# Motion to Dismiss or Affirm — Gholston v. Martin

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Motion to Dismiss or Affirm
- **Published:** January 1, 1982
- **Citation:** 459 U.S. 808

## Text

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RECEIVED |

: i al AUG 2 6 1982
No. 82-5100 .

Pr OFFICE OF Tie CLERK
guPRue COURT, U.S.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1982

Lois Gholston,

Appellant,

Edward W. Martin, Jr., M.D., et al.,

Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Motion in the Alternative to Dismiss or Affirm

Le S. Monahan

Counsel of Record

BRICKER & ECKLER

100 East Broad Street
Columbus, Ohio 43215

(614) 227-2300

Counsel for Appellee
Edward W. Martin, Jr., M.D.

OF COUNSEL:

Joseph W. Ryan, Jr.

PORTER, WRIGHT, MORRIS 6 ARTHUR
37 West Broad Street

Columbus, Ohio 43215

(614) 227-2244

Counsel for Appellee

Edward W. Martin, Jr., M.D.

tO Oe eg ee

C
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1982

Lois Gholston,
Appellant,
Vv.
‘Edward W. Martin, Jr., M.D., et al.,

Appellees.

MOTION IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

May it please the Court:
Appellee moves that the appeal herein taken be dismissed on
the ground that said appeal does not present a substantial

federal question.

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' TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . cece cccsceeseeereeeeeeeeeeeeeerereree iii

QUESTION PRESENTED... -sececcccsesresecneeeeereeeeeeneanene 1
OPINIONS BELOW... .cccccrcceeceeereeeeeeneeeeeeeeeeeeeaeees 1
JURISDICTION. .cccccserecessereereeeeeeeeeeeeeseeeeaeeeeeese 1
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. ..+eeeeeeeereceees 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE... ceccccccccterareeeeneseeeseeereeeee 1

ARGUMENT

I. SECTION 2305.11 AND ITS FOREIGN OBJECT
EXCEPTION ARE REASONABLE AND THUS DO NOT
VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ....sseeeeeeererecereeee 2

II. THE ACCRUAL DATE AND ONE YEAR PERIOD FOR
BRINGING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SUITS, AS
ESTABLISHED IN SECTION 2305.11, IS A
REASONABLE POLICY DECISION, BALANCING
OHIO'S INTEREST IN DISCOURAGING STALE
CLAIMS AND PROMOTIN®. QUALITY HEALTH CARE °
WITH PLAINTIFFS’ INTEREST IN RECOVERING
DAMAGES FOR INJURIES NEGLIGENTLY INFLICTED
UPON THEM, AND THUS DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT... ccccccccccseeesassseeeeeeseeseeeneee 5

CONCLUSION. cc cesses sseseererreeerrreeeereseseseeeeseeeeeerrrnere Qa

PROOF OF SERVICE. ccccceseeese eee eee eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 10

-ii-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Anderson v. Wagner,
73 Til.2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979).....eee00+2, 5, 6, 9

Botzet v. Spencer,
F.Supp. 177 (dD. Minn. LET Ta Sede eee aseweeseeedbecoeel

Carmichael v. Silbert,
422 N.E.2d 1330 (Ind. App. RAD ic. nied dik bib ale temas ob 6 On

Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson,

1945 TREPUEEEEPELEME REE E ETT Tee eee

Clark v. Gulesian,
400 U.S. 993 CISL ) aden cdine teaeadeadecrtersevesceehs 3, S,...7

Clark v. Gulesian,

429 F.2d 405 (list cir. LOPE i ce cdecseevecesensena . 6, 7

Duffy v. King Chiropractic Clinic,
17 Wash. App. 693, 565 P.2d 435
(Wash. ct. App. SO IN Tike alld ae eal a ghee ake ROL aia ete eso ae

Hamby v. Neurological Associates,
see GO. GEE, 296 Bebe BG S7E 6197) ooccveconesecesedcsccoced

