# Appendix — Frank Thompson, Jr. v. United States > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_0301%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appendix - **Published:** January 1, 1983 - **Citation:** 461 U.S. 961 ## Text In The AN14 10 Supreme Court of the Gnited States October Term, 1982 FRANK THOMPSON, JR., Petitioner -VS.- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent APPENDIX FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT _ el FRANK ASKIN Counsel of Record Constitutional Litigation Clinic Rutgers Law School 15 Washington St. Newark, N.J. 07102 (201) 648-5687 DANIEL H. POLLITT University of North Carolina Law School Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514 Attorneys for Petitioner PRINTINGHOUGE PRESS—(212) 719-3120 TABLE OF CONTENTS INDEX DECISION OF UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR SECOND CIRCUIT DATED NOVEMBER 17, 1982 DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING .......... DECISION OF UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR SECOND CIRCUIT DATED SEPTEMBER 3, 1982 AFFIRM- ING CONVICTION .....ceececcvveees MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING DUE PROCESS AND OTHER POST- TRIAL MOTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, DATED SULT BR, I9GS wocccccsccccvcscces DECISION OF U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT, DATED AUGUST 8, 1980, IN UNITED STATES v. MYERS .....ccccccceees DECISION OF THE COURT OF AP- PEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT, DATED AUGUST 26, 1980, AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO DIS- MISS THE INDICTMENT ............ PETITION FOR REHEARING WITH SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC, DATED SEPTEMBER 24, 1982 ...... Page 283a la DECISION OF UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR SECOND CIRCUIT DATED NOVEMBER 17, 1982 DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING August Term, 1981 (Submitted September 29, 1982 Decided November 17, 1982) Docket No. 81-1345 > UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, _—Vo— FRANK THOMPSON, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. Before: LUMBARD, FRIENDLY, NEWMAN, Circuit Judges. 7 On Petition for Rehearing NEWMAN, Circuit Judge: On petition for rehearing, Thompson contends, among other things, that the words he spoke to Criden at the evening meeting at the W Street house on October 9, $565 2a 1979, were “You look at that for me will you?” and not “You look after that for me will you?” as reflected in the panel’s opinion and in the Government’s version of the videotape transcript given to the jury. At the request of Thompson’s counsel we viewed the videotape of this meeting. After viewing and hearing the videotape we cannot be certain whether the disputed word was “at” or “after.” If we give the defendant the benefit of the doubt, this would surely have aided his argument to the jury that he thought the briefcase transferred at the meeting con- tained investment documents (to be looked at) rather than money (to be looked after). But this interpretation of the videotape would not alter the sufficiency of the evidence on which the jury convicted nor our assessment of the investigation fom purposes of rejecting the due process challenges. On the contrary, viewing the videotape reenforces our conclusion that the events at the evening meeting on October 9 reflect a contrived arrangement whereby $50,000 was transferred pursuant to Thompson’s ground rule, explained earlier in the day by Criden to Amoroso and Weinberg, that money was not to be discussed. At the very start of the meeting, Criden says, “Frank under- stands the situation.” Criden then ceremoniously lifts the briefcase from a table to his right and places it between himself and Thompson without any conversation by any- one concerning the briefcase or its contents. Amoroso says, “There’s the briefcase,” pointing to it. Thompson then says to Criden, “You look at that for me will you?” The visual impact is of people handling and talking about a briefcase containing something of importance, not sim- ply drafts of documents for a lawyer’s perusal. Thomp- son’s knowledge that the briefcase contained money is supported by several circumstances. Later in the conver- 5566 3a sation Amoroso said the morning conversation had been “shadow boxing,” to which Thompson replied, “Well, you have to be careful.” The next day Criden told Cook that he had handed Thompson $20,000 of the $50,000 in the briefcase. Still later Thompson told Congressman Murtha that there would be $50,000 in “walking around money” for Congressmen willing to help. The petition for rehearing is denied. 5567 4a DECISION OF UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR SECOND CIRCUIT, DATED SEPTEMBER 3, 1982, AFFIRMING CON- VICTION Nos. 904, 905, 906, 907, 840, 841, 855 —August Term, 198) (Argued April 5, 1982 Decided September 3, 1982) Docket Nos. 81-1342, 1343, 1344, 1446, 1345, 1346, 1347 —w- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, _—V— MICHAEL O. MYERS, ANGELO J. ERRICHETTI, Louis JOHANSON, and HowarD L. CRIDEN, Defendants-Appellants. + UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, — FRANK THOMPSON, Jr. and JOHN M. MurPHy, Defendants-Appellanis. 4597 5a UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, _V— RAYMOND F, LEDERER, Defendant-Appellant. Before: LUMBARD, FRIENDLY and NEWMAN, Circuit Judges. —§t- Appeals from judgments of conviction entered in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York (George C. Pratt, Judge), after three separnte jury trials in which four United States Congressmen and three other defendants were found guilty of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(c), 201(g), 203(a), and 371, arising out of the Abscam investigation. Judgments affirmed on all counts as to all appellants, except Count Three (section 203(a)) of the indictment against John M. Murphy, which is reversed and remanded for a new trial. > NEIL JOKELSON, Philadelphia, Pa. (Rochelle Newman, Jokelson and Rosen, Phila- delphia, Pa., on the brief), for defen- dant-appellant Myers. 4598 6a RAYMOND A, Brown, Newark, N.Y. (Henry F. Furst, Newark, N.Y., on the brief), Sor defendant-appellant Errichetti. JOHN J. DurFy, Philadelphia, Pa. (Steven H. Gifis, Alan Dexter Bowman, Princeton, N.J., on the joint brief for Myers, Erri- chetti, and Johanson), for defendant-ap- pellant Johanson. RICHARD BEN-VENISTE, Washington, D.C. (Ben-Veniste & Shernoff, Washington, D.C., on the brief), for defendant-appel- lant Criden. TIMOTHY SAVAGE, Philadelphia, Pa., for de- Sendant-appellant Lederer. DANiEL H. POLLitt, Chapel Hill, N.C., and Frank Askin, Newark, N.Y. (Neal Rutledge, Washington, D.C., on the brief), for defendant-appellant Thomp- son. MICHAEL E, TiGar, Washington, D.C. (Sam- uel J. Buffone, Linda Huber, Tigar, Buf- fone & Doyle, Washington, D.C., on the brief), for defendant-appellant Murphy. EDWARD KorMAN, U.S. Atty., and Lawrence Sharf, Sp. Atty., Brooklyn, N.Y. (Thomas P. Puccio, Atty-in-Charge, Or- ganized Crime Strike Force, Edward A. McDonald, Sp. Atty., Gregory J. Wal- lance and Vivian Shevitz, Asst. U.S. At- tys., Brooklyn, N.Y., on the briefs), for appellee. —— 4599 7a NEWMAN, Circuit Judge: In United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980) (Myers 1), we ruled that the Government had not violated the defendant’s constitu- tional rights as a Member of Congress by requiring him to stand trial on charges of bribery arising out of an under- cover “sting” operation now well known to the nation as Abscam. See also United States v. Murphy, 642 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1980). The Myers ruling, made in advance of trial, was based on the face of the indictment that had been returned. Now before us are appeals from judg- ments of conviction entered in the Eastern District of New York (George C. Pratt, Judge), after three separate jury trials in which four Congressmen and three co-defen- dants were found guilty of various offenses related to corruption of public office arising out of the Abscam investigation. Nos. 81-1342, 81-1343, 81-1344, and 81- 1446 are appeals from convictions in the joint trial of appellants Michael O. Myers, formerly Congressman from the First District of Pennsylvania; Angelo J. Erri- chetti, formerly Mayor of Camden, New Jersey; Louis Johanson, formerly a member of the City Council in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Howard L. Criden, a law partner of Johanson’s. No. 81-1347 is an appeal from the conviction of appellant Raymond F. Lederer, formerly Congressman from the Third District of Pennsylvania, at a separate trial. Nos. 81-1345 and 81-1346 are appeals from the convictions of Frank Thompson, Jr., formerly Congressman from the Fourth District of New Jersey, and John M. Murphy, formerly Congressman from the Seven- teenth District of New York, at a joint trial. Though some of the three trials present distinct issues, all seven appel- lants raise questions of such similarity that we have found it appropriate to consider all of the claims in one opinion. 4600 For the reasons that follow, we have concluded that all of the judgments should be affirmed on all counts, with the exception of Count Three of the indictment against Murphy, as to which we reverse and remand for a new trial. I. Myers, Errichetti, Johanson, and Criden were charged in a three-count indictment. Count One alleged a con- spiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) to defraud the United States and to violate 18 U.S.C. § 201, punish- ing bribery and the receipt of bribes by public officials including Members of Congress. This count alleged that the conspiracy sought to defraud the United States of the Government’s right (a) to the honest service of Congress- man Myers “in relation to matters before the House of Representatives performed free from corruption”; (b) to have the “official action” of Congressman Myers “in attempting to influence decisions of departments and agencies of the United States in relation of matters of immigration and residence performed free from corrup- tion”; (c) to have the immigration laws “administered honestly and impartially, free from improper and undue pressure and influence”; and (d) to have officials enforc- ing the immigration laws “perform their official duties free from impairment and obstruction by the exercise upon them of corrupt . . . pressure and influence.” The conspiracy to violate section 201 was alleged to consist of the defendants’ agreeing to demand and receive money for Congressman Myers in return for the Congressman’s “being influenced in his performance of official acts.” Count Two alleged bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) and § 2. This count alleged that Congressman 4601 9a Myers, aided and abetted by the other co-defendants, agreed to receive and received money “in return for” his “being influenced in his performance of official acts as a member of Congress, to wit, his decisions and actions in a matter involving immigration, residency and citizenship of foreign nationals which might at any time be pending or which might by law be brought before the House of Representatives and departments” of the Government. Count Three alleged that all four defendants traveled in interstate commerce to carry on the unlawful activity of bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 and § 2. The charges stemmed from an elaborate undercover “sting” operation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Three FBI agents and a private citizen, all acting in an undercover capacity, purported to be repre- sentatives of two Middle Eastern sheiks operating a ficti- tious entity known as Abdul Enterprises, Ltd. The under- cover operatives let it be known that their principals were interested in investing money in the United States and immigrating to this country. The core allegation against Myers and his co-defendants was that on August 22, 1979, Myers received $50,000 in return for his promise to introduce private immigration bills permitting the sheiks to remain in the United States and to take other necessary action including intervention with the State Department. A jury trial was begun on August 11, i980, and con- cluded on August 29, 1980. The jury convicted all four defendants on all three counts. Errichetti and Criden were each sentenced to concurrent terms of six years’ imprison- ment and fines totalling $40,000. Myers and Johanson were each sentenced to concurrent terms of three years’ imprisonment and fines totalling $20,000. In a separate indictment, Lederer was charged, along with Errichetti, Joharson, and Criden, in a four-count 4602 10a indictment. Three of the counts paralleled the conspiracy, bribery, and interstate travel counts of the Myers’ indict- ment. In addition, a fourth count alleged receipt of an unlawful gratuity by Lederer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(g). This count alleged that Lederer, aided and abetted by his co-defendants, agreed to receive and re- ceived money “for and because of” the performance of his official duties in a matter involving immigration of foreign nationals. The core allegation in this indictment was that on September 11, 1979, Lederer received $50,000 in return for his promise to help the sheiks with their immigration problems. Lederer’s co-defendants were severed from his case after their convictions in the Myers case. Lederer’s trial began January 5, 1981, and con- cluded January 9, 1981. The jury convicted Lederer on all four counts. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of three years’ imprisonment and fines totalling $20,000. In a third indictment, Thompson and Murphy were charged, along with Criden and Joseph Silvestri, a New Jersey businessman, in a five-count indictment. Counts One, Two, and Four paralleled the conspiracy, bribery, and interstate travel counts of the Myers’ indictment. Count Three charged a so-called conflict of interest, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 203(a). This count alleged that Thompson and Murphy, aided and abetted by Criden, agreed to receive and received money “as compensation for services to be rendered before departments, agencies and officers of the executive branch of the Government” in a matter involving immigration of foreign nationals. Count Five, paralleling a count of the Lederer indict- ment, charged receipt of an unlawful gratuity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(g). The core allegation in this indict- ment was that on October 20, 1979, Murphy received $50,000, subsequently shared with Thompson, in return 4603 lla for their promises to help the sheiks with their immigra- tion problems. The charges against Criden and Silvestri were severed by agreement from the charges against Thompson and Murphy. Trial (the second in the sequence of three) began on November 10, 1980, and concluded on December 3, 1980. Before the case went to the jury, Judge Pratt dismissed Count Four charging unlawful interstate travel. The jury found Thompson guilty on Counts One, Two, and Five charging conspiracy, bribery, and receipt of an unlawful gratuity; he was found not guilty on Count Three charging conflict of interest. Murphy was found > guilty on Counts One, Three, and Five charging ‘con- spiracy, conflict of interest, and receipt of an unlawful gratuity; he was found not guilty on Count Two charging bribery. Thompson was tentatively sentenced to the max- imum allowable terms, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4205(c), pending further consideration of his medical condition. ' Murphy was sentenced to concurrent terms of three years’ imprisonment and fines totalling $20,000. In the interim between the conclusion of the three trials and the sentencing of all appellants, Judge Pratt con- ducted a consolidated hearing to consider various claims by all seven appellants that the Government’s conduct in the Abscam investigation and in the prosecution of the charges at trial violated rights protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In considering these allegations, Judge Pratt took testimony during a 16-day “due process” hearing conducted in January and February, 1981. Judge Pratt also permitted the seven appellants to rely upon evidence pertinent to their due ! Imposition of a tentative sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4205ic) (1976) does not alter the finality of the judgment of conviction for purposes of our appellate jurisdiction. Corey v. United States, 375 U.S. 169, 174-76 (1963) (construing predecessor statute). 