# Petition — Borough of Sayreville v. Middlesex County Utilities Authority

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_0255%3A1

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1983
- **Citation:** 460 U.S. 1023

## Text

8 2 sas 1 l 5 ah, Supreme Court, U.S,

FILED

NO. WAN ‘2 1993

ALEXANDER L. STEVAS
CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocrosrr Term, 1982

BOROUGH OF SAYREVILLE, JOHN E. CZERNIKOW-
SKI, RANIERO TRAVISANO, KENNETH W. BU-
CHANAN, SR., WILLIAM JACKSON, JOSEPH M.
KEENAN, JR., THOMAS R. KUBERSKI and FELIX
WISNIEWSKI, :

Petitioners,

vs.

MIDDLESEX COUNTY UTILITIES AUTHORITY and
WILLIAM FRENCH SMITH, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.,

Respondents.

—- — —————————ee

———— —

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
THIRD CIRCUIT

WruuM S. Greensere,
Counsel of Record,
GREENBERG, Kevuey & Prior,
Attorneys for Petitioners,
196 West State Street,
Trenton, New Jersey 08608.
(609) 989-9800

James F’. ScHwerin,
On the Petition.

Adams Press Corp., 50 Park Place, Newark, New Jersey 07102—(201) 623-8611

Questions Presented

1. Whether the Tenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution is violated by the federal government requir-
ing a municipality to enact a particular tax.

Parties to the Proceedings

Borough of Sayreville; John E. Czernikowski, Mayor;
Raniero Travisano, Kenneth W. Buchanan, Sr., William
Jackson, Joseph M. Keenan, Jr., Thomas R. Kubkerski,
Felix Wisniewski, as members of the Borough Council of
the Borough of Sayreville, petitioners-defendants-third
party plaintiffs.

Middlesex County Utilities Authority, respondent-plain-
tiff.

William French Smith, United States Attorney General;
Anne M. Gorsuch, Administrator, United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency; Jacqueline Schafer, Regional
Administrator, Region II, United States Environmental
Protection Agency and W. Hunt Dumont, United States
Attorney, respondents-third party defendants.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions PRESENTED i

Parties TO THE PROCEEDINGS

TasLeE OF AUTHORITIES

Oprnions BeELow

CONSTITUTIONAL Provisions INVOLVED

ii
Vv
2
JURISDICTION 2
2
3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Reasons ror GRANTING THE Writ—Certiorar: should
be granted to determine whether the Tenth Amend-
ment is violated when the federal government re-
quires a municipality or other unit of local gov-
ernment to enact a tax to raise monies not needed
by the municipality 5

ConcLUsION 18

APPENDIX:

A—Opinion of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit la

B—Judgment of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit 20a

C—Order of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Cireuit Denying Motion for
Stay of Mandate and Affirming Judgment
of the District Court 22a

D—Transcript of Opinion of Debevoise, U.S.D.J.,
dated November 16, 1981 24a

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

E—Order of Debevoise, U.S.D.J., Dismissing the
Third Party Complaint on Summary Judg-
ment and for Remand to the Superior Court
of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Middle-
sex County, dated December 1, 1981 ............

PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Vv

PAGR
Cases Cited
Table of Authorities
Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), va-
cated and remanded per curiam, 431 U.S. 99
(1977) 16,17
Charles C. Steward Machine Company v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548, 57 S.Ct. 883, 81 L.Ed. 1279 (1937) ........ 6
City of New Brunswick v. Borough of Milltown, 519
F. Supp. 878 (D.N.J. 1981), aff’d 686 F.2d 120
(3rd Cir. 1982) 12
City of Sault Ste. Marie v. Andrus, 458 F.Supp. 465
(D.D.C. 1978) 10
District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded per curiam snh
nom EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977)... 16
FERC v. Mississippi, —— U.S. ——, 102 S.Ct. 2126,
72 L.Ed. 2d 532 (1982) 10, 17
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 95 S.Ct. 1792,
44 L.Ed. 2d 363 (1975) 6, 16
Greater St. Lous Health Systems Agency v. Teas-
dale, 506 F.Supp. 23 (E.D. Mo. 1980) ...................... 15
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Association, Inc., 452 U.S. 265, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69
L.Ed. 2d 1 (1981) 7, 8,17
Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall 71, 19 L.Ed. 101
(1869) 8, 10

Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 94 S.Ct. 786, 39 L.Ed.
2d 1 (1974) 7

vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE
Maryland vy. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975), va-
cated and remanded per curiam sub nom EPA v.
Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) 15-17
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 888 S.Ct. 2017, 20
SX FR So 6, 16
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96
S.Ct. 2465, 49 L.Ed, 2d 245 (1976) 20. 5, 6, 8 16, 17
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1, 101 8.Ct. 1531 ..7, 10, 11, 18

Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974) 16

Snow v. Dixon, 66 Til, 2d 443, 363 N.E. 2d 1052
(1977), cert. den. 434 U.S. 939, 98 S.Ct. 429, 52
L.Ed. 2d 298 10

State of North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano,
445 F.Supp. 532 (18.D.N.C. 1977), aff’d 435 U.S, 962,
98 S.Ct. 1597 (1978) 14, 15

State of Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service
Commission, 330 U.S. 127, 67 S.Ct. 544, 91 L.Ed.

794 (1947) 14
State Water Control Board v. Train, 559 1'.2d 921
(4th Cir. 1977) 12,13

Texas Landowners Rights Association v. Harris,
453 F.Supp. 1025 (D.D.C, 1978), aff’d 598 F.2d 311
(D.C, Cir.) cert. den. 444 U.S. 927 (1979)... 15

United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 56 S.Ct. 421,
80 L.Ed. 567 (1936) 6

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES vii

PAGE
United States Constitution Cited
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 6
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 5
Re ID cevisniccsnssscentsssiniastnnensstnssiones i, 2, 4, 7, 10, 15-17
Statutes Cited

Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA):

See. 204(b)(1) ...... 4

See. 301(b) (1) . 1
18 U.S.C. (Hatch Act):

See. 61 a . 14
28 U.S.C.:

See. 1254(1) 2

See. 1441(a)

Sy EN casiitaciehaeseisdebiebcibieicaiee
29 U.S.C. (Fair Labor Standards Act):

See. 201 5
33 U.S.C.:

See. 1284(b) (1) 4

See. 1311(b) (1) . 12

42 U.S.C. (National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act, 1974) :

See. 300k 14

Secs. 4001-4128 (National Flood Insurance Pro-
gram) 15

NO.

IN THE

Supreme Cowt of the United States

October ‘erm, 1982

in
see os

BOROUGH OF SAYREVILLE, JOHN E. CZERNIKOW-
SKI, RANIERO TRAVISANO, KENNETH W. BU-
CHANAN, SR., WILLIAM JACKSON, JOSHPH M.
KEENAN, JR., THOMAS R. KUBERSKI and FELIX
WISNIEWSKI,

Petitioners,

vs.

MIDDLESEX COUNTY UTILITIES AUTHORITY and
WILLIAM FRENCH SMITH, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
THIRD CIRCUIT

Petitioners, Borough of Sayreville, John E. Czernikow-
ski, Raniero Travisano, Kenneth W. Buchanan, Sr., Wil-
liam Jackson, Joseph M. Keenan, Jr., Thomas R. Kuberski,
and Felix Wisniewski respectfully pray that a writ of
certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit entered in this pro-
ceeding on October 12, 1982,

Opinions Below

Petitioners request review of a portion of the decision of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cireuit
reported at 690 F.2d 358 (1982).

The decision of the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey was a bench opinion and unre-
ported. The transcript of the District Court’s opinion is
reproduced in the Appendix at p. 24a, infra, and the Judg-
ment Order at p. 3la, infra.

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Cireuit was entered on October 12, 1982, This
petition for certiorari has been filed within 90 days of the
date of said judgment. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked
pursuant to 28 U.S.C, §1254(1), which states:

“cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by
the Supreme Court...

(1) by writ of certiorari granted upon a petition of
any party to any civil or criminal case, before or
after rendition of judgment or decree... .”

Constitutional Provisions Involved

The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:

“The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to States respectively, or to the people.”

Statement of the Case

This is an action instituted by the Middlesex County
Utilities Authority (MCUA) in New Jersey Superior Court
alleging breach of contract by defendant Borough of Sayre-
ville and seeking injunctive relief to compel action by the
individual defendants in their capacity as the voting mem-
bers of the Borough Council with authority to enact ordi-
nances, It was alleged that the Borough had breached a
contract with MCUA under which it was required to obey
all pertinent federal regulations necessary for MCUA to
obtain funding for the building of a waste water treatment
facility which would handle the sewerage from Sayreville
and numerous other municipalities in the region.

