# Petition — Public Service Commission v. Washington Gas Light Co. > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_0759%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition - **Published:** January 1, 1983 - **Citation:** 462 U.S. 1107 ## Text 8 y ba 1 6 5 S Oftice-Supreme Court, U.S. FILED No. apR Ll 1983 ALEXANDER L. STEVAS, CLERK IN THE Supreme Court of the United States OCTOBER TERM, 1982 PUBI.IC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Petitioner, Vs WASHINGTON GAS LIGHT COMPANY, Respondent. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS Lloyd N. Moore, Jr. Counsel of Record for Petitioner Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia 451 Indiana Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001 Tel. (202) 727-3050 Of Counsel: Michael E. Geltner Michael d. Newsoin THE CASILLAS PRESS. INC — 1717 K Street NW — Washington, D.C. — 223-1220 QUESTION PRESENTED Whether the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission exceeded its jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act when it decided to approve the annual budgets of Gas Research Institute, a research, development and demonstration organization engaged in research into synthetic gas and other subjects beyond FERC’s regulatory jurisdiction, and to authorize the cost of Gas Research Institute’s activities to be added to the wholesale cost of natural gas, requiring State and local regulatory Commissions to pass that cost on to consumers. *Parties to the proceeding in the District of Columbia Court of Ap- peals, in addition to the Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia and Washington Gas Light Company, included the Office of People’s Counsel of the District of Columbia. Gas Research In- stitute filed a brief as amicus curiae. eas TABLE OF CONTENTS Page CRS HO PRESENTED unc cc ccccccccccccncncccccsevens i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............. ccc cece cece ee eens iv PUPP MEY ccc crccccccescccteccccenvevceesescees ] PEPE ROUIOE civic ccncuncnscccecceccesccccccncseccuense 2 PNET CIEE VEE cccccccccccccccccesccesccesscaccees 3 STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............6 00 cee ce eens 3 REASONS FOR GRANTING PP TT rr Tee er err rrr rr rere eye 7 IE sa ccdcvdcretccesacecscececenscareseseasnees 13 APPENDIX Opinion of District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Entered October 29, 1982 ............5. la Order of District of Columbia Court of Appeals Denying Petition for Re- hearing, Entered January 21, 1983 0.0.0... ceca 26a Excerpts from Proposed Opinion and Interii Order of the Commission, Issued October 3, SE Scie hn io 656544049 44544,04454054840440400044450 048 28a Excerpts from Final Opinion and Order of the Commission, Issued November 10, DS aiaied 6.44.5529.904400544440421054404000 104 84R EES 33a Excerpts from Order of the Commissicn Denying Applications for Reconsideratiun, Issued December 24, 1980 2.0.0.6 cee eee 34a Natural Gas Act, §§ 2,4, 8, & 16 2.0... ccc cee eee 34a iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Case: Page Davis v. United States, ee es Ss co ncendenutuasanieeesaaeeeedienes 12 Davis v. United States, en SE co 2 os G4456 she obs BPE CeEAR AER ERS 12 F.P.C. v. Texaco, Inc., el errr PrerT yee) errr ere Tyee 6 Henry v. F.P.C., 168 U.S. App. D.C. 173, 513 F.2d 395 (1975) ........... 7,10, 11 John Hancock Ins. Co. ». Bartels, eh, 12 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States OCTOBER TERM, 1982 No. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Petitioner, Vv. WASHINGTON GAS LIGHT COMPANY, Respondent. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the District of Columbia Court of Ap- peals which this petition seeks to have the court review is officially reported at 452 A.2d 375 (D.C. App. 1982). It is reproduced in the appendix, starting at la. The orders of the Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia are reported at 39 PUR 4th 161 (D.C.P.S.C. 1980).' There is no official report. Pursuant 'The Commission first issued a proposed opinion and interim order. Excerpts are at 28a. Commissioner Long filed a partial concur- ring and dissenting opinion. The Commission then issued a final opi- nion and order. Excerpts are at 33a. Finally, the Commission issued an order denying applications for reconsideration. Excerpts are at 34a. 2 to authorization of the Clerk, ten copies of the orders of the Public Service Commission of the District of Colum- bia have been lodged with the Clerk’s Office. Excerpts, containing all of those portions of the orders relevant to this petition are reproduced in the appendix, starting at 28a. JURISDICTION The Judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Ap- peals which this petition seeks to have the court review was entered on October 29, 1982. Petitioner filed a timely peti- tion for rehearing