# Respondents Brief — Welsh v. Wisconsin

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Respondents Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 466 U.S. 740

## Text

Case No. 82-5466 j

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term 1982

EDWARD G. WELSH,
Petitioner,

U.

STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

BRONSON C. LA FOLLETTE
Attorney General of Wisconsin

STEPHEN W. KLEINMAIER
Assistant Attorney General
of Wisconsin

Attorneys for Respondent.

Department of Justice
Post Office Box 7857
Madison, Wisconsin 53707
(608) 266-1677

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED ..................06. l
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS....... 4
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT..................0000: 6
SE es ceo dd lc abEen tech 144400 4 bN baie cieeake 7

I. The Defendant Was Arrested For
The Misdemeanor Offense Of
Operating A Motor Vehicle While
Under The Influence Of An Intoxi-
(SE pea a ay a Sy 7

II. Whether The Defendant Was Ar-
rested For A Misdemeanor Or A
Forfeiture Offense, The Arrest
Was Valid If The Police Had Prob-
able Cause To Believe He Com-
mitted The Offense Of Drunk
Driving And Exigent Circum-
stances Existed To Justify Their
Failure To Obtain A Warrant ....... 12

A. The common law rules of arrest
were not made part of the constitu-
tion by the adoption of the fourth
I es roe eee tees 15

B. Even if the common law rules of
arrest were adopted as part of the
United States Constitution, the
arrest of the defendant was valid
because drunk driving qualifies as
a felony under the eighth amend-

SORE TE 5 io Sills Cdl dan oc gists kieee 25

III.

IV.

VI.

CONCLUSION

i

C. Evenif the United States Constitu-
tion adopted the common law rules
of arrest, and even if the labels
placed on the offenses by the local
legislatures are controlling, the
arrest in the instant case was

Ce es ea a gs eee di so

At The Time Of The Arrest, The
Police Possessed Probable Cause
To Arrest The Petitioner
For The Offense Of Operating A
Motor Vehicle While Under The
Influence Of An Intoxi-
Se ca alrns oF ieee ede hs te hoes caw ees

Exigent Circumstances Existed To
Justify The Warrantless Arrest
Of the Defendant. ................

A. Hot pursuit ................ eats

B. Theimminent threat to safety. ...

C. Prevention of the destruction of

ERIE Bigey SPREE See

This Court Should Not Require
The Police To Seek A Telephone
Warrant Before Entering The

Defendant’s Home To Arrest Him. ...

A Decision Invalidating The Entry
Into The Defendant’s Home Would
Hamper Effective Law Enforce-

SE Ah s bead ccabe spac beats cu bibas «

“eee eee eee eee eee eee

Page

.. 29

ss

.. 36

44

‘oa

ill

Page
CASES CITED

Aliff v. State,

627 S.W.2d 166

oe 8 Re ee ero 39
Argersinger v. Hamlin,

Be es CTs on kavavs daveeesss vaun bee 18
Bad Elk v. United States,

Er Se I cs ik cevesdeusaccanceeences ane 24
Baldwin v. New York,

Be SITE so voc avevenewasednned apenas 27
Boyd v. United States,

Be CEE ook con aevduccatbavacseeeeane 32-33
Breithaupt v. Abram,

SE UE, GIB oie be nccccedinuticdedcereutes 28
Brown v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles,

86 Cal. App. 3d 357,

ope Bo Sh ek rere ee 43
Camara v. Municipal Court,

ee GA ETD inners acvsvecrdiete 30,31,32,40,41
Carroll v. United States, )

Re a EEE bss da ccccagcievdcnenawee Gane 18
City of Columbus v. Herrell,

18 Ohio App. 2d 149,

ee ee FH CRUD vk cca ccvevescecseveseneae 23
Commonwealth v. Levesque,

469 Pa. 118,

RED o.oo onc cddsueeeSecess cabana 23

Cemmonwealth v. Trefry,
. 249 Pa. Super. 117,
a SEINE hive ba bessvaus chaaauens 38,41,43

iv

County of Walworth v. Rohner,
108 Wis. 2d 713,
CRONIES , oc tcc ccccccvccccvcces 9,26

DeVaney v. State,
259 Ind. 483,

ME CPCB) 5. .ccccccccccccsvcccvece 38,43
Diamond v. Marland,

395 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Ga. 1975) ................ 23
Duncan v. Louisiana,

ee ces seueeceveeee 27
Gregg v. State,

OE) 38
Hayes v. State,

634 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982)............. 38

In the Matter of Gardner,
39 N.C. App. 567,

RIND ccc o cc ccccccevevececce 23
Johnson v. United States,

EE 38
Ker v.California,

Tee pee eseseseees 25
Klingler v. United States,

S00 F.20 300 (Oth Cir. 1068)..........cccccceeees 25
Mackey v. Montrym,

ET 26-27,40,41,42
McDonald v. United States,

Teen tees esececvescecs 38

Michigan v. Tyler,
ccc ceceseevedeeve 38

Noble State Bank v. Haskell,
aes dc pele vo beds cuevns 21

North American Cold Storage
Company v. City of Chicago,

ce oa ne nauwe 6 eels 40
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,

ee ee ER ahd cave kcncs veces ciuatunse<s 32,33
Payton v. New York, 6,12,14,15,17,21,

445 U.S. 573 (1980) ..........0006. 25,30-31,31-32,39

People v. Baca,
198 Colo. 399,
SE SUE io c.0'0ceS avec veekna teas slocnes 35

People v. Bell,
41 Ill. App. 3d 233,

IRIN « . obs es odevinrecdeseecheaves 38
People v. Rodriguez,

645 P.2d 857 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) .............. 38
Pollard v. State,

439 N.E.2d 177 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) ............. 38
Rummel v. Estelle,

eg ee eeu sy 18
Schmerber v. California,

BOS UB. TOs CIGGOD occ ce cccccicces 38,39,40,41,42,43
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,

ae aew thane 27

Shultz v. State,
417 N.E.2d 1127
Se I ED w'bin os 6 wose.vepes DSS eb ont 38

Silver v. Silver,
I hi a 21

vi

Page
Solem v. Helm
I ie EE MD casa ak von cecniewheen wuss 28
South Dakota v. Neville, — U.S. —,
ee 26,41

State in Interest of M.P.C.,
165 N.J. Super. 131,
Se TO RENTEND 5 cob poche pvdctccdeciseenes 38

State v. Banks,
105 Wis. 2d 32,

Ee ET CEUIED occ ckccrccvsccthacedocces 8,9,11
State v. Berker,

ee OE PUPS yc ivnssvecvoovdeesenees 23
State v. Burkman,

96 Wis. 2d 630,

ee EE CEO) boss vc cneccevesepsceeveces )
State v. Campbell,

615 P.2d 190 (Mont. 1980) ..............ceeeeees 38

State v. Jennings,
112 Ohio App. 455,

Pe RM PE LEO cv ccvccccccecvecveccceeshs 28
State v. Martin,

275 S.C. 141,

SES Bi 0. 10GB (1GG0) . wc ccc cccncrecers 36,37,43

State v. McAllister,
107 Wis. 2d 532,
SAD Be. 0 ee OOO (IGGS) . og cc ccc cece cccess 9,10,11,34

State v. Niedermeyer,
48 Or. App. 665,
617 P.2d 911 (1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981) ............. 32,35

Vii

Page

State v. Oevering,

268 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. 1978) ...........0c ecu eeee 38
State v. Penas,

200 Neb. 387,

- fF & Af Ya. 7. ene meemm rer ee te hn 35
State v. Spence,

G5 ee. BE Ge Cae, TOE) v0 occ rvvcncnssctenespnn 43
State v. Welsh,

108 Wis. 2d 319, 11,17,27-28,

S31 N.W.2G 246 (19063)... cc ccsccccsens 34,35,36,37
State v. Williams,

417 So. 2d 755

Pes le EG BOE ic ccvc'es vvevasscoeeeebeene 38,43
Steagald v. United States, 6,12,17,21-22,

Me CH I MMEED i ccccccnscuovévanens 31,32,34,39
Street v. Surdyka,

492 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1974)............. 22-23,23-24
United States v. Bonds,

422 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1970).......... 0. ccc eee es 11
United States v. Grosso,

225 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Pa. 1964)................ 23
United States v. Harvey,

robe ff. tee: rrr 38
United States v. Santana,

SE Ce OED bison sins sos tbcenesdevassael 34,38
United States v. Stubblefield,

621 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1980).......... 00.0 c ee ees 35

United States v. Watson,
— 423: U.S. 411 (1976)... . cece eee conse 15,16,17,18,32

vill

Page

United States ex rel. LaBelle v. La Vallee,

517 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1975),

cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1062 (1976) ............... 10
Vale v. Louisiana,

INI sv ss wok oe nb dba nee be’ 38,39,40
Warden v. Hayden,

i he SE a te 34

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
United States Constitution
13,14,15,17,18,25

Fourth Amendment........ 26,27,29,30,31,32,33,39

POET EE key 27

Eighth Amendment.......... 1,12,14,18,25,26,29,43

STATUTES CITED

Alabama

Ala. Code § 32-5A-191 (Supp. 1982).............. 20
Alaska

Alaska Stat. § 28-35-030 (Supp. 1982) ........... 20
Arizona

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-692

da 5d 5 ya o.o'soan'ne'e dood vee 20
Arkansas

Ark. Stat. Ann. § 75-1027 (1979) ................ 20
California

Cal. Veh. Code § 23152
a a calince baveweesain 20

ix

Connecticut
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-227(a) (1983) .............. 20
Delaware

Del. Code Ann. tit. 21,
I conc s pdcwseancdtacee rece wen 20

District of Columbia
D.C. Code Ann. § 40-716 (Supp. 1982) ........... 22
Florida

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 316.193
EN cri dinla Ve clansscnns votes nnebe 20

Georgia
Ga. Code Ann. § 68A-902
ES tase Gh buy Wea deb Man Ries bes Anak ae 20

Hawaii

Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 291-4 (Supp. 1982) .......... 21
Idaho

Idaho Code § 49-1102 (1980) .................4.. 21
Illinois

Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 95 1/2,
§ 11-501 (Smith-Hurd
ee oes cocckbensatanrsenerse 21

Indiana

Ind. Code Ann. § 9-4-1-54
SD SI Es hic bb v6.cds-0 de seu ceeowed 18,20,21

Iowa

- Iowa Code Ann. § 321.281
(West Supp. 1982-1983) ....................08. 20,21

Kansas

Kan. Stat. Ann § 8-1567 (1982)..........

