# Amicus Brief — Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 466 U.S. 243

## Text

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No, 82-1186

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
2 Petitioner,
FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, FRANKLIN MINT
LIMITED and MCGREGOR, SWIRE AIR SERVICES LIMITED,
Respondents,

INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION AND
FORTY-THREE OF ITS MEMBER AIRLINES (SEE APPENDIX I),
Potential Intervenors.

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE IN
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. v.
FRANKLIN MINT CORP., NO, 82-1186 AND
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI OF
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.

CARROLL E. Dusuc *
AIDAN D. JONES
RAND! L. BRESLOW
HAIGHT, GARDNER, Poor
& HAVENS
1819 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 775-1300
Counsel for Petitioners

Of Counsel: International Air Transport
KENNETH F. RIPPLE Association and Forty-Three
Notre Dame Law School Member Airlines (see

Notre Dame, Ind. 46556
January 20, 1983

Appendiz 1)
* Counsel of Record

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit holding on non-constitutional grounds
that the cargo liability limitation of Article 22 of the
Warsaw Convention, a Treaty of the United States, is
prospectively unenforceable in United States courts is a
violation of the separation of powers doctrine derived
from U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl.2 where

(a) no Act of Congress specifically abrogated the
United States’ adherence to the Convention and
neither Congress nor the Executive Branch has
expressed any need for a Treaty reservation; and

(b) the decision of the Court of Appeals intrudes
upon the ongoing process of Executive and Leg-
islative Branch negotiation and ratification of
amendments to the Treaty.*

* Franklin M.nt Corporation, Franklin Mint Limited and McGre-
gor, Swire Air Services Limited, plaintiffs-appellants below (here-
inafter referred to collectively as “Franklin Mint”), and Trans
World Airlines, Inc. (TWA), defendant-appellee below, were the only
parties to these proceedings. Neither International Air Transport
Association (IATA) nor its member carriers (except TWA) were
parties in the District Court or on the appeal. However, after the
Panel of the Second Circuit’s September 28, 1982 prospective unen-
forceability ruling, IATA and 36 of its member airlines filed an
amicus curiae brief in su rt of TWA's petition for rehearing of
the Panel’s decision. IATA is an organization of 123 international
air carriers, many of whom are either owned by (“government own-
ership” herein means greater than 50% government ownership) or
represent foreign sovereign nations which are parties to the War-
saw Convention. Six U.S. airlines are members of IATA. See
Appendix (hereinafter “App.”) I (66a) for a list of IATA members.
Those members who join in this petition are marked by an asterisk
in App. I.

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ............c0ccceeecseees sicesostgiehddiainnd
IIIT MOUIIUNITT, ceseeotcecesicseessscieseconevelbbenvensanatenegnabeate

EARS CO SER CID peticcnsensectnscisnsctsistiicmmmnns

A. Summary of the Litigation and Decisions Be-
SUT cincssncsknpssnsaosntetnssindekiassciotinetsbebiataaaananaaaalie

B. The Warsaw Convention, Its Protocols And
Their Implementation By The U.S. Government..

C. The Interest of IATA and Its Member Airlines..

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ..................
A. The Decision Of The Court of Appeals Violates
The Constitutional Separation Of Powers Doc-
trine Ry Improperly Interjecting The Judiciary
Into The Conduct of Foreign Relations ..............

1. The Judiciary Has Intervened in the Treaty
eempetttie: FU GUIOE coc iccsascsccnccessscsinstetenstoasinns

2. The Court of Appeals Has Disregarded
the Division of Labor within the Political
IIE vv nncsscinstendisciiccmptanetconinaae

B. The Decision Of The Court of Appeals Has and
Will Seriously Disrupt International Air Com-
merce and the Federal Courts ............0.0..0...0.0...

1. The Decision Has an Immediate Adverse Ef-
fect on the International Air Cargo System..

2. The Decision Has An Immediate Adverse Ef-
fect on the Federal Courts ...0.000000.0.0.000cccccccce

8. The Decision Has An Adverse Long-Term
Effect on International Air Commerce........

CEPR ncscccnsnstsistesy, applicable law as set forth in
the Convention or the Protocol, and the tariff filing re-
quirements in Section 403 of the Federal Aviation Act of

1 With respect to their liability to passengers, this order will
affect only a smal! proportion of the U.S. and foreign air carriers.
Most carriers engaged in international transport«tion by air in-
volving journeys to or from the United States adhere to the Mon-
treal Agreement ( Agreement CAB 18900 approved by Order E-23680
dated May 13, 1966, 31 FR 7302) pursuant to which they have filed
tariffs providing for a $75,000 limit of liability for death or injury
to passengers. Since this limit is stated in terms of U.S. dollars, it
is unaffected by the change in the gold value of the dollar.

