# Appendix — Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_0666%3A02 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appendix - **Published:** January 1, 1984 - **Citation:** 468 U.S. 263 ## Text a sass & Court, U.S, ae “TITLED 82-1565 MAR 15 1983 = PL STEVaS, CLERK In the Supreme Court OF THE United States Octoser Team, 1982 Baccuvs Imports, Lrp., and Eacte Distrrsvrors, Inc., {ppellants, vs. Georce FREeIrAs, Director of Taxation of the State of Hawaii, Appellee. On Appeal from the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii APPENDIX TO JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT Auuan S. Hatey 410 Spring Street Nevada City, CA 95959 Telephone: (916) 265-5524 Attorney for Appellants Bacchus Imports, Ltd. and Eagle Distributors, Inc. BOWNE OF SAN FRANCISCO, INC. * ISO NINTH ST. © B.F..CA 84103 © (418) 864-2300 APPENDIX A IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII OCTOBER TERM 1982 In the Matter of the Tax Appeals of BACCHUS IMPORTS, LTD., PARADISE BEVERAGES, INC., EAGLE DISTRIBUTORS, INC., and FOREMOST- MCKESSON, INC., dba MCKESSON WINE & Spirits Co., Taxpayers NO. 7802 APPEAL FROM THE TAX APPEAL COURT HONORABLE YASUTAKA FUKUSHIMA, JUDGE (CASE NOS. 1852, 1862, 1866, 1867) DECEMBER 23, 1982 RICHARDSON, C.J., LUM, NAKAMURA, PADGETT AND HAYASHI, JJ. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - equal protection of laws; equal rights - taxation - in general. TAXATION - constitutional requirements and restrictions - equality and uniformity - in general - constitutional requirements and operations thereof in general. Although the strictures of the Equal Protection Clause condition the exercise of a state's power of taxation, the Fourteenth A-2 Amendment was not intended to compel the State to adopt an iron rule of equal tax- ation. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - construction, opera- tion, and enforcement of constitutional provisions - determination of constitu- tional provisions - determination of con- stitutional questions - presumptions and construction in favor of constitutionality - in general, SAME - equal protection of laws; equal rights - taxation - in general. j | A-3 OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAMURA, J. In this appeal from the Tax Appeal Court, four wholesalers of liquor, Bacchus Imports, Ltd., Paradise Beverages, Inc., Eagle Distributors, Inc., and Foremost-Mc- Kesson, Inc. (Bacchus, Paradise, Eagle and McKesson respectively, the taxpayers collec- tively) challenge, on constitutional grounds, the levy of excise taxes on the sale or use of liquor pursuant to HRS § 244-4. i/ They assert the statute in question runs afoul of the Equal Protection, 2/ Import-Export, 3/ and Commerce Clauses 4/ of the United States Constitution. 3/ though we have carefully scrutinized the statute with the cited con- stitutional provisions in mind, we discern no infirmities in HRS §244-4. We therefore affirm the Tax Appeal Court!’s decision. I. The Hawaii Liquor Tax, HRS Chapter 244, A-4 imposes a levy on the sale or use of alco- holic beverages amounting to twenty percent of the wholesale price of the liquor sold or used, which essentially is an excise levied on the first sale of liquor within the State of Hawaii. See note 1 supra. At its inception, the tax was one imposed on retailers, and the amount of the levy was six percent of the retail price. S.L.H. 1939, c. 222, § 5. But its incidence has since been shifted to wholesalers and the rate has been raised to twenty percent of the wholesale price. &/ Limited exemptions from the tax have been approved periodically by the legislature; transactions involving okolehao 7/ ana "{ajny fruit wine manufac- tured in the State from products grown in the state" 8/ were thus free of taxation during the relevant period. This aspect of the Hawaii Liquor Tax has been challenged by the taxpayers. A-5 Bacchus, Paradise, 9/ and Eagle are Hawaii corporations licensed to engage in the wholesaling of liquor; McKesson is a Maryland corporation authorized to do bus- iness in Hawaii, also licensed as a whole- sale liquor dealer under applicable liquor control laws. See HRS Chapter 281. Bac- chus initially protested the assessment of excise taxes on its sale or use of alcoho- lic beverages by a letter directed to the State Director of Taxation on May 30, 1979. It subsequently filed a complaint pursuant to HRS § 40-35, 10/ seeking a refund of taxes paid during the period between Decem- ber 1977 and May 1979. Paradise, Eagle, and McKesson quickly followed Bacchus’ lead with their letters of protest to the Director and refund suits. ii/ The taxpayers' complaints averred that HRS §244-4 contravened the Import-Export and Commerce Clauses of the federal constitution A-6 because the statute discriminated in favor of locally produced liquor by providing ex- emptions for sales and uses of okolehao and fruit wine brewed in Hawaii from locally grown products. The cases were consolidated for trial and disposition by agreement of ali the parties and submitted to the Tax Appeal Court for decision on Stipulations of Facts. The court ruled the tax is "a valid State tax," and timely appeals to this court were filed by the taxpayers. II. Focusing on the allegations of uncon- stitutionality advanced by the taxpayers, we first consider their claim that the favored treatment of okolehao and locally produced fruit wine denies them equal pro- tection. A-7 A. We recognize, of course, that the strictures of the Equal Protection Clause condition the exercise of a state's power of taxation. Bell's Gap Railroad v. Pen- nsylvania, 134 U.S. 232 (1890). Still, "the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to compel the State to adopt an iron rule of equal taxation.” Id. at 237. For such a construction would not only supersede all those constitu- tional provisions and laws of some of the States, whose object is to secure equality of taxation, and which are usually accompanied with qualifications deemed material; but it would render nugatory those discriminations which the best interests of society require; which are necessary for the encouragement of needed and useful industries, and the discour- agement of intemperance and vice; and which every State, in one form or another, deems it expedient to adopt. Id. Moreover, "[iJt has... peen pointed out that in taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification.” Madden A-8 v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) (foot- note omitted). And "(t]he burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it." Id. (Footnote omitted). the legislative arrangement in question, the taxpayers claim, breaches the equal pro- tection guaranty because of its favored treatment of transactions involving okolehao and pineapple wine. But the statute does not establish a classificatory scheme that disfavors any of the taxpayers--all whole- salers of liquor distributing alcoholic bev- erages in Hawaii are subject to taxation