# Amicus Brief — Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1984
- **Citation:** 467 U.S. 837

## Text

-

Supreme Court of the United States

Octoser Term, 1982

* ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMEN-
a TAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
5 Petitioner,

.
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL, INC., ef al.
Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

— —

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No.

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1982

ADMINISTRATOR,
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Petitioner,
V.
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, et al.

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF OF
MID-AMERICA LEGAL FOUNDATION AS AMICUS CURIAE
SUPPORTING THE POSITION OF PETITIONER

Mid-America Legal Foundation ("Mid-America")

moves the Court for leave to file the accompanying

Brief as amicus curiae in support of the captioned

petition for a writ of certiorari, as well as the related
petitions filed by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. in Docket No.
82-1005 and by American Iron and Steel Institute et al.

in Docket No. 82-1247,

.
3
Ys “77.

The Solicitor General, counsel to petitioner, has
consented to this filing. His written consent is filed
with the Clerk of the Court. Counsel to certain
respondents have not consented, thereby necessitating
this motion. )

Mid-America was organized in 1975 to engage in
legal research, study and analysis for the benefit of
the general public as to the effect of evolving concepts
of law on our democratic institutions. Mid-America
takes special interest in issues of a national scope that
originate in or have a direct effect on the mid-America
region, namely Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan,
Minnesota, Ohio and Wisconsin. Mid-America has an
interest in this case because the region is one of the
most important manufacturing areas of the Nation.

In the accompanying brief, Mid-America as amicus
curiae presents data from the Harvard Business School
case study of an air pollution control program utilizing
the bubble“ concept at the Middletown, Ohio steel
plant of Armco, Inc. In announcing the expected
approval of the plan by former Administrator, Douglas
M. Costle, EPA stated that, "Armco's bubble! dust
control plan would eliminate 4,000 tons per year of

particulate as compared to 652 tons per year under
existing regulations."

Amicus presents the empirical evidence and analy-
sis set out in the Harvard study to advance two points
in support of the petitions for a writ of certiorari.

? First, there is no inconsistency between the
"bubble" concept and either the language of the Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seg. (the "Act") or the
purpose of Congress in bringing all air quality regions
of the United States into compliance with the national
ambient air quality standards pursuant to Part D of
the Act. In fact, as the Harvard study demonstrates,
considerably greater improvement in air quality may be
achieved with the bubble concept than without it.

Second, altvsent such inconsistency, the policy
decision of the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency to approve state implementation
plans which permit use of the bubble concept and
otherwise meet the requirements of the Act, as re-
flected in the challenged reguletion, must be sus-
tained. .

In the brief, Mid-America urges the Court to
grant the petitions for a writ of certiorari because the

court of appeals has decided an important question of
federal law which has not been, but should be, settled
by this Court and has done so in a way in conflict
with Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977), and

Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975).

Accordingly, Mid-America requests leave to file

the accompanying brief as amicus curiae.

Respectfully submitted,

onn M. Cannon
Susan W. Wanat
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

OF COUNSEL:

Ann P. Sheldon
William H. Link, Jr.

Mid-America Legal Foundation
Suite 842

20 North Wacker Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60606

(312) 263-5163

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE „ ew setae eee
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT „ eee R tr b
ARGUMENT * 7 * * * * * * * * * eee 3
I. Use of the bubble“ concept is
consistent with the improvement
Of etm / . CS

II. The policy judgment of the
Administrator was rejected
in a way in conflict with
Batterton and Train. ......... Il

CONCLUSION ....2cceeveves 6 as. eae

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,
8 C. ir. 9) 2

ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F. 2d 319

0

Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977)...

Baur v. Mathews, 578 F.2d
D

Train v. NRD C, 421 U.S. 60, (1975)

Statutes
N ae CeCe? vas 2 6 8 ee
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.§ 7401 et seq.

Section 111, ed 17411

Part C, * § 7470 et seq.

Part D, n 17501 et seq.
Other

A. Kantrow, D. Dyer and J. Fox,

Armco and the Bubble Policy, (1981)
(distributed by HBS Case Services,

Harvard Business School, Boston,

Mass. G16)

(1976)

Comment, An Overview of the Bubble Concept,

8 Colum., J. Envtl. L.

46 Fed. Reg. 8683 (January 27, 1981)
46 Fed. Reg. 19468 (March 31, 1981)

4-9

10

10

No.

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1982

ADMINISTRATOR,

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL ae ae AGENCY >

Petitioner,
Vv *

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., et al.