2? The Hague Protocol of 1955 doubles the Warsaw liabiuty limit
for passengers, but since the United States has not signed or ad-
hered to the Protocol, its provisions do not normally apply with
respect to air transportation.

50a

1958, and Part 221 of the Board’s Regulations and they
must be canceled.

8. That the minimum acceptable figures in United
States dollars for liability limits applicable to “interna-
tional transportation” and “international carriage” are as
follows’

Convention and Protocol

Minimum Liability Actual Rounded °

125,000 francs (per passenger, $10,002.90 $10,000.00
Convention only)

250,000 francs (per passenger, 20,005.80 20,000.00
Hague Protocol only)

5,000 francs (per passenger for 400,116 400.00
unchecked baggage )

250 francs (per kilogram for 20.00580 20.00
checked baggage and goods)

250 francs (per kilog.am on a 9.07460 9.07
per-pound basis )

Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, particularly Sections 204(a), 403,
and 1002 thereof,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1, The carriers named in Appendix A, attached hereto,
shall revise all liability limitations which may be applica-
ble to “international transportation” or “international car-
riage” as defined in the Convention or the Protocol which
are inconsistent with the dollar amounts set forth herein
so as to conform with suci, amounts,

* Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention permits the liability limits
specified therein in gold franca to be converted into any national
currency in round figures. The Board is permitting the round
dollar amounts set forth in this order to be filed in the tariffs for
purpose of convenience. This order is not intended to prohibit car-
riers from specifying the actual! dollar equivalents in their tariffs as
some of them do at the present time. The dollar values herein are
calculated in accordance with the criteria detailed in Order 72-6-7.

5la

2. The tariff cancellations directed in ordering para-
graph 1 above shall become effective on or before February
6, 1974 on not less than 10 days’ notice.

8. That copies of this order shall be served on the air
carriers and foreign air carriers named in Appendix A.

This order will be published in the Federal Register.
By the Civil Aeronautics Board:

EDWIN Z, HOLLAND
Secretary

[SEAL]

52a

APPENDIX G
Civil Aeronautics Board Order 78-8-10 (excerpts)

DOCKETS 25280, 27578, AGREEMENTS CAB 2698, R-41;
2699, R-49; 2700, R-43; 3119; 7648, R-107; 24475, R-4,
R-5; 25186, R-12; 25954, R-1, R-2, R-3; 26701, R-9,
IATA, CARGO CARRIAGE CONDITIONS—order 78-8-10
adopted August 8, 1978.

On June 21, 1974, the Internationa! Air Transport
Association submitted, pursuant to section 412 of the
Act, resolution 600b (agreement CAB 24475, R-4) re-
stating the conditions of carriage of cargo to appear on
the back of cargo airwaybills and resolution 600j (agree-
ment CAB 24475, R-5) restating the condition to appear
on the face of the airwaybills. Thereafter, the Board
issued order 75-11-106 on November 26, 1975, inviting
all interested persons to submit comments on these agree-
ments and to show cause why the proceeding in agree-
ment CAB 7648, order E-8543 (printed with order
E-11024), Pan Am. World Airways et al., Conditions of
Carriage, 24 C.A.B. 575, 580-591 (1957), should not be
terminated and why the Board’s earlier approval of
agreements CAB 2698 et al., order E-3230, JATA Traffic
Conference Resolutions, 10 C.A.B. 788 (1949), should not
be withdrawn.

The last previous Board approval of IATA conditions
of carriage for cargo occurred on September 1, 1949,
IATA Traffic Conference Resolutions, supra. Though the
Board approved the resolution then before it on the
ground that the “establishment of these uniform condi-
ditions should minimize confusion and misunderstanding,”
the Board took pains to note that “serious questions relat-
ing to the public interest could arise,” and placed its in-
terpretation on several of the provisions. The Board con-
cluded with the following admonition (id. at 798-794) :

We extend our approval for a temporary period
in order to permit the immediate use of the uniform

58a

arrangements discussed herein pending revision of
the provision under consideration in a manner con-
sistent with the views expressed herein. Should the
carriers fai] to make such revision at their first op-
portunity, the public interest may require us to with-
draw the approval herein granted.

