# Opposition — Nix v. Williams > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_0752%3A03 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Opposition - **Published:** January 1, 1984 - **Citation:** 467 U.S. 431 ## Text Sl en ket WO. 32-1651 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES October Term, 1962 CRISPUS NIX, Warden of the lowa State Penitentiary, vs. ” ROBERT ANTHONY WILLIAMS, Respondent. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ON TO POR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION : ROBE.RT BARTELS College of Law é. Arizona State University ‘ Tempe, Arizona #52867 4 (602) 965-7053 sta Counsel for Respondent i i : -« : ‘ ¥ = -- > -- -? : -f r) ‘ ’ -- . ~ “7 ‘ ‘ -- a) - co ~ _ *« vw . . . , > , . ‘ ‘ >, _- ‘ -~ ss ™~ ‘ » = teenrr S.C. _ Pa 700 F.2d 164 (1 its pini t a Jeclined ¢t i or hy t ticai- evidence btaine ecunsel,” the ) inevitable-disc benefit without 700 F.2d at 169 held that the st 700 F.2d at 1171 Supieme Court. State v._ Williams' subsequent conviction was upheld Williaws, 285 N.W. 2d 248 t court articulated a two-pronged inevitable-discovery which the State was required to show (1) that the ate ft robably would ha constitutio riolation was comm ad satisfied bot ucght habeas cory . » 7 rounds, includi yurte's re ° irt’s applicati € Distri > urt ™ eB « lowa NO suU-4 eal the Eight? the District 983) (Pet at Al) T single Llssue inevi je “whether to recog! independent-source ex 1 in vioiliatior sf the overy provi exception the 5t ng that the poli (Pet. at AlO-Al ve been discovered in the nal violation, and (2) that itted in good faith. It then rh prongs. 285 N.W. 2d at pus relief in the District ng a multi-level challenge ion of the “inevitable dis- fenied the petition. 9-D, Dec. 18, 1981 (Pet. at cuit Court of Appeals Court. Williams v. Nix, he Court of Appeals confined vitable discovery. Although it table-discovery , tw c - ~ 3 a ~ exception to the rule excluding sld that “if there is to be an ate should not receive its ce did not act in bad faith.* The Court of Appeals then tad failed to show lack of bad faith. 7). SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT il. Contrary to tne state's assertions, it naa ample notice of the “good faith" issue on which the Court of Appeals decided this case: The Iowa Supreme Court announced good faith as an element of its hypothetical inevitable discovery doctrine; Wil- liams and the State raised and argued Leaming's good faith both in the District Court and in the Court of Appeals; and the State specifically argued that the Court of Appeals should decide the good faith issue. 2. The decision of the Court of Appeals was correct under Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), and Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). Williams led Leaming to the body soon after the violation of his rights; there were no intervening circum- stances; and Leaming's intentional elicitation of incriminating information before Williams could consult with his attorney -- in violation of Leaming's agreement with that attorney -- was flagrantly unconstitutional. 3. This Court need not consider or decide the validity of any inevitable-discovery doctrine in the context of this case, since the Court of Appeals was correct in holding (a) that any valid inevitable-discovery doctrine must include a good faith element and (b) that good faith was not established. Good faith is a par- ticularly important issue under the "attenuation" exception to the exclusionary rule under Brown v. Illinois and Dunaway v. New York, supra, and there is no reason why*it should be any less an issue under any inevitable-discovery exception. Moreover, permitting the introduction of ‘evidence derived from bad faith violations of the Sixth Amendment would remove the incentive for the police to use legal means to obtain such evidence, and would impugn the integrity of the judicial process. 4. The Court of Appeals was correct in concluding that Leaming did not act in good faith. This court's decision in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), established that Leaming intentionally and purposefully sought to elicit incriminating in- formation from Williams before he could reach his attorney, and that this was in violation of an agreement with that attorney. Especially in light of Massiah v. United States, 37° U.S. 201 (1963), Leaming could not have believed, reasonably or otherwise, that this conduct did not violate Williams’ Sixth Amendment rights. Consequently, Leaming's good faith was established under a “subjective” or an “objective” standard. 