# Opposition Brief — Ohio Power Co. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 469 U.S. 1034

## Text

No. AS

On the Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OcToBER TERM, 1984

Oxn10 Power COMPANY, PETITIONER
Vv.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS
IN OPPOSITION

Rex E. Lee
Solicitor General

F. Henry Hasicut, II
Assistant Attorney General

Dirk D. SNEL
JANET L. STECKEL
Attorneys

Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the court of appeals, in reviewing the promulga-
tion by the Environmental Protection Agency of air pollu-
tion emission limitations pursuant to the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. 7401 et seq., properly remanded for further consid-
eration one of the agency’s factual determinations which the
court found unsupported by the administrative record,
without ordering repromulgation of the agency’s emission
limitation in its entirety.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

7 Page
Co ciS se Le cicisihesdevccasbectsecces |
EEE Tc. pobechesnh pacesugsesoipeceveess |
EE Eas Dhlica nn'n oo ak bbb Gelne ob MED abeedpecne 2
PE ilies bani eds dis oo kdo hac ehae ss oe 6 o'ssece 7
SE Cees en dedes sss ae pene see es Vee dovecces 16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
American Importers Assn v. CAB

Ge MEU EG Se wSs bles iics bec ccvccee li
American Meat Institute v. EPA,

ED os Ws bie s BWW ein ci ccveves 11
Asarco, Inc. v. OSHA, 647 F.2d 1 ......... 11, 12
ASH VeCAB, TIS 2B TOS: vieceviviovccccccvtee 12
Bullock v. Mumford, 509 F.2d 384 ............ 7
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United

CPT PEE cccccceovssdvosccccccce 10
California Cartage Co. v. United States,

DTM Cetcacccedneaeecebeccatccese 12

SE a PUREE Gilets EOD ccc ccccccccccccace 9
Central Power & Light Co. v. United :

IIIT a vaccccenepecscccece 11, 12
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.

We VOIR Wels TES pacccncccccccccscccccs 9

Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v.
EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, cert. denied,
NINE Fa SUS 500 b0 Fad cc cee sccccccces 2

IV

Page
Cases—Continued:
Columbus & Southern Ohio Electric Co. v.

Castle; GIB FAO SIO: .cccccicevcvvcccveveass 8
CPC International, Inc. vy. Train,

ee aes as os os os Sma batan 11
Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA,

Be EE has Ve ddWeen ide ves ceseweee 11, 12
EDF, Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275 ........ee8: 12
FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.,

Dee Che i na ch ee ek eave cehees tes g
FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 ........cceeees 4
FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973 .......+6-- 11
FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line

COPD .; Ge SAS Heber nrenccresccecs 7, 10
FTC v. Colgate- Palmolive Co.,

PE rl Oda ae oes kn onc. tae tee 7
Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305

SE a isle nik sow ede tikind dee oe eres 10, 11
Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 499 F.2d

SEE acbick cthud ovuhhedl kekeeed sees are 11
International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus,

478 F.2d 615 ........ OP EEE AP LOO 11
Jamestown Farmers Elevator, Inc. v. General

SE Os ee SE con Cha bccbdvercdves 7
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d

RY RRINR ERIE Oa Say 2 eA ATS GE 11

Page
Cases—Continued:

League to Save Lake Tahoe, Inc. v.

Troundary, 598 F.2d 1164, cert. denied,

Ge Adnan AentrenAvibanAchesceccecce 9
Montana- Dakota Utilities Co. vy. FERC,

EE nec kath tens veanbardeneeess 12
NRDC v. EPA, 494 F.2d 519 ..... cc cceeceees 11
New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution

VFR PEt PM NEED cocccevicdecccivvcce 11
Port Norris Express Co. v. ICC,

a neice es hanes cane me 12
Rodway v. Department of Agriculture,

EE ic ceed k dake on onpe 4s es 11
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.

eh hi cee eke a wa eye ene ss be bes 9
Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377 ...... 1
Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 ........+650% 9
Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v.