Defendants filed a third party Complaint against Wil-
liam French Smith, Attorney General of the United States,
and various other federal defendants alleging that the re-
quirement that recipients of federal funds utilize a special
tax solely for the purpose of raising the funds needed to
meet its obligations to provide adequate funding for the
operation of a waste water facility built with federal monies
was unconstitutional in that it violated the Tenth Amend-
ment reservation of powers to the States. The third party
federal defendants then had the matter removed to the
United States District Court for New Jersey pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §1441(a) and 28 U.S.C. §1446.

The Borough of Sayreville has never contested its obli-
gation to pay its fair share of MCUA’s costs of operating
the facility. Unlike other municipalities, Sayreville has
more than adequate funds available to it from already ex-
isting taxes to meet its obligation in full without imposing
additional, unneeded levies on its citizens, and has in fact
always made its payments in a timely fashion. Neverthe-
less, although the administrator of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) in 1976 approved MCUA’s grant

4

application, four years later, after advancing 80% of the
promised funds, EPA suspended further payments, The
reason given was that Sayreville and one other munici-
pality serviced by MCUA, Milltown, had not adopted ordi-
nances providing for user charges as per 33 U.S.C, §1284
(b)(1) [§204(b)(1) of the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act (FWPCA)]}.

Both the federal third party defendants and plaintiff
MCUA made motions for summary judgment in the United
States District Court. Judge Debevoise granted the third
party defendants’ motion, upholding the constitutionality of
the FWPCA requirement and thereby dismissing the case
as to them, However, he refused to rule on the motion by
MCUA and remanded that portion of the case to New Jer-
sey Superior Court. Judgment was subsequently rendered
in the New Jersey court requiring Sayreville to pass the
appropriate ordinance, and the Appellate Division of Su-
perior Court affirmed. Sayreville has filed a petition for
certification with the New Jersey Supreme Court.

On appeal from that portion of the District Court Order
granting summary judgment in favor of the third party
defendants, the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment of the
District Court.”

* Apart from the Tenth Amendment argument presented by this
petition, Sayreville also raised the claim of denial of equal protection
of the law. That claim is not being urged before this Court.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Certiorari should be granted to determine whether
the Tenth Amendment is violated when the federal
government requires a municipality or other unit of
local government to enact a tax to raise monies not
needed by the municipality,

It is well settled that Congress is not in possession of
unbridled authority to exercise its powers in a manner
which will unduly interfere with powers reserved to the
States under the Tenth Amendment. That limitation has
been clearly expressed by this Court in its decision in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S.Ct.
2465, 49 L.Ed, 2d 245 (1976). At issue therein was the
constitutionality of 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §201 et seq. In those amend-
ments, Congress extended minimum wage and maximum
hour provisions to virtually all public employees of the
States and their political subdivisions. The amendments
were passed as an exercise of Congress’ powers granted
by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, Article I, See-
tion 8, Cl. 3.

The Court, recognizing that the Commerce Clause is “a
grant of plenary authority to Congress,” nonetheless fur-
ther agreed with the appellants in National League of Cities
that the commerce power is limited by other affirmative
expressions of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 96
S.Ct. at 2469:

This Court has never doubted that there are limits
upon the power of Congress to override state sover-
eignty, even when exercising its otherwise plenary
powers to tax or to regulate commerce which are
conferred by Art. I of the Constitution. 96 S.Ct. at
2470.

The Court specifically rejected dicta from United States
v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 56 S.Ct. 421, 80 Lied, 567
(1936) which totally denied the authority of a State to chal-
lenge an exercise of Commerce Clause authority. 96 8.Ct.
at 2475-2476. This led the Court to overrule its earlier deci-
sion in Maryland vy. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 888 S.Ct, 2017, 20
L.Ed, 2d 1020 (1968) which had upheld extension of the
Fair Labor Standards Act to employees of state hospitals,
institutions and schools,

In Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 95 S.Ct. 1792, 44
L.Ed, 2d 363 (1975), it was stated:

While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized
as a ‘truism,’ stating merely that ‘all is retained
which has not been surrendered,’ United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S, 100, 124, 61 8.Ct, 451, 462, 885 L.Ed,
609 (1941), it is not without significance, The
Amendment expressly declares the constitutional
policy that Congress may not exercise power in a
fashion that impairs the States’ integrity or their
ability to function effectively in a federal system...
95 S.Ct. at 1795-1796, n.7.