5. A grant of certiorari in this case also would be inap- propriate because even if an inevitable-discovery doctrine without a good faith element were valid, the result reached by the Court of Appeals would stand. Additional evidence introduced in the District Court established (a) that the search for the victim's body that was initiated two days after her disappearance would not have extended into Polk County, where the body was located, and (b) that even if the search had extended into Polk County, searchers would not have been able to see the body. Thus, even application of the broadest possible inevitable-discovery doctrine would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 6. This is not an appropriate case for this Court to consider an extension of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), beyond the Fourth Amendment context. The holding and rationale of Stone were carefully limited to the judicially-created exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations. See also Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1978). Unlike the claimed Fourth Amendment viola- t.ons in Stone, the Sixth Amendment violations in this case involved personal rights, and directly affected the in- tegrity of the judicial process. Moreover, extension of Stone would pe especially inappropriate in this case because the con- stitutional violations were not committed in good faith. Finally, ypplication of S*o"- *> this case would not chenge the result in any event, since Williams did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims in the state courts. REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT I. THE STATE HAD AMPLE NOTICE OF, AND LITIGATED, THE "GOOD FAITH" ISSUE IN THE DISTRICT COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS. As noted previously, the Court of Appeals did not reach the question of whether the “inevitable discovery” doctrine ap- plied by the Iowa Suprem Court was constitutionally valid. However, the Court of Appeals did hold that if an inevitable- discovery doctrine was to be recognized, it must include a “good faith" element, and that the State had failed to show that Detec- tive Leaming acted in good faith when he committed the violations of Williams’ constitutional rights that led to the discovery of the evidence in question. The State's first,and lengthiest, complaint about the decision below is that the State had no “real notice” of the “good faith® issue on which the Court of Appeals based its holding, and that that issue should have been remanded to the District Court for a “limited evidentiary hearing... .” (Pet. at 8-9). ‘This com- plaint is totally without merit because the State in fact had ample notice of the “good faith" issue -- and argued it on the merits -- throughout the proceedings in the District Court and the Court of Appeals: 1. Prior to the filing of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court, the Iowa Supreme Court identified “good faith" as a critical element in the hypothetical inevitable-disccvery doctrine it applied. 285 N.W. 2d at 260. 2. The initial memorandum that was filed in the District Court in support of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus raised the lack-of-bad faith element of the Iowa Supreme Court's hypothetical inevitable discovery test. (Memorandum filed ~~ — . Moreover, in uU | Mar. 30, 1981, p. 2 ging that this Court's decision in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), required re- versal of the Iowa Supreme Court's inevitable-discovery Gecision, . Williams argued in the District Court that Detective Leaming’s conduct was a flagrant i ation of his rights. (7a. at 23). Cine *¢) sr anevu"™ _ _™~ 7 > . i+ - had r - hed Since flagrancy is simply ‘ xsite jood faith, Dunaway OW rk, 442 > 200, 2é b> ane (1979), State v. ~ Rg . > | if . ~ c ) rr - c a * > U uw ‘~ - a peals directly ad- dressed the “good faith” issue on its merits (Appellee's Brief at 22). Moreover, at ora] argument counsel for the State explicitly o ] GQ. a | i) i © i) ° ret) e* pers te. or t ~- o . - os . - - a . - eta II ISION OF F : YF A EAI WAS JRRECT NDER 2IOR ECISIONS THIS COURT. This Court als should deny the petition for a writ of > ~~? | certi i p De iuSt tne le a> tne = urt >t Appeais “= ViZd.» >» > , ; 4 > ~ R _. woe heen xc inA Wer a it Cha ice c 3 i sue snouic sve been exclucec because 1 was obtained as the direct result of acts by a state law enforce- ment officer that (a) violated the Sixt Amendment and (b) were not committe in "good faith” -- plainly was correct under Brown T1li is, 422 U.S 590 (1975), and D way v. New York, In Brown, the defendant was arrested, without probable cause, at about 7:45 p.m. Following repeated Miranda warnings, he gave oo oa o s oo] ou oO c nd ve) o two incriminating statements, firs 0 p.m., and then - between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m. the following day. This Court re- versed Brown's conviction, holding tht both statements were fruits of the illegal arrest, and that neither the Miranda war- nings nor any other factors sufficiently attenuated the taint of For similar reasons, the State's references to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (Pet. at 10-11) also are misplaced. the illegality. 