# Appendix — Tassone v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1983
- **Citation:** 460 U.S. 1070

## Text

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No. 80-1684

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff-Appellee

-VS-

ANTHONY TASSONE
Defendant-Appellant

ORDER
(Filed: December 27, 1982)

Before: MERRITT and CONTIE, Circuit Judges; and
NEESE, District Judge.*

The defendant Tassone has petitioned the panel for
rehearing. Upon consideration, the petition is denied.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

(s) John P. Hehman, Clerk

*The Honorable C. G. Neese, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.

Ib

Nos. 80-1657; 80-1684; 81-1382

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff-Appellee

-VS-

BENJAMIN SERIDO, (80-1657)

ANTHONY TASSONE, (80-1684)

LARRY Koojt KUNITAKE, (81-1382)
Defendants-Appellants

ORDER
(Filed: October 13, 1982)

Before: MERRITT and CONTIE, Circuit Judges; and
NEESE, District Judge.*

John P. Hehman, Clerk

These cases involve the appeals by defendants Serido,
Tassone and Kunitake of their convictions involving a horse
race fixing scheme in Detroit, Michigan. These defendants,
as well as five other co-defendants, were charged in a
seven-count indictment for their participation in a conspi-
racy to knowingly influence, by fraud and bribery,
thoroughbred horse races at the Detroit Race Course and
the Hazel Park Race Track. Count | charged the defendants
with the use of wire communications in the execution of a
scheme and artifice to defraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.
$1343. Count 2 charged the defendants with participating in
a bribery conspiracy of sporting events in violation of 18
U.S.C, §224, Counts 3 through 7 charged various defen-
dants with participating in the fixing of specific races on
specific dates.

* The Honorable C, G. Neese, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.

2b

Defendant Serido was charged with violating counts |, 2
and 4 and was found not guilty on count 4 but guilty as to
counts | and 2, Defendant Tassone was charged with violat-
ing counts | through 7 but was found guilty of counts 2
through 7. The trial court declared a mistrial as to count |.
Defendant Kunitake was charged with violating counts 1, 2,
5 and 6. He was acquitted on count | and the district court
declared a mistrial with regard to counts 2, 5 and 6. He was
then retried and found guilty of counts 2, 5 and 6.

The conspiracy to knowingly influence horse racing at
the two race tracks was initiated and orchestrated by unin-
dicted co-defendant Anthony Ciulla. Mr. Ciulla was the
government's key witness in the conviction of these defen-
dants. He was granted immunity in exchange for his tes-
timony. Mr. Ciulla put together this conspiracy by the
following means: (a) obtaining financial backing for the
scheme from defendant Tassone, (b) bribing owners, train-
ers and groomers to allow access to horses for the purpose
of administering drugs and stimulants, (c) bribing jockeys to
manipulate the outcome of horse races, (d) causing and
attempting to cause certain persons to place wagers on
certain predetermined races for the purpose of increasing
profits from wagering pools, and (e) administering drugs and
stimulants to race horses.

The three defendants have raised several issues concern-
ing their convictions. We find no merit in these assignments
of error, however, and we affirm all three convictions.

Defendants Tassone and Serido first assert prosecutorial
misconduct in violation of their due process rights. They
assert that the prosecutor improperly used the testimony of
witness Ciulla knowing said testimony to be false and
perjured,

Ciulla testified that in June, 1973, he met with defen-
dants Tassone and Serido in Detroit, Michigan. At this
time, however, Tassone was in prison in New Jersey.
Defendant Tassone introduced prison records, as well as

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the testimony of two prison officials, indicating that he was
incarcerated in June when this meeting allegedly occurred.
The defendants claim that the government deliberately de-
ceived the jury by using the testimony of Ciulla concerning
the Detroit meeting in June, 1973. The defendants assert
that the government had a duty to refrain from using this
testimony or a duty to correct it when it appeared.