Louisiana
La. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 14.98 (West Supp. 1983)...............

Maine
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 29,

§ 1312B (Supp. 1982-1983) ..............

Maryland
Md. Transp. Code Ann.

Sees CD. TORE) oo i vc ccicncckccwes

Michigan
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.625

A EP RUE 6 chad 000 cat veccwees se

Minnesota
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 169.121

Sere DOIN: ss vas cosy a keabesdees

Mississippi
Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30

I ee Oh ion wg de his Sees was fae

Missouri
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 577.010 and

§ 577.012 (Supp. 1983) ..................

Mo. Ann. Stat. § 557.023

GI I oo huctcs una wdn owes caeon eee

Nebraska

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669-07 (1978) .......

xi

Nevada

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 484.379 (1981) ..............05. 21
New Hampshire

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 265:82 (1982) ............ 21
New Jersey

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:4-50
Ee 21

New Mexico

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-102
eas vec ae cs cccsscccsvecetes 21

New York
N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1192
(McKinney Supp. 1982-1983) .............. 18,20,21

North Dakota

N.D. Cent. Code § 39-08-01
EE ee 21

Ohio
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4511.19
enact nssvocscresecses 21
Oklahoma

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 47,
§ 11-902 (West Supp. 1982-83) ............. 18,20,21
Oregon

Or. Rev. Stat. § 487.540 (1981) ................5. 22
Pennsylvania

Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. tit. 75,
* §3731 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984) ................ 22

Rhode Island
R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2

SI cueskt bea une sues kee ecwes

South Dakota
S.D. Codified Laws Ann.

PE ek eeerirapcndicvsasecneus

S.D. Codified Laws Ann.

TTT TTP TT eee eee

Tennessee
Tenn. Code Ann. § 5510-401

Ec av aca cuhwe bree dnh s6r40 e000

Texas
Tex. Veh. Code Ann. § 6701 L-1

(Vernon Supp. 1982-83)..............05.

Tex. Veh. Code Ann. § 6701 L-2

(Vernon Supp. 1982-83) ................

Utah
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44

PE atin cad ss ks sae seunsseeien

Vermont
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 23,

DE I MED sodincdssvcccebacceace

Virginia

Va. Code § 18.2-266 (1982) ..............

Washington
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 46.61.515

__ (Supp. EG os dic cucnuusonacexeets

Page

xiii

Page
West Virginia
W.Va. Code § 17C-5-2 (Supp. 1982) .............. 22
Wisconsin
Wis. Stats. Sec. 345.22 (1975) ........... cece eens 17
$46.63(1) (1975) ....... ee eeevees 9,10
DOR ARED oo vecivedccecseencs 8,9
IU o's cb astseesstasuas 10
346.65(2) (1975) ........... 7,8,18,28
346.65(2) (1981) ...........06. 2-3,18
rer errr ry 1,7
ED ov ch ccctevecensnss 3,17
SHIGE CIGBA) «cc ccscccvcicces 3,45
ST CHOED ob cc cnctaxcciscdes 2,17
Wyoming
Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-229
I EE 6 a So hcekadiwicetecbaveeaceeeeenss 22

OTHER AUTHORITIES

2 La Fave, Search & Seizure,
REE 6s bo vache Cenk scbhesbuhireacaues 24

Case No. 82-5466

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term 1982

EDWARD G. WELSH,
Petitioner,

Vv.

STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED

In addition to the constitutional and statutory pro-
visions cited in the Brief of Petitioner, the following
provisions are cited in the Brief of Respondent:

United States Constitution:

Amendment VIII: Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Section 939.12, Wis. Stats. (1975):

Crime defined. A crime is conduct which

is prohibited by state law and punishable by

* fine or imprisonment or both. Conduct punish-
able only by a forfeiture is not a crime.

2

Section 968.07, Wis. Stats. (1975):

Arrest by a law enforcement officer. (1)
A law enforcement officer may arrest a person
when:

(a) He has a warrant commanding that
such person be arrested; or

(b) He believes, on reasonable grounds,
that a warrant for the person’s arrest has been
issued ir this state; or

(c) He believes, on reasonable grounds,
that a felony warrant for the person’s arrest has
been issued in another state; or

(d) There are reasonable grounds to believe
that the person is committing or has committed
a crime.

(2) A law enforcement officer making a
lawful arrest may command the aid of any
person, and such person shall have the same
power as that of the law enforcement officer.

Section 346.65(2), Wis. Stats. (1981):

Penalty for violating sections 346.62
to 346.64.

(2) Any person violating s. 346.63(1):

(a) Shall forfeit not less than $150 nor
more than $300, except as provided in par. (b) or
(ce).

(b) Shall be fined not less than $300 nor
more than $1,000 and imprisoned not less than 5
days nor more than 6 months if the total of
revocations under s. 343.305 and convictions

3

under s. 346.63 (1) or a local ordinance in
conformity therewith, or s. 346.63(2) or 940.25, or
s. 940.09 where the offense involved the use of a
vehicle, equals 2 in a 5-year period, except that
revocations or convictions arising out of the
same incident or occurrence shall be counted as
one. The 5-year period shall be measured from
the dates of the refusals or violations which
resulted in the revocation or convictions.

(c) Shall be fined not less than $600 nor
more than $2,000 and imprisoned for not less
than 30 days nor more than one year in the
county jail if the total of revocations under s.
343.305 and convictions under s. 346.63 (1) or a
local ordinance in conformity therewith, or s.
346.63(2) or 940.25, or s. 940.09 where the offense
involved the use of a vehicle, equals 3 or more in
a 5-year period, except that revocations or con-
victions arising out of the same incident or
occurrence shail be counted as one. The 5-year
period shall be measured from the dates of the
refusals or violations which resulted in the
revocation or convictions.

Section 940.19(1), Wis. Stats. (1981):

Battery; aggravated battery. (1) Whoever
causes bodily harm to another by an act done
with intent to cause bodily harm to that person
or another without the consent of the person so
harmed is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 939.60, Wis. Stats. (1981):

Felony and misdemeanor defined. A
crime punishable by imprisonment in the Wis-
consin state prisons is a felony. Every other
. crime is a misdemeanor.

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS

The respondent, State of Wisconsin (hereinafter “the
state”), provides the following facts to supplement those
stated in the Brief of Petitioner and to correct a statement
in regard to the facts made in the amicus curiae brief filed
for the Wisconsin Civil Liberties Union Foundation.

Randy Jablonic saw Edward G. Welsh (hereinafter
“the defendant’) driving his car extremely cautiously,
first traveling very, very slowly and then a little faster (R.
13:8).'/ Jablonic saw the car go from side to side on the
road; and as the car approached a boulevard it headed for
the median where there was a sign telling drivers to stay
to the right (R. 13:8-9). Jablonic said the car was not
traveling at an excessive rate of speed, but it was
weaving back and forth (R. 13:9). Jablonic saw the
defendant’s eastbound car go down the left lane (R. 13:9).
When acar approached from the east, the defendant’s car
veered left at the last moment before a head-on collision
occurred and drove into a cemetery, or open field, where
the car stalled or got stuck. (R. 13:9).

Jablonic drove past the defendant’s car, turned
around and pulled up behind the car to keep it from
returning to the road (R. 13:10). Jablonic explained:

I made a u-turn there and pulled up behind
because | didn’t want that car to come back out
on the road. Because I realized they would
probably kill somebody. And I immediately
stopped the lady or the person who had been
forced to stop by this car, and asked them to go
call the police — to get some help so that we

'/ The record reference is to page 8 in the transcript of the hearing
of July 14, 1980, which has been numbered document 13 in the record.
Later in this brief there is a reference to a transcript of another portion
of the July 14, 1980, hearing and that transcript is numbered
document 14 in the record.

could prevent this person from getting back out
on the road.

(R. 13:10)

As reported in the Brief of Petitioner, while Jablonic
was stopped the defendant approached Jablonic’s truck.
The defendant asked Jablonic for a ride home and
Jablonic said that they had better wait to get some help to
get the car out (R. 13:12). Jablonic testified:

And then the person broke into a very slurred
conversation — “you wouldn’t get your cops”
—or something — it was very insecure and not
very controlled conversation. I was very — they
were very much concerned that I would call the
cops, and they were accusing that I was going to
call the cops. I said, “Well, I have sent the lady to
get help.”

(R. 43:12)

Jablonic said that the defendant again asked for a
ride home, and when Jablonic refused the defendant
walked away (R. 13:12).

At page 27 of the amicus curiae brief filed for the
Wisconsin Civil Liberties Union Foundation there is a
statement that the police “barged right in” the Welsh
home. There is nothing in the record to support the claim
that the police barged into the Welsh home. As indicated
at pages 10 and 11 of the Brief of Petitioner, the police
thought they had received consent to enter the home but
Mrs. Welsh denied that she had given consent. The judge
made no findings on whether the entry was consensual;
but not even Mrs. Welsh’s testimony supports a claim
that the police “barged right in” the home.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The police made a warrantless arrest of the defendant
in his home for the offense of operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of an intoxicant. The defendant
was charged with the misdemeanor offense of operating
while under the influence (R. 3:1; J.A. 4-5).

The state understands the defendant’s argument to
be that his arrest was invalid for two reasons: first, he
was arrested for a forfeiture offense and the police can
never make a warrantless arrest of an accused in his
home for a forfeiture offense; and, second, even if a
warrantless arrest in the home could be made on the
basis of probable cause and exigent circumstances, no
exigent circumstances existed in this case.

In responding to the defendant’s arguments, the
state contends, first, that this case should be treated as
an arrest for a misdemeanor rather than for a forfeiture
offense since under the state law the defendant had to be
charged with the misdemeanor offense because he had a
prior conviction for drunk driving.*/ Second, whether the
arrest was for an offense labeled either a forfeiture or a
misdemeanor by the Wisconsin Legislature, the police
had the authority to make the warrantless entry and the
arrest was constitutionally valid as long as the police
possessed probable cause and there were exigent circum-
stances justifying their failure to obtain a warrant. This
is the same test applied by this Court in Steagald v.
United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211-12 (1981), and Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590, 603 (1980). Third, the
probable cause prong has been satisfied in this case and
the defendant has not challenged the fact that the police
possessed probable cause. Fourth, exigent circumstances

2/ Whether the difference between an arrest for a forfeiture offense
and an arrest for a misdemeanor offense is significant will depend
upon how this Court decides the question of the police officer's
a to arrest, a question the state discusses in section II of this

rief.