422 U.S. at 604-605. In Dunaway. the defendant was taken into enstody without probable cause and interrogated after he was given Miranda war- mings. The defendant waived counsel and eventually made state- ments that incriminated him. Holding that Dunaway was “vir- y a replica of® Brown, this Court held that the defendant's statements were illegal fruits of the unconstitutional seizure oO aa °? > 4 re) » * sefendant, and that neither the fact that the police had complied with Miranda nor the fact that the defendant's state- nts were voluntary attenuated the taint of the initial ille- gality. 442 U.S. at 218-219. In both Brown and Dunaway, this Court's focus was on the actual causal connection between the initial constitutional vio- lations and the evidence derived therefrom. This Court specifi- cally eschewed any simple “but for" causal test; rather, the ques- tion was whether the challenged evidence was obtained through exploitation of the primary illegality. In determining that question, three factors were to be considered: (1) the "temporal proximity f£ the illegality and the evidence; (2) “the presence of intervening circumstances"; and (3) “particularly, the purpose anc flagrancy of the official misconduct ...." This Court noted specifically that “the burden of showing admissibility 7 ° uw . ) oT , Of course, on the prosecution." 422 U.S. at 603-604; 442 An examination of these factors in the instant case leaves no doubt as to the correctness of the result reached by the Court of Appeals. First, the “temporal proximity” of the unconstitutional statements and the discovery of the body was as close as that in Brown and Dunaway. Second, there were no intervening circumstances between the violation of Williams’ constitutional rights and the discovery of the body. Third, the official misconduct in the instant case was especially flagrant. As this Court held in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), Leaming had agreed with Williams’ ~ av he would not interrogate Davenport lo ws Moines. Nevec- os rw Pa a re? a . of conduct which he admitted s much incriminating infor- sre he could reach McKnight. his Court held was flagrant because “the tuality of purposefulness’ in ce’ admittedly undertaken ‘in cs snaway v. New York, rown Illinois, supra, stant case, Leaming's uncon- lition for evidence t something incriminating it side of the coin nably be said that Leaming slly set out to elicit ums before he could get to his IlI. THE COURT OF APPEALS' CONCLUSION THAT ANY VALID "INEVITABLE DISCOVERY" DOCTRINE MUST INCLUDE A "GOOD FAITH" ELEMENT WAS CORRECT, AND DID NOT CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS IN OTHER CIRCUITS. This Court has not decided the validity of any “inevi- table discovery” exception to the exclusionary rule in the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendment context. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 475, n.22 (1980). However, this Court's decisions re- garding the evidentiary “fruits” of constitutional violations strongly suggest the impropriety of such an exception, since those decisions uniformly have determined the admissibility of challenged evidence on the basis of whether the evidence “has been come at by exploitation of [illegal conduct] or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint,” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1964) (emphasis added) -- not on the basis of whether the evidence hypothetically would have been discovered if the primary illegality had not occurred. See also Division II, supra: United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967).° In any event, this Court need not, and should not, reach the issue of the validity of an inevitable-discovery doctrine in this case. Eyen assuming, as the Court of Appeals did, that some inevitable-discovery doctrine is constitutionally valid, the evidence in question here was inadmissible because Leaming did not act in good faith when he purposefully violated Williams’ constitutional rights. Recognition of any hypothetical inevitable discovery doctrine would seriously emasculate the purposes of the exclusionary rule. Under that doctrine, even if the police were able to obtain evidence by legal means, there would be little incen- tive for them to use such means, rather than more *"convenient® illegal means, since the evidence would be admissible in any event. Application of the hypothetical