4604 12a process claims that had been presented in other proceed- ings stemming from the Abscam investigation. These included the record of the trial and the “due process” hearing concerning charges against former United States Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., of New Jersey, in the Eastern District of New York, and the trial and “due process hearing records of charges against former Phila- delphia Councilmen Harry P. Jannotti and George X. Schwartz in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (John P. Fullam, Judge),? against former Congressman John W. Jenrette and a co-defendant in the District of Columbia (John G. Penn, Judge), and against former Congressman Richard Kelly and two co-defendants in the District of Columbia (William B. Bryant, Judge).’ Based upon this comprehensive record, Judge Pratt, in a detailed and thoughtful opinion, denied the due process contentions of the seven appellants as well as their multitude of other claims attacking the validity of their convictions. United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). II. The background of the Abscam operation is described by Judge Pratt as follows: 2 Judge Fullam set aside the jury verdicts that had been returned against Jannotti and Schwartz, United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980), but on appeal the Third Circuit reinstated the verdicts, United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d $78 (2d Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3903 (U.S. June 7, 1982). 3 Judge Bryant set aside the jury verdicts that had been returned against Kelly and his co-defendants and ordered a new trial for the co-defendants. United Siates v. Kelly, $39 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1982), appeal docketed, No. 82-1660 (D.C. Cir. June 15, 1982). 4605 13a “Abscam” is the code word given by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to an undercover “sting” operation conducted out of the FBI office at Haup- pauge, Long Island, New York, under the supervi- sion of agent John Good. Abscam began after Melvin Weinberg in 1977 was convicted in the West- ern District of Pennsylvania on his plea of guilty to fraud. In return for a sentence of probation Wein- berg agreed to cooperate with the FBI in setting up an undercover operation similar to the London In- vestors, Ltd. “business” that Weinberg had used with remarkable success before his arrest and conviction in Pittsburgh. For most of his life Weinberg had been a “con man” operating in the gray area between legitimate enterprise and crude criminality. For a number of years in the 1960s and early 1970s, he had been listed as an informant by the FBI and had provided his contact agent from time to time with intelligence about various known and suspected criminals and criminal activities in the New York metropolitan area and elsewhere, for which he had received in return occasional small payments of money. When he was arrested on the charge that led to his guilty plea, his informant status was cancelled, later to be reinstated after his guilty plea and agreement to cooperate with the FBI. As agent-in-charge of the FBI’s Long Island office Good was, at all times, the supervising agent for Abscam. Initially, Weinberg worked directly under special agent John McCarthy who later was replaced by special agent Anthony Amoroso. Both McCarthy and Amoroso worked undercover with Weinberg. 4606 l4a The general pattern of the “scam” or “sting” operation reflected Weinberg’s earlier theme of rep- resenting wealthy Arab interests who had large sums of cash available for business opportunities in this country. When operating outside the law in Hunt- ington, Long island as London Investors, Weinberg’s method had been a “front-end scam” for real estate investment wherein he would promise to obtain large loans for his victims and pick-up “appraisal” or “processing” fees of several thousand dollars, but without ever producing the final loans. Although not identical to London Investors, the initial plan developed by Weinberg and the FBI was similar. Weinberg was to present himself as a business agent for “Abdul Enterprises”, an organization backed by two extremely wealthy Arab sheiks look- ing for American outlets for their cash. He would pass the word of big money available for deals to other con men and people who move between the legitimate and illegitimate. If criminal proposals ap- peared, appropriate action would be taken by the FBI. Weinberg and the agents set up business in an office in Holbrook, Long Island. The FBI’s code name “Abscam” came from the first two letters of “Abdul”, combined with the word “scam”. At first Abscam’s focus was upon stolen and forged securities and stolen art work. Other “invest- ment” opportunities soon presented themselves, and quickly the investigation turned itself toward Atian- tic City and the gambling casinos which were then being proposed and constructed. As word spread about Weinberg’s contact with virtually inexhaustible Arab funds, Angelo Errichetti, who was both mayor 4607 —— —_—_S 15a of Camden, New Jersey, and a New Jersey state senator, came on the scene. Errichetti claimed to have extraordinary influence in obtaining gambling casino licenses, power over the commissioners who issued the licenses, connections with organized crime, ability to deal in narcotics, guns and counterfeit securities, as well as intimate knowledge of which members of the New Jersey legislature could be bought. Errichetti brought to the undercover agents How- ard Criden, a Philadelphia lawyer seeking to pro- mote a gambling casino in Atlantic City. In July of 1979, Errichetti and Criden met with Weinberg and Amoroso on the sheiks’ yacht in Florida to discuss financing for the proposed casino that a client of Criden’s wanted to build. In the course of the day Amoroso and Errichetti discussed the problem that might be faced by the sheiks should a revolution occur in their country and should they want to come to the United States as permanent residents. Amoroso told Errichetti that he thought cooperation of public officials would be needed and that money would be no problem. Immediately after this conversation Errichetti and Criden formed an alliance in which they undertook to produce for Amoroso and Weinberg public offi- cials who, in return for money, were willing to use their influence with the government on the sheiks’ behalf. Meetings were arranged at various locations in New York, Philadelphia and Washington where the FBI monitored the proceedings with concealed videotape cameras the microphones. Where video- tape was not feasible, audio recordings were used. 527 F. Supp. at 1209-10. 4608 l6éa Once the focus of Abscam shifted to the “asylum scenario,”* as the parties at the trials characterized the plan to have Abdul Enterprises offer cash to public Officials in return for help on immigration matters, events rapidly unfolded, leading to the incidents on which the charges against the seven appellants were based. After returning to Philadelphia from the cruise on the yacht, Criden told his law partners, Johanson and Ellis Cook, that Errichetti had told him they could make substantia! sums of money if they knew any Congressmen who would be willing to meet the sheik or his representatives. Cook testified for the Government under a grant of immunity. Criden reported that the money, $100,000, would be paid directly to each Congressman and then shared with the law partners. The purpose, according to Criden and Johanson, was that by meeting and paying the Congress- man, the sheik would have a “friendly face,” someone “that sort of owed him a favor” and would “help the sheik come into this country” and also help members of his family. Criden suggested that Johanson should contact Myers and Lederer, since Johanson knew both Congress- men. Johanson then contacted Myers and reported that Myers was willing to attend the proposed meeting. 4 There is room for dispute as to who originated what came to be called the “asylum scenario,” the willingness of Abdul Enterprises to pay money to public officials in return for help with future immigra- tion problems that the sheiks might encounter. Weinberg testified before Judge Fullam that the idea first occurred to him while on the yacht on July 26, 1979, as a result of a suggestion of Criden. Agent Amoroso testified before Judge Fullam and Judge Pratt that he thought of the idea the previous day as a result of a newspaper article about the immigration problems of former Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza. The Government argued to Judge Bryant that the idea was originated by Errichetti, Criden, and Myers. At least a general reference to the idea was broached by Weinberg to George Katz, a defendant in another Abscam case, in a recorded telephone conversation held on July 14, 1979. 4609 17a The Payment to Myers. The first meeting with Myers took place on August 22, 1979, at the Travelodge Interna- tional Hotel near Kennedy Airport on Long Island. Myers, Johanson, Criden, and Errichetti drove from New Jersey and Pennsylvania to the Pan American terminal at the airport, where they met for a brief conversation. As all four understood, only Myers and Errichetti were to attend the hotel meeting with the sheik’s representative. Just prior to the meeting the FBI instructed Weinberg to inform Errichetti in the hotel lobby that the previously mentioned figure of $100,000 had been reduced to $50,000. Errichetti and Myers then met with Amoroso (who used the name Tony DeVito) and Weinberg in a hotel room. The meeting was recorded on videotape. Early in the conversation, Myers boasted of his influence in Congress. When Amoroso mentioned his conversation on the yacht with Errichetti concerning the sheiks’ possi- ble immigration problems, Myers replied, “Absolutely. Where I could be of help in this type of a matter, first of all, is private bills that can be introduced.” Myers ex- plained that delay was important in immigration matters and said, “[{I]f I wanta keep somebody in the country, all I do is introduce a private bill.” Later in the conversation, Amoroso told Myers that his employer was planning major investments in the United States, possibly including something in Philadelphia. Myers agreed with Amoroso that such an investment in his district would give him “a little protection,” and added that it would provide a reason to go “full force and, ah, not that I won’t otherwise,” and the “perfect opportunity to raise hell before Congress.” At the end of the meeting Amoroso handed Myers an envelope containing $50,000 in $100 bills. Amoroso said, “Spend it well”; Myers replied, “Pleasure.” 4610 18a After leaving the hotel, Errichetti met briefly with Criden at Kennedy Airport. Criden then returned to his law office in Philadelphia with the envelope Amoroso had handed to Myers. Criden reported to Cook that Errichetti had taken $15,000 for himself. Shortly thereaf- ter Myers and Johanson arrived and conferred with Criden. Cook was then told that Myers had agreed to take only $15,000; of the remaining $20,000, Criden received $9,000 or $9,500, Johanson received $6,000 or $6,500, and Cook received $4,500. At a subsequent meeting on January 24, 1980, at the Barclay Hotel in Philadelphia, Myers and Criden met with two other FBI undercover agents, posing as repre- sentatives of the sheiks. These agents were Michael Wald (using the name Michael Cohen) and Ernest Haridopo- lous (using the name Ernie Poulos). Myers vehemently complained about ending up with only $15,000, after expecting to retain $50,000 for himself out of an antici- pated payment of $100,000. As Myers pointed out, “Who am I goin’ to complain to. . . my congressman[?}” The undercover agents mollified Myers with an offer to pay an additional $35,000, which Myers said would be agree- able. On February 2, 1980, the date set for the additional payment, Myers was questioned at his home by FBI agents who identified themselves and said they were investigating the activities of Criden, Errichetti, Wein- berg, DeVito (Amoroso), and Cohen (Wald). Myers de- nied knowing Weinberg, DeVito, or Cohen. The same day FBI agents interviewed Johanson. He admitted driving to Kennedy Airport for the August meeting and receiving a stack of cash. He said he realized the seriousness of this type of activity, but could not resist the chance to make easy money. 4611 19a Claims at the Myers Trial. Myers acknowledged at his trial that he had retained $15,000 of the $50,000 handed to him by Amoroso. His defense, also adopted by his three co-defendants, was that all of his statements to Amoroso and Weinberg at the hotel on Long Island and to Wald and Haridopolous at the hotel in Philadelphia were what he termed “playacting.” Myers, the only defen- dant of the four on trial to testify, claimed that Weinberg had told Errichetti, and Errichetti had told Myers, that nothing would ever have to be done for the sheiks in connection with immigration. According to Myers, Erri- chetti told him just prior to the August 22 meeting what he should say to impress the sheik’s representatives. Myers claimed he did not intend to fulfill any of the promises he made at the meeting. Over the Government’s objection, Judge Pratt instructed the jury that they should convict the defendants at the Myers trial of brib- ery only if they found that Myers was not “playacting.” The jury’s verdicts constitute a rejection of Myers’ de- fense. The Payment to Lederer. The initial contact with Led- erer, as with Myers, was made by Johanson. He told Cook that Lederer had been briefed on the sheik’s immi- gration problem, on the sheik’s interest in investing in Philadelphia, and on the requirement that the Congress- man personally receive the $50,000 being offered. Cook testified that Lederer said he “would gladly do it for Lou [Johanson] and all he wanted was a $5,000 contribution for the spring primary.” On September 11, 1979, Lederer and Errichetti met with Amoroso and Weinberg at the Hilton Inn near Kennedy Airport. The meeting was re- corded on videotape. Lederer said that Errichetti had briefed him on the sheik’s immigration problems. When Amoroso said, “I understand that you can introduce 4612 20a legislation,” Lederer replied, “Right, a bill. Private bill. Sure.” Lederer then raised a concern that people might ask, “Why all at once does a Philadelphia Congressman want to help somebody. . . ?” It would be “so much nicer,” he continued, if the sheik had a “legitimate in- terest” in the port of Philadelphia.” At the end of the meeting, Amoroso handed Lederer a bag containing $50,000 in $100 bills, commenting, “I hope you don’t mind a brown paper bag with this in’’ and adding, ‘‘I hope you spend it well.’’ The next day Criden met with Cook in Philadelphia and handed him two envelopes. One, marked “RL” (Ray- mond Lederer), contained $5,000; the other, marked “EC” (Ellis Cook), contained $4,500. Criden told Cook that $20,000 had gone to Errichetti, $5,000 to “Mel and Tony” (Weinberg and Amoroso), and the remaining $15,500 to Criden and Johanson. Later Johanson de- livered Lederer’s $5,000 share to the Congressman. On February 2, 1980, Lederer was questioned by FBI agents about the September 11, 1979, meeting. He denied that Errichetti was present, that private immigration bills were discussed, and that he had received a package or a brown paper bag. Claims at the Lederer Tria/. Lederer acknowledged at his trial that he had been given $5,000 of the $50,000 handed to him by Amoroso. His sole defense was that he had been entrapped and that there was no evidence of his predisposition to commit any offenses. The jury, charged with respect to the entrapment defense, rejected it by their verdicts. The Payments to Thompson and Murphy. In Septem- ber, 1979, Criden met Silvestri, the New Jersey business- man, in Florida and, knowing of Silvestri’s contacts 4613 2la among Democratic politicians in New Jersey, inquired about Congressmen who might be willing to meet the sheik’s representatives. Silvestri suggested Congressman Thompson. On October 4, Silvestri introduced Criden to Thompson, at which time Criden and Thompson spoke privately. That evening Criden told Weinberg that Thompson had agreed to assist and would meet Weinberg and Amoroso in Washington on October 9. Criden told Cook that he had made arrangements so that Thompson would not personally have to take the “package.” Thompson and Criden met with Amoroso and Weinberg on the morning of October 9 at a townhouse on W Sireet maintained by FBI agents. The meeting was videotaped. The discussion centered on the use of private immigration bills to prevent or at least delay deportation. When Amoroso stated, “That’s what the money is for,” Thomp- son replied, “I’m not looking for any money.” The discussion of private immigration bills continued. Wein- berg said the sheik wanted friends he could depend on, to which Thompson replied, “I don’t know how many more ways I could say it.” At this time no money was trans- ferred. Later that day Criden returned to the W Street house for a further discussion with Weinberg and Amoroso. This meeting was videotaped. Criden complained that at the morning session Amoroso had altered their agree- ment, which, he claimed, called for no mention of money and Criden simply receiving a package. Weinberg and Amoroso denied making such an arrangement, stating that they were willing to have Criden take the package as long as Thompson acknowledged the money. Criden de- murred, arguing that Thompson was too experienced and suspicious and could not be expected to act like Myers 4614 22a and Lederer. Criden agreed to talk with Thompson and telephoned to arrange a meeting with the Congressman. On the evening of October 9, Thompson and Criden returned to the W Street house and met again with Amoroso. The meeting was videotaped. Criden said, “Frank understands the situation.” Amoroso said, “There’s the briefcase,” pointing to a briefcase containing $50,000 in $100 bills. Thompson said to Criden, “You look after that for me will you?” Thompson and Criden then said they would bring others whom they would carefully screen. Later the group discussed possible in- vestments of the sheik’s money in New Jersey. Thompson suggested some possibilities, noting that such investments would put him in a position to justify his support of the sheik. Amoroso, recalling the morning conversation, said that they had then been “shadow boxing,” to which Thompson replied, “Well, you have to be careful.” Thompson said the first Congressman he might send would be his “pal” from New York, meaning Congress- man Murphy. Thompson said he would “brief” his pal beforehand. As the meeting ended, Thompson and Cri- den both momentarily lifted the handle of the briefcase, and Criden carried it out. The next morning Criden told Cook in Philadelplhia how the $50,000 was to be divided. Thompson had taken $20,000,' Errichetti would receive $10,000, Silvestri, $3,500, “Mel and Tony,” $5,000, and $10,000 for Criden, Johanson, and Cook, leaving $1,500 unaccounted for. 5 At trial the Government contended that its evidence showed that Thompson had received a portion of the money delivered at the October 9 meeting, but his violation of the bribery and unlawful gratuity statutes was based entirely on the claim that he had received a portion of the money delivered to Murphy and Criden at the October 20 meeting. 4615 23a On October 10, Thompson met with Congressman Murphy in Murphy’s office. After Thompson returned from a brief trip, he arranged for Murphy to meet Criden on October 19, and a meeting with the sheik’s representa- tives was arranged for October 20. Murphy and Criden met with Amoroso and Weinberg at the Hilton Inn near Kennedy Airport on October 20. The meeting was video- taped. The discussion centered on the sheik’s anticipated immigration problems. Amoroso said that his employers felt it was worth “whatever they have to put out” to obtain assistance. Amoroso explained that his employer had said, “[T]ake the money, go find the people that can, can do this for me.” Criden replied, “All you have to do is get a hold of me. I will get a hold of Jack [Murphy].” Later, Weinberg said, commenting on the apparent ab- sence of any problem, “As long as the man says he’s going to take care of it. That’s what counts.” Murphy answered, “Yeah.” Weinberg then made clear that it would be a “different deal” if any help was needed for anyone other than the two employers that had been mentioned. “[I]n other words,” Amoroso explained, “these, what we’re, what we’re coming up front with, the money for is just for these two guys.” Murphy answered, “Yeah.” At the end of the meeting Amoroso picked up a briefcase containing $50,000 in $100 bills. Criden said, “Why don’t you give that to Jack.” Murphy said, “How- ard why don’t you take care of that.”® 6 The Government contends that a close listening of the videotape reveals Murphy to have said, “Howard why don't you take care of that for me?” The Government's transcript of the tape, shown to the jury, contained this version. Murphy's transcript, also shown to the jury, omitted the final words “for me.” Our listening of the tape did not catch the words “for me,” though it was surely proper to permit the jury to decide for themselves. Whether or not Murphy's line ended with “for me,” the echo from the Thompson-Criden dialogue of October 9 is unmistakable. 4616 24a On October 22, Criden, carrying the briefcase contain- ing $50,000, met with Cook in Philadelphia and explained the expected division of the money. $25,000 would be delivered to Thompson, of which Murphy would receive $15,000; Errichetti would receive $10,000, “Mel and Tony,” $5,000, and Criden, Johanson, and Cook, the remaining $10,000. Later that day Thompson telephoned Criden and arranged for Criden to meet him at a motel in New Jersey. Upon his return to Philadelphia, Criden told Cook that he had delivered the money to Thompson. Subsequent events cast further light on the issue, se- riously contested at the Thompson-Murphy trial, as to whether either Thompson or Murphy had received money at or as a result of the October 20 meeting. On November 8, Thompson gave Criden the name of Congressman John Murtha of the Twelfth District of Pennsylvania as a next “candidate” for the sheik’s representatives. Criden passed Murtha’s name along to Amoroso and Weinberg later that day at the conclusion of a meeting the three of them had with Laurence Buser, a friend of Murphy’s. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss a proposed ship- ping deal to be financed by the sheiks in which Murphy, according to Buser, would be a “silent partner.” Thomp- son then undertook to recruit Murtha. As Murtha testi- fied at trial, Thompson told him, in a discussion on the floor of the House of Representatives, about the wealthy Arabs who might need assistance on immigration matters. In a second conversation with Murtha on the House floor, Thompson told Murtha that there would be $50,000 in “walking around money” for Congressmen willing to help. Thompson told Murtha he had already enlisted Murphy in the venture. Ultimately, no money was ever paid to Murtha. 4617 25a On January 10, 1980, Murphy, Buser, and Criden met with Amoroso and Weinberg at the W Street house. The meeting was videotaped. The discussion concerned the proposed shipping deal, as to which Murphy said he was “not in.” Later Amoroso spoke privately with Murphy. In this conversation Murphy acknowledged the dangers of speaxing about money and then, in the Government’s view, engaged in playacting of his own in denying receipt of any money. Murphy told Amoroso, “[A]ny time money’s mentioned where a public official is mentioned, there—there’s automatically an ability to link ‘em to something illegal or to taking a consideration for some- thing, uh, that he’s supposed to do or use his office to do and there’s, no public official would ever be involved in anything like that. . . . Particularly Thompson, myself, or Murtha. We’d never do anything like that. See?” Amoroso said, “[YJou’re being coy with me.” Murphy said, “Sure.” Then when Amoroso said he had been reluctant to give Murphy money, Murphy said, “You didn’t, you didn’t give me any money... . I never, received any money from anyone.” The conversation continued with the two discussing future plans for Murphy to meet the sheik. After this meeting Murphy requested a private investigator to check out Weinberg, “DeVito,” and Abdul Enterprises. Murphy said he thought they were either phonies or government agents. On February 2, 1980, FBI agents questioned Thompson about his October 9 meeting with Amoroso and Wein- berg. Thompson denied that immigration matters had been discussed and denied that anyone had received a briefcase. Claims at the Thompson-Murphy Trial. At trial Thompson denied receiving any money. He testified that 4618 26a his sole purpose is going to the meetings with the sheik’s representatives and arranging introductions to Murphy and Murtha was to attract investments to his and their districts. He claimed that he thought the briefcase handed to Criden at the October 9 meeting had contained invest- ment proposals. Murphy neither testified nor presented defense witnesses at trial. His defense, as argued in summation, was that he had not received any money. Hil. We turn first to a series of broad claims asserted, with slight variations, by some or all seven of the appellants as grounds for rejecting the lawfulness of their convictions. These are claims that in several distinct, though related, respects these convictions were obtained in violation of an outer limit of fairness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to all persons whenever the Government of the United States acts to detect and prosecute criminal activity. Some of the claims are reen- forced by the contention that the Abscam investigation and prosecution of Congressmen, and those chaged with aiding and abetting them and conspiring with them, also violated constitutional protections of Members of Con- gress, either contained explicitly in the Speech or Debate Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, or implicitly in the doctrine of separation of powers. A. Lack of Prior Suspicion. Appellants contend that it is unconstitutional for the Executive Branch of the Government to predicate the conviction of a Member of Congress upon a criminal opportunity created by agents of the Executive Branch, in the absence of probable cause, or perhaps some lesser 4619 27a standard of suspicion, to believe that the Congressman has previously engaged in criminal activity. The argument emphasizes the risk of abuse: if the practice is permitted, it might be directed at Congressional targets selected for political reasons, and such political targeting, though violating the First Amendment, see United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1972), would be difficult to establish and therefore too readily available for use by malevolent officials.’ The argument also sug- gests that it is simply not the constitutional business of the Executive Branch to test the virtue of Members of a coordinate branch of government. In Myers I we canvassed the considerations supporting and opposing this claim and concluded that while the claim raised important issues of public policy appropriate for the attention of the Executive and Legislative Bran- ches, it did not present a court with a ground for declaring that the Constitution had been violated, 635 F.2d at 938-39. Our reflection upon the issue has been deepened by the passage of time and focused more sharply by the vast record assembled on these appeals, but our conclusion has not been altered. The Constitution permits Congress to apply the criminal law enforcement process to a Member’s acceptance of a bribe. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972). A Congressman is as entitled as any other citizen to the constitutional and Statutory protections that limit the power of the Govern- ment to investigate and prosecute criminal offenses. But, 7 Several appellants in fact contend that in these cases the Government targeted the defendant Congressmen for political or other impermissi- ble reasons. This claim is flatly contradicted by the evidence. The Government had no role whatever in the selection of any of the four Congressmen involved in these appeals. Criden and Johanson selected Congressmen Myers and Lederer. Silvestri selected Congressmen Thompson. Thompson selected Congressman Murphy. 