreed not merely to
the level of temporary emergency relief
needed but also as to the need to grant
emergency relief forthwith and to make it
immediately effective.

Notwithstanding the swiftness
of the Commission's action, it is not
ill-considered in the circumstances.

The company has supplied as
Exhibit B a projected income statement

for 1981, a projected cash flow statement

155

for 1981, and a measurement of unsecured
indebtedness as against charter limita-
tions on that indebtedness for the same
period. The data, as to which no ques-
tion of reliability has been raised and
which is based in substantial part on
actual data recorded on the books ot the
company and on the known obligation of
the company to write off $52,495,829 as
of September 30, 1981, on the advice of
the company's independent auditors,
reveals that a $150,000,000 10% bond
issue must be refunded August l, 1981,
and must be replaced in the company's
existing circumstances with high cost,
short term debt approximating a cost rate
of 20%, that the estimated direct short
term indebtedness will range from

$289,000,000 to $382,000,000 between

156

August and December, 1981, and that by
year end 1981, the company will have
effectively reached the limitation under
its charter relating to unsecured
indebtedness absent permanent financing
to partially relieve this burden. More-
over, the information indicates that the
write-off of almost $52.5 million may
jeopardize the continued stock dividend
payment of the company and thus indi-
rectly serve as a practical impediment to
the company in raising permanent debt or
equity capital for its on-going
construction program, which includes
funding for the environmental contro:
program underway.

The Commission is, of course,
not bound by the Stipulation and Recom-

mendation presented to it by its Staff

157

and the parties. However, a joint recom-
mendation made by the Staff and the par-

ties in circumstances such as these is

entitled to careful consideration and
should not be lightly regarded. It is
impressive that there is unanimous
concurrence in the conclusion that
$90,000,000 in emergency relief is imme-
diately needed. While ordinarily in
emergency cases the Staff is not able to
conduct as detailed an investigation as
it does in permanent cases, in this case,
the Staff has been investigating the Com-
pany's financial condition in connection
with the permanent application for nearly
five months. Under these circumstances,
the Staff's stipulation and recom-
mendation regarding the need for emer-

gency relief is even more persuasive.

158

It is not the custom of the
Commission to act without prior hearing
and the taking of testimony in emergency
cases nor would it ever do so except in
extraordinary circumstances. In the
opinion of the Commission, however,
extraordinary circumstances exist in this
case to justify such a course of action,
including not merely the urgency of the
need for emergency action but also the
effective participation of all parties
normally taking part in Ohio Edison rate
cases. Moreover, the Commission believes
Summary action is lawful. Section
4909.16, Revised Code, not only does not
require a hearing, but the fact that no
provision was made by the iegislature for
a hearing may well be an acknowledgment

that the ability of the Commission to act

159

promptly in emergency circumstances is an
essential feature of its authority under
Section 4909.16, Revised Code, for it
cannot be doubted that in some circum-
stances the best means of containing an
emergency at overall lowest cost to cus-
tomers is to grant relief as swiftly as
possible. Accordingly, the Commission
concludes that a temporary emergency
increase should be granted forthwith.
Moreover, the existence of an emergency
cannot be in doubt. It is clear that the
funds needed by Ohio Edison to finance
the enterprise must come from external
sources under present rates. It is
equally clear that undue reliance by the
company on short-term unsecured borrow-
ing, particularly at the high cost

prevailing today, cannot only create a

160

crisis of investor confidence but, in so
doing, reduce the future ability of the
company to finance essential requirements
at reasonable cost to ratepayers.

When, moreover, there is the
sudden occurrence of an unexpected event
that has forced the withdrawal of pro-
posed issues of bonds and common stock
and has destroyed, for all practical pur-
poses, the ability of the company to
resort to the market for permanent
financing, the Commission is bound to
recognize in the interests of ratepayers
that untoward measures to cope with the
emergency are in order. It can but hope
that prompt relief, which will maximize
receipts in 1981, the year of extraor-
dinary loss, and that the level of relief

granted, as requested by the company and

161

concurred in by the Staff and all par-
ties, will prove to be adequate.

Upon review of the evidence
supplied by the company and the Stipula-
tion and Recommendation of the Staff and
the parties, the Commission finds that an
emergency exists which, without rate
relief, will imperil the company's abil-
ity to provide adequate and reliable
electric service consistent with its duty
as a public utility. We accept the
recommendations to the Commission in the
Stipulation and Recommendation in so far
as they relate to the granting of emer-
gency relief. While the Stipulation and
Recommendation also encompasses stipula-
tions and recommendations relating to the
permanent rate case, which was used as a

vehicle to establish a proper level of

162

interim emergency relief, those matters
must be finally reviewed and determined
in the permanent rate case, Case No. 80-
1139-EL-AIR. Only the recommendation in
the Stipulation and Recommendation that a
hearing should be held on whether the
Commission should order a management
audit as requested in Case No. 80-1139-
EL-AIR can be addressed at this time. In
light of the allegations contained in the
company's emergency application and based
on the motion for a management audit
filed by the Office of Consumer's Counsel
in Case No. 80-1139-EL-AIR, the Commis-
sion believes that a management audit
should be conducted and will so order.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

1) Ohio Edison Company is an Ohio

corporation and a public utility engaged

163

in the construction of generating, trans-
mission, distribution and other facili-
ties required to furnish adequate and
reliable supplies of energy to its cus-

tomers now and in the future.

2) The company is a public utility
as defined in Sections 4905.02 and
4905.03, Revised Code, and is subject to
the jurisdiction of the Commission pursu-
ant to Sections 4905.04, 4905.05 and
4905.06, Revised Code.

3) The applicant filed the instant
application for emergency rate relief
pursuant to the provisions of Section
4909.16, Revised Code, on July 30, 1981.

4) The inability of the company to
obtain permanent capital and to rely
entirely on short-term unsecured borrow-

ings at high cost and in amounts

164

approaching the company's charter limita-
tions on its ability to raise such
capital, will injure the business or
interests of the public and the company
and constitutes an emergency within the
meaning of Section 4909.16, Revised Code.

5) The immediate suspension of
existing rates and authorization to the
company to file new rates producing a
$90,000,000 increase effective immedi-
ately on bills rendered on and after

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_2976%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
