# Amicus Brief — Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_0288%3A14

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 466 U.S. 243

## Text

Orice Supreme Cour, GS.
FILED

OCT 12 1983

Nos. 82-1186 and 82-1465
EE Ee L. STEVAS,
CLERK

Ix THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1983

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, Ixc.,
Petitioner,
v.
FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, et al.,
Respondents.

FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, Ixc.,
Respondent.

Brief of Amicus Curiae Mark Hammerschlag and Ellen
Van Fleet in Support of Franklin Mint Corporation

Marc 8S. Moiier
Attorney of Record
Krernpier & KReEINDLER
Attorneys for Mark Hammerschlag and
Ellen Van Fleet
99 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10016
(212) 687-8181

Question Presented.

Kreindler & Kreindler, on behalf of Mark Hammerschlag and
Ellen Van Fleet as amicus curiae will address the following ques-
tion:

Whether the appellate court below properly determined that
repeal of the 1973 Par Value Modification Act and the resulting
elimination of gold as a unit of account in the United States and
international monetary systems rendered unenforceable Article
22 of the Warsaw Convention; the Convention defines the limits
of liability of air carriers for wrongful death and personal injury
of passengers and cargo loss in the course of international
transportation in terms of gold.

Teble of Contents.

rr yey
Interest of Mark Hammerschlag and Ellen Van Fleet ....
Sn GS ROGIER, «oii cdnd bee doch nactebeevel
PEEL. dn d's coves acecdecdccbth ceveepsevaneenane

POINTI. Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention limiting
liability of airlines for death or injury in interna-
tional transportation has been superseded and
rendered unenforceable by subsequent congres-
sional legislation, international agreements and
Changed CirCcuUMsStances .......0ccceceseseveses

A. In Interpreting Article 22 the Court Below Prop-
erly Found That the Treaty Provision Had Been
Superseded by a Subsequent Act of Congress ....

B. Holding Article 22 to be No Longer Enforceable
Properly Applies the Rebus Sic Stantibus Doc-
I Sion 000.0900 caeuen iste seanenieen

C. The United States Has Acknowledged That the
Application of Article 22 Was Linked to and
Dependent Upon ‘‘Gold’’ as a Unit of Account in
the Domestic and International Monetary
BRN. kn isc adivscevdvcescevartaeaseeel

D. Declaring the Article 22 Damage Limits Unen-
forceable is Consistent With Our Government’s
Rejection of the Low Limits of Recovery Re-
sulting From the Gold Value Clause............

15

el

E. Preservation of the ‘‘Official’’ Price of Gold for
Warsaw Convention Purposes is Anti-Competi-
tive and, Thereby, Contravenes One of the
*‘Goals for International Aviation Policy’’ Set
Porth in 49 U.S.C. §1SGRD) .. wc cccccvccccees

POINT II. The market value of gold is the only gold
value which may arguably be utilized to calculate
the Article 22 damage limitation, but its use is not
DEN in ¢dvunbbdeeviiis selec debnestsrbeces

a casbabasaiek vical a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.

CASES:
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40(1960).........

Benjamin v. British European Airways, $72 F.2d 913, 917
ES CEST ne

Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France,386 F.2d 323,
337 (Sth Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905
DE iL cacuh vc anes ov heee benakhatke

Boehringer Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc., 531 F.Supp. 344 (S.D. Tex.
1981), appeal pending No. 81-2519 (Sth Cir. Dec.
DUD ciWs du os0beend 600 0se6s0ecknobn

Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238 (1889) ............

The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616, 20 L.Ed. 227
GERFED ccccccscccccccccesasccucecceswtws noes

Page

13

10

iv.

Companhia de Seguros Maritimos v. Varig, Federal Court
of Appeals, Brazil (June 3, 1975) ..............

Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933) ............
Costell v. Iberia, Lineas Aereas de Espana, S.A., No. 25§
(Court of Appeals, Valencia, Spain, Oct. 16,
Reese Pkt eek ei: béucedenteepi>bewke ks
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654(1981) .........

Day v. Trans World Airlines, $28 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976)...............

Deere & Co. v. Deutsche Lufthansa A.G. v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., ef a/., N.D. Ill. Ne. 81C4726 (Dec.
Be irda o's che ak ob bes cibeb ee tedekhicn

Dreyfus v. Von Flinck, $34 F.2d 24, 29 (2nd Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1977)..... i cdkexnar

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc., 438 O.S. $9 (1978) ..........0005.

Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933) ..........

Franklin Mint Corporation v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
690 F.2d 303 (2nd Cir. 1982) ............ eee

Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890)..............05.
The Gold Clause Cases, 294 U.S. 240 (1935) ...........

Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, reversed 617 F.2d
697, vacated 444 U.S. 996 (1980)...............

Page

13

23

Hammerschlag, et al. v. Korean Air Lines, 1981 CV 1058,
United States District Court, Central District of
CN are lt owes hanno one

Head Money Cases (Edye v. Robertson), 112 U.S. $80,
ED < c vibe 00 scndkdacptabesuseunaanain

Hornlinie A.G. v. Societe’ Nationale Petrole, 1972 Ned-
erlandse Jurisprudentie No. 269, at 728 (JA 144) .

In re Aircrash at Kimpo Intern. Airport, Korea, on No-
vember 18, 1980, 558 F.Supp. 72 (C.D. Cal.
1983), interlocutory appeal denied, No. 83-8051
Cie, BE TO, Bite cdusidvcccsccvesedacs

In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14,
1980, 535 F.Supp. 833, affirmed 705 F.2d 85 (2nd
Cir. 1983), petition for writ of certiorari pending .

Maschinefabrik Kern, A.G. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
et al., $62 F.Supp. 232 (N.D. Ill. 1983) .........

Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, 294
SP ay ns co towce veegte saseasnemenn bens

Pakistan Int’! Airlines v. Compagnie Air Int’l, S.A., No.
79/2278 (Court of Appeals, Aix-en-Provence,
France (Oct. 30, 1980) (JA 133)... ....6c ccc eues

Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles
W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138 (1934) .........00e

Prepakt Concrete Co. v. Augusto Menendez Const.
Corp., 293 F.Supp. 638 (DPR, 1968) ...........

Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2nd Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
43S U.S. SEZ (IGTT) .. wc rcccccccccccvvcccccees

Page

15

vi.

Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18, 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1 L.Ed. 2d
IES 5 6.c Woes. hwne sp pacers eees

Ross v. Pan American Airways, 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d
EER age ERR ng UE, RB ins Oy

Saga v. Sagoland (Lower Court, — Sweden, Oct.
NS ear a oie ie eh aah aaat sees ¢

Valentine v. United States, ex re/. Neidecker, 299 U.S. §,
as Se OE ks DREPOUD 6 be cvécosvnecess

Van Der Weyde v. Ocean Transport Co., 297 U.S. 114
EN ae Te pa PCa stn eo oes na bdabe he eee ee Ae

Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 31 L.Ed. 386, 8
PEERS i cavichoussorvabatdssebeddves

Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40(1903) .................

Zakoupolos v. Olympic Airways, No. 256/1974 (Feb. 15,
NRA n oa ran wo 4 Gees Waaeire renee?

TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS:

The Hague Protocol, September 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S.
371, reprinted in A. Lowenfeld, Aviation Law,
Doc. Supp. at 955-63 (2d ed. 1981).............

The Guatamala City Protocol, done March 8, 1971,
reported in A. Lowenfeld, Aviation Law 975 (2nd
i, a PEER, acs ccccvevebosse¥¥eween

CED ccc ccrccvosrdédvcenbaee ene

Page

24

27

1S

13

27

19

19

Vii.