7

existed, i.e., the police needed to make an immediate
arrest in order to prevent the imminent destruction of
evidence because if time had been taken to obtain a
warrant the alcohol level in the defendant’s blood would
have diminished before tests could be made.

On the basis of these arguments, the state concludes
that, because the police possessed probable cause and
exigent circumstances existed, the warrantless arrest of
the defendant in his home was constitutionally valid.

ARGUMENT

I. The Defendant Was Arrested For
The Misdemeanor Offense Of
Operating A Motor Vehicle While
Under The Influence Of An Intoxi-
cant.

The defendant was arrested in his home on April 24, .
1978, for operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of an intoxicant (R. 13:27, 38; J.A. 29, 46).

In April, 1978, a person convicted of drunk driving
for the first time could be required to forfeit not more than
$200. Sec. 346.65(2), Wis. Stats. (1975). For each subse-
quent conviction for violating the drunk driving statute
within five years, the person “shall be imprisoned not
less than five days nor more than one year and in
addition may be fined not more than $500.” Sec. 346.65(2),
Wis. Stats. (1975). Thus, under Wisconsin’s definition of a
crime, conviction for the first offense of drunk driving
was not criminal since it was punishable only by a
forfeiture; but each subsequent conviction within five
years was a crime because it was punishable by a fine or
imprisonment or both. See sec. 939.12, Wis. Stats. (1975)
(crime is an offense punishable by fine, imprisonment or
both).

The defendant has contended that he was arrested
for the first offense of drunk driving, i.e., a forfeiture
offense, because there was no evidence that at the time of
the arrest the police knew that within the previous five
years he had been convicted of drunk driving.

The defendant has stated that the question presented
in this case is whether the police can, without a warrant
and without consent, enter a suspect’s home at night to
arrest him for a nonjailable traffic offense committed
outside the presence of the police (Brief of Petitioner at
2-3).

The state submits that the defefidant is incorrect in
concluding that the arrest was made for a nonjailable
traffic offense. The state contends that, for the following
reasons, the arrest was made for a misdemeanor offense
for which the defendant, if convicted, would be required
to spend a minimum of five days in jail and for which he
could be sentenced to spend up to one year in jail.

The defendant was charged with the misdemeanor
offense of drunk driving (R. 3:1; J.A. 4-5), thereby in-
dicating that he had a prior conviction within five years.
Because the defendant had the prior conviction, he had to
be charged with the misdemeanor offense of drunk
driving; the prosecutor and the trial court had no choice.
In State v. Banks, 105 Wis. 2d 32, 39, 40, 313 N.W.2d 67, 70
(1981), the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered a later
version of sec. 346.65, Wis. Stats., which states the
penalty for drunk driving; and the court concluded that,
because the statute used the word “shall” in regard to the
punishment for subsequent offenses, the legislature in-
tended that criminal proceedings and penalties are
required for a second offense drunk driving charge
within a given five-year period. Under the rationale of
Banks, the use of the word shall in sec. 346.65(2), Wis.
Stats. (1975), which was in effect on the date of the
defendant’s arrest, required that the defendant be charged

9

with the criminal offense of drunk driving because he
had a prior conviction within five years.

In Banks, the Wisconsin Supreme Court pointed out
that the trial court had no discretion to treat the second
offense as anything but a misdemeanor. 105 Wis. 2d at 42,
43, 313 N.W.2d at 71, 72. In County of Walworth v.
Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d 713, 717, 324 N.W.2d 682, 684 (1982),
the Wisconsin Supreme Court said that even though the
first drunk driving offense may be charged civilly,
“subsequent offenses must be charged as crimes.’”
(Emphasis added in Rohner.) The court considered a
version of sec. 346.65, Wis. Stats., that differed from the
1975 version applicable to the defendant; but because the
court’s conclusion was based on the legislaturé’s use of
the word “shall” (Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d at 717, 324 N.W.2d
at 683), the court’s reasoning and conclusion apply tothe
1975 statute that also used the word shall to require
imprisonment for the second or subsequent offenses
within five years. This means that, because the defendant
in the instant case had a prior drunk driving conviction,
he had to be charged with the misdemeanor offense of
drunk driving. When the police officers arrested the
defendant for drunk driving, the arrest was for the
misdemeanor offense of drunk driving whether or not the
police knew of the prior conviction.

The police had probable cause to arrest the defendant
for the misdemeanor offense of drunk driving even if they
did not know of the prior conviction. The two elements of
the offense of operating while under the influence of an
intoxicant are (1) driving or operating a motor vehicle
and (2) doing so while under the influence of an intoxi-
cant. State v. McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d 532, 535, 319 N.W.2d
865, 867 (1982), and State v. Burkman, 96 Wis. 2d 630,
644, 292 N.W.2d 641, 647-48 (1980). Those two elements
constitute the conduct prohibited by the drunk driving
stdtute, which was sec. 346.63(1), Wis. Stats. (1975).
Those are the only facts the police must know about the

10

accused in order to have probable cause to believe that
the accused violated the drunk driving statute.

The penalty for violating sec. 346.63(1), Wis. Stats.
(1975), was specified in a different statute, sec. 346.65,
Wis. Stats. (1975), which provided that the first offense
carried a forfeiture penalty and that subsequent offenses
within five years must be penalized by imprisonment and
possibly a fine. The graduated penalty structure in sec.
346.65, Wis. Stats., “is nothing more than a penalty
enhancer similar to the repeater statute which does notin
any way alter the nature of the substantive offense, i.e.,
the prohibited conduct, but rather goes only to the
question of punishment.” McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d at 535,
319 N.W.2d at 867.

Therefore, when the police had probable cause to
believe that the defendant had operated a motor vehicle
while under the influence of an intoxicant, the police had
probable cause to believe that the defendant had com-
mitted a crime in violation of sec. 346.63(1), Wis. Stats.
(1975). Because the defendant had the prior conviction
his conduct constituted the crime whether or not the
police knew of the prior conviction.

The instant case is similar to United States ex rel.
LaBelle v. LaVallee, 517 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1062 (1976). In that case, the officers
thought they had a valid warrant to arrest the accused
for a misdemeanor. The court held the warrant invalid
but ruled that the arrest was still valid simply because
the facts known by the police constituted probable cause
to believe that the accused had committed a felony. Thus,
in LaBelle, the arrest was valid because the facts known
by the police constituted a felony. It made no difference to
the validity of the arrest that the police did not realize
they had knowledge of a felony; in fact, they believed the
arrest was for a misdemeanor.

11

In the instant case, then, the defendant was arrested
for the misdemeanor offense of drunk driving. Whether
the police knew of the defendant’s prior conviction is
irrelevant to the question of the validity of the arrest. As
the state will argue in the next section of this brief, the
arrest was valid whether the defendant was arrested fora
forfeiture offense or for a misdemeanor. But if it makes a
difference whether the defendant was arrested for a
forfeiture or a misdemeanor, for the reasons discussed
above, this Court must treat the arrest as being for a
misdemeanor. Because of the defendant’s prior convic-
tion, he had to be charged with the misdemeanor offense;
and the penalty had nothing to do with the elements of
the offense, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled in
McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d at 535, 319 N.W.2d at 867.

In its opinion in this case, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court treated the arrest of the defendant as being for the
forfeiture offense. In doing so, the court apparently acted
on a belief that knowledge of the defendant’s prior
conviction was relevant to probable cause. However, this
was erroneous since the penalty provision is not pertinent
to the elements of the offense, as the supreme court said in
McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d at 535, 319 N.W.2d at 867. See also
Banks, 105 Wis. 2d at 42,313 N.W.2d at 71.3/ This Court is
not required to accept the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s
erronéous-belief that the arrest was for a forfeiture. This
Court can independently evaluate the facts and circum-
stances known to the police officer; and if those facts
show probable cause for a misdemeanor, then this Court
should treat the arrest as being for a misdemeanor. See
United States v. Bonds, 422 F.2d 660, 664 (8th Cir. 1970).

‘/ In the instant case, the state was not able to rely on the
McAllister opinion for support in the state courts because the
McAllister case was decided after the Welsh case was briefed and
argued. See the dates listed on the title pages of the opinions in State v.
Wetsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319, 321 N.W.2d 245 (1982), and McAllister, 107 Wis.
2d at 532, 319 N.W.2d at 865.

12

In summary, because the defendant had a prior
conviction within five years, he had to be charged with
the misdemeanor offense of drunk driving for his arrest
on April 24, 1978. As will be noted later in this brief, the
police had probable cause to believe that the defendant
had violated the drunk driving statute. Therefore, when
the police arrested the defendant, the arrest was for a
misdemeanor offense even if the police did not know of
the prior conviction.

II. Whether The Defendant Was
Arrested For A Misdemeanor Or
A Forfeiture Offense, The Arrest
Was Valid If The Police Had Prob-
able Cause To Believe He Com-
mitted The Offense Of Drunk
Driving And Exigent Circum-
stances Existed To Justify Their
Failure To Obtain A Warrant.

In Payton, this Court ruled that in the absence of
consent or exigent circumstances a warrant is needed to
enter the residence of an accused to arrest him. 455 U.S.
at 590, 603. See also Steagald, 451 U.S. 211-12.

Payton involved a warrantless entry to make a
felony arrest; but the state contends that the same rules
apply for arrests for all offenses, whether they are labeled
felony, misdemeanor or forfeiture, as long as the offense
could be classified as a crime within the limits of the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
This rule will result in a uniform application of the
constitution in all the states.

Applying the Payton test to the instant case, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the arrest of the
defendant in his home was valid because the police
possessed information that gave them probable cause to
believe that the defendant was guilty of drunk driving,

13

and exigent circumstances existed because absent an
immediate arrest evidence would be destroyed by the
dissipation of the alcohol in the defendant’s blood.

The defendant contends that without a warrant the
police cannot constitutionally arrest an accused person
in his home for a misdemeanor crime or a forfeiture
offense because the common law rules of arrest were
made part of the United States Constitution by the
adoption of the fourth amendment; and under the common
law a police officer could not make a warrantless arrest
for a misdemeanor, even in a public place, unless the
misdemeanor was committed in his presence. The defend-
ant contends that because he did not commit the offense
of drunk driving in the presence of an officer, he Could not
constitutionally be arrested even for the misdemeanor
offense of drunk driving and even in a public place.
Therefore, he concludes that without a warrant the police
could not constitutionally arrest him in his home for the
forfeiture offense of drunk driving.