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF OF MID-AMERICA LEGAL FOUNDATION
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING THE
~~POSTTION OF PETITIONER

INTEREST OF AMICUS

The interest of amicus is set out in the accompa-

nying motion for leave to file this brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The court of appeals has invalidated regulations
of the Environmental Protection Agency which allowed

the application of a "bubble" concept to new source
review requirements in areas which have not attained
the national ambient air quality standards under the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (the "Act").
It did so by ruling that the bubble“ concept is
incompatible with those provisions of the Act which
have the purpose of improying rather than maintaining
air quality. The court of appeals thereby decided an
important federal question which has not been, but
should be, settled by this Court and did so in a way
in conflict with Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416

(1977), and Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975).

First, there is no inconsistency, between the
"bubble" concept and either the language of the Act or
the purpose of Congress in bringing all air quality
regions of the United States into compliance with the
national ambient air quality standards pursuant to Part
D of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7501 et seq. in fact, as

the Harvard Study presented herein demonstrates,

considerably greater improvement in air quality may be

achieved with the bubble concept than without it.
Second, absent such inconsistency, the policy

judgment of the Administrator of the Environmental

Protection Agency, reflected in the challenged regu-
lation, must be sustained. Contrary to the decision of

the court of appeals in this case, ASARCO, Inc. v.

EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978), did not hold

otherwise and cannot be controlling here,
ARGUMENT

I. Use of the "bubble" concept is consistent with the
improvement of air quality.

There is no incompatibility between the "bubble"
concept and either the language of the Clean Air Act
or the legislative purpose of bringing all air quality
regions of the United States into compliance with the
national ambient air quality standards pursuant to Part
D of the Act. In fact, use of the bubble“ concept in
nonattainment areas not only may achieve greater air
quality improvemenf than the stack by stack approach,
but may also speed up the achievement of clean air
standards in nonattainment areas. This was
demonstrated in the case study of an air pollution
control program at the Middletown, Ohio steel plant of

Armco, Inc. which was prepared for class discussion
at the Harvard Business School.

The Middletown plant site produced 3
million tons of steel yearly, covered 2,600
acres, employed roughly 7,000 people, and
stockpiled (depending on the season) some-
thing on the order of 670,000 tons of raw
materials. Its various operations were well
monitored by the EPA. Even though mea-
surements at only one of the monitoring
stations on the periphery and in the vicinity
of the plant exceeded the primary TSP
ambient air standard of 75 ug/m (micro-
grams per cubic meter, a measure of densi-
ty), that single station resulted in the
Middletown area's being designated a "nonat-
tainment“ area.

Harvard Study Part A, at 1 (exhibits and footnotes
omitted).

To deal with Armco's problem and others like it,
Congressional hearings and a White House conferefice
were held. In addition, Anthony Solomon,
Undersecretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs,
chaired a special task force on industry problems

whose recommendations appeared in 3 December, 1977

1. Kantrow, D. Dyer and J. Fox, Armco and the

Bubble Policy, (1981) (distributed By ABS Case
Services, wave Business School, Boston,

Massachusetts 02163) (hereinafter cited as the
"Harvard Study").

report, A Comprehensive Program for the. Steel

Industry. Seeking a middle ground between
"environmental animus and industry complaint," the
Solomon Committee recommended that government and
industry cooperate in a study of new solutions to the
probleme of pollution control. Harvard Study at 2.

Emissions standards, as then fixed by
legislation, generally applied on a process-
by-process basis to each individual stage of
the steelmaking operations. They also
applied, on a point-by-point basis, to indi-
vidual sources of pollution. As a result,
plants in violation of ambient air standards
for total emissions could not remedy the
situation merely by undertaking that mix of
corrective actions that would have the great-
est immediate effect on overall ambient air
quality. Even though the problem had to do
with the general level of TSP emissions,
corrective action had to be addressed to
specific contributory sources - whether or
not they were responsible for the bulk of
the problem.

Id. at 5.