4620 28a with the exception of section 6 of Article 1, which explic- itly affords immunity to Senators and Congressmen “for any Speech or Debate in either House” and privilege from arrest for most criminal offenses during attendance at sessions of Congress, the Constitution does not provide Members of the Legislative Branch with any extra protec- tions beyond those guaranteed to all citizens. Specifically, Members of Congress enjoy no special constitutional rule that requires prior suspicion of criminal activity before they may be confronted with a governmentally created Opportunity to commit a crime. What is available in such circumstances is the tradi- tional defense of entrapment, which prevents conviction of a person induced to commit a crime unless the prosecu- tion can establish the person’s predisposition to commit the crime. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). The entrapment defense exonerates a defendant who engages in criminal behavior when the activity of government agents “implant(s] in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce[s] its commission,” Sorrells v. United States, supra, 287 U.S. at 442. But the defense of entrapment is not established simply because government agents “afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the offense,” Sorre/ls v. United States, supra, 287 U.S. at 441, or engage in “*deceit.”’ United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1973). The legal defense of entrapment is not established whenever a defendant is caught by a ruse. Although the defense of entrapment was available to all seven appellants, none except Lederer elected to assert the defense at trial, or request a jury instruction on the issue. The defendants in the Myers and Thompson- Murphy trials made no attempt to avail themselves of the 4621 29a limited opportunity a defendant has to defend on the dual grounds of non-involvement and entrapment, see United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1170-72 (2d Cir. 1980) (amended 1981). They claimed only that bribery had not occurred, the Myers defendants on the ground that Myers was only “playacting,”—pretending to promise official action—and Thompson and Murphy on the ground that proof was lacking that they had accepted money for promises of official action. We do not doubt that when an entrapment defense is raised by evidence of inducement, either through cross-examination or affirmative evidence, a defendant is entitled to have a court assess, as with every other element of an offense, whether the record contains sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt, United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 1972), that the prosecu- tion has proved the defendant’s predisposition to commit the offense. See United States v. Valencia, supra, 645 F.2d at 1167-68 (evidence of predisposition sufficient to create issue for jury). But a defendant is not entitled to a court ruling on the minimal sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence as to a defense that the accused has not placed in issue. A defendant's failure to assert an entrapment defense prevents the prosecution from responding to evidence of inducement by presenting evidence of the defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime. We hold that a defendant who fails to assert entrapment as a factual defense at his trial, cannot assert it as a legal defense to his conviction. See United States v. Bishop, 367 F.2d 806, 809-10 (2d Cir. 1966). Although Lederer, having asserted the defense of en- trapment at trial, can challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of his predisposition, his claim is without merit. In seeking only $5,000 for himself out of the $50,000 he 4622 -_ “~-+@er + 30a received, Lederer displayed neither the greed of Myers nor the guile of Thompson and Murphy; nevertheless, the evidence at his trial fully entitled the jury to find his predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt. Predisposition may be established by “the accused’s ready response to the inducement,” United States v. Viviano, 437 F.2d 295, 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971); United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1008 (2d Cir. 1933). The videotape of the September 11 meeting reveals Lederer responding with alacrity. As he assured the sheik’s repre- sentatives, “I’m not a Boy Scout.” B. Excessive Government Role. Appellants contend that even if the traditional entrap- ment defense fails, whether factually in Lederer’s case or procedurally as to the other appellants, the conduct of Abscam violated standards of due process because the Government’s role in the investigation was excessive and fundamentally unfair. Unlike the entrapment defense, which focuses on the defendant’s predisposition, this due process claim focuses on the conduct of the government agents.’ There are several strands to the argument. First, it is urged, the Government created the crimes. The elaborate contrivance of Abscam is claimed to extend beyon legitimate role of law enforcement in detect- ing cr & into a forbidden area of instigating crime. e 8 ‘e , pellants sometimes refer to this claim as “entrapmeni as a matter of law.” We prefer ‘o characterize it as a due process claim, leaving the phrase “entra; nt as a matter of law” to describe the claim that, with respect to a traditional defense of entrapment, the evidence of predisposition was insufficient as a matter of law to permit the jury to find that the prosecution had proved predisposition as a matter of fact. Unlike the claim of entrapment as a matter of law, the due process claim of excessive governmental inducement is available to a defendant whether or not he asserted an entrapment defense at trial, since this claim is independent of evidence concerning predisposition. 4623 3la Second, the appellants contend that the inducements offered to the Congressmen for their corrupt promises of official action were so excessive that a court should declare them to exceed limits claimed to inhere in the Due Process Clause. Third, appellants in the Myers case con- tend that the Government agents, notably Weinberg, “coached” Congressman Myers into committing the crimes by having Errichett: and Criden tell Myers what to say at the videotaped meetings and simultaneously as- suring him that he need not intend to keep the promises he was making since he would never be called upon to deliver. In assessing this collection of claims, we acknowledge the intimations in decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court that the due process requirement of fundamen- tal fairness may have a special pertinence when Govern- ment creates opportunities for criminal conduct in order to apprehend those willing to commit crimes. See Hamp- ton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 491-95 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); United States v. Russell, supra, 411 U.S. at 431-32; United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1973); see also Archer v. Commissioner of Cor- rections, 646 F.2d 44, 46-47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 291 (1981) (Archer IJ). At the same time, we recognize that, with the exception of a decision by a divided panel of the Third Circuit, United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978), convictions have not been invalidated by federal appellate courts on grounds of excessive govern- ment involvement after the decisions of the Supreme Court in Russell and Hampton narrowed the availability of this defense. As the decisive concurring opinion of Justice Powell in Hampton stated, “Police overinvolve- ment in crime would have to reach a demonstrable level of outrageousness before it could bar conviction.” 425 4624 32a U.S. at 495 n.7. Our own decision in Archer I/, though questioning an extreme example of governmental initia- tion of a criminal opportunity, if not the crime itself, rejected the due process claim. 646 F.2d at 47. Moreover, as we recently observed in United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1982), an Abscam conviction of an employee of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the due process claim, in the rare instances when success- ful, has prevailed to restrain law enforcement activities that involve coercion, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), or outrageous violation of physical integrity, e.z., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 1. Instigation. The appellants’ claim of excessive governmental involvement in the instigation of criminal conduct is not supported by the facts. Though the “sting” was surely elaborate, its essential characteristic was the creation of an opportunity for the commission of crime by those willing to do so. The Government produced people with fictitious identities ready to pay bribes to Congressmen. Word of the availability of bribe money was made known, From thai point on, the essential conduct of the agents and their paid informant was to see who showed up to take the bribes and videotape them in the act of doing so.’ Whatever may be the due process limit of governmental participation in crime, it was not reached here. See Hampton vy. United States, supra; United States v. Russell, supra; United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3963 (U.S. June 7, 1982); United States v. 9 As Judge Prati pointed out, Murphy's conduct is more accurately described as the taking of money, rather than a bribe, since the jury acquitted him of the bribery offense and convicted him of accepting an unlawful gratuity, $27 F. Supp. at 1225 n. 14, 4625 33a McQuin, 612 F.2d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 954 (1980); United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 876-78 (7th Cir. 1975), 2. Inducement. Appellants contend that the size of the inducements offered to the Congressmen were exces- sive. They refer not to the $50,000 amounts of the bribes, but to the offers of financing multi-million dollar projects in the Congressmen’s districts. We have considerable difficulty with the premise of this argument, which is that a Congressman is privileged to take a $50,000 bribe so long as he simultaneously believes he is bringing the benefits of investments to his district. The argument is an affront to all the law-abiding Members of Congress and state officials who consider it a normal part of their public responsibilities to promote business activity for the benefit of their constituents. Moreover, if appellants are contending that there are due process limits on the size of an inducement that a government agency may offer and condition on acceptance of a bribe, the facts of these cases belie the fanciful image of four Congressmen so anxious to bring investment benefits to their districts that they reluctantly accept bribes on which they thought the investments were conditioned. Quite to the contrary, the evidence shows four Congressmen jumping at the chance to take a bribe and discussing investments in their districts as a convenient cover to justify their rendering of pur- chased legislative services. As Thompson said, anticipat- ing possible criticism for helping the sheik, “I’m in a position to say well of course I’im helping this guy. Why shouldn't I help this guy. . . his money is helping my guys work everyday.” Myers put it more bluntly: an investment in the district “gives me a little protection.” Thompson contends that inducement in violation of due process limits occurred in his case because the agents 4626 34a persisted in offering money after his initial rejection on the morning of October 9, 1979. The claim is spurious. At the morning meeting Thompson did not reject a bribe, he rejected its payment under circumstances he feared would be incriminating. Then in the afternoon Criden met first with Amoroso and Weinberg and later with Thompson, At the meeting on the evening of October 9, what oc- curred was not unfair inducement, but simply the of- fering of money pursuant to an arrangement developed by Thompson and Criden whereby the bribe could be accepted while preserving what Thompson mistakenly thought would be deniability, 3. “Coaching.” Appellants in the Myers case claim that excessive governmental activity, breaching due process limits, is to be found in the alleged conduct of Weinberg in “coaching” Myers to say falsely that he would introduce private immigration bills while assuring him that he would not be called upon to deliver on his promises. The claim is that Weinberg gave Errichetti and Criden the script for a charade that Myers would enact before the television cameras, and Errichetti and Criden then instructed Myers, in effect, how to obtain money under false pretenses. In the District Court, Judge Pratt accepted, for pur- poses of these trials, the legal sufficiency of the “playact- ing” defense," and afforded the defendants in the Myers case wide latitude to present evidence in support of their claim. He then submitted the claim to the jury, under an instruction that the jury was not to convict unless the 10 We suspect that this ruling reflects the not uncommon practice of district judges, faced with a defense claim of unquestionable legal validity in the course of protracted proceedings, to err on the side of caution and permit the defense to make its factual claim to a jury, rather than risk a reversal and retrial, 4627 35a Government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a Congressman who had accepted money in return for a promise to introduce immigration bills had done so with the intention of carrying out that promise. In other words, the jury was to acquit on the bribery charge if they accepted the “playacting” defense. The Myers jury ob- viously rejected the defense, and, on the evidence before them, they were certainly entitled to do so. Despite the existence of some evidence that Weinberg, through Erri- chetti and Criden, had encouraged the Congressmen to “come on strong,” as Weinberg acknowledged in his testimony at the Myers trial, the jury was entitled to conclude that this was no charade. An entirely plausible inference even from the defendants’ evidence, and the one the jury apparently accepted, is that Weinberg was not urging the Congressmen to utter promises they were reluctant to make and did not intend to keep, but was simply anxious to make sure that they fully and unambig- uously expressed on videotape the promises they were all too ready to make and fully intended to keep. Moreover, after the trials were concluded, Judge Pratt afforded the defendants a full opportunity at the “due process” hearing to amplify the record to persuade him, as the trier of fact on the due process claim, that only a charade had occurred. After conducting a wide-ranging hearing, the District Judge found the claim unsupported as a factual matter, and his findings are not clearly erroneous. However, circumstances in the record prompt us not to place this portion of our decision solely on the traditional deference an appellate court extends to the fact-finding of a jury and a trial judge when supported by sufficient evidence. The record contains one striking instance, in the early stages of Abscam, when Weinberg unquestionably 4628 36a pursued a course of conduct with Senator Williams that reveals precisely the sort of “coaching” for “playacting” that some of these appellants claim occurred with them.'' In a videotaped conversation with Senator Williams on June 29, 1979, Weinberg made these statements: He’s only interested in you. You gotta tell him how important you are, who you are, what you can do and you tell him in no uncertain terms “without me there is no deal.” “I’m the man. I’m the man who’s gonna open the doors. I’m the man who’ gonna do this and use my influence and I guarantee this.” Follow me? All bullshit. And that’s it, it goes no further, it’s all talk, all bullshit. That’s all he wants to hear it. It’s . . . it’s a walk-through. You should be out of there in twenty: minutes. Come on, “Me, I’m the power.” And that’s it. It’s as simple as that. You’re on stage for twenty minutes. So you ready to go on-stage? When this “coaching” session came to the attention of the office of the United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey, prosecutors there strenuously protested Wein- berg’s conduct and complained to Department of Justice officials and the prosecutors in charge of Abscam in the Eastern District of New York. That protest led to a meeting on August 9, 1979, at the home of Special Agent iN We intimate no opinion with respect to the effect of this episode on Senator Williams’ appeal from his conviction. 