Johnson v. St. Vincent yoapetat

404 N. . 5 I . 8 Coeeeececesnessecceseceeeds 4, 7
Landgraff v. Wagner,

6 Ariz. App. 49, 546 P.2d 26

(Ariz. ct. App. BOTS} Poccccceccoscvcsesccesesescessenvcercds 7

Laughlin v. Forgrave,
4 Be 2 308 (Mo. LOSE) cocoecrenasceccesvesocsesecd, 7

Melinyk v. Cleveland Clinic,
32 Ohio St.2d 198, 290 N.E.2d GIS CASTS) acccccrwaccssh, $

Mishek v. Stanton,

616 P.2d 135 (Colo. ROBO) .0.cc.a.c 0.96 celccnee.c 6 Onde Wives oD, 7

Owen v. Wilson,
2 RG ed OR. eae BO Caer e Pa ctdsecbovnovebebecech”

Roberts v. Durham County Hospital,
N.C. App. » 289 S.E.2d 875
W.c. ro) a App. SOUT s Ra bictacntrccadacd scuseatakeenect. «

Sellers v. Edwards,
a. , 65 So.2d 438 SAFES > amo bbb ae het aeeaaass cen

Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Association,
230 Kan. 55, 63 P.2 22 198 Tryryrerrriey Terr sire tf 7

COC CeCe ee rerereeeeeeseseceeay s, 6, 9

Wyler v. Tripi,
° t.2d 164, 267 N.E.2d 419 (1971). ocvceoeccroestoels 8

(iii)

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Appellant has been denied any federal right of
due process or equal protection, where her medical malpractice
claim against the Appellee was held to be barred because she
neglected to sue within one year after the termination of her
physician-patient relationship with the Appellee, and thus failed
to comply with Ohio's statute of limitations for medical claims
(Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Section 2305.11 (Page 1981), as interpreted
by the Supreme Court of Ohio).

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinions below are adequately referred to in the
Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement, and copies of the opinions
are attached thereto.

JURISDICTION

The grounds upon which this Court's jurisdiction is invoked
are set forth in the Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The pertinent Constitutional and statutory provisions are
set forth in the Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Ohio's statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims
requires that a medical malpractice plaintiff bring suit within
one year after accrual of the cause of action. See Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. Section 2305.11(A) (Page 1981). By judicial decision,
a cause of action for medical malpractice accrues, at the latest,
when the physician-patient relationship terminates. See Wyler v.
Tripi, 25 Ohio St.2d 164, 267 N.E.2d 419 (syllabus) (1971). Also
by judicial decision, in cases where the physician's negligence
involves merely the leaving of a foreign object in the patient's
body, the statute of limitations is tolled until the patient
discovers or reasonably should have discovered the negligent
act. See Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic, 32 Ohio St.2d 198, 201, 290
N.E.2d 916, 918 (1972).

The precise date on which the physician-patient relationship
terminated here is not settled. But even by Appellant's account,
she failed to bring suit unti) two-and-one-half years had elapsed

-~l-

after the termination of the Appellee's professional relationship
with her -- well beyond the one-year period provided to her by
statute. Appellant's claim arose from an extended simple
mastectomy that occurred on September 28, 1977. After the
Appellee had diagnosed that she was suffering from breast cancer
and discussed with her the laboratory findings that provided the
basis of his diagnosis, he performed the operation. The
post-operative period was uneventful. It is undisputed that
Appellant did have carcinoma of the breast.

Several years later, another doctor allegedly told Appellant
that her entire breast need not have been removed. After another
eleven months, she filed this suit. Her claim has been rejected
on three separate instances by the courts of Ohio, because the

statute of limitations has run with respect to her claim.

ARGUMENT
I. OHIO REVISED CODE SECTION 2305.11 AND ITS FOREIGN OBJECT
EXCEPTION ARE REASONABLE AND THUS DO NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
Within the past twelve years, this Court has twice declined
to hear equal protection challenges to medical malpractice

statutes of limitations. See Woodward v. Burnham City Hospital,

449 U.S. 807 (1980), dismissing appeal from Anderson v. Wagner,

79 I11.2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979); Clark v. Gulesian, 400 U.S.

993 (1971), denying cert. to 429 F.2d 405 (1st Cir. 1970). The

challenged distinction in both cases was that between medical
malpractice plaintiffs as a group and all other tort plaintiffs,
to whom longer limitations periods were available.’ Appellant
here, however, attacks the distinction in Ohio law between
foreign object plaintiffs and other medical malpractice
plaintiffs for purposes of determining when the cause of action

accrues.