thereunder in similar fashion. Bacchus, Paradise, and Eagle enjoy no advantage over McKesson, a Maryland corporation, by reason of their incorporation under Hawaii law since their transactions are taxed at the same rate McKesson's are. A-9 The taxpayers nonetheless contend Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959), and Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949), sustain their thesis that the necessary equality of treatment is absent. To be sure, the cases support a proposition that a state tax expressly favoring residents over nonresidents does not pass constitution- al muster. Yet we think the cited cases do not boost the taxpayers' cause here; they reinforce instead the validity of the Hawaii Liquor Tax. In Wheeling Steel, the Court struck down provisions of Ohio's ad valorem property tax law that discriminated aginst foreign corporations by taxing their accounts re- ceivables arising from business transacted within the State but not the property of similar nature owned by restdents and domes- tic corporations. The inequality to which A-10 the foreign corporations were subjected was premised solely on the residence of the owners of the accounts receivables. i2/ And the Court did not consider the declared purpose of the statute to proffer a scheme of reciprocity in the taxation of such pro- perty to other states a redeeming feature. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. at 572-74. In Allied Stores, Ohio's levy of an ad valorem property tax on the contents of warehouses was upheld despite an exemption of merchandise belonging to nonresidents and being held "'in a storage warehouse for storage only'." The preferred status ac- corded merchandise owned by nonresidents, the Court held, did not deny Ohio residents equal protection; it found the purpose and policy of the State Legislature could rea- sonably have been to encourage nonresidents to construct or lease warehouses in Ohio A-11 and thereby benefit the State's economy. Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. at 528-29. Thus it concluded the questioned proviso was neither invidious nor palpably arbitrary, and ruled the statute did not deny equal protection to Ohio residents de- spite the discriminatory classification. The cited cases therefore confirm that the Court does not countenance the unequal treatment of taxpayers based solely on state residence, Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. at 572; but if the classification rests upon some reasonable consideration of ditference or policy, there is no denial of equal protection. Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. at 527-28. On its face, the Hawaii law applies equally to all whnole- salers; the taxpayers, however, assert the classification in question carries a dis- criminatory result. We thus proceed to an examination of the exemption from excise A-12 taxation of transactions involving okolehao and pineapple wine to determine whether the exemption is rationally related to the a- chievement of a valid legislative purpose. Cc. In deciding whether the challenged clas- sification meets this test of rational rela- tionship, we are compelled to answer two questions: "(1) Does the challenged legisla- tion have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose? See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S., at 461-463; Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97- 98 (1979)." Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 668% (1981). Shibuya v. Architects Hawaii, Ltd, 65 Haw. 26, 35, 647 P.2d 276, 283 (1982). The legislature's reason for exempting A-13 "ti root okolehao” from the "alcohol tax" was to “encourage and promote the establish- ment of a new industry," S.L.H. 1960, c. 26; Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 87, in 1960 Senate Journal, at 224, and the exemption of "fruit wine manufactured in the State from products frown in the State" was intended "to help” in stimulating "the local fruit wine industry.” S.L.H. 1976, c. 39; Sen. Stand. Comm. Kep. No. 408-76, in 1976 Sen- ate Journal, at 1056. 13/ NO one could quar- rel with the proposition that the promotion of domestic industry is a legitimate state purpose. See Western & Southern Life Insur- ance Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451. U.S. at 671; Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 143 (1970); Parker v. Brown, We likewise entertain no doubt that the Classification satisfies the second part of the applicable test, for the pertinent in- A-14 quiry here is only whether the "legislature rationally could have believed that the. . . [classification] would promote its ob- jective." Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. at 6/2 (citations omitted) (emphasis in the original). The lawmakers are under no obli- gation "to convince the courts of the cor- rectness of their legislative judgments. Rather, 'those challenging the legislative judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classifica- tion is apparently based could not reason- ably be conceived to be true by the govern- mental decisionmaker.' Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S., at 111." Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 464. The taxpayers have not met their burden in this regard. The legislature could rationally have believed the exemption would promote its objective, and nothing has been pre- sented to controvert this. A-15 D. The taxpayers' equal protection claim also encompasses a putative breach of the State counterpart of the Equal Protection Clause. Compare U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 and Hawaii Const. art. 1, §5. In pas- sing on an earlier taxpayer challenge of our tax laws premised on an alleged viola- tion of the foregoing State constitutional provision, we structured our analysis on Supreme Court precedent, particularly Lehn- hausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359 (1973). See In re Simpson Manor, Inc., 57 Haw. 1, 548 P.2d 246 (1976). And Lehnhausen was quoted to the following effect: ‘"[I)n taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification." .. . "The burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it. Id. at 8-9 548 P.2d at 251 (citation omit- mls A-16 ted) (emphasis in the original). The claim there was rejected because the taxpayer had "failed to meet its burden"; we perceive no reason to regard the present challenge more favorably. Id. The taxpayers have not even attempted to negative the declared basis for enacting the exemptions. IIl. Having found no denial of equal protec- tion, we turn to the assertion that the Ha- waii Liquor Tax contravenes the Import-Export Clause of the federal constitution. The taxpayers contend that HRS § 244-4 is dis- criminatory on its face and thus violative of the clause because of the exemption of transactions involving locally produced oko- lehao and fruit wine. They further assert the excise tax is