Because the Court in National League of Cities concluded
that the amendments impaired the ability of the States to
effectively function in a federal system, they were held to
not be within the authority granted Congress by the Com-
merce Clause, The Court expressly declined to render an
opinion as to whether such limitation might be imposed
under the authority granted to Congress as the Spending
Power, Article I, Section 8, Clause 1. 96 S.Ct. at 2474, n.
17. However, other decisions have explicitly recognized
that the Spending Power is also subject to limitations. In
Charles C, Steward Machine Company v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548, 57 S.Ct. 883, 81 L.Ed, 1279 (1937), the Court upheld
provisions of the Social Security Act under which in States

7

choosing to enact unemployment compensation legislation,
a state taxpayer contributing to an unemployment fund
may receive credit against federal taxation, Although find-
ing that there was no contravention of the Tenth Amend-
ment in that case, the Court did declare that it would be
possible for Congress to enact taxing legislation designed
to stimulate or discourage certain conduct which would un-
duly intrude upon the powers reserved to the States and
exceed the bounds of power granted to Congress, 57 S.Ct.
at 892, That expression of limitation on the power of
Congress has been repeatedly reiterated by the Court, Lau
v. Nichols, 414 U.S, 563, 94 S.Ct. 786, 39 L.Ed, 2d 1 (1974);
Pennhurst State School and Hospital vy, Halderman, 451
U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct, 1531, 1540 n, 13,

It is thus apparent that whether the challenged portions
of the FWPCA be deemed to have been enacted under the
Commerce Clause or under the Spending Power, they are
subject to challenge as being beyond the proper boundaries
of either of those powers as granted to Congress in the
Constitution. It is submitted that by requiring a munici-
pality to enact a particular form of tax, in this instance a
user fee, Congress and the EPA, through its regulations
implementing the statute, have impermissibly infringed
upon the rights reserved to the States by the Tenth
Amendment,

Recently, this Court articulated the standards to be ap-
plied in determining whether federal legislation violates
the Tenth Amendment in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min-
ing and Reclamation Asscciation, Inc., 452 U.S. 265, 101
§.Ct, 2352, 69 L.Ed, 2d 1 (1981). These requirements were
enunciated :

First, there must be a showing that the challenged
statute regulates the ‘States as States.’ Second, the
federal regulation must address matters that are in-

8

disputably ‘attributes of state sovereignty.’ And,
third, it must be apparent that the States’ compli-
ance with the federal law would directly impair their
ability ‘to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional functions,’

101 S.Ct. at 2366 (citations omitted),

All of these requirements were taken by the Court from
language in the National League of Cities decision,

In its decision below, the Third Cireuit did not really dis-
pute that Sayreville had met the first two of the Hodel
requirements :

Because the challenged condition relates to the ways
in which Sayreville and other affected state sub-
entities are to raise and allocate revenues, it argu-
ably addresses ‘States as States’ and in relation to
‘attributes of state sovereignty.’

690 F.2d at 364,

That the user fee requirement regulates the “States as
States,” and addresse “attributes of state sovereignty,”
seems beyond challenge. The power to tax has been re-
served to the States without any limit except those ex-
pressed in the Constitution such as lack of power to tax
exports. In National League of Cities, the Court had ocea-
sion to cite to Lane County vy. Oregon, 7 Wall, 71, 19 L.Ed.
101 (1869) for its statement on the federal structure of our
govenment, That decision also establishes that the power
to tax is one of the powers contemplated by the Tenth
Amendment as having been reserved to the States.

Now, to the existence of the States, themselves, ne-
cessary to the existence of the United States, the
power of taxation is indispensable, It is an essen-

tial function of government. It was exercised by the
Colonies; and when the Colonies became States, both
before and after the formation of the Confederation,
it was exercised by the new governments. Under the
Articles of Confederation the Government of the
United States was limited in the exercise of this
power to requisitions upon the States, while the whole
power of direct and indirect taxation of persons and
property, whether by taxes on polls, or duties on im-
ports, or duties on internal production, manufac-
ture or use, was acknowledged to belong exclusively
to the States, without any other limitation than that
of non-interference with certain treaties made by
Congress. The Constitution, it is true, greatly
changed this condition of things. It gave the power
to tax, both directly and indirectly, to the National
Government, and subject to the one prohibition of
any tax upon exports and to the conditions of uni-
formity in respect to indirect and of proportion in
respect to direct taxes, the power was given without
any express reservation. On the other hand, no power
to tax exports or imports, except for a single pur-
pose and to an insignificant extent, or to lay any
duty on tonnage, was permitted to the States, In
respect, however, to property, business and persons,
within their respective limits, their power of taxa-
tion remained and remains entire. It is, indeed, a
concurrent power, and in the case of a tax on the
same subject by both governments, the claim of the
United States, as the supreme authority, must be
preferred; but with this qualification it is absolute.
The extent to which it shall be exercised, the sub-
jects upon which it shall be exercised, and the mode
in which it shall be exercised, are all equally within
the discretion of the Legislatures to which the States

