# Opposition Brief — Cochran v. United States

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_2136%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1992
- **Citation:** 502 U.S. 1093

## Text

Sunrane Court, U.S.

=) FILED
No. 91-916 : FEBS 4992
HE CLERK

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

STEVEN FLETCHER COCHRAN, PETITIONER
Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

KENNETH W. STARR
Solicitor General

ROBERT S. MUELLER, III
Assistant Attorney General

THOMAS E. BooTH
Attorney
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the stop of petitioner’s car and the subse-
quent seizure of an ammunition clip and a firearm
from it violated the Fourth Amendment.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TREE Ea AE ORAS SE EERE CAD ESE Se aE EE aS 1
EEE ERI SR OCC AC ECP, RR 1
SER STE Sa is Ste es ot sve PRAT Se Dee SE SOND 1
EAL e SO OE LD Ae Te SOS 4
IIIT cass sleuieicas ccassaessicanlicheatecsteaetaltcesnenicicaidskebinacaxcebesseniacnamensoaae 6

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:

Brinegar Vv. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) ___.... 4
Michigan Vv. Long, 463 U.S. 1082 (1983) 2.00.00... 5
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) ........... 3,4
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) ......0000... 5
United States v. Paulino, 850 F.2d 93 (2d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1052 (1989) .......... 5
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 789 (1982) ............. 5,6
Jnited States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) _....... 5
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) _........ 4
United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d 1174 (D.C.
rll a As Elan Pan TORE HERS 5

Constitution and statutes:

ee 4,5,6
es, ccscmencinbinienessabousievsan 2
a 1,3

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

No. 91-916
STEVEN FLETCHER COCHRAN, PETITIONER
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App.
1-10) is reported at 939 F.2d 337.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on July 17, 1991. A petition for rehearing was de-
nied on September 6, 1991. Pet. App. 11-12. The
petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on Decem-
ber 5, 1991. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

Following a plea of guilty in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan,
petitioner was convicted of possessing an unregistered

(1)

2

firearm not identified by its serial number, in viola-
tion of 26 U.S.C. 5861(d). Following a jury trial
in the same court, he was convicted of interstate
transportation of a firearm by a felon, in violation of
18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He was sentenced to concur-
rent terms of 52 months’ imprisonment. The court
of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. 1-10.

1. On February 21, 1990, after receiving informa-
tion that petitioner was a drug dealer, law enforce-
ment agents began surveillance of his residence. The
agents observed petitioner take a thickly packaged
rectangular box from his coat, place it in the trunk
of his car, and drive to the residence of George Reid.
The agents, who were experienced investigators, be-
lieved that petitioner’s box contained drugs, because
kilogram quantities of cocaine are frequently trans-
ported in packages of that style and shape. The
agents also knew that petitioner had numerous ar-
rests for carrying weapons in his car, including one
incident in which Reid was a passenger. Pet. App.
19-32.

Based on their observations, the agents obtained a
search warrant for petitioner’s residence and began
administrative forfeiture proceedings against peti-
tioner’s car. On February 23, 1990, the agents ar-
rived at petitioner’s residence to execute the search
warrant. To promote a safe and orderly search, the
agents decided to seek petitioner’s assistance in ex-
ecuting the warrant. They knew that he carried
arms and kept a guard dog on the premises. Before
the agents approached the house, however, petitioner
drove away from the premises in his car. Pet. App. 2,
33-34.

Two agents stopped petitioner’s car and ordered
him to step outside. Petitioner quickly moved his
right arm, causing the agent on the driver’s side to

3

open the car door and repeat his order for petitioner
to exit. When petitioner continued his motion, the
agent pulled petitioner out of the car, while the other
agent opened the car’s glove box, causing a loaded
ammunition clip to fall out. The agents knew that
petitioner, as a convicted felon, was not entitled to
possess a firearm or ammunition. The agents ar-
rested petitioner and later searched the car and
seized an unregistered machine gun from the trunk.
Petitioner filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evi-
dence seized from his car. The district court denied
the motion. Pet. App. 2-8, 34-36, 76-79, 100-102,
155-161.