inevitable-discovery doctrine also would involve a highly subjective and ambiguous “factual” inquiry, and hence a high potential for abuse. In this regard, the iorari complains w ind - ° ~ wa oe ~ o ~ cr? ~ t would r if wo , t a » & ‘ ttis¢ Sisincentive . ° ’ © “A , © ’ - ° . . t the intentional use f un nstitutional eans to gather evi- - . ’ . a . ’ 7 - . ’ | - lence, rather than less venient nstitutional means. on . . . e preceding analysis applies with special force when the pri- mary illegality is a violation € the Sixth Amendment, rather than the } irth Amendment. Since Sixth Amendment violations neces- sarily ‘cur after the initiation of formal judicial proceedings, Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), bad faith police conduct in the Sixth Amendment context directly affects the integrity of the idicial process. Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 479 (1977); see Division VI, infra. oe i? a > 3 & we scovery doc- he discovery lini, 435 itable dis- in a foot- it clear pted the 285 (9th Cir. ernment to result of amr> eve ¢ »> Ps : ‘ *, ¥ ‘ . , ‘ ‘ ’ ‘ ‘ ’ s —Saa . ,r? nar id r -~ Ff . re st y ; , > ; ‘ - ¥ . aa sve ane fase ; ‘ A 4 ’ . ‘ a . nse. ee * " , ” . , > , ‘ sca ‘ ‘ > , . Pl . > 57 nent ,? 2 } ° ] eS , ia ; ‘ iv oe iuse er ler Vv Aine re ; yi y » 7 y rul ; nN an Pe r } 2 e , ‘ ren + ‘ 7.) eG > ie h* ; , *h wO LT ¥ ‘ + sat — IV. THE COUR1 OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT DETECTIVE LEAMING DID NOT ACT IN GOOD FAITH. Having correctly decided that the State could prevail on an inevitable-discovery theory, if at all, only upon a showing that Leaming acted in good faith when he violated Williams’ con- stitutional rights, the Court of A such a showing had not been made. ful Opinion itself demonstrates, 7 A1l3-A17), this holding was correct whether good faith is regarded as issue. A From what the Court of jective” point of view, all of the contradicts any notion that Leamin that he was not violating Williams facts already established in this Williams, supra, lack of g i fait clusion. Like every court that ha found that before he left Des Moin port, Leaming made an agreement wi would bring Williams straight back tioning him. 430 U.S. at 391, 410 isolated from counsel, however, Le ppeals went on to hold that As the Court of Appeals’ care- 00 F.2d at 1171-1173 (Pet. at ; and this is so regardless of a “subjective” or “objective” Appeals characterized as a “sub- evidence in the record directly 3 acted under an honest belief ' rights. Indeed, given the Court's holding in Brewer v. h is essentially a foregone con- s reviewed this case, this Court es to pick up Williams in Daven- th Williams’ attorney that he to Des Moines without ques- , 415. As soon as Williams was aming broke this agreement by purposefully and intentionally attempting to obtain as much in- criminating before Williams could 6 the body -- at 399, 407-408, 411-412. ° As the Court of Appeals noted, 7 the record would not support any actions on the ground that he wa alive. That the State does not a reason for Leaming's conduct i Leaming insisted at the first tr told him that information as possible -- the victim was dead including the location of reach his attorney. 430 U.S. 00 F.2d at 1172 (Pet. at Al5), attempt to “justify” Leaming'’s s hoping to find the victim suggest that it could prove such s hardly surprising, since ial that Williams’ attorney had (2p. to Brewer v. Williams, ——— ee Supra, at 96-97), and told Williams that they should stop and locate “the body® U.S. at 393). in order to en sure a “Christian burial” (430 ee Especially given Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1963), which this Court hae held to he “constitutionally indistinguish- able” from this case, 430 U.S. at 400, it could not reasonabiy be inferred that Leaming did not realize that intentionally and de- signedly attempting to elicit evidence from a defendant before he could reach his attorney -- in violation of an agreement with the attorney -- would be unconstitutional. This conclusion is sup- ported by Leaming's false denials that he had made an agreement with Mc¥Fnight and that he had refused to permit another attorney, Mr. Kelly, to accompany Williams from Davenport to Des Moines. 