As argued above, the state contends the defendant
was arrested for the misdemeanor offense of drunk
driving. Nevertheless, whether the arrest was for the first
offense of drunk driving (a forfeiture offense) or a subse-
quent offense of drunk driving (a misdemeanor offense)
is not important for purposes of determining the consti-
tutionality of the arrest. In either event, the arrest was
valid. The reasons for the validity of the arrest can be
summarized as follows:

First, the common law distinction between arrests
for misdemeanors and arrests for felonies was not adopted
by the fourth amendment. Thus, the constitutional limits
on the rules for arrest are the same for all crimes and the
states are free to enact laws giving the police the same
powers to arrest for forfeiture offenses and misdemeanors
as for felonies. If the fourth amendment permits arrests
only for crimes, the word “crime” should be defined in

14

terms of the eighth amendment, i.e., any conduct that
could be prohibited as a crime within the limits of the
eighth amendment should be considered a crime for
purposes of fourth amendment rules of arrest and search
and seizure. This will insure uniform constitutional
rights throughout the country. Because drunk driving
can be classified as a crime within the limits of the eighth
amendment; and because the constitutional rules for
arrest are the same for all crimes; the constitutionality of
the arrest of the defendant is tested by the standards
adopted in Payton. Under those standards, the defend-
ant’s arrest was valid because the police possessed
probable cause and exigent circumstances existed.

Second, in the alternative, if this Court concludes
that the constitution preserved the common law distinc-
tion between misdemeanor arrests and felony arrests, for
purposes of constitutional rules, the distinction still
should be made in terms of the eighth amendment. In
other words, for purposes of fourth amendment rules of
arrest, a felony would be any offense that could be
classified a felony under the eighth amendment. In the
instant case, because drunk driving can be classified a
felony under the eighth amendment, the rules of felony
arrest would apply to the defendant’s arrest regardless of
whether the offense was labeled forfeiture or misde-
meanor by the Wisconsin Legislature. Under the rules
applicable to felony arrests, the arrest of the defendant in
his home was valid because the police possessed probable
cause and exigent circumstances existed.

Under either theory, it is important to use the eighth
amendment to define the level of the offense for purposes
of the fourth amendment rules of arrest so that application
of the fourth amendment is consistent throughout the
country. Constitutional rights should not be determined
by the label a particular state affixes to prohibited
conduct.

15

Third, if this Court concludes that the constitution
preserved the common law distinctions between mis-
demeanor arrests and felony arrests and that the local
legislature’s label of felony or misdemeanor is controlling,
the arrest of the defendant is valid because all warrant
requirements have allowed exceptions to the rule. The
state admits that usually a warrant is needed to enter a
home to arrest the accused. However, typically warrants
are not required where exigent circumstances exist. In
this case, the exigent circumstances exception applies
whether the arrest was for a misdemeanor or a forfeiture.

A. The common law rules of arrest
were not made part of the constitu-
tion by the adoption of the fourth
amendment.

The defendant argues that Payton and United States
v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), “recognized that the
common law rules of arrest had been carried into the
fourth amendment guarantees against unreasonable
searches and seizures, i.e., a warrantless arrest not
permitted by the common law was constitutionally
unreasonable.” (Brief of Petitioner at 32.)

The state submits that the defendant is incorrect
because the state does not believe that the common law
rules of arrest were made part of the constitution by the
adoption of the fourth amendment; at least the common
law distinctions between felony arrests and misdemeanor
arrests were not made part of the constitution.

The common law distinguished between felonies and
misdemeanors by allowing officers to make warrantless
arrests for felonies in public places on the basis of °
probable cause even if the felony was not committed in
the officer’s presence; however, in the case of a misde-
_ meanor, the officer could make a warrantless arrest in a
public place only if the offense was committed in the
presence of the officer. Watson, 423 U.S. at 418, 419.

16

In Watson, this Court held that it was constitutional
for the police to arrest a person in a public place if the
police officer simply had probable cause to believe that
the accused had committed a crime. 423 U.S. at 415, 423-
24. The crime involved in Watson was a felony. 423 U.S.
at 413 n.2, 415.

Justice Marshall dissented in Watson because he
believed that, unless exigent circumstances existed, a
warrant should be required to arrest a person in a public
place. 423 U.S. at 435, 451. Justice Marshall believed that
the majority of the Court in Watson eliminated the
common law rules of arrest:

Second, by paying no attention whatever to the
substance of the offense, and considering only
whether it is labeled “felony,” the Court, in the
guise of ‘“‘constitutionalizing” the common-law
rule, actually does away with it altogether,
replacing it with the rule that the police may,
consistent with the Constitution, arrest on
probable cause anyone who they believe has
committed any sort of crime at all. Certainly
this rule would follow if the legislatures re-
denominated all crimes as “felonies.” As a
matter of substance, it would seem to follow in
any event from the holding of this case, for the
Court surely does not intend to accord constitu-
tional status to a distinction that can be readily
changed by legislative fiat.

423 U.S. at 545-55 (footnote omitted).

If Justice Marshall is correct, the constitution makes
no distinction between a misdemeanor and a felony in
regard to the authority of the police to arrest in a public
place. Because each is a crime, the arrest for either a
misdemeanor or a felony can be made in a public place as
long as the officer has probable cause. It makes sense to
treat all crimes the same under the constitution. If the

17

constitution treated the officer’s arrest authority differ-
ently depending on whether the crime was a felony or a
misdemeanor, the state legislatures could effectively
alter the accused’s constitutional rights simply by
changing the label attached to the crime or by redefining
what they choose to call a felony. See, e.g., sec. 939.60,
Wis. Stats. (1981), which defines felony as a crime
punished by imprisonment in the Wisconsin state prisons.

Justice Marshall must be correct in concluding that
the constitution makes no distinction between police
authority to make a misdemeanor arrest and the authority
to make a felony arrest because, if the constitution made
the distinction, it would sanction the paradox whereby
states could indirectly grant the police greater arrest
authority simply by classifying all crimes as felonies, but
they could not directly grant the police greater authority
by passing a law saying that the arrest authority for
misdemeanors was the same as for felonies. Such a
situation is avoided if the fourth amendment treats all
offenses alike and permits the states to establish the
arrest authority either directly or indirectly, as they
choose. Wisconsin chose to take the direct route by
authorizing the police to make arrests in traffic cases and
misdemeanor cases on the basis of probable cause, the
same standard applied in felony cases. See sec. 345.22,
Wis. Stats. (1975), and sec. 968.07, Wis. Stats. (1975).

In Payton, this Court ruled in the context of a felony
case that in the absence of consent or exigent circum-
stances the police need an arrest warrant to enter the
accused’s home to arrest him. 455 U.S. at 590, 603. See
also Steagald, 451 U.S. at 211-12. Payton has been
interpreted to permit a warrantless home entry to arrest
the accused if police have probable cause and if exigent
circumstances exist. Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d at 327, 321
N.W.2d at 250.

The state submits that, asin a public place where the
constitutional rule of arrest is the same for a misdemeanor

18

as for a felony, see Watson, 423 U.S. at 454-55 (Marshall,
J., dissenting), the constitutional rule for arrest in an
accused’s home should be the same for a misdemeanor as
for a felony. In the case of either type of crime, a
warrantless arrest should be valid as long as the police
possess probable cause and exigent circumstances exist.

If the constitution required standards for the arrest
of a misdemeanor different from the standards applied to
the arrest for a felony, an accused’s constitutional rights
would change from state to state depending upon the
label the various state legislatures placed on the offense.
As applied to the instant case, the constitutional rules for
entry of an accused’s home would differ in Indiana, New
York, Oklahoma and Texas where second offense drunk
driving is a felony*/ from Wisconsin where the second
offense drunk driving is a misdemeanor.°*/

To ensure a uniform constitutional rule of arrest, the
fourth amendment should treat all crimes the same.
Whether crimes are classified as felonies or misdemeanors
is largely a state matter, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25, 38 (1972); and legislative bodies may exercise a
relatively wide discretion in classifying particular
offenses as felonies or misdemeanors, United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. at 439 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting),
quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925).
However, the legislative bodies do not have unlimited
discretion in classifying offenses as misdemeanors or
felonies. The eighth amendment imposes limits on what
can be made criminal and punished as such as well as
setting limits on what offenses can be classified and
punished as felonies. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,
269, 284 (1980).

4/ Ind. Code Ann. § 9-4-1-54 (Burns Supp. 1982); N.Y. Veh. & Traf.
Law § 1192(McKinney Supp. 1982-83); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, § 11-902
(West Supp. 1982-83); Tex. Veh. Code Ann. § 6701 L-2 (Vernon Supp.
1982-83).

5/ Section 346.65(2), Wis. Stats. (1975), and sec. 346.65(2), Wis.
Stats. (1981).

19

For the sake of uniformity under the constitution, the
fourth amendment should view all crimes the same for
purposes of search and seizure and arrest. In addition,
any offense, whether a violation of federal or state or
local laws, should be considered a crime for purposes of
the fourth amendment if the offense could be classified as
a crime within the limits of the eighth amendment.
Under this approach, all the constitutional limits govern-
ing arrest and search and seizure will be contained
within the four corners of the constitution where they
cannot be altered by statutory changes. The limits will be
set by the fourth and eighth amendments. Although
states could still set tighter limits on the police officer's
authority to arrest, the tighter limits would be based on
state laws and constitutions; the different limits would
not be a result of states altering federal constitutional
rights through the labeling of offenses.

Under this approach, individuals do not lose any
constitutional right that they already have. States have
always been able to make any offense a crime and any
crime a felony as long as the eighth amendment has been
satisfied. After an offense has been classified a felony,
the police have been able to enter the accused’s home to
make a warrantless arrest as long as the police had
probable cause and exigent circumstances.

Under the approach suggested by the state in this
brief, the constitution will recognize uniform police arrest
authority regardless of the label the legislature attaches
to the offense. The constitutional limits on the police
officer’s arrest authority will be based solely on the limits
contained in the constitution and will not be based in part
on the vagaries of state legislatures.

Under this approach, the police could enter the
defendant's home if they had probable cause and exigent
circumstances. This is so because under the eighth
amendment drunk driving can be classified as a crime.