Page
Montreal Agreement, C.A.B. Agreement No. 18900, 31
Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966), reprinted in A. Lowenfeld,
Aviation Law, 971 (2d ed. Doc. Supp. 1981)..... 2
Second Amendment of Articles of Agreement of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund, Apr. 1, 1976, 29
Shes EY Betas CU ED -o Canc erididons 6 oo. 18
Warsaw Convention, Formally Known as the Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Inter-
national Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, October
29, 1934, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11,
reprinted in 49 U.S.C. 1502 Note:
Aceh cedh BA et Ecine reane egg Bee en Gn rare Ca 10
ars 55 28 cles eeiay diem wid Oe eire emae 10
hia cistaGckbe Ok ss hae var ed cue ekl passim
EN Sees os Calle or eVeeeki oh newe ees 27
EN Sate dias Rhee ek weslke meme naewenes 10
STATUTES, RULES AND LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:
EE WS oes. Gs bis 6a 600 6's b He owed a dees 3
ei ic ean ont b'coh ba ava DR Re 26
PN oo sno as pps tod s bl Abana ee ees Eese 20
Pub. L. No. 92-268, §2, 86 Stat. 116(1972) ............ 17
Pub. L. No. 97-258, 96 Stat. 985, Sept. 13, 1982 ........ 20

Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub.L. 95-504, Oct.
nn. THD, .ckcevspeakhssnexauones 26

viii.
Page

British Parliamentary Debates (Hansari), House of Com-
mons Official Report, Vol. 997 No. 29 January

BME Goce cescietecee bese ene cents eee 4
Bretton Woods Agreement Act, Pub.L. 94-564, 90 Stat.

ME a's Nab dkecelecedetedsnawsuebas ieee 2
Gold Reserve Act of 1934, 12 U.S.C. §411 ef seq., 48

CET 6303.00 0cb desdea hcaakereeeenacusnenn 17
Hearings Before the Committee in Foreign Relations,

89th Cong., Ist Sess., Exec. H, at 15 (May 26-27,

SERS 5 bp dowdvcddedecedst dcnvedeeuabetareeue 24
Minutes of Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign

Relations, United States Senate, 95th Congress,

Ist Sess. Executive B, July 26, 1977 atp.6....... 19

Par Value Modification Act of 1973 formerly 31 U.S.G.
§449, Pub.L. No. 93-110, §1, 87 Stat. 353 (1973) . 2, 10

Price Anderson Act, Pub.L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576
STE ss bs cdddcotectassoovotcuaundnenerian 27

International Air Transportation Competition Act of
1979, Pub.L. No. 96-192, Feb. 15, 1980......... 26

Report to the Congress of the Commission on the Role of
Gold in the Domestic and International Monetary
es rer 18

S. Exec. Rep. B, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981)........... 25

Bo.

Page

ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIALS:

J. Gaynes, Memorandum, Legal Division, Bureau of In-
ternational Aviation, Civil Aeronautics Board
RET oa. si 6 a6 a o's Ka buaeb eon h ie 20

J. Golden, ‘‘Warsaw Convention Liability Limits,’’
Memorandum, Director, Bureau of Compliance
and Consumer Protection, Civil Aeronautics
CED a0 5 see deckonedvebune aioe 20

P. Kennedy, Memorandum, Policy Development Divi-
sion, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Civil
Aeronautics Board (Mar. 18, 1980) p.2......... 20, 21

C.A.B. Order 74-1-16, Docket No. 26274, 39 Fed. Reg.

Ey i aicis at's NE cla vs néb e's ev ab tk ee UbeeT 17, 18

50 Department of State Bulletin 923 (1965)............. 3

BOOKS, TREATISES AND ARTICLES:

CTE, . cb onceccdeccedecsestbeee 15

Drion, Limitation of Liabilities in International Air Law,
Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1954............ 16, 22

Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol. V, §511
EE cas cpancnn ovaneaandn wane wine 14

Heller, The Value of the Gold Franc—A Different Point
of View, 6 J. Mar. L. & Com. (1976) ........... 16, 27

Hill, the doctrine of ‘‘Rebus Sic Stantibus’’ in its
International Law, IX Unv. of Missouri Studies 7
CIM. oc Ua wan ets wae wh tude so hele wal dea 14

Page

Horner & Legrez, Second International Conference on
Private Aeronautical Law, Minutes, Warsaw, Oc-
Ee MEEUTON sos gccbcctacccevevieesc 16

Larsen, Legal Problems in Compensation Under the
Gold Clauses of Private International Law
Agreements, 63 Geo. L. J. 817, 825(1975) ...... 28

Lowenfeld, A. Aviation Law, 975 (2d ed. Doc. Supp.
MN a gli Aintth Wes bw UG 4 ess bia bad uaa aeen ake 19

Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and The
Warsaw Convention, 80 Harv.L.Rev. 497 (1967). 3, 10

Restatement, 2d, Foreign Relations Law of the United
Eo hts gale ase wsendndcedaacleene wus 8

Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law, 3rd ed. v2 No. 7,
CIEE oe i ee ee 10

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1983.

Nos. 82-1186 and 82-1465.

e
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, Inc.,

Petitioner,
Vv.

FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, ef ai.,

Respondents.

®
FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, ef ai.,

Petitioners,
vy

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, Inc.,
Respondent.

Brief of Amicus Curiae Mark Hammerschiag and Ellen
Van Fleet in Support of Franklin Mint Corporation.

2

Interest of Mark Hammerschlag and Ellen Van Fleet.

We support the position of Franklin Mint Corporation that
the ‘‘gold’’ clause of Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention
should be declared unenforceable.

Mark Hammerschlag and Ellen Van Fleet are plaintiffs in ac-
tions pending in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California wherein each seeks damages for the
wrongful death of their respective spouses as a result of the
crash of a Korean Air Lines (KAL) Boeing 747 at Kimpo inter-
national Airport at the end of a trans-Pacific flight on
November 18, 1980.? In its Answer to the Hammerschlag and
Van Fleet complaints KAL asserted as an affirmative defense
that its liability was limited by the Warsaw Convention and the
Montreal Agreement.’ On February 15, 1983, the District Court
substantially adopted the reasoning of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Frankiin Mint Corporation
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982) and
agreed that the elimination of gold in the international and
domestic monetary systems had rendered Article 22 of the Con-
vention unenforceable.‘

‘Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to In-
ternational Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S.
No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. 1502 note.

*Mark Hammerschiag, et al. v. Korean Air Lines, 1981 CV 1058.
United States District Court, Central District of California, sub nom
In Re Aircrash at Kimpo International Airport on November 18,
1980, MDL 482.

*Montreal Agreement, C.A.B. Agreement No. 18900, Order
F-23680, May 13, 1966, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966), reprinted in A.
Lowenfeld, Aviation Law, 971 (2d ed. Doc. Supp. 1981).

‘In Re Aircrash at Kimpo International Airport, Korea, on
November 18, 1980, $88 F. Supp. 72 (C.D. Cal 1983) interlocutory ap-
peal denied, No. 83-8051 (9th Cir. May 10, 1983). Kimpo did not
follow the Second Circuit’s reasoning that Article 22 should be unen-
forceable prospectively only, finding instead that the provision was
unenforceable in the pending cases.

The central questions concerning the enforceability of the
gold-based limitation of liability provisions of the Warsaw Con-
vention as presented to this Court by Franklin Mint are raised in
the narrow context of a cargo loss, not an injury or death claim.