700 F.2d at 1173 (Pet. at Al6-Al7). B. Under an “objective® view of “good faith," the factors discussed in the preceding paragraphs and in the Court of Appeals’ opinion lead even more ineluctably to the conclusion that Leaming @id not act in good faith. As this Court indicated in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, objective good faith is not established if the - x 7. x relevant state official eithés »9r reasonably should have known that his conduct would violate the Constitution. The “ob- jective” question of whether Leaming in fact knew that his conduct would violate Williams’ Sixth Amendment rights is at least very close to (if not the same as) the "subjective" question which the Court of Appeals asked: whether Leaming believed that his conduct would violate the right to counsel. Clearly, the answer to the former question must be the same as the answer to the latter. Similarly, particulariy in light of Massiah v. United States, it is clear that Leaming reasonably should have known that inten- tionally and designedly eliciting as much incriminating evidence as possible from Williams before he could consult with his attor- ney, in direct violation of an express agreement with that attorney, would violate the Sixth Amendment.’ 7 The same result also follows from application of this Court's holdings in Brown v. Illinois and Dunaway v. New York, supra. See Division II, supra. > we a4 ’ i= " . - . a , ~ > , .* ; ‘ na rv? » 258 | “. eS ) , + n v4 ‘ -) ; mori Rive ; yy ‘ rie ¥ > se ; a de- 1 act t tate's . . = ® ¢ ; _ 7 tnat wa ipreme > ro- S ar ) ire wa ipreme e that it 13) and >A ) a i 234-23 t n »f the r 4 t 1 - ” y to qd oO so t from the nity (See 11 evidence its arguments er Leaming this ue whl ch V. THE RECORD DOES NOT SHOW THAT THE VICTIM'S BODY WOULD HAVE BEEN FOUND IF RESPONDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS HAND NOT BREEN VIOLATED. The preceding paragraphs demonstrate that the Court of Appeals’ decision concerning Leaming's lack of good faith was legally and factually correct. Even if this were not the case, however, a grant of certiorari would be inappropriate in this case because . ven if an inevitable discovery doctrine without a good faith element were applied to the record, the result reached by the Court of Appeals would be upheld. In concluding that the victim's body, and the evidence con- nected therewith, probably would have been discovered “in any event," the Iowa Supreme Court found (1) that an organized search for the victim would have extended into Polk County, to the area where the body was found, and (2) that the searchers would have seen the body because it was highly visible. 285 N.W. 2d at 262. Even under a “preponderance of the evidence” standard, '° however, neither of these conclusions was correct. A. The Search Would Not Have Extended Into Polk County, Where the Body was Located. On December 26, 1968, a group of volunteer searchers under the direction of Iowa S3ureau of Criminal Investigation (BCI) agents Ruxlow and Mayer searched Poweshiek and Jasper Counties (both located east of Polk County) for the victim's body. They discon- tinued the search at the Polk County border at 3:00 p.m., before Williams indicated he would take Leaming to the body. At the suppression hearing preceding the second trial, Ruxlow testified that he intended to continue the search into Polk County. How- ever, all of the other eivdence in this record directly contra- dicts this testimony (which Ruxlow gave after being informed by the prosecuting attorney that the issue at the suppression hearing would be whether he would have discovered the body if Williams had not led the police to 1... «uxlow Depo. Tr. at 30): 10 under United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), the proper standard would be “clear and convinci:9g evidence.” ad ae | 7 . - : . + . anew - sith ¥ « J : isper > . . © > , tt us _r- 1 re . > it ; * > | > > . > oe . lat + i L ¢ ? This is especially so with regard to bad faith Sixth Amendment violations, which strike with particular force at the inteqrity of the judicial process. This conc)usion is supported by the post-Stone decisions of this Court and of the Federal circuit courts. In Rose v, Mitchel 443 U.S. 549 (1979), this Court declined to extend Stone beyond the Fourth Amendment to a claim by state prisoners that their convictions should be overturned because of discrimination in the selection of grand jury foremen -- even though this claim did not implicate the integrity of the fact-finding process by which they had been found guilty. Reaffirming the "limited reach of Stone,” 443 U.S. at 560, this Court noted that Rose involved a claimed violation of personal rights, and that the “judicial integrity" concerns and constitutional interests were more compelling than in Stone because the claimed violations struck at “core concerns of the Fourteenth Amendment and at fundamental values of our so- ciety and our legal system." 443 U.f. at 563, 564. As noted previously, the instant case similarly involves violations of i3 Since the Fifth Amendment explicitly prohibits the use of com- pelled testimony in criminal proceedings, violations of the Fifth Amendment also directly implicate the integrity of the lL, judicial process. In this connection, it should be noted that the District Court in the first habeas corpus proceeding held that Williams’ Fifth Amendment rights were violated, in two respects. 