# Opposition — Kline v. Louisiana

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1983
- **Citation:** 461 U.S. 906

## Text

Office-Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

NO. 82-1480 APR 2 1963
IN THE ALEXANDER L. STEVAS,

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
1983 TERM

DAVID KLINE
Petitioner,

Versus

STATE OF LOUISIANA,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

RESPONSE OPPOSING PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI

E. RUDOLPH MCINTYRE, JR.
Assistant District Attorney
Fifth Judicial District of Louisiana

P.O. BOX 426
Winnsboro, Louisiana 71295
Telephone: (318) 435-4205
Counsel for Respondent

ati

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Statement of the Case 3
Argument 8
Conclusion 30

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Constitutions

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION,
Fourth Amendment 8,15

Cases

BELL-V.-WOLFISH, 441 U.S. 520, 559,
99 S.Ct. 1861,1884,60 L.Ed.2d
447,481 (1979) 13,30

BRIENEGAR-V.-UNITED STATES, 338
U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93
L.Ed. 1879 (1949) 16

CHIMEL-V.-CALIFORNIA, 395 U.S.
752, 89 S.Ct. 2034,23 L.Ed.2d
685 (1969) 21,30

CARROLL-V.-UNITED STATES, 267 U.S.
132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed
543 (1925) 22,23,
25,30

CHAMBERS-V.-MARONEY, 399 U.S. 42,

90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419
(1970) 22,23,
25,30

affe
Page
COOLIDGE-V.-NEW HAMPSHIRE,403 U.S.
443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d

564 (1971) 19,23,
30

SCHECKLOTH-V.-BUSTAMONTE, 412 U.S.
218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d

854 (1973) 28, 30
UNITED STATES-V.-ROSS, 102 S.Ct.
2157 (1982) 25,30
STATUTES

LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES,
L.R.S. 14:62 3

LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES
L.R.S. 14:95.1 6

The defendant was convicted of the crime
of Simple Burglary in violation of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 14:62 in the Fifth Judicial
District Court, Franklin Parish, Louisiana,
on October 20, 1980. The defendant was sen-
tenced to serve for a period of three years
at hard labor under the supervision of the
Louisiana Department of Corrections which said
sentence was suspended and he was placed on
active supervised probation for a period of
three years.

Within three days prior to January 9, 1981,
Deputy Larry Crum of the Franklin Parish She-
riff's Office received information from a con-
fidential reliable informant that the defen-
dant was in the possession of a long barrel re-
volver. The informant told Deputy Crum that
the defendant carried the pistol back and forth
to work with him in his truck and in the truck
he drove for his employer. The informant stated

that the information was based on first-hand per-

-\.

sonal observation of the pistol in the posses-
sion of the defendant.

Deputy Crum was familiar with the defen-
dant, his personal truck and the pistol and
its black case having arrested the defendant
previously on the simple burglary charge and
on a possession of marijuana charge. Deputy
Crum had observed these items during the de-
fendant's prior arrests. Deputy Crum also knew
where the defendant worked.

Sometime after receiving the information
from the informant but prior to January 9, 1981,
Deputy Crum contacted the defendant's proba-
tion officer, Ezell Thomas, to determine if the
defendant was violating the conditions of his
probation by possessing a firearm. The pro-
bation officer informed Deputy Crum that the
defendant was not 2ilowed to possess a firearm.

With this information in mind, Deputy Crum,
working by himself, parked his police vehicle
a short distance down the street from where
the defendant worked and observed him drive
away in his truck from the premises at about

3:15 A.M. on January 9, 1981. The defendant's

an

truck drove past the police vehicle and Deputy
Crum pulled in behind it. The defendant then
pulled over and stopped a short distance down
the street in a parking lot without any sig-
nals from Deputy Crum. The police vehicle
pulled over and stopped near the defendant's
truck.

The defendant exited his truck at about
the same time Deputy Crum exited his police
vehicle. The defendant left his driver's door
open and the light inside the truck was shining.
Deputy Crum met the defendant at the front of
the police vehicle and near the front door of
the defendant's truck. As the two conversed,
Deputy Crum recognized the black pistol case
lying on the front seat of the defendant's
truck from the vantage point of his position
near the open door.

Deputy Crum then asked what was in the
case and the defendant stated his pistol was
in the case. As that time Deputy Crum arrested
the defendant for possessing the firearm and
advised him of his Constitutional Rights.