actually a prohibited im- port duty since it is levied on wholesale value, which in the case of liquor of for- eign origin perforce includes the amount of A-17 the duty levied by the federal government and transportation cost. This, they main- tain, results in a disproportionate State levy on liquor of foreign origin. They sl- so Claim the rate at which the tax is ap- plied deters the consumtion of such liquor and indirectly deprives the federal govern- ment of revenue. The precepts enunciated in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976), and ratified by Washington Revenue Department v. Stevedoring Associa- ers' view, proscribe the imposition of the tax. We do not read the Import~-Export Clause and Michelin to have such effect. ie The Import-Export Clause commits "sole power to lay imposts and duties on imports in the Federal Government, with no concur- rent state power.” Michelin Tire Corp. v. A-18 Wages, 423 U.S. at 285. But "the term ‘im- post or duty’ is not self-defining and does not necessarily encompass all taxes.” Wash- ington Revenue Department v. Stevedoring As- sociation, 435 U.S. at 759. The foregoing cases give us examples of what is not encom- passed therein. In the former, the Court held Georgia's levy of a general ad valorem property tax on Michelin's inventory of im- ported tires and tubes stored in a Georgia warehouse was not interdicted by the Import- Export Clause. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. at 302. And in Washinton Revenue Department, the application of Washington's business and occupation tax to stevedoring was approved, even though it reached services provided within the State "to imports, ex- ports, and other goods." Washington Revenue Department v. Stevedoring Association, 435 U.S. at 761. In reaching these decisions, the Court A-19 "examined whether the exaction offended any of the three policy considerations leading to the presence of the Clause: "The Framers of the Constitution thus sought to alleviate three main concerns... : the Federal Government must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments, and tariffs, which might affect for- eign relations, could not be implemented by the States consistently with that exclusive power; import revenues were to be the major source of re- venue of the Federal Government and should not be diverted to the States; and harmony among the States might be disturbed unless seaboard States, with their crucial ports of entry, were prohi- bited from levying taxes on citizens of other States by taxing goods merely flowing through their ports to the other States not situated as favorably geographically." Washington Revenue Department v. Stevedoring Association, 435 U.S. at 752-53 (quoting Michelin Tire Co. v. Wages, 423 U.S. at 285- 86) (footnotes omitted). Our task then is to scrutinize HRS § 244-4 in the light of the concerns that, in the Court's opinion, explain the presence of the clause. B. HRS § 244-4 provides that "[elvery per- son who sells or uses any liquor... [not A-20 previously taxed thereunder] shall pay an excise tax .. . equal to twenty percent of the wholesale price of the liquor so sold or used.” As the tax is usually imposed on the person who engages in the first sale or use of liquor in the State and is mea- sured by wholesale value, it is in effect an excis2 levied on wholesalers. In this sense, it resembles the Washington business and occupation tax that was deemed a permit- ted tax, rather that a prohibited import duty, by the Court. The taxpayers, however, Claim an objectionable feature, the exemp- tion of okolehao and fruit wine, causes it to transgress the first two policy consid- erations underlying the Import-Export Clause. We do not find their argument convincing, for like the Georgia property tax and the Washington business and occupation tax, the Hawaii Liquor Tax offends none of the policy considerations delineated by the Court A-21 in Michelin and Washington Revenue Depart- 14/ ment. Hawaii's tax on wholesaling activity ap- plies to ail liquor wholesalers engaged in business in the State. I1t touches all la- cal sales and uses of liquor produced in foreign countries, in the mainland States, and in Hawaii, with the exception of okolehao and pineapple wine. i5/ There is absolutely no indication that it has been applied se- lectively to discourage imports in a manner inconsistent with foreign policy. Nor is there a scintilla of evidence that it has the effect of a proisctive tariff or that it has any substantial indirect effect on the demand for imported ligour. And no rea- son whatsoever to consider the limited ex- emption a threat to the federal treasury ap- pears. L6/ Michelin and Washington Revenue Department thus sustain a conclusion that the tax in question is not a prohibited im- port duty. See note 14 supra. 2) ret | A-22 IV. Though we have concluded the Hawaii Liquor Tax infringes neither the Equal Pro- tection Clause nor the Import-Export Clause, whether it "falls short of the substantially even-handed treatment demanded by the Commerce Clause” remains for decision. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission, 429 U.S. 318, 332 (1977). A. "In reviewing Commerce Clause challenges to state taxes ... [the Court's objectivel has .. . been to ‘establish a consistent and rational method of inquiry’ focusing on ‘the practical effect of a challenged tax.' Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 443 (1980)." Commonwealth Ed- ison E. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 615 (19481). The method of inquiry presently favored by the Court is the four-part test described in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). “Under that test, a ’ A-23 state tax does not offend the Commerce Clause if it ‘is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to services provided by the State.' 430 U.S., at 279." Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. at 617. The taxpayers do not dispute that the Hawaii Liquor Tax satisfies the first and fourth prongs of the test, for the activity subject to taxation is the wholesaling of liquor in Hawaii and the revenues derived are for the support of general governmental services. The tax is challenged on grounds that it does not meet the test's second and third requisites, i.e., it is discrimina- tory and not fairly apportioned. But we are also unable to perceive any basis to seriously consider the taxpayers' assertion that the tax is not fairly apportioned A-24 since they agree it is assessed only on intrastate sales and uses of liquor. It has no extraterritorial effect and the State does not seek thereby to obtain a share of a taxpayer's net income derived from an interstate enterprise. Nor is there a possibility that it will subject "interstate business to a burden of dupli- cative taxation that an intrastate taxpayer would not bear." Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commis- sioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. at 443. No issue related to fair apportionment is extant, and our examination of the tax centers on whether it discriminates against interstate commerce. B. In our analysis of the equal protec- tion claim, we discerned no disparate treat- ment of taxpayers. For Bacchus, Paradise, and Eagle gain nothing over a foreign cor- poration because of their incorporation un- A-25 der Hawaii law. That McKesson is a Mary- land corporation and engaged in business elsewhere plays no part in fixing its lia- bility under HRS §244-4. The corporation presumably is also"tree to engage in the wholesaling of okolehao and pineapple wine if it has reason to believe this will re- lieve its tax burden. 12/ We detect no discrimination against Bacchus, Paradise, Eagle, McKesson, or interstate commerce un- der the circumstances. The taxpayers nonetheless argue Mary- lana v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981), and its precursors preclude the validation of HRS §244-4. Maryland was an original action brought in the Supreme Court by several states and the federal government, chal- lenging the Louisiana First-Use Tax on nat- ural gas on grounds that it contravened the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses. We are, . of course, mindful of the following precepts A-26 of "Commerce Clause jurisprudence” that were reiterated by the Court there: One of the fundamental principles of Commerce Clause Clause jurisprudence is that no State, consis- tent with the Commerce Clause, may ‘impose a tax which discriminates against interstate commerce .. . by providing a direct commer- cial advantage to local business.’ North- western States Portland Cement Co. v. Min- mesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959). See Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977). This antidiscrimination prin- ciple ‘follows inexorably from the basic pur- pose of the Clause’ to prohibit the multipii- cation of preferential trade areas destructive of the free commerce anticipated by the Consti- tution. Boston Stock Exchange, supra. See Dean Milk Co. v. [City of] Madison, 340 U.S. 349,356 (1951). Id. at 754, and A state tax must be assessed in light of its actual effect considered in conjunction wiht other provisions of the State's tax scheme. ‘In each case it is our duty to deter- mine whether the statute under attack, what- ever its name may be, will in its practical operation work discrimination against inter- state commerce.’ Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454,455-456 (1940). See Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64,69 (1963); Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472, 478-480 (1932). In this case, the Loui- siana First-Use Tax unquestionably discrimi- nates against interstate commerce in favor of tocal interests as the necessary result of various tax credits and exclusions. Id. at 756. A-27 Yet, Hawaii's excise on intrastate sales and uses of liquor can hardly be like- ened to Louisiana's tax on the "first-use" of any natural gas brought into the state without being taxed previously by another state or the federal government. The pri- mary impact of that levy was on gas produced in the Outer Continental shelf and piped to processing plants in Louisiana. Some of this gas was sold to Louisiana consumers, but most of it was eventually sold to out- of-state consumers. Louisiana consumers for the most part were not burdened with the levy due to exemptions and credits pro- vided by State law, but the tax azplied un- iformly to gas moving out of the state. Id. at /31-33. The Court found the "First-Use”" Tax, while imposed on the pipeline companies, - « « (was) clearly intended to be passed on to the ultimate consumer.” Id. at 736. And it struck down a scheme of taxation A-28 that "resulted in Louisiana customers being ‘protected in whole or in part trom the in- cidence of the tax which is passed on to consumers out of the State.'" Id. at 758. Unlike the situation in Maryland v. Louisi- ana, supra, the incidence ot the tax here is on wholesalers of liquor in Hawaii and the ultimate burden is borne by consumers in Hawaii. Nor can HRS § 244-4 be equated with the New York statute imposing a transfer tax on securities transactions which was invalidated by the Court in Boston Stock Excnange v. State lax Commission, supra. For there, an amendment to the theretofore uniform tax caused transactions involving out-of-state sales to be taxed more heavily than most transactions involving in-state sales. 48/ The instant situation also bears no likeness to that in Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, supra, wnere the A-29 taxpayer was engaged in servicing oil wells in Louisiana and several other oil-producing states and the specialized servicing equip- ment it had assembled in Oklahoma and used in its Louisiana operation was subjected to use taxation by Louisiana, which applied the tax to the value of labor expended and shop overhead incurred in assembling the equip- ment. The State conceded this cost factor would not have been subject to taxation if the taxpayer had assembled the equipment in Louisiana rather than in Oklahoma. Id. at 66-67. 19/ The Court logically concluded a condition precedent for a valid state tax, the even-handed treatment of in-state and out-of-state taxpayers, had not been met. Id. at 70. But the Louisiana use tax can- not be categorized with the Hawaii Liquor Tax. 29/ The tax in question here is definitely not abarricade against the movement of trade, see e.g., City of Philadelphia v. A-30 New Jersey, 437 u.S. 617 (1978); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, supra, nor is ita means through which Hawaii seeks more than a just share of the income earned by tax- payers engaged in multi-state enterprises. See e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, supra; Northwestern States Port- land Cement Co. v. Minnesota, supra. And our survey of the case law of Commerce Clause litigation in the Supreme Court has uncovered no instance where a state tax of similar nature has been voided. The tax- payers have failed to demonstrate that the Hawaii Liquor Tax in its practical opera- tion works discrimination against inter- state commerce. 