375 F. Supp. at 179-184. This holding has never been reversed. _—— personal rights that strike at fundamental values of the adversary cystem,. Consistently with Rose, every federal circuit court faced with the issue has declined to extend Stone v. Powell to Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims. See, e.g., White v. Finkbeiner, 687 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1982); Hinman vy. McCarthy, 676 F.2d 343, 348-49 Warden, 624 F.2d 69, 70 (9th Cir. 1980); Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 872 (Sth Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1981); Morgan v. Hall, 569 F.2d 1161, 1168-69 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978). A few final words regarding the applicability of Stone v. Powell to the Sixth Amendment violation in this case are necessi- tated by the assertion by the amici that Williams’ guilt “was not in question” (Illinois Amicus Brief at 9). Quite apart from the fact that nothing in Stone would suggest that the apparent guilt of a defendant by itself would preclude federal habeas corpus review of bad faith Sixth Amendment violations, the suggestion of the amici that Williams’ guilt was not questioned simply is not factually correct. Although Williams' guilt may have appeared Clear on the record from the first trial, see 430 U.S. at 428, 437, 441, the Court of Appeals specifically noted that at the second trial, Williams' defense -- that someone else killed the victim and placed her body in his room -- was supported by sub- stantial physical and scientific evidence indicating, inter alia, that the perpetrator, unlike Williams, was sterile. 700 F.2d at s ’ , ~ i , | 1: it | ra ° - ’ = ’ i -S ‘ hy j oe af Oo- ‘ tha Time J» L Se > hert ning rest- el saw sunds to Bowers yt going and he mn it. istr ict ly was not District Court demonstrated that the Iowa Supreme Court, in con- eluding that the Stare had satisfied its hynothetical inevitable discovery test, relied on evidence that was seriously misleading. Since the failure to present this additional evidence to the state courts was excusable, the Iowa Supreme Court's misapprehension of the facts rendered its consideration of the suppression issue less than "full and fair." Consequently, whether Stone v. Powell should be extended beyond its Fourteenth Amendment context is a moot issue in the instant case, and this Court therefore should not consider it. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied. RORERT BARTELS 2s College of Law Arizona State University Tempe, Arizona 85287 (602) 965-7053 Counsel for kespondent . Certificate of Service The undersigned hereby certifies that he received the petition for a writ of certiorari in this case on April 12, 1983, and that on the 2% aay of May, 1923, he deposited one copy of the foregoing document in a United States Post Office, with first-class postage prepaid, and addressed to counsel for the petitioner: Mr. Brent R. Appel Deputy Attorney General Hoover Office Building Des Moines, Iowa 50319 The undersigned further certifies that all parties required. to be served have been sexved. ROBERT BAPTELS Sen RECEIVED NO. 2>-fel MAY 1 6 1963 siaitiemeancetaatiiaiamiaieiss OFriCe OF ime Coca sUPrEME COURT, YS . . . = veneer nasmud ME © RT C THE NITET TATES ctober Term, 1982 — . . Nik, waracen f the lowa a t > “e lary, Petitioner, VS. - . ‘ se ‘auc ANTHON ". LAMS , 4 ” tenet. - > : ——- AG ~ PE N Wri )F i : TATES . , , ens rem a J in s+ — a Ae er M N ‘ eS ee oe N FORMA PAUPERIS . _ +% . The res} jent, bert Anthony Williams, wno 18 - ; Aie« ao T mn ¢ ne.~aG if s wa H t ee tiatzt at rort Madison, ,Owa, hereby asks leave to proceed in this action in forma pauperis spondent was permitted to proceed in forma superis with appointed counsel in tne District Court and the JOOBA(G) (6). @ vu f ~ ROBERT BARTELS Sollege of Law Arizona State University Tempe, Arizona 85287 (602) 965-7053 Counsel for Pespondent Certificate of Service petition for a writ of certiorari 1983, and that on the [7% day of copy of the foregoing document in with first-class postage prepaid, the petitioner: Mr. Brent R. Appel Deputy Attorney General Hoover Office Building Des Moines, Iowa 50319 The undersigned further certifies oe served have been served. The undersigned hereby certifies that he received the. in this case on April 12, May, 1983, he deposited one a United States Post Office, and addressed to counsel for that all parties required to is J ROBERT BARTELS Saal i i¢ AS *, .) eee Pi ~ 5 iA? --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_0752%3A03. Public record. Not legal advice.