Due process is violated when a prosecutor obtains a
conviction with the aid of evidence whi.) he knows is false
regardless of whether such evidence concerns the pro-
secutor’s proof or the credibility of a witness. Napue v
Illinois, 360 U.S, 264 (1959), Further, due process is viol-
ated and a new trial is required when a prosecutor inten-
tionally or inadvertently fails to correct materially false
testimony relevant to the credibility of a key government
witness. Giglio v United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972),

In the present case, there is no evidence that the pro-
secutor knowingly used perjured testimony. First, there is
no evidence that the testimony of the government's witness
was deliberately falsified concerning the June meeting. Sec-
ond, the government records indicate that defendant Tas-
sone was arrested on May 23, 1973, and that he was
incarcerated in the Trenton State Prison on July 9, 1973. It
is not clear, however, that the government knew that the
defendant was jailed in the Mercer County Jail since May
25, 1973. At the time that Ciulla testified, we cannot find
that the government knew that defendant Tassone was in
prison for the entire month of June. Further, records of
arrest or incarceration do not conclusively prove that such
a meeting could not have possibly occurred. Conceivably,
the defendant may have obtained leave from prison for
some reason, See United States v Indelicato, 611 F.2d 376
(Ist Cir, 1979),

Assuming arguendo, however, that prosecutorial mis-
conduct exists in this case, we do not believe that the
defendant was prejudiced thereby. A new trial is required
only when the tainted evidence was material to the case.

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And, the materiality requirement recognizes that the mis-
conduct's effect on the trial, not the blameworthiness of the
prosecutor, is the crucial inquiry for due process purposes.
Smith v Phillips, —. U.S. —_., 102 S.Ct. 940 (1982). The
only question is whether the defendants received a fair trial.

In the cases Napue and Giglio, supra, neither the pro-
secutor nor defense counsel had knowledge that the pro-
secution witnesses’ testimony was false. In the present
case, however, the defense counsel were aware that, con-
trary to the testimony of Ciulla, defendant Tassone was
incarcerated during the month of June, 1973. Further, the
defense counsel chose not to cross-examine Ciulla concern-
ing the inconsistency. Rather, Ciulla’s testimony was im-
peached by the introduction of prison records and the
testimony of prison officials that defendant Tassone was
incarcerated at the time that the Detroit meeting was to
take place.

Unlike Napue and Giglio, supra, therefore, the trial in
this case was not substantially affected by the inaccessibil-
ity, at the time of trial, of information that would enable the
defendants to bring the matter before the jury for its evalua-
tion. United States v Bruner, 657 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir.
1981); United States v Iverson, 648 F.2d 737 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Ross v Heyne, 638 F.2d 979 (7th Cir, 1980). The
defendants were provided with an adequate opportunity for
cross-examination and impeachment concerning the al-
legedly perjured and at least inconsistent evidence. We
cannot find that the defendants have been denied a fair
trial.

The defendant Tassone further argues, however, that
Ciulla’s testimony caused him to introduce prejudicial evi-
dence. Defendant Tassone asserts that in order to impeach
Ciulla’s testimony he was required to introduce the prejudi-
cial evidence that he was incarcerated during the relevant
period. Reviewing the evidence in this case, however, we
find that this argument is without merit. The government

Sb

introduced evidence of Tassone’s incarceration in proving
that Ciulla met with Tassone in August, 1973 at the Trenton
State Prison. Thus, the jury would have known of Tas-
sone’s incarceration even if Ciulla’s testimony concerning
the Detroit meeting was not contradicted by the prison
evidence.

Defendant Tassone raises two additional issues. First,
he asserts that the district court improperly coerced a juror
to vote in open court. On May 12, 1980, the jury foreperson
advised the trial court that the jury could not reach a
verdict regarding some of the defendants. The court was
advised, however, that the jury had arrived at a verdict
concerning defendants Serido and Tassone. By agreement
of counsel, the jury was asked to return a verdict concern-
ing the defendants on which it could agree. The jury found
Tassone guilty of counts | through 7. The court then polled
the jury, pursuant to rule 31 (d) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and foreperson Klea responded that as
to Tassone it was not her verdict. After a bench conference
with counsel, the court then questioned Mrs. Klea as to
each count against defendant Tassone. She first responded
that it was her verdict on each count. But, upon a second
poll, Mrs. Klea stated that it was not her verdict as to
count | but that it was her verdict as to the remaining
counts.