Deputy Crum then retrieved the case, unzipped

-6-

it and discovered the long barrel revolver in-
side.

On the way to the police station the defen-
dant, who was seated on the front seat of the
police vehicle stated, "You're going to find
it when we get to the office anyway. If you'll
reach in my back pocket, there is another pis-
tol in my back pocket." (See Transcript Page
22) Deputy Crum then reached in the defendant's
back pocket and retrieved a small concealed
-25 calibre automatic pistol.

The defendant was charged by bill of in-
formation with violating Louisiana Revised
Statutes 14:95.1 because he was in the posses-
sion of firearms after having been convicted of
simple burglary.

Prior to trial, defendant filed a Motion
to Suppress Evidence based upon the warrantless
seizure of evidence from his person and truck.
Judge John C. Morris, Jr., the trial judge,
denied the Motion to Suppress.

Subsequently, the defendant plead guilty
to the reduced charge of attempted possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation

of Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:95.1 with the

reservation to appeal the adverse ruling of the
trial court on the Motion to Suppress. The de-
fendant was sentenced to serve for a period

of one and one-half years at hard labor under
the supervision of the Department of Corrections.
This sentence was to run concurrently with the
Simple burglary sentence described above. In
addition, the defendant was sentenced to pay

a fine of $500.00 and court costs. (See
Excerpts From Court Minutes, Transcript Page 4).
The defendant appealed this conviction, relying
upon one Assignment of Error relating to the
overruling of the Motion to Suppress Evidence.

(See Assignment of Error, Transcript Page 13).

-8-

ARGUMENT

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:

In order to properly determine whether
the trial judge erred in denying the defendant's
Motion to Suppress Evidence, several questions
must be answered. First of all, it must be
established that an unreasonable search and
seizure actually took place. Secondly, assuming
that an unreasonable search and seizure did
occur, it must be determined whether the chal-
lenged search and seizure violated an interest
of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution was designed

to protect. Thirdly, assuming that the above
is true, it must then be established whether
the warrantless seizure was justified under one
of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.
It follows then that the first query is
whether an unreasonable search and seizure in
violation of the defendant's rights under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Consti-

tution actually took place.

wie

First of all, it is contended by the State
of Louisiana that when an officer inadvertently
observes evidence of a crime from a vantage
point that does not intrude upon a protected
area, there should be no violation of the search
warrant rule because there has been no search.

In the case at bar, there can be no doubt
that Deputy Crum did not intrude upon the defen-
dant's protected area by standing on a public
parking lot near the defendant's open truck
door. (See Transcript Page 21). Therefore,
Deputy Crum did not conduct an unconstitutional
search of the .357 magnum long barrel revolver
located on the defendant's truck seat. In
addition, Deputy Crum did not conduct an uncon-
stitutional search of the .25 calibre automatic
pistol located in the defendant's back pant's
pocket because the defendant himself requested
that Deputy Crum secure the concealed weapon
from his person. (See Transcript Page 22).
Assuming there was not an unconstitutional search
in the case at bar, we must now determine whe-
ther the defendant's constitutional rights were

violated when Deputy Crum entered the truck and

~10-

the defendant's pocket and seized the firearms
without a warrant.

The defendant had been convicted of Simple
Burglary and was on active supervised proba-
tion at the time of the seizure of the fire-
arms. Therefore, the defendant's status as a
probationer requires that we determine whether
and to what extent he had a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy regarding the seizure of evi-
dence herein.

It is the contention of the State of Lou-
isiana that a probationer, such as the defen-
dant, should enjoy a reduced expectation of
privacy and should not have the same freedom
from governmental intrusion as the ordinary
citizen.

In the case at bar, Deputy Crum knew
that the defendant was on active supervised
probation for his simple burglary conviction.
(See Transcript Page 20). He knew that it was
a violation ofhis probation for the defendant
to own or possess firearms. (See Transcript
Page 20). He also knew that it was a violation

of law for one convicted of simple burglary to

@-11-

own or possess firearms. (See Transcript

Page 20). He had been told by a confidential
and reliable informant, whose credibility

has not been attacked in this appeal, that the
defendant carried a long barrel revolver with
him in his personal truck and in his employer's
truck. (See Transcript Page 18). The revol-
ver, its black case and the defendant's truck
were personally known by Deputy Crum. (See
Transcript Pages 18 and 19).