pi My we ey Pe eee 9
South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d

GR i dee etwas Chas de was eenkne epee 11, 12
State of New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.2d

BRE Te a a oe C8 Ce a eee 11
Tabor v. Joint Board for Enrollment of

ACME, FO Tn TOP. cha cpeccencccccecoss 12
Train. v. NRDC, 421 U.S. Qiviccsic deine ccccccces 2

United States v. Sutherland, 428 F.2d |
1152, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1078 ............. 7

VI

Page
Cases—Continued:
United States Steel Corp. v. EPA,
GAD AIR i ink wei CARA 4 Ge eRNARES eo ce 11
United Steelworkers v. Marshall,
GOT Fi OO ik. i sits ee Dake 6 le wn deuesee 11
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
NRDC, Brac, 435 UiS. SUD kc cviccccvivveaee 10
Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. EPA,
GS DOR: 6s os FER RH Gh io i854 eae 11, 12
Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231 ........eeeeee 7
Statutes:
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
551 et seq. :
FRR obs oka bs aes wed pviee 14
as oe a's aks veh wees Mebane ee 8
SU es EE oo oe nied nc cc bwenavecens 11, 12
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et. seq. .......... 1
§ 110(a), 42 U.S.C. 7410(a) ............20-- 2
§ 110(c), 42 U.S.C. 7410(c) ...........50es 2
§ 306(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7606(b)(1) ........... 2
§ 306(d), 42 U.S.C. 7606(d) ............ 5, 15
§ 307(d), 42 U.S.C. 7607(d) ...........06-- 6
§ 307(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(1) ........... 4
§ 307(d)(8), 42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(8) .......... 15
§ 307(d)(9), 42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(9) ........ 9, 15

§ 307(d)(9)(A), 42 U.S.C.
TEOHGNOMA) 2. cccccccccccccccccccces 6

Vil

Page
Statutes—Continued:
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L.

No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 et seg. ........eceeeee 2
MFP a 6ccin'e sé 0 vie dé oes esos y
oe ee ede cbeebvisececese y

Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L.

No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 42 U.S.C.

CT chi werccdcncccccces 2
en cose etaneserere 8-9

Pub. L. No. 95-190, § 14(a),
Oe chsh ba cbkbicdescicevevecess Q
Miscellaneous:
H.R. Conf. Rep. 95-564, 95th Cong.,
Se Eo U st kok iro ses ccvcedovcsncece 4
41 Fed. Reg. 36324 (1976) ......... esha ew een 2

OF es I Fie RIFT 6 ooo. 0.00.0 5000 ob o00 0 4, 13

In the Supreme Court of the Huited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

No. 84-195
OHIO POWER COMPANY, PETITIONER
Vv.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
_ ETAL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS
IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-8a) is
reported at 729 F.2d 1096. A previous opinion of the court
of appeals (Pet. App. 9a-22a) is reported at 578 F.2d 660.

JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 96a-97a)
was entered on March 22, 1984. A petition for rehearing
was denied on May 8, 1984 (Pet. App. 98a). The netition for
a writ of certiorari was filed on August 3, 1984. The jurisdic-
tion of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

2

STATEMENT

The Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604,
84 Stat. 1676, 42 U.S.C. (1970 ed.) 1857 et seq.,' directed the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
ensure that a plan for the control of air pollution is estab-
lished in each state. See Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60
(1975). The State of Ohio failed to develop a plan for the
control of sulfur dioxide pollution that satisfied the
requirements of Section 1 10(a), 42 U.S.C. 7410(a). Accord-
ingly, as required by Section 1 10(c), 42 U.S.C. 7410(c), EPA
promulgated its own control plan for sulfur dioxide emis-
sions in Ohio, including limitations on power plants oper-
ated in Ohio by petitioner. 41 Fed. Reg. 36324 (1976).

Shortly thereafter, petitioner and others sought judicial
review of the plan in the court of appeals pursuant to
Section 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). The court of
appeals issued two decisions. Its first decision, issued Feb-
ruary 13, 1978, concerned questions applicable to all utility
companies involved in the appeal. It held that the EPA
hearings on the control plan were procedurally adequate
and approved the computer model used by EPA to set
emission standards for pollution sources in urban areas.
Cleveland Electric Iluminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978).

