# Petitioners Reply Brief — Committee to Preserve American Color Television v. United States

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_1140%3A3

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petitioners Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1983
- **Citation:** 463 U.S. 1203

## Text

No. 82-2045

IN THE
Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

COMMITTEE TO PRESERVE AMERICAN COLOR TELEVISION
(a.k.a. COMPACT) AND THE IMPORTS COMMITTEE, TUBE
DIVISION,
ELECTRONIC INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION,
Petitioners,
¥.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The
United States Court Of Appeals For The Federal Circuit

PETITIONERS’ REPLY BRIEF

Pau. D. CuLLEN

Counsel of Record
NORMAN G. KNopF
RogBert L. MEUSER
COLLIER, SHANNON,

Ritt & Scorr
OF COUNSEL: 1055 Thomas Jefferson St., N.W.
WiwuraM F. Fox Washington, D.C. 20007
Wituiam D. ApPLER (202) 342-8400
CoLLiER, SHANNON, Attorneys for Petitioners
Ritt & Scorr

1055 Thomas Jefferson St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TN is ia i oes ce eve cee 1
1. Petitioners’ First Question Presented ........... 2
2. Petitioners’ Second Question Presented ......... 3
3. This Proceeding Will Not Become Moot ......... 6
8

Ree eg ieee

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Dono-
We, Se es I ee a,

Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S.
apt HE EA

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
Ae oe i a

Smith-Corona — Consumer Products Division,
SCM Corp. v. United States, Appeal No. 82-24
re EF, Ee si oc cc ks

Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498
Bk CO a Man te Ne

war os Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115
C2 ROR ARREST Oe heen es apes

United States v. A. N. Deringer, Inc., 593 F.2d 1015
ee BO oie hice a,

United States v. Cajo Trading, Inc., 403 F.2d 268
(C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 827 (1968) ....

United States v. C.O. Mason, Inc., 51 C.C.P.A. 107,
C.A.D. 844, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 999 (1965) ....

Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975) ..........

STATUTES:
19 U.S.C. § 1614 (1976 & Supp. V 19681) ..-..........

We ee OE CRD 6 ecco cnc c es cesse 2, 3, 4,

me UG, § 1661G@) Gupp. V 1962) .................-

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

S. Rep. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1979
=. Wome Cone. & Ad. News $8) ..............

ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIALS:
7... (eto, O68 ed, Ree. 27,006 (1088) .........-. ...
Oe FO TO Tr Ce kon cc

~] =«]

IN THE
Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

No. 82-2045

COMMITTEE TO PRESERVE AMERICAN COLOR TELEVISION
(a.k.a. COMPACT) aNpD THE ImporRTs COMMITTEE, TUBE

DIVISION,
ELECTRONIC INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION,
Petitioners,
ge
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The
United States Court Of Appeals For The Federal Circuit

PETITIONERS’ REPLY BRIEF

INTRODUCTION

The government does not challenge petitioners’
representations that the issues sought to be reviewed are
of major importance, as they govern the implementation
of the entire antidumping/countervailing duty programs.
Congress has determined that dumping and subsidization
of imports distort free market forces, injure American
industries and eliminate jobs and employment opportuni-
ties for American workers. Just as it has regulated the
business conduct of domestic firms through the antitrust
laws, Congress has sought, through the antidumping and
countervailing duty laws, to regulate the conduct of for-
eign producers who choose to sell in this market. The

2

antidumping/countervailing duty regulatory regime is of
potential application to all imported merchandise. To date
more than 180 administrative findings are in place. Those
findings presently cover billions of dollars of trade in
products affecting virtually every sector of the economy,
including agricultural commodities, basic manufactures,
and high technology products. Petition (“Pet.”) 3-4. The
importance and widespread impact of the issues raised in
this litigation are readily apparent.