While the United States has long acknowledged that the Arti-
cle 22 Warsaw Convention damage limit for death or injury is
grossly inadequate,‘ the treaty limitation on recovery for lost or
damaged cargo has not been a matter of general concern since
1929. All the efforts to amend the treaty left the liability limits
for cargo losses essentially unchanged from the dollar value
equivalent of ‘‘250 francs per kilogram’’ specified in Article
22(2) based upon a $42.22 per ounce gold price or lower gold
value. A 1965 ‘‘denunciation’’ of the treaty, later withdrawn in
1966,*° and subsequent efforts to permit higher recoveries for
Americans are evidence of the depth of United States’
dissatisfaction with the low death and injury limits obtained by
operation of the Convention.

Many of the signatories to the Warsaw Convention, like the
United States, have required international air carriers to provide
higher limits o° liability for death or injury claims than those

‘Department of State Bulletin 923 (1965); see generally,
Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and The Warsaw Con-
vention, 80 Harvard L. Rev. 497 (1967); Reed v. Wiser, $$5 F.2d 1079
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 922 (1977).

‘The Department of State recalled these events as follows:

‘*An inter-carrier agreement, known as the 1966 Montreal Agree-
ment, was reached and approved by the C.A.B., and the United States
withdrew its denunciation.

The 1966 Montreal Agreement still governs air carrier liability
under the Warsaw Convention for flights to and from the United
States. Since 1966, there have been intensive efforts to modernize the
provisions of the Warsaw Convention and a strong push by the United
States for international agreement on limits which would adequately
compensate American claimants.’’ Minutes of Hearing Before the
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 95th Cong.,
Ist Sess. Executive B, July 26, 1977 at p. 6.

Foreign Air Carrier Permits are issued pursuant to 49 U.S.C.
$1302.

4

obtained under the Convention.’ These ‘‘special contracts’’
may be interpreted as admissions that the Convention ‘‘gold’’
clause is outmoded at least insofar as death and injury claims
are concerned. They are also evidence of a substantial lack of
uniformity in the practical application of the damage limitations
in the Convention. No such general reaction has been addressed
to cargo losses.

**(1) Countries which quote a special rate of US $58,000 (equal
to 45,000 Specia! Drawing Rights).

Air Afrique Countries Ireland New Zealand
Australia Israel Panama

Belgium Italy Singapore

Burma Japan Spain

Canada Jordan Thailand

E! Salvador Lebanon United Kingdom

Finland Luxembourg

France Netherlands

(2) Countries which quote a special contract rate of 25,500
(equal to 46,400 SDRs).

Bruneri Gibraltar Hong Kong

(3) Countries which quote a special contract rate in their own
currencies.

Austria Sch. 1.1m (equal to SDRs 62,400)
Denmark Kr 375,000 (equal to SDRs 49,000)
Federal Republic

of Germany DM 150,000 (equal to SDRs 60,200)
Norway Kr 333,000 (equal to SDRs 50,500)
Sweden Kr. 270,000 (equal to SDRs 48,600)
Switzerland Fr. 170,000 (equal to SDRs 75,500)

(4) The United Kingdom will be increasing its special contract
limit to 100,000 SDRs as of 1 April 1981 and it is believed that France
will be increasing its limit 80,000 SDRs from the same date. Other
European countries are understood to be thinking of similar increases
over the next few months.

All figures have been rounded to a convenient approximation in
view of “he day to day variations due to currency fluctuations.”’
British Perliamentary Debates (Hansari), House of Commons Official
Report, Vol. 997 No. 29 January 20, 1981.

5

As strong as the case is for holding Article 22 unenforceable
when examined in a cargo loss perspective, it is even stronger
when examined in the broader context of death and injury
claims.

We respectfully submit that a decision by this Court will
materially affect the unrepresented class of wrongful death an
injury claimants, and accordingly request that we be permitted
to address the issues before this Court from their unique and
special perspective.'

Franklin Mint Corporation and Trans World Airlines have
consented in writing to our filing of this brief as amicus curiae.

Summary of Argument.

1. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
properly exercised its constitutional responsibility to interpret
treaties when it determined that Article 22 of the 1929 Warsaw
Convention was rendered unenforceable by a subsequent Act of
Congress and international agreement. The decision implements
the principle that where a provision of a treaty is in conflict with
an Act of Congress, the one later in time shall be controlling.’ It

"We respectfully submit that the federal courts which addressed
the ‘‘gold’’ issue in the following cases were in error: See Maschinen-
fabrik xern, A.G. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., et al., 562 F. Supp. 232
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (selecting last official U.S. price of gold in cargo
case); Deere & Co. v. Deutsche Lufthansa A.G., v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., et al., N.D. Ill. No. 8104726 (Dec. 30, 1982) (selecting
last officia! U.S. price of gold in cargo case); Jn Re Air Crash Disaster
at Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, $35 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y.
1982) (selecting last official U.S. price of gold in passenger case), ap-
peal denied on that issue, No. 82-8018 (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 1982). Boehr-
inger Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. vy. Pan American World Airways,
Inc., 531 F. Supp. 344 (S.D. Tex 1981) (selecting free market price of
gold in cargo case), appeal pending No./ 81-2519 recognized that the
official price of gold was no longer relevant and applicable.

’The foreign decisions which, according to TWA (TWA Brief p.
22 fn. 28), determined that the ‘‘offical’’ price of gold was the ap-
propriate Convention conversion factor are clearly distinguishable.

(Continued on following page)

6

also accords with the rebus sic stantibus doctrine which holds
that where the facts and circumstances which existed when a
treaty was executed and upon which its terms were predicated
have substantially changed, the treaty may be declared in-
operative.

2. Since 1934 when the United States adhered to the Warsaw
Convention our government, through its cabinet departments
and civil aviation authorities, has acknowledged that ‘he
**gold’’ clause of Article 22 of the Convention was directly tied
to and dependent upon the domestic and international! u ¢ and
acceptance of gold as a monetary unit. A 1974 Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) Order (74-1-16, 35 Fed. Reg. 1526) and subse-
quent statements by the Department of State make the relation-
ship explicit. When Congress in 1976 enacted the Bretton
Woods Agreement Act and repealed the Par Value Modifica-
tion Act which had set a $42.22 ‘‘official’’ gold price, it

(Footnote continued)

Hornlinie A.G. v. Societe’ Nationale Petrole, 1972 Nederlandse
Jurisprudentie No. 269, at 728 (JA 144), Association Aeronautique v.
Thierache, Tr.b.gr.inst., Paris, France, Feb. 10, 1973, and Com-
panhia de Seguros Maritimos vy. Varig, Federal Court of Appeals,
Brazii, June 3, 1975, all predate elimination of gold as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund unit of account in 1978. A careful reading of
Costell v. Iberia, Lineas Aereas de Espana, S.A., No. 285 (Court of
Appeals, Valencia, Spain, Oct. 16, 1981, reveals that a pure ‘‘official’’
gold value was rejected in favor of an SDR value because of ‘The
abandonment of the classic patterns of monetary systems which are
already outmoded.’’ (TWA Brief BA 10). Pakistan Int’! Airlines v.
Compagnie Air Int'l, S.A., 79/2278 (Court of Appeals, Aix-en-
Provence Oct. 30, 1980) (JA 133) applied the ‘‘official’’ gold value
fixed by the governmental declaration as of August 10, 1969, since
that was apparently the ‘‘official’’ rate when that particular contract
of carriage was made. The court specifically noted that the Second
Amendment to the IMF agreements (1978) ‘‘prohibiting the fixing of a
gold parity as a denomination of the national currency’’ (JA 138) was
not yet in force when the contract of carriage was made. These foreign
cases do not fairly support the propositions for which they were
brought to the court’s attention. Instead they demonstrate an interna-
tional awareness of the infirmity of Article 22 due to changes in the
role of gold in the monetary system.