4629 37a Larry Schneider of the FBI office in New Jersey, attended by Weinberg, prosecutors from the Eastern District of New York and the District of New Jersey, and FBI agents. What was said at that meeting was a matter of dispute at the due process hearing before Judge Pratt. FBI agent Martin Houlihan recounted an exchange between Edward Plaza, then an Assistant United States Attorney in New Jersey,"* and Weinberg. According to Houlihan, Plaza told Weinberg that he could not put words into people’s mouths; Weinberg replied “to the effect that if he didn’t say things like that, then we wouldn’t be making any cases.” Agent Schneider supported Houlihan’s account with the following testimony: at a meeting a few days later with Thomas P. Puccio, attorney in charge of the Organized Crime Strike Force in the Eastern District, Weinberg denied ever saying that he had “to put words in people’s mouths or we won’t make any cases,” to which Schneider and Houlihan promptly replied, in substance, “Mel, that’s not so, you did say that.” Schneider also testified that, when the Williams’ “coaching” session was discussed at the August 9 meeting and Weinberg was admonished to refrain from such conduct, he (Schneider) made “a statement to the effect ‘Yeah, at least if you're going to coach him you don’t tape it.’” At the hearing, Schneider characterized this as a “joking remark,” which “was said in a joking matter, as far as I understood everybody understood it to be a 12 Judge Pratt concluded that both Plaza and ancther Assistant United States Attorney from New Jersey, Edward Weir, were motivated to criticize the Abscam operation by jealousy over the control by prosecu- tors from the Eastern District of New York of an investigation uncovering corruption in the District of New Jersey. 527 F. Supp. at 1245-47. Professional rivalry may have been afoot, but our review of the record inclines us to think that Piaza and Weir were expressing in good faith concerns based largely on their sense of the proper adminis- tration of justice. 4630 38a joking matter.” To put it mildly, this is an odd subject for humorous bantering. Not having heard the participants who testified about the August 9 meeting, we are in no position to assess credibility and decide whether Weinberg made the remark attributed to him. We note that Judge Pratt’s discussion of the August 9 meeting does not make a finding of fact on this point. 527 F. Supp. at 1235. Judge Pratt did find that, by the time of the August 9 meeting, the Williams “coaching” incident was “past history, and the technique was not thereafter repeated.” Jd. This finding relates to whether Weinberg himself did any “coaching” of the Congressmen. It does not preclude the distinct possibility that Weinberg encouraged Errichetti and Criden to handle the “coaching” for him. Judge Pratt expressed the view that, if this happened, the Government bore no responsi- bility for whatever Errichetti and Criden might have told the Congressmen. Jd. at 1735-37. If impropriety of con- stitutional dimension had arisen from Weinberg’s “coach- ing,” we would not be so certain as Judge Pratt that the taint would be dissipated by transmission through middle- men. See United States v. Valencia, supra, 645 F.2d at 1168-72); Note, Entrapment Through Unsuspecting Middlemen, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1122 (1982).'’ There is a 3 Although there is room for fair dispute as to the circumstances in which government may be held responsible for extrapment by a third party, see United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1176 (2d Cir. 1981) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), “the defense is available, of course, where government agents act through private citizens,” United States v. Buie, 407 F.2d 90S, 908 (2d Cir.), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87 (1969); see Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); Johnson v. United States, 3\7 F.2d 127, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1963). Appel- lants’ claim of indirect “coaching” presents the strongest circumstance for attributing third-party conduct to a government agent, since this is a claim of what might be called “instructed transmission” of an inducement: Weinberg, acting as agent for the Government, allegedly 4631 39a substantial risk that Weinberg, having been admonished for “coaching” Senator Williams, and, even on the Gov- ernment’s version, having heard FBI agents and prosecu- tors “joke” about his not taping further “coaching” sessions, did decide to encourage Errichetti and Criden to undertake similar “coaching” ventures with the Congress- men.'* Since we are left with at least a measure of unease as to whether some indirect “coaching” occurred, we prefer to consider the substance of appellants’ claim. (3)a. “Coaching” and the “Playacting” Defense. The appellants’ “coaching” claim seeks to create a due process violation by combining an erroneous interpretation of the bribery statute with an unrealistic assessment of the facts. The first step in the argument is taken when the appel- lants contend that “playacting” is a defense to bribery. It is not.’ Since Myers appears to be the first public official gave “coaching” directions to middlemen Errichetti and Criden with specific instructions that they should relay his directions to the Con- gressmen. The justification for holding government accountable for a middleman’s behavior would be less compelling if the claim were one of “uninstructed transmission”: 2 middleman takes it upon himself to pass an agent's inducement along to others. Government responsibility has been rejected where the circumstances showed what might be called “caused” inducement: an agent induces a middleman to commit a crime, and the middleman, responding to the pressure upon him, takes it upon himself to induce another person to participate in the crime. E.g., United States v. Reed, §26 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 986 (1976). See generally United States v. valencia, supra, 645 F.2d at 1178 (explication of Reed facts). \4 At the Philadelphia due process hearing before Judge Fullam, Errichetti and Criden, testifying under an arrangement that precluded use of their testimony against them, both alleged that, acting at Weinberg’s behest. they had told the Congressmen that money could be obtained simply by pretending to give assurances of using Congres- sional influence. is Appellants have no basis for complaint because Judge Pratt gave them an opportunity, accepted by defendants in the Myers trial, to try to persuade the jury that the facts supported a defense to which they were not entitled. 4632 40a in a reported federal decision to defend a bribery charge on the ground that he intended to keep the bribe but not to keep the promise he made to the bribe-payer,"* it is not surprising that the appellate reports have not dealt explic- itly with the claim. The statute proscribes the corrupt receipt of money by a public official “in return for: (1) being influenced in his performance of any Official act. .. .” The phrase “in return for” appeared in the statute in 1962 when Congress revised and consolidated various public corruption statutes. This phrase makes it clear that bribery under section 201(c) requires a promise of a future act in exchange for the money given to the public official, an element not required for receipt of an unlawful gratuity under section 201(g), which punishes receipt of a gratuity paid “for or because of” perform- ance of a future or past official act. United States v. Niederberger, 580 F.2d 63, 68-69 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978); United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 71-72 (D.C. Cir. 1974). As the Supreme Court said in United States v. Brewster, supra, 408 U.S. at 526, con- struing the bribery statute, “[t}he illegal conduct is taking or agreeing to take money for a promise to act in a certain . way.” But the text of the 1962 revision perpetuates the preexisting ambiguity as to whether the promise given by the public official must be one that he intends to carry out. A prior statute, 18 U.S.C. § 205 (1958), had required that a Congressman receive the bribe “with the intent to 16 Cases have considered and rejected the somewhat similar defense _ that the bribe-taker was unable to be influenced because the official act for which the bribe was paid either was beyond his authority, see, ¢.g., United States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424, 433 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972); United States v. Heffler, 402 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1968); cert. denied, 394 U.S. 946 (1969), or had already been taken, see, é.2., United States v. Arroyo, $81 F.2d 649, 6$3-57 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979). 4633 4la have his action ... influenced.” This somewhat awkward phrasing left it unclear whether the Congress- man must intend to take action or need only intend to receive money with awareness of the purpose for which the briber gives it. The present version, as revised in 1962, deletes “intent” from the description of the conduct specifically pro- scribed, and instead requires that the overall offense be committed “corruptly.” The specific conduct is rephrased as receipt of money in return for “being influenced” in official actions. The meaning of the new language (and probably that of the prior language as well) is clarified by the report of the House Committee on the Judiciary: The language used in subsection (c) [of section 201] emphasizes that it is the purpose for which the recipient knows the bribe is offered or given when he solicits, receives, or agrees to receive it which is determinative of criminality. Some courts have given this intepretation to the present section 202." (See, e.g., Woelfel v. United States, 237 F.2d 484, 488; Whitney v. United States, 99 F.2d 327, 331.) H.R. Rep. No. 748, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 18 (1961). Thus, “being influenced” does not describe the Congress- man’s true intent, it describes the intention he conveys to the briber in exchange for the bribe. The citation in the House Report to the Whitney decision underscores the point. On the page of the Federal Reporter to which the 7 Section 202 of Title 18, as it read before the 1962 revision, pro- scribed acceptance of bribes by various officials of the United States. Using language similar to former section 205, covering receipt of bribes by Members of Congress, section 202 proscribed receipt “with intent to have his decision or action . . . influenced thereby.” 18 U.S.C. § 202 (1958). 4634 42a Report refers appear these sentences (and no others ot consequence): The evidence shows that [the public official] not only took but solicited money in connection with said sales, and whether his action was influenced is imma- terial. The money was solicited and taken for the purpose of causing [the people who paid the bribe] to believe that they would get more consideration than they would otherwise. Whitney v. United States, 99 F.2d 327, 331 (10th Cir. 1938). As the Seventh Circuit has said, in rejecting a claim that a bribe was not received in return for being influenced because the event requiring influence had al- ready occurred, “The phrase [‘in return for’] brings into play the purpose of the bribe and thus the mind of the bribe-payer.” United States v. Arroyo, 581 F.2d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979). Con- struing a similar statute proscribing receipt of money for the promise of a public office, 18 U.S.C. § 215 (1952) (a predecessor of 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1976)), the Supreme Court upheld a conviction despite the fact that the public office, though authorized, was not in existence. United States v. Hood, 343 U.S. 148 (1952). “Whether the corrupt transaction would or could ever be performed is immaterial. We find no basis for allowing a breach of warranty to be a defense to corruption.” Jd. at 151. With respect to the bribery statute, we believe the defense of fraud is equally unavailable." If Myers was “playacting” 18 This construction of the statute is especially appropriate when the public officials who receive bribes are Members of Congress. since the Speech or Debate Clause bars evidence of their subsequent official action or the reasons for it, United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966), evidence that would frequently be highly probative of whether, at the time of the bribe, the Member intended to take official action. It 4635 43a and giving false promises of assistance to people he believed were offering him money to influence his official actions, he violated the bribery statute." 3(b). “Coaching” as Inducement. With the statute thus understood, the “coaching” claim does not provide a legal defense simply because some “coaching” may have occurred; the claim would have merit only if there were insufficient evidence of the defendants’ predisposition to “playact” or if the agents’ conduct were so extreme as to exceed due process limits. We have already ruled that the entrapment defense is without merit in Lederer’s case and is procedurally unavailable to the other appellants be- cause they elected not to assert it at trial. The entrapment defense fares no better when the appellants shift their focus from the size of the inducements to Weinberg’s alleged suggestion of a script. Prompt acquiescence shows predisposition to accept a bribe, whether or not a promise of official action is intended to be kept. Thus, appellants are left with a claim that the “coach- ing” was so outrageously coercive as to violate due process, wholly apart from the traditional defense of entrapment. The record does not remotely support the is unlikely that Congress, aware of the special protection its Members enjoy under the Speech or Debate Clause, included in the offense of bribery an element for which the Clause insulates the pertinent evi- dence. 