With this information in mind, Deputy
Crum, working by himself, parked his vehicle
near the defendant's employer's premises during
the early morning hours of January 9, 1981.
(See Transcript Page'20). The defendant drove
away from the premises at about 3:15 A.M. in
his truck and passed by Deputy Crum's police
vehicle. (See Transcript Page 20). Deputy
Crum pulled out behind the defendant's truck
and without any signal from Deputy Crum, the
defendant slowed down and parked in the adja-
cent parking lot. (See Transcript Page 21).
Deputy Crum parked his car near the driver's

door of the defendant's truck and both men

-12-

got out of their vehicles almost simultaneously.
(See Transcript Page 21).

Deputy Crum met the defendant at the front
of his police vehicle and near the open door of
the defendant's truck. (See Transcript Page 21).
The light inside the defendant's truck was
shining. (see Transcript Page 21). Deputy Crum
and the defendant talked for a few minues and,
as *hey conversed, Deputy Crum looked inside
the defendant's truck from his position on the
parking lot and observed a black pistol case,
which he had seen on prior occasions in the
possession of the defendant, lying on the truck
seat. (see Transcipt Pages 19,21,23 and 24).
Deputy Crum then asked the defendant what was
in the case and the defendant stated that his
pistol was in the case. (See Transcript Page
21). At this time Deputy Crum arrested the
defendant for the possession of the firearm
and advised him of his constitutional rights.
(See Transcript Page 22). Then Deputy Crum
entered the open truck door and retrieved the
black pisto] case. Inside the case he discov-

ered a long barrel revolver as described by the

atts

informant and the defendant and of which he
had personal knowledge. (See Transcript Page
19,21,23 and 24).

As Deputy Crum was transporting the defen-
dant to the police station, the latter said,
"you're going to find it when we get to the
office anyway. If you'll reach in my back
pocket, there is another pistol in my back poc-
ket." (See Transcript Page 22). At this, De-
puty Crum reached into the defendant's back
pant's pocket and retrieved the concealed .25
calibre automatic pistol. (See Transcript
Page 22).

It is the contention of the State of Lou-
isiana that the seizure of these two firearms
was reasonable and not in violation of defen-
dant's constitutional rights. In the case of

Bell-V.-Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,559, 99 S.Ct. 1861,

1884 ,60 L.Ed.2d 447,481 (1979) this Honorable
Court stated the following test of reasonable-
ness for searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment, to-wit:

"The test of reasonableness under

the Fourth Amendment is not capa-

ble of precise definition or mech-
anical application. In each case

~14-

it requires a balancing of
the need for the particular
search against the invasion
of personal rights that the
search entails. Courts must
consider the scope of the
particular intrusion, the
manner in which it is conduc-
ted, the justification for
initiating it and the place
in which it is conducted."
[cites omitted]

Following the guidelines set forth above,
there can be no doubt that Deputy Crum did not
intrude upon the defendant's protected area
by standing on a public parking lot near the
defendant's open truck door and, from that van-
tage point, observing a black pistol case lying
on the truck seat. It is also obvious that
Deputy Crum was justified in asking the defen-
dant what was in the case based on the infor-
mation he had available and his prior knowledge
of the defendant's activities. The defendant's
statement that his pistol was in the case gave
Deputy Crum reasonable cause to initiate the
limited seizure of the .357 magnum long barrel
revolver from the defendant's truck seat. The
seizure of this firearm was, therefore, rea-
sonable under the four requirements cited above

and was not a violation of the defendant's re-

=

duced expectation of privacy as a probationer.

In addition, the four requirements under
the test of reasonableness cited above are
satisfied in Deputy Crum's seizure of the con-
cealed .25 calibre automatic pistol from the
defendant's back pant's pocket. The defendant
himself requested that Deputy Crum take the
firearm and, therefore, the scope of the parti-
cular intrusion, the manner in which it was
conducted, the justification for initiating it
and the place in which it was conducted were
all reasonable and not in violation of the de-
fendant's reduced expectation of privacy as a
probationer.

It is submitted by the State of Louisiana
that the challenged seizure of the two firearms
did not violate an interest of the defendant

which the Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution was designed to protect.

It follows that the final inquiry is whether
the search and seizure of the two firearms was
justified under one of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement. The State of Louisiana will]
argue the seizure of the .357 magnum long barrel

revolver from the defendant's truck seat first

-16-

before proceeding to the argument regarding

the seizure of the .25 calibre pistol secured
from the defendant's back pant's pocket to avoid
confusion.