in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals which that court denied without opinion on January 21, 1983. This petition is filed within 90 days of that date. This court has jurisdiction to review the judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals by writ of cer- tiorari pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3). STATUTES Natural Gas Act §§ 2, 4, 8 and 16.? STATEMENT OF THE CASE On June 29, 1979, Respondent Washington Gas Light Company (“Washington Gas”) filed a rate increase ap- plication which led to proceedings before Petitioner Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia (“the Commission”). The proceedings were designated Formal Case No. 722. One of the issues which the Commission had to address in Formal Case No. 722 was whether it was *See Appendix, pp. 34a-4la. 3 required to permit Washington Gas to treat Washington Gas’ costs for its allocable share of the budget of Gas Research Institute (“GRI”) as an operating expense. GRI is a research, development and demonstration organization whose members consist of wholesale and retail gas companies, including Washington Gas and its wholesale suppliers, Columbia Gas and Transco (“the pipelines”). GRI engages in research into a variety of gas related issues, much of it involving synthetic gas. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) is authorized to regulate the wholesale price of natural gas under § 4 of the Natural Gas Act. Although FERC has no Statutory authority to supervise or regulate research organizations, FERC decided to assume jurisdiction to ap- prove GRIs’ budgets and to authorize GRI to impose charges upon its members. Under this scheme, FERC authorized the member pipelines to include their GRI assessments in the wholesale price of natural gas to retailers, such as Washington Gas. In Formal Case No. 722, the Commission decided to use the calendar year ending December 31, 1979 as its test year.» The Commission was then faced with deciding whether it was obliged by FERC preemption to permit Washington Gas to recover its GRI surcharges as operating expenses* without independently reviewing the reasonableness of those charges, as it must for all other such expenses. >Under District of Columbia law, the Commission engages in tradi- tional test year ratemaking in which it examines the rate base, rate of return and expenses on the basis of a particular year’s data and, if that year’s data warrants it, authorizes a prospective change in public utili- ty rates. See Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Public Service Commis- sion, 402 A.2d 14 (D.C. App.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979). ‘During the test year, the GRI surcharge from the pipelines to Washington Gas was .047 center per therm. —_— es 4 Washington Gas contended that FERC’s action in regulating GRI and authorizing GRI’s expenses to be add- ed as a surcharge to the wholesale cost of natural gas com- pletely preempted state and local regulatory commissions from independently inquiring for retail ratemaking pur- poses into the reasonableness of Washington Gas’ GRI payments. People’s Counsel, a statutory party to Commis- sion proceedings, contended that the Commission retained authority, despite FERC’s approval of the surcharge, to determine whether Washington Gas’ GRI expense was beneficial to District of Columbia ratepayers and, if the Commission determined that it was not, to refuse to per- mit Washington Gas to treat the surcharge as an operating expense for ratemaking purposes. On October 3, 1980, the Commission issued its Propos- ed Opinion and Interim Order in Formal Case No. 722. (Excerpted at 28a) Having heard evidence on GRI’s pro- gram, the Commission concluded that the benefits to the immediate consumer were “indirect at best” and will be substantially less to residential consumers than to in- dustrial and commercial customers and to gas utility com- panies in general. (3la-32a) Although the Commission found that Washington Gas’ stockholders stood to receive a substantially greater benefit from GRI than _ its customers, the Commission decided to allow Washington Gas’ test year GRI charge as an operating expense because the amount was small and because there was some promise of benefit to consumers.‘ *The order noted that the Commission was aware that FERC’s Opi- nion No. 64, which reviewed GRI, was under review on the preemp- tion issue in Public Utilities Commission of Colorado v. FERC, 213 U.S. App. D.C. 1, 660 F.2d 821 (1981), cert denied, 456 U.S.__, 102 S.Ct. 2009 (1982), which was at that time still undecided. 