-

eliminated any statutory reference to an ‘‘official’’ gold value
from our domestic monetary system. The same legislation
ratified the elimination of ‘‘gold”’ as a unit of account of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund and consequently from the interna-
tional monetary system. After April, 1978, when tne repeal
became effective, there was no ‘‘official’’ gold velue in existence
by which to calculate and determine the monetary value of the
Convention’s damage limits. Continued use of a gold value
after April, 1978 to set the limits was unjustified and conflicts
with government policy.

3. Though originally designed to protect an infant industry
our government has been on record for decades that the limita-
tions of liability for wrongful death and personal injury ex-
pressed in the Warsaw Convention are unacceptably, indeed in-
conscionably, low. The determination by the Court of Appeals
below that Article 22 is unenforceable is, therefore, consistent
with this position.

4. The markedly changed economic circumstances of today
from those which existed in 1929 offer further evidence that
there is no justification for giving Article 22 the strained inter-
pretation now proffered by the airlines and the United States.
Their restrictive interpretation of Article 22 is neither fair to
airline passengers nor required by the treaty. Air crash victims’
rights to full recovery should not be compromised by an ob-
solete treaty provision.

5. The decision of the appellate court below was fore-
shadowed and anticipated by the aviation community.

6. Courts do not have the power to substitute Special Draw-
ing Rights or any other alternative currency specie for ‘‘gold’’ to
calculate damages under the Warsaw Convention.

7, The only available ‘‘gold’’ value for calculating the Con-
vention damage limit is its market value though use of that value
is not advocated by the United States or preferred. The best
solution is to hold Article 22 unenforceable.

8
ARGUMENT.
I.

Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention limiting liability
of airlines for death or injury in international transporta-
tion has been superseded and rendered unenforceable by
subsequent congressional legislation, international agree-
ments, and changed circumstances.

A. In Interpreting Article 22 the Court Below
Properly Found That the Treaty Provision
Had Been Superseded by a Subsequent Act of
Congress.

Federal courts have constitutional authority and responsibil-
ity to interpret treaties. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102
(1933); Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. vy.
Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138 (1934); Wright v. Henkel,
190 U.S. 40 (1903); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276
(1933). In exercising that power courts are obligated to construe
treaties according to their ordinary and natural meaning,
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890), and must ‘‘ascertain the
meaning intended by the parties for the terms in which the
agreement is expressed, having regard to the context in which
they occur and the circumstances under which the agreement
was made.’’ Restatement (2d), Foreign Relations Law of the
United States §146. Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France,
386 F.2d 323, 337 (Sth Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905
(1968).

More than a century ago, it was determined by this Court that
where provisions of a treaty and a subsequent Act of Congress
are in conflict, the Act of Congress wil! control in United States
courts as a later expression of our law.

9

The effect of treaties and acts of Congress, when in
conflict, is not settled by the Constitution. But the ques-
tion is not involved in any doubt as to its proper solu-
tion. A treaty may supersede a prior Act of Congress,
and an Act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty.

The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616, 20 L. Ed. 227 (1870).

Congressional authority to enact a statute which supersedes
or renders ineffectual the provisions of a treaty to which the
United States is a party was subsequently confirmed. Head
Money Cases (Edye v. Robertson), 112 U.S. $80, $99 (1884):
Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238 (1889).

The vitality of this principle was recently reiterated.

This Court has also repeatedly taken the position that an
Act of Congress, which must comply with the Constitu-
tion, is on a full parity with a treaty, and that when a
statute which is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a
treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict renders the
treaty null.

Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1955), citing Whitney v. Robertson,
124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888), wherein this Court stated:

By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same
footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of
legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be
the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is
given to either over the other. . . . [I]f the two are incon-
sistent, the one last in date will control the other... .

The Warsaw Convention was opened for signature in 1929,
and adhered to by the United States in 1934. The underlying
purpose for the Convention at that time was to provide uniform

id

rules and economic protection for the infant international com-
mercial aviation industry,'® and to limit the liability of air car-
rier for death or injury to passengers and cargo loss.'' The
treaty created a presumption of liability which could be over-
come only by a showing that the loss occurred notwithstanding
that the airline had taken ‘‘all necessary measures.’’'*? In addi-
tion, airline liability was unlimited if the loss was occasioned by
the airline's ‘‘willful misconduct.’’'’

Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention and Section 6 of the
1976 Bretton Woods Agreement Act, which repealed Sect:on 2
of the Par Value Modification Act, Pub.L. 93-110, §1, 87 Stat.
3§3 (1973) (formerly 31 U.S.C. §449), are all concerned with
‘*gold’’ in monetary systems. The 1976 statute abolished the use
of gold for domestic and international monetary purposes; the
Convention used gold as a basis for measuring the value of
damages recoverable and the conversion of that value into na-
tional currencies. The attempt to calculate the Article 22

"Uniformity of practice and procedures within the international
aviation industry, on such matters as ticketing and bills of lading, etc.
can now be accomplished through the International Civil Aviation
Organization which was brought into being by the Chicago Conven-
tion of 1944, reprinted in Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law, 3rd
ed., v.2 no. 7, 1975.

''*What is made quite clear is the extent to which the delegates
were concerned with creating a uniform law to govern air crashes,
with absolutely no reference to any national law (except for the ques-
tions of standing to sue for wrongful death, effects of contributory
negligence and procedural inatters; see Articles 21, 24(2), 28(2). The
delegates were concerned lest major air crash cases be brought before
courts of nations whose courts were not (according to current Western
standards) well organized, nor whose substantive law (according to
the same standards) progressive. To avoid the prospect of a jungle-like
chaos,"’ Reed v. Wiser, supra, $85 F.2d at 1092, the Convention laid
down rules that were to be universally applicable.’’ Benjamin v.
British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 917 (2d Cir. 1978). See,
Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and The Warsaw Con-
vention, 80 Harv.L.Rev. 497 (1967).

‘Warsaw Convention Article 20(1).

‘Warsaw Convention, Article 25.

11

damage limit in terms of a gold value, after April 1, 1978, when
the legislation became effective, places the 1929 treaty and later
statute in direct conflict. It also calculates damages by reference
to a ‘‘national’’ law (and a repealed national law at that) which
was always anathema to those who drafted the Convention and
its adherents. '*

The fact that the 1976 Bretton Woods Agreements Act does
not make express reference to the Warsaw Convention is not a
legitimate basis for denying the existence of a conflict. The
historical relationship between gold as a monetary unit and the
Convention confirms the conflict, and makes it clear that the
decision of the court of appeals below had long been
foreshadowed and anticipated.’

Use of the $42.22 gold value for certain official non-
transactional accounting purposes by some international
development banks or even by the United States in setting a
book value for its gold reserves does not demonstrate the

“See n.11 supra; see n.20 infra.

‘It is clearly established that the airlines knew that ‘a rational
limit on liability cannot exist’ without an internationally agreed upon
unit and ‘the Montreal meeting in 1975 was a recognition by the War-
saw parties that the Convention’s unit had been eliminated.’
Therefore, airlines, including Korean, presumptively knew that this
‘international disarray’ would prevent the Convention from shielding
them in any rational manner, and they would be expected to protect
themselves and obtain additional! insurance.

Furthermore, the knowledge of this ‘international disarray’ and
the ‘recognition by the Warsaw parties that the Convention's unit had
been eliminated by events,’ contrary to the holding in Franklin Mint,
would allow the airlines to see—as early as 1975—that, eventually, a
court would refuse to enforce the Convention. Therefore, this Court's
decision as to the enforceability of the Convention is applicable to this
action.’’ /n re Aircrash at Kimpo International Airport on November
18, 1980, supra, $88 F.Supp. at 75.