In its second decision, the procedural aspects of which are
challenged in the instant petition, the court of appeals
reviewed the methods EPA used to set emission limitations
for pollution sources in rural areas (Pet. App. la-8a). The
court approved EPA’s plan for controlling the ambient air
affected by four rural sources of air pollution in Ohio.? It

'The Clean Air Act is now 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seg. See Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 e seq..

7Two of the four sources were power plants operated by petitioner.
See Pet. App. 2a, n.1.

3

also affirmed EPA's specific emission limitations developed
for those sources and the agency's modeling techniques (the
MAXT-24 model)’ for predicting the sources’ sulfur diox-
ide pollution, with one exception (Pet. App. 2a, 10a-13a,
17a-22a). That exception involved EPA's use in the approved
MAXT-24 model of what was termed the “Class A assump-
tion” or “Class A co-efficient” in determining pollution
dispersion under “least stable” wind conditions in rural
areas of complex terrain (Pet. App. 4a, 16a-17a).4 The
emission limitations for petitioner’s power plants, among
others, had been determined by employing the Class A
assumption in the MAXT-24 model (Pet. App. 72a-73a).

The court held that “{o]n this present record” the use of
the Class A assumption was “arbitrary and capricious”
(Pet. App. 16a). It noted that EPA’s justification for using
the Class A assumption was that no better solution had
been proposed. The court found that the record did not
show that EPA had considered adequately several studies
cited by industry petitioners that they claimed supported
the use of Class B stability coefficients. Therefore, the court
remanded for EPA to reconsider the question of the proper
coefficient to use in setting emission limitations under Class
A meteorological conditions, explicitly setting the limits of
the remand (Pet. App. 17a):

This is also referred to as the CRSTER model (see Pet. App. 15a).

‘Meteorological conditions are classified into six categories of stabil-
ity (from Class A to Class F), representing the rate at which emissions
from a source would disperse in the atmosphere under those meteoro-
logical conditions. The categories were based on the relative stability of
the weather conditions, Class A being the least stable and Class F being
the most stable. Under the Class A conditions, the “plume” of emissions
from a source reaches the ground the most rapidly and directly. See Pet.
App. 13a-l4a.

4

By pointing out [a] proposed solution, we do not man-
date its acceptance by United States EPA. Our ulti-
mate action on this score is simply to remand this issue
to United States EPA for further study. This might
result in the writing of a new record which supplies the
now missing support for the use of Class A coefficients
for the least stable wind condition in rural counties, or
it might result in United States EPA‘s adoption of use
of the Class B coefficients for the two least stable wind
conditions, or it might result in a new record which
supports a wholly new solution.

Petitioner did not immediately seek review of that decision
in this Court. Several other parties did, but not on the issue
presented in the instant petition. This Court denied their
petitions for certiorari. 439 U.S. 1114 (1979).

In response to the court of appeals’ remand order, EPA
published a notice in the Federal Register stating its prelim-
inary conclusions and soliciting public comment on its
reconsideration of the use of the Class A assumption for the
least stable meteorological conditions. 44 Fed. Reg. 7798
(1979). In that notice, the agency also stated that the effect
of the court of appeals’ decision was to stay the application
of the emission limitations which were based on the Class A
assumption pending its reconsideration.

The agency’s decision on remand was issued on June 19,
1980 (Pet. App. 28a-59a). EPA’s review showed that the use
of the Class A assumption for least stable meteorological
conditions was justified, and therefore was correctly used in
setting the emission limitations for the four sources in ques-
tion. In reaching its decision, the agency had reconsidered
the arguments previously submitted by the utilities, includ-
ing petitioner, and had reviewed field data not previously
considered during the initial rulemaking. In addition, the
agency considered the comments submitted in response to
its February 1979 notice and evaluated new alternatives and

5

further data, as suggested by the comments. However, EPA
concluded that the commenters had provided no technical
basis to support changing the agency’s use of the Class A
assumption, and that, in fact, the latest data reviewed indi-
cated further support of the Class A assumption (Pet. App.
59a).