5 Washington Gas filed exceptions to the Commission’s proposed opinion. It noted that its GRI surcharge had been raised by an increase in the per therm rate, effective January 1, 1981, and sought to have the Commission reflect that change in its authorized retail rates. In its Final Opinion and Order, filed November 10, 1980, the Com- mission denied Washington Gas’ exception. The Commis- sion declined to approve the post-test year per term in- crease, because, “although approved by FERC, [it] has not been shown to be justified on a record before this Commission.” (33a) Washington Gas pressed the same issue by application for reconsideration, and, in an order entered December 24, 1980, the Commission ruled that, since Public Utilities Commission of Colorado v. FERC, supra, was still pen- ding, the post-test year increase lacked the certainty necessary to require rate order adjustment. (34a) On appeal to the District of Columbia Court of Ap- peals, Washington Gas raised the issue of Commission authority to deny automatic pass through of its GRI per therm surcharge, contending that the Commission was wholly preempted by FERC’s assumption of jurisdiction over GRI. People’s Counsel intervened in the appeal and argued that, despite FERC approval, the Commission re- tained authority to review GRI’s potential benefit to ratepayers before approving expense treatment of the GRI surcharge. The Commission’s position was that, until the District of Columbia Circuit finally decided the Colorado case, the GRI surcharge lacked the certainty to justify post-test year rate adjustment. Its contention was that, while it could not reexamine the appropriateness of a FERC — approved wholesale rate surcharge, it was not obliged to authorize the retail utility to pass through such 6 a surcharge if FERC’s approval of it was ultra vires, the point in issue in the Colorado case. While this case was pending before the District of Col- umbia Court of Appeals, the District of Columbia Circuit decided the Colorado case, affirming FERC’s authority to regulate GRI. Public Utilities Commission of Colorado v. FERC, 213 U.S. App. D.C. 1, 660 F.2d 821 (1981). The Public Utilities Commission of Colorado bypassed sug- gesting rehearing en banc and sought review here.® On April 26, 1982, this court denied certiorari. 456 U.S.__., 102 S.Ct. 2009. The Commission then was granted leave to file a sup- plemental memorandum in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. The Commission requested the court to sus- tain its denial to Washington Gas of the post-test year ad- justment on the alternative ground that, since FERC lack- ed authority to regulate GRI, the Commission was obliged to review Washington Gas’ payments for GRI expenses before approving rate treatment. Noting that this court had denied Colorado’s petition, the Commission contend- ed that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals had authority to independently examine the issue of FERC jurisdiction and that it should do so, since such action would create the conflict which this court might see as necessary to grant review.’ The Commission then argued *The Commission and several state regulatory commissions filed briefs as amici curiae urging the court to accept the Colorado Case. ‘Appellate review of FERC decisions can be sought in the District of Columbia Circuit or the circuit in which the natural gas company has its principal place of business. See F.P.C. v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1954); 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b). Since GRI is not a natural gas company, the practical effect of the law is to limit review to the District of Columbia Circuit. 7 to the court of appeals that, since a large part of GRI’s ac- tivities involved research into synthetic gas* or subjects far removed from natural gas and Congress had specifically denied FERC authority to regulate synthetic fuels,’ FERC exceeded its authority when it undertook to regulate GRI and authorize rate treatment of its budget. In an opinion filed October 29, 1982, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the Commission had no authority to inquire into the reasonableness of the GRI surcharge. (20a) The court declined the Commission’s re- quest to hold that FERC had exceeded its jurisdiction, because “[rjeview of the rulings of FERC is vested by statute in the United States Court of Appeals, not this court.”'" (21a) The Commission’s timely application for rehearing was denied January 21, 1983. (26a) REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT It is important that the integrity of basic regulatory systems be maintained in the face of overreaching by FERC, that the careful balance which Congress ordained between federal and state regulation of interstate natural gas sales be defended. The court below, however, squarely held that the Com- mission had no authority to disallow the GRI surcharge as ‘See Public Utilities Commission of Colorado v. FERC, supra, 660 F.2d at 825-826. *See Office of Consumer's Counsel v. FERC, 210 U.S. App. D.C. 315, 655 F.2d 1132 (1980); Public Service Commission of New York v. F.P.C., 177 U.S. App. D.C. 245, 543 F.2d 392 (1976); Henry v. F.P.C., 