In 1954 the IATA carriers filed a revision to the ear-
lier approved resolution (agreement CAB 7648, R-107,
adopted by the IATA traffic conferences in Honolulu in
November 1953). In considering the Honolulu revisions
in order E-85438,' the Board stated:

The Board is seriously concerned with the little
progress that appears to have been made to revise
the basic provisions of these agreements to meet the
points raised in the aforesaid opinion. While still
recognizing the importance of uniformity in the
tickets, waybills, and conditions of carriage, it is of
the opinion that such uniformity should not be ob-
tained at the sacrifice of the rights of passengers and
shippers, and that further approval of provisions
which are otherwise adverse to the public interest is
not warranted.

The Board, accordingly, tentatively approved some of
the provisions, some conditionally, and tentatively disap-
proved others, giving parties 30 days within which to file
objections. Objections were filed by the IATA carriers,
in which they requested the opportunity for conferences
with the staff of the Board for purposes of facilitating
disposition of the issues. The Board authorized such in-
formal! discussions by order E-8842, dated December 22,
1954, but no final resolution of the cargo issues ever
materialized.* The result is that the tentative order of
August 5, 1954, with respect to cargo, never became final,

1 Pan Am, World Airways et al, Conditions of Carriage, supra
at 581.

2 The informal conferences resulted in a revised resolution re-
specting passenger service which was approved by order E-11024.

54a

and the only order of approval of IATA conditions on
cargo now in effect is that of September 1, 1949 (JATA
Traffic Conference Resolutions, supra).

Comments * in response to order 75-11-106 have been
filed by IATA, Seaboard, the Board’s Office of Consumer
Advocate (OCA), and (jointly) the National Retail Mer-
chants Association, the Shippers Nationa] Freight Claim
Council, Inc., and the National Small Shipments Traffic
Conference (Shippers). In addition, IATA submitted
agreement CAB 25954, R-1, R-2, and R-3, docket 27573,
revising or canceling some of the provisions in the 1974
agreements, which meet some of the objections listed in
appendix C to order 75-11-106. Attached are appendixes
A and B containing resolutions 600b and 600j, as filed
and as amended. Neither IATA nor the carrier parties
address the part of order 75-11-106 dealing with the
rescission of the Board’s approval of the earlier IATA
agreement in JATA Traffic Conference Resolutions, supra,
or the termination of the proceeding in Pan Am, World
Airways et al., Conditions of Carriage, supra.

Order 75-11-106 also deferred decision on the provisions
of the agreement that presented issues similar to those
under review by the Board in the Liability and Claim
Rules and Practices Investigation, docket 19923. By
order 76-3-139, March 22, 1976, and order 77-3-61,
Liability and Claim Rules and Practices, 73 C.A.B. 116
(1977), the Board resolved these issues, and we are now
able to dispose of the matters before us. Petitions to
review certain aspects of orders 76-3-139 and 77-3-61
were filed by American Airlines et al. in the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. There-
after Congress passed and the President signed Public
Law 95-163, removing Board jurisdiction over the reason-
ableness of domestic cargo rates and rules. When the

* App. C to order 75-11-106 contains an analysis and the Board's
tentative findings as to each provision of the IATA agreements in
issue so that comments could be directed to the specific problems
enumerated.

55a
enactment of Public Law 95-163 was called to the atten-

tion of the court, the court vacated and remanded the
proceedings to the Board.

Inasmuch as the resolutions and agreements before us
concern international traffic, we believe that neither the
court’s remand nor Public Law 95-163 prevents us from
giving such weight as we think necessary to the findings
and conclusions of the Liability Rules case.

We turn now to section-by-section consideration of the
conditions of carriage.

RESOLUTION 600b

v

Article (1).—Article (1) is the preamble to the condi-
tions of carriage and states that the Warsaw Convention,*
if applicable, limits the liability of the carriers for loss
or damage to the cargo. Though this preamble on the
back of the waybill does not specifically refer to the car-
rier’s liability for delay, the front of the waybill contains
a statement that Warsaw limits the carrier’s liability for
loss, damage, or delay of cargo. Moreover, article 19 of
Warsaw specifically provides that the carrier shall be
liable for damages occasioned by delay in the transporta-
tion of cargo.’ In these circumstances, we consider the
omission of the word “delay” in the preamble to be an
oversight, which the carriers shall correct.