19 We recognize that some opinions have described the bribery statute in language that can be read to suggest that the bribe-taker must intend to take the promised official action. See United States v. Brewster, $06 F.2d 62, 70-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Irwin, 3$4 F.2d 192, 198-96 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1966). We do not give controlling weight to such dicta, since they were expressed without any need to consider the bizarre defense that the bribe-taker did not intend to keep his corrupt promise. Consequently, the opinions had no Occasion to discuss the 1962 House Judiciary Committee Report, which is so pertinent to the claim in this case. 4636 44a claim. Even if all of the appellants’ evidence is credited, a generous assumption that strains credulity, it shows at most that Errichetti and Criden, perhaps prompted by Weinberg, laid out before each Congressman a scheme for pocketing $50,000 by falsely promising to introduce private immigration bills. Suggesting how easy it is to commit a crime hardly establishes a due process violation. The “coaching,” if it occurred, barely qualifies as any inducement at all; if the script was supplied, no one was coerced into playing his part. Due process challenges to an undercover agent’s encouragement have been rejected when one defendant was solicited twenty times before committing an offense, United States v. Esquer-Gamez, 550 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1977), and when another defen- dant was tempted by a million-dollar cash deal and prodded by veiled threats, United States v. Revnoso-Ul- loa, 548 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978). Whatever conduct might transgress the stan- dard outlined in Hampton and Russell, the facts of the Abscam investigation are not even close to the line. United States v. Alexandro, supra; United States v. Jan- notti, supra. The bare suggestion to a Congressman that he take a bribe, even for a promise he need only pretend to make, surely does not violate a constitutional standard of “outrageous” behavior. The public has the right to expect that their public officials have sufficient integrity not to capitulate at such a suggestion. Whatever the public’s expectation, the record reveals that these Con- gressmen were not children of Hamelin, seduced by the piping of Melvin Weinberg. C. Impairment of Accurate Fact-Finding. Appellants allege that the conduct of the Abscam investigation denied them due process for a variety of 4637 45a reasons that are combined in support of a broad claim that the Government prevented the presentation to the jury of an accurate account of the events. With the exception of traditional arguments that exculpatory evi- dence was withheld in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the due process foundation of this genera! area of attack is more the product of resourceful argument than precedent. To be successful, this attack must overcome our well-established reluctance to dismiss criminal prosecutions because of faulty Government in- vestigation. See United States v. Brown, 602 F.2d 1073 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 952 (1979); cases cited id. at 1076-77. It might be thought that the specific constitu- tional guarantees concerning criminal procedure, e.g., the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and the Federal Rules of Evidence provide sufficient standards for determining the quality of evidence appropriate to support a finding of guilt. Yet the Due Process Clause, with its principle of constitutionally required fairness, has been applied to develop minimum standards concerning the accuracy of evidence, notably in the area of eyewit- ness identification testimony. See Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). Appellants invite us to frame comparable stan- dards for undercover investigations. 1. Deliberate Ambiguity. An interesting component of the argument, advanced by Thompson and Murphy, maintains that when the Government is in control of an undercover operation, as contrasted with merely observ- ing events in which no governmental agent is involved, due process requires the investigators to eliminate or at least minimize ambiguities in the critical events that form the basis of the criminal offense. Otherwise, they con- tend, the Government needlessly creates risk of erroneous 4638 46a fact-finding by the jury on the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. Relating the claim to these cases, they argue that an undercover offer of a bribe must be expressed in terms that leave no uncertainty that money is being transferred to a Congressman and that it is being paid to influence his official actions. As counsel for Murphy contends, “Congressman Murphy was denied the oppor- tunity to say ‘no,’ [see Myers J, supra, 635 F.2d at 939] because the Government did not clearly convey its invita- tion to corruption.” (Murphy Br. 50.) Perhaps at some point deliberate governmental efforts to render ambiguous events over which agents can exer- cise considerable control would transgress due process limits of fundamental fairness. Wherever those limits might be, they have not been crossed in these cases. Undercover agents offering bribes to Congressmen are entitled to sirnulate the guarded conversation that would be expected of those proposing an unlawful venture. C/,. United States v. Reynoso-Ulioa, supra, 548 F.2d at 1338- 39, They need not say, “Congressman, I have here a cash bribe to be exchanged for your corrupt promise to be influenced in your official action.” In the Myers and Lederer cases, the bribe offers created no risk of ambiguity. There were ample references to money and to its payment in exchange for assistance with private immigration bills, and both Myers and Lederer directly received envelopes filled with cash under circum- stances leaving no doubt as to their knowledge of the contents. The episodes involving payments to Thompson on October 9 and to Murphy on October 20 are somewhat more ambiguous. Although the events and conversations at those meetings are captured on videotape, the sights and sounds, considered in isolation, create fair questions of fact as to whether Thompson and Murphy knew that 4639 47a money was in the briefcase, and whether the money was received by the Congressmen. Both Congressmen contend that they did not know that the briefcase contained cash and that on both occasions Criden received the briefcase and did not share its contents with either Thompson or Murphy. Whatever ambiguity arises from the manner in which the bribes were offered at the meetings on the evening of October 9 and on October 20 is directly attributable to the cautious ground rules insisted upon by Criden and Thompson in the hope of insulating Thompson and those he recruited from culpability. It is plainly inferable from the taped conversations of the three meetings on October 9 that Thompson arranged to have the cash transferred without explicit references to it, apparently in the forlorn hope that if any of his trusted companions ever appeared on a witness stand to accuse him, he could escape convic- tion by recounting how he had told the group that he did not want cash and had left the meeting without any money. The permissible, if not the irresistible, inference the jury could draw from the series of conversations on October 9 was that Thompson was not rejecting money; he was carefully orchestrating how to accept it with feigned innocence. The evidence supported a finding that Thompson and Criden, recognizing that those offering bribes understandably want some indication that the Congressman they have bought is aware of the purchase, worked out a scenario whereby Thompson would ac- knowledge receipt with only the oblique comment to Criden, “You look after that for me will you?” That formula, the jury could find, would surely satisfy the bribe-givers that Thompson was acknowledging receipt, while preserving his opportunity, if the occasion ever 4640 48a arose, to claim at a trial, as he did, that he thought the briefcase contained investment proposals. The transaction on October 20, which formed the basis for the substantive offenses of which both Thompson and Murphy were convicted, followed the same pattern Cri- den and Thompson had developed and used for the evening session on October 9. The evidence shows that Thompson and Criden had explained their ground rules to Murphy. A recorded telephone conversation between Criden and Weinberg on October 17 contained these passages: Weinberg: Now, you gonna lay those ground rules to Murph, right? Criden: Oh yeah. No problem. Criden: I am going to have lunch with this guy, with Murphy. And I am gonna make sure he under- stands clearly... . Criden: I’ve got to coach these guys. I’ve got to make them feel at ease. Criden: I gotta stroke him, you know, uh, make him feel comfortable. Weinberg: They all got that problem, they're ner- vous. Criden: They're all nervous. You know, they all figure that maybe it's a set up, you know, Weinberg: Thompson must have spoken to him, huh. Criden: Yeah, naturally. 4641 49a The caution displayed by Thompson and Murphy permit- ted them a chance to confront the jury with a contestable question of fact. The jury, asked to determine the factual question of whether Thompson and Murphy knowingly took money while seeking to minimize the incriminating nature of their own words and conduct, saw through the ploy. Facing the legal issue of whether the investigators’ bribe offer was unfairly obscured, we are equally un- moved, The agents did not violate due process limits by observing the defendants’ ground rules. Murphy further contends that there is a First Amend- ment dimension to the due process claim of deliberate creation of ambiguous facts. The ambiguities of what occurred on October 20, he suggests, blur the line that must be maintained between unlawful conduct that vio- lates criminal statutes and lawful conduct, protected by the First Amendment, that occurs when a Congressman discusses legislative action and assistance with his constit- uents. Reliance is placed on cases such as United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), and United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969). This First Amendment claim is untenable. Unlike O'Brien, there is no issue in these appeals whether con- duct arguably protected by the First Amendment as expression is nonetheless being punished. “[I]t is taking the bribe [or an unlawful gratuity], not performance of the illicit compact, that is a criminal act.” United States v. Brewster, supra, 408 U.S. at 526 (emphasis original). Nor do these appeals present the issue, illustrated by Spock, whether a lawful objective was pursued by lawful or unlawful means. See United States v. Spock, supra, 416 F.2d at 169. In some circumstances a prosecution of a Congressman for bribery can present a close question as to whether money was received as an illegal bribe or a 4642 50a lawful campaign contribution; in such cases, the jury must be carefully instructed as to the distinction, and the evidence must show “specific knowledge of a definite official act” for which payment is made. United States v. Brewster, supra, 506 F.2d at 81. But none of these Congressmen claimed that he had received what he thought was a campaign contribution.” Murphy’s point is that, at least in his case, there was an undue risk that the jury might convict him simply for engaging in the normal congressional activities of meeting with people who might invest in his district and advising people on immigration matters. That risk was adequately met by Judge Pratt’s instructions, which focused the jury’s attention squarely on whether Murphy knew that there was money inside the briefcase transferred on October 20 and whether Murphy received that money. The First Amendment claim cannot obscure the fact that Murphy accepted Thompson’s invi- tation to accept money unlawfully under an arrangement that they both mistakenly believed would yield insuffi- cient evidence of their guilt. The risk of a mistaken conviction is adequately protected by scrutizing the suffi- ciency of the evidence on which a jury is permitted to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 2. Conduct of the Investigation. Appellants’ remain- ing challenges to the accuracy of the Government’s proof require little discussion. They voice a chorus of indigna- tion that the Government would employ the services of such an untrustworthy person as Weinberg, and they fault the FBI agents and prosecutors for not subjecting Wein- 20 Though Lederer was quoted by Cook as saying he would be satisfied with only a $5,000 campaign contribution from his lawyer friends out of the $50,000 payment, he made no claim at trial that he thought the sheik's representatives were making a donation to his campaign. His sole defense was entrapment. 4643 5la berg to more exacting supervision and for compensating him too generously. They challenge Weinberg’s failure to record all of his conversations with all of the defendants and his loss and erasure of some audio tapes. They urge that in various respects the entire investigation failed to conform to internal guidelines of the Department of Justice promulgated by former Attorney General Edward Levi. The use of dishonest and deceitful informants like Weinberg creates risks to which the attention of juries must be forcefully called, but the Due Process Clause does not forbid their employment, detail their supervi- sion, nor specify their compensation. Weinberg’s rewards, both in cash and in lenient treatment for his 1977 fraud conviction, were fully explored with the jury. Though the appellants claimed that he was induced to lie by offers of contingent payments for making cases, the District Court found no such arrangement. 527 F. Supp. at 1240. No doubt Weinberg did not record every conversation with every defendant, but hundreds of audiotapes were made, in addition to the videotaping of all the meetings with the Congressmen. Despite the appellants’ dark insinuations, the evidence fully justified Judge Pratt’s findings that on one occasion a few audiotapes were stolen from Wein- berg’s flight bag and on other occasions, Weinberg re- corded over and thereby erased previously taped conver- gations that were unimportant. Jd. at 1231. There was conflicting evidence, considered by the jury, as to whether on another occasion a tape gap was the result of accident, as Weinberg claimed, or deliberate manipulation, as a defense witness claimed. In no instance can defendants point to any unrecorded conversation or portion of a conversation that would have added anything of signifi- cance to their defenses. Non-compliance with internal 4644 52a departmental guidelines is not a ground for complaint. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979). 