168 U.S. App. D.C. 137, 513 F.2d 395 (1975). ‘Since the court of appeals concluded that its reversal of the Com- mission on the GRI issue did not render the entire rate order unreasonable, it did not remand on that point for modification of the rate order. (24a-25a) a reasonable operating expense and that the Commission was unauthorized to consider whether the GRI surcharge benefits District of Columbia ratepayers. As a conse- quence, the court has stripped those ratepayers of any meaningful protection — heretofore afforded by the D.C. Commission — from having to bear the cost of programs that may be of no benefit to them whatsoever. GRI clearly is not a natural gas company within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act, for GRI, a research and development organization, is engaged neither in the trans- portation of natural gas in interstate commerce nor the sale of natural gas in interstate commerce for resale.'' Thus no basis exists under the Natural Gas Act for FERC to regulate or approve GRI surcharges, much less to obligate state commissions'? to pass those charges through to consumers without regard to any benefit therefrom for the local ratepayers. The problem stems from the rule that, when FERC authorizes a charge to be placed on wholesale rates, regulators of retail sales of natural gas must permit the charges authorized by FERC to be passed on to the retail ratepayers as part of the cost of purchased gas. See, e.g., Narragansett Electric Co. v. Burke, 381 A.2d 1358 (R.1. 1977), cert. den., 435 U.S. 972 (1978). On the other hand, where FERC does not regulate a charge on wholesale rates, retail commissions, such as the D.C. Commission, may determine the reasonableness of the charge before ad- ding it to the retail rates. Thus, any increase of FERC ''See FERC opinion No. 11 quoted in Public Utilities Comm'n of Colorado v. FERC, supra, 660 F.2d at 823. '2While the D.C. Commission is not a “state” regulatory commis- sion and was created by an Act of Congress, it functions like a state commission in regulating retail natural gas sales. 9 regulatory jurisdiction decreases the regulatory jurisdic- tion of state retail commissions; FERC’s usurpation of authority regarding GRI charges reduces the authority of State commissions. The decision below graphically il- lustrates that proposition and shows the harm that accor- dingly befalls retail ratepayers. Because of this harm, the direct result of overreaching by FERC, a writ of certiorari should issue to review the decision below. It is important that courts and agencies maintain the in- tegrity of basic regulatory systems mandated by Congress. That integrity is destroyed when loose and casual scrutiny by FERC of the potential benefit to ratepayers of GRI charges is substituted for the close scrutiny of the D.C. Commission. It is also important that the integrity of basic regulatory systems created by Congress not fall prey to actions that run directly counter to the will of Congress. Much of research and development work proposed to be undertaken by GRI involves something other than natural gas as such. See Public Utilities Commission of Colorado v. FERC, supra, 660 F.2d 821, 825 n.9. While it might be desirable for FERC to administer — and raise money for — a varied research program in the name of conservation of dwindling gas supplies, the fact remains that Congress has denied FERC such authority. The decision below con- flicts with that decision of Congress. Synthetic fuels provide the most obvious example of how overreaching by FERC given legal sanction by the decision below violates Congressional intent. Several of GRI’s research areas concern synthetic fuels. Congress, however, has legislated on this subject, creating, in- ter alia, the Synthetic Fuels Corporation, 42 U.S.C. 10 §§ 8701 ef seq.'* Under the Act, the corporation may pro- vide financial assistance of various types to research and development projects in an amount of up to $88 billion. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 8772(c)(11), 8751. That munificent sum of money does not, however, come from gas ratepayers as such. Congress has determined that financial support for synthetic fuels development should come from sources other than ratepayers. Nothing in the Act refers to FERC or to ratepayers. FERC approval of GRI charges for synthetic fuels research conflicts with Congressional intentions. '° It is important that the decisional law in this area be both internally consistent and supportive of basic regulatory systems. The decision below, treats the Col- orado decision as controlling. The latter decision is, however, directly inconsistent with Henry v. F.P.C., 168 U.S. App. D.C. 137 513 F.2d 395 (1975) and Office of Consumers’ Counsel v. FERC, 210 U.S. App. D.C. 315, 655 F.2d 1132 (1980). In Henry, supra, three applications were filed before FERC pursuant to § 