# Petition — Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, SA v. Hall > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_0228%3A01 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition - **Published:** January 1, 1984 - **Citation:** 466 U.S. 408 ## Text Supreme Court, U.S. FILED No. —— ALEXANDER L. STEVAS _ SE IN THE Supreme Court of the Gnited States OCTOBER TERM, 1982 HELICOPTEROS NACIONALES DE Co.Lomsia, S.A., Petitioner, Vv. ELIZABETH HALL, et al., Respondents. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS THOMAS J. WHALEN Counsel for the Petitioner Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. 1030 15th St., N.W. Suite 720 Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 289-0500 A PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTCN, D.C. IN THE Supreme Court of the United States OCTOBER TERM, 1982 No. HELICOPTEROS NACIONALES De CoLomaia, S.A.. Petitioner, Vv. ELIZABETH HALL, ef ai., Respondents. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS Questions Presented 1. Whether a Texas Court constitutionally may assert in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident Col- ombian corporation where the plaintiffs’ wrongful death actions arose out of a helicopter accident in Peru and where the Colombian corporation’s sole contacts with Texas involved equipment purchases from a third party Texas corporation and a single contract discussion with decedents’ employer in Texas and where plaintiffs’ causes of action did not arise out of these contacts. 2. Whether the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment are violated by the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident ii alien corporation under circumstances in which a nonresi- dent United States corporation could not constitutionally be subjected to jurisdiction. ' ' The following persons and entities were parties before the Texas Supreme Court: Elizabeth Hall, individually and as next friend of Delbert Hall, a minor; Susan Carol Porton; Harve Porton and Verda Ola Porton, individually and as next friends of Jeffery Taylor Porton, a minor; Naomi Lewallen, individually and as next friend of Ginger Lewallen, a minor; Gary Lewallen; Louise C. Moore (appellants); and Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. (appellee). Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. (hereinafter Helicol), is a Colombian Corporation. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia (known as Avianca) owns approximately 94 percent of Helicol’s capit- al stock. The remainder of its stock is held by Aerovias Corporacion de Viajes and four South American individuals. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page QUESTIONS PRESENTED ..........cccccccccsscsecvese i EES EP POL ET POOLEY ETRE EEC TT ETE Ce l Gs i cue cde aae ease ae peateews aveenes s 2 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED ........eeeee05 2 PATERMENT OF THE CAGR occ cc cccccccccec: cascncssan 2 Reasons FOR GRANTING WRIT 2... cccccccesescccecces 6 I. II. ITI. THE DeEcIsION OF THE TEXAS SUPREME CowuRT Con. FLICTS WITH THE DECISION OF THE CouRT iN PER. KINS v. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED MINING Co., 342 U.S. 4387 (1952), AND Is Contrary To THE PRINCc!.- PLES OF IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION OVER NONRESI- DENT CORPORATE DEFENDANTS LaID Down By THE Court IN INTERNATIONAL SHOE CoO. v. WASHINGTON, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), AND WorLD-WIDE VOLKSWAGEN Corp. v. Woopson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) ......... Tue HoLpinc Or THE Texas SUPREME CouRT THAT AN ALIEN NONRESIDENT CORPORATION WAS SUBJECT To THE IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION OF A STATE Court Because Or Its PuRCHASE OF AMERICAN Propucts IN THE Forum StaTE Is CoNTRARY TO THE DECISION OF THE Court IN ROSENBERG BROTHERS & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923), AND PRESENTS AN IMPORTANT QUESTION HAVING WIDE- RANGING IMPLICATIONS For UNITED STATES TRADE IR ee es Sea anhanies heen a6 THE DECISION OF THE TEXAS SUPREME CouRT Con. FLICTS WITH DEcISIONS OF THE HIGHEST CouRTs OF SEVERAL STATES AND DEMONSTRATES THE NEED For FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF FEDERAL DUE PROCESS As It RELaTEs To JN PERSONAM JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENT CORPORATIONS .......eceeeeseeees 14 iv Table of Contents Continued Page IV. THE PRINCIPLE THAT AN ALIEN NONRESIDENT CORPORATION Is Not ENTITLED To THE SAME RIGHTS Or FEDERAL DUE Process AND EQUAL PROTECTION Or THE Laws As ARE UNITED STATES CORPORATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF AMENABILITY To Su!T IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS PRESENTS AN IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION WHICH SHOULD BE ReE- SOLVED By THE Court IN THE INTEREST OF THE FOREIGN COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES ..... 18 DMN, es eda ccs. co uu be hokde ite mb binae ewe ae 20 Vv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES: Page Baxter v. Mouzavires, 434 A.2d 988 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1006 (1982) ........ccceceeeees 17 Chelsea House Publishers v. Nicholstone Book a Inc., 621 S.W.2d 560 (Tenn. 1981), cert. denied, 455 CT OR COD vnndcnccdvacceseauNoewuswmassere 17 Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959) 16 oo v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. l Pl en cawokerice sue dewsbsasorbekeer shennan International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (ERE ceccdvash Cocknncnsseuseesnensken 7, 8, 12, 18 Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) .... 7, 11, 18 Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construc- tion Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, AAB'U.S. BOT CRGBD) 6 oacn ct ceccccasccccesecvenss 17 Marshall Egg Transport Co. v. Bender Goodman Co., 275 Minn. 534, 148 N.W. 2d 161 (1967) .......... i6 Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. OT CED code ccunceacuvennuscsucares 7, 9, 10, 12, 13 Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982) ........eeeeeees 1? Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 444 F.2d 745 (4th ir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 948 (1971) .......... 10 Rosenberg Brothers & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. GRE CISD ik nccpvccs cucvautancevadducousenpens 14, 15 — v. Parke, Davis & Co., 423 F.2d 584 (1st Cir. DED vebadcunes aneensetecdseveeugspanennonnakun Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) .....- eee eens 8 U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W. 2d 760 Cree STE co cvcovascctcavketseccsnaeeepeanene World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 GED CLG eh acavaccecdevancsabeshekenwun (ae me ae CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTES: if Ge OW eb Ren aera 2 , Bie Come bh. > Ts. | Pe ey 2 Tex. Rev. Stat. Ann. art. 2031b (1982) ...........05- 5 vi Table of Authorities Continued RULEs: i cn POE «cccsvicssbecdteeecesvanene 13, 15 OTHER AUTHORITIES: Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 47 (1971) . 9 IN THE Supreme Court of the Gnited States OCTOBER TERM, 1982 a HELICOPTEROS NACIONALES DE CoLomsia, S.A., Petitioner, Vv. ELIZABETH HALL, et al., Respondents. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS Opinions Below The final opinion of the Supreme Court of Texas appears in the appendix to this petition with the concurr- ing opinion of Justices Campbell and McGee and the dis- senting opinion of Justice Pope in which Chief Justice Greenhill and Justice Barron joined. (App. pp. la-14a, 32a-45a). Also appearing in the appendix are the initial opinion of the Supreme Court of Texas which was with- drawn on respondents’ motion for reconsideration (App. pp. 46a-57a), the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals of the State of Texas (App. pp. 63a-71a), and the directive of the trial court, the District Court of Harris County, Texas, for an order denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss on grounds of lack of in personam jurisdiction. (App. pp. 72a-73a). The final opinion of the Supreme Court of Texas is reported at 638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982). The opinion of 2 the Court of Civil Appeals is reported at 616 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1981), Jurisdiction On October 6, 1982, the Supreme Court of Texas denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of its July 21, 1982 judgment. (App. pp. 74a-75a). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1982). Constitutional Provision Involved Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein ex d reside. No State shall make or enforce any law whic shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due proc- ess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic- tion the equal protection of the laws. Statement of the Case On January 26, 1976, a helicopter owned by Helicopter- os Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., (hereinafter Helicol), crashed in Peru, killing respondents’ decedents, employ- ees of Williams-Sedco-Horn, a joint venture head- quartered in Oklahoma. Respondents’ decedents were United States citizens domiciled in states other than Texas, hired by Williams-Sedco-Horn to provide services in Peru in furtherance of the joint venture’s contract with Petro Peru, the Peruvian state-owned oil company, to construct a pipeline from the jungles of Peru to the Pacific 3 For purposes of its work on the Peruvian pipeline, Williams-Sedco-Horn formed a consortium under Peru- vian law operating under the name “Consorcio”. Con- sorcio designated Lima, Peru, as its legal residence, as Peruvian law forbade construction of the pipeline by a non-Peruvian company. Helicol, a Colombian corporation having its principal place of business in Bogota, Colombia, is in the business of providing helicopter transportation in South America to oil and construction companies. Helicol was initially con- tacted in South America by a member of Consorcio, Wil- liams International Sundamerica, Ltd., (hereinafter Wil- liams), a construction company headquartered in Oklaho- ma, with which Helicol had previously done business in South America. Helicol was asked to send an officer to Tulsa, Oklahoma, to discuss a potential contract for the performance of services in Peru. After the commence- ment of a meeting in Tulsa, Helicol’s officer was re- quested to fly to Houston, Texas, on Williams’ corporate aircraft to meet with the other members of Consorcio. Some preliminary contractual discussions occurred at the Houston meeting. Thereafter, a contract was signed in Peru on November 11, 1974, by Helicol’s Peruvian lawyer and by a Peruvian resident representing Consorcio. Prior to its execution, the contract had been approved by the Peruvian Air Force, as required by Peruvian law. It was written in Spanish on official government station- ery and provided that the residence of all parties to the contract would be Lima, Peru, and further provided that controversies arising out of the contract would be sub- mitted to the jurisdiction of Peruvian courts. It also pro- vided that Consorcio would make payments to Helicol’s account with the Bank of America in New York City. 4 The following significant facts are a part of the record in the courts below: 1. Helicol has never performed any of its business or helicopter operations in Texas; 2. Helicol has never solicited any business in Texas; — 3. Helicol has never sold any products that reached Texas; 4. Helicol has never been authorized to do busi- ness in Texas and has never had an agent for the service of process in Texas; 5. Helicol has never recruited employees in Texas; 5. Helicol has never owned real or personal prop- erty in Texas and has never had any records or offices in Texas or representatives based in Texas; 7. The contract between Helicol and Consorcio was executed in Peru to be performed in Peru; 8. Payment for helicopter services in Peru ren- dered to Consorcio was made to Helicol, pursuant to the contract terms, by deposit of funds in a New York bank specified by Helicol; 9. The = business transactions ever entered into in Texas by Helicol were the purchase of several Bell Helicopters and associated equipment which in- cluded transitional training on the operational char- acteristics and maintenance requirements of the pur- chased equipment; 10. The tort causes of action sued upon arose out of a helicopter accident in Peru; li. Neither respondents nor respondents’ dece- dents were or are residents or citizens of Texas. Respondents filed four wrongful death actions in the District Court of Harris County, Texas, claiming that 9] negligence on the part of Helicol proximately caused the helicopter accident in Peru on January 26, 1976 in which respondents’ decedents were killed. Helicol filed special appearances and moved to dismiss respondents’ actions for lack of in personam jurisdiction. After an evidentiary hearing, Helicol’s motions were de- nied (App. pp. 72a-73a), respondents’ actions were con- solidated for trial and judgment subsequently was en- tered against Helicol on a jury verdict in favor of respon- dents. On January 22, 1981, the Court of Civil Appeals re- versed the judgment of the trial court and held that the trial court lacked in personam jurisdiction over Helicol. (App. pp. 63a-71a) On February 24, 1982, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals. The respondents thereafter moved for reconsideration of the decision. The Supreme Court of Texas, on July 21, 1982 reversed itself, withdrew its earlier opinion and filed a second opinion reversing the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirming the decision of the trial court. Justice Campbell filed a concurring opinion in which Jus- tice McGee joined. Justice Pope filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Greenhill and Justice Barrow joined. Helicol then moved for reconsideration which the Supreme Court of Texas denied on October 6, 1982, with three justices dissenting. (App. pp. 74a-75a). The Supreme Court of Texas, in reaching its decision that personal jurisdiction could properly be exercised over Helicol by the Texas trial court, determined that the Texas long-arm statute, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2031b (1982) (App. pp. 76a-78a), permitted Texas courts to exercise jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by 6 the Constitution, citing U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W. ' 760 (Tex. 1977). This determination was rejected by the dissenting justices, who stated: “Article 2031b requires a nexus between the helicopter crash and the contacts relied upon to justify jurisdiction.” (emphasis in original) (App. p. 33a). The Texas Supreme Court went on to hold that “Heli- col’s numerous and substantial contacts do constitute ‘do- ing business’ in this State and the trial court’s actions do not offend due process.” (App. p. 7a). In his concurring opinion (App. p. 10a), Justice Camp- bell stated that federal due process in respect to in perso- nam jurisdiction