The State of Louisiana contends, first of
all, that the seizure of the .357 magnum revol-
ver should be condoned as incident to the de-
fendant's lawful arrest and by virtue of the
plain view doctrine and the automobile excep-
tion to the warrant requirement.

Since the defendant's arrest was made
without benefit of the issuance of an arrest
warrant, we must first determine whether there
existed probable cause to arrest him.

Probable cause exists when facts and cir-
cumstances within the arresting officer's know-
ledge and of which he has reasonable and trust-
worthy information are sufficient to justify a
man of average caution in the belief that the
person to be arrested has committed or is com-

mitting an offense. Brienegar-V.-United States,

338 U.S. 160, 69S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949).
The arresting officer, Deputy Crum, was

in possession of the following facts: (1) he

-17-

knew the defendant personally having previously
arrested him for simple burglary and, on another
occasion, for possession of marijuana; (2) he
knew that the defendant was on active super-
vised probation for his simple burglary convic-
tion; (3) he knew it was a violation of his pro-
bation for the defendant to own or possess fire-
arms; (4) he knew that it was a violation of
law for one convicted of simple burglary to

own or possess firearms; (5) he had been told

by a confidential and reliable informant that
the defendant carried a long barrel revolver
with him in his personal truck and in his em-
ployer's truck; (6) this information came to
Deputy Crum within three days prior to the
seizure of evidence; (7) the informant's infor-
mation was based on the latter's first-hand
personal information; (8) the revolver, its
black case and the defendant's personal truck
were personally known by Deputy Crum; (9) he
saw the defendant drive by his location in the
truck in question from the defendant's place

of employment; (10) after both vehicles stopped,

Deputy Crum visually observed the black pistol
ease, which he was familiar with, lying on the
truck seat and (11) when questioned about the
case, the defendant replied that his pistol
was in the case.

It is submitted by the State of Louisiana
that Deputy Crum's knowledge of these facts and
circumstances satisfies a basic standard for
probable cause. Given Deputy Crum's awareness
of the defendant's simple burglary conviction
and his status as a probationer, the informa-
tion he received from the confidential reliable
informant, his observations of the defendant
and the pistol case and the defendant's state-
ment that his pistol. was in the case, as a man
of average caution he was justified in believing
that the defendant was committing the offense
in question.

Assuming, therefore, that Deputy Crum did
have probable cause to arrest the defendant,
the question remains as to whether the warrant-
less seizure of the .357 magnum revolver from
the defendant's truck seat was permissible.

It is the contention of the State of Lou-

-19-

isiana that the plain view doctrine is appli-
cable in this case

In order for the "plain-view" doctrine
to be applicable,there must have been a prior
justification for an intrusion into a protected
area, in the course of which evidence was dis-
covered inadvertently, or an officer must have
inadvertently observed evidence of a crime from
a vantage point without intrusion upon a pro-
tected area, and it must have been immediately
apparent without close inspection that the items
were evidence or contraband. When an officer
observes evidence of a crime before entering a
protected area, he may not seize the evidence
without first obtaining a warrant, absent exi-
gent circumstances or another exception to the
warrant requirement. Coolidge-V.-New Hampshire,

403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971),

The record of the hearing on the Motion
to Suppress Evidence reveals that Deputy Crum,
working by himself, saw the black pistol case,
which he had seen containing a long barrel pis-

tol on previous arrests of the defendant, lying

-20-

on the defendant's truck seat. Deputy Crum
observed this evidence through the open door
of the defendant's truck. The inside of the
cab of the truck was illuminated by the over-
head light. Deputy Crum was standing near the
truck on a public parking lot and was conver-
sing with the defendant when he saw the black
pistol case. When Deputy Crum asked what was
inside the case, the defendant replied his
pistol was inside the case.