Article (1)1.—This subparagraph defines carrier as all
air carriers which carry or undertake to carry cargo
under the airwaybill or perform any other services inci-
dental to such air carriage. The Warsaw Convention is
defined as the convention signed at Warsaw on Octo-

4 Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transpor-
tation by Air, signed at Warsaw Oct. 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000), re-
ferred to as “Warsaw Convention” or simply “Warsaw.”

8 Art. 23 of Warsaw further provides that any provision tending
to relieve a carrier of its liability under Warsaw shall be null and
void.

56a

ber 12, 1929, or the Convention as amended at The
Hague, September 28, 1955." The definition of French
gold francs is the same as the definition in the Warsaw
Convention—consisting of 651, milligrams of gold with
a standard fineness of nine hundred-thousandths. These
are standard definitions, and no objections have been filed
against them. This subparagraph will be approved.

Article (1)2(a).—This subparagraph states that the
Warsaw Convention is applicable unless the carriage is
not “international transportation” as defined in the War-
saw Convention. The Board’s decision in docket 19923
retained the distinction between Warsaw and non-
Warsaw traffic,’ so the Board will approve this provision.

Article (1)2(b).—This subparagraph states that the
carriage of cargo is subject to applicable laws, regula-
tions, and tariffs which are made a part of the contract
of carriage. This provision is approved subject to the
condition that it is not to be construed as Board approval,
either express or implied, of the provisions of any of the
filed tariffs.

Article (1)3.—This subparagraph provides for the ab-
breviation of a carrier’s name on the waybill. It also
provides that carriage to be performed by several suc-
cessive carriers shall be regarded as a single operation.
Inasmuch as most carriers’ abbreviations are generally
understood and no party objected to this provision, we
shall approve this subparagraph.

Article (1)4.—This subparagraph states that except
as otherwise provided in a carrier’s tariffs or conditions
of carriage, the carrier’s liability for non-Warsaw cargo

* Referred to as the “Hague Protocol” in this order.

7 Under Warsaw, international transportation not only must take
place between two countries, but the two countries must also be
signatories to the Convention. There are several countries which
have not adopted the Convention, giving rise to the distinction be-
tween so-called Warsaw and non-Warsaw traffic.

57a

shal] not exceed $20 per kilogram of the goods lost, dam-
aged, or delayed, unless a higher value is declared and
additional charges paid. At the present time a carrier’s
liability for Warsaw traffic, in the absence of a declara-
tion of higher value, is $20 per kilogram, so that this
subparagraph provides the same monetary limit for non-
Warsaw traffic, unless the carrier’s tariff provides other-
wise, ” = =

APPENDIX A

Resolution 600b Air Waybill—Conditions of Contract
(1974 agreement CAB 24475, R-4) (as amended by 1976
agreement CAB 25954-R1, and 1977 agreement CAB
26701-R9) (new)

106 (CTPU)600b, 206/CTPC)600b, 306(CTPC) 600b
Expiry, indefinite; type, B

RESOLVED THAT:

(1) The conditions of contract, prefaced by a notice, on
the reverse side of the air waybill/consignment note,
read as follows:

NOTICE CONCERNING CARRIERS LIMITATION
OG? LIABILITY

If the carriage involves an ultimate destination or stop
in a country other than the country of departure, the
Warsaw Convention may be applicable and the conven-
tion governs and in most cases limits the liability of the
carrier in respect of loss of or damage to cargo to 250
French gold francs per kilogramme, unless a higher value
is declared in advance by the shipper and a supplemen-
tary charge paid if required. The liability limit of 250
French gold francs per kilogramme is approximately U.S.
$20 per kilogramme on the basis of U.S. $42.22 per ounce

of gold.