Several flaws were thought to be implicit in the
logic of this existing environmental regulation. For
example:

To those who, following the technology-
forcing legislation, viewed abatement activity
primarily in terms of individual process- or
point-TSP emissions, the only appropriate
measure of success was the absolute level of
TSP reduction per individual source. If 80%
of a given smokestack's emission could be

*

kept out of the atmosphere, 90% was even
better, and 100% ("zero emissions") was best
of all. At one level, of course, this was
pure common sense; at another, however, it
was profoundly misleading, for to think in
these terms was to ignore the fact that each
additional increment of pollution reduction
costs a good deal more than the previous
one. In other words, to achieve the last
tiny marginal improvement in ambient air
quality for a given smokestack - an improve-
ment which, when measured in absolute TSP
reduction, is insignificant - is far more
expensive than to achieve gross TSP re-
ductions for other pollution sources. For
example, the first 95% of TSP reduction for
an electric furnace cost 3.5¢/Ib.; the next
4%, 30¢/Ib.; and the final 1%, $35/Ib.

Also implicit in the accepted regulatory
logic, Armco felt, was the notion that all
forms of pollution control employ roughly
equivalent amounts of energy. In other
words, the specific EPA standards, as they
stood, made no allowance at all for the
differential consumption of energy. [Armco's
director of environmetnal engineering!
thought this both narrow-minded and self-
defeating: narrow-minded because energy,
like clean air, was a finite good, meriting
conservation; self-defeating because the
production of usable energy itself-entailed a
certain predictable level of air pollution.
There was a law of diminishing returns in
control activity, a point beyond which the
production of energy needed for incremental
control created more emissions than it
removed. For example, "To produce the
electricity to run the fans and motors to
clean up the scarfing machine [at the Kansas
City plant] meant that the local power plant
would produce more pollution than we will
capture."

Id. at 6-7 (exhibits and footnotes omitted).

In seeking alternatives to this type of
self-defeating regulation, EPA hired the Midwest
Research Institute to develop a scientific basis for
accurately estimating pollution from open dust sources.
By 1978, the Institute had perfected a series of
emissions factor equatiors for. doing so. These
equations made possible for the first time a full
inventory of pollution sources. This test, using a
methodology called "exposure profile sampling“ yielded
the following results at Armco's Middletown plant.

Contrary to expectations, roughly 60%
of particulates came neither from stack nor
process emissions but, instead, from open
dust sources. Even when differential parti-
cle size was taken into account, the result
remained pretty much the same. For all
particulates less than 30 um (microns), open
dust emissions were six times greater than
process fugitive emissions, which were the
focus of EPA concern. For particulates less
than 5 um (the size most responsible for
ambient air quality more than 1 mile from an
industrial site), open dust emissions were
still three times greater than process fugi-
tive emissions.

Given these figures [Armco officials]
realized that "there [was] very little room
for further reduction [in TPS levels] from
presently controlled sources by adding more
efficient controls." To attack the remaining
smokestack or process emissions would be to
direct Armco's efforts toward a relatively
minor part of the problem... .

.. To cite the most striking example,
controlling windblown emissions from raw

materials piles would remove 284 tons of
particulates from the air each year (a re-
duction of some 60%) at a capital cost of
$200,000 - or $704 per ton - and with an
energy expenditure of 46 KWH per ton. By
contrast, controlling fugitive emissions from
open hearth operations would remove only 64
tons of particulates from the air each year
(a reduction of 80%) at a capital cost of
$4,000,000 - or $63,992 per ton - and with
an energy expenditure of 179,700 KWH per
ton. These were staggering numbers in-
deed. By focusing efforts on open dust
instead of process fugitive sources, Armco
could get more particulates out of the air at
1/89th the cost per ton and with 1/3906th
the energy.

Id. at 8-9 (exhibit and footnote omitted).

After much study and on-site monitoring of a
pilot project at the Middletown plant, EPA announced
the expected approval of Armco's specific bubble plan
by EPA Administrator, Douglas M. Costle. In a press
release issued on October 20, 1980, EPA stated:

It is our judgment that Armco will be
able to satisfy the "bubble" requirements
and EPA will be able to act favorably on
Ohio's State Implementation Plan for the area
affected by the plant when it is submitted
by the State,' Costle said.

.. A joint air monitoring study bv federal,
state and local governments and Armco has
confirmed in a pilot project that this bubble
is effective and has resulted in significant

improvements in ot oun 58
rmco's ubble ust control plan

would eliminate 4,000 tons per year of

particulates as compared to 652 tons per
year under existing regulations.

Harvard Study, Part D, Ex. 2, p.2-3 quoting EPA
"Environmental News." (emphasis added).