2. The court of appeals affirmed petitioner’s con-
viction, rejecting his contention that the evidence
seized from his car should hzve been suppressed. The
court concluded that under Michigan v. Summers,
452 U.S. 692 (1981), the agents properly stopped
petitioner, after he departed from his residence, to
seek his assistance in executing the warrant. The
court rejected petitioner’s argument that the agents
manipulated the circumstances to permit them to
search petitioner’s car. Pet. App. 3-5. The majority
also concluded that the search of the glove box in
petitioner’s car was justified by the agents’ concern
for their own safety, which was precipitated by peti-
tioner’s threatening arm movement, and that the dis-
covery of the ammunition clip gave the agents proba-
ble cause to search the car and to seize the clip and
the firearm. /d. at 6.

Judge Wellford dissented. In his view, the decision
in Michigan vy. Summers did not permit law enforce-
ment agents to detain petitioner once he was away
from his residence or to return him to the premises
to assist in executing the search warrant. Pet. App.
8-10.

4

ARGUMENT

Petitioner contends (Pet. 12-21) that the govern-
ment violated the Fourth Amendment by stopping his
car and subsequently seizing a machine gun and am-
munition clip from it. In particular, he maintains
that the court of appeals misapplied Michigan v. Sum-
mers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), because the right of law
enforcement agents armed with a search warrant for
a residence to restrain an occupant from leaving the
premises does not extend to detaining a person who
has already driven away. See Pet. 15-17. There is
no need to reach that issue, however, because the law
enforcement agents had probable cause—or at least
reasonable suspicion—to stop petitioner while he was
in his car, based on the information supporting the
search warrant. Furthermore, even if there is a
question under Summers whether the agents could
force petitioner to return to his residence, they cer-
tainly were entitled, at the leasc, to stop petitioner
to request his assistance in executing the warrant.
Thus, petitioner was lawfully stopped, and his subse-
quent threatening motion justified the search of his
car.

1. Law enforcement agents can arrest a suspect
for a felony in a public place without a warrant if
they have probable cause to beiieve that the suspect
has committed a crime. United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411 (1976). Probable cause exists when the
facts and circumstances within the arresting officers’
knowledge are sufficient for a reasonable person to
believe that the suspect has committed or is commit-
ting a crime. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 175-176 (1949). Here, the law enforcement
agents were entitled to stop petitioner’s car because
they had probable cause, based on the information
justifying the search warrant, to believe that peti-

5

tioner was engaged in drug trafficking. Because the
agents had probable cause to arrest petitioner, they
were entitled to open petitioner’s glove compartment
as a search incident to arrest to prevent him from
reaching for a weapon. New York vy. Belton, 453 U.S.
454 (1981). And upon discovery of the ammunition
clip, the agents were entitled to search the trunk and
seize the machine gun. United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798 (1982).

2. Even if the agents’ information did not estab-
lish probable cause to arrest petitioner, it gave them
reasonable suspicion to stop petitioner’s car for fur-
ther investigation. See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe,
470 U.S. 675, 682-688 (1985). Alternatively, the
agents were entitled, under the Fourth Amendment’s
standard of reasonableness, to stop petitioner to re-
quest his assistance in executing the search warrant.
See, e.g., id. at 682 (“‘we examine ‘whether the offi-
cer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether
it was reasonably related in scope to the circum-
stances which justified the interference in the first
place’ ’’).

Under either rationale, when petitioner—a person
who was known to have an affinity for firearms—
moved his arm suddenly upon hearing the agents’
command, the agents properly concluded that peti-
tioner was armed and dangerous. See, e.g., United
States v. Paulino, 850 F.2d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1052 (1989); United States
v. Williams, 822 F.2d 1174, 1180 n.62 (D.C. Cir.
1987). To prevent petitioner from drawing a fire-
arm, the agents properly restrained petitioner and
opened the car’s glove box. Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032 (1983). And after the agents discovered
the ammunition clip, they had probable cause to
search the rest of petitioner’s car and to seize the

6

machine gun. See United States v. Ross, supra.
Thus, the government’s search of petitioner’s auto-
mobile was lawful under the Fourth Amendment, ir-
respective of whether this Court’s decision in Sum-
mers would have allowed the government to return
petitioner to his residence while the search was

conducted.
CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
denied.

Respectfully submitted.

KENNETH W. STARR
Solicitor General

ROBERT S. MUELLER, III
Assistant Attorney General

THOMAS E. BooTH
Attorney

FEBRUARY 1992

vw U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE; 1992 312324 45298

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_2136%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