3. Brady Claims. Appellants contend that various items were not disclosed to them until after the comple- tion of the jury trials, items that they claim were exculpa- tory and required to be disclosed under the rule of Brady v. Maryland, supra. Many of the claims concern items that would allegedly have bolstered the attack upon the credibility of Weinberg. Judge Pratt properly placed these claims in perspective when he noted the abundant grounds available to the defendants at trial to impeach Weinberg’s credibility: Weinberg admitted that he had been a criminal most of his life, that he had made his living by being a con man, that he had lied and cheated and violated the law from his early teenage years, that he was a convicted felon, that he had made a deal with the government to cooperate in return for probation on his felony conviction in Pittsburgh, and that he had received substantial compensation for his coopera- tion in the Abscam investigation and trials. 527 F. Supp. at 1248. In any event, the claims are without merit. Criden points to evidence he contends would have buttressed his claim that Weinberg had received and had falsely denied receiving a $350 microwave oven and other gifts from Errichetti. The prosecution had sought to support Wein- berg’s credibility with evidence that he had promptly turned over to FBI agents three $6,000 gold watches given him by George Katz, a defendant in another Abscam case. At the Myers trial, Weinberg testified that he told the agents about the watches after he received them. What Criden now complains of is the late disclosure of a 4645 53a memorandum indicating that Weinberg had told the agents about the watches even prior to his receipt of them. Whenever he mentioned them, the Government’s point remains that Weinberg was not likely to conceal a $350 gift when he had been forthcoming about an $18,000 gift. Lederer complains that not until after his trial did he obtain the transcript of the August 9, 1979, “coaching” session involving Weinberg and Senator Williams and other documents revealing criticism by the New Jersey prosecutors of Weinberg’s tactics. In fact, Lederer did receive, prior to trial, a lengthy memorandum in which a senior Department of Justice official summarized the criticism from the New Jersey prosecutors and much of the basis for their criticism. Armed with this memoran- dum, Lederer called two New Jersey prosecutors as de- fense witnesses to testify about the August 9 session. Moreover, Lederer’s defense was entrapment, not “play- acting.” Thompson claims he could have bolstered his attack on Weinberg’s credibility if he had been given Weinberg’s testimony at the “due process” hearing in Philadelphia before Judge Fullam, in which Weinberg falsely denied having been cautioned, after the August 9 session, not to coach potential defendants. The falsity of this denial was not relevant to any testimony Weinberg gave at Thompson’s trial. Thompson made no claim that he had been “coached” into making false promises to help the sheik. Moreover, like all the defendants, he had abundant grounds on which to attack Weinberg’s credibil- ity. None of these claims, nor any of the other alleged Brady violations, which we do not detail, remotely pro- vides a basis for any relief. = * e & s Having considered all of appellants’ claims that the investigation violated the standards of the Due Process 4646 54a Clause, we conclude that the conduct of the Abscam operation did not deny any appellant a constitutionally protected right.** Appellants contend, nevertheless, that we should assess the conduct of the government agents under more exacting standards than those of the Due Process Clause and dismiss the indictments in the exercise of our supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice. Whatever the scope of that authority in the aftermath of United States v. Paynor, 447 U.S. 727 (1980), it does not permit courts to fashion their own “sub-constitutional” limitations on the conduct of law enforcement agents. Prior to Paynor, the supervisory power was used to fashion and enforce rules for judicial proceedings in order to safeguard important constitu- tional rights. See, e.g., United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1151-53 (2d Cir. 1980) (right to counsel); United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002, 1010 (2d Cir.) (self-in- crimination), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976). And, on infrequent occasions, the power was used to discipline prosecutorial irregularities, particularly in front of grand juries. See United States v. Jacobs, 531 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), 2! Some of the appellants contend that venue was improperly laid in the Eastern District of New York. They acknowledge that significant events occurred in that District, notably the payments to Myers, Lederer, and Murphy, the last of which was shared with Thompson. The claim is that venue was “manufactured” in the Eastern District for ulterior reasons, primarily to enable the Eastern District prosecutors to handle the trials. In United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (1973), we rejected the Government's attempt to create federal jurisdiction by luring a defendant into placing a telephone call across a state line. We do not preclude the possibility of similar concerns if a case should arise in which key events occur in one district, but the prosecution, prefer- ring trial elsewhere, lures a defendant to a distant district for some minor event simply to establish venue. Here, the key events occurred in the Eastern District of New York, and the Government cannot be faulted for selecting hotels near Kennedy Airport as the site for transactions involving Congressmen from New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. 4647 55a vacated mem., 429 U.S. 909, reinstated, 547 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 436 U.S. 31 (1978). It has not been used as a general corrective authority over the conduct of criminal investigations, and, in light of Pay- nor, its scope is surely not to be expanded. Appellants are entitled to no more from the courts than a testing of Abscam against constitutional standards. IV. We consider next a series of claims that arise in one or another of the three trials. A. Myers Trial 1. Sufficiency of Evidence. Criden and Johanson both chalienge the sufficiency of the evidence to establish that they knew the purpose for which the money was paid to Myers. The record shows their awareness at the early stages of the plan; their law partner, Cook, testified that after the meeting on the yacht, Criden and Johanson told him about the sheik’s concern for asylum in the United States and that payment to Congressmen would assure a “friendly face” who “owed him a favor” and would “help” him. Criden’s claimed assurance that the Con- gressmen would never have to do anything does not lessen his and Johanson’s knowledge that the money was being corruptly received for a promise to be influenced concern- ing Official action, whether or not the promise was intended to be kept. Criden’s attendance at and participa- tion in the January conversations with Myers in Phila- delphia leave no doubt whatever of his knowledge. Jo- hanson’s knowledge was fairly inferable by the jury from his initial hearing of the plan, his recruitment of Myers, his receipt of cash, and his acknowledgment to the FBI 4648 56a that he had had many sleepless nights but had not been able to resist the chance to make some easy money. This non-hearsay evidence of Johanson’s culpability justified the admission against him of the acts and declarations of the co-conspirators. See United States v. Mastropieri, No. 81-1017 (2d Cir. July 20, 1982), slip op. 4011-21. 2. Evidentiary Ruling. The Myers appellants contend that it was error to admit into evidence the January, 1980 conversations that Myers and Criden had with undercover agents Wald and Haridopoulos at the Barclay Hotel in Philadelphia. In these conversations Myers demanded an additional $35,000 to bring his share up to the $50,000 he had expected to receive from the August 22, 1979, meet- ing; he also discussed possible investments by the sheik that would provide a justification for his assistance with immigration matters. Appellants contend that these con- versations were evidence of other crimes occurring after the end of the conspiracy concerning the August 22 payment and were inadmissible under Feb. R. Evid. 404(b). The argument builds upon the ruling Judge Pratt made when the evidence was offered. Anxious to keep the jury's attention focused on the August 22 episode, Judge Pratt told the jury that the January conversations were “outside the conspiracy charged in the indictment” and should be considered as acts and statements “only against the defendant who made them.” In fact, the conversa- tions, illuminating the nature of the conspiracy and oc- curring while the conspiracy was still in existence, were fully admissible against all defendants. Judge Pratt's limiting instruction, as he recognized, was unduly favor- able to the defendants and affords them no basis to complain. 3. Jury Instructions. Criden levels several attacks upon the charge in the Myers trial, none of which has 4649 57a merit. It was not error for the District Court to decide the appellants’ due process claims, without submitting them to the jury. United States v. Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir. 1980). In a general observation in the portion of the charge concerning witness credibility, Judge Pratt told the jury that they may consider a witness’s prior “failure to disclose information, when the opportunity to do so presented itself.” Criden apprehends that the jury may have taken this as permission to draw an adverse inference from Myers’ silence during the course of an interview with FBI agents. This portion of the charge was not directed at Myers, the jury was not told that Myers had exercised his right to remain silent during the interview, and in any event, Myers’ failure to give his version of the facts was probative since he had elected to make statements to the agent before deciding to end the interview. See Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980) (per curiam). It was not improper to refer to Weinberg as an “informer,” and the charge adequately cautioned the jury concerning his testimony. Finally, it was surely not prejudicial error, if error at all, to omit the requested instruction that the jury may infer that tapes and unrecorded portions of tapes not produced by the Government would be unfavorable to the prosecution if the jury found that such tapes or portions “could” have contained pertinent material. The failure to record all conversations and all portions of taped conversations and the dispute concerning whether Weinberg had purposely erased two tapes of conversations with Errichetti were fully argued to the jury. B. Lederer Trial. 1. Evidentiary Ruling. Lederer contends that evi- dence was introduced at his trial in violation of the 4650 58a Speech or Debate Clause. He objects to the admission of his annual financial disclosure statement, filed with the Clerk of the House of Representatives pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 2 U.S.C. § 701 ef seq. (Supp. IV 1980). In that statement Lederer falsely listed his $5,000 share of the bribe as a “consulting fee” from Johanson. The financial report was not shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause. Though the Clause, in covering “legislative acts,” Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972), extends beyond words spoken during legisla- tive debate, any other matters it reaches “must be an integral part of the deliberative and communicative proc- esses by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings ... .” Jd. Disclosure of income from sources other than employment by the United States, see 2 U.S.C. § 702(a)(1)(A), is no part of such “deliberative and communicative processes.” Cf. Hutch- inson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (newsletters and press releases); United States ex rel. Hollander v. Clay, 420 F. Supp. 853 (D.D.C. 1976) (Congressional travel vouchers). Prosecutions for falsification of similar state- ments indicate that Lederer’s financial disclosure state- ment was not shielded. See United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955) (prosecution for false statement to House Disbursing Office); United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (prosecution for false statement to House Office of Finance), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980). 2. Jury Instructions. Lederer’s two objections to the charge are without merit. It was not error for Judge Pratt to explain “predisposition” by asking the jury to deter- mine whether the defendant was “ready and willing” to commit the crimes charged whenever a favorable oppor- tunity arose. United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882 4651 59a (2d Cir. 1952). Lederer would have preferred an explana- tion that required finding a “previous intent or purpose,” as some courts have phrased the test, e.g., United States v. Karas, 624 F.2d 500, 503 n.2 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1981). In this Circuit, the “ready and willing” phrase has been repeatedly used. E£.g., United States v. Martinez-Carcano, 557 F.2d 966, 969-70 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1222 nn.11 & 12 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974); United States v. Braver, 450 F.2d 799, 801 n.4, 805 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1064 (1972). The jury need not find that the defendant consciously consid- ered committing the crime before the opportunity arose, only that he was predisposed to accept the opportunity presented to him, /.e., of a frame of mind that made him “ready and willing” to commit a crime, even on the first occasion that he may have considered it. Nor was it improper to tell the jury, in the course of explaining that the defendant has no obligation to present any evidence, that a defendant has the power to subpoena witnesses. This phrase prompted no objection at trial, and cannot be raised on appeal. In any event, there is no merit to Lederer’s suggestion that the jury might have mistakenly thought he could have called Errichetti, Cri- den, and Johanson to support his entrapment claim. Having failed to subpoena his severed co-defendants, Lederer cannot assume that their testimony was not available to him. Cf. United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1978) (failure to subpoena witness pre- cludes claim that lack of use immunity for the witness created prejudice), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979). 