may be applied differently where the defendant is an alien resident of a foreign country rather than a United States citizen. (App. p. 10a). See also note 6 infra at p. 18. This rationale was refuted in Helicol’s motion for reargument and rejected by three of the jus- tices of the Texas Supreme Court. (App. pp. 44a-45a). Reasons For Granting Writ The Supreme Court of Texas incorrectly held that Heli- col, an alien nonres.dent corporation, was doing business in Texas because Helicol made equipment purchases in Texas and had a single contract discussion in Texas and, therefore, was subject to the jurisdiction of the Texas courts on a cause of action unrelated to its contacts with Texas. - THE DECISION OF THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT CONFLICTS WITH THE DECISION OF THE COURT IN PERKINS v, BENGUET CONSOLIDATED MINING CO., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), AND IS CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENT CORPORATE DEFE) VANTS LAID DOWN BY THE COURT IN INTERNATIONAL SHOE CO. vy, WASHINGTON, 326 U.S, 310 (1945), AND WORLD-WIDE VOLKSWAGEN CORP. v. WOODSON, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) The issue in this case is the quality and nature of a nonresident corporation's activities in a state which, as a matter of federal due process, will permit that state to entertain a cause of action against that nonresident corporation, where the cause of action did not arise from the corporation's activities in the state, In reaching its decision, the Texas Supreme Court violated the teachings of the Court in /nternational Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), Perkins v, Ben- guet Consolidated Mining Co., 242 U.S, 487 (1952) and World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). The decision of the Texas Supreme Court was an unconstitutional exercise of in personam jurisdiction over Helicol which this Court should reverse and set aside as was done in Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S, 84 (1978) and World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, supra. In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S 310 (1945), the Court recognized that different due process considerations are involved where the defendant's activi- ties in the state are so substantial and continuous as to constitute residency in the state and, on the other hand, where the nonresident defendant’s contacts with the 8 state, although incidental, transitory and infrequent, gave rise to the cause of action.’ International Shoe teaches that while a small number of contacts between the defendant and the forum state might be a sufficient basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant with respect to a cause of action arising out of a defendant’s activities in the forum state, a qualitatively different relationship is required where the cause of action is unrelated to the contacts of the defendant with the forum state. {I]t has been generally recognized that the casual presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a state in the corporation’s behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with the activi- ties there [citations omitted]. ... To require the corporation in such circumstances to defend the suit away from its home or other jurisdiction where it carries on more substantial activities has been thought to lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with due process. 326 U.S. at 317, The Texas Supreme Court could not and did not hold that the cause of action arose from Helicol’s contacts with Texas. Rather, it held that Helicol’s contacts with the state were sufficient to permit Texas to exercise in perso- nam jurisdiction over Helicol even though the cause of action did not arise from such activities in the state. * The Court in Shaffer v, Heitner, 433 U.S, 186, 204 (1977), reiter- ated that a relationship between the forum and the cause of action is required for the assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident defend- ant, stating that “the relationship among the defendant, the forum and the litigation {is}... the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.” g The issue in this case is the same issue that was before the Court in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidat. 1 Mining Co., 342 U.S. 487 (1952). As the Court stated the issue in Perkins: It remains only to consider, in more detail, the issue of whether, as a matter of federal due process, the business done in Ohio by the respondent mining com- pany was sufficiently substantial and of such a nature as to permil Ohio to entertain a cause of action against a foreign corporation, where the cause of action arose from activities entirely distinct from its activities in Ohio (emphasis in original). 342 U.S. at 447. In vacating the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio which held that Ohio courts could not exercise in perso- nam jurisdiction over a Phillipine defendant on a cause of action arising outside Ohio, the Court, in Perkins, emphasized that the defendant had moved its operations to Ohio during World War II and that the president of the company operated from Ohio, carrying on a “continuous and systematic” supervision of the company. Thus the Court concluded that because of the defendant’s sub- stantial and continuous activities in Ohio, “it would not violate federal due process for Ohio either to take or decline jurisdiction of the corporation in this proceeding.” 342 U.S. at 448, The due process standard the Court established in Perkins is that with respect to a foreign based cause of action, the nonresident corporation's activities must at least be “continuous” and “substantial.” 342 U.S. at 445- 447, See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 47 (1971). The activities or contacts of Helicol in Texas were neither continuous nor substantial. 10 The Texas court, after reciting Helicol’s “contacts” with Texas, held that “these contacts constitute sufficient minimum contacts to find Helicol amenable to the jurisdiction of the Texas courts.” (App. p. 3a). The minimum contacts standard the Texas Supreme Court applied with respect to a cause of action which did not arise from Helicol’s contacts with the state was con- trary to the Court’s decision in Perkins, as Justice Pope of the Texas Supreme Court pointed out in his dissenting opinion. (App. pp. 43a-44a).’ The Supreme Court of Texas in concluding that Helicol was “uoing business” in Texas and that Texas courts could exercise in personam jurisdiction over Helicol without violating due process relied upon the following: (a) Purchases by Helicol of helicopters from a Texas company, Bell Helicopter Company, and cer- tain transition training given to Helicol employees incident to its equipment purchases; (b) Asingle business meeting between a represent- ative of Helicol and Williams-Sedco-Horn in Hous- ton, Texas, for the purpose of discussing a potential contract with Consorcio; and (ec) The payment of funds to Helicol by drafts drawn on a Texas bank. The items listed in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Texas (App. p. 3a) can be reduced to the contacts listed above. As discussed in Point II, infra, purchases in the forum state as distinct from sales in the forum state do not ‘The decision of the Texas Supreme Court also conflicts with decisions in the United States Courts of Appeais for the First and Fourth Circuits, Ratliff v, Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 444 F.2d 745 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 948 (1971); Seymour v. Parke, Davis & Co., 423 F.2d 584 (1st Cir, 1970). 11 constitute doing business in the forum. Similarly, one discussion of a potential contract by an officer of Helicol in Texas cannot provide a basis for a finding that Helicol was “doing business” within the state. One contact cannot constitute either substantial or continuous activity. Helli- col did not even solicit this business within the State of Texas. It was contacted in South America by a member of Consorcio. Its services were solicited.‘ The Texas Supreme Court also relied upon Helicol’s receipt of contractual payments drawn on a Texas bank as a basis for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction. Drafts forwarded by Consorcio from Texas to Helicol’s bank in New York for deposit do not constitute payments made in Texas. For its part, Helicol had no bank account or representative for receipt of payments within Texas. Furthermore, the election by Consorcio to draw upon a Texas bank for the purpose of making payments in New York was its own. The unilateral act ofa third party or the other party to the action cannot provide the basis of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident. See, e.g., World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). In sum, Helicol’s “contacts” with the State of Texas as described by the Supreme Court of Texas do not con- stitute “substantial” and “continuous” activity. Perkins ‘ Helicol’s officer testified at the evidentiary hearing held on the question of personal jurisdiction that he had no intention of traveling to Texas when he left South America, that he planned to travel only to Oklahoma pursuant to the request of a member of Cousorcio with whom Helicol had previously dealt, that once it wa» deemed neces- sary by the Oklahoma member of Consorcio to travel to Texas, a corporate aircraft was made available for that purpose, that his wife remained in Tulsa while he was flown to Houston and that he re- turned to Oklahoma immediately after the Houston meeting. 12 v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. at 446, 447, Where, as here, respondents’ cause of action did not arise from Helicol’s contacts with Texas, Perkins and International Shoe mandate that there must be sub- stantial business activity by a nonresident defendant to satisfy federal due process requirements. The Texas court ignored the Perkins and International Shoe standards and its decision is in direct conflict with those decisions. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), is the most recent statement of the Court on the due process requirements governing the amenability of a nonresident defendant to suit in a distant forum. In that case, the cause of action arose from an automobile accident in Oklahoma and the Court held that, notwithstanding the accident in the forum state, mini- mum contacts must also exist between the defendant and the forum state. 444 U.S. at 292. The Court held that there were no such contacts between the forum and the defendant and that the due process clause does not con- template in personam jurisdiction where the corporate defendant had “no contacts, ties or relations” with the forum. Id. at 294 (citing International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319). The dissenting Justices in World-Wide Volkswagen were of the view that the Oklahoma court constitutionally could exercise in personam jurisdiction because of the interest of the forum in adjudicating the action which arose in the forum state. The dissenting Justices agreed that minimum contacts must exist among the parties, the contested transaction and the forum state. 444 U.S. at 310-311 (Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting), 313 (Mr. Jus- tice Marshall, dissenting), 318 (Mr. Justice Blackmun, dissenting). 13 World-Wide Volkswagen was a minimum contacts case dealing with a forum-based cause of action. The Supreme Court of Texas misread World-Wide Volkswagen by applying the minimum contacts principles announced in that case to a case where the cause of action is foreign- based and where, according to /nternational Shoe and Perkins, substantial business activity on the part of the nonresident corporate defendant constitutionally is re- quired. The constitutional principle underlying the Court’s statement in Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (a custody case involving a natural person as defendant) is equally applicable to the present case involving an alien corporate defendant. To hold such temporary visits [defendant’s visit to California in 1959 on a three day military stopover on his way to Korea and a four hour stopover in 1960 on his return from Korean service] to a State a basis for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction over unre- lated actions arising in the future would make a mockery of the limitations on state jurisdiction im- posed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 436 U.S. at 93. The assertion of in personam jurisdiction over Helicol by Texas courts on the basis of the incidental and in- frequent contacts described above with respect to a cause of action unrelated to Texas was an unconstitutionai ex- ercise of in personam jurisdiction over Helicol in violation of federal due process and contrary to the decisions of the Court. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Min- ing Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Sup. Ct. R. 17.1(c). 14 II THE HOLDING OF THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT THAT AN ALIEN NONRESIDENT CORPORATION WAS SUBJECT TO THE IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION OF A STATE COURT BECAUSE OF ITS PURCHASE OF AMERICAN PRODUCTS IN THE FORUM STATE IS CONTRARY TO THE DECISION OF THE COURT IN ROSENBERG BROTHERS & CO. v. CURTIS BROWN CO., 260 U.S. 516 (1923), AND PRESENTS AN IMPORTANT QUESTION HAVING WIDE-RANGING IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES TRADE RELATIONS In concluding that Helicol was doing business within the State of Texas, the Supreme Court of Texas relied heavily upon Helicol’s purchase of equipment from Bell Helicopter Co., a Texas manufacturer. (App. p. 3a) This Court expressly has held that purchases by a nonresident corporation within the forum state are insufficient to constitute “doing business” for purposes of assessing the corporation’s amenability to personal jurisdiction. In Rosenberg Brothers & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923), appellant sought a reversal of the lower court’s holding that purchases within the forum state did not constitute “presence” for purposes of asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. In affirming the lower court’s decision, the Court stated: {[Appellee’s] only connection with [the forum] appears to have been the purchase there from time to time of a large part of the merchandise to be sold at its store [in another state] ... The only business alleged to have been transacted [in the forum]. . . related to such purchases of goods by officers of a foreign corporation. Visits on such business, even if occurring at regular intervals, would not warrant the inference that the corporation was present within the State. 