1, number of other recent cases have involved equal protection
challenges, after the plaintiff's claim has been held to be
time-barred, to medical malpractice statutes of limitations.

No courts have struck down the statutes, however. See Botzet v.

Spencer. 362 F.Supp. 177 (D. Minn. 1973) (claim based on ——
contract and arising out of an operation for plaintiff's

As noted in the Statement of the Case, the cause of action
in a medical malpractice claim in Ohio accrues for a foreign
object plaintiff at the time of discovery (or when the foreign
object reasonably should have been discovered). For all other
medical malpractice plaintiffs, however, the cause of action
accrues at the termination of the physician-patient
relationship. In either situation, suit must be filed within
four years after the date of the negligent act or omission giving
rise to the claim. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2305.11(B) (Page

1981). Appellant does not challenge this four-year limit.

varicose veins; court rejected equal protection challenge to
distinction between medical contract cases and other contract
cases with respect to limitations period); Stephens v. Snyder
Clinic Association, 230 Kan. 115, . 631 P.2d 222, 234 (1981)
(claim based on negligent insertion of IUD; court rejected equal
protection challenge to distinction between medical malpractice
and other tort claims, with respect to limitations period);
Mishek v. Stanton, 616 P.2d 135, 139 (Colo. 1980) (claim based
on negligent administration of medication during childbirth;
court rejected equal protection challenge to distinction between
malpracticing medical professionals and other tortfeasors, with
respect to limitations period); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital,
404 N.E.2d 585, 603 (Ind. 1980) (consolidated cases involving
Claims arising out of tonsillectomy, hysterectomy, eye
treatment, and general hospital treatment; court rejected equal
protection challenge to distinction between medical malpractice
and other tort plaintiffs, with respect to accrual date and
tolling provisions) ; Lamy v. Neurological Associates, 243 Ga.
698, 256 S.E.2d 378 (1979 medical malpractice claim for loss
of consortium; court rejected equal protection challenge to
distinction between medical malpractice and other tort claims,
with respect to limitations period); Sellers v. Edwards, 289
Ala. 2, 6, 265 So.2d 438, 440-41 (1972) (claim based on a
bulldog-clamp left in plaintiff's body; court rejected equal
protection challenge to distinction between malpracticing
medical professionals and other tortfeasors, with respect to
limitations period); Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308,
314-15 (Mo. 1968) (claim based on rubber dam left in back;

court rejected equal protection challenge to distinction between
medical malpractice and other tort plaintiffs, with respect to
limitations period); Roberts v. Durham County Hospital,

N.C. App. ° , 289 S.E.2d 875, 878-79 (N.C. Ct. App.
1982) (claim based on intravenous catheter pieces left in
plaintiff's arm; court rejected equal protection challenge to
distinction between malpracticing medical professionals and
other tortfeasors, with respect to limitations period); Duffy v.
Ki Chiropractic Clinic, 17 Wash. App. 693, 696-97, 565 er
235, 437 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977) (undetailed medical malpractice
claim; court rejected equal protection challenge to distinction
between malpracticing health-care providers and other
tortfeasors) ; Landgraft v. Wagner, 26 Ariz. App. 49, 55, 546
P.2da 26, 31-32 Ar zZ-. . App. 1 76), a dismissed, 429 U.S.
806 (1976), (claim based on surgical clamp tere in plaintiff's
abdomen; court rejected equal protection challenge to
distinction between health-care providers and other tortfeasors,
with respect to limitations period) (appeal dismissed for want
of jurisdiction).

( (

The proper test for determining the validity of distinctions
drawn by statutes of limitations, when challenged on equal

protection grounds, is whether the distinctions are reasonable.