The seizure of the black case and the
-357 magnum revolver was inadvertent and the
evidentiary character of those items seized
was immediastely obvious. Deputy Crum in-
advertently observed the evidence from a
vantage point without intrusion upon a pro-
tected area. In addition, the probable
cause to arrest the defendant for the
apparent commission of the offense in ques-
tion also would give Deputy Crum probable
cause to search the vehicle for the major
object of the crime, the firearm itself.
Also, Deputy Crum's entry into the open truck

door appears justified by exigent circum-

@-21-

stances. Exigency here may be summarized
in the fact that the truck could have been
moved or the evidence lost or destroyed.
In addition, Deputy Crum's actions were in
keeping with officer safety based upon the
defendant's proximity to the firearm and
the officer's knowledge of the defendant's
previous criminal behavior. It is the State's
contention that the seizure of the evidence
was reasonable under these circumstances.

The seizure of the evidence is also
justified as one incident to a lawful arrest,
another exception to the warrant require-

ment. Chimel-V.-California, 395 U.S. 752,

89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). It
has been held by this Honorable Court that
this justification for a warrantless search
of a person arrested for a crime is within
the conceptual scope of removing any weapons
from within the possible reach of the arres-

ted person. Chimel-V.-California, supra.

The evidence seized herein was in plain
view on the seat of the truck with the driver's

door open and under circumstances in which

-22-

the defendant was standing near the truck with
its interior under his immediate control.
Therefore, it is the State's contention that
this exception to the warrant requirement

is also applicable in the case at bar.

In addition to the plain view doctrine
and the search incident to a lawful arrest
exceptions to the warrant requirement, the
State of Louisiana suggests that the seizure
of the evidence herein was also in keeping
with the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement.

This Honorable Court has recognized that
a person's expectation of privacy in an auto-
mobile or truck is léss than in a home or

office. Carroll-V.-United States, 267 U.S.

132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925).

It has also been held that the police may
stop a moving vehicle when there is probable
cause of criminal activity or an investiga-
tory stop may be made when the detaining
officer has articulable knowledge of speci-
fic facts that give rise to a reasonable sus-

picion of criminal activity. Chambers-V.-

-23-

Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d
419 (1970); Carroll-V.-United States, supra.

It is contended by the State of Louisiana
that, if indeed an investigatory stop was
made, Deputy Larry Crum had sufficient proba-
ble cause or at least sufficient articulable
knowledge of specific facts that give rise to
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
to justify the stopping of the defendant's
truck and questioning the defendant. These
specific facts within Deputy Crum's knowledge
have been previously argued in detail in this
brief. Therefore, the State contends that
the stop was lawful.

The courts have also held that once a ve-
hicle has been stopped on either ground, a
warrantless search of the vehicle will be
justified on the ground of probable cause plus

exigent circumstances. Coolidge-V. New Hamp-

shire, supra.

Once the defendant's truck had been stop-
ped, Deputy Crum obtained sufficient probable
cause and there existed exigent circumstances

for the seizure of the firearm and its case.

-24-

The probable cause factors have been previous-
ly outlined in this brief. The exigent cir-
cumstances necessitating the seizure of the
evidence include: (1) the evidence was capa-
ble of being hidden during the delay required
to get a search warrant; (2) Deputy Crum,
working by himself, had a "fleeing opportunity”
to search the truck; (3) there was no immediate
police backup to secure protection of the evi-
dence during the delay in obtaining a search
warrant; (4) the lateness of the hour (3:15
A.M.) made the securing of a search warrant
almost impossible prior to day break; (5) the
truck could have been moved during the delay
to obtain a search warrant, and (6) Deputy
Crum's actions were in keeping with officer
safety based upon the defendant's proximity
to the firearm and the officer's knowledge of
the defendant's previous criminal behavior.
Having made the investigatory stop,
Deputy Crum, through the open door of the ligh-
ted truck, saw a black pistol case on the front
seat in plain view. When Deputy Crum asked

the defendant what was in the case, the defen-

-25-

dant replied his pistol was in the case.
The defendant, to this officer's knowledge,
had been convicted of simple burglary, was
placed on active supervised probation and was
allegedly carrying firearms in the truck in
question.

It is obvious, therefore, that Deputy
Crum's observation of the black pistol case
on the front seat of the truck together with
the defendant's admission that his pistol was
in the case and the prior information given
to Deputy Crum by his informant, supplied
the officer with sufficient probable cause to
believe that a firearm was located inside the
black pistol case. It has been held by this
Honorable Court that when probable cause exists
for the searching of a vehicle and circumstances
render a warrant impractical, a warrantless
search of the automobile does not violate

the Fourth Amendment. Chambers-V.-Maroney,

supra, Carroll-V.-United States, supra.