In July and August 1980, the utilities concerned, includ-
ing petitioner, petitioned EPA for reconsideration of its
June 19, 1980 decision. They alleged they had new informa-
tion to support changing the emission limitations and
further criticized the agency’s previous decision. After
reviewing the comments submitted, the agency, on Novem-
ber 3, 1980, rejected the petitions for reconsideration (Pet.
App. 7la-9la). EPA found that the data presented by the
petitioners either was not new and had been addressed
before or was not relevant to the issue at hand (Pet. App.
76a-80a). In addition, the agency found that the petitioners’
renewed objections to its June 19, 1980 decision did not
warrant a revision in the original emission limitations (Pet.
App. 80a-90a). On the same day, EPA restarted the com-
pliance schedules and revised the attainment dates in the
Ohio state implementation plan for the sources in question,
noting that the application of the emission limitations had
been stayed pending its review of the Class A assumption
(Pet. App. 63a-70a).

Various parties again petitioned the court of appeals for
review of EPA’s decision. Petitioner herein, along with the
other utilities, raised extensive criticisms of the factual basis
for EPA’s decision to retain the use of the Class A assump-
tion. They also claimed that the agency’s reconsideration of
the issue was procedurally unsound because it had failed to
give a meaningful opportunity for notice and comment.
Finally, the utilities asserted that EPA had improperly
failed to repromulgate, pursuant to Section 306(d) of the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7606(d), the emission limitations

6

applicable to their power plants, which they believed had
been vacated in the court of appeals’ previous remand
order.

The court of appeals affirmed EPA’s decision (Pet. App.
la-8a). It noted that it had previously approved all aspects
of EPA’s implementation plan for Ohio, except its use of
the Class A assumption to determine pollution dispersion
under least stable wind conditions in rural areas. That
ruling, the court pointed out, was based on its view that the
administrative record presented in that appeal was inade-
quate to support the choice of the Class A assumption and,
therefore, the case was remanded for further consideration
of that issue. Pet. App. 4a-5a. Thus, the court ruled (Pet.
App. Sa):

[TJhe sole issue of practical significance before this
court at this time is the question as to whether or not
the EPA, since the remand, has properly carried out
this court’s mandate to undertake further study of the
basis for the use of Class A coefficients, and whether, if
so, the record now supports EPA's renewed determina-
tion that the Class A coefficients should continue to be
used for power plants in rural areas.

Rejecting what it termed “many newly stated arguments
from EPA’s opponents,” the court held “that we carefully
limited the remand to a single issue and that we should now
decide only that issue” (Pet. App. 6a). The court agreed with
EPA that full repromulgation proceedirgs under Section
307(d) of the Clean Air Act had not been required, since the
proceedings on remand had not constituted promulgation
or revision of an implementation plan (Pet. App. 6a n.2).
Applying the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review
in Section 307(d)(9)(A) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
7607(d)\(9)(A), the court found that the agency’s reaffirma-
tion of the use of the Class A assumption was proper (Pet.
App. 6a-8a).

7

ARGUMENT

The only issue raised in the petition involves the format of
the 1978 decision: petitioner challenges the propriety of the
court of appeals’ procedure of remanding EPA’s promulga-
tion of an air pollution implementation plan for Ohio for
reconsideration simply of the one factual finding not sup-
ported by the administrative record. That decision was
correct, and does not conflict with any decision of this
Court or of any other court of appeals.5 Accordingly, and
particularly in light of EPA’s consideration of petitioner’s
objections on the remand, further review by this Court is
not warranted.