20

Indeed, most states classify drunk driving as at least a
misdemeanor.®/ Several states classify second or sub-
sequent offenses of drunk driving as felonies.’ /

The approach to arrest and search and seizure
problems suggested by the state provides a system of
uniform rights under the constitution. Under this
analysis, a person’s constitutional rights do not change
depending upon the labe! a state legislature places on an
offense.

If the common law rules of arrest were not made part
of the constitution, the various states by statute and state
constitution can set different limits on the arrest authority
of the police; but the United States constitutional limits
and rights will not thereby be changed. Under the
common law, the police officer did not have authority to
arrest for a misdemeanor not committed in his presence.
The states by statute or by state constitution should have

*/ In the following states and the District of Columbia, the first
conviction for drunk driving is punished as a misdemeanor:

Ala. Code § 32-5A-191 (Supp. 1982)
Alaska Stat. § 28-35-030 (Supp. 1982)
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-692 (Supp. 1982-1983)
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 75-1027 (1979)
Cal. Veh. Code § 23152 (Deering Supp. 1983)
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-227(a) (1983)
Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 4177 (Supp. 1983)
Fla. Stat. Ann. € 316.193 (West Supp. 1983)
Ga. Code Ann. § 68A-902 (Supp. 1982)
(footnote continued)

’/ Drunk driving is classified a felony in the following states: Ind.
Code Ann. § 9-4-1-54 (Burns Supp. 1982), second offense; lowa Code
Ann. § 321.281 (West Supp. 1982-1983), third and subsequent offenses;
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.625 (Supp. 1982-1983), third offense
within ten years; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 577.023 (Supp. 1983), third offense
within three years; N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1192 (McKinney Supp.
(182-1983), second offense within ten years; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, §
11-902 (West Supp. 1982-1983), second offense; S.D. Codified Laws
Ann. § 32-23-4 (1976), third and subsequent offenses; and Tex. Veh.
Code Ann. § 6701L-2 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), second offense.

21

the power to alter the common law arrest authority of
police officers. Typically, the common law can be changed
by statute or state constitution. See Silver v. Silver, 280
U.S. 117, 122(1929), and Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219
U.S. 104, 113 (1911). The common law rule of arrest
should not be an exception. In Payton, this Court pointed
out that the common law rule of arrest developed in legal
contexts that substantially differ from the cases arising
today. 445 U.S. at 591. In Steagald, this Court said in 451
U.S. at 217 n.10:

The significance accorded to such authority
[referring to the common law as being instructive
by determining what sort of searches and
seizures the framers of the fourth amendment
regarded as reasonable], however, must be kept
in perspective, for our decisions in this area
have not “simply frozen into constitutional law

Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 291-4 (Supp. 1982) ‘
Idaho Code § 49-1102 (1980)
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 95 1/2, § 11-501

(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983)
Ind. Code Ann. § 9-4-1-54 (Burns Supp. 1982)
lowa Code Ann. § 321.281 (West Supp. 1982-1983)
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1567 (1982)
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14.98 (West Supp. 1983)
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 29, § 1312B (Supp. 1982-1983)
Md. Transp. Code Ann. § 21-902 (Supp. 1982)
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.625 (Supp. 1982-1983)
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 169.121 (West Supp. 1983)
Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30 (Supp. 1982)

. Ann. Stat. § 577.010 and § 577.012 (Supp. 1983)

. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1192( Supp. 1982-1983)
. Cent. aa ange (Supp. 1981)

. Code Ann. § 4511.19 (Page Supp. 1982)
tit. 47, § 11-802 (West Supp. 1982-1983)

snecaiete
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22

those enforcement practices that exited at the
time of the fourth amendment’s passage.”
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 591 n.33. The
common-law rules governing searches and
arrest evolved in a society far simpler than ours
is today. Crime has changed, as have the means
of law enforcement, and it would therefore be
naive to assume that those actions a constable
could take in an English or American village
three centuries ago should necessarily govern
what we, as a society, now regard as proper. C7.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-353
(1967). Instead, the amendment’s prohibition
against “unreasonable searches and seizures”
must be interpreted “in light of contemporary
norms and conditions.”” Payton v. New York,
supra, at 591 n.33.

Several courts have already concluded that the

common law rules of arrest are not part of the United
States Constitution and that the states are therefore free
to alter the common law and to give police the same
authority to arrest for misdemeanors that they had at
common law to arrest for felonies, i.e., the authority to
arrest for a crime committed outside their presence as
long as they have probable cause. See Street v. Surdyka,

Or. Rev. Stat. § 487.540 (1981)

Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. tit. 75, §3731 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984)
R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2 (Supp. 1982)

8.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 32-23-1 (1976)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401 (Supp. 1982)

Tex. Veh. Code Ann. § 6701L-1 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 1981)

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 1201 (Supp. 1982)

Va. Code § 18.2-266 (1982)

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 46.61.515 (Supp. 1983-1984)

W. Va. Code § 17C-5-2 (Supp. 1982)

Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-229 (Supp. 1982)

D.C. Code Ann. § 40-716 (Supp. 1982)

23

492 F.2d 368, 371-72 (4th Cir. 1974); Diamond v. Marland,
395 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Ga. 1975); United States v. Grosso,
225 F. Supp. 161, 170 (W.D. Pa. 1964); In the Matter of
Gardner, 39 N.C. App. 567, 251 S.E.2d 723 (1979); City of
Columbus v. Herrell, 18 Ohio App. 2d 149, 247 N.E.2d 770,
773 (1969); Commonwealth v. Levesque, 469 Pa. 118, 364
A.2d 932, 937 (1976); and State v. Berker, 391 A.2d 107
(R.I. 1978). The rationale for these decisions was explained
in Street, 492 F.2d at 371-72:

The constitutional restrictions on arrest are
derived from the fourth amendment’s prohibi-
tion of unreasonable seizures. Because the
Supreme Court has interpreted the fourth amend-
ment in light of the law that existed wheri the
Bill of Rights was adopted, see, e.g., Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149-51, 45S. Ct. 280,
69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), it might be argued that the
fourth amendment incorporates the common
law’s restrictions on warrantless arrests for
misdemeanors. But the supreme court has never
given constitutional force to this element of the
common law. In Bad Elk v. United States, 177
U.S. 529, 20 S. Ct. 729, 44 L.Ed. 874 (1900), the
Court applied the common law rule but hinted
that its restrictions could be relaxed by statute.
Subsequent cases have focused entirely on the
requirement of probable cause. See Beck v. Ohio,
379 U.S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964);
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S. Ct.
168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959). We do not think the
fourth amendment should now be interpreted to
prohibit warrantless arrests for misdemeanors
committed outside an officer’s presence. The
difference between felonies and misdemeanors
is no longer as significant as it was at common
. law. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
158, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). Maryland

24

courts have criticized the continued use of the
common law rule as impractical and illogical,
and have invited the state legislature to adopt
new rules. Robinson v. State, 4 Md. App. 515, 243
A.2d 879 (1968). Classifications based on other
criteria could be both rational and practical. For
example, Congress has authorized warrantless
arrests on probable cause for any violation of
the federal laws pertaining to narcotics or mari-
juana. 26 U.S.C. sec. 7607. We are most reluctant
to adopt a constitutional interpretation that
would impede reform in this area. The fourth
amendment protects individuals from unfounded
arrest by requiring reasonable grounds to believe
a crime had been committed. The states are free
to impose greater restrictions on arrest, but their
citizens do not thereby acquire a greater federal
right.

(Footnotes omitted and emphasis added.)

It has been pointed out that this Court has never held
that the constitution requires a warrant to arrest for a
misdemeanor occurring out of the presence of an officer. 2
LaFave, Search & Seizure, sec. 5.1 at 231 (1978).

In Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529 (1900),
which was referred to in Street, this Court applied the
common law rule of arrest but said it could “not find any
statute of the United States or of the State of South
Dakota giving any right to these men to arrest an
individual without a warrant on acharge of misdemeanor
not committed in their presence.” 177 U.S. at 535. The
Court, therefore, implied that it would have been consti-
tutional for the United States or South Dakota to pass the
statute giving the police officers broader arrest authority
than they had at common law.

25

The lawfulness of an arrest is determined by state
law insofar as the law does not violate the United States
Constitution. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34, 37 (1963);
and Klingler v. United States, 409 F.2d 299, 302 (8th Cir.
1969). As argued up to now, the State of Wisconsin
submits that its legislature and supreme court have not
acted unconstitutionally in holding that under Wiscon-
sin’s law of arrest the police have the authority to arrest
the defendant in his home for drunken driving on the
basis of probable cause and the existence of exigent
circumstances. The arrest is constitutional because under
the fourth amendment all offenses that could be classified
as crimes can be treated the same and Wisconsin acted
constitutionally in so treating them. Therefore, it is
constitutional to judge the entry into defendant’s home
by the standard established in Payton, i.e., did the police
possess probable cause and did exigent circumstances
exist?

B. Even if the common law rules of
arrest were adopted as part of the
United States Constitution, the
arrest of the defendant was valid
because drunk driving qualifies as
a felony under the eighth amend-
ment limits.

Even if this Court concludes that the common law
distinctions between misdemeanor arrests and felony
arrests were incorporated into the constitution by the
adoption of the fourth amendment, and even if this Court
applies the rule of Payton only to offenses that could be
classified as felonies under the eighth amendment, the
police acted properly in this case because drunk driving is

26

a serious enough offense that under the eighth amend-
ment it could be classified as a felony.*/

On several occasions, this Court hos acknowledged
the seriousness of drunk driving.’/ In South Dakota v.
Neville, — U.S. —, 103 S. Ct. 916, 920 (1983), this Court
said:

The situation underlying this case — that of the
drunk driver — occurs with tragic frequency on
our Nation’s highways. The carnage caused by
drunk drivers is well documented and needs no
detailed recitation here.

In Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979), this
Court said:

States surely have at least as much interest in
removing drunken drivers from their highways

*/ If the Court concludes that the common law distinctions
between misdemeanors and felonies in regard to the rules of arrest
were incorporated in the constitution, the state submits that for
purposes of the fourth amendment the terms felony and misdemeanor
should still be defined by the limits set by the eighth amendment. In
other words, for the purposes of the fourth amendment, any offense
should be considered a felony if it could be classified as a felony under
the eighth amendment. Any other offense that could be classified asa
crime, but not a felony, under the eighth amendment would be a
misdemeanor. As pointed out above, this approach would ensure a
uniform application of the constitution throughout the country.