58a
APPENDIX H

FOR INFORMATION
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
May 20, 1981

MEMORANDUM
TO: The Board
FROM: Director, Bureau of Compliance and Con-

sumer Protection

CC: Director, Bureau of International! Aviation
Director, Bureau of Domestic Aviation
General Counsel

SUBJECT: Warsaw Convention Liability Limits

For more than a year now, various components of the
Board’s staff have been considering the question of how
the liability limitations contained in the Warsaw Con-
vention should be converted to dollars. The question is a
troublesome one, and the memoranda exchanged among the
staff have not reached the same conclusions of this issue.'
There is considerable interest in the final resolution of this
matter among parties outside the Board, including some
involved in litigation where the amount of potential lia-
bility is a significant issue.

The Board has never taken a position as to which lia-
bility limitation level is correct, and the Bureau of Com-
pliance and Consumer Protection recommends that the
Board decline to take any position which would affect the
determination of liability limits until the matter has been
further defined at the staff level. Any policy recommenda-
tion that would come from the staff should be communi-
cated to the Departments of Transportation and State as

1 This Bureau wrote the first memorandum in March, 1980. BIA
and BDA wrote reply memos in April, 1980.

59a

well in the hope of reaching interagency agreement. This
memorandum contains BCCP’s reappraisal of the problem
and is intended to initiate a fresh start in addressing the
question at the Board.

I. Background

The Warsaw Convention was signed at Warsaw, Poland,
on October 12, 1929, and ratified by the United States
Senate on July 31, 1934." Among its most compelling
purposes were the protection of the fledgling aviation in-
dustry from potentially ruinous damage judgments and
the assurance of some reliable and consistent basis for
recovery for injury or damage to persons or property.*
Thus the Convention (a) enunciated carriers’ liability for
personal injuries (Article 17), damage or loss of baggage
and other property (Article 18), and damage due to
delay (Article 19) subject to affirmative defenses which
could be proved by a carrier, i.e., the carrier’s freedom
from fault (Article 20) or the injured person’s contribu-
tory fault (Article 21); ‘b) provided a limitation on the
extent of liability (.\rticle 22) ; and (‘c) nullified any pro-
vision tending to relieve a carrier of any such liability or
to fix a lower limit (Article 23). In addition, the Con-
vention required carriers to provide notice to the passen-
gers in the form of a ticket or baggage check with respect
to, inter alia, the limitations on liability, and barred de-
fenses permitted by the Convention, including the limita-
tion of liability, if carriers accept passengers or baggage
without delivering the required ticket or baggage check
(Articles 3 and 4).

The Board has implemented Articles 3 and 4 by specify-
ing the notice carriers must provide concerning the lia-

18 49 Stat. 3000.

2 Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 Harv.L.Rev. 497, 498-500 (1967). See also Horner
& Legrez, Minutes, Second International Conference on Private
Aeronautical Law, Warsaw 1929 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1975),

pp. 38, 40-41.

60a

bility limits. 14 C.F.R. Sections 221.175 and 221.176.
Carriers also include the liability limits in tariffs filed
with the Board, as required by Section 403(a) of the Act
and Part 221.3 of the Roard’s Regulations. The Board has
also been an active participant in Congressional hearings
concerning possible amendments to the Convention.

In March, 1980, our former Policy Development Divi-
sion sent the Board a memo suggesting that carriers are
violating the Warsaw Convention by asserting liability
limits much lower than those actually permitted by the
Convention. These limitations are expressed in terms of
gold and have always been converted to dollars by use of
the official rate of gold. Since there no longer is an
“official” price for gold in the U.S., the memorandum sug-
gested that the market value of gold has to be used in
converting the liability limits to dollars.

BIA and BDA have written memos responding to this
suggestion. Each response posed two major objections,
i.e., (1) that the recommendation is inconsistent with the
intention of the Warsaw signatories and (2) that it is
inconsistent with IMF amendments establishing ‘Special
Drawing Rights” tied to a basket of 16 currencies, rather
than gold, as the basic unit of account for converting cur-
rencies. The Board has not taken any action on the
recommendation.

II. Discussion

In 1929, when the Warsaw Convention was adopted,
currencies were either expressed in gold or easily con-
vertible to gold using an official rate. From 1933 to 1974,
gold ownership in the United States was legal only for
a small class of uses, such as jewelry-making and dentistry.
The price of gold in these transactions was dictated by the
government's official price, since jt was the government’s
policy to buy and sell gold at that rate. A private buyer
would thus not pay more than the official rate because he
could buy it from the government at that price and,

6la

conversely, a private seller would not accept less than the
official rate because he could sell it to the government for
that amount.