‘Although petitioner now contends (Pet. 6) that the question pre-
sented is “an important and unsettled question of administrative law,” it
neither sought this Court's review of that question in 1978, nor raised
the question in its second petition for review in the court of appeals.
Instead, petitioner merely assumed that the court of appeals had
vacated the emission limitation, and argued, based on that assumption,
that EPA should repromulgate the rule. The challenge to the 1978 order
raised here was first made in the petition seeking rehearing of the court
of appeals’ 1984 order — too late for that court to consider it. See
Jamestown Farmers Elevator, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc., 552 F.2d
1285, 1295-1296 (8th Cir. 1977); Bullock v. Mumford, 509 F.2d 384,
385-389 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Sutherland, 428 F.2d 1152,
1158 (Sth Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1078 (1972). This Court does
not ordinarily decide questions that have not been properly raised for
consideration by the courts below. See, e.g. Youakim v. Miller, 425
U.S. 231, 234-235 (1976).

We do not here challenge petitioner’s claim (Pet. 2, 6 n.5) that this
Court now has jurisdiction to consider petitioner’s objections to the
1978 order. But cf. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374,
378-379 (1965) (suggesting that issues presented only in first appeal
from agency order would be barred on review of second appeal).
Nevertheless, this Court has recognized that challenges alleging that the
reviewing court has overstepped the bounds of its authority in remand-
ing to the agency for further consideration should not be delayed.
“Clearly the effect of the [remand] order is immediate and irreparable,
and any review by this Court of the propriety of the order must be
immediate to be effective” (FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line
Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 331 (1976)). This Court should accordingly reject
petitioner's attempt further to delay the implementation of the emission
limitations imposed on it.

1. Petitioner insists here, as i: did ir. the court of appeals,
that the court in 1978 found EPA’s emission limitation
invalid and therefore should have vacated and remanded
that rule for repromulgation (see Pet. 6, 7,9, 10). Petitioner
still seems unwilling to concede that the court below knew
and said precisely what it intended to do. In fact, the court
made the simple finding that EPA’s decision that the Class
A coefficient was the most accurate representation of the
dispersion of air pollution under certain meteorological
conditions was not supported “{oJn the present record,” and
should be given further consideration by the agency (see
pages 2-4, supra).* The question presented by the petition,
then, is equally simple — whether a court may properly
remand an agency’s determination on one issue for further
consideration without also vacating the overarching rule-
making.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim (Pet. 11-15), the court of
appeals’ remand was completely harmonious with this
Court’s view of the proper role of courts in the review of
agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 5 U.S.C. 706, and other statutes.” A review of this

6Petitioner’s suggestion (Pet. 5 n.3) that the court of appeals’ mandate
in its 1978 decision was unclear is not believable. As petitioner notes, the
Sixth Circuit did, in a different case, Columbus & Southern Ohio
Electric Co. v. Costle, 638 F.2d 910, 911 (1980), off-handedly state that
the emission limitations had been set aside. But that reference could not
have confused petitioner here, since it came well after EPA had under-
taken the reconsideration required by the remand. Furthermore, the
clarity of the 1978 remand order was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit itself
when, in its 1984 opinion here, it noted that its previous decision had
“carefully limited the remand to a single issue” (Pet. App. 6a). Thus, the
court’s reference in Columbus to the emission limitations was a mis-
taken one, which should have had no effect on petitioner here.

7Petitioner makes a curious attempt (Pet. 12 n.8) to show that the
APA and not the Clean Air Act governed the court of appeals’ review in
1978 of EPA's emission limitations. This claim is wrong. The court's
jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from EPA's promulgation of the
1976 implementation plan derived from the Clean Air Amendments

9

Court’s decisions on which petitioner relies shows the
Court’s concern has always been to ensure that courts do
not encroach too far into the realm properly occupied by
the administrative agencies. Thus, the Court has turned
aside lower court attempts, when an administrative record
is inadequate to support an agency action, either to delve
into the record itself in order to supply an appropriate
explanation® or to conduct its own de novo factual proceed-
ings.? Likewise, the Court has prohibited lower courts from

of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 12(a), 84 Stat. 1707. The 1977 amend-
ments to the Clean Air Act (Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 305(a), 91 Stat. 772)
added Section 307(d)(9), which states that the court of appeals “may
reverse” any EPA action enumerated in Section 307(d)(1) which is
found to be “arbitrary and capricious.” The 1977 amendments were to
be effective immediately, pursuant to Section 406 of Pub. L. No. 95-95,
91 Stat. 795, as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-190, § 14(a) (91 Stat. 1405).
See League to Save Lake Tahoe, Inc. v. Troundary, 598 F.2d 1164,
1172-1173 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943 (1979). Thus, review of
EPA’s implementation plan in 1978 was governed by the Clean Air Act,
as the court of appeals correctly noted (Pet. App. 16a).