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act'® for cer- tificates of public convenience and necessity. The facilities involved included plant for the manufacture and transpor- tation of synthetic gas and plant for the mixing of syn- thetic and natural gas. The court, affirming the FPC, held that the FPC had no jurisdiction over plant devoted to the '*This legislation is part of the Energy Security Act of 1980, P.L. 96-294. '*The Energy Security Act of 1980 includes other titles concerning, inter alia, biomass energy and alcohol feels, renewable energy in- itiatives, solar energy and energy conservation, and geothermal reser- voirs. In none of these areas does it appear that Congress meant for FERC to saddle ratepayers with research costs. 'S15 U.S.C.A. § 717f(c). 11 production or transportation of synthetic gas prior to its mixture with natural gas from wells. In Office of Consumers’ Counsel, supra, a consortium of natural gas companies sought a § 7(c) certificate for a coal gasification plant and a pipeline to transport the syn- thetic gas to a point where it would be commingled with natural gas and sold. FERC granted the application. On appeal the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding on the basis of Henry that FERC had no regulatory jurisdiction over any aspect of synthetic gas production or development prior to its commingling with natural gas. FERC had argued that its action merely authorized future sales of commingled gas. The court rejected the argument, finding that the proposal at issue was in fact a financing device rather than a gas supply project, that the hypothetical sale of commingled gas was remote in time, place and even probability, and that FERC would regulate the plant during the construction and preoperation period, a time during which, of course, there would be no syn- thetic gas from the plant to commingle with natural gas. It is entirely clear, in light of Henry and Office of Con- sumers’ Counsel, that FERC has no regulatory jurisdiction of synthetic gas plant. And yet the court below implements the Colorado decision, to the effect that FERC can never- theless regulate and guarantee rate treatment of synthetic fuel research development and demonstration and for research into appliance, performance and technology, even though few of the GRI’s research activities cited in the FERC opinions independently fall under FERC jurisdiction and even though none of them are any more closely related to a jurisdictional event — the transporta- tion or sale for resale of natural gas — than was the plant at issue in Office of Consumers’ Counsel. 12 The court below held that review of FERC actions was vested only in the United States Court of Appeals. If it is correct, it underscores the need for this court to consider the merits of this case; neither state supreme courts nor other circuits would have authority to decide the issue of FERC authority differently from the District of Columbia Circuit. Consequently only that court and this one can set matters right. Sinc. the District of Columbia Circuit has not done so, only this court can. It is important that the writ of certiorari should issue for this purpose. The decision of the court of appeals in Public Utilities Commission of Colorado v. FERC, supra, is in conflict with the same court’s earlier opinion in Office of Con- sumer’s Counsel v. FERC, 210 U.S. App. D.C. 315, 655 F.2d 1132 (1980). While there has been some expression that an intracircuit conflict is for the court of appeals itself to resolve through its en banc procedure, '* the existence of such a conflict must be weighted with other factors in deciding whether to grant certiorari. For example, the combination of an intracircuit conflict with an important question does justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. See John Hancock Ins. Co. v. Bartels, 308 U.S. 180, 181 (1939). See also Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978), in which the combination of conflicting views among the judges of the District of Columbia Circuit and the importance of the question led this court to grant cer- tiorari where it had earlier denied the writ to the same issue presented on interlocutory review. In addition, where the area of the law is a specialized one and the problems have 'In Davis v. United States, 405 U.S. 933 (1972), the court denied certiorari when the solicitor general so argued. See Davis v. United ° States, 417 U.S. 333, 340 (1974). Davis, however, was a criminal case in which the litigant could and did present the issue again in a col- lateral proceeding. That is not the case here. 13 arisen and will continue to arise within one circuit,'” it is most appropriate for this court to exercise its discretion to intervene and resolve the conflict. See Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 59-60 (1948). The latter category applies par- ticularly to