The drafters of the Warsaw Convention thus foresaw
no ambiguity in their use of gold as the unit of account
because at the time governments had an official rate of
gold which was easily discernible and virtually identical
to the market rate of gold, to the extent that a market
rate existed at all. Seeing no ambiguity, they never ad-
dressed the question of whether the official or market rate
should be used in converting the limits to national cur-
rencies. To determine how the limits should be converted
now that there is no official rate, one must attempt to
determine what is most consistent with the purpose of the
limitation on liability.

The primary purpose of the liability limits in the War-
saw Convention is the protection of carriers from unfore-
seeable and unlimited liability. At the time of the Con-
vention, it was feared that carriers would refuse to carry
passengers and or cargo unless they could measure the
scope of risk they were assuming. The limits were thus
intended to provide a measure of predictability for car-
riers so that they could operate free from the fear of
unlimited liability.

The use of gold as the unit of account was intended
“to avoid, as far as the limits are concerned, the effects
of devaluations which would result from having the limits
expressed in any local currency.” * The use of gold was

8H. Drion, Limitations of Liabilities in International Air Law
1954. p. 183. Other writers agree but add that the use of gold was
also intended to assure that damages awarded by different countries
would have a uniform value and to provide stability in terms of
the purchasing power represented by the limits, Bristow, “Gold
Franc—Replacement of Unit of Account,” LMCLQ 31 (1978), Asser,
“Golden Limitations of Liability in International Transport Con-
ventions and the Currency Crisis,” 5. J. Maritime L. and Com, 645
(1978-74), Norway, “Conversion from Poincare Franc to National

62a

thus seen as providing more stability than any national
currency could, further promoting the predictability the
limits were intended to provide. This was because na-
tional currencies were subject to devaluation by their
country, whereas the value of gold was not subject to
change as the result of a single country’s unilateral action.

There can be no doubt that use of the official rate of
gold produces results more consistent with these purposes
than use of the market rate. The official rate of gold, at
least in the United States, fluctuated only rarely. Even in
countries whose currencies were devalued more frequently,
the official rate would provide greater predictability and
stability than the market rate. This is especially true now,
since speculation has led to wildly fluctuating market
prices of gold.

Use of an official rate is supported by the approach
adopted in more recent Conventions, when the ambiguity
of expressing limits in terms of gold was more apparent.
Both the Convention Concerning Liability for Oil Pollu-
tion, signed in Brussels in 1969, and the Convention Re-
lating t» the Limitation of the Liability of the Owners of
Inland Navigation Vessels, signed in Geneva in 1973, ex-
pressly provided for the use of the official value of gold in
setting liability limits. Conversion by the official rate is
further bolstered by the fact that a majority of courts
have used it in converting Warsaw's limits after the
official and market rates began to diverge.’ ICAO also
passed a resolution in 1974 opposing the use of the market
price of gold in ~~nverting Warsaw’s limits, which pro-

Currency,” Presented to the 1974 meeting of ICAO’s Legal Com-
mittee, and Tobolewski, “The Special Drawing Right in Liability
Conventions: an Acceptable Solution?” 2 LMCLQ 169, 171 (1979).

‘The Legal Committee of ICAO, Resolution Concerning the Con-
version of Poincare Francs to National Currencies in the Warsaw
and Rome Conventions, 1974.

6 Tobolewski, “The Special Drawing Right in Liability Conven-
tions: An Acceptable Solution?” 2 LMCLQ 169, 171 (1979).

63a

vides a strong indication of how other participating
countries fee}.”

Since it appears that stable limits were of paramount
importance to the drafters of the Convention, basing them
on the market value of gold would be inconsistent with the
Convention. Since there is no longer an official rate of gold
in the United States, however, it is not entirely clear how
the limits should be converted.

In 1975, the Warsaw signatories attempted to deal with
the changes in the role of gold in international monetary
transactions. Their answer, embodied in the Montreal
Protocol, was the satin of Special Drawing Rights
(SDR’s) for gold as the Basis for conversion. The SDR is
a creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the agency which establishes the basic ground rules for
currency transactions between member countries. Use of
SDR’s by the Montreal signatories was presumably in-
tended to eliminate the confusion over how the Warsaw
limits should be converted from gold to national currencies.
With no official rate of gold and a fluctuating market rate
which would produce results at odds with the Convention’s
purposes, the Montreal signatories chose to abandon gold
in favor of SDR’s because SDR’s provided the stability
and ease of conversion which had attracted the Warsaw
signatories to choose gold as the unit of account.