However, as petitioner notes, Congress intended that the Clean Air
Act’s standard of review should reflect the same rigorous standard
previously applied by the courts to review Clean Air Act regulations
under the APA. H-R. Conf. Rep. 95-564, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 178
(1977). The legislative history does not address the change in language
from the APA’s direction that unlawful agency actions “shall” be “set
aside” to that in the Clean Air Act, which states that courts “may
reverse” unlawful EPA actions. While the Clean Air Act language
would seem more permissive, the courts have considered their duties
under that statute, in this respect at least, to be the same as under the
APA. See Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705
F.2d 506, 519-520, 521 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Kennecott Corp. v. EPA, 684
F.2d 1007, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298,
391-392 (D.C. Cir. 1981). We see no reason to dispute this since, as
shown below, the court of appeals’ remand order was proper under the
APA standard.

*FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (1965); FCC v. Pottsville Broad-
casting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940).

%Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973); Citizens to Preserve-Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194 (1947).

10

dictating to agencies the manner in which remand proceed-
ings should be handled.'° The remand order of the court of
appeals here, then, was in keeping with this Court’s rulings.
The agency determination found unsupported by the record
was remanded for further proceedings, leaving EPA free to
determine how best to remedy the flaw in the record and
what actions to take once that flaw had been corrected. The
court of appeals’ order thus fully respected the agency’s
prerogatives. See note 17, infra.

In addition, in defining the courts’ proper role, this Court
has never imposed the sort of “all or nothing” review powers
that petitioner advocates. Rather, the Court decided in
Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 364 (1939), that
remand for further proceedings on distinct issues was
proper and “familiar appellate practice” (305 U.S. at 373).
Indeed, the Court found that review procedure particularly
appropriate in the review of agency action since its purpose
was “consonant with that of the administrative proceeding
itself, — to secure a just result with a minimum of technical
requirements” (ibid.). See also, Burlington Truck Lines,
Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962).

Petitioner asserts (Pet. 6-7) that the lower courts have
been confused and in conflict over whether partia! remand
for further proceedings is proper. In fact, quite the opposite
is true. The lower courts have followed Ford Motor Co.,
supra, in a remarkably consistent manner. Virtually every
circuit has recognized that it need not invalidate an other-
wise proper administrative action in its entirety because the
record fails adequately to support one or more findings
upon which the action is based, or because of procedural
errors. Indeed, the courts’ practice of remanding limited
issues for further consideration, or for correction of pro-
cedural errors, is most prevalent in the review of EPA

10 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, Inc., 435 U.S.
519 (1978); FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S.
326 (1976).

regulations governing air and water pollution.'! Such judi-
cial restraint in this technologically complex area of regula-
tion is particularly warranted. The importance to the health
and safety of the public of the timely promulgation of such
regulations makes it impractical to require EPA to “start
from scratch” each time a court finds an error in the agen-
cy’s decision-making process, as petitioner advocates here.
In addition, the courts apply the same principle of review
authorized in Ford Motor Co., supra, in other regulatory
areas. !2

This established approach of the courts of appeals is not
in conflict with the dictates of Section 706(2) of the APA, as
petitioner insists (Pet. 11-12). Petitioner apparently believes
that that provision permits or requires the courts to “set

