# Appendix — Lins v. United States

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_0011%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1983
- **Citation:** 459 U.S. 1147

## Text

21
APPENDIX

Table of content:

1) Decision by the Court of Claims,
No, 594-81-C, Sept. 8, 1982

2) Notices by Federal Reserve Bank

3) Subpoena by the District Court for
the Southern District of New York,
Sept. 6, 1974

4) Decree by the Swiss Prosecutor (excerpt),
Aug. 4, 1978

5) Time-Table

ll

12

Gn the Gnited States Court of Glaims

No. 594-81C

(Decided September 8, 1982)

RENE E. LINS
v. THE UNITED STATES

Rene E. Lins, pro se.
Charles L. Schlumberger, with whom was Assistant
Attorney General J. Paul McGrath, for defendant.

Before FrigepMAN, Chief Judge, KasHiwA and Smirtn,

Judges.

ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS

FRIEDMAN, Chief Judge, deliverd the opinion of the
court:

This is a suit to recover on a $1,000,000 United States
Treasury Bill. We hold that the statute of limitations bars
the suit.

The Treasury Bill was a bearer bill redeemable on July
30, 1974. It was one of a number of securities which

2

disappeared from the vaults of Chase Manhattan Bank
(“Chase”) in New York during November 1973. Chase
notified the Treasury Department, which issued warning
notices about the bills and also issued replacements to
Chase. In return for the replacements, Chase had to acquire
indemnification coverage for the United States in case the
Treasury had to redeem both the original and replacement
bills. 31 U.S.C. §738a(b) (1976); 31 C.F.R. §§ 306.110,
309.12(a) (1981).

The plaintiff, appearing pro se, is a Swiss banker who
acquired possession of the bill in November or December
1973 in Switzerland. In December, the plaintiff checked
with the Swiss office of Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. (“Merrill Lynch”) to see if the bill was valid.
Merrill Lynch gave only a “neutral” answer, saying it had
to check with its Protection Service in New York. In
January 1974, Merrill Lynch told the plaintiff the bill was
stolen.

In July 1974, when the bill became due, the plaintiff was
in Thailand, fighting extradition proceedings to Switzer-
land. Through various agents, the last of which was Irving
Trust Company, the plaintiff eventually presented the bill
to the Federal Reserve Bank in New York on September 5,
1974. United States securities issued for a term of one year
or less are overdue if presented a month or more aft-y
maturity. 31 C.F.R. § 306.25(b\1) (1981). Section 306.25(b)
provides that: “If a bearer security . . . is presented and
surrendered for redemption after it has become overdue,
the Secretary of the Treasury will ordinarily require
satisfactory proof of ownership. (Form PD 1071 may be
used).” Accordingly, the bank refused to redeem the bill
until Form PD 1071 was completed. Irving Trust took the
bill and the form back to the office, intending to complete
the form and present the bill again shortly. The next day,
however, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which had
discovered the bill was stolen, subpoenaed it from Irving
Trust.

A long investigation followed to determine how the bill
had gotten to Switzerland and whether the plaintiff had
received stolen goods. In 1978, the Swiss prosecutor decided
there was not enough evidence to prosecute the plaintiff. In
February 1979, the plaintiff finally presented his Form PD

3

1071, known also as a certificate of ownership. This form
requires proof that the bearer acquired the bill for value,
before the maturity date, and without notice of any defect
in title. The Department requires this proof to avoid the
possibility of double liability, because insurers might not
indemnify it if the United States redeems an overdue bond
from an illegitimate bearer.

In February 1980, the Treasury refused again to pay the
plaintiff. It said that the plaintiff's certificate of ownership
showed he acquired the bill before maturity, but that “it