Following submission of the required technical
support documents, EPA formally proposed the
conditional approval of the Ohio plan on January 27,
1981, 46 Fed. Reg. 8683, and gave that approval on
March 31, 1981, 46 Fed. Reg. 19468. The Harvard
Study and the data obtained by EPA in support of the
Ohio plan illustrate that a policy which allows use of
the bubble“ concept may provide significantly greater
improvement in air quality than a contrary policy
which precludes it.

In addition to providing greater improvements in
air quality, the bubble policy may speed up the
achievement of clean air standards because it enables
firms operating the sources of air pollutants to revise
their control policies to achieve the most cost effective
method of meeting the requirements of the Act. Plant
enginsers may turn their sights to inventing new and
more effective pollution control devices.

Traditional command and control“ regulations
may actually deter the development of new

technology because firms, fearing that new
items of capital equipment will be specifically
required, may hide information about more
effective means of pollution reduction. By
contrast, the bubble would serve as an
incentive for developing cost-effective pol-
lution control technology since, when not
forced to use particular technologies, a
buyer will choose the least expensive means
of satisfying emissions limitations. Comment,
An Overview of the Bubble Concept, 8
Colum. J. Envtl. L. 137, 1 :

Some have voiced concern that use of the bubble
might allow the reduction of less harmful emissions as
a tradeoff for not reducing more hazardous air pollu-
tants. This objection is not well-founded. The equiv-
alence of tradeoffs may be addressed directly. Limita-
tions designed to ensure that the facility-wide defini-
tion of stationary source is used to improve air quality
and meet other requirements of the Act are not

incompatible with the bubble concept. See EPA's

Widening Embrace of the Bubble Concept: The Legality

and Availability of Intra-Source Trade-Offs, 9 Envtl.

L. Rep. 10027, 10029 (1979).
Thus, since the use of the bubble concept has
been shown to be capable of improving air quality, use

of the bubble in nonattainment areas is not

10

inconsistent with the purpose of Congress in enacting
Part D of the Act.

II. The policy judgment of the Administrator was
rejected in a way in conflict with Batterton and Train.

It is well established both by principles of admin-
istrative law and the decisions of this Court that in
the absence of a conflict between the policy judgment
of an agency administrator charged with responsibility
for implementing a federal statute and either the
language or purpose of that act, the agency decision
must be sustained. See Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 706; Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416
(1977); and Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, (1975). In

the decision below, that principle was turned on its
head when the court of appeals substituted its judg-
ment for the policy decision of the EPA Administrator
to approve state implementation plans allowing the use
of a bubble concept which is based on the language of
the Act itself. A facility-wide definition of "stationary
source" in the verbatim language of Section 111 of the
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411, was the regulatory mechanism

11

utilized by EPA to authorize the "bubble" concept for
the nonattainment provisions of Part D of the Act.

The presumption in favor of the agency's policy
judgment is based on practical concerns about the
proper utilization of agency expertise. As noted in

Baur X. Mathews, 578 F. 2d 228, 233 (9th Cir, 1978):

The administrative agency clothed with
responsibility for implementing congressional
pronouncements is generally well acquainted
with the policy of the statute it administers.
This is particularly true when the agency
has long been involved in the construction
and administration of a given statute or its
predecessors. Where, as here, the agency
has extensive experience, has relied on the
common meaning of the relevant statute's
specific language, and can point to important
congressional purposes furthered by its
interpretation, only a clear showing of a
contrary intent by Congress will justify
overruling the agency's regulations.

The special competence of EPA to interpret its
mandate under the Clean Air Act is well recognized.
In Train, this Court sustained an EPA regulation as
"sufficiently reasonable" without going so far as to
hold that such construciion was "the only one it
permissibly could have adopted,” 421 U.S. at 75.

This Court also noted that judicial review should
allow d proper degree of flexibility for administrative
proceedings:

12

.
:
5
ay
.
OF,
we,

The fact that the interpretation placed on
the section by the Agency may on occasion
require administrative flexibility and ingenu-
ity to a greater degree than would a more
rigid alternative is not, of course, a reason
for rejecting the Agency's otherwise reason-
able construction.

421 U.S. at 94 n. 28,

The limitations on judicial review of administrative
action were reiterated by this Court in Batterton.
The Secretary, similar to the EPA Administrator, was
delegated authority by Congress to prescribe stan-
dards in order to accomplish the purposes of the Act.
This Court stated the applicable principle of law as
follows:

In a situation of this kind, Congress en-
trusts to the Secretary, rather than the
courts, the primary responsibility for inter-
preting the statutory term. In exercising
that responsibility, the Secretary adopts
regulations with legislative effect. A
reviewing court is not free to set aside those
regulations simply because it would have
interpreted the statute in a _ different
manner.