See, @-g-» Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, 404 N.E.2¢ 585, 600

(Ind. 1980); Ross v. Kansas City General Hospital, 608 S.W.2d
397, 399 (Mo. 1980); Roberts v. Durham County Hospital, N.C.

App. 9 » 389 S.E.2d 875, 878-79 (rejecting strict

scrutiny).

The Ohio Supreme Court has ably enumerated several reasons
for applying the discovery rule in foreign-object cases: the
absence of the typical “stale claims" problems of proof that
accompany other medical malpractice claims, see Melnyk v.

Cleveland Clinic, Inc., supra, at 200 n.5, 290 N.E.2d at 917 n.5;

and the "pressures associated with modern surgeon-patient
relationships,” Melnyk, supra, at 202, 290 N.E.2d at 918. After
balancing the policy considerations involved, the Ohio Supreme
Court announced in Melnyk that the cause of action in foreign
object cases accrues from the date of discovery, rather than the
date of termination of the physician-patient relationship t' t

applies to other medical malpractice claims. Melnyk, supra,

201, 290 N.E.2d at 918.

Recent case law uniformly upholds foreign object exceptions
such as that challenged here against equal protection attacks.
The decisions also uphold statutes of limitations that treat
medical malpractice plaintiffs in general differently from other
tort plaintiffs.

In 1980, for example, the Missouri Supreme Court sustained,
against a federal equal protection challenge, distinctions
identical to those that Appellant complains about here. Ross v-

Kansas City General Hospital, supra, at 399. The plaintiff in

Ross suffered an allegedly negligently performed tubal ligation,
which negligence resulted in her subsequent pregnancy. The
Missouri courts held that her claim was barred by Missouri's
statute of limitations for medical malpractice ciaims. The
plaintiff attacked the Missouri statute on the ground that, inter

alia, the distinctions that the statute drew between different

-4-

types of medical malpractice claimants violated the federal equal
protection clause. She contended that it was unreasonable for
the accrual date for foreign object claims to be the date of
discovery, while for other medical malpractice claims such as the
plaintiff's, the claim accrued from the date of the negligent act

or omission. See Ross, supra, at 398.

The Missouri Supreme Court applied the rational basis test
to her argument. It then imputed two reasons behind the

distinction to the Missouri legislature: first, a special

unfairness in barring foreign object plaintiffs; and second,
fewer problems with stale evidence in foreign object cases. See

Ross, supra, at 399. The court then unanimously held that the

distinction did not violate Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
’
guarantees.

The reasoning in Ross is sound. It leads directly to the
appropriate conclusion here: Ohio's foreign object exception is
reasonable, and thus withstands Appellant's equal protection
objections.

II. THE ACCRUAL DATE AND ONE-YEAR PERIOD FOR BRINGING MEDICAL

MALPRACTICE SUITS, AS ESTABLISHED IN SECTION 2305.11,

IS A REASONABLE POLICY DECISION, BALANCING OHIO'S INTEREST

IN DISCOURAGING STALE CLAIMS AND PROMOTING QUALITY HEALTH

CPRE WITH PLAINTIFFS' INTEREST IN RECOVERING DAMAGES FOR

INJURIES NEGLIGENTLY INFLICTED UPON THEM, AND THUS DOES NOT

VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.

This Court has twice declined over the past twelve years to
hear due process challenges to medical malpractice statutes of

limit. “ions. See Woodward, supra p.2; Clark, supra p.2. In

Woodward, the challenged provision of the statute placed a limit
of four years from the date of the negligent act or omission on

medical malpractice claims. See Anderson v. Wagner, 79 1I11.2d

295, 312, 402 N.E.2d 560,568 (1980), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Woodward v. Burnham City Hospital, 449 U.S. 807 (1980). In
Clark, the period was even shorter: two years from the date of
the negligent act or omission. See Clark v. Gulesian, 429 F.2d
405, 406 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 993 (1971).