23/ Tne decision of the Tax Appeal Court upholding the assessment of the tax against Bacchus Imports, Ltd., Paradise Beverages, Inc., Eagle Distributors, Inc., and Fore- most-McKesson, Inc. is affirmed. A-31 Allan S. Haley (Cro- nin, Fried, Sekiya, Haley & Kekina, of counsel) for plain- tiffs-appellants Bacchus Imports and Eagle Distribu- tors. /s/ Willian S. Richardson Bruce C. Bigelow (Julian H. Clark with him on the /s/ H. Lum briefs; Case, Kay & Lynch, of coun- sel) for plaintiff- appellant Foremost- McKesson /s/ Edward H. Nakamura Joined in Opening Briefs of Bacchus Imports, Foremost- McKesson & Eagle /s/ Frank D. Padgett Distributors: Michael K. Kawahara (Vernon F. L. Char /s/ Yoshimi Hayashi with him on the joinder; Damon Key, Char & Bocken, of counsel) for plain- tiff-appellant Para- dise Beverages T. Bruce Honda (Allan S. Chock on the brief), Deputy Attor- neys General, for de- fendant-appellee Direc- tor of Taxation A=-32 1/ HRS § 244-4, in pertinent part, read as follows when the taxes in question were as- sessed: Every person who sells or uses any liq- cur not taxable under this chapter in respect of the transaction by which such person or his vendor acquired such liquor, shall pay an excise tax which is hereby imposed, equal to twenty percent of the wholesale price of the liquor so sold or used; provided, that the tax shall be paid only once upon the same liquor; pro- vided, further, that the tax shall not apply to: (6) Okolehao manufactured in the State for the perioag May 17, 19/1 to June 3u, 1981; or (7) any fruit wine manufactured in the State from products grown in the State for the period May 17, 1975 to June 30, 1981. 2/ The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution reads: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the ju- risdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or en- force any law which shall abridge the orivileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its juris- diction the equal protection of the laws. Ju A-33 Article I, § 10, cl. 2 of the federal constitution reads: No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's [sic] inspection Laws: and the net Pro- duce of all Duties and Impost. laid by any State on Imports, or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the Congress. Article I, § 8, cl. 3 of the federal con- stitution reads: The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. Article I, § 5 of the Hawaii Constitution reads: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor be denied the equal prrotec- tion of the laws, nor be denied the enjoy- ment of the person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex or ancestry. S.L.H. 1947, c. 111, §3 14 raised the tax rate from six percent to eight percent; S.L.H. 1949, c. 343, § 3 shifted the tax incidence to wholesale transactions and increased the rate to twelve percent of the wholesale price; $.L.H. 1957, c. 1, § 7(b) (special session; 1957 Tax Act) raised the rate to sixteen per- Im | A-34 cent; S.L.H. 1965, c. 155, § 8 increased the rate to twenty percent. Okolehao is an alcoholic beverage made from the root of the ti plant, an indigenous shrub. The exemption of ckolehao was initially approved in 1960 and remained in effect until 1965. S.L.H. 1960, c. 26 § 1. The exemption was reenacted in 1971 to cover a five-year per- fod. §.L.H. 1971, c. 62,§1. Im 1976, the exemption period was extended to June 30, 196k. S.eR. 1976, 0. Ws § i Tne only “fruit wine (that was) manufac- tured in the State from products grown in the State” during the relevant time span was pine- apple wine. This exemption was approved in 1976 to cover a five-year period. S.L.H. 1976, ie = Oe Paradise acknowledges it is a “beneficiary” of the exemptions from taxation proveded by HRS § 244-4 for okolehao and fruit wine produced in Hawaii. It nevertheless maintains the sta- tute is unconstitutional probably because the volume of sales of the exempted products is relatively insubstantia.. BRS § 40-35 authorizes a taxpayer to vay taxes under protest and to commence an action in the Tax Appeal Court for the recovery of the disputed sums. See In re Otis Elevator Co. 58 Haw. 163, 167 & an. 10, 566 p.2d 1091, 1094 & a. 10 (1977). The dates of the letters of protest and the periods for which refunds were sought are set forth below: J, Bae A-35 Period Protested Taxpayer Date of Letter per Letter Bacchus In- May 30, December, 1977 ports, Ltd. 1979 through May, 1979 Paradise Bev- July 30, June, 1977 through erages, Inc. 1979 July, 1979 Eagle Distri- August 3l, August, 1974 butors, Inc. 1979 through July, 1979 Foremost-—Mc- September August, 1974 Kesson, Inc. 6, 1979 through August, 1979 12/ The General Code of Ohio § 5328-1, chal- lenged in Wheeling Steel, provided in pertin- ent part: Property of the kinds and classes mention- ed in section 5328-2 of the General Code, used in and arising out of business trans- acted in this state by, for or on behalf of a non-resident person... shall be subject to taxation; and all such prop- erty of persons residing in this state used in and arising out of business trans- acted outside of this state by, for or on behalf of such persons .. . shall not be subject to taxation. ... (Emphasis added). The Hawaii Liquor Tax, on the other hand, exempts all sales and uses of okolehao and pineapple wine from taxation. It does not matter whether the transactions are engaged in by foreign corporations of Hawaii corporations. Furthermore, a foreign corporation manufac- turing okolehao and pineapple wine in Hawaii would not be treated differently from a Hawaii corporation under the general excise tax law, HRS Chapter 237. A-36 The Supreme Court has stated that in equal protection analysis, it may be assumed "that the objectives articulated by the legislature are actual purposes of the statute, unless an examination of the circumstances forces... {a onclusion] that they ‘could not have been a gce’ of the legislation.'" Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Col, 449 U.S. 456, 463 n.7 (1981) (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975). The Court summarized the reasons why there was no breach of the clause in the foregoing situations in the latter case. With respect to the tax at issue in Michelin, it concluded in relevant part: The ad valorem property tax there at issue offended none of . . . [the} poli- cies. It did not usurp the Federal Gov- ernment's authority to regulate foreign relations since it did not ‘fall on in- ports as such because of their place of origin.’ .. . As a general tax applicable to all property in the State, it could not have been applied selectively to encou- rage or discourage iMportation in a man- ner inconsistent with federal policy. Further, the tax deprived the Federal Government of no revenues to which it was entitled. The exaction merely paid for services, such as fire and police protec- tion, supplied by the local government. Although the tax would increase the cost of the imports to consumers, its effect on the demand for Michelin tubes and tires was insubstantial. The tax, therefore, would not significantly diminish the num- ber of imports on which the Federal Gov- ernment would levy import duties and would not deprive it of income indirectly. A-37 Washington Revenue Department v. Stevedoring Association, 435 U.S. at 753 (citation omitted). And its relevant conclusions with respect to the Washington tax were: A similar approach demonstrates that the application of the Washington business and occupation tax to stevedoring threat- ens no Import-Export Clause policy. First, the tax does not restrain the ability of the Federal Government to conduct foreign policy. As a general business tax that applies