260 U.S. at 518. See also Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.). - 15 The decision of the Texas Supreme Court conflicts with the holding of this Court in Rosenberg. In addition, as in personam jurisdiction was asserted over an alien corporation because of its purchase of Amer- ican products, the decision of the Texas Supreme Court presents serious problems for nonresident alien pur- chasers. Prospective foreign purchasers of American products may be deterred from buying them if, in so doing, they may be forced to defend lawsuits in the United States arising from foreign disputes unrelated to the purchases. As the holding of the Texas Supreme Court is not only inconsistent with Rosenberg Brothers & Co., v. Curtis Brown Co., but also imposes an unnecessary obstacle to United States trade relations, the Court should grant this petition for a writ of certiorari to address the question whether purchases from a forum vendor by a nonresident purchaser constitute a sufficient basis for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident purchaser with respect to a foreign cause of action which does not arise from such purchases. Sup. Ct. R. 17.1(b), (c). Ul THE DECISION OF THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT CONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS OF THE HIGHEST COURTS OF SEVERAL STATES AND DEMONSTRATES THE NEED FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF FEDERAL DUE PROCESS AS IT RELATES TO IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION OF NONRESIDENT CORPORATIONS The Texas Supreme Court relies heavily, if not entire- ly, upon purchases made by Helicol in Texas as a basis for finding that Helicol had numerous and substantial busi- ness contacts in Texas. This ruling is in conflict with 16 Marshall Egg Transport Co. v. Bender Goodman Co., 275 Minn. 534, 148 N.W. 2d 161 (1967), and Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959). In Marshall Egg, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that a series of purchases of eggs in the forum state was insufficient to support the assertion of in personam jurisdiction over the out-of-state purchaser. The court stated: Plaintiff asserts, however, that because it had had a series of similar transactions with defendant the lat- ter should be considered subject to the jurisdiction of the Minnesota court. The trial court disagreed with this reasoning and took the position that the question involved herein should not depend on the quantity of transactions but rather on the nature of the transac- tion giving rise to this controversy. We again agree with the trial court that, under the circumstances here, where a single transaction would lack the de- gree of participation necessary to require defend- ant’s submission to the jurisdiction of this state, such a deficiency could not be cured merely by repeated similar transactions. 275 Minn. at 538, 148 N.W.2d at 164. In Conn, the Supreme Court of Utah, in refusing to give full faith and credit to an Illinois judgment, held that where a contract for the purchase of horses was entered into in Utah, but with inspection and delivery occurring in Illinois, such did not amount to the transaction of any business within the forum state (Illinois). Thus, according to the Utah court, sufficient minimum contacts did not exist so as to constitutionally allow the forum state (IIli- nois) to assert jurisdiction over the purchaser. The Conn court stated: “[T]he correspondence through the mails between the parties plus the incidental activi- 17 ties of having an agent inspect the horses and taking delivery in Illinois did not amount to the ‘transaction of any business’ within the state of Illinois.” 9 Utah 2d at 255, 342 P.2d at 875. The existence of conflicting state court decisions on the issue of in personam jurisdiction over nonresident corporations was noted by Mr. Justice White in his dis- sent from the denial of a writ of certiorari in Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979, cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980). Mr. Justice White stated: The question of personal jurisdiction over a nonresi- dent corporate defendant based on contractual deal- ings with a resident plaintiff has deeply divided federal and state courts [citations omitted]. . . . The question at issue is one of considerable importance to contractual dealings with purchasers and sellers lo- cated in different states. The disarray among federal and state courts noted above may well have a disrup- tive effect on commercial relations in which certainty of result is a prime objective.° 5 In two subsequent denials of petitions for writs of certiorari, Mr Justice White and Mr. Justice Powell filed similar dissenting opinions on denials of petitions for writs of certiorari. Chelsea House Pub- lishers v. Nicholstone Book Bindery, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 560 (Tenn. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 994 (1982); Baxter v. Mouzavires, 434 A.2d 988 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1006 (1982). 18 IV THE PRINCIPLE THAT AN ALIEN NONRESIDENT CORPORATION IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE SAME RIGHTS OF FEDERAL DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS AS ARE UNITED STATES CORPORATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF AMENABILITY TO SUIT IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS PRESENTS AN IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION WHICH SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY THE COURT IN THE INTEREST OF TiiE FOREIGN COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES Although it is difficult to be certain of the complete rationale of the Texas Supreme Court, the justices who filed a concurring opinion indicated that the application of “due process,” with respect to in personam jurisdiction, is different where the lawsuit is brought by a United States citizen against an alien defendant, rather than against another United States citizen.* (App. p. 10a). As the dissenting justices noted: A separate concurring opinion filed on rehearing con- tends that the “long arms” of state jurisdiction should extend more elastically when reaching for nonresident defendants who are citizens of other countries. While this argument may appeal to those who contend that noncitizens should receive less due * The concurring justices in their opinion dated July 21, 1982 had stated that because the jurisdictional issue is between countries, namely citizens of the United States and a resident of Colombia, “our ‘due process’ application must be broader in scope.” (App. p. 10a) On September 17, 1982, after Helicol’s motion for rehearing was filed raising the above issue, the Clerk of the Texas Supreme Court advised West Publishing Company by letter that the language: “Therefore, our ‘due process’ application must be broader in scope” was removed from the opinion and the following language was sub- stituted: “Therefore, ‘due process’ in this case must be universal in its application.” (See App. p. 10a) 19 process than United States citizens [citations omit- ted], it is nevertheless inconsistent with the way due process has been applied in previous cases. (App. p. 44a). The issue in this case is whether the alien status of the defendant is a factor which may be considered by a court in determining the scope of due process, and, if so, whether an alien nonresident corporation enjoys less due process than a United States corporation and may con- stitutionally be required to defend legal actions in state courts from which United States corporations would be immune. The due process clause of the United States Constitu- tion refers to “persons,” without distinction as to their citizenship. Additionally the equal protection clause for- bids a state to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The Texas Supreme Court appears to have decided that due process requirements are lessened in the case of an alien corporation. Even if this were a permissible construction of the due process clause, it would be imper- missible under the equal protection clause. The equal protection clause applies to Helicol’s rights since, for the purpose of determining the question of in personam jurisdiction, Helicol had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Texas courts for the resolution of that question. Cf. Plyler v. Doe, 102 S.Ct. 2382 (1982). To the extent that the decision of the Supreme Court of Texas was based upon a lesser standard of due process because Helicol was an alien nonresident corporation, the decision should be reversed and the principle reestab- lished that alien corporations are entitled to be judged by the same due process standards as United States corpora- tions. 20 Any dilution of the mandate of the Fourteenth Amend- ment concerning equal protection of the laws as it relates to alien corporations should be examined by the Court before further confusion ensues. Such dilution will have a negative effect upon alien nonresidents who conduct any type of business transactions with United States citizens. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, petitioner urges that this petition for a writ ae Biase a THOMAS J. WHALEN Counsel for the Petitioner Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. 1030 15th St., N.W. Suite 720 Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 289-0500 Dated: January 4, 1983 Of Counsel: CONDON & FORSYTH AUSTIN P. MAGNER CYNTHIA J. LARSEN CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Thomas J. Whalen, being over the age of 18 years and a member of the firm of Condon & Forsyth, hereby certify that I have this fourth day of January, 1983, served three copies of the foregoing petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Texas upon respondents Elizabeth Hall, et al., the only parties required to be served, by mailing such copies to their attorney of record in sealed envelopes, first class postage prepaid, deposited at the United States Post Office, located at North Capitol and Massachusetts Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C., and addressed as follows: George Pletcher, Esq. Helm, Pletcher & Hogan 2800 Two Houston Center Houston, Texas 77002 , hore hala Thomas J. W¥alen, Esq, INDEX TO APPENDIX Page Opinion of Supreme Court of Texas on Respondents’ Mo- tion For Rehearing dated July 21, 1982 ......... la Concurring Opinion dated July 21, 1982 ........... Sa Withdrawn Dissenting Opinion dated July 21, 1982 . 15a Dissenting Opinion dated October 6, 1982.......... 32a Withdrawn Opinion of the Supreme Court of Texas dated POT Us GE Noch rspepvesentvenebeannwnna. 46a Dissenting Opinion dated February 24, 1982 ....... 58a Opinion of the Court of Civil — of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.), dated January 22, 1981 .........0005. 63a Letter from Judge Wyatt Heard of the District Court Overruling the Special Appearance of Helicol dated PURE BOOED ceverevccrsacceucscsnaceencae ss 72a Order of October 6, 1982, Overruling Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing before the Supreme Court of the State Se Corer ashe l a Cinna eunen ay Re oamny es 74a Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2081b. ........s0c000. 76a la IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS No, C-243 ELIZABETH HALL, ef al., Petitioners, v, HELICOPTEROS NACIONALES De CoLomaia, S.A. (“HELICOL”), Respondent, From Harris County First District ON MOTION FOR REHEARING Our opinion of February 24, 1942, « withdrawn and this opinion is substituted therefor. Elizabeth Hall and the other plaintiffs in the trial court (Hall) are the survivors of four citizens of the United States killed ina helicopter crash in Peru while working in that country con- structing a pipeline, Hal] sued Helicol, the owner and operator of the helicopter which crashed, in Harris County, Texas, in four separate causes of action. Helicol entered a special appearance in each of the actions, to contest the jurisdiction of the Texas court pursuant to Rule 120a, TEX. R. CIV. P., all of which were overruled by the respective trial courts. The four actions were consolidated for trial resulting in a judgment for Hall. The court of civil appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered the case dismissed for lack of jurisdic- tion, 616 S,W.2d 247, We reverse the judgment of the court of civil appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court. The only issue before us is whether under the facts of this cause of action, was Helicol arnenable to jurisdiction in Texas. Therefore, this Court must decide whether the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Helicol was consistent with the requirements of due process of law under the Constitution of the United States. 2a In 1974, Petro Peru, the Peruvian state owned oil company, made a contract with Williams-Sedco-Horn,' (referred to as Consorcio in their contract), a joint venture based in Houston, Texas, to construct a pipeline from the interior of Peru to the Pacific Ocean, The defendant, Helicol, was brought into the project by Williams-Sedco-Horn to provide necessary trans- portation of workers and supplies, by helicopter, to regions where there were no roads. Helicol was originally contacted by a Williams executive who had contracted with Helicol in the past. In response to that contact, the general manager of Helicol flew to Oklahoma, and then proceeded to Houston, Texas to negotiate with the three members of the joint ven- ture, After reaching agreement on all terms of the contract in Houston, those terms were related to Helicol’s office in Peru. The contract in its final form was approved by the Peruvian Air Force as required by Peruvian law, typed in Spanish and executed by representatives of all parties in Peru. Helicol did not maintain an office in Texas, had no designated agent for service of process in Texas, was not authorized to do business in Texas, performed no helicopter operations in Texas, and did not recruit employees in Texas. The deceased workers here in question, were not Texas residents, but were al] United States citizens. They were hired by Williams-Sedeo-Horn, in Houston, Texas, and sent to Peru to work on the pipeline. The workers were killed in crash of a Bell helicopter, owned and operated by Helicol in Peru, during their transportation pursuant to the contract between Helicol and Williams-Sedeo-Horn. ' Williams-Sedeo-Horn is a joint venture composed of Williams International Sundamericana, Ltd., a Delaware corporation head- quartered in Tulsa, Oklahoma, Sedco Construction Corporation, a Texas corporation, and Horn International, Inc., a Texas corpora- tion, 3a In addition to negotiating this contract, Helicol committed all of the following acts in Texas: a. b. Purchased substantially all of its helicopter fleet in Fort Worth, Texas; Did approximately $4,000,000 worth of business in Fort Worth, Texas, from 1970 through 1976 as pur- chaser of equipment, parts and services. This con- sisted of spending an average of $50,000 per month with Bell Helicopter Company, a Texas corporation; Negotiated in Houston, Harris County, Texas, witha Texas resident, which negotiation resulted in the con- tract to provide the helicopter service involving the crash leading to this cause of action (previously men- tioned), and wherein Helicol agreed to obtain liability insurance payable in American dollars to cover a claim such as this; Sent pilots to Fort Worth, ‘Texas to pick up helicop- ters as they were purchased from Bell Helicopter and fly them from Fort Worth to Colombia; Sent maintenance personnel and pilots to Texas to be trained; Had employees in Texas on a year-round rotation basis; Received roughtly $5,000,000 under the terms and provisions of the contract in question here which pay- ments were made from First City National Bank in Houston, Texas; and Directed the First City National Bank of Houston, Texas to make payments to Rocky Mountain Helicop- ters pursuant to the contract in question. (Involved — of a large helicopter capable of moving heavier loads for Williams-Sedco-Horm. ) We hold that these contacts constitute sufficient minimum contacts to find Helicol amenable to the jurisdiction of the Texas courts. In their briefs before this Court, all parties agreed that our opinion in L’-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977) controlled the disposition of this case. da In U’-Anchor, we stated: Article 2031b provides that a nonresident entering into a contract with a Texas resident performable in part by either party in Texas shall be deemed to be doing business in Texas... . We agree that in this respect, as well as with the respect to ‘other acts that —_ constitute doing busi- ness,’ icle 2031b reaches as far as the federal con- stitutional requirements of due process will permit. We let stand the statement in Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1973, writ refd n.r.e.) ‘that the reach of Art. 2031b is limited only by the United States Constitution.’ . .. Furthermore, such a construction is desirable in that it allows the courts to focus on the con- stitutional limitations of due process rather than to engage in technical and abstruse attempts to consistently define ‘doing business.’ In the U-Anchor opinion we specifically adopted the above language from Hoppenfeld. Also in L’-Anchor, this Court approved the three-prong test set out in O’Brien v. Lanpar Company, 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966). That three-prong test is: (1) the nonresident defendant or foreign corporation must purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in the forum state; (2) the cause of action must arise from, or be connected with, such act or transaction; and (3) the assumption of jurisdiction by the forum state must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice; consideration being given to the uality, nature, and extent of the activity in the orum state, the relative convenience of the parties, the benefits and protection of the laws of the forum state afforded the respective parties, and the basic equities of the situation. The second prong of the O’Brien test requiring that the cause of action must arise out of the contacts with the forum state, has been the subject of some controversy ever since the O'Brien test was adopted. The second prong is useful in any fact. situation in which a jurisdiction question exists; and is a oa necessary requirement where the nonresident defendant only maintained single or few contacts with the forum. However, the second prong is unnecessary when the nonresident defend- ants presence in the forum through numerous contacts is of such a nature, as in this case, so as to satisfy the demands of the ultimate test of due process. Accordingly through the statuto- ry authority of Art. 2031b TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. there remains the single inquiry: is the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the requirements of due process of law under the United States Constitution? This inquiry is frequently put into the following terms: “. . . due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Jnternational Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940). The U.S. Supreme Court has broadened the parameters of due process to allow inquiry into other “relevant factors.” Recently in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), the Supreme Court reiterated that the rela- tionship between the defendant and the forum must be such that it is “reasonable. . . to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.” Citing, /nterna- tional Shoe, supra. In looking to this reasonableness, the U.S. Court stated that the burden on the defeadant: . . while always a primary concern, will in an ng a a ate case be considered in light of other relevant factors, including the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, see McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 2 L.Ed.2d 2238, 78 S.Ct. 199 (1957); the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, see Kulko v. California ee Court, [436 U.S.] at 92, 56 L.Ed.2d 132, 98 S.Ct. 1690, at least when that interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiff's ve er to choose the forum, c.f. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 6a 186, 211, n. 37, 53 L.Ed.2d 683, 97 S.Ct. 2569 (1977); the interstate judicia] system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared in- terest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies, see Kulko v. California Super- ior Court, supra, at 93, 98, 56 L.Ed.2d 132, 98 S.Ct. 1690. Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 291. Therefore, our inquiry can go beyond the substantial contacts which Helico] maintains in Texas, and we may also look to this State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; and Hall's interest in effective and convenient relief. Texas has an interest in adjudicating this dispute. Hall is not a Texas resident, but is a citizen of this country. More importantly, Hall was hired in Houston, Texas, by a Texas resident. It cannot be questioned that this forum has an in- terest in protecting the employees of its “residents” (Williams- Sedco-Horn). This is especially necessary in light of the fact that Texas is the headquarters of countless international com- panies, and as a member of the “interstate judicial system,” this State has an interest in obtaining the most efficient resolu- tion of controversies and in furthering fundamental substan- tive social policies. (See above quote, citing Kulko v. Califor- nia Superior Court, supra.) Hall has a genuine interest and desire in obtaining con- venient and effective relief. The U.S. Supreme Court directly considered the plaintiffs interest involved in McGee v. Inter- national Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). In McGee, a California resident was suing a Texas insurance company asa - beneficiary under a life insurance policy. The defendant's only contact with California had been its mailing of the policy to the state, and its receipt of premium payments from the decedent. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the relative convenience of the parties and based their decision allowing maintenance of the suit in California on the State’s interest in providing effec- tive redress, and the fact that an individual claimant could not overcome the difficulties of maintaining an action in a foreign forum “... thus in effect making the company judgment (a proof.” 355 U.S. at 223. The Court did recognize the in- convenience that this worked on the defendant, but based on the contacts of the defendant, due process would not be offended. Admittedly this cause does not fall precisely within the facts of McGee, it does fall within its spirit. Based on the considerations of the above discussion and looking to the requirements of the L’-Anchor test, we find that Helicol’s numerous and substantial contacts do constitute “do- ing business” in this State and the trial court’s actions do not offend due process. The judgment of the court of civil appeals is reversed and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. JAMES P. WALLACE Justice Concurring opinion by Justice Campbell in which Justice McGee joins. Dissenting opinion by Justice Pope in which Chief Justice Greenhill and Justice Barrow join. OPINION DELIVERED): July 21, 1982 5a IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS No. C-243 ELIZABETH HALL, et al., Petitioners, Vv. HELICOPTEROS NACIONALES DE CoLomeia, S.A. (“HELICOL”), Respondent. From Harris County First District ON MOTION FOR REHEARING CONCURRING OPINION I concur with the result of the opinion by Justice Wallace for these additional reasons. The issue in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), was “whether, consistently with the due proc- ess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, an Oklahoma court may exercise in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident automobile retailer and its wholesale distributor in a products liability action, when the defendants’ only connection with Oklahoma is the fact that an automobile sold in New York to New York residents became involved in an automobile acci- dent in Oklahoma.” /d. at 287. The question before this Court is whether, consistently with the due process clause of the Four- teenth Amendment, a Texas court may exercise in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident provider of helicopter serv- ices, when the defendant’s connections with Texas were all of those listed in the opinion by Justice Wallace. In World-Wide, there was no evidence that World-Wide or its retail distributor, Seaway, did any business in Oklahoma, shipped or sold any products to or in that state, had an agent to receive process there, or purchased advertisements in any 9a media calculated to reach Oklahoma. During oral arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court, plaintiffs attorney conceded there was no showing that any automobile ever sold by World- Wide or Seaway had ever entered Oklahoma with the single exception of the car involved. /d. at 289. Thus, World-Wide holds that driving a car through a state is not such “minimum contacts” to give that state jurisdiction in an action against a New York seller. In reaching this decision, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: Petitioners carry on no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma. a close no sales and perform no services there. They avail themselves of none of the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law. They solicit no business there either through salespersons or through advertising reasonably calculated to reach the state. Nor does the record show that they regularly sell cars at wholesale or retail to Okla- homa customers or residents or that they indirectly through others, serve or seek to serve the Oklahoma market. In short, respondents seek to base jurisdiction on one isolated occurrence and whatever inferences can be drawn therefrom: the fortuitous circumstance that a sin- gle Audi automobile, sold in New York to New York residents, happened to suffer an accident while passing through Oklahoma. 444 U.S. at 295. Applying that same language to the facts of this case, I would write: Helicol carries on much business in Texas. They close many purchases of helicopters and spare parts and negotiate contracts in Texas. They regularly secure the services of Bell Helicopter in training their pilots and repair technicians. They solicited business in Texas by sending a representative to Houston to negotiate with Williams-Sedco-Horn. The record shows they regularly buy helicopters and spare parts in Texas and seek Texas services for training their employees. They directly secure the services of the Texas markets, maintain employees in Texas on a year-round basis and 26 times sent officials of their company to Texas. This activity has continued since 1970. In this multi-million dollar business in Texas, Heli- 10a col has availed itself of the privileges and benefits of Texas law. In short, our petitioners seek to base jurisdiction on many significant contacts in Texas that reflect a continuous general presence in Texas. The U.S. Supreme Court, in World-Wide, was addressing the jurisdictional problem between states. However, we do not have the same problem as World-Wide. We do not have a dispute over jurisdiction between coequal sovereigns in a federal system. We are deciding jurisdiction between coun- tries; as to citizens of the United States and a resident of Colombia. Therefore, our “due process” application must be broader in scope.’ Now, let us look at what World-Wide said about “minimum contacts” and reasonableness of the “forum” among the states, and apply those tests to our facts: The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their statutes as coequal sovereigns in a federal system. The protection against inconvenient litigation is typical- ly described in terms of “reasonableness” or “fairness.” We have said that the defendant's contacts with the forum State must be such that maintenance of the suit “does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus- tice.’ ” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, [326 U.S.] at 316, 90 L. Ed. 95, 66 S. Ct. 154, 161 A.L.R. 1057, ‘On September 17, 1982, after Helicol’s motion for rehearing was filed, the Clerk of the Court advised West Publishing Company by letter that the language: “Therefore, our ‘due process’ application must be broader in scope” was removed from the opinion and the following language was substituted: “Therefore ‘due process’ in this case must be universal in its application.” lla uoting Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 85 L. Ed. 78, 61 S. Ct. 339, 182 A.L.R. 1357 (1940). The rela- tionship between the defendant and the forum must be such that it is ‘reasonable. . . to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.” 326 U.S. at 317, 90 L. Ed. 95, 66S. Ct. 154, 161 A.L.R. 1057. Implicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the under- standing that the burden on the defendant, while always a rimary concern, will in an appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant factors, including the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, see McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. 355 U.S. 220, 223, 2 L. Ed. 2d 223, 78S. Ct. 199 (1957); the plaintiff's interest in obtain- ing convenient and effective relief, see Kulko v. California Superior Court, [436 U.S.] at 92, 56 L. Ed. 2d 132, 98 S. Ct. 1690, at least when that interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiff's power to choose the forum, cf. haffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211, n. 37, 538 L. Ed. 2d 683, 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977); the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of con- troversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies, see Kulko v. California Supenor Court, [436 U. s Jat 93, 98, 56 L. Ed. 2d 132, 98 S. Ct. 1690. 444 U.S. at 291-92. The contacts of Helicol in Texas were not “minimal,” they were “substantial.” It is not unreasonable to require a com- pany with the expertise in international business, as Helicol, to defend a suit in a state where it has conducted multi-million dollars of business. However, it is unreasonable to require the widows and children seeking relief here to go to a foreign country to prosecute their action. This Court has an interest in adjudicating the dispute of these United States citizens. They do not have the power to select another state but must be removed to a foreign country, This Court has an interest in assuring these plaintiffs obtain convenient and effective relief, at least when that interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiff's power to choose the forum country. 