Upon review of the transcript of the colloquy between
the court and foreperson Klea, we find that the district
court's inquiry was not coercive. The purpose of a jury poll
is to determine if there is a valid verdict based on unanimi-
ty. United States v Love, 597 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1979). If a
lack of unanimity is discovered, the district court may
either discharge the jury or retire it for further delibera-
tions. The court, however, may question a juror to clarify a
verdict and to elicit an unequivocable expression of the
juror’s vote. United States v Lockhart, 366 F.Supp. 843
(E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 495 F.2d 1369 (3d Cir. 1974).

6b

In the present case, foreperson Klea had already made
her decision concerning the Tassone verdict and the district
court's inquiry only identified that the lack of unanimity
existed only with regard to count |. Foreperson Klea was
not coerced into surrendering a view conscientiously enter-
tained,

Tassone finally argues that the trial judge should have
recused himself under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §45S(a).
The Detroit Race Course and Hazel Park Race Track were
owned and operated by two individuals who, along with the
trial judge, held an ownership interest in an apartment
complex. The trial judge owned a 13.3% interest in the
apartment complex and the two race track owners owned a
50% interest. The race track owners acquired their interest
independent of and after the trial judge had acquired his
interest. No other relationship existed between these indi-
viduals, and the trial judge did not associate with the race
track owners personally or in any other way. This relation-
ship was revealed to counsel by the trial judge upon discov-
ery during the second day of impaneling the jury.

Section 45S(a) provides:

Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United
States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned.

Under the provisions of this statute, a trial judge must
disqualify himself if a reasonable man, were he to know all
the facts and circumstances, would harbor doubts as to the
judge's impartiality. Potashnick vy Port City Construction
Co., 609 F.2d 1101 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820
(1980). Under the facts of this case, we find that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to recuse
himself. The court revealed the relationship to counsel to
avoid any appearance of partiality. Further, the court dis-
closed that no interest or relationship existed between him-
self and the two race track owners other than the collateral

7b

business relationship. Finally, the court tried the case with
the assistance of a jury. We conclude that a reasonable
man, with knowledge of these facts, would not question the
trial court's impartiality in this case based on a remote
business association. Additionally, the trial judge possessed
no financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or
in a party to the proceeding. 28 U.S.C. §455(b) and (d).

Defendant Serido raises five issues in addition to the
claim of prosecutorial misconduct. First, he asserts that the
district court failed to fully investigate the possibility of
improper contact with a juror. On May 8, 1980, the trial
court's law clerk received a phone call from an unknown
woman stating that she was a juror. She stated that one of
the jurors told other jurors that she got drunk with her
husband, discussed the case with him and that her husband
told her what to do on the case. The clerk asked for the
juror’s name but the woman hung up.

The trial court conducted an in-chambers questioning of
foreperson Klea concerning the call. Mrs. Klea stated that
she did not hear any such talk. Mrs. Klea, however, told
the court she had drawn her own conclusion and then
attempted to relate something to the court. The court re-
fused to allow Mrs. Klea to relate anything further. The
Court then re-instructed the entire jury concerning their
duty as jurors. Finally, upon the jury's rendering of a
verdict, the court questioned each juror concerning the
phone call and found that none of the jurors had knowledge
of the phone call or its subject matter. The trial court
refused to allow inquiry of Mrs. Klea concerning what she
wished to relate to the court on the basis of Federal Rules
of Evidence 606(b).

The trial court had a duty to inquire into the character
of potentially prejudicial material, the extent of the expo-
sure and its effect on the jury's ability to render an impar-
tial verdict. United States v Spinella, 506 F.2d 426 (Sth
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 917 (1975). But the court also
had a duty to be careful not to make inquiry with regard to

8b

the jury’s deliberation of the evidence. Fed. R. Evid.
606(b). In this case, the court determined that all of the
jurors had no knowledge of the phone call or the subject
matter of the call. Having made this determination, that no
improper jury contact occurred, the court properly refused
inquiry into what Mrs. Klea attempted to tell the court
in-chambers.