12

absence of a conflict between the treaty and the subsequent
statute. '*

There is a complete absence of proof—or even argument in
any of the briefs submitted in this case—that the $42.22 gold
price has practical transactional significance today which affects
people or nations except, of course, the Warsaw Convention.

In light of the foregoing principles the argument by TWA and
the United States that the Court below ‘‘abrogated’’ the Con-
vention (TWA Brief p. 15, U.S. Brief p. 13) is unfounde. By
applying the principles governing treaty analysis the cour: below
concluded that subsequent legislation and events have rendered
the challenged treaty provision unenforceable. The court has
merely recognized and reacted to legislative and other historical
developments.'’ The court did not void the Warsaw Conven-
tion; it merely held one provision inoperative.

Authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United
States is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and the
legislative branches of government. There was no invasion of
this role by the appellate court. The Bretton Woods Agreement
Act was enacted in 1976 in furtherance of our nation’s foreign

'*We note the reference to ‘‘articles of agreement"’ of certain in-
ternational development banks at TWA Brief p. 17 n.24 and 18 n.24.
Each of the development banks mentioned was chartered by interna-
tional agreement or treaty between 1945 and 1965. Consequently, the
reference to subscriptions in terms of ‘‘gold’’ is fully understandable
when those ‘‘banks’’ were founded. TWA candidly acknowledges that
the change to SDRs for valuation of the Work Bank’s capital stock
was an ‘‘internal’’ matter. (TWA Brief p. 17 n.24). The fact that after
1978 the World Bank ‘‘will continue to accept capital subscriptions . . .
at the last par value of the U.S. dollar’ is totally irrelevant to the issue
before this Court. None of its articles of agreement limit the rights of
individuals. They relate to accounting procedures peculiar to that in-
stitution.

''The inter-relationship between the Executive, Legislative and
Judicial branches of our government is demonstrated in Go/dwater vy.
Carter, 481 F.Supp. 949, reversed 617 F.2d 697, vacated 444 U.S, 996
(1980).

13

policy as was the Warsaw Convention in 1929. The foreign
policy decision to remove ‘‘gold’’ from its role in monetary
systems conflicts with the earlier foreign policy decision to rely
upon a ‘‘gold’’ value to limit airlines’ liability. Whatever
‘political questions’’ were raised by the ‘‘gold’’ issue were
resolved by Congress and the Executive not by the courts.
Thereafter, a court which recognizes, accepts, and acts in a
manner consistent with these foreign policy judgments is prop-
erly exercising its judicial function. See, Van Der Weyde v.
Ocean Transport Co., 297 U.S. 114 (1936).

Furthermore insofar, as the ‘‘foreign policy’’ argument of the
United States is concerned (U.S. Brief p. 2), the comments of
Justice Powell in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,
(1981) citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) are
in point.

The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property
shall not be taken for a public use without just compen-
sation was designed to bar the Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justness, should be borne by the public as a
whole.

453 U.S. 654 at p. 691. No showing has been made in the court
below or in this Court to justify using victims of air crashes to
further the foreign policy interests of the nation.

The argument in the United States’ brief herein supporting
the use of the $42.22 repealed ‘‘official’’ gold value is a change
from public positions our government has taken (infra pp.
1$-23). The alteration in its public stance.may be the reaction of
some who mistakenly misperceived or disregarded the dramatic
changes which affected international monetary affairs and the
Convention which portend the end of antiquated and un-
necessary airline industry protectionism.

14

B. Holding Article 22 to be No Longer
Enforceable Properly Applies the
Rebus Sic Stantibus Doctrine

The changed role of gold in domestic and international
monetary systems coupled with the development of the airline
industry since 1929 makes doctrine of rebus sic stantibus
operative in this case.

[This is a] name given to a tacit condition, said to attach
to all treaties, that they shall cease to be obligatory so
soon as the state of facts and conditions upon which
they were founded has substantially changed. Taylor,
Int. L. §394; 1 Oppenheim, Int. L. $$0; Grotius, ch.
XVI, §XXV; Vattel B. 2, c. 13, §200; Hall, Int. L. §116;
Hershey, Int. Pub. L. 319 2 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary
2820 (unabridged 3d Rev., 1914) Black’s Law Dic-
tionary 1139 (Sth Ed. 1979).

One commentator has described the doctrine as follows:

Although the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is based
upon the idea of a relation between the binding force of
the treaty and a continuance of a state of facts essen-
tially unchanged, because the parties intended that the
continuance of the state of facts should be a condition
of the binding force of the treaty, two variations of this
concept may be distinguished. In the one case, a tacit
clause rebus sic stantibus is presumed to be contained in
every treaty. In the second case, no such tacit clause is
presumed in every treaty; but if, upon examination, it is
clear that a particular treaty was entered into with
reference to the existence of a particular state of facts,
the continued existence of which was envisaged by the
parties as a determining factor moving them to under-
take the obligations stipulated, then the rule of rebus sic
stantibus applies... .

Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol. V, §511 at p.
349; see also, Hill, the doctrine of ‘‘ Rebus Sic Stantibus’’ in In-
ternational Law, IX Univ. of Missouri Studies 7 (1934).

15

The fact that treaties are ‘‘contracts’’ among nations,
Dreyfus vy. Von Flinck, 534 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1976), Cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1977), which should be interpreted like
other contracts, 87 C.J.S., Treaties §13, underscores the point
that since the facts and circumstances which led to defining the
Article 22 damage limits in terms of ‘‘gold’’ have been materi-
ally altered by economic developments, international
agreements and domestic legislation the provision should no
longer be enforced.'*

In applying these various principles we believe the court
below and the district court in Kimpo were mindful of the ad-
monition that treaties must be ‘‘liberally’’ construed to effect
their intended purpose.

Factor v. Laubenheimer, supra, at p. 293-294, Valentine v.
United States, ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 57 S.Ct. 100 81
L.ed. 5 (1936).

The rebus sic stantibus doctrine and the policy favoring
liberal treaty interpretation require that in 1983 the judicial
focus should favor a treaty construction which does not hurt.
but rather helps American airline passengers.

C. The United States Has Acknowledged That
the Application of Article 22 Was Linked
to and Dependent Upon ‘‘Gold”’ as a Unit of
Account in the Domestic and International
Monetary Systems

The Warsaw Convention limitation of liability for death or
personal injury was stated to be ‘125,000 francs’’, and each
franc was deemed to refer to a French franc consisting of ‘65
milligrams of gold at the standard of fineness of nine hundred

'*See, Prepakt Concrete Co. v. Augusto Menendez Const. Corp.,
293 F.Supp. 638 (D.P.R. 1968) for application of this doctrine in a
commercial contract dispute.

16

thousandths.’’ The treaty limit for cargo was ‘250 francs per
kilogram.’’'’

There is no disagreement that the damage limitations were to
be calculated in terms of ‘‘gold'’ because the parties to the
treaty were determined to have an ‘‘internationa! value’’ rather
than one created or determined by national law.*® Gold was
selected because it was then the accepted standard unit of ac-
count for international monetary transaction and was an ap-
propriate measure for currency conversion.’?’ Use of a gold
value was also consistent with the Convention's drafters’ irtent
of utilizing a uniform internationa! standard which wou'J res-
pond to inflation.*?