*/ The defendant in his brief contends that the Wisconsin
Legislature has determined that drunk driving is a minor offense
(Brief of Petitioner at 19). The amicus curiae brief implies that the first
offense of drunk driving in Wisconsin is not a serious offense because
it does not carry a jail penalty (Brief of Amicus Curiae at 19-20). The
state submits that the Wisconsin Legislature does not consider drunk
driving to be a minor or nonserious offense. The reason the first
offense of drunk driving is a forfeiture was explained in County of
Walworth v. Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d at 718-22. In Wisconsin, the state
constitution does not permit local governments to create crimes.
Statutes, however, authorize local governments to create ordinances
(footnote continued)

27

as in summarily seizing mislabeled drugs or
destroying spoiled foodstuffs.

(Footnote omitted.)

In the footnote to that statement, this Court pointed
out that in 1975 alone drunk drivers accounted for 283 of
the 884 traffic fatalities in Massachusetts; and the Court
noted that traffic deaths commonly exceed 50,000 annu-
ally in the United States and approximately one half of
these fatalities are alcohol related. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 17
n.9.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Welsh cited statis-
tics similar to those used in Mackey:

In 1980, 583 drivers were killed [in Wisconsin].
Of these drivers, 470 were tested for blood
alcohol content, and 269 were found to be legally
intoxicated, having a minimum blood alcohol

prohibiting drunk driving, but the penalty must be a forfeiture.In
order to treat first offense drunk drivers equally under local and state
law, the state law treats first offenses as forfeitures. Therefore, the
first offender receives the same treatment whether he is arrested by a
state or a local official. All subsequent offenses within five years must
be charged under the state law as crimes. Thus, the legislature made
first offense drunk driving a forfeiture, not because it believed the
offense to be minor, but in order to ensure equal treatment for all
persons arrested for first offense drunk driving.

The amicus curiae brief cites Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68
(1970), and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968), as authority
for the proposition that drunk driving is not a serious offense in
Wisconsin (Amicus Curiae Brief at 20). Those cases are inapplicable to
the instant case. They were concerned with the right to a jury trial
under the sixth amendment. This case is concerned with the consti-
tutionality of arrest under the fourth amendment. The fourth amend-
ment and the sixth amendment are concerned with different interests,
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241 (1973); and therefore,
sixth amendment cases are not necessarily controlling on fourth
amendment issues. However, to the extent that Baldwin and Duncan
are relevant to the instant case, they help the state's position. In
Baldwin, this Court concluded that for purposes of an accused being
entitled to a jury trial a “serious offense” is one in which the accused

28

content of .10 percent. Wisconsin Accident Facts
1 (1981). Similarly in 1978, 576 drivers were
killed; while 226 of the 448 tested were found to
be legally intoxicated. Wisconsin Accident Facts
1 (1979).

Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d at 335 n.9, 321 N.W.2d at 253 n.9.

In Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957), this
Court said in the context of a case where a driver was
tested for intoxication:

Modern community living requires modern
scientific methods of crime detection lest the
public go unprotected. The increasing slaughter
on our highways, most of which should be
avoidable, now reaches the astounding figures
only heard of on the battlefield.

(Footnote omitted.)

In State v. Jennings, 112 Ohio App. 455, 176 N.E.2d
304, 307 (1959), the court said that an automobile becomes
a dangerous instrument when it is being operated by one
under the influence of intoxicating liquor and, when so
operated, the automobile becomes a public menace.

Justice Marshall was reported to have made a
comment in the oral argument in Solem v. Helm, 33 Crim.
L. Rptr. 4003 (No. 82-492, argued March 29, 1983), that
was similar to that made by the Ohio court. Justice
Marshall was quoted as saying that a defendant’s “drunk
driving conviction is close to a violent act; he was lucky
that something serious didn’t happen. A lot of states
recognize cars as dangerous weapons.” 33 Crim. L. Rptr.
4005.

faces a possible sentence of imprisonment of more than six months. In
the instant case, the defendant was arrested and charged with the
second offense of drunk driving and faced a possible jail sentence of
one year. See sec. 346.65(2), Wis. Stats. (1975). Therefore, under the
cases cited in the amicus curiae brief, the defendant was arrested for a
serious offense.

29

In the instant case, the defendant was fortunate that
his drunk driving did not result in an accident. Jablonic
testified that the defendant was driving in the wrong
lane of traffic and at the last moment veered off the
highway avoiding a head-on collision when another car
was approaching (R. 13:9)

Because the eighth amendment would permit a state
to classify drunk driving as a crime, even a felony, the
fourth amendment should allow a person to be arrested in
his home for drunk driving on the basis of probable cause
and exigent circumstances. The limits imposed by the
United States Constitution should be the same through-
out the country. What a police officer can do constitu-
tionally in Wisconsin should be the same that he can do
constitutionally in Texas, New York, Oklahoma and
Indiana. Also, the accused persons should have the same
rights under the constitution in Texas, New York,
Oklahoma and Indiana as in Wisconsin.

C. Evenifthe United States Constitu-
tion adopted the common law rules
of arrest, and even if the labels
placed on the offenses by the local
legislatures are controlling, the
arrest in the instant case was
valid.

Even if this Court concludes that the common law
rules of arrest were made part of the constitution by the
adoption of the fourth amendment and that the label
placed on conduct by local legislatures determines
whether the offense is a forfeiture, misdemeanor or
felony for constitutional purposes, the arrest of the
defendant in the instant case is valid. This is so because
this Court has recognized an exception to the warrant
requirement when exigent circumstances exist. This
exception applies to arrests for forfeitures and misde-

30

meanors as well as to arrests for felonies.'°/ In addition,
this Court has approved the warrantless entry into a
home to search for evidence in the case of a misdemeanor.

Decisions from this Court have indicated that the
test for the warrantless entry into a home under the
fourth amendment is the same for misdemeanors as for
felonies — in either case the warrantless entry is valid as
long as the police possess probable cause and exigent
circumstances exist. When the crime is considered a
felony, Payton is authority for entry to arrest based on
probable cause and exigent circumstances. When the
crime is a misdemeanor, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967), provides authority to enter to arrest on
the basis of probable cause and exigent circumstances.

In Camara, the Court considered whether a building
inspector needed a warrant to enter a residence to check
for building code violations when the resident refused to

10/ The defendant has argued that a warrantless entry cannot be
made at night to make an arrest for a minor offense. The state
contends that, when the police possess probable cause and exigent
circumstances exist, the warrantless entry can be made regardless of
the time of day or the degree of the offense. Fox wupport for his
argument, the defendant cites Justice White’s dissenting opinion in
Payton, which suggests that warrantless felony arrests be allowed in
the home in the daytime. The state submits that the defendant’s
argument is incorrect for at least two reasons. First, drunken driving
is not a minor offense. Second, the state submits that the defendant
has misread the comment by Justice White, who said in Payton, 445
U.S. at 616:

Today’s decision ignores the carefully crafted restrictions
on the common-law power of arrest entry and thereby
overestimates the dangers inherent in that practice. At
common law, absent exigent circumstances, entries to
arrest could be made only for felony. Even in cases of
felony, the officers were required to announce their
presence, demand admission, and be refused entry before
they were entitled to break doors. Further, it seems
generally accepted that entries could be made only during
daylight hours. And, in my view, the officer entering to
(footnote continued)

31

give consent for the entry. A violation of the code
constituted a misdemeanor. See 387 U.S. at 527 n.2. This
Court decided that normally search warrants are needed
to enter the residence to check for code violations, 387
U.S. at 534; but the Court said its decision did not
foreclose warrantless inspection in emergency situations,
387 U.S. at 539. The Court decided that the warrantless
entry in the Camara case was invalid because there was
no emergency demanding immediate access. 387 U.S. at
540.

Camara is important to the instant case because in
Camara this Court indicated that the warrantless entry
of a residence in an emergency situation to search for
evidence of a misdemeanor was constitutional. In Payton
and Steagald, this Court said that under the fourth
amendment the same rules apply to arrest that apply to
searches and seizures. Payton, 455 U.S. at 585, 588-89,

arrest must have reasonable grounds to believe, not only
that the arrestee has committed a crime, but also that the
person suspected is present in the house at the time of
entry.

(Emphasis added; footnotes omitted.)

The defendant cites this statement to support his argument that
nighttime warrantless arrests are invalid.

The state submits that Justice White’s comment supports its
position. As the state understands the Payton decision, Justice White
dissented because he felt that the police should be able to make
warrantless entries into a suspect’s home to arrest him, even in the
absence of exigent circumstances, as long as the officers announce
their presence, demand admission, enter only in daylight and have
probable cause to arrest for a felony. The state understands this to
mean that when there are exigent circumstances, most of the require-
ments do not have to be satisfied; i.e., in the case of exigent
circumstances, the entry does not have to be announced, the entry can
be made at night, and the arrest can be made for a misdemeanor.
However, probable cause is always required.

Under this interpretation of Justice White’s comments, the entry
into the defendant’s home was constitutional because the police had
probable cause and exigent circumstances existed.

32

590; Steagald, 451 U.S. at 212. Therefore, if under Camara
an officer can make a warrantless entry in an emergency
situation to search for evidence of a misdemeanor, the
officer can make a warrantless entry in an emergency
situation to arrest for a misdemeanor, if the officer has
probable cause. Thus, the same rule of arrest applies to
misdemeanors and felonies alike. Under Camara and
Payton, the officer can enter a home to make a warrantless
arrest as long as he possesses probable cause and exigent
circumstances exist.!!/

This rule is no more than an application of the usual
exception to the warrant requirement. The state does not
dispute that normally an officer needs an arrest warrant
to arrest an accused person in his home for any offense,
whether it is a felony, misdemeanor or forfeiture. How-
ever, exigent circumstances typically constitute an
exception to the warrant requirement. Watson, 423 U.S.
at 431 (Powell, J., concurring), and Watson, 423 U.S. at
435, 437 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Therefore, the State of
Wisconsin is not asking this Court to expand the authority
of police officers in order to rule that the arrest in the
instant case is valid. The state is only asking the Court to
apply the usual rule that warrantless action is valid
when exigent circumstances exist and the police possess
probable cause.