Statutes such as that upheld in Clark may operate more

harshly upon medical malpractice plaintiffs than Ohio's

( (

limitation scheme, even though the period in Clark was two years
while the period in Ohio is one year. This potential for greater
harshness is due to the difference in accrual dates: under
statutes such as that in Clark, the cause of action accrues from
the date of the negligent act or omission, whereas in Ohio the
cause of action may accrue -- as it did in Appellant's situation
-- as late as the termination of the physician-patient relation-
ship. So long as the relationship terminates more than one year
after the negligent act, the plaintiff under Ohio law will have
had a total of more than two years from the date of the negligent
act during which to discover the malpractice, versus only two
years under statutes such as that in Clark. Thus, in Clark this
Court declined to hear a challenge to a medical malpractice
statute of limitations that often operates more harshly than the
Ohio statute. The Court should likewise decline to hear
Appellant's challenge here.

Although Ohio's statute of limitations may in some cases
operate harshly by precluding the claims of plaintiffs who did
not discover -- and reasonably could not have discovered -- their
injury before the statute has run, it does not therefore deny due

process. For example, in Anderson v. Wagner, Supra p.5, one of

the plaintiffs underwent amputation on both legs and also
developed cataracts, due to massive steroid treatments that he
received after an erroneous tissue diagnosis. See Anderson, at
300, 402 N.E.2d at 562. After the statute had run, a new
diagnosis performed on tissue preserved from the first test
showed that the earlier diagnosis was incorrect. The court
recognized that:

Although such a result - a cause of action

barred before its discovery - seems harsh

and unfair, the reasonableness of the

statute must be judged in light of the

circumstances confronting the legislature

and the end which it sought to accomplish,

Id. at 312, 402 N.E.2d at 568.
The court went on to find no violation of plaintiff's right to
due process.

The facts were equally compelling in Clark, supra p.2.

The plaintiff had suffered intestinal problems and general ill

( C"

‘ health for eighteen years, due to a towel left in his abdominal
cavity. The towel had been left there during an operation that
the defendant had performed. A unanimous First Circuit panel,
speaking through then-Chief Judge Aldrich, observed that:

Unfortunate as the present result may be for
the plaintiff, the state may reasonably
recognize that a defendant has an interest
in repose, and in the avoidance of stale
claims, however free from fauit the
Claimant's delay may be. Clark, supra, at
406 .

The court proceeded to uphold the statute.

A number of other courts have likewise held that, while a
medical malpractice statute of limitations may preclude some
plaintiffs from recovering damages before they reasonably can
discover that they have a claim, the statute does not therefore
violate federal due process guarantees.” Indeed, there is no
good case law holding medical malpractice statutes of limitations

unconstitutional on due process grounds.”

2See, e.g., Stephens, supra n.1, at , 631 P.2d at 236
our-year statute, accruing from date of negligent
act/omission, barred claim based on an IUD becoming buried in
plaintiff's uterine wall; the IUD was not discovered until a
hysterectomy was required after the statute had run); Owen v.
Wilson, 260 Ark. 21, 25, 537 S.W.2d 543, 545 (1976) (two-year
Statute, accruing from date of negligent act/omission, barred
claim based on surgical instrument left in plaintiff's body;
the instrument was not discovered until after the statute had
run); Laughlin, supra n.1, at 314 (two-year statute, accruing
from date of negligent act/omission, barred claim based on
rubber dam left in plaintiff's back; the rubber dam was not
discovered until after tne statute had run, even though the
plaintiff had seen seven different doctors to treat her back
pains); Carmichael v. Silbert, 422 N.E.2d 1330, 1333 (Ind. App.
1981) (two year statute, accruing from date of negligent
act/omission, barred malpractice claim; plaintiff discovered
the negligence within the period, but the court analyzed the
due process challenge recognizing that the statute could bar
some claims before plaintiffs knew about the negligence causing
their injury); Landgraff v. Wagner, 26 Ariz. App. 49, 54-55,
546 P.2d 26, 31-32 tiriz. Ct. App. 1976), a al dismissed, 429
U.S. 806 (1976) (six-year statute, accruing fron date of
negligent act/omission, barred claim based on a six-inch
surgical clemp left in plaintiff's body; the clamp was not
discovered until after the statute had run) (appeal dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction).

w

In addition to the two cases discussed in the text and the five
cases cited in note 2, courts in several other cases have
addressed federal due process challenges to medical malpractice
statutes of limitation; in every case, the court rejected the
challenge. See Mishek, supra n.1, at 138; Johnson, supra n.1,
at 603-04; Ross, supra p.4, at 400.