The Gold Clause Cases, 294 U.S. 240 (1935) demonstrate that
prior to the date legislative restrictions were imposed upon the

"When these two Conventions were drafted, the French franc
actually had the gold-value stated in the definition, after its value had
been established in 1928 by Poincare. For this reason, it is often re-
ferred to as the Poincare gold franc The drafters of the Convention
wisely fixed the gold value of the unit used, whilst leaving to France
the satisfaction of the French franc being taken as a basis.’’ Drion,
Limitation of Liabilities in International Air Law, Martinus Nijhoff,
The Hague 1954, p. 182.

**A Swiss delegate to the Warsaw Convention said,

**We must base ourselves on ar international value, and we have
taken the dollar. Let one take the gold French franc, it’s all the same
to me, but let’s take a gold value.’’ (R. Horner & D. Legrez, Second
International Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, Minutes,
Warsaw, October 4-12, 1929, at 89-90 (1975).

?'The $42.22 gold price has nor been an ‘‘international’’ value
since 1978. TWA agrees that use of a gold franc clause in 1929 ‘‘is
readily understandable when it is considered in light of the interna-
tional gold exchange system in existence when the Convention was
drafted.’ (TWA Brief p. 6.)

*1**These increases in the limit of liability show that these limits
and the adoption of gold francs as an imaginary unit of account was
agreed upon not only in order to achieve uniformity among all the
contracting parties, but also in order to provide adequate compensa-
tion and’’—in the words of Asser—'‘‘to protect their real value."’
Heller, The Value of the Gold Franc—A Different Point of View, 6 J.
Mar. L. & Com. 73, 76 (1976).

17

use of gold clauses in private agreements by the Gold Reserve
Act of 1934, 12 U.S.C. §411 et seqg., 48 Stat. at L. 337, they were
popular in commercial agreements and debt instruments to pro-
tect against depreciation and against discharge of an obligation
by payment of less than the bargained-for value.’’

The United States has acknowledged the direct relationship
between the role of gold as a monetary unit and the Warsaw
Convention.

The United States routinely responded to increases in the
price of gold by correspondingly raising the limitations of
liability for death or injury spelled out in Article 22. When the
Gold Reserve Act of 1934 set the U.S. ‘‘official’’ price of gold at
$35 per ounce the ‘'125,000 francs”’ Convention damage limit
had a value of $8.291.87. In 1971 the U.S. ‘official gold price
was raised to $38 per ounce, 1972 Pub.L. No. 92-268, 86 Stat.
116 (1972) and the damage limit was recalculated to be $8,666
by the CAB.

A further devaluation of the U.S. dollar was accomplished in
1973 by enactment of the Par Value Modification Act increasing
the “‘official’’ price of gold to $42.22. The Civil Aeronautics
Board again reacted to the 1973 increase in the ‘‘official’’ gold
price by issuing its CAB Order 74-1-16. The CAB explicitly
ruled that the change in the price of gold in the monetary system
had the effect of requiring that the Convention damage limit for
death and injury be raised to $10,000. This 1974 Order on its
face confirms the long-standing direct relationship between the
statutes regulating the gold value and the Cwnvention:

The liability limits in the Warsaw Convention are set
forth in terms of gold francs so that as long as the value
of the dollar in terms of gold remained constant, no

"We also think that, fairly construed, these clauses were in-
tended to afford a definite standard or measure of value, and thus to
protect against a depreciation of the currency and agair.t the
discharge of the obligation by a payment of lesser value than that
prescribed. When these contracts were made they were not repugnant
to any action of the Congress.’ Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad Company, 294 U.S. at p. 302.

18

change was required in the dollar amount of the liability
limits contained in the tariffs. However, by Order 72-6-7
adopted June 2, 1972, the Board directed the carriers to
revise their tariffs to reflect the devaluation of the dollar
in terms of gold from $35 per ounce to approximately
$38 which took place effective May 8, 1972, and such
revisions have been made. On September 21, 1973,
Public Law 93-110 was enacted further devaluating the
U.S. dollar to approximately $42.22 per ounce of gold
effective October 18, 1972. As a result, the minimum
liability limits specified in Order 72-6-7 and the tariffs
currently on file with the Board no longer me.t the
minimum liability limits of the Convention and a revi-
sion of the tariffs is necessary to accurately reflect such
limits in dollars.

CAB Order 74-1-16, Docket No. 26274, 39 Fed. Reg. 1526 (JA
§5).*

The Jamaica Accords*’ gave the elimination of gold as a
monetary unit its formal international dimension.”*

The reaction of the Department of State (DOS) to the
elimination of gold in the international and domestic monetary
system?’ and its effect on the Warsaw Convention was predict-
able and publicly stated. DOS advised the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations in 1977 as follows:

“The statement in the TWA brief at p. 19. ‘‘The Par Value
Modification Act has always been totally unrelated to the effec-
tiveness of the Warsaw Convention and, therefore, its repeal is
necessarily irrelevant to the treaty’s continued viability’’ is plain.y
wrong.

Second Amendment of Articles of Agreement of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, Apr. 1, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.5. No.
8937 effective April 1, 1978.

“See, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News, Vol. 5, p. 5938
for the legislative history of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act.

"See, Vol. 1, Report to the Congress of the Commmission on the
Role of Gold in the Domestic and International Monetary Systems,
March, 1982.

19

A further development affecting the Warsaw Conven-
tion occurred in the early 1970's. The role of gold in the
international monetory system was diminished, and the
period experienced the development of a new monetary
unit for financial transactions, the Special Drawing
Right, or SDR, of the International Monetary Fund.
The limits of liability in the Guatemala City Protocol, as
well as in the other Warsaw instruments, are expressed
in gold. The United States, seeking to take advantage of
the schedule of the 197S Montreal Conference, pressed
for expansion of its agenda to include consideration of
an SDR provision to replace the gold clause in the
Guatemala City Protocol. (Emphasis supplied.)**

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations confirmed these
observations, but went further. The committee recognized that
the role of gold ‘‘would end"’, and that a new method of cur-
rency conversion would have to be found.

In the period preceding the 1978 Montreal Diplomatic
Conference, it also became apparent that the role of
gold as the basis for world currency conversion would
end. Since Article 22 of the Convention (as amended
both by The Hague and Guatemala City Protocols) pro-
vides for conversion of the liability limits to national
currencies on the basis of the ‘‘poincare franc’’—a
measure of gold equivalency—it became apparent that a
new method for currency conversion would have to be
found.

“Minutes of Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, United States Senate, 9Sth Cong. Ist Sess., Executive B, July
26, 1977, p. 7; The Guatemala City Protocol, done March 8, 1971,
reported in A. Lowenfeld, Aviation Law 975 (2d ed. Doc. Supp. 1981
was a protocol to increase the Warsaw Convention damage limit to the
dollar equivalent of $100,000; see, Reed v. Wiser, $$$ F.2d at p. 1084,

20

Executive Rept. 97-45. Report of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States Senate, Montreal Aviation Protocols
Nos. 3 and 4, December 16, 1981 p. 3-4.*"

The Civil Aeronautics Board has nor taken the position that
the gold clause of Article 22 remains enforceable. Three CAB
staff memoranda, however, have been written on the subject,
but none of them constitutes an order or decision of the
Board.’” Nevertheless, they do demonstrate the awareness of
the United States’ civil aviation authorities of the relationship
betweer, statutory changes and IMF adjustments in the .alue
and role of gold to the Convention.

The March 18, 1980 memorandum authored by the CAB
Chief, Policy Development Division (the Kennedy Memoran-
dum) in fact stated:

During the early 1970's, the carriers and many govern-
mental aviation authorities foresaw the effects that the
changing role of gold could have on the interpretation
of provisions like Article 22.’