4652 60a C. Thompson-Murphy Trial 1. The “Impossibility? Defense. Thompson contends that the indictment against him fails to state an offense on the theory that the fictional nature of the “sheiks” and their immigration problems renders the crime of bribery, as alleged in the indictment, impossible of performance. The “impossibility” defense has been a matter of conflict- ing views. Compare People v. Jaffe, 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906) (defense upheld as to a “fence” who bought goods from a police informant that were not in fact stolen), and State v. Guffey, 262 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. App. 1953) (defense upheld as to a hunter who shot a stuffed deer placed as a decoy by a game warden), with People v. Rojas, 55 Cal. 2d 252, 358 P.2d 921 (1961) (rejecting defense as to a “fence” who bought goods not in fact stolen). Federal courts have upheld the defense when the crime charged had not in fact occurred, even though the defendant thought it had. E.g., United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881 (Sth Cir. 1976) (sale of uncon- trolled substance incorrectly believed to be controlled substance); United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973) (transmittal of letters to prison inmate incor- rectly believed to be without warden’s knowledge). The claim is unavailing here for the basic reason that the crime charged did occur. The indictment charged and the evidence established that Thompson received a bribe in return for his corrupt promise to take official action. That suffices to constitute a violation of § 201(c). United States v. Brewster, supra, 408 U.S. at 525-26. Whether the promise was carried out is irrelevant, id. at 527, and it is no defense that the promise could not have been carried out either because the official act to be taken was beyond the defendant's authority, United States v. Carson, 464 4653 6la F.2d 424, 433 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972): United States v. Heffler, 402 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 946 (1969), or had already been taken, United States v. Arroyo, supra, 581 F.2d at 653-57; ef. United States v. Rosner, supra, (18 U.S.C. § 201(b), punishing the bribe-payer, is violated whether or not purpose of the bribe is capable of attainment); United States v. Jacobs, supra, 431 F.2d at 759 (same).” Neither is it a defense that the public official will not be called upon to take official action because of the fictitious nature of the person alleged to be seeking assistance. “Official act” is defined as action on any matter that “may at any time be pending” before a public official, 18 U.S.C. § 201(a). Introducing a private immigration bill qualifies as an “official act,” whether or not the benefi- ciary of such a bill is a real person. It was not necessary for the investigators to continue Abscam to the point of having bills introduced, conduct that would, in any event, have been immunized by the Speech or Debate Clause. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966). el 22 Thompson relies on United Srates v. Reisiey, 35 F. Supp. 102 (D.N.J. 1940), in which Circuit Judge Maris, sitting in the District Court, upheld a defense to an indictment charging violation of 18 U.S.C. § 203 (1934), a conflict of interest statute that preceded 18 U.S.C. § 281 (1958) and 18 U.S.C. § 203 (1976). An employee of the Veterans Administration had received money for promising to effect an increase in the payor’s benefits. In fact, the increase had already occurred without any action by the defendant. Reis/ev viewed the offense as accepting payment for services rendered, and acquitted the defendant since in fact services had not been rendered. Even if that decision is correct as to a conflict of interest violation, its force as applied to a bribery violation is negated by the explicit Congressional recognition, expressed by the House Committee on the Judiciary when the current bribery statutes were revised in 1962, that “it is the purpose for which the recipient knows the bribe is offered or given when he solicits, receives, Or agrees to receive it which is determinative of criminality.” H. Rep. No. 748, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 18 (1961). The House Report cited approvingly to Whuney v. United States, 99 F.2d 327, 331 (10th Cir. 1938), which had construed an early bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1934), contrary to Reis/ev's view of a conflict of interest statute. 4654 62a 2(a). Jury Instructions — Element of Receipt. Thompson and Murphy both challenge portions of the jury instructions. One claim, applicable to all of the substantive counts, attacks Judge Pratt’s supplemental instruction, in response to a jury inquiry, concerning the element of receipt of illegal payment. Understanding the claim requires some elaboration of the pertinent circum- stances. The counts of the indictment charging violations of bribery, unlawful gratuity, and conflict of interest all alleged receipt of money between October 10, 1979, and February 2, 1980. The Government’s theory of the Thompson-Murphy case was that the substantive offenses committed by both Thompson and Murphy arose out of the October 20 transaction involving Murphy and Criden, not the October 9 transaction involving Thompson and Criden. In its bill of particulars the Government alleged that the $50,000 cash payment “was received by Criden and Murphy on October 20, 1979. . . . Criden left the meeting in physical possession of the money. The date on which and the place where Murphy took physical posses- sion of his share of the payment is [sic] unknown.” In charging the jury initially with respect to the “receipt” element of Count Two, the bribery offense, Judge Pratt focused the jury’s attention on the issue of whether either defendant had received a share of the $50,000 after the October 20 meeting: “It is for you to determine based on all of the evidence whether the Government has es- tablished beyond a reasonable doubt that the money in the briefcase transferred from Amoroso to Criden on October 20th was for the benefit of and eventually re- ceived by defendant Murphy or defendant Thompson or both.” (Emphasis added.) The jury was told that this “receipt” element also applied to the unlawful gratuity and conflict of interest counts, and that a defendant who 4655 63a did not receive part of the money must be acquitted on all the substantive counts. The jury’s first inquiry on this issue read as follows: Your Honor, If this question is in order— If the briefcase was under the control of but not in the physical possession of the defendant Murphy, does [sic] that, under your charge, be considered “for the benefit of an eventual reception by defen- dant Murphy or defendant Thompson or both?["] Judge Pratt apparently thought that the jury mistakenly understood that Murphy's possession of the briefcase at the October 20 meeting was a required aspect of a finding of receipt by him. He therefore gave a supplemental instruction that included the following: In specific answer to your question, as I interpret it, actual possession of the briefcase itself by Murphy wouid not have to be shown before you could deter- mine that he later received part of the money. The correctness of this response is not challenged on appeal. It soon became apparent that the jury had not wondered whether Murphy’s actual possession on Octo- ber 20 was required; they were making the more trenchant inquiry as to whether his constructive possession on that date was sufficient. Their subsequent note read as fol- lows: Your honor: Some members of the jury feel it is possible that defendant Murphy took “direction & control” of the briefcase however momentarily by instructing Criden to take physical possession, making Criden the “ex- ecutor” of the money in a sense at that point. 4656 64a May we construe this to be in satisfaction of element one of Count 2 in lieu of “eventually[{") receiving the money at some Jater time? [Emphasis original.] This inquiry provoked an extended colloquy between Court and counsel. Murphy contended that the inquiry should be answered with a simple “no,” arguing that any other response would unfairly alter the Government's theory of how the offense occurred. This concern was heightened when the prosecutor, in urging that the proper response was “yes,” pointed out that the bribery statute is violated when a public official receives anything of value either “for himself or for any other person or entity.” Ultimately, Judge Pratt decided to steer a middle course, rejecting a “no” answer and also rejecting the Govern- ment’s effort to permit the jury to convict Murphy on the theory that he was merely seeking to confer a benefit upon Criden. Instead, Judge Pratt kept the jury’s atten- tion focused on the crucial element of whether money was received by Murphy and for his benefit, but permitted the jury to consider whether receipt by Murphy was es- tablished by his words and conduct at the October 20 meeting. First, he reminded the jury to focus on the essential element of count Two, which he summarized as being “that on or shortly after October 20, 1979, the defendant received a sum of money.” He then endeavored to paraphrase the jury’s inquiry and respond to it: When I said in the charge it is for you to determine based upon all the evidence whether the Government has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the money in the briefcase transferred from Amoroso to Criden on October 20th, was for the benefit and 4657 65a eventually received by the defendant Murphy, or defendant Thompson, or both, when I use the term “eventually,” there did I really mean eventually and not then, October 20th[?] And my answer to that is[:] you in applying this element to the defendant Murphy, you may disregard the term eventually. It is for you to evaluate what was said, what happened, what the circumstances were, and determine from that whether the defendant Murphy received the money. [Emphasis added.] Since the major factual dispute framed by Murphy’s cross-examination and summation was whether Murphy had any knowledge that money was in the briefcase, Judge Pratt emphasized that the element of receipt could not be established unless the jury found that Murphy knew that money was in the briefcase. He then recapitu- lated his response in these words: So my final answer to your question is: If you are talking simply about the temporal aspect of this, the timing now as opposed to eventually, the answer is yes. You may construe those circumstances to be receipt of money on or shortly after October 20, 1979, as that set forth in the element one of Count 2. Significantly, the only criticism voiced by counsel after hearing the supplemental instruction was to request that one sentence of the response might have been misunder- stood as altering the Government's burden of proof as to knowledge. Judge Pratt promptly recalled the jury and reemphasized, as he had when the inquiry was first answered, that the burden to prove Murphy’s knowledge of the money beyond a reasonable doubt rested upon the Government. 4658 66a The supplemental instruction presents no ground on which either Murphy or Thompson may now complain.” Judge Pratt’s response did not alter the requirement that the money be received for the benefit of the defendant.” Limiting himself to the precise point raised by the jury, he broadened only the temporal aspect of receipt. He per- mitted a finding of receipt not only at some point after Ociober 20 but also at the time of the October 20 meeting. This permitted the jury to find that Murphy had constructively received the money for himself on October 23 Complaint is also made that Judge Pratt did not adequately alert counsel to his proposed response before giving it to the jury. See United States v. Ronder, 639 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1981). Although Judge Pratt did not give counsel a verbatim version of his proposed response, he held an extended colloquy with counsel, afforded both sides an Opportunity to suggest their preferred responses, then outlined, in summary fashion, the response he proposed to give, and thereafter allowed counsel to make further argument. There is no basis for procedura! complaint, especially in view of the fact that counsel's remarks, after hearing what Judge Pratt proposed to do, questioned only the substance of the response and offered no suggestion that might improve its wording. Murphy was acquitted on the bribery count and therefore challenges the supplemental instruction only as it may have affected the element of receipt for the unlawful gratuity and conflict of interest counts, the substantive counts on which he was convicted. Since we conclude that the supplemental instruction did not alter the prosecution's obligation to prove that Murphy must be shown to have received the money for his benefit, we are willing to assume, for the sake of argument, that, though the jury's inquiry mentioned only Count Two, they understood the response also to apply to the receipt element of the counts charging an unlawful gratuity and a conflict of interest. In his initial charge, Judge Pratt had told the jury that the element of receipt as to bribery applied equally to the other substantive offenses. Section 201(g), punishing receipt of an unlawful gratuity, is limited to receipt by the public official “for himself,” and “for any other person or entity” as provided in section 201(c), punishing bribery. We are also willing to assume, for the sake of argument, that section 203(a), punishing conflict of interest, is limited to receipt of compensation by and for the public official, though this point is somewhat doubtful. Cf United States v. Shirey, 389 U.S. 288 (1989) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 214 (1988) (now 18 U.S.C. § 210 (1976)). 4659 67a 20 and had permitted Criden to take physical possession, presumably with the expectation that at some point Murphy would regain physica! possession of a portion of the money, even if the occurrence of that last step was not found to have been established.” The jury wanted to know if receipt could be found to have occurred on October 20, and Judge Pratt correctly told them that it could. Since the principally disputed issue as to Murphy was whether he knew there was any money in the brief- case on October 20, it is difficult to see how the defense would have acted differently if it had been specifically alerted to a theory of receipt on October 20, a theory that, in any event, was comprehended by the bill of particulars. In arguing the point on appeal, Murphy makes no showing of any prejudice from the supplemen- tal instruction. Thompson likewise offers no theory of prejudice as to him. The jury’s question and the Court’s response both related explicitly to Murphy, leaving unva- ried in any respect the initial instruction that the jury must find Thompson to have received his share of the October 20 payment sometime after the meeting. Murphy contends that the instruction permitted the jury to find receipt on a theory of constructive possession without adequate guidance as to the standards governing that concept. That complaint cannot be made now. Counsel had ample opportunity after hearing both the substance of Judge Pratt’s proposed response and the 25 Early in the colloquy with counsel, Judge Pratt ha [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_0301%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.