The arrest of the defendant is valid even if this Court
believes that the defendant was arrested for a forfeiture
offense of drunk driving rather than a misdemeanor
offense. In a forfeiture case, an accused is entitled to the
same fourth amendment protection asin a criminal case.
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693,
697-98 (1965). Quoting from Boyd v. United States, 116

'!/ An entry into a home to make an arrest for a misdemeanor was
approved in State v. Niedermeyer, 48 Or. App. 665, 617 P.2d 911, 913
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981), on the ground that the police
possessed probable cause and exigent circumstances existed. In
Niedermeyer, hot pursuit qualified as the exigent circumstance.

33

U.S. 616, 633-34 (1886), this Court said that suits for
forfeiture “‘are within the reason of criminal proceedings
for all the purposes of the fourth amendment of the
Constitution.’”” One Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 697-98.
The state submits that in the forfeiture proceeding the
accused is entitled to the same fourth amendment rights
he receives in a criminal proceeding; but that he is not
entitled to any more fourth amendment rights. Therefore,
the rules of arrest applicable to crimes under the fourth
amendment are the same for forfeitures; and the entry of
the home is valid if the police possessed probable cause
and exigent circumstances existed.

To summarize, under any of the theories used by the
state above, for the purposes of a constitutional challenge
it makes no difference whether the defendant was arrested
for an offense that was labeled as a forfeiture or a
misdemeanor under Wisconsin law at the time. The
arrest was valid under the fourth amendment if at the
time of the arrest the police possessed probable cause to
believe the defendant had committed an offense and
exigent circumstances existed to justify the failure to
obtain a warrant. The state submits that both require-
ments were satisfied in this case.

III. At The Time Of The Arrest, The
Police Possessed Probable Cause
To Arrest The Petitioner For The
Offense Of Operating A Motor
Vehicle While Under The Influ-
ence Of An Intoxicant.

The defendant was arrested in his home for operating
a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant
(R. 13:38; J.A. 46).

_ The elements of that offense are that the accused (1)
drove or operated a motor vehicle and (2) that he did so

34

while under the influence of an intoxicant. McAllister,
107 Wis. 2d at 535, 319 N.W.2d at 867.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the police
had probable cause to arrest the defendant. Welsh, 108
Wis. 2d at 329-35, 321 N.W.2d at 251-54. In this Court, the
defendant has not challenged that conclusion of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court. Therefore, in this Court there
is no question that the police had probable cause to arrest
the defendant. The first requirement of a valid warrant-
less arrest has been satisfied.

IV. Exigent Circumstances Existed To
Justify The Warrantless Arrest
Of The Defendant.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that for three
reasons exigent circumstances existed to justify the
immediate, warrantless arrest of the defendant in his
home. The circumstances cited by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court were hot pursuit, the imminent threat to safety
doctrine and the probable destruction of evidence. Welsh,
108 Wis. 2d at 336-39, 321 N.W.2d at 254-55.

A. Hot pursuit.

This Court has long recognized that “hot pursuit”
cases fall within the exigent circumstances exception to
the warrant requirement. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 218; United
States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976); and Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).

In Santana, this Court said that hot pursuit involves
some sort of a chase. 427 U.S. at 43. However, some cases
since Santana have justified warrantless entries even
though the police did not chase the accused persons into
the homes. In these cases the offenses were quickly
reported to the police who acted on the basis of informa-

35

tion received from witnesses and arrived at the suspects’
homes within minutes of the commission of crimes.
United States v. Stubblefield, 621 F.2d 980, 982-83 (9th
Cir. 1980), and People v. Baca, 198 Colo. 399, 600 P.2d 770,
772(1979). Two other cases have approved the warrantless
entries of homes to arrest suspects for misdemeanors
when the police possessed probable cause and hot pursuits
satisfied the exigent circumstance requirement. State v.
Penas, 200 Neb. 387, 263 N.W.2d 835 (1978), and Nieder-
meyer, 617 P.2d at 913.

In Welsh, the Wisconsin Supreme Court said that the
hot pursuit doctrine has evolved to encompass situations
where time was of the essence, i.e., where requiring the
police to obtain a warrant would constitute undue delay.
108 Wis. at 336, 321 N.W.2d at 254. This analysis is
consistent with the approach used by the courts in
Stubblefield and Baca.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court pointed out that the
defendant, “fearful of the officer’s impending arrival and
recognizing the possibility of being requested to submit
to a blood alcohol test, left the scene of the accident upon
discovering that the officer had been summoned.” 108
Wis. 2d at 336, 321 N.W.2d at 254. Randy Jablonic had
testified that when the defendant approached his truck
Jablonic refused to give him a ride home and told him to
wait to get help to get the car out (R. 13:12). Jablonic then
testified that the defendant was concerned that he
(Jablonic) would call the cops. (R. 13:12).

The defendant left Jablonic and walked to his home.
The police arrived at the accident scene, talked to Jablonic
and went to the defendant’s home. The trial court con-
cluded that the police arrived at the defendant’s home
within ten minutes of the defendant leaving the accident
scene (R. 14:35; J.A. 79).

* Emphasizing the importance of quick action by the
police, the Wisconsin Supreme Court said that if the

36

officers had retreated to obtain a warrant “rather than
immediately pursuing and arresting the suspect, the
requirements of the blood alcohol statutes would have
been frustrated.” Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d at 336, 321 N.W.2d at
254.

The hot pursuit doctrine applied to these facts where
the defendant left the accident scene when he learned
that the police had been called and where the police
responded quickly to the call for assistance and were able
to reach the defendant’s home within ten minutes of his
leaving the accident scene. As noted by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, time was of the essence because the
police had to preserve evidence of the defendant’s level of
alcohol consumption. This required quick action by the
police and justified the hot pursuit. As will be discussed
later, the need to prevent the destruction of evidence also
supplied an independent ground for finding the existence
of exigent circumstances. However, that ground was in
addition to the hot pursuit.

B. Theimminent threat to safety.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court also justified the
warrantless arrest of the defendant on the ground that
prompt action by the police prevented ‘“‘the driver from
returning to his car, or another automobile, where he
could have continued to drive in his current state posing a
danger to himself and the public.”” Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d at
337, 321 N.W.2d at 255. The Wisconsin court concluded
that the nature of the offense, coupled with the potential
threat to public safety, satisfied the exigent circumstances
test pursuant to the imminent threat to safety doctrine.
108 Wis. 2d at 337-38, 321 N.W.2d at 255.

In State v. Martin, 275 S.C. 141, 268 S.E.2d 105, 107
(1980), the South Carolina Supreme Court said a police
officer was justified in making a warrantless arrest of a
suspected drunken driver at an accident scene because

37

“la]n intoxicated person who has just been in an accident
and who still has the opportunity to operate his vehicle
presents a clear and present danger to the community.”
Thus, the South Carolina Supreme Court also recognized
that the danger posed by a drunk driver returning to his
car and driving can justify action by the police that
might otherwise be illegal.

In the instant case, the defendant contends that he
posed no danger to the community because he had
returned home, undressed and gone to bed. However, in
making this argument the defendant forgets that this
Court must be concerned with information known to the
police officer, not the facts known by the defendant.
When the police officers entered the defendant’s home
there was no way for them to know that he was in bed. For
all the officers knew, the defendant was prepared to walk
the short distance to his car to retrieve it from the
cemetery and to continue driving about the city in his
intoxicated condition. Therefore, the fact that the defend-
ant was in bed cannot defeat an otherwise valid reason
for the police to act in the interest of defusing a threat to
public safety.

C. Prevention of the destruction of
evidence.

The final reason the Wisconsin Supreme Court gave
for finding that exigent circumstances existed was that
an immediate arrest was needed to prevent the probable
destruction of evidence. 108 Wis. 2d at 338, 321 N.W.2d at
255. The court noted that alcohol rapidly metabolizes in
the blood after a person stops drinking and “[w]ithout an
immediate blood alcohol test, highly reliable and per-
suasive evidence facilitating the state’s proof of the
defendant’s alleged violation” of the drunk driving law
would be destroyed. 108 Wis. 2d at 338, 321 N.W.2d at 255.

38

The state submits that the prevention of the imminent
destruction of evidence provides the strongest reason for
finding that in the instant case exigent circumstances
existed to justify the warrantless entry of the defendant’s
home to arrest him.

This Court has recognized that the threat of the
removal or destruction of evidence, when coupled with
probable cause, justifies a warrantless entry of a suspect’s
home to arrest or to search. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S.
499, 509 (1978); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43
(1976); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35(1970); McDonald
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948); and Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948).

In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71
(1966), this Court ruled that the diminishing of the
percentage of alcohol in the blood that begins shortly
after drinking stops justified the warrantless seizure of a
blood sample from a suspected drunken driver. The Court
ruled that this threatened destruction of evidence posed
an emergency that justified the warrantless action. 384
U.S. at 770-71. Numerous other courts have agreed with
Schmerber that the loss of alcohol from the blood con-
stitutes an exigent circumstance that permits the warrant-
less seizure of evidence. United States v. Harvey, 701 F.2d
800, 803 (9th Cir. 1983); People v. Rodriguez, 645 P.2d 857,
860 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Williams, 417 So. 2d
755, 756 (Fla. Ct. App. 1982); People v. Bell, 41 Ill. App. 3d
233, 355 N.E.2d 38, 40-41 (1976); DeVaney v. State, 259
Ind. 483, 288 N.E.2d 732, 735 (1972); Pollard v. State, 439
N.E.2d 177, 182, 183 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Shultz v. State,
417 N.E.2d 1127, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); State v.
Oevering, 268 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 1978); Gregg v. State,
374 So. 2d 1301, 1303-04 (Miss. 1979); State v. Campbell,
615 P.2d 190, 196 (Mont. 1980); State in Interest of M.P.C.,
165 N.J. Super. 131, 397 A.2d 1092, 1094 (1979); Common-
wealth v. Trefry, 249 Pa. Super. 117, 375 A.2d 786, 793
(1977); Hayes v. State, 634 S.W.2d 359, 363 (Tex. Ct. App.

39

1982); and Aliff v. State, 627S.W.2d 166, 169, 170 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1982).

In Schmerber, this Court said that ordinarily search
warrants would be required to obtain a blood sample
from a suspect:

Search warrants are ordinarily required for
searches of dwellings, and absent an emergency,
no less could be required where intrusions into
the human body are concerned.