Defendant Serido next contends there was a fatal var-
iance between the single conspiracy alleged in the indict-
ment and the two conspiracies proven at trial. He also
asserts that the evidence revealed a conspiracy between
himself and co-defendant Owens, of receiving payment from
clients for information on how to wager on certain races,
which is not conduct violative of the sports bribery statute,
18 U.S.C. §224. We disagree. Unlike the case Kotteakos v
United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), the evidence indicates
that the scheme of Serido and Owens became part of
Ciulla’s bribery conspiracy. Ciulla’s testimony reveals that
the clients of Serido and Owens were used in order to get
them to wager on certain fixed races, thereby increasing
profits within the wage earning pools. Thus, the government
sufficiently proved one conspiracy as well as conduct viola-
tive of 18 U.S.C. §224. United States v Phillips, 630 F.2d
1138, 1146 (6th Cir. 1980).

Related to these claims, we also find that there exists
sufficient evidence to sustain Serido’s convictions on counts
1 and 2. Determining the sufficiency of the evidence re-
quires the Court to view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the government, Glasser v United States, 315
U.S. 60 (1942), and to determine whether there exists
sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find that the
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. U.S. v
Francis, 646 F.2d 251, (6th Cir.) cert. denied, __. U.S.
——., 102 S.Ct. 637 (1981). Under this standard, credibility
choices must be determined in favor of the government.
Accordingly, the testimony of the government's witness
Ciulla is sufficient to implicate defendant Serido in the
conspiracy charged in counts | and 2.

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Finally, defendant Serido contends that an in-court iden-
tification by F.B.1l. agent Langford should have been
excluded because of the out-of-court identification proce-
dures used. Assuming this in-court identification was based
on unreasonably suggestive out-of-court identifications and
was unreliable under the totality of the circumstances, Neil
v Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), we find this error to be
harmless. This identification evidence was cumulative in
that witness Ciulla and another FBI agent identified Serido
as being with Ciulla on September 15, 1973. Additionally,
defendant Serido was acquitted on count 4, which charged
Serido with participating in the fixing of the tenth race on
September 15, 1973. No prejudice to the defendant occurred
as a result of the introduction of this evidence.

Defendant Kunitake has raised two issues: that he was
granted immunity from prosecution in exchange for his
grand jury testimony; and, that the district court improperly
limited the cross-examination of witness John Hamilton
concerning an extortionate demand allegedly made by Ciulla
in 1978. Reviewing the entire record as well as the parties’
briefs, we conclude that the district court's finding, that no
informal grant of immunity was given to Kunitake in ex-
change for his grand jury testimony, was not clearly er-
roneous. We, therefore, find Santobello v New York, 404
U.S. 257 (1971), inapplicable. Further, the fact that the
district court excluded the defendant's grand jury tes-
timony, based on a finding that the defendant possessed a
subjective belief that immunity had been granted, rendered
any error harmless.

In regard to the limit placed on the cross-examination of
witness John Hamilton during the course of defendant
Kunitake’s second trial, we find that the district court did
not abuse its discretion. Hamilton's testimony was a general
attack on the credibility of the government's key witness.
The evidence was offered only to show Ciulla’s willingness
to fabricate testimony. It was not a particular attack di-
rected toward revealing biases, prejudices or ulterior mo-

10b

tives of the government's witness as they relate to the
issues in this case. Davis v Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
The district court properly excluded the extrinsic evidence
under Federal Rules of Evidence, 609%a) and (b). See Un-
ited States v Withers, 637 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1980).

Accordingly, the convictions of all three defendants are
hereby AFFIRMED.

AFFIRMED BY ORDER OF THE COURT.
(s) John P. Hehman, Clerk

ISSUED AS MANDATE ON CASE NOS. 80-1657 and
80-1684 ONLY

January 4, 1983

COSTS: NONE

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