1. Petitioners’ First Question Presented

The government’s opposition reinforces the critical
need to resolve fundamental differences as to how Con-
gress intended the antidumping and countervailing duty
statutes to be administered. Petitioners contend that the
1979 amendments to the antidumping law conferred un-
conditional rights upon interested domestic parties to
participate in the administrative assessment of
antidumping and countervailing duties and to appeal as-
sessment determinations to the United States Court of
International Trade. Those rights were created specifi-
cally for the benefit of domestic industries and workers
injured by dumped and subsidized imports. Pet. 13-16.

The government responds by asserting that the Secre-
tary of Commerce may circumscribe the rights created in
the 1979 reforms by virtue of a general compromise provi-
sion (19 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976) (“section 617”)) first enacted
in 1922 and never previously used in an antidumping
proceeding. The government would have us believe that
interested domestic parties have no interest in the assess-
ment of antidumping duties, asserting that the “govern-
ment is compromising its own rights” when it executes
settlement agreements. Brief for the United States in
Opposition (“Br. in Opp.”) n.9. It contends that “[pleti-
tioners are strangers to these [settlement] agreements,”

3

which do not involve “the rights of third parties.” Jd.
Although all evidence of Congressional intent is to the
contrary (Pet. 13-14 & n.14), the government seeks to
elevate this once obscure compromise authority to co-
equal status with the specific procedures in the antidump-
ing law. Br. in Opp. 10.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit attempts to resolve these diametrically opposed
positions by agreeing with the government that the Sec-
retary has unfettered discretion either to assess duties
under the 1979 legislation with all of its attendant pro-
cedural safeguards, or to compromise the same duties
without so much as giving domestic interests notice and
the opportunity for comment. No attempt to harmonize
these conflicting statutes is made; nor is there any at-
tempt to provide guidelines as to the appropriate circum-
stances in which one or the other statute should be ap-
plied.

This case will permit the Court to resolve these
fundamentally different views regarding the essential
nature of the antidumping remedy. It is critical to the
proper administration of this vital statute that the Court
determine whether mandatory provisions of a statute
may be selectively negated without recognizable stand-
ards, without notice to the holders of substantial rights,
and without even the semblance of judicial supervision.

2. Petitioners’ Second Question Presented

Petitioners allege that the report and recommendation
required by section 617 were fraudulently prepared and
that procedural compliance with that provision was a
sham. These allegations were detailed and specific and, in
the procedural posture of this case, must be deemed true
and construed in a light favorable to petitioners. Pet. 18
n.16.

4

Fairly read, the decision below stands for the proposi-
tion that such allegations are “not proper for judicial
inquiry” regardless of sufficiency. Petitioners’ Appendix
(“Pet. App.”) 5a & 8a. Even the government’s opposition
does not defend the correctness of this holding (Br. in
Opp. 15), but merely seeks to justify the results on other
grounds.'

Implicit in the Federal Circuit’s refusal to find jurisdic-
tion over allegations of bad faith is its determination to
accord extreme deference to agency action, particularly
where foreign policy implications are perceived. The
court below not only would permit the Secretary to de-
prive domestic interests of the elaborate procedural safe-
guards of the 1979 law, it would also allow him carte
blanche authority to ignore even the limited protections
afforded by section 617.2 The Federal Circuit’s excessive

‘In its opposition, the government advances a number of factual
considerations not of record upon which it speculates the Secretary
could have relied in his compromise determination. Br. in Opp. 12-15.
These “post hoc rationalizations,” of course, provide no basis to
justify the Secretary’s conduct. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971), quoting Burlington Truck
Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-169 (1962). The facts
of record as pleaded in the complaint, and necessarily accepted by the
court below as true in the posture of this case, are that the statutorily
mandated report was not timely provided to the Secretary; com-
pliance with statutory procedures was a sham: and the entire com-
promise process was carried out in bad faith in an effort to justify a
result that had been preordained for political reasons. It was these
facts into which the court below held it had no jurisdiction to inquire.