384 U.S. at 770.

In comparing the search of a dwelling with the
search of a human body, this Court indicated that absent
a warrant the state would have to make as great a
showing of an emergency to search the body as to search
the home. In Schmerber, the possible destruction of
evidence by the alcohol metabolizing in the blood qualified
as an emergency justifying the warrantless seizure of the
blood sample from the body. If loss of evidence of
intoxication justifies entering the human body, then,
under Schmerber, it logically follows that the threat of
loss of the same evidence justifies entry into a home to
obtain the evidence. Since the fourth amendment rules
governing search and seizure are the same as those
governing arrest, Payton, 445 U.S. at 590; Steagald, 451
U.S. at 212, the prevention of the loss of evidence of
intoxication provides the emergency needed to make the
warrantless entry into the home to arrest the defendant

, and to obtain evidence of the level of alcohol in the blood.

In other cases this Court has implied even more
strongly that the prevention of the destruction of intoxica-
tion provides the exigent circumstance needed to make a
warrantless entry into a home. In Vale, the warrantless
entry into the suspect’s home was ruled unconstitutional.
In explaining why the entry was illegal, this Court noted
that no one claimed that the police were responding to an

40

emergency. 399 U.S. at 35. The Court said: “The goods
ultimately seized were not in the process of destruction.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71.” Vale, 399
U.S. at 35.

The state submits that it is significant that this
Court cited Schmerberin a home entry case. The citation
of Schmerber in Vale indicates that the threat of the
destruction of the evidence of alcohol in the blood would
justify the warrantless entry into the home. Such a
justification exists in the instant case.

Also, in Camara, this Court cited Schmerber as a
case exemplifying the type of situation where a warrant
is not necessary because “the burden of obtaining a
warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose
behind the search.”’ 387 U.S. at 533. The citation of
Schmerber in Camara is important because the issue in
that case was whether a warrant was required to enter a
residence to search for evidence of a misdemeanor viola-
tion of the building code. In other words, the citation of
Schmerber in Camara indicates that the loss or the
destruction of alcohol in the blood would justify the
warrantless entry into the home to search for evidence of
a misdemeanor.

Camara also adds further support to the state’s
position when read together with Mackey v. Montrym,
443 U.S. 1 (1979). In Camara, this Court said that the
warrantless entry of the residence to search for a mis-
demeanor building code violation would be justified in
emergency situations, such as the seizure of unwholesome
food in North American Cold Storage Company v. City of
Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908). See Camara, 387 U.S. at 539.
In Mackey, this Court said that states have at least as
much interest in removing drunk drivers from their
highways as in summarily destroying spoiled foodstuffs,
citing the same North American Storage case that was
cited in Camara. See Mackey, 443 U.S. at 17-18. The state

41

submits that if its interest in seizing unwholesome food
creates a sufficient emergency to justify the warrantless
entry of a residence, as implied in Camara, 387 U.S. at
539; and if the state’s interest in removing drunk drivers
from the highway is as sufficient as seizing unwholesome
food, as stated in Mackey, 443 U.S. at 17-18; then the
state’s interest in removing drunk drivers from the
highway should justify the warrantless entry into the
suspect’s home, especially when the entry is made only to
avoid the destruction of evidence that will surely be lost
unless quickly seized.

The defendant argues that, for three reasons, the
prevention of the loss of evidence of alcohol in the blood is
not sufficient to justify the warrantless entry into the
home. First, the defendant contends that the evidence
may not be obtained anyway because he may refuse to
give his consent to the breathalyzer test. However, under
Schmerber, the state could forceably obtain evidence of
the alcohol level in the blood. See Neville, 103 S. Ct. at
921l;and Trefry, 375 A.2d at 792. Also, if the defendant
refuses to give his consent to the test, the state can
introduce evidence of the refusal at the defendant's trial
on drunk driving. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 916.

Second, the defendant contends that he may drink
more alcohol before the police reach his home and
thereby he will destroy the validity of any test. The state
submits that this possibility is the strongest reason for
permitting the police to make a warrantless entry to
prevent the destruction of evidence. The time the police
would take to obtain a warrant provides the defendant
with even more time to drink mure alcoho! and to destroy
the validity of a test. In order to reduce the chances of the
defendant drinking more alcohol, the police must be
permitted to enter the defendant’s home and arrest him
as soon as possible.

Finally, the defendant contends that alcohol does
not dissipate all that quickly in the blood so that there

42

will be time to obtain a warrant, arrest the defendant and
conduct a test before all the alcohol has dissipated.

It is obvious that in some cases tests concluded three
or more hours after the driving have shown alcohol levels
in the blood that exceeded the legislatively mandated
level of intoxication. However, it cannot be certain thatin
all cases the alcohol level will be that high after three
hours. Over the course of three hours the alcohol level will
surely be reduced because, as pointed out in Schmerber,
384 U.S. at 770, the percentage of alcohol in the blood
begins to diminish shortly after the drinking stops. In the
case of the defendant, the police did not know when he
had stopped drinking; it may have been a long time
before he drove. The police only had probable cause to
believe that the defendant was intoxicated when he
drove. There was no way for the police to know that the
defendant’s level of intoxication would not go below the
statutory level of intoxication if time was taken to obtain
a warrant. Even if the percentage of alcohol did not go
below the statutory level of intoxication, the percentage
of alcohol in the blood would have diminished during the
time the warrant was obtained and evidence would have
therefore been destroyed. To prevent the destruction of
evidence, the police were justified in entering the defend-
ant’s home to arrest him.

This Court has recognized the importance of early
testing for intoxication:

The Commonwealth must have the authority, if
it is to protect people from drunken drivers, to
require that the breath-analysis test record the
alcoholic content of the bloodstream at the
earliest possible moment.

Mackey, 443 U.S. at 15 (emphasis added).

Other courts have also concluded that, becausé the
alcohol content in the blood diminishes after drinking

43

stops, the test for intoxication must be completed as soon
as possible after the offense. Brown v. Municipal Court of
Los Angeles, 86 Cal. App. 3d 357, 150 Cal. Rptr. 216, 220
(1978); Williams, 417 So. 2d at 756; De Vaney, 288 N.E.2d
at 735; State v. Spence, 418 So. 2d 583, 586 (La. 1982);
Tefry, 375 A.2d at 793; and Martin, 268 S.E.2d at 107-08.

Because it is necessary to test for the level of intoxica-
tion as soon as possible, there is not time for the police to
obtain a warrant before entering the defendant's home to
arrest him. The state has observed that few, if any, of the
cases that allow the warrantless seizure of the blood
samples even discuss the time it would take to obtain a
warrant. In Schmerbder, this Court said the officer could
conclude that an emergency existed and the Court did not
mention the time necessary to obtain the warrant. The
courts have recognized that during the time it takes to get
a warrant — however long that may be — evidence will be
lost. Therefore, the courts have allowed the immediate
seizure of the evidence. This rationale also permitted the
police in the instant case to enter the defendant’s home
without a warrant in order to obtain evidence of intoxica-
tion before the evidence was lost.

The state submits that for the reasons discussed in
this section of the brief, exigent circumstances existed to
justify the warrantless entry into the defendant’s home.
The exigent circumstances coupled with the probable
cause possessed by the police resulted in a constitutional
arrest of the defendantin his home. For reasons discussed
earlier in the brief, the arrest was valid whether this
Court concludes that the defendant was arrested for a
forfeiture offense of drunk driving or for a misdemeanor
offense of drunk driving. In either case, drunk drivingisa
serious offense that could be classified as a crime, even a
felony, within the guidelines of the eighth amendment.

44

V. This Court Should Not Require
The Police To Seek A Telephone
Warrant Before Entering The
Defendant’s Home To Arrest
Him.

The defendant contends that before they could justify
the warrantless entry of his home to arrest him, the police
should be required to show that obtaining a telephone
warrant would have been impracticable.

The state submits that the unavailability of a tele-
phone warrant should not be made a requirement for
justifying a warrantless entry. At the time of the arrestin
the defendant’s case, Wisconsin did not provide a pro-
cedure for obtaining such a warrant. In addition, at no
time prior to filing his brief in this Court did defendant
contend that the police should have sought a telephone
warrant.

In any event, in the context of this case, the police
should not be required to seek even a telephone warrant
because during the time taken to obtain it evidence would
have been lost. Not as much evidence may be lost in
obtaining a telephone warrant as in obtaining a regular
warrant, but some evidence nonetheless will be lost
because the alcohol will continue to dissipate in the blood
while time is taken to obtain the warrant.

Finally, the state is not aware of any case where this
Court has ruled that the telephone warrant procedure is
constitutional. The state submits that it would be pre-
mature for this Court to require the police in this case to
have sought a telephone warrant when this Court has not
ruled that the telephone warrant procedure is constitu-
tional.

45

VI. A Decision Invalidating The Entry
Into The Defendant’s Home Would
Hamper Effective Law Enforce-
ment.

The defendant argues at the end of this brief that
invalidating the entry into his home would not hamper
effective law enforcement. The defendant urges this
Court to adopt a “bright line” rule prohibiting the police,
without a warrant, from entering a home to arrest a
suspect whose only offense is minor.

Of course, the state contends that such a rule would
not apply in the instant case anyway because drunk
driving is more than a minor offense. However, if drunk
driving were a minor offense, the defendant’s rule would
seriously hamper the enforcement of the drunk driving
laws. The rule would permit the drunk driver to race home
and avoid immediate arrest as long as he did not commit
a serious offense, which the defendant would apparently
define as a felony. Needed evidence of intoxication would
be lost while the police sought a warrant. The defendant’s
rule does not even allow an entry without a warrant in
those areas of the country that are sparsely populated
and where obtaining a warrant can take a great deal of
time. In addition, because the defendant does not want to
permit a warrantless arrest in the case of minor offenses,
he would apparently not allow the police to enter a home
to stop a battery that in Wisconsin is a misdemeanor. See
sec. 940.19(1), Wis. Stats. (1981). In other words, the
defendant’s rule would not permit the police to make a
warrantless entry into a home to stop acrime of violence.
This single example shows how impractical and dan-
gerous the defendant’s proposed rule is. The rule should
be rejected and this Court should apply the norma! rule
that dispenses with the warrant requirement where the
police possess probable cause and exigent circumstances
exist. That exception was satisfied in the instant case.

46

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the State of Wiscon-
sin requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court.

Respectfully submitted,

BRONSON C. LA FOLLETTE
Attorney General of Wisconsin

STEPHEN W. KLEINMAIER
Assistant Attorney General
of Wisconsin

Attorneys for Respondent.

Department of Justice
Post Office Box 7857
Madison, Wisconsin 53707
(608) 266-1677

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_1316%3A06. Public record. Not legal advice.