10

commit the exercise of the power. That discretion is
restrained only by the will of the people expressed
in the state constitutions or through elections, and
by the condition that it must not be so used as to bur-
den or embarrass the operations of the National

_ Government, There is nothing in the Constitution
which contemplates or authorizes any direct. abridge-
ment of this power by national legislation.

7 Wall. 76-77 (emphasis added).

The conclusions drawn in the Lane County decision have
never been overturned, and in fact recent court decisions
have reiterated that the power to tax is protected by the
Tenth Amendment. In City of Sault Ste. Marie v. Andrus,
458 F.Supp. 465 (D.D.C. 1978), it was held that “the power
to levy a property tax is one of those powers reserved to
the states by the Tenth Amendment” and that such power
may be delegated to a municipality. 458 F.Supp. at 473.
In Snow v. Dixon, 66 Til. 2d 448, 363 NE 2d 1052 (1977),
cert. den. 434 U.S. 939, 98 S.Ct. 429, 52 L.Ed. 2d 298, it was
recognized that matters of state taxation are reserved to
the States by the Tenth Amendment and are unrestricted
if not otherwise unconstitutional. 362 NE 2d at 1062.

The Third Cireuit rejected Sayreville’s claim on the basis
of its conclusion that there was no interference with the
freedom to “structure integral operations in areas of tra-
ditional governmental functions” because Sayreville need
not apply for federal funds. 690 F.2d at 364. This con-
clusion was reached in reliance upon the generally ac-
cepted rule that the federal government may fix the terms
on which it disperses money to the States. Pennhurst
State School and [Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101
8.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1981); FERC v. Mississippi,
— US. —, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 72 L.Ed. 2d 532 (1982).
It is submitted that while the above cited cases do in-

IL

dicate that Congress may normally attach conditions to
grants of federal money, they also recognize that such
power is not without limits, and this case presents facts
which call for an application of those limits.

In the Pennhurst decision, Justice Rehnquist noted the
limits on Congress’ Spending Power:

. .« legislation enacted pursuant to the Spending
Power is much in the nature of a contract: in re-
turn for federal funds, the States agree to comply
with federally imposed conditions. The legitimacy
of Congress’ power to legislate under the Spend-
ing Power thus rests on whether the State volun-
tarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘con-
tract.’ 101 S.Ct. at 1539.

The key word for the purpose of this case is “volun-
tarily.” It is submitted that the Third Circuit erred
in accepting at face value the argument that it is en-
tirely up to municipalities to reject federal funds or ac-
cept them and therefore agree to comply with the user
fee requirements. In Pennhurst State School and the
cases cited therein, the statutes in question involved the
government offering money to States who met certain con-
ditions as an incentive to meet those conditions. How-
ever, if the States chose not to accept the money, they
were under no obligations. That is not the case under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Theoretically, a
State or local governmental entity could avoid the need
for instituting a user charge by not seeking federal grant
funds for construction of treatment works. This pos-
sibility exists in theory only and is in no way representa-
tive of reality.

Totally apart from whether federal grant funds are
sought, this statute imposes obligations on States and

municipalities which must be met. In State Water Con-
trol Board vy. Train, 559 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1977), it was
argued that publicly owned sewage treatment plants which
have not received any federal grants need not meet ef-
fluent limitations imposed by §301(b)(1) of the FWPCA
[83 U.S.C. §1311(b)(1)]. That notion was completely
rejected by the court.

. effluent limitations are, on their face, uncon-
ditional; and no other provision indicates any link
between their enforceability and the timely receipt
of federal assistance.