'' State of New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. NRC, 727 F.2d 1127,
1131 (D.C. Cir. 1984); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478
F.2d 615, 649-650 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA,
462 F.2d 846,850-851 (D.C. Cir. 1972); South Terminal Corp. v. EPA,
504 F.2d 646, 665-666 (Ist Cir. 1974); Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 499
F.2d 1118 (2d Cir. 1974); NRDC v. EPA, 494 F.2d 519, 526 (2d Cir.
1974); Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979);
Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 522 F.2d 1186(3d Cir. 1975); FMC Corp.
v. Train, 539 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1976); Central Power & Light Co. v.
United States, 634 F.2d 137, 178 (Sth Cir. 1980); American Meat
Institute v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975); United States Steel
Corp. v. EPA, 649 F.2d 572, 576-577 (8th Cir. 1981); CPC Interna-
tional, Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1050(8th Cir. 1975); Western Oil &
Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 633 F.2d 803, 812-813 (9th Cir. 1980).

'2Asarco, Inc. v. OSHA, 647 F.2d 1, 2 (9th Cir. 1981) (OSHA
standards regulating employee exposure to inorganic arsenic); United
Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (OSHA
standards regulating employee exposure to lead); Rodway v. Depart-
ment of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (food stamp pro-
gram regulations); American Importers Ass'n v. CAB, 473 F.2d 168
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (CAB order approving international carrier’s agree-
ment limiting time freight may be held at an airport free of demurrage).

12

aside” only arbitrary and capricious “rules” (Pet. 12). In
fact, Section 706(2) is not so limited. It directs courts to set
aside arbitrary and capricious “action, findings and conclu-
sions.”!3 Indeed, the courts have recognized that their duties
under Section 706(2) of the APA coexist with their equit-
able discretion to fashion remand orders on discrete matters
for further proceedings. '¢

Thus, the format of the court of appeals’ 1978 remand
order is fully in compliance with this Court’s view of the
proper methods of judicial review of agency action. Despite
petitioner’s attempt selectively to paint a contrary picture, '*
it is also completely consistent with the views of other

\3There is no dispute here that the effect of the court of appeals’
decision was to set aside EPA’s reliance on the Class A assumption,
even though it did not explicitly so order (see Pet. App. 94a-95a). The
agency treated that reliance as reversed and gave the matter full-blown
reconsideration on remand. See pages 4-5, supra.

\4See Asarco, Inc. v. OSHA, supra; Western Oil & Gas Ass'n Vv.
EPA, supra; Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, supra; South Terminal
Corp. v. EPA, supra.

\SAIl of the circuits referred to by petitioner (Pet. 7) obviously do not
condemn the type of remand order fashioned by the court of appeals
here, since they each have done the same in the appropriate circumstan-
ces. See page 11 & notes 11-12, supra. In addition, none of the cases
cited by petitioner stands for the proposition that partial remand of the
record for further consideration is prohibited. In some, the agency’s
actions were simply incurably wrong and had to be vacated for new
proceedings. California Cartage Company v. United States, 721 F.2d
1199 (9th Cir. 1983); Montana- Dakota Utilities Co. v. FERC, 631 F.2d
557 (8th Cir. 1980). In others, while the agency action was vacated in
full, the courts did not prohibit another solution. ASH v. CAB, 713
F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Port Norris Express Co. v. ICC, 687 F.2d
803 (3d Cir. 1982); Tabor v. Joint Board for Enrollment of Actuaries,
566 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In EDF, Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275
(D.C. Cir. 1981), the court upheld the agency’s action, and therefore did
not address the proper scope of remand. The court in Central Power &
Light Co. v. United States, 634 F.2d 137 (Sth Cir. 1980), as noted above
(page 11 n.11, supra), fashioned the same sort of remand order as did
the court of appeals here.

13

circuits on the propriety of partial remand for further
consideration.