"The antipathy of Congress to “‘gold clauses’’ is further evi-
denced by 31 U.S.C. §$118 which updated the government's refusal to
permit their enforcement. Pub.L. 97-258, 96 Stat. 985, Sept. 13, 1982.

’P. Kennedy, Memorandum, Policy Develoment Division,
Bureau of Consumer Protect’on, Civil Aeronautics Board (Mar. 18,
1980) (JA 42); J. Gaynes, Memorandum, Legal Division, Bureau of
Internationa! Aviation, Civil Aeronautics Board (Apr. 18, 1980) (JA
60); J. Golden ‘‘Warsaw Convention Liability Limits,"’ Memoran-
dum, Director, Bureau of Compliance and Consumer Protection,
Civil Aeronautics Board (May 20, 1981) (JA 33).

Highlighting the relationship between IMF action and Article 22
of the memorandum continued: ‘‘Under the original Articles of
Agreement of the IMF, each member country was obliged to establish
a par value for its currency, expressed in terms of gold or the U.S.
dollar (the value of which was expressed in terms of gold) for the of-
ficial settlement of international currency transactions. Pursuant to
this requirement, the United States established a par value of the
dollar as $35 per fine troy ounce of gold. In 1972 and again in 1974,

(Continued on following page)

The May 20, 1981 staff memorandum (The Golden
Memorandum) concluded that the CAB should continue to
observe the ‘‘legal fiction’’ inherent in the $42.22 gold value,
while noting ‘‘In 1975, the Warsaw signatories attempted to
deal with the changes in the role of gold in international
monetary transactions.’’ (JA 39.)

Commenting on the May 20, 198! CAB Memorandum, the
Court of Appeals below observed:

The CAB order on which Judge Knapp relied was ex-
pressly permised on the existence of an official price
under the Par Value Modification Act of 1973. The
more recent internal CAB memorandum supporting
continuation of that order is based ultimately on a
policy determination that the last official price is the
best available standard. The inconsistency of the CAB
position, however, is starkly evident. It rejects SDR’s
because the Senate has not ratified the Montreal Pro-
tocol, while adopting the last official price of gold which
has been explicitly rejected by the Congress. The sole
criterion supporting the CAB's position appears to be
the law of inertia.

690 F.2d at 309-310.

In October of 1974, before the elimination of gold from the
international monetary scene, the Legal Committee of the Inter-
national Civil Action Organization (‘‘ICAO"’) Legal Committee
issued a resolution to clarify Article 22 at a time when there was
a two-tier gold value system—an official price and a market

(Footnote continued)

Congress passed legislation that changed the par value of the dollar.
In each case, the Board ordered corresponding adjustments to carrier
tariffs, raising the liability limits to convert the limits of the Conven-
tion, expressed in terms of gold, to U.S. dollars.’’ P. Kennedy,
Memorandum, Policy Development Division, Bureau of Consumer
Protection, Civil Aeronautics Board (Mar. 18, 1980) p. 2.

22

price—from which to choose.’? At that time, when an ‘‘of-
ficial’? $42.22 gold price was still in limited formal use, the
resolution constituted an acknowledgment by ICAO of the
pressing ‘‘gold’’ probiem which Article 22 presented. The 1974
ICAO Legal Committee interpretation of Article 22 does not
support the claim that after 1978, use of $42.22 gold value is
proper. Even if the ICAO Legal Committee took such a posi-
tion it would not be binding on this court.

Continued use of the $42.22 value has also been recognized as
inconsistent with the intent of the Convention's drafters who
used a gold value to maintain the value of currency in tirues of
inflation.’’ The present market value of gold is nearly ten times
the 1973 gold price.

"The Legal Committee of ICAO, Resolution Concerning the
Conversion of Poincare Francs to Nationa! Currencies in the Warsaw
and Rome Conventions, 1974, Cited at TWA brief p. 25 n. 32.

** As long as the official price of gold existed and remained fairly
constant, the Warsaw limitations remained close to the level con-
sidered adquate to cover passenger claims filed with airlines back in
the 1930's. The limits for death and personal injury increased with the
approval of the Montreal Agreement. But baggage liability limits,
which started out at $7.62 per pound in 1934, have not risen ap-
preciably since that time. Following the devaluation of the dollar in
1972, they went up to $8.16 per pound, and in 1974 they increased to
the present level of $9.07 per pound. For a hypothetical 44-pound lost
suitcase, the maximum amounts the carrier would have to pay a claim-
ant were $330, $359 and $400, respectively. During this period,
however, the value of the dollar declined. In terms of purchasing
power, three hundred thirty 1934 dollars were worth $1,031 in 1972,
$1,215 in 1974 and $1,920 in January, 1980,

The liability limits increase dramatically if the calculations are
based upon the market value of gold.
. . .

While the figures for baggage liability limits based on the market
value of gold are probably in excess of the value of most passengers’
checked belongings, the limits on death and personal injury claims are
lower than amounts received by many plaintiffs in wrongful death ac-
tions.’’ The Kennedy Memorandum (JA 47-49).

See also, H. Drion, Limitations of Liabilities in International Air
Law, 1984, p. 183.

23

Day v. Trans World Airlines, 528 F.2d 31, 35-36 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976), made the observation
that:

‘*The conduct of the parties subsequent to ratification
of a treaty may, thus, be relevant in ascertaining the
proper construction to accord the tr>aty’s various provi-
sions.”’

The conduct of our government since 1929 relating interna-
tional monetary changes and IMF action to Article 22,
therefore, is strong support for the position we advocate.

Even the federal courts which have recently accepted the
$42.22 ‘‘fictive’’ gold value for Article 22 purposes (albeit we
submit, mistakenly) have appreciated the historical relationship
between the Warsaw Convention's gold clause and its use within
the monetary system, e.g., /n re Air Crash Disaster of Warsaw,
Poland on March 14, 1980, $35 F.Supp. at 842; Machine-
fabrick Kern, A.G., v. Northwest Airlines, $62 F.Supp. at
237-38. Boehringer Mannheim Diagnostics v. Pan American
Airlines, $31 F.Supp. at 349-53, while converting the Article 22
damage limit to dollars based upon the free market value of
gold, also recognized the direct relationship.

D. Declaring the Article 22 Damage Limits
Unenforceable is Consistent With Our
Government's Rejection of the Low Limits
of Recovery Resulting From the Gold Value
Clause

Whatever the rationale which led to United States acceptance
in 1934 of the low damage limits for injury and death specified
in Article 22 of the convention, it has long been apparent that
American victims of air crashes were being grossly under-
compensated and that the treaty was an anachronism.

When the Convention was concluded in 1929, only two
years after Lindbergh's historic flight, international air

24

travel was in its infancy. We are living in a different
world and airlines were no doubt thought to need
assistance in developing international air travel. There
can be little doubt, however, that the framers of the
Convention included the requirements mentioned in
view of what my brother Desmond has termed the
“‘drastic restrictions’ of the Convention. They were
drastic even in 1929. Injury or death from negligence of
the carrier was fixed at 125,000 ‘‘French franc consisting
of 65% milligrams of gold at the standard of finer -ss of
nine hundred thousandths,’’ art 22, par (4), or
$8,29187. Since then our dollar has been devaluated
40% so that the total amount recoverable for injury or
death due to negligence is less in 1929 dollar value than
$5,000.

Ross v. Pan American Airways, 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E. 2d 880
(1949) (Conway, J. dissenting).