*The Federal Circuit went so far as to assert that “the Secretary
{in deciding to compromise] is not limited solely to the factors ex-
plicated in these [statutory] reports.” Pet. App. 7a. The government
has taken the position that since the Secretary is not limited in his
settlement decision to consideration of the factors spelled out in the
Statutory report, “the validity of certain factors in the report is of
little, if any, relevance.” Br. in Opp. 13-14. The proposition that an

5

deference has been manifested in other decisions as well.
In Smith-Corona Group, Consumer Products Division,
SCM Corp. v. United States, Appeal No. 82-24 (C.A.F.C.
Aug. 9, 1983), the new Federal Circuit found that “the
foreign policy repercussions of a dumping determina-
tion, makes the enforcement of the antidumping law a
difficult and supremely delicate endeavor” (Slip op. at 4
(emphasis added)) and that the decisions of the Secretary
are entitled to “tremendous deference,” id. at 36.

The Federal Circuit’s holding that allegations of bad
faith administrative conduct are not justiciable is contra-
ry to the vast weight of authority and accepted principles
of American jurisprudence. Pet. 17-20. Its extreme de-
ference to the agency charged with the administration of
a regulatory statute because of perceived foreign policy
implications poses basic questions as to the proper bal-
ance between the needs of the executive and the mandate
of Congress.

The antidumping law is not a foreign policy tool of the
executive. It does not stem from the President’s con-
stitutional authority to conduct foreign policy, but rather
from Congress’ power to regulate interstate and foreign

administrator may consider criteria in addition to those established
in a relevant statute is, in itself, rather dubious. Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412; American Textile Manu-
facturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 508-11 (1981).
Even if the Secretary is permitted to consider factors in addition to
those required by section 617, there is no authority for the proposi-
tion that the bona fides of the report and recommendation specifically
mandated by that statute may be ignored by a reviewing court. The
Federal Circuit’s excessive deference to the Secretary has enabled
him to circumvent not only the extensive procedural safeguards of
the 1979 amendments, but the limited procedures of section 617 as
well.

6

commerce. This Court may find that the foreign policy
implications of the antidumping law require that some
balance be struck in its administration and judicial
enforcement. But the blind deference of the Federal Cir-
cuit strikes no balance. Rather, it ignores the regulatory
nature of the statute and permits selective enforcement
of the antidumping law to become a tool of foreign policy.
It further relegates the judiciary to the role of a passive
witness to agency action without jurisdiction to ensure
proper implementation of the Congressional mandate.
The extreme measure of declaring that allegations of bad
faith in the administration of a key Congressional regula-
tory program are nonjusticiable warrants review by this
Court so that definite guidelines for the reviewing re-
sponsibilities of the new Federal Circuit may be estab-
lished.

3. This Proceeding Will Not Become Moot

Contrary to the assertions of the government, this
action will not become moot upon liquidation of the cus-
toms entries covered by the April 28, 1980 settlement
agreements. The agency action under challenge falls
clearly within the exception to the mootness doctrine
governing conduct which is capable of repetition yet
evading review. Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC,
219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).

Judicial review of future use of this compromise author-
ity may be avoided by the prompt liquidation of the com-
promised customs entries. Liquidation normally occurs
within six weeks of entry into the customs territory of the
United States, S. Rep. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 67,
reprinted in 1979 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 381, 453,
a duration far shorter than even expedited judicial
proceedings. Thus, a future compromise will evade re-
view because liquidations made pursuant to settlement

7

will moot any controversy prior to litigation.’ B.g., Super
Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 125-26

(1974).

The government’s obvious intention to employ section
617 in the future makes this controversy likely to re-occur
and injure petitioners. The government’s brief demon-
strates that it fully intends to utilize the general com-
promise authority of section 617 in the future. Br. in Opp.
10. It seeks unfettered discretion to choose between com-
promise and use of the enforcement proceedings man-
dated by the antidumping law. It further seeks to insulate
its enforcement decisions from participation by in-
terested domestic parties or effective judicial review.