432 U.S. at 426.7

2Here, the court of appeals noted specifically that
"EPA, it is not disputed, has authority to define the
constituent terms of source enumerated in the statute
‘("building, structure, facility or installation“) in a

13

17

Under these circumstances, where there is no
conflict with the language of the Act, the legitimate
inquiries a reviewing court should make are whether
the administrator "exceeded his statutory authority“
and whether the "regulation is ‘arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.“ Id. at 426. The decision below clearly
failed to do so. As a result, the court of appeals
substituted its judgment for the policy judgment of the
EPA Administrator in the absence of any conflict with
either the language or the purpose of the Act. It did
so by relying solely on the prior decision in ASARCO,
Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C.Cir. 1978), as having

established that the bubble concept is inconsistent with
the improvement of air quality. AS ARCO, however,

manner that will dest effectuate the expressed
2 of the Act.“ 685 F.2d at 723 n. 22; Chevron
et. Cert. Appx. at A-9 n. 22.

3685 P. 2d at 727-28; Chevron Pet. Cert. Appx. at
A-16-17. "We express no view on the decision we
would reach if the line drawn in Alabama Power and
ASARCO did not control our judgment.” 685 F.2d at
720 nn. 7; Chevron Pet. Cert. 17 4 at A-4 n. 7.
Alabama Power Co, v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D. C. cir.

» man a bu concept under Part C of the

14

es

did not hold that the bubble concept is incompatible
with improving air quality.

The regulation involved in ASARCO sought to
redefine the statutory term "facility" in Section 111 of
the Act to mean "a combination of such units.“ 578
F.2d at 327. This was rejected as "inconsistent with
the language of the Act.“ Ibid. The ASARCO court
clearly stated that its consideration of "the purpose of
the Clean Air Act and Section 111“ merely "reinforced"
the decision which was based on this conflict between
the language of the regulation involved in that case
and the language of the Act. Ibid. No such conflict
is present in this case. The regulation here at issue
incorporates the relevant statutory language verbatim.

It does not redefine "facility" or any other statutory
&

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7470 et „ for areas which have
attained the national ambient dir quality standards.

4 amicus here assumes arguendo that ASARCO was

y decided on its own terms. The alternative
argument that ASARCO should not be controlling here
because it was Incorrectly decided and conflicts with
Alabama Power, must also be noted. See Chevron Pet.

Cert. pp. 7-10.

15

term. Accordingly, since the basis of the AS ARCO

decision is completely inapplicable to this case, it
cannot be controlling here.

The reinforcing dictum of ASARCO ‘that the
bubble concept is inconsistent with "the purpose of the
Clean Air Act and Section 111," could not and did not

hold that the different application of the differently
worded bubble concept which the Administrator here
adopted for Part D of the Act is inconsistent with the
improvement of air quality. By ruling otherwise, the
court below failed to make even one of the rulings or
findings required to set aside the action of the
Administrator under the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 706. Policy decisions of an agency are

"entitled to more than mere deference or weight" and

5ASARCO expressly noted that, in proper
circumstances, the statutory term „facility“ could cover
an entire plant. 578 F.2d at 324 n. 17.

6578 F.2d at 327-30 (emphasis added). Even if it had
done 80, such a conclusion would be subject to
reconsideration as inconsistent with the factual data
subsequently developed by EPA, including the
measurement techniques developed for EPA by the
Midwest Research Institute and the joint monitoring
study at Middletown. See pp.6-8 supra.

16

3

can be set aside only if the Administrator "exceeded
his statutory authority or if the regulation is
‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.'" 432 U.S. at
426.

CONCLUSION

The Court below has decided an important ques-
tion of federal law which has not been, but should be,
settled by this Court and has done so in a way in
conflict with the decisions of this Court in Batterton
and Train.

For these reasons and the reasons set forth in
the petitions, a writ of certiorari should issue to
review the judgment and opinion of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

OF COUNSEL: Respectfully submitted,

Ann P. Sheldon
William H. Link, Jr.
Mid-America Legal Foundation
Suite 842 N M.

20 North Wacker Drive usan W. Wanat
Chicago, Illinois 60606 Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

We wish to acknowled the assistance of Mary
Jane Chapman and Paul J. Cummiskey, law students at
DePaul University College of Law.

17

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_0106%3A05. Public record. Not legal advice.