559 F.2d at 924.

This conclusion was echoed by Judge Debevoise in City
of New Brunswick v. Borough of Milltown, 519 F. Supp.
878 (D.N.J. 1981), aff’d 686 F. 2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1982):

Its [MCUA] obligation to comply with the treat-
ment and discharge requirements of the Clean Water
Act is completely independent of the receipt of any
financial assistance from the government.

519 F.Supp. at 885.

The court in State Water Control Board went on to
discuss the difficulties in financing construction of needed
water treatment facilities:

To assist in financing the facilities necessary to ac-
complish the effluent reduction mandated by Section
301, Title II of the Act establishes a program of
federal grants to states, municipalities and intergov-
ernmental agencies for the construction of publicly
owned treatment plants. Section 202(a) provides
that the amount of any grant made under this pro-
gram shall be 75% of approved construction costs;

13

and Section 207 authorizes the appropriation of $18
billion for fiscal years 1973 through 1975 for such
grants.

Unfortunately, however, the grant program’s ef-
fectiveness in facilitating compliance with the 1977
effluent limitations has been limited. Grants have
not been available for many construction projects
because the money authorized by Section 207 is in-
sufficient to finance 75% of the cost of every needed
sewage treatment plant in the country. Moreover,
disbursement of the authorized funds has been sub-
stantially delayed by Presidential impoundment and
by the time consumed by administrative processing
of grant applications. These problems, together with
the fiscal difficulties now confronting most State
and local governments, have made it economically
impossible for many localities to accomplish the
required effluent reductions by the 1977 deadline.
559 F.2d at 923-924 (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).

It is clear from the above quotation that it has been diffi-
cult if not impossible for many States and municipalities
to meet the requirements imposed by the FWPCA even with
federal grant money, and so to argue that it is realistic for
Sayreville, MCUA or any other State or local government
to comply with the statute without applying for grant
money is to ignore all notions of practicality. The FWPCA
simply does not allow a municipality such as the Borough
of Sayreville to evade the currently existing clean water
standards in the statute by declining to request federal
funds.

Given the conclusion in the State Water Control Board
decision, it would be grossly unfair to apply the doctrine
that the federal government may freely tie conditions to

14

the disbursement of federal money. The case most gener-
ally relied upon for that proposition is State of Oklahoma
v. United States Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127,
67 S.Ct. 544, 91 L.Ed. 794 (1947). At issue therein was
the constitutionality of the Hatch Act, 18 U.S.C. §61 et seq.
Specifically questioned was the provision which barred any
officer or employee of a State or locality whose principal
employment was in connection with an activity financed in
whole or part by loans or grants from the United States
from taking an active part in political management or poli-
tical campaigns. There was a total lack of any affirmative
obligations placed on a recipient of federal funds, Okla-
homa was totally free to reject federal funds and keep the
particular employee involved as Highway Commissioner.
The only penalty was the loss of highway grant funds equiv-
alent to the salary payments to this employee. That situ-
ation is a far ery from deciding whether or not to meet
the conditions for receipt of federal funds needed to com-
ply with binding requirements which involve the expendi-
ture of untold millions.

Other cases which may be cited in support of this prin-
ciple are equally distinguishable. State of North Carolina
ex. rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F.Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C.
1977), aff’d 435 U.S. 962, 98 S.Ct. 1597 (1978) dealt with
the National Health Planning and Resources Development
Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §300k et seq. That statute made fed-
eral funds available to States which agreed to establish a
health planning and development agency to administer a
state health program requiring usage of a certificate of
need. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that such a
program could not be implemented in North Carolina with-
out an amendment to the state constitution. North Carolina
then challenged the statute arguing that it was being co-
erced to comply. It did not challenge the general rule that
the federal government may attach conditions to the grant-

15

ing of funds, but argued that the need to amend its state
constitution constituted coercion “under the unique circum-
stances applicable to it.” 445 F.Supp. at 535, The court re-
jected this argument noting that its acceptance would al-
low states to evade otherwise valid conditions by obtaining
a state court decision similar to the one in North Carolina
thus leaving enforcement of the conditions to the quirks of
local law. What is significant is that the federal statute
was one devoid of any compulsion in the form of action
that a State must take even if it chooses to do without any
federal funding. See Greater St. Louis Health Systems
Agency v. Teasdale, 506 F.Supp. 23 (E.D. Mo. 1980).