T.D. 71-76, the Japanese television dumping finding,
remains in force, see 48 Fed. Reg. 37,506 (1983), and the
imposition of antidumping duties on current and future
imports of Japanese television receivers could be com-
promised. Moreover, antidumping investigations of color
television receivers imported from Taiwan and the Re-
public of Korea have been initiated at the behest of mem-
bers of petitioners, 48 Fed. Reg. 23,879 (1983), and
antidumping duties potentially due on imports covered by
those proceedings could also be compromised. Petitioners
therefore have a “reasonable expectation” that section

*The government’s Suggestion that future compromise will not
evade review because of the injunctive power of the courts is, at best,
specious. It contends that, “as the lengthy history of this and related
litigation demonstrates, . . . it is clear that an aggrieved party witha
likelihood of success on the merits could obtain injunctive relief to
prevent implementation of the settlement until such time as he has
obtained judicial review.” Br. in Opp. n.7. If this Court denies cer-
tiorari in this proceeding, however, few, if any, aggrieved parties
could show a likelihood of success on the merits in future cases so as to
obtain the grant of injunctive relief.

8

617 will again be employed to compromise liability for
antidumping duties imposed for their benefit. Weinstein
v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975); Super Tire Engi-
neering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 125-27 (1974).

Moreover, there is some authority that liquidations
made pursuant to the settlement agreements are not final
and conclusive as to petitioners. Although a dispositive
precedent does not exist, the United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”) has held liquida-
tions void ab initio where premised upon an unlawful
legal foundation.‘ United States v. Cajo Trading, Inc.,
403 F.2d 268 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 827 (1968)
(liquidations void when based upon invalid Presidential
proclamation); United States v. C.O. Mason, Inc., 51
C.C.P.A. 107, C.A.D. 844, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 999
(1965) (liquidations void when based upon unconstitution-
al statute). If petitioners prevail on the merits, the
liquidations could be held void under the authority of Cajo
andMason.’ The present liquidations accordingly will not
moot this controversy.

CONCLUSION
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit fundamentally alters the statutory

‘Petitioners sought injunctions of any implementation of the
settlement agreements because of the absence of a dispositive ruling
on the void liquidations doctrine.

>The government asserts that this action will become moot upon
completion of liquidation, citing 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (1976 & Supp. V
1981). Br. in Opp. 8. The government’s reliance on section 1514 is
misplaced. Section 1514 governs only the rights of importers to
contest liquidations. In United States v. A.N. Deringer, Inc., 593
F.2d 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1979), the CCPA found that Congress had
effectively eliminated the force of Cayo and Mason in the realm of an
importer’s protest under section 1514, but the court expressly re-

9

scheme enacted by Congress for antidumping and
countervailing duty proceedings and raises important
questions as to the role of the new Federal Circuit in
overseeing the administration of these important stat-
utes. The issues presented in this petition have wide-
ranging implications affecting billions of dollars of im-
ports of products involving virtually every sector of the
United States economy. The petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Paut D. CuLLEN
Counsel of Record
NorMAN G. Knopr
RosBert L. MEusER
CoLLieR, SHANNON,
Ritt & Scorr
OF COUNSEL: 1055 Thomas Jefferson St., N.W.
WILLIAM F. Fox Washington, a... 20007
WituiaM D. ApPLER (202) 342-8400
COLLIER, SHANNON, Attorneys for Petitioners
Ritt & Scorr
1055 Thomas Jefferson St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007

September 1983

jected the government’s invitation to overrule C ajo and Mason in
other potential applications. Jd. at 1020. Liquidations remain open to
challenge by interested parties (other than importers) who rely on
jurisdictional provisions other than section 1514. The government’s
claim of finality accordingly must fail, for petitioners are not impor-
ters and can rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (Supp. V 1981) as the
jurisdictional basis for their challenge to these void liquidations.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_1140%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