2. Even if petitioner were correct on the merits, interven-
ing events have long since rendered harmless any error in
the format of the 1978 remand order. Petitioner’s complaint
that the court of appeals should have ordered repromulga-
tion of the emission limitations, as well as reconsideration
of EPA’s reliance on the Class A assumption, presents a
distinction without a difference. EPA treated the applica-
tion of the emission limitations to petitioner as stayed by the
court of appeals during its reconsideration of the Class A
assumption (Pet. App. 64a; 44 Fed. Reg. 7798 (1979)). The
Class A assumption was given a full airing and detailed
study by the agency, and was found to be the proper coeffi-
cient for setting emission limitations. '® Hence, the emission
limitations were reinstated, and the compliance timetables
restarted (Pet. App. 63a-70a), based on a then valid and
fully supporting record. Since the only flaw in the record on
which the emission limitations were based was then cor-
rected without a change in the result, there was no practical
need to reconsider the emission limitations themselves. !7

Petitioner does not challenge EPA’s substantive decision
to reinstate the use of the Class A assumption. Rather, it
puts forward only one reason why it was necessary to
repromulgate the emission limitations despite this decision.
It claims (Pet. 5, 14) that when EPA reconsidered the Class
A assumption it used a “different modeling procedure” than
it had in the initial rulemaking. Petitioner speculates that if
EPA had repromulgated the emission limitations with this

‘See pages 4-5 supra; Pet. App. 28a-68a; 44 Fed. Reg. 7798 (1979).

'7As EPA itself recognized, had another assumption been determined
more appropriate than Class A, promulgation of new emission limita-
tions would have been required (Pet. App. 58a).

14

change, it would have resulted in less stringent limitations,
and a savings to petitioner of $29 million.

In fact, EPA did use a different computer model on
remand in implementing the Class A assumption—the
“MPTER” model. This model had the capability of calcu-
lating concentrations of pollution at specific designated
locations which the previous model could not. Therefore,
the MPTER model was used because it provided more
accurate comparisons between model calculations and
monitor data (Pet. App. 87a-88a). However, EPA specifi-
cally found that, except for the increased predictive accu-
racy of MPTER, the two models were equivalent in most
respects (Pet. App. 88a). To be absolutely sure that the new
model would resuli in no change in the emission limitations,
EPA “remodeled” its calculations for petitioner’s power
plant using the MPTER, and compared the pollution con-
centrations found under both models. It found the differen-
ces in the two insignificant (Pet. App. 89a-90a). Thus, peti-
tioner’s claim that the change in the model used to
implement the Class A assumption necessitated the repro-
mulgation of the emission limitations is contradicted by the
record.

In any event, the agency recognized the right of the
parties before it t© seek revision of the emission limitations.
When petitioner here asked for reconsideration of the agen-
cy’s reaffirmation of the Class A assumption, EPA treated
the motion as a petition to revise the previously promul-
gated limitation rule pursuant to the APA, 5 U.S.C. 553(e)
(Pet. App. 74a-75a). EPA then extensively reviewed the
matters raised in the petition for reconsideration, which

15

largely presented allegedly new data to challenge the predic-
tive accuracy of the Class A assumption. The agency deter-
mined that none of the matters raised warranted a change in
the emission limitations, either because the data were not
new or because they were not relevant to the Class A
assumption’s predictive accuracy (see page 5, supra; Pet.
App. 75a-91a); the court of appeals agreed (Pet. App. 8a).

Thus, the failure of the court of appeals to order the
formal repromulgation of the emission limitations, with all
the attendant procedural trappings, even if incorrect, would
not be a basis for reversal of the 1978 decision. Even if
repromulgation under Section 307(d) had been required,
EPA’s actions on remand would have rendered any proced-
ural error harmless under Section 307(d)(8) of the Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(8), as the court of appeals itself held
(Pet. App. 6a in.2).!8

'*Under that Section, courts may not invalidate rules for procedural
errors if the errors were not so serious that there is substantia! likelihood
the rule would have been significantly changed without them. The cour’
of appeals referred to subsection (d)(9), which addresses the standard of
judicial review of rules promulgated under the Clean Air Act and
permits reversal for procedural error only when consistent with subsec-
tion (d)(8).

16
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.

Rex E. Lee
Solicitor General

F. Henry Hasicut, Il
Assistant Attorney General

Dirk D. SNeEL
Janet L. STECKEL
Attorneys

NOVEMBER 1984

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ea > = ea

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_2577%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