12a “Due process” is not a rigid, unchanging rule that courts could always determine by an unchanging formula. The con- cept of “due process” is designed to meet the test of change and to protect the rights of American citizens in the 1980's, as it did when the Constitution was written. In World-Wide, it was stated: The limits imposed on state jurisdiction by the Due Process Clause, in its role as a guarantor against in- convenient litigation, have been substantially relaxed over the years. As we noted in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., supra, at 222-223, 2 L. Ed. 2d 223, 78S. Ct. 199, this trend is largely attributable to a fundamental transformation in the American economy: “Today many commercial transactions touch two or more States and may involve parties separated by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization of com- merce has come a great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.” The historical developments noted in McGee, of course, have only accelerated in the generation since that case was decided. 444 U.S. at 292-93. The quote from McGee is as applicable to the facts of this case as it was to the McGee facts. It could be written: Today many commercial transactions touch two or more countries and may involve parties separated by continents or oceans. With this increasing internationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail and satellite communications across continental lines. At the same time modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a country where he engages in economic activity. The McGee court further stated: “Of course there may be inconvenience to the insurer if it is held amenable to suit in California where it had this contract but certainly nothing l3a which amounts to a denial of due process.” 355 U.S. at 224. In my opinion, the inconvenience to Helicol, considering their substantial contacts in Texas, is certainly nothing which amounts to a denial of due process. In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), the Supreme Court, in explaining the requirements of due process, stated: The unilateral activity of those who claim some rela- tionship with a non-resident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. The applica- tion of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant’s activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protec- tions of its laws. [Emphasis added). 357 U.S. at 253. This Court, in U’-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977), tested the jurisdiction of Texas courts over the Oklahoma resident by stating: [T]he contacts of Burt with Texas are minimal and for- tuitous, and he cannot be said to have “purposefully” conducted activities within the State. Burt's contacts with Texas were not grounded on any expectation or necessity of invoking the benefits and protections of Texas law, nor were they designed to result in profit from a business transaction undertaken in Texas. The contract was soli- cited, negotiated, and consummated in Oklahoma, and Burt did nothing to indicate or to support an inference of any purpose to exercise the privilege of doing business in Texas. Simply stated, Burt was a passive customer of a Texas corporation who neither sought, initiated, nor prof- ited from his single and fortuitous contact with Texas. 553 S.W.2d at 763. Applying the L’-Anchor test and using the U-Anchor lan- guage, I find Helicol’s contacts are numerous and not for- tuitous, as Helicol purposefully conducted activities within the state. Helicol’s contacts with Texas were grounded on the l4a expectation, or necessity, of invoking the benefits and protec- tions of Texas law; and they were designed to result in profit from a business transaction undertaken in Texas. The con- tracts and contacts were solicited or negotiated in Texas and some consummated in Texas. Helicol’s activities, therefore, did more than indicate or support an inference of purposefully exercising the privilege of doing business in Texas. Helicol was an active customer of Texas corporations and companies who sought, initiated, and hopefully profited from its many and purposeful contacts with Texas. RoBerT M. CAMPBELL Justice Justice McGee joins in this concurring opinion. OPINION DELIVERED: July 21, 1982 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS No. C-243 ELIZABETH HALL, ef ai., Petitioners, HELICOPTEROS NACIONALES De CoLomeia, S.A. “HELICOL” Respondent. From Harris County, First DISTRICT DISSENTING OPINION I respectfully dissent. Jurisdiction was originally exercised in this case over Helicol, a nonresident defendant, on a cause of action that arose in South America. The suit was brought by Hall and others, all residents of states other than Texas. In our original opinion, we held that the exercise of jurisdiction over Helicol was improper and violated the requirements of due process. Significant in that holding was the fact that the underlying cause of action, concerning the crash of a helicopter in Peru, was unvelaced to Helicol’s contacts with Texas. We concluded that, absent a showing of the defendant's “general business presence” in this state, created by “substantial and continuous activity,” jurisdiction based upon contacts unre- lated to the cause of action was unconstitutional. For reasons expressed in our original opinion, and for addi- tional reasons that have become clear on rehearing, | remain convinced that jurisdiction should not be exercised in this case, and that the original opinion shoula be retained as the opinion of this court. That opinion was at least an attempt to define standards clarifying the vague and uncertain statutory and constitutional boundaries of in personam jurisdiction. The rehearing opinion, on the other hand, ignores the need for l6a standards, and will very likely enhance rather than alleviate the confusion surrounding this difficult area of the law. Article 2031b and Unrelated Contacts In our earlier opinion, we stated that article 2031b, the Texas “long-arm” statute, reaches to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, authorizing the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whenever doing so is consistent with due process. We were concerned with avoiding technical distinctions as to what is and what is not “doing business.” We concluded that the “catch-all” language in the statute— “without including other acts that may constitute doing business”—extended coverage of the term essentially to all activity a nonresident might perform in the state, and that the only remaining determination in jurisdiction cases should be whether asserting jurisdiction is constitutional. While it still seems correct to say that the term “doing business” should be defined broadly, reexamination on rehearing of our original analysis indicates that it is nevertheless incorrect to conclude that article 2031b reaches as far as due process permits. As explained in a series of Federal Fifth Circuit opinions begin- ning with Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260 (Sth Cir. 1981), due process is broader than statutory boundaries of jurisdiction in Texas because the Constitution will sometimes permit a state to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defend- ant who has contacts with the state unrelated to the cause of action being asserted. See Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (general jurisdiction based upon “substantial and continuous activity”). Article 2031b, on the other hand, expressly limits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to causes of action arising out of activities or business done within the state. Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., supra at 1265. See also Jim Fox Enterprises, Inc. v. Air France, 664 F.2d 62, 63-64 (5th Cir. 1981); Placid Investments, Ltd. v. Girard Trust Bank, 662 F.2d 1176, 1178 (5th Cir. 1981). Stated differently, article 2031b requires that there always be a nexus between the cause of action and the contacts relied 17a upon to justify jurisdiction, while due process does not always demand that such a nexus be shown. The source of the nexus requirement in Texas is the clear wording of the statute itself. Section 3 of article 2031b pro- vides: Any foreign corporation, association, joint stock com- pany, partnership, or non-resident natural person that engages in business in this State, irrespective of any Stat- ute or law respecting designation or maintenance of resi- dent agents, and does not maintain a place of regular business in this State or a designated agent upon whom service may be made upon causes of action arising out of such business done in this State, the act or acts of engag- ing in such business within the State shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such foreign corporation, joint stock company, association, partnership, or nonresi- dent natural person of the Secretary of State of Texas as agent upon whom service of process may be made in any action, suit or proceedings arising out of such business done in this State, wherein such corporation, joint stock company, association, partnership, or non-resident natu- ral person is a party or is to be made a party. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 3 (emphasis added).’ This statute determines the length that the “long ‘Section 2 of article 2031b also requires a nexus, although this section was not the basis for exercise of jurisdiction in the present case. Section 2 provides: When any foreign corporation, association, joint stock com- pany, partnership, or non-resident natural person, though not required by any Statute of this State to designate or maintain an —. $ engage in business in this State, in any action in which such corporation, joint stock company, association, part- nership, or non-resident natural person is a party or is to be made a party arising out of such business, service may be made by serving a copy of the process with the person who, at the time of (he service, is in charge of any business in which the defendant or defendants are en in this State, provided a copy of such process, together with notice of such service upon such person in ~ lXa arms” of Texas jurisdiction may extend. The quoted language unambiguously confines that reach to suits arising out of con- tacts with the state. Nothing in the development of article 2031b indicates that the nexus requirement should be disregarded. The statute was enacted in the wake of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), which greatly expanded the jurisdictional potential of the various states. The Supreme Court reasoned in International Shoe that the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant satisfies due process when the defend- ant has had “certain minimum contacts ... such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ Jd. at 316. This standard was broader in its effect than the “long-arm’ statutes then employed in most states, including Texas.‘ Most states, like Texas, responded to the action of the Supreme Court by enact- ing new statutes aimed at taking advantage of the expanded limits of potential jurisdiction. Yet, while the reach of a partic- ular statute could always be coextensive with constitutional charge of such business shall forthwith be sent to the defendant or to the defendants [sic] principal place of business by reg- istered mail, return receipt requested. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 2 (emphasis added). * Article 2031b became effective August 10, 1959. Prior to that time, Texas had no general jurisdictional statute. Instead, jurisdic- tion was based upon a nonresident moiorist statute, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2039a, and upon several statutes applying to nonresidents in specific circumstances, such as TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 3.65, 3.66, 21.38 §6; TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.11, 8.10; TEX. NON-PROFIT CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.09: TEX. REY. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 2031, 2031a, 2032, 2033, 2033b. See Thode, In Personam Jurisdiction; Article 2031b, The Texas “Long Arm” Jurisdiction Statute; And the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEXAS L. REV. 279, 304 n. 165 (1964) (hereinafter cited as Thode). 19a confines outlined by the Supreme Court, states were not com- pelled to assert jurisdiction that far. See Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., supra at 440; Prejean v. Sonatrach, Ine., supra at 1264; Thode, supra at 304. Some states took advantage of the full range of jurisdiction allowed. See, @.9g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.081(5) ( allowing jurisdiction over un- related causes of action whena foreign corporation has a “busi- ness office” in the state and engages in the transaction of business there); WIS. STAT. ANN, § 801.05 1) (jurisdiction over unrelated causes of action permitted when an individual carries on “substantial and not isolated activities” in the state). See also UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATION- AL PROCEDURE ACT § 1.02 (jurisdiction may be asserted as to unrelated causes of action when a defendant has his principal place of business in the state). Others wrote more restrictive statutes. Texas included the requirement that the jurisdiction be limited to causes of action arising from local activity.’ ‘The nexus requirement of article 2031b was contained in the original version of the act and has remained there unchanged since enactment. Comment, The Tezas Long-Arm Statute, Article 2031: A New Process Is Due, 30 Sw. LJ. 747, 747 (1976). The statute is thought to have been adapted from the 1947 Vermont “long-arm” Statute, which also contains a nexus requirement. The pertinent portion of that statute provides: If a foreign corporation makes a contract with a resident of Vermont to be performed in whole or in part by either party in Vermont, or if such foreign corporation commits a tort in whole or in part in Vermont against a resident of Vermont, such acts shall be deemed to be doing business in Vermont. . . and shall be deemed equivalent to the appointment .. . of the secretary of state of Vermont... to be its true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful process in any actions or proceed- . Ings. . . arising from or growing out of such contract or tort. oa VT. STAT. ANN. title 12, § 855, quoted in Thode, supra at 305 n. 167 (emphasis added). Other statutes adopted with similar provisions include: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1): MD. ANN. CODE, 20a Jurisdiction statutes stand as expressions of a state's in- terest, and the limits of that interest, in acquiring jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.