The United States supported the SDR approach at
Montreal and signed the Montreal Protocol.’ If the Senate
had ratified the Protocol, the SDR approach would be law
and there would be no problem in determining Warsaw’s
limits. The Senate has not ratified the Protocol, however,
although it was submitted for ratification in January,
1977. Its failure to either ratify or reject the Protocol

* See footnote 4.

7 Fitzgerald, “The Four Montreal Protocols to Amend the Warsaw
Convention Regime Governing Internation Carriage by Air,” 42
J. Air L. & Comm. 273, 325, 329-30 (1976).

"ie

64a

makes determination of the proper conversion rate difficult
because (1) as explained above, use of the market rate of
gold produces results inconsistent with the Convention’s
purposes, (2) there is no current official rate of gold and
(3) the United States is obligated by international law
to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of the Montreal Protocol.*

To fulfill its obligation to observe, to the extent possible,
the requirements of both the Warsaw Convention and
Montreal Protocol, the Board has for the past five years
been engaging in a legal fiction. Unable to use the SDR
approach because Montreal has not been ratified and con-
strained from using the market price of gold because doing
so would defeat the object and purpose of both Montreal
and Warsaw, the Board has continued to convert Warsaw’s
limits based on the official rate of gold immediately pre-
ceding the elimination of all ties between gold and the
dollar. This approach produces the greatest degree of
stability possible since the dollar limits will remain con-
stant unless and until the United States reestablishes ties
between gold and the dollar.

We believe that the Board’s current course of action is
superior to any of the alternatives currently available.
Use of the last official rate of gold, however may at times
prevent passengers from recovering the full extent of dam-
ages caused by carriers.’ Carriers may no longer need

§ Article 18, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, requires
a country to refrain from acts which would defeat the purpose and
object of a treaty it has signed until it makes clear its intention
not to become a party. This obligation applies even when the treaty
was signed subject to ratification and has not yet been ratified.

® Thus, the notice of Warsaw's limits required by Parts 221.175
and 221.176 of the Board’s Regulations is based on conversion at
this rate.

© The limits are $9.07 per pound for checked luggage, $400 for
carry-on-bags and approximately $10,000 per passenger. The $10,000
limit is superseded, however, by a $75,000 limit adopted by carriers
in 1966.

65a

the protection of these low limits, given the maturation of
the aviation industry since 1929.

Because of the confusion inherent in converting War-
saw’s limits when there is no official rate of gold and the
equitable considerations raised by the low limits currently
in force, we believe the Board should develop a coherent
policy resolution of the questions, and then meet with the
Departments of Transportation and State to review this
problem. These agencies will be solely responsible for en-
forcing Warsaw in the future and have participated ac-
tively in formulating U.S. policy in this area in the past.
Pending resolution of this issue by the three agencies we
believe the Board should take no action which would dis-
turb the conversion formula now contained in sections
221.175 and 221.176 of the regulations.

/s/ John Golden
JOHN GOLDEN

Prepared by:

Steven Rothenberg
Ext. 3-5943

66a
APPENDIX I

Membership List of International Air Transport
Association (IATA)

(As of January 15, 1983)

Members who join IATA as potential intervenors
herein are designated by an asterisk.

ACTIVE Members

*Aer Lingus Teoranta
* Aerolineas Argentinas
* Aeronaves de Mexico S.A. (AEROMEXICO)
Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia S.A.
(AVIANCA)
Air Afrique
Air Algérie
Air Botswana Pty. Ltd.
Air Burundi
*Air Canada
*Air France
Air Gabon
Air Guinée
* Air-India
*Air Malawi Limited
Air Mali
Air Malta
*Air Mauritius
*Air New Zealand
Air Niugini
Air Pacific
Air Tanzania Corporation
Air Tungaru Corporation
Air UK
Air Vanuatu Limited
Air Zaire
Air Zimbabwe
*ALIA—The Royal Jordanian Airline (a wholly
owned subsidiary of Arab Wings)

67a

*ALITALIA—Linee Acree Italiano
American Airlines Inc.
Ariana Afghan Airlines Co. Ltd.
Austrian Airlines

Braniff International Inc.
*British Airways
*British Caledonian Airways Ltd.
Cameroon Airlines
Caribbean Air Cargo Company Ltd.
*Ceskoslovenske Aerolinie (CSA)
Compania Mexicana de Aviacion S.A. de C.V.
*CP Air
*Cruzeiro do Sul S.A.—Servicos Aéreos
Cyprus Airways Limited

*Deutsche Lufthansa A.C.