Statutes of limitations are by nature arbitrary and thus

eccasionally harsh. But as this Court noted in Chase Securities

Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945), establishing statutes of
limitations is a valid exercise of legislative prerogative, based
on public policy considerations:

Statutes of limitation find their justifica-
tion in necessity and convenience rather
than in logic.... They have come into the
law not through the jvdicial process but

th: ough legislation. They represent a
public policy decision about the privilege
to litigate. Chase Securities Corp. v.
Donaldson, supra, at 314.

Ohio's one-year statute and its accrual upon the termination
of the physician-patient relationship represents a legislative
decision resolving competing policy considerations. On the one
hand is the policy of giving patients who are negligently injured
by health-care providers a fair opportunity to recover their
damages; on the other hand is the policy of discouraging stale
Claims, with their attendant problems of absence of witnesses,

failure of memory, and so forth. See Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio

St.2d 160, 166, 267 N.E.2d 419, 420 (1971). The Ohio Supreme
Court, in refusing to adopt a discovery rule for the accrual of
medical malpractice causes of action, recognized that the Ohio
legislature has manifested its preference for the termination
rule -- and the policy decisions it embodies -- over the

discovery rule. Wyler v. Tripi, supra, at 170-72, 267 N.E.2d at

423-24. The court thus properly deferred to the legislative
judgment in this pragmatic, policy-laden area.

The Ohio legislature itself has more recently articulated
another important policy consideration behind the state's statute
of limitations for medical malpractice claims: assuring an
adequate supply of good health care to Ohio's citizens. In
leaving the termination rule for accrue] undisturbed and imposing
upon all medical malpractice claims a four-year limit from the
date of the negligent act or omission, the Legislature declared
that “immediate action is necessary to ensure a continuance of
health care delivery to the citizens of Ohio.” Am. Sub. H.B. No.

682, 1975-76 Ohio Laws 2609, 2843-44. Assuring good health care

% ‘ip
to the public has been explicitly recognized as a basis for
special medical malpractice statutes of limitations by a number
of courts around the nation as well as by the Ohio Legislature.

See, e.g., Anderson, supra p.5, at 301-09, 402 N.E.2d at 562-66

(extended discussion of the “malpractice crisis" and legislative
responses to it).

Thus, Ohio's statute of limitations for medical malpractice
Claims represents a reasonable legislative decision resolving a
variety of competing policy considerations. One year from the
termination of the physician-patient relationship offers medical
malpractice plaintiffs as a group a fair opportunity to litigate,
at the same time that it discourages stale claims and promotes
the quality of health care for the people of Ohio.

CONCLUSION

As demonstated in the foregoing argument, Ohio's medical
malpractice statute of limitations, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2305.11,
does not violate either the equal protection or the due process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Appellant's position has been frequently
propounded and uniformly held to be without merit. Appellant's
contentions present no substantial federal question, and

Appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal should therefore be

sustained.

Respectfully submitted,

_ snsee i thavtahte/

s S. ‘Monahan
ounsel of Record
Bricker 6 Eckler
100 East Broad Street
Columbus, Ohio 43215
(614) 227-2300
Counsel for Appellee
Edward W. Martin, Jr., M.D.

OF COUNSEL:

Joseph W. Ryan, Jr.

PORTER, WRIGHT, MORRIS & ARTHUR
37 West Broad Street

Columbus, Ohio 43215

(614) 227-2244

j : : OF ~

’ .

PROOF OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion in
the Alternative to Dismiss or Affirm was served upon John E.
Duda, Attorney for Appellant, at 800 Bond Court Building,
Cleveland, Ohio 44114; and to Thomas P. Michael, at 17 South
High Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, by regular U.S. Mail, postage

prepaid, this 24th day of August, 1982.

Deed: Jrevcahtr/

s S. Monahan

-10-

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_1276%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.