‘ In this way, article 2031b may Courts and Judicial Proceedings, § 6-103; N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 302; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382. See also Precision Polymers, Inc. v. Nelson, 512 P.2d 811, 813 (Okla. 1973) (construing OKLA. STAT. title 12, $§ 187, 1701.03): Under the above holding if it does not appear from the record that plaintiff's cause of action arises out of or is based upon the same acts of defendant alleged to confer jurisdiction in personam of the defendant, plaintiff may not invoke the provisions of § 147, supra, to acquire jurisdiction of defendant. This holding is in harmony with the language of § 187, which limits its application “to any cause of action arising, or which shall have arisen, from doing any” of the acts therein enumerated. The Oklahoma statute requires a nexus notwithstanding the fact that the act has been construed to extend to constitutional limits. See Roberts v. Jack Richards Aircraft Co., 536 P.2d 353, 355 (Okla. 1975). ‘The United States Supreme Court has frequently looked to jurisdiction statutes to determine the extent of a state's expressed interest in acquiring jurisdiction over a particular lawsuit. In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 252 (1958), the Court distinguished the previous case of McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), by stating: This case is. . . different from McGee in that there the State had enacted special legislation (Unauthorized Insurers Process Act) toe xercise what .\VMeGee called its “manifest interest” in provid- ing effective redress for citizens who had been injured by nonresidents engaged in an activity that the State treats as exceptional and subjects to special regulation. Cf. Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647-49; Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 627; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352. See also Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 34. 95 (1978) (“California has not atternpted to assert any particularized interest in trying such cases in its courts by, ¢.g., enacting a special jurisdiction- al statute.”); Iowa Electric Light and Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979); Comment, Federalism, Due Process, and Minimum Contacts: World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 1341, 1345 (1980). 2la be seen as a reflection of Texas’ interest, as expressed by the legislature, in assuming jurisdiction over suits arising out of acts done in this state.’ A desire to gain jurisdiction over nonresidents for unrelated actions arising from activities out- side the state is not reflected in the history of the statute or in the act’s clear and unambiguous wording. Certainly, the legisl- ature could have drafted the statute in language expressly extending its effect to the full extent permitted by the Con- stitution, as it did in TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.26 (permitting the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident respondent “if there is any basis consistent with the constitu- tion of this state or the United States for the exercise of the personal jurisdiction”), or it could have simply left out in the nexus requirement, as in TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.10 (providing for service of process on foreign corporations authorized to transact business in the state). Absent such legislative action, however, we must enforce the clear provi- sions of article 2031b as presently written. See generally Fox v. Burgess, 157 Tex. 292, 297, 302 S.W.2d 405, 409 (1957); 2A ‘This is another way of saying that the legislature has expressed an interest in providing a forum for state residents who are injured by activities of nonresidents performed within the state’s bound- aries, and to require that the nonresident bear the costs of injuries caused by their activities in the state. That these considerations were factors in the drafting of the provisions of article 2031b is reflected indirectly in one commentator’s call for legislative action prior to the enactment of the statute. See Wilson, Jn Personam Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents: An Invitation and a Proposal, 9 BAYLOR L. REV. 363 (1957). The proposed draft of a statute included by Profes- sor Wilson in his article contained a nexus requirement ider.cical to the one found in article 2031b. This proposed draft is considered by some to have served as a model for the first five sections of the statute adopted by the legislature. Thode, supra at 303 n.151, 22a SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.04 (4th ed. 1973).’ Those who insist that the nexus requirement in article 2031b should be ignored rely upon L’-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978), as authority for the idea that the statute should extend to “constitutional limits.” This court used that broad language in its opinion in L’-Anchor, but it is evident from the facts and context of that case that the defendant's contacts with Texas formed the very basis for the cause of action sued upon. There- fore, the nexus requirement was satisfied and the court did not need to deal with that issue. Instead, the court examined the statutory definition of “doing business” located in section 4 of “It has been contended that the statute, article 2031b. was originally enacted to extend Texas “long-arm” jurisdiction to the full limits allowed after International Shoe, and that, if constitutional limits were actually broader than the legislature then believed, or if those limits have since been expanded, the statute’s scope should likewise be enlarged in order to reach to the maximum extent possi- ble. This argument is defective, however, for several reasons. First, article 2031p was enacted after Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., supra, which very clearly stated that states could, in certain instances, exercise jurisdiction over unrelated causes of ac- tion. 342 U.S. at 445-47. Second, even assuming that article 2031b was initially intended to be coextensive with due process, and due process was at that time believed to always require a nexus, we cannot assure that the drafters would have extended the statute to constitutional limits had the true limits been known, or when the limits were expanded. Perhaps the legislature was willing to extend article 2031b to constitutional limits only so long as a nexus was required. Finally, statutes drafted and enacted in other states near the time that article 2031b was written contained provisions authorizing the exercise of jurisdiction over unrelated causes of action in some cases, indicating that at least some legislatures had the idea that such an exercise of jurisdiction was constitutional. See, ¢.g., MD. ANN. CODE, Courts and Judicial Proceedings, § 6-102; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 801.05(1). 23a the act and, relying upon the “catchall” language of that sec- tion, construed the term “doing business” as broadly as the constitution would permit.’ In a sense, therefore, the court did extend the statute to constitutional limits by substituting the constitutional “minimum contacts” standard for the more restrictive “tort or contract” definition of “doing business.” In other words, the inquiry in jurisdiction cases after L’-Anchor became whether a defendant had had “minimum contacts” with this state, rather than whether he had committed a tort or entered into a contract here. While this construction expanded the scope of the statute to constitutional limits in the sense of section 4, however, it can in no way be seen to have affected the requirement in sections 2 and 3 that the cause of action “arise out of” the contacts with the forum. *The idea that article 2031b should “extend to constitutional lim- its” seems to have been lifted by the court from the comments of Professor Thode, supra. Like the court in L’-Anchor, Thode spoke of expanding the statute in the context of defining “doing business.” He stated: “[T]he specific language pertaining to contracts and torts is sufficiently broad to encompass all constitutionally permissible suits in these two areas of the law.” /d. at 307. Concerning the “catchall” phrase used by the court in L’-Anchor to accomplish the broadening of article 2031b to constitutional limits, Thode remarked: Does article 2031b provide for jurisdiction in the many areas of law other than tort or contract wherein a lawsuit could arise against a nonresident defendant’? The answer lies in the fact that section 4 also includes a catch-all clause... . The wording (of the clause) is ambi , but the other purpose is clear. The words “without including other acts that may constitute doing busi- ness” could be construed to mean that no other acts are to be included within the jurisdictional reach of article 2031b. But the obvious meaning, and the one consistent with the whole of the act, is that this catchall language is intended soenpand the jurisdictional scope of the sta ‘ute to constitutional limits “with- out incl other acts” in the s c description of acts that fall within the purview of the article 2031b. Id. at 307-08. 24a It is well established that the threshold inquiry in any in personam jurisdiction case is whether statutory requirements have been met. Only if the exercise of jurisdiction in a given instance is within the scope of statutory authority is the con- stitutionality of that exercise ever at issue. Prejean v. Sona- trach, Inc., supra at 1264; Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191, 196 (5th Cir. 1980); Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Lumar, 513 8.W.2d 251, 253 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1974, writ refd n.r.e.). The exercise of jurisdiction over Helicol in this tort action was heyond the scope of authority defined by article 2031b. The tort sued upon did not occur in Texas; it occurred in South America, and arose purely out of Helicol’s transacting business there. Helicol has had contacts with Texas, but there has been no allegation or proof that the purchase of helicopters in Fort Worth or the negotiation of a contract in Houston in any way caused the crash in Peru. Put simply, the contacts of Helicol with Texas did not give rise to the cause of action being asserted, and the nexus requirement contained in article 2031b has not been met. Absent this statutory authorization, jurisdiction may not be asserted. The statement that jurisdiction may not be exercised over Helicol because the cause of action is not related to the forum contacts is true regardless of the extent or quality of Helicol’s unrelated contacts. In Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., supra, one defendant, Beech, had extensive contacts with Texas, all unre- lated to the cause of action. These contacts were remarkably similar to Helicol’s activities in Texas, but were much more extensive. For example, Beech entered into an $11.1 million subcontract with Bell Helicopter in Fort Worth for the produc- tion of airframe assemblies, and had produced these for Bell continuously since 1967 under contracts exceeding $72 million. Id. at 1270 n.19. In addition, Beech had two employees resid- ing and conducting business in Texas. A local corporation wholly owned by the defendant had sold and serviced aircraft manufactured by Beech. Notwithstanding these contacts, which quite obviously constituted “doing business” in Texas, the court concluded that jurisdiction could not be asserted 25a because the activities were not shown to have the “slightest causal relationship with the decedent’s wrongful death.” /d. t 1270. In Jim For Enterprises, Inc. v. Air France, 664 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1981), the defendant, Air France, was doing “a thriving business in Texas." /d. at 65. It had a ticket office at Houston's Intercontinental Airport and a district sales office downtown. It listed six local telephone numbers in the Houston telephone directory, leased Texas real estate, employed Texas residents, and paid Texas employment and personal property taxes. Gross receipts from passenger ticket sales in Texas totalled in excess of $59 million. Nevertheless, the court in Jim For recognized that article 2031b requires a nexus between the cause of action and the contacts with Texas, and that Air France's contacts, being unrelated to the cause of action, were insufficient to support jurisdiction. In another case, Placid Investments, Ltd. v. Girard Trust Bank, 662 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1981), it was undisputed that the defendant did business in Texas. As noted by the court, the defendant maintained bank accounts in Texas, owned Texas real estate, and received revenue from Texas sources. /d. at 1178. None of these contacts, however, “gave rise” to the cause of action. As a result, the court concluded, the causal rela- tionship or nexus requirement in article 2031b was not met, and jurisdiction could not be asserted. Put simply, the boundaries of jurisdiction authorized by article 2031b are more restrictive than those defind by due process. If the state has an interest in asserting jurisdiction over suits unrelated to activity performed in the state, the legislature should act to extend the reach of the statute. Until the legislature does act, however, we must enforce the clear provisions of the present statute. Enforcement of that statute in the present case yields the result that Helicol was not subject to the jurisdiction of this state on the asserted cause of action. I would, therefore, affirm the judgment of the court of civil appeals, as this court did in the first opinion. 26a Due Process Because | believe that the requirements of article 2031b were not met in this case, I would not reach the constitutional question. Even if article 2031b authorized the exercise of jurisdiction, however, I would still conclude, as the court con- cluded in its original opinion, that the exercise of jurisdiction over Helicol exceeded the limits imposed by due process. As stated in the initial discussion, the Constitution will sometimes permit a state to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant for causes of action unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the forum. To state this fact, how- ever, is to state the exception and not the rule. Generally, a defendant's contacts with the forum state will only support the power to adjudicate with respect to issues arising from the very controversy sued upon. L. D. Reeder Contractors v. Hig- gins Industries, 265 F.2d 768, 773-75 (9th Cir. 1959); von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966) (hereinafter cited as von Mehren & Trautman); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 35(1) (1971). Only when the defendant has established a general business pre- sence in the state, characterized by “substantial and con- tinuous activity,” rnay the state assume jurisdiction over the defendant for unrelated causes of action. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., supra at 438, 445, 448; O'Neal v. Hicks Brokerage Co., 587 F.2d 1266, 1268 (4th Cir. 1976); Seymour v. Parke, Davis & Co., 423 F.2d 584, 585-86 (1st Cir. 1970); W. H. Elliott & Sons Co. v. Nuodex Products Co., 243 F.2d 116, 122 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957). See also R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CON- FLICT OF LAWS 145 (2d ed. 1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 35(3) (1971)." “The reason for placing emphasis upon contacts related to the cause of action has to do with the need to show a state interest in 27a The term “substantial and continuous activity” has a distinct meaning when used in the context of due process analysis. It suggests that the individual or corporate defendant is enough assuming jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. As explained in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344, 346-47 (5th Cir. 1966): “There mus* be a rational nexus between the fundamental events giving rise to the cause of action and the forum State which gives that State sufficient interest in the litigation before it may constitutionally compel litigants to defend in a foreign forum.” The United States Supreme Court had made it clear that a state's interest in subjecting a nonresident to its judicial jurisdiction is a fundamental factor to be considered in cases of this kind. In /nterna- tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the interest of the state was obvious in that the suit was brought by the state itself, for unpaid taxes. In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957), the validity of the exercise turned upon Califor- nia’s paramount interest in the litigation. The Court noted the state’s manifest interest in protecting its residents, stating: “These resi- dents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to follow the insurance company to a distant State.” In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251-52 (1958), the Court emphasized the absence of a substantial state interest, distinguishing McGee. The Court ex- plained: The cause of action in this case is not one that arises out of an act done or transaction consummated in the forum State. In that ene, it differs from McGee International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, and the cases there cited. In McGee, the nonresident defendant solicited a reinsurance ment with a resident of California. The offer was accepted in that State, and the in- surance premiums were mailed from there until the insured’s death. Noting the interest California has in providing effective redress for its residents when nonresident insurers refuse to pay claims on insurance they have solicited in that State, the Court wee jurisdiction because the suit “was based on a contract which had substantial connection with that State.” In contrast, this action involves the validity of an ment that was en- tered without any connection with the forum State. Contrary to this court’s conclusion on rehearing that Texas has an interest in adjudicating this case because the plaintiffs are United 28a of an “insider” in the forum that he may be safely relegated to the state’s political processes. Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 87 (1980). Achievement of such a position obviously requires more of the defendant than “mini- mum contacts.” Instead, the defendant must establish some close substantial connection with the state approaching the relationship between the state and its own residents.’ It was upon such a basis—the defendant’s operating temporary corporate headquarters in the forum state—that the Supreme Court upheld the exercise of jurisdiction over an unrelated States citizens, cases demonstrate that state interest in litigation is consistently derived from a state's desire to protect its own citizens and property and to effectuate its own regulatory policies. See, ¢.g., Blount v. Peerless Chemicals, Inc., 316 F.2d 695, 697 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 831 (1963); Compania de Astral v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 9438 (1955). See also Comment, Federalism, Due Process, and Minimum Contacts: World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1345 (1980). * This relationship is most commonly characterized by the fact that the forum state is the habitual residence, place of incorporation, or principal place of business for the defendant. See Seymour v. Parke, Davis & Co., supra at 587: “Ifthe plaintiff has some attachment to the forum, or if the defendant has adopted the state as one of its major places of business, we would have no question of the right of the state to subject the defendant to suit for unconnected causes of action.” See also Hill, Choice of Law and Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 960 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 35, comment e (1971): “The individual's activities in the State may . . . be so continuous and substantial as to justify the exercise of judicial jurisdiction over him as to causes of action arising from activities in other states. This is particularly likely to be true in a situation where the individual's principal place of business is in the State.” 29a cause of action in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., supra." This court, on rehearing of the present case, would consider the nexus between the cause of action and the forum contacts a necessary requirement only in cases involving “single or few” contacts with the forum state. The court remarks that a nexus is “unnecessary when the nonresident defendant's presence in the forum through numerous contacts is of such nature, as in this case, so as to satisfy the demands of the ultimate test of due process.” The “ultimate test of due process” then applied by the court is the “minimum contacts” standard. The error in this reasoning is that the nexus requirement is satisfied and becom- es unnecessary not upon a showing of “minimum contacts,” but upon a demonstration of the defendant’s substantial and con- tinuous activity in the forum. Absent a showing of such activ- ity, the nexus requirement becomes a highly significant factor. Given the additional fact that the forum has no other basis for establishing its interest in the lawsuit, such as by residence of the plaintiff, see Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 444 F.2d ° As stated in von Mehren & Trautman, supra at 1144: Given the facts of the case, the [Perkins] decision can be re- ed as approving the forum utilized as a surrogate for the place of incorporation or head office. Against the backdrop of increasingly refined thinking about specific jurisdiction to ad- judicate, and despite the Ohio court’s language on remand, the Perkins case should be regarded as a decision on its exceptional facts, not as a significant reaffirmation of obsolescing notions of general jurisdiction. See also Seymour v. Parke, Davis & Co., supra at 587 (limiting Perkins to its facts); Newton, Conflict of Laws, 34 Sw. L.J. 385, 394 (1980) (“The proper characterization of Perkins. . . is that it never offends traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice for a defendant to be sued in his own backyard, no matter where the cause of action arose.”) 30a 745 (4th Cir. 1971), the nexus requirement becomes control- ling. No state should assume jurisdiction over a case involving a nonresident plaintiff and defendant when the cause of action arises out of facts totally unrelated to the forum state. A separate concurrence filed on rehearing contends that the “long-arms” of state jurisdiction should extend more elastically when reaching for nonresident defendants who are citizens of other countries. While this argument may appeal to those who contend that noncitizens should receive less due process than United States citizens, cf. Plyler v. Doe, 50 U.S.L.W. 4650 (1982); Truar v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), it is nevertheless inconsistent with the way due process has been applied in previous cases. Although such a contention is rarely raised, cases dealing with jurisdictional issues invariably apply the same due process standards to citizens and noncitizens alike. See, e.g., Jim Fox Enterprises v. Air France, 664 F.2d 63 (Sth Cir. 1981); Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1981); Hutson v. Fehr Brothers, Inc., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1978); Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975); Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974); Bryant v. Finnish National Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439 (1965). See also A. EHRENZ- WEIG & E. JAYME, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW vol. II at 22 (1973) (neither party’s citizenship affects an Amer- ican court’s jurisdiction). Except for the purchase of helicopters and spare parts and the negotiation of a single contract to be performed in South America, Helicol conducted all of its business outside of the State of Texas. Nevertheless, the court has concluded that Helicol is subject to the jurisdiction of Texas courts for suits arising anywhere in the world. As a result, the court has established Texas as a “magnet” forum, drawing to its courts the trial of any lawsuit involving a defendant who has ever done business in Texas. Texas is now the courthouse for the world. I must conclude that this result is not only inconsistent with constitutional standards established in previous cases, but is 3la detrimental to the “fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra at 39. JACK PoPE Justice Chief Justice Greenhill and Justice Barrow join in this dis- sent. OPINION DELIVERED: July 21, 1982 32a IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS No. C-243 ELIZABETH HALL, et al., Petitioners, Vv. HELICOPTEROS NACIONALES DE CoLomsia, S.A. (“HELICOL”), Respondent. From Harris County, First DISTRICT DISSENTING OPINION I respectfully dissent. The former dissenting opinion handed down July 21, 1982, is withdrawn. The survivors of four nonresidents who were killed in an airplane crash in the jungles of Peru, have sued the defendant Helicol in Houston, Texas. Helicol is a resident corporation of Colombia, South America. Neither the plaintiffs, the decedents, the defendant, nor the tort action have any connection with Texas. The court makes Texas the courthouse for the world, requiring only that the plaintiff show that the defendant had made purchases of sup- plies from some unrelated business located in Texas. I disagree with the court’s opinion, because it is not grounded upon the correct facts and because our long-arm statute reaches only to “causes of action arising out of such business done in this State.” TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 20310. The court mistakenly says that Williams-Sedco-Horn, a Texas joint venture, was the party that contracted with the Peruvian owned oil company, Petro Peru. The opinion also says that the defendant Helicol negotiated and made its agree- ment with Williams-Sedco-Horn in Houston, Texas. The true facts, as stated by the court of civil appeals are that Williams- Sedco-Horn was not the party who contracted either with the 33a Peruvian oil company or with Helicol. The undisputed testi- mony was that Peru forbade a contract to construct the pipe- line with any corporation unless it was a Peruvian company. The contract, written in Spanish and approved by the govern- ment, was with Peruvian-based Consorcio, not Williams- Sedco-Horn. The parties to the contract for the helicopters were Consorcio and Helicol. The court of civil appeals so found and enforced that finding by its further reference to paragraph 19 of the contract, which states, in tae words of that court, “that all parties agree that Lima, Peru, is the residence for all related to the contract and that the parties submitted to the jurisdiction of Peru.” The court of civil appeals made these other significant findings: It [Helicol] does not conduct business, advertise, nor per- form any helicopter operations in Texas. It has never had a Texas charter nor has it ever had a contract to perform any work in Texas. Helicol’s operations are based —v in South America. It is difficult to conclude that Helicol had any expectation of availing itself of the benefits and protections of the law of the state of Texas. We can find no indication that Helicol intended to make a profit from any business deal undertaken in Texas. Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974). Article 2031b Requires a Nexus to Business Done in This State. Article 2031b expressly requires a nexus between the heli- copter crash and the contacts relied upon to justify jurisdic- tion. The nexus requirement in Texas is found in the clear wording of the statute itself. Section 3 of article 2031b pro- vides: Any foreign corporation, association, joint stock com- pany, partnership, or non-resident natural person that engages in business in this State, irrespective of any Stat- ute or law respecting designation or maintenance of resi- dent agents, and does not maintain a place of regular business in this State or a designated agent upon whom service may be made upon causes of action arising out of such business done in this State, the act or acts of engag- 34a ing in such business within the State shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such forei corporation, joint stock company, association, partnership, or nonresi- dent natural person of the Secretary of State of Texas as agent upon whom service of process may be made in any action, suit or proceedings arising out of such business done in this State, wherein such corporation, joint stock company, association, partnership, or non-resident natu- ral person is a party or is to to made a party. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, $3 (emphasis added). ’ Article 2031b was enacted in the wake of / nternational Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), which greatly ex- panded the jurisdictional potential of the various states. The Supreme Court reasoned in / nternational Shoe that the ex- ercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant satisfies due process when the defendant has had “certain minimum con- tacts. . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ "Jd. at 316. This standard was broader in its effect than the “long- ‘Section 2 of article 2031b also requires a nexus, although this section was not the basis for exercise of jurisdiction in the present case, Section 2 provides: When any foreign corporation, association, joint stock com- pany, + poopie 4 or non-resident natural person, though not required by any Statute of this State to designate or maintain an ent, shall engage in business in this State, in any action in which such corporation, joint stock company, association, part- nership, or non-resident natural person is a party or is to be made a party arising out of such business, service may be made | serving a copy of the process with the person who, at the time of the service, is in charge of wer tage gy in which the defendant or defendants are engaged in this State, provided a copy of such process, together with notice of such service upon such person in charge of such business shall forthwith be sent to the defendant or to the defendants (sic) principal place of business by reg- istered mail, return receipt requested. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 2 (emphasis added). 35a arm” statutes then employed in most states, including Texas.’ Most states, like Texas, responded to the action of the Su- preme Court by enacting statutes aimed at taking advantage of the expanded limits of potential jurisdiction. While the reach of a particular statute could always be coextensive with con- stitutional confines outlined by the Supreme Court, states were not compelled to assert jurisdiction that far. See Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 440 (1952); Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1264 (5th Cir. 1981). Some states took advantage of the full range of jurisdic- tion allowed. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.081(5) (allow- ing jurisdiction over unrelated causes of action when a foreign corporation has a “business office” in the state and engages in the transaction of business there); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 801.05(1) (jurisdiction over unrelated causes of action per- mitted when an individual carries on “substantial and not iso- lated activities” in the state). See also UNIFORM IN- TERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT § 1.02 (jurisdiction may be asserted as to unrelated causes of action when a defendant has his principal place of business in the state). Texas and other states wrote more restrictive stat- * Article 2031b became effective August 10, 1959. Prior to that time, Texas had no general jurisdictional statute. Instead, jurisdic- tion was based upon a nonresident motorist statute, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 20392, and upon several statutes applying to nonresidents in specific circumstances, such as TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 3.65, 3.66, 21.38 § 6; TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.11, 8.10; TEX. NON-PROFIT CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.09; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 2031, 2031a, 2032, 2033, 2033b. See Thode, In Personam Jurisdiction; Article 2031b, The Texas “Long Arm” Jurisdiction Statute; And the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEXAS L. REV. 279, 304 n.165 (1964) (hereinafter cited as Thode]. 36a utes. Texas included the requirement that the jurisdiction be limited to causes of action arising from loca! activity.’ ‘The nexus requirement of article 2031b was contained in the original version of the act and has remained there unchanged since enactment. Comment, The Texas Long-Arm Statute, Article 2031): A New Process Is Due, 30 Sw. L.J. 747, 747 (1976). The statute is thought to have been adapted from the 1947 Vermont “long-arm” statute, which also contains a nexus requirement. The pertinent portion of that statute provides: If a foreign corporation makes 4 contract with a resident of Vermont to be performed in whole or in part by either party in Vermont, or if such foreign corporation commits a tort in whole or in part in Vermont against a resident of Vermont, such acts shall be deemed to be doing business in Vermont. . . and shall be deemed equivalent to the appointment... of the secretary of state of Vermont . . . to be its true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful process in any actions or proceed- ings ... arising from or growing out of such contract or tort VT. STAT. ANN. title 12, § 855, quoted in Thode, supra at 305 n. 167 (emphasis added). Other statutes adopted with similar provisions include: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §17(1); MD. ANN. CODE, Courts and Judicial Proceedings, § 6-103; N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 302; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382. See also Precision Polymers, Inc. v. Nelson, 512 P.2d 11, $13 (Okla. 1973) (construing OKLA. STAT. title 12, §§ 187, 1701.03): Under the above holding if it does not appear from the record that plaintiff's cause of action arises out of or is based upon the same acts of defendant alleged to confer jurisdiction in personam of the defendant, plaintiff may not invoke the provisions of § 187, supra, to acquire sear of defendant. This holding is in harmony with the language of § 187, which limits its application “to any cause of action arising, or which shall have arisen, from doing any” of the acts therein enumerated. The Oklahoma statute requires a nexus notwithstanding the fact that the act has been construed to extend to constitutional limits. See Roberts v. Jack Richards Aircraft Co., 536 P.2d 353, 355 (Okla. 1975). 37a Jurisdiction statutes express the limits of a state's interest, in acquiring jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.‘ Article 2031b limits Texas’ interest, to suits arising out of acts done in this state.’ A desire to gain jurisdiction over nonresidents for ‘The United States Supreme Court has frequently looked to jurisdiction statutes to determine the extent of a state's expressed interest in acquiring jurisdiction over a particular lawsuit. In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 252 (1958), the Court distinguished the previous case of McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), by stating: This case is. . . different from McGee in that there the State had enacted special legislation (Unauthorized Insurers Process Act) to exercise what McGee called its “manifest interest” in provid- ing effective redress for citizens who had been injured by nonresidents engaged in an activity that the State treats as exceptional and subjects to special regulation. Cf. Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647-49; Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 627; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352. See also Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978) (“California has not attempted to assert any particularized interest in trying such cases in its courts by, ¢.g., enacting a special jurisdiction- al statute.”); Iowa Electric Light and Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 603 F.2d 1301 (&th Cir. 1979); Comment, Federalism, Due Process, and Minimum Contacts: World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1341, 1345 (1980). 5 This is another way of saying that the legislature has expressed an interest in providing a forum for state residents who are injured by activities of nonresidents performed within the state's bound- aries, and to require that the nonresident bear the costs of injuries caused by their activities in the state. That these considerations were factors in the drafting of the provisions of article 2031b is reflected indirectly in one commentator’s call for legislative action prior to the enactment of the statute. See Wilson, Jn Personam Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents: An Invitation and a Proposal, 9 BAYLOR L. REV. 363 (1957). The proposed draft of a statute included by Profes- sor Wilson in his article contained a nexus requirement identical to the one found in article 2031b. This proposed draft is considered by some to have served as a model for the first five sections of the statute adopted by the legislature. Thode, supra at 303 n.151. 38a unrelated actions arising from activities outside the state is not reflected in the history of the statute or in the act’s clear and unambiguous wording. Certainly, the legislature could have drafted the statute in language expressly extending its effect to the full extent permitted by the Constitution, as it did in TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.26 (permitting the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident respondent “if there is any basis consistent with the constitution of this state or the United States for the exercise of the personal jurisdiction”), or it could have left out the nexus requirement, as in TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.10 (providing for service of process on foreign corporations authorized to transact business in the state). Absent such legislative action, however, we must en- force the clear provisions of article 2031b as presently written. See generally For v. Burgess, 157 Tex. 292, 297, 302 S.W.2d 405, 409 (1957); 2A SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CON- STRUCTION § 46.04 (4th ed. 1973).° *It has been contended that the statute, article 2031b, was originally enacted to extend Texas “long-arm” jurisdiction to the full limits allowed after /nternational Shoe, and that, if constitutional limits were actually broader than the legislature then believed, or if those limits have since been expanded, the statute's scope should likewise be enlarged in order to reach to the maximum extent possi- ble. This argument is defective, however, for several reasons. First, article 2031b was enacted after Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., supra, which held that states could, in rare instances, exercise jurisdiction over unrelated causes of action. 342 U.S. at 445-47. Second, even assuming that article 2031b was initially in- tended to be coextensive with due process, and due process was at that time believed to always require a nexus, we cannot assume that the drafters would have extended the statute to constitutional limits had the true limits been known, or when the limits were expanded. Perhaps the legislature was willing to extend article 2031b to con- stitutional limits only so long as a nexus was required. Finally, statutes drafted and enacted in other states near the time that article 39a Two prior opinions by this court hold that the nexus was required and in both cases, it was present. In O’Brien v. Lanpar Company, 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966), we upheld an Illinois default judgment against O’Brien, a nonresident Texas corporation whose president went to Illinois and em- ployed the plaintiff as its attorney. We then stated this three- prong requisite for jurisdiction over a nonresident: *** Such would appear to be: (1) The nonresident defendant or foreign corporation must purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in the forum state; (2) the cause of action must arise from, or be con- nected with, such act or transaction; and (3) the assump- tion of jurisdiction by the forum state must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, consideration being given to the quality, nature, and ex- tent of the activity in the forum state, the relative con- venience of the parties, the benefits and protection of the laws of the forum state afforded the respective parties, and the basic equities of the situation. U’-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977), was the next time this court wrote on this subject. U-Anchor, a Texas corporation, solicited a contract with de- fendant Burt in Oklahoma to place advertising displays at points along Oklahoma highways. Burt agreed to pay U- Anchor $80.00 a month for 36 months and to make the pay- ments at U-Anchor’s office in Amarillo, Texas. We held that U-Anchor’s cause of action against Burt satisfied the nexus required of article 2031b. We wrote that it was “connected with the contractual obligation assumed by Burt and partially per- formable in Texas.” /d. at 762. We held, however, that Burt could not be sued in Texas because U-Anchor failed to satisfy 2031b was written contained provisions authorizing the exercise of jurisdiction over unrelated causes of action in some cases, indicating that at least some legislatures had the idea that such an exercise of jurisdiction was constitutional. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE, Courts and Judicial Proceedings, § 6-102; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 801.05(1). 40a the first and third requirements of O’Brien, supra at 763. As to the first requirement, we held that Burt's contacts with Texas were not purposefully conducted activities within Texas. Con- cerning the third requirement, we held that Burt's mailing of checks for payment to U-Anchor in Amarillo was a minimal contact. In contrast with those few contacts, we wrote that the solicitation, negotiation and consummation of the contract in Oklahoma showed that Burt might reasonably expect enforce- ment to be governed by Oklahoma rather than Texas law. There is more reason here than in L’-Anchor to deny Texas jurisdiction. The four plaintiffs worked for Consorcio. The contract fixed jurisdiction in Peru. Billings for work had to be made by Helicol to Consorcio in Peru. In L’-Anchor, we held that Burt was no more than a passive customer of a Texas corporation, in that instance, the very party who was sued. In this case, however, Helicol has been pulled from Peru to Texas because it has been a customer of Bell Helicopter in Fort Worth. It had transactions with a company that in no way was connected with this litigation. L’-Anchor is no support for the majority opinion. The majority opinion disregards the statutory requirement that suit may be brought against a foreign corporation “upon causes of action arising out of such business done in this State.” The construction of article 2031b, here urged, conforms to that of the Fifth Circuit in several recent decisions. In Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1981), one defend- ant, Beech, had extensive contacts with Texas, all unrelated to the cause of action. These contacts were similar to Helicol’s activities in Texas, but were much more extensive. For ex- ample, Beech entered into an $11.1 million subcontract with Bell Helicopter in Fort Worth for the production of airframe assemblies, and had produced these for Bell continuously since 1967 under contracts exceeding $72 million. /d. at 1270 n.19. In addition, Beech had two employees residing and conducting business in Texas. A local corporation wholly owned by the defendant had sold and serviced aircraft manufactured by 4la Beech. These contacts constituted “doing business” in Texas, but the court concluded that jurisdiction in Texas could not be asserted because the activities were unrelated to the cause sued upon. They did not have the “slightest causal relationship with the decedent’s wrongful death.” /d. at 1270. In Jim Fox Enterprises, Inc. v. Air France, 664 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1981), the defendant, Air France, was doing “a thriving business in Texas.” /d. at 65. It had a ticket office at Houston’s Intercontinental Airport and a district sales office downtown. It listed six local telephone numbers in the Houston telephone directory, leased Texas real estate, employed Texas residents, and paid Texas employment and personal property taxes. Gross receipts from passenger ticket sales in Texas totalled in excess of $59 million. Nevertheless, the court in Jim For recognized that article 2031b requires a nexus between the cause of action and the contacts with Texas, and that Air Fran [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_0228%3A01. Public record. Not legal advice.