to virtually all businesses in the State, it has not created any special pro- tective tariff. The assessments in this case are only upon business conducted en- tirely within Washington. No foreign bus- iness or vessel is taxed. Respondents, therefore, have demonstrated no impedi- ment posed by the tax upon the regulation of foreign trade by the United States. Second, the effect of the Washington tax on federal import revenues is identi- cal to the effect in Michelin. The tax merely compensates the State for services and protection extended by Washington to the stevedoring business. Any indirect effect on the demand for imported goods because of the tax on the value of load- ing and unloading them from their ships is even less substantial than the effect of the direct ad valorem property tax on the imported goods themselves. Id. at 754 15/ Okolehao and pineapple wine are not the only alcoholic beverages produced in Hawaii. Also produced here are fruit liqueurs and sake, a Japanese-type rice wine. We need not consider the third policy consideration described in Michelin and Washington Revenue Department since the tax- payers concede it does not apply to this case. We noted earlier that Paradise, a Hawaii corporation engaged in the wholesaling of oko- lehao, also claims the tax violates the Commerce Clause. See noti 9 supra. We find it diffi- cult to give muci. credence to a claim that the tax creates an undue burden on interstate com- merce when the argument is advanced by one who logically would be a "beneficiary" of the al- leged discrimination. The questioned legislative action and its effect were summarized as follows in the Court's opinion: [T]he legislature in 1968 enacted § 270-a to amend the transfer tax by providing for two deviations from the uniform applica- tion of § 270 when ome of the taxable e- vents, a sale, takes place in New York. First, transactions by nonresidents of New York are afforded a 50% reduction (‘nonresident reduction’) in the rate of tax when the transaction involves an in- state sale. Taxable transactions by re- sidents (regardless of where the sale is made) and by nonresidents selling outside the State do not benefit from the rate decrease. Second, § 270-a limits the to- tal tax liability of any taxpayer (resident or nonresident) to $350 (maximum tax) for a single transaction when it involves a New York sale. If a sale is made out-of- State, the § 270 tax rate applies to an in-state transfer (or other taxable event) without limitation. 19/ A-39 Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission, 429 U.S. at 324-25 (footnotes omitted). The stipulation of facts upon which the case was submitted for decision stated in part: ‘If Halliburton had purchased its materials, operated its shops, and incur- red its Labor and Shop Overhead expenses at a location within the State of Louisi- ana, there would have been a sales tax due to the State of Louisiana upon the cost of materials purchased in Louisiana and a Use Tax on Materials purchased out- side of Louisiana; but there would have been no Louisiana sales tax or use tax due upon the Labor and Shop Overhead.’ Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. at 67. We also have good reason to believe nei- ther okolehac not pineapple wine is produced elsewhere. Thus, our situation is totally different from Halliburton where the equip- ment was assembled out of state, but could have been assembled in Louisiana too. _ Furthermore, the producers of okolehao and pineapple wine are not exempted from pay- ment of the general excise tax imposed by HRS Chapter 237. Though the taxpayers submitted no evidence on the amount of okolehao and pineapple wine sold in Hawaii, we believe we car safely assume these products pose no competitive threat to other liquors produced elsewhere and consumed in Hawaii. A-40 We also find it unnecessary to address the taxpayers’ claim that the rate of taxation in itself constitutes a violation of the Com- merce Clause. "The simple fact is that the appropriate level or rate of taxation is es- sentially a matter for legislative, and not judicial, resolution." Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. at 627 (footnote omited). =, be a APPENDIX B ALLAN S. CHOCK 1582 Deputy Attorney General State of Hawaii Room 305, Hale Auhau 425 Queen Street Honolulu, Hawaii 96813 Tel. No. 548-4762 Attorney for Director of Taxation, Detendant IN THE TAX APPEAL COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII BACCEUS IM- PORTS, LTD., CASE NO. 1852 Piaintiff, Vs. GEORGE FREITAS, Director of Tax- ation, Defendant. ERAGES, INC., Plaintiff Vs. GEORGE FREITAS, Director of Tax- ation, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) PARADISE BEV- ) CASE NO. 1862 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Defendant. ) ) - led EAGLE DISTRI- BUTORS, INC., Plaintiff, vs. GEORGE FREITAS, Director of Tax- ation, Defendant. FOREMOST=-McKBS- SON, INC., dba MCKESSON WINE & SPIRITS CO., Plaintifé, vs. GEORGE FREITAS, Director of Tax- ation, Defendant. CASE NO. 1866 CASE NO. 1867 DECISION AND ORDER DECISION AND ORDER these proceedings involve the asses- ment of the liquor tax imposed pursuant to the provisions of HRS Chapter 244, the Ha- waii Liquor Tax Law. The tacts in this case are set forth in the Stipulations of Facts on file with A-43 the records of these appeals and are incor- porated herein and by reference made a part of this Decision. The cases have been con- solidated by stipulation for disposition. Briefly stated, the facts are as fol- lows: BACCHUS IMPORTS, LTD., PARADISE BEV- ERAGES, INC., and EAGLE DISTRIBUTORS, INC., Taxpayers and herein Plaintiffs, are cor- porations organized and existing under the laws of the State of Hawaii. FOREMOST-Mc- KESSON, INC., the other Plaintiff, is a Maryland corporation authorized to do busi- ness under the laws of the State of Hawaii. Taxpayers are all licensed dealers as de- fined by section 244-1, Hawaii Revised Sta- tutes. At all times herein, Taxpayers wexe engaged in the wholesaling of intoxicating liquors in the State of Hawaii. The nature of their business includes the importation and distribution of liquor at the wholesale A-44 level to various retail licensees through- out the State. At the various times listed below, each Taxpayer sent a letter of protest to- gether with its monthly return of the lic- uor tax. The letter of protest applied to that and all previous payments of the lig- uor tax up to a period of five years. Within 30 days of the initial letter of protest, each Taxpayer filed a Complaint for Refund of Liquor Taxes Paid, pursuant to section 40-35, HRS. TAXPAYER Bacchus Im- May 30, December 1977 ports, Ltd. 1979 thru May 1979 Paradise Bev- July 30, June 1977 erages, Inc. 1979 thru July 1979 Eagle Distri- August 3l, August 1974 butors, Inc. 1979 thru July 1979 Foremost-Mc- September August 1974 Kesson, Inc. 6, 1979 thru August 1979 : ~ ss A-45 The liquor is imported into Hawaii through three