In addition, this Honorable Court has
held in United States-V.-Ross, 102 S.Ct. 2157

(1982) that the “automobile exception" may be

-26-
extended to include the right to search
containers found in a vehicle legiti-
mately stopped by police officers under the

Carroll Doctrine.

It is therefore submitted by the State
of Louisiana that the trial judge did not
err in denying the defendant's Motion to
Suppress Evidence regarding the .357 magnum
long barrel revolver seized from the defen-
dant's truck.

Now, turning to the .25 calibre automa-
tic pistol, it is the contention of the
State of Louisiana that this firearm was
seized by Deputy Crum as the result of the
lawful consent of the defendant and as an
incident to his lawful arrest.

The following is the series of ques-
tions and answers regarding the seizure of
the .25 calibre automatic pistol found on
page 22 of the Transcript, to-wit:

"Q. And what happened at that
point?
A. At this time I talked with
Deputy Sanders on the radio.

I had asked Mr. Kline would

A.

-27-

it be alright for another
officer to drive his truck in
to save having to call a
wrecker at that time of the
morning. Deputy Sanders came
around and did drive the ve-
hicle to the courthouse for me.
On the way to the courthouse,
Mr. Kline stated to me, he
said, ‘you're going to find

it when we get to the office
anyway.' and leaned forward
and said ‘If you'll reach in
my back pocket, there is ano-
ther pistol in my back pocket.'
What did you do at that time?
I reached into his back pocket
and retrieved the weapon.

Was the weapon concealed?

Yes, sir. It was in his back
pocket and unable to see it.
What kind of weapon was this?
It was a small .25 calibre,

automatic, nickel plated."

-28-

A valid consent given by a defendant to
law enforcement officers to search is a well-
recognized exception to the requirement of a
search warrant and a search pursuant to defen-
dant's voluntary consent need not be based on

probable cause. Scheckloth-V.-Bustamonte, 412

U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).

The defendant in the case at bar told
the officer where the firearm could be found,
in his back pocket. In fact, the defendant
requested that the officer remove the fire-
arm which Deputy Crum did. Deputy Crum exerted
no effort to coerce or dominate the defendant
into giving his permission to seize the fire-
arm principally because he was not aware of
the firearm's presence on the defendant.

Deputy Crum could also have seized the
-25 calibre pistol from the defendant at the
moment of his arrest as an incident of the
lawful arrest for the reasons stated in de-
tail in other portions of this brief.

It is therefore submitted by the State
of Louisiana that the trial judge did not err

in denying the defendant's Motion to Suppress

=29-

Evidence regarding the .25 calibre automatic
pistol seized from the defendant's person.
Defendant apparently argues that Deputy
Crum had probable cause and sufficient time
to obtain a warrant prior to his seizure of
this evidence. He apparently contends that
because Deputy Crum did not secure a search
warrant for the defendant's truck, the sei-
zure of the evidence herein is illegal be-
cause there existed no exigent circumstances.
It is apparent to the State of Louisi-
ana, however, from a review of the Trans-
cript, that Deputy Crum did not feel he had
probable cause to secure a search warrant
until all of the facts fell into place at
the time of the seizure of the evidence.
(See Transcript Page 26). It was only then
that Deputy Crum had a reasonable belief
that the defendant was committing an offense.
The circumstances which strengthened the
informant'’s tip at the scene of the seizure
were Deputy Crum's observation of the black
pistol case and the defendant's admission

that it contained his pistol. At that

-30-
time Deputy Crum had probable cause to seize
the firearm and its case but exigent circum-
stances forced immediate action. There was
no time to secure a search warrant. The

defendant's argument is without merit.

For the reason that the decision of the
Louisiana Supreme Court in this case is sup-

ported by the Bell-V.-Wolfish, supra, and

Chimel-V.-California, supra, and Carroll -V.-

United States, supra, and Chambers-V.-Maroney,

supra, and Coolidge-V.-New Hampshire, supra,

and Scheckloth-V.-Bustamonte, supra, and

United States-V.-Ross, supra, cases, the State

of Louisiana respectfully submits that this
Honorable Court should refuse to grant a Writ
of Certiorari in this case and that the peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari filed herein be

dismissed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

EXud ugh Ned.

E. RUDOLPH INTYRE, JR:
Assistant District Attorney
P.0. Box 426

Winnsboro, Louisiana 71295
Telephone: (318) 435-4205

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_0581%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.