*Eastern Air Lines Inc.

*Egyptair

*E! Al Israel Airlines Limited

Empresa Consolidada Cubana de Aviacién

(CUBANA)

*Empreso Ecuatoriana de Aviacion
(ECUATORIANA)

*Ethiopian Airlines

Finnair OY
Flying Tiger Inc. ‘a wholly owned subsidiary
of Tiger International)

P.T. Garuda Indonesian Airways
Ghana Airways Corporation
Gulf Air Company G.S.C.

“IBERIA, Lincas Aéreas de Repata S.A.
Icelandair
Indian Airlines
*Iran Air, The Airline of the Islamic Republic
of Iran
*Iraqi Airways

68a

Jamahiriya Libyan Arab Airlines
*Japan Air Lines Co, Limited
Jugoslovenski Aerotransport (JAT)

Kenya Airways Ltd.
*KLM Roya! Dutch Airlines
*Kuwait Airways Corporation

LAM—Linhas A‘reas de Mocambique

Linea Aérea del Cobre Ltda. (LADECO)
Linea Aérea Nacional] de Chile (LAN-CHILE)
Linea Aéreas Constarricenses S.A. (LACSA)
Lloyd Aéreo Boliviano S.A. (LAB)

* Middle East Airlines Airliban
Nigeria Airways Limited
*Olympic Airways S.A.

Pakistan International Airlines Corp.
*Pan American World Airways, Inc.
*Philippine Airlines Inc.
Polskie Linie Lotnicze (LOT)
*Polynesian Airlines (Operations) Ltd.
Primeras Lineas Uruguayas de Navegacion
Aérea (PLUNA)

*Qantas Airways Limited

Royal Air Maroc
Royal Swazi Nations! Airways
Corporation Ltd.

*SABENA (Société anonyme belge d’explcitation
de la navigation a¢rienne)
*Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp.
*Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS)
Sierra Leone Airlines Limited
Solomon Islands Airways Limited (SOLAIR)
Somali Airlines
*South African Airways
Sudan Airways

69a

*Swiss Air Transport Co. Limited (SWISSAIR)
Syrian Arab Airlines

TAAG—Linhas Aereas de Angola

(Angola Airlines)
*TAP—Air Portugal

Trans-Mediterranean Airways S.A.R.L. (TMA)

Trans World Airlines Inc. ‘a wholly owned
subsidiary of Trans World Corp. )

Trinidad and Tobago ‘BWIA International)
Airways Corp.

Tunis Air

Turk Hava Yollari A.O. (Turkish Airlines)

*Union de Transports A¢riens |UTA)
United Airlines

*VARIG S.A. ‘Viacao A¢rea Rio-Crandense)
Venezolana Internacional! de Aviacion S.A.
(VIASA)

YEMENIA Yemen Airways Corporation
Zambia Airways Corporation Ltd.

ASSOCIATE Members

Aerolineas Cordillera Ltda. ‘AEROCOR)

Air Liberia

Ansett Airlines of Australia (a division of
Ansett Transport Industries Ltd.)

Aviacion y Comercio, S.A. (AVIACO)

Commercial] Airways ( Pty.) Ltd.
Douglas Airways Pty. Limited

*Eastern Provincial Airways Limited
East-West Airlines Limited

IPEC Aviation

Kenda!! Airlines (a division of Ansett Trans-
port Industries Ltd.)

70a

Masling Commuter Services Pty. Ltd.
Mount Cook Airlines (a division of the Mount
Cook Group Ltd.)

Namib Air (Pty.) Ltd.
Quebecair

TALAIR Pty. Limited

Trans Australia Airlines

Transbrasil S.A. Linhas A¢reas (Trans Brasil)
Trans-Jamaican Airlines Limited

Viacao Aérea Sao Paulo S.A. (VASP)

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_0288%3A06. Public record. Not legal advice.