different routes. (1) Liquor originating in foreign countries and im- ported directly to Hawaii as the first port of entry. (2) Liquor originating in foreign countries which is imported by an- other State as the first port of entry and is thereafter purchased by Taxpayers and imported to Hawaii. (3) Liquor which o- riginates in a State other than Hawaii and is imported to Hawaii. All of the Taxpayers file their lig- uor tax returns with the State and report their gross sales each month, less sales exempted by Chapter 244. Taxpayers also remit the tax due per each return along with the return filed. The wholesale price charged by Tax- payers is based upon the landed costs of the liquor. These costs include: 1. The original cost of the liquor A-46 2. Ocean or air freight to Hawaii 3. Wharfage fees in Hawaii 4. Drayage charges for transporta- tion to Taxpayers' warehouses 5. Brokerage fees 6. Customs, duties, and internal rev- enue taxes 7. Warehouse handling charges Because of the added landed costs, the wholesale price is higher for liquors im- ported into Hawaii as compared with liquor which is manufactured locally. Locally manufactured liquor include Okolehao, fruit wine made from pineapple, fruit liqueurs and sake. The Hawaii liquor tax is based upon the wholesale price of the liquor sold to licen- sees for use and consumption in the State of Hawaii. Exemptions from the tax are granted for certain sales and transactions, includ- ing sales of Okolehao and fruit wine manu- - o ai] 7 eZ a - * ope” ay A~47 factured in Hawaii, until June 30, 1981. But the exemption does not apply to sales of fruit liqueurs and sake manufactured locally. In their complaints for refunds, Tax- payers allege that the Hawaii Liquor tax is unconstitutional in that it violates the Import-Export Clause and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The Court does not agree with the Tax- pauers' contentions. The Court finds the liquor tax as administered under the pro- visions of HRS Chapter 244 to be constitu- tionally valid and is not violative of ei- ther the Import-Export Clause nor the Com- merce Clause of the United States Constitu- tion. Under the United States Supreme Court's decision in Michelin Tire Co. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 96 S.Ct. 535, 46 L.Ed.2d 495 (1975), a nondiscriminatory state tax is not an impost or duty prohibited by the Im- A-48 port-Export Clause and is a proper state exaction. The Court has also decided in Department of Revenue of Washington v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Com- panies, 435 U.S. 734, 98 S.Ct. 1388, 55 L.Ed.2d 682 (1978)and in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977) that a nondiscriminatory tax is not violative of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, where applied to activity with a substantial nexus to the State, The principal question addressed to the Court, therefore, is whether or not the provisions of HRS Chapter 244 are dis- criminatory. If the tax does not discrim- inate against foreign imports or against interstate or foreign commerce, the tax would be valid under both the Import-Export " Clause and the Commerce Clause of the Unit- - ee Cg &S ed States Constitution. A-49 HRS section 244-4 imposes the Hawaii liquor tax upon every person who sells or uses any liquor in the State. It essenti- ally provides that the tax is imposed upon the first sale or use of the liquor within the State of Hawaii. The tax so imposed is equal to 20 percent of the wholesale price of the liquor used or sold. HRS section 244-4(6) and (7) exempt Okolehao and fruit wine manufactured in Ha- waii from imposition of the tax. The ex- emption, however, extends only until June 30, 1981. Taxpayers pose two arguments in sup- port of their contention that the Hawaii liquor tax is discriminatory. In the first, Taxpayers argue that the tax discriminates against all imported liquor because the dol- lar amount of taxes imposed upon imported liquor is greater than the dollar amount imposed upon locally manufactured liquor. A-50 The Court rejects this argument. The mere fact that the dollar amount of taxes paid upon one item may be higher than an- other does not per se make the tax a dis- criminatory one. The difference in the exaction may be attributed, as in the case at bar, to the fact that imported liquors have a higher tax base because of their added landing costs. The nondiscriminatory nature of the tax herein imposed is evidenced by the fact that the tax is imposed at a flat rate of 20 percent of the wholesale price of all liquor so used or sold, whether local or imported. It is a commonplace occurrence that any item "imported" from any place outside Hawaii will generally have a higher cost than one produced locally. The fact that this causes such items brought into Hawaii to result in a greater amount of tax does not make the tax discriminatory. In A-51 Re Tax Appeal, Puna Sugar Co., 56 Haw. 621 (1976); Michelin Tire Co. v. Wages, supra. Taxpayers' second argument is that the tax discriminates by exempting locally produced Okolehao and fruit wine until June 30, 1981. This they say has the effect of taxing only liquor brought into Hawaii while relieving locally produced liquor from the tax. The Court finds this argu- ment without merit. Exemptions are the proper exercise of the police powers of the state and are va- lid, unless applied with no rational basis. In Re Pacific Marine & Supply Co., 55 Haw. 572 (1974); Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 79 S.Ct. 437, 3 L.Ed.2d 480 (1959). : In allowing the exemptions to the Oko- lehao and fruit wine industries, our Legis- lature has found that the exemptions would help to put these budding industries on a firmer financial footing and that the exemp- tions would benefit the State by providing A-52 a new industry. Act 39, Session Laws of Hawaii, 1976; Senate Stan. Com. Rep. 408- 76. The Court finds the legislative pur- pose provides a rational basis for the ex- emptions and there was no arbitrary action taken by the Legislature in granting the exemptions. This is all the Court can do. In Re Pacific Marine & Supply Co., supra, at 582. It is also interesting to note that the Taxpayers argue that the exemptions have the effect of the liquor tax being applied only to liquor brought in to Hawa- ii while relieving all locally produced liquor from the tax. But the argument over- looks the fact that locally produced sake and fruit liqueurs are not exempted by Chap- ter 244, HRS. Two classes of liquors pro- duced in Hawaii, then, are still subject to the tax. A-53 IT IS ACCORDINGLY HEREBY ORDERED, AD- JUDGED AND DECREED that the Hawaii liquor tax as imposed by Chapter 244, Hawaii Re- vised Statutes, is a valid State tax and the amounts of taxes herein paid are valid government realizations. Judgment is en- tered in favor of George Freitas, Director of the Department of Taxation, State of Ha- waii, and against the herein Taxpa) ers. Dated: Honolulu, Hawaii, January 29, 1980. ay Yasutaka Fukushima dge of the above-entitiled Court ree A-54 DECISION AND ORDER, TAX APPEALS OF BACCHUS IMPORTS, LTD. (CASE NO. 1852), PARADISE BEVERAGES, INC. (CASE NO. 1862), EAGLE DISTRIBUTORS, INC. (CASE NO. 1866), AND FOREMOST-MCKESSON, INC., dba MCKESSON WINE & SPIRITS CO. (CASE NO. 1867). APPROVED AS TO FORM: ALLAN S. HALEY, ESQ. Cronin, Fried, Sekiya, Haley & Kekina 1900 Davies Pacific Center Honolulu, Hawaii 96813 Attorney for Plaintiffs BACCHUS IMPORTS, LTD. and EAGLE DISTRIBUTORS, INC. fac Michael K. Kawahara PF. - CHAR, ESQ. MICHAEL K. KAWAHARA, ESQ. 10th Floor, City Bank Bldg. 810 Richards Street Honolulu, Hawaii 96813 Attorneys for Plaintiff PARADISE BEVERAGES, INC. A-55 MICHAEL R. MARSH, ESQ. 1100 First Hawaiian Bank Bldg. Honolulu, Hawaii 96813 Attorneys for Plaintiff FOREMOST=MCKESSON, INC, dba MCKESSON WINE & SPIRITS CO. APPENDIX C NO. 7802 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII OCTOBER TERM 1982 In the Matter of the Tax Appeals of BACCHUS IMPORTS, LTD., PARADISE BEVERAGES, INC., EAGLE DISTRI- BUTORS, INC. and FOREMOST=-McCKESSON, INC., dba McKESSON WINE & SPIRITS, CO., CASE NO. 1852 CASE NO. 1862 CASE NO. 1866 CASE NO. 1867 APPEALS FROM FINDING OF FACT AND CON- CLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDG- MENT Plaintiffs-Appellants. TAX APPEAL COURT HONORABLE YASUTAKA FUKUSHIMA, Judge ee ee ee ee eee ee eee ee ee ee ee ee PILED JUDGMENT ON APPEAL 1983 Jan. 5 /s/ Clement J.H. Chun T. BRUCE HONDA 690 Deputy Attorney General COURT State of Hawaii Room 305, Hale Auhau Attorney for Di- 425 Queen Street rector of Taxa- Honolulu, Hawaii 96813 tion, Appellee A-57 NO. 7802 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII OCTOBER TERM 1982 In the Matter of the Tax Appeals of BACCHUS IMPORTS, LTD., PARADISE BEVERAGES, INC., EAGLE DISTRI- BUTORS, INC. and FOREMOST-McKESSON, INC., dba McKESSON WINE & SPIRITS, CO., CASE NO. 1852 CASE NO. 1862 CASE NO. 1866 CASE NO. 1867 APPEALS FROM FINDING OF FACT AND CON- CLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDG- MENT Plaintiffs-Appellants. TAX APPEAL COURT HONORABLE YASUTAKA FUKUSHIMA, Judge ee ee ee eee eer” JUDGMENT ON APPEAL Pursuant to the Opinion of the Sup- reme Court of the State of Hawaii filed December 23, 1982, the judgment of the Tax Appeal court is affirmed. DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, Jan. 5, 1983. ee if e P Ls al APPROVED: Justice a A-58 BY THE COURT: s/C nt J.H. Chu er ura APPENDIX D NO. 7802 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIT OCTOBER TERM 1982 BACCHUS IMPORTS, LTD., Plaintiff- Appellant, and PARADISE BEVERAGES, INC. Plaintiff- Appellant, and EAGLE INC. DISTRIBUTORS, Plaintiff- Appellant, and FOREMOST=-McKESSON, INC., dba MCKESSON WINE & SPIRITS, CO., Plaintiff- Appellant, vs. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO. 1852 APPEAL BY BACCHUS IMPORTS, LTD. FROM DECISION AND ORDER FILED ON JANUARY 29, 1980 CASE NO. 1862 APPEAL BY PARADISE BEVERAGES, INC. FROM DECISION AND ORDER FILED ON JAN- UARY 29, 1980 CASE NO. 1866 APPEAL BY EAGLE DISTRIBUTORS, INC FROM DECISION AND ORDER FILED ON JAN- UARY 29, 1980 CASE NO. 1867 APPEAL BY FOREMOST- MCKESSON, INC. FROM DECISION AND ORDER FILED ON JANUARY 29, 1980 TAX APPEAL COURT A-60 GEORGE FREITAS, Director of Tax- ation, HONORABLE YASUTAKA FUKUSHIMA Defendant- ) ) ) ) ) Appellee NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ALLAN S. HALEY 982-0 410 Spring Street Nevada City, CA 95959 of Counsel: CRONIN, FRIED, SE- Attorney for Appel- KIYA, HALEY & KE- lants: Bacchus Im- KINA ports, Ltd. and Eagle Distributors, Inc. FILED 1983 MARCH 3 ie Clement J. H. Chun A-61 NO. 7802 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII OCTOBER TERM 1982 BACCHUS IMPORTS, LTD., Plaintiff- Appellant, and PARADISE BEVERAGES, Inc. Plaintiff- Appellant, and EAGLE DISTRIBUTORS, INC. Plaintiff- Appellant, and FPOREMOST-McKESSON, INC., dba McKESSON WINE & SPIRITS, CO., Plaintiff- Appellant, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) vs. ) ) CASE NO. 1852 APPEAL BY BACCHUS IMPORTS, LTD. FROM DECISION AND ORDER FILED ON JANUARY 29, 1980 CASE NO. 1862 APPEAL BY PARADISE BEVERAGES, INC. FROM DECISION AND ORDER FILED ON JAN-~ UARY 29, 1980 CASE NO. 1866 APPEAL BY EAGLE DISTRIBUTORS, INC FROM DECISION AND ORDER FILED ON JAN- UARY 29, 1980 CASE NO. 1867 APPEAL BY FOREMOST- MCKESSON, INC. FROM DECISION AND ORDER FILED ON JANUARY 29, 1980 TAX APPEAL COURT A~62 HONORABLE YASUTAKA FUKUSHIMA GEORGE FREITAS, Director of Tax- ation, Defendant- ) ) ) ) ) Appellee NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Bacchus Imports, Ltd., and Eagle Dis- tributors, Inc., the Taxpayers-Appellants named above, hereby give notice of their appeal and appeals, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1257(2), to the Supreme Court of the United States from the judgment of the Supreme Court of Hawaii entered in this action on January 5, 1983, and each and every part thereof. DATED: Nevada City, California, Feb- ruary 28, 1983 Attorney for appellants Bacchus Imports, Ltd. and Eagle Distributors, : Inc. | . i ——— « = - =e A-63 NO, 7802 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII OCTOBER TERM 1982 BACCHUS IMPORTS, LTD., Plaintiff- Appellant, and PARADISE BEVERAGES, Inc, Plaintiff- Appellant, and EAGLE DISTRIBUTORS, INC. Plaintiff- Appellant, and FOREMOST-McKESSON, INC., dba McKESSON WINE & SPIRITS, CO., Plaintiff- Appellant, vs. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ’ ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO. 1852 APPEAL BY BACCHUS IMPORTS, LTD. FROM DECISION AND ORDER FILED ON JANUARY 29, 1980 CASE NO. 1862 APPEAL BY PARADISE BEVERAGES, INC. FROM DECISION AND ORDER FILED ON JAN- UARY 29, 1980 CASE NO. 1866 APPEAL BY EAGLE DISTRIBUTORS, INC FROM DECISION AND ORDER FILED ON JAN- UARY 29, 1980 CASE NO. 1867 APPEAL BY FOREMOST- MCKESSON, INC. FROM DECISION AND ORDER FILED ON JANUARY 29, 1980 TAX APPEAL COURT al A-64 HONORABLE YASUTAKA FUKUSHIMA GEORGE FREITAS, Director of Tax- ation, Defendant- ) ) ) ) ) Appellee . CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal was duly served on all parties required to be served by placing copies of the same in the United States mail, first-class postage prepaid, properly addressed, on February 28, 1983, to the following: T. BRUCE HONDA 690 Deputy Attorney General State of Hawaii Room 305, Hale Auhau 425 Queen Street Honolulu, Hawaii 96813 Of Counsel Case, Kay & Lynch JULIAN H. CLARK 717-0 BRUCE C. BIGELOW 1290-0 1100 First Hawaiian Bank Bldg. Honolulu, Hawaii 96813 Attorneys for Plain- tiff llant McKES- SON WINE & SPIRITS, CO. A-65 VERNON F. L. CHAR, ESQ. MICHAEL K. KAWAHARA, ESQ. 10th Flr., City Bank Bldg. 810 Richards Street Honolulu, Hawaii 96813 ‘si Allan S. Haley Attorney for Appellants: BACCHUS IMPORTS, LTD. and EAGLE DISTRIBUTORS, IN. j al 4 “. * des - --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_0666%3A02. Public record. Not legal advice.