The United States has sought to secure higher recoveries for
passengers for decades. In 1955, many of the subscribers to the
Convention became parties to the Hague Protocol which dou-
bled the Article 22 limits to 250,000 francs or $16,600 for death
Or injury cases. The United States objected, taking the position
that ‘‘The central defect in the Warsaw convention is its low
limit of liability.’’**

One of the proposals advanced by the United States in 1966
included uniform rules with no limit of liability.’

“Hearings Before the Committee in Foreign Relations, 89th
Cong., Ist Sess., Exec. H, at 15 (May 26-27, 1965).

“In the summer and fall of 1965, efforts were made by the
United States to obtain support for increasing the Warsaw limits to
$100,000 per passenger. These efforts were unsuccessful, and the
United States announced that it would withdraw from the Conven-
tion. Notice of denunciation wes deposited in November 1965, to take
effect in May 1966. At the same time the United States announced that
it would be willing to withdraw the denunication if, before it was to

(Continued on following page)

25

When the Guatemala City Protocol reached the Senate floor
for a vote on March 8, 1983 in the form of Montreal Potocols #3
and #4, the Senate refused to give its ‘‘advice and consent’’ to
ratification. This refusal, according to the Department of State,
could trigger ‘‘denunication’’ of the treaty. During the 1977
Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the
Department of State spokesman indicated as much during an
exchange with the Committee Chairman.

‘*The Chairman: Should the United States choose not to
ratify protocols 3 and 4, is it the intention of the ex-
ecutive branch to withdraw altogether from the Warsaw
Convention?

Mr. Hansell: I think the answer to that is difficult at this
time to forecast, Mr. Chairman. I think we would have
to look very seriously at the question of denouncing the
convention if these protocols were not approved, but no
decision has been taken on that question.”’

See n.35 at p. 28.
Against this record it cannot fairly be claimed that the conse-

quences of holding Article 22 unenforceable would conflict with
any policy of the United States and were not foreseeable.

(Footnote continued)

take effect, there were a reasonable prospect of an international agree-
ment on a limit of liability in the area of $100,000 or on uniform rules
with no limit of liability, and if, pending the entry into force of such
international agreement, a provisional arrangement were concluded
among the principal international airlines which would waive the War-
saw limits up to $75,000 per passenger.”’

S. Executive Rept. B, 95th Cong., Ist Session, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Dec. 16, 1981, p. 2.

As the 1977 and 1982 Foreign Relations Committee hearings re-
count even before the Guatemala Protocols were signed in 1971, the
$100,000 limit was recognized to be grossly inadequate. Opponents of
the treaty argued that no limit is required for an industry which can
readily procure low cost insurance coverage to protect itself from all
risk, and $0 senators agreed that the latest expressions of the Warsaw
scheme should not be ratified.

26

E. Preservation of the ‘‘Official’’ Price of
Gold for Warsaw Convention Purposes is
Anti-Competitive and Contravenes One of
the ‘‘Goals for International Aviation
Policy’’ Set Forth in 49 U.S.C. §1502(b)

49 U.S.C. §1502(b) provides, in part:

(b) Goals for international aviation policy.—in for-
mulating United States international air transportation
policy, the Congress intends that the Secretary of >tate,
the Secretary of Transportation, and the Civil
Aeronautics Board shall develop a negotiating policy
which emphasizes the greatest degree of competition
that is compatible with a well-functioning international
air transportation system.

The policy of promoting competition in international aviation
is consistent with domestic goals articulated in the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub.L. 95-504, Oct. 24, 1978, 92
Stat. 1705,

Allowing airlines to perpetuate the Convention damage
limitation at $42.22, the lowest conceivable level under the
treaty, would violate the mandate of Congress to promote com-
petition in international aviation.

The CAB is on record that the new government policies
favoring competition significantly impact upon the continued
justification for the Warsaw Convention scheme.

Enactment of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,
Public Law 95-504, October 24, 1978, and the Interna-
tional Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979,
Public Law 96-192, February 15, 1980, »oth of which
were aimed at removing governmental intervention from
aviation as much as possible, creates a totally different
atmosphere than existed in 1977.

27

Statement of the Civil Aeronautics Board Before the Committee
on Foreign Relations submitted September 27, 1981, at p. 3.’*

The market value of gold is the only gold value which,
arguably, may be utilized to calculate the Article 22
damage limitation, but its use is not favored.

We do not believe that use of the market value of gold to
establish airline’s limits of liability under Article 22 is the best
resolution of the conflict, but we are obligated to comment that
it is a gold value which would satisfy a literal reading of Article
22(4).

The court of appeals below found the free market value of
gold inconsistent with the intent of the contracting parties. 690
F.2d at 310. The United States agreed. (U.S. Brief, p. 25.)

However, in Zakoupolos v. Olympic Airways, No. 256/1974
(Feb. 1S, 1974), for example, the Court of Appeals (3d Depart-
ment) in Athens, Greece decided that the fair market price of
gold as set on the Athens Bourse was the appropriate valuation
for liability limits of the Warsaw Convention.

Likewise, in Saga v. Sagoland (Lower Court, Goteberg,
Sweden, Oct. 2, 1973) cited in Heller, The Value of the Gold

*TWA's passing reference (TWA Brief p. 21 n.27) to the Price-
Anderson Act, Pub.L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. $76 (1957) and Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 O.S. $9
(1978) is irrelevant to the point of the issue before the Court. Price-
Anderson created a $$60-million fund for recovery, accompanied by
an express statutory commitment to ‘‘ ‘take whatever action is
deemed necessary and appropriate to protect the public from the con-
sequences of a nuclear accident. . . . to be a fair and reasonable
substitute for the uncertain recovery of this magnitude from a utility.
_. .' $38 U.S. at 90-91. The Warsaw limits liability offer no parallel
assurances by the government.

28

Franc—A Different Point of View, 6 J, Mar. L. & Com. 91,
99-100 (1976) and in Larsen, Lega/ Problems in Compensation
Under the Gold Clauses of Private Internationa! Law
Agreements, 63 Geo. L. J, 817, 825 (1975), the Court held that
the fair market price of gold was the appropriate valuation for
liability limits of the Warsaw Convention. See also, Boehringer,
supra, p. 6.

The fair market value ensures that claimants are to some ex-
tent, within the framework of the Convention damage limits,
protected against the vicissitudes of inflation. Therefor., ap-
plication of the market price rather than the ‘‘official’’ price of
gold would further our government's policy that aircraft acci-
dent victims’ recoveries, although unfairly restricted by treaty,
should not be further diminished by inflation.

Special Drawing Rights are clearly not an alternative conver-
sion factor for Warsaw Convention purposes. The court below
correctly observed:

The Convention itself contains not the slightest author-
ity for its use and the Senate has thus far decliend to
ratify the Montreal Protocols.

690 F.5d at 310.

We respectfully submit that given the alternative methods by
which the Article 22 damage limitations may be calculated, the
choice is quite narrow. SDR’s and any national currency are
unavailable alternatives. The market value of gold is available,
but is not a favored alternative. Logic and fairness, therefore,
support the best alternative, which is to hold Article 22 unen-
forceable.

29
Conclusion,

For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully urge this Court
to affirm the judgment below of the United States Court of Ap-
pe’.'s for the Second Circuit to the extent that it held that Article
22 of the Warsaw Convention unenforceable and modify the
judgment to the extent that it held the treaty enforceable pro-
spectively only.

Respectfully submitted,
KREINDLER & KREINDLER

MARC S. MOLLER

A Member of the Firm

99 Park Avenue

New York, New York 10016
(212) 687-8181

Attorneys for Mark Hammerschlag and
Ellen Van Fleet

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY
LEFT BLANK

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_0288%3A14. Public record. Not legal advice.