this case and the court from which it comes. See note 7, supra. CONCLUSION The court should issue a writ of certiorari to review the issue of FERC regulatory authority. Respectfully submitted, /§/. Lloyd N. Moore, Jr. Counsel of Record for Petitioner Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia 451 Indiana Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001 Tel: (202) 727-3050 Of Counsel: Michael E. Geltner Michael d. Newsom '’In this instance, while the decision in Public Utilities Commission of Colorado, supra, was written for the District of Columbia Circuit, it was authorized by a visiting district judge. APPENDICES Opinion of District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Entered October 29, 1982 ......... Order of District of Columbia Court of Appeals Denying Petition for Re- hearing, Entered January 21,1983 ................. Excerpts from Proposed Opinion and Interim Order of the Commission, Issued October 3, EERE ES Aig cee is AS a ae 39a counts, records of cost-accounting procedures, correspondence, memoranda, papers, books, and other records as the Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate for purposes of the administration of this chapter: Provided, however, That nothing in this chapter shall relieve any such natural-gas company from keeping any accounts, memoran- da, or records which such natural-gas company may be required to keep by or under authority of the laws of any State. The Commission may prescribe a system of accounts to be kept by such natural-gas companies, and may classify such natural-gas companies and prescribe a system of accounts for each class. The Commission, after notice and opportunity for hearing, may deter- mine by order the accounts in which particular outlays or receipts shall be entered, charged, or credited. The burden of proof to justify every ac- counting entry questioned by the Commission shall be on the person making, authorizing, or requiring such entry, and the Commission may suspend a charge or credit pending submission of satisfactory proof in support thereof. (b) The Commission shall at all times have ac- cess to and the right to inspect and examine all accounts, records, and memoranda of natural- gas companies; and it shall be the duty of such natural-gas companies to furnish to the Commis- sion, within such reasonable time as the Commis- sion may order, any information with respect thereto which the Commission may by order re- quire, including copies of maps, contracts, reports of engineers, and other data, records, and papers, and to grant to all agents of the Commission free access to its property and its ac- 40a counts, records, and memoranda when requested so to do. No member, officer, or employee of the Commission shall divulge any fact or informa- tion which may come to his knowledge during the course of examination of books, records, data, or accounts, except insofar as he may be directed by the Commission or by a court. (c) The books, accounts, memoranda, and records of any person who controls directly or in- directly a natural-gas company subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission and of any other company controlled by such person, insofar as they relate to transactions with or the business of such natural-gas company, shall be subject to ex- amination on the order of the Commission. Natural Gas Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 717(c). Administrative powers of Commission; rules, regulations, and orders The Commission shall have power to perform any and all acts, and to prescribe, issue, make, amend, and rescind such orders, rules, and regulations as it may find necessary or ap- propriate to carry out the provisions of this chapter. Among other things, such rules and regulations may define accounting, technical, and trade terms used in this chapter; and may prescribe the form or forms of all statements, declarations, applications, and reports to be filed with the Commission, the information which they shall contain, and the time within which they shall be filed. Unless a different date is specified therein, rules and regulations of the Commission shall be effective thirty days after publication in the manner which the Commission Shall prescribe. Orders of the Commission shall be effective on the date and in the manner which 4la the Commission shall prescribe. For the purposes of its rules and regulations, the Commission may classify persons and matters within its jurisdic- tion and prescribe different requirements for dif- ferent requirements for different classes of per- sons or matters. All rules and regulations of the Commission shall be filed with its secretary and shall be kept open in convenient form for public inspection and examination during reasonable business hours. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_0759%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.