Texas Landowners Rights Association v. Harris, 453 F.
Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1978), aff’d 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.)
cert, den, 444 U.S. 927 (1979) dealt with the National Flood
Insurance Program, 42 U.S.C. 44001-4128. Under that stat-
ute, federal assistance for a program of flood insurance
would be denied unless localities participated in the federal
program, which meant adoption of local flood plain manage-
ment measures. The argument against the constitutionality
of Uiat statute amounted to no more than the statement that
the plaintiffs would lose more by not participating than
they would gain by becoming part of the program and so
they were being unlawfully coerced. Once again, the stat-
ute made no demands on any local goverment which chose
to forego receipt of a federal grant.

Nor can reliance be placed on the fact that protection of
the environment is an important and legitimate federal con-
cern. In the past, when the EPA has sought to order States
to establish particular programs to meet federal specifica-
tions, three different Circuit Courts, all citing to the Tenth
Amendment, found such action unconstitutional. Maryland
v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated and re-
manded per curiam sub nom EPA vy. Brown, 431 U.S. 99

16

(1977) ; District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded per curiam sub nom
EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); Brown v. EPA, 521
F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded per curiam,
431 U.S. 99 (1977).* The only contrary decision, Pennsyl-
vania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974), relied on the
decision in Maryland v. Wirtz, supra, which was overruled
in National League of Cities.

In Brown v, EPA, it was accepted by all parties and the
court that Congress had full power to regulate air pollu-
tion, and from that the EPA argued that the power existed
to direct a State to incorporate in its laws regulations
designed to control air pollution properly promulgated by
the Administrator of EPA. This was rejected on the
grounds that the Commerce Power does not allow Congress
to require a State to undertake governmental tasks. Re-
liance was placed on the language in Fry v. United States,
supra, regarding the limitations on congressional power
expressed in the Tenth Amendment. See 521 F.2d at 837-
842.

In considering the same issue in District of Columbia
v. Train, the District of Columbia Circuit addressed the
language in Fry regarding the ‘fashion” in which Congress
exercises power that has been granted to it by the Con-
stitution:

In other words, the Tenth Amendment may pre-
vent Congress from selecting methods of regulating

* The three decisions vacated and remanded in EPA v. Brown
were all on the basis of the controversies having become moot
due to the repeal of certain EPA regulations and the concession
that those remaining in controversy would be invalid unless modi-
fied.

17

which are ‘drastic’ invasions of state sovereignty
where less intrusive approaches are available.

521 F.2d at 994.

Requiring a State to enact statutes and regulations was
found to be a “drastic” intrusion on state sovereignty.

In State of Maryland v. EPA, the court technically did
not reach the constitutional issue, premising its decision
on a statutory construction that EPA lacked the authority
to require a State to pass legislation. Nonetheless, Brown
v. EPA was cited approvingly, and commenting upon
EPA regulations requiring Maryland to adopt statutes
and regulations, the court said that “we are of opinion
their constitutional validity is very doubtful at the very
best . ..” 530 F.2d at 226.

In his concurring opinion in National League of Cities,
Justice Blackmun indicated that an overriding federal
interest such as environmental protection may outweigh
what would otherwise be an impermissible infringement
on the powers reserved by the Tenth Amendment. It is
submitted that the three Circuit Court decisions which
reached this Court in EPA v. Brown, supra, subsequent
to National League of Cities, indicate that interest in
environmental protection is not enough to allow the federal
government to impose on the States in violation of the
Tenth Amendment. While in Hodel this Court cited to
Justice Blackmun’s statement, it did so only for the gen-
eral proposition that some federal interests might justify
State submission notwithstanding the Tenth Amendment.
See 101 S.Ct. at 2366, n. 29. As Justice O’Connor noted
in her dissent in FERC v. Mississippi, the Court has not
yet explored the circumstances that might justify an ex-
ception to the standards set forth in Hodel, 102 S.Ct. at
2147, n. 4.

18

A writ of certiorari should issue so that the Court can
give content to Justice Rehnquist’s indication in the Penn-
hurst case that there are limits to the constitutional ability
of Congress to place conditions on a grant of federal
funds. This case presents facts which call for the Court
to indicate to the lower federal courts that they must not
automatically uphold all Congressional action simply be-
cause it deals with federal funds.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully urged
that this Court issue a writ of certiorari to review the
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

WituuM S. Greensera,
Counsel of Record,
Greenserc, Keviey & Prior,
Attorneys for Petitioners,
196 West State Street,
Trenton, New Jersey 08608.
(609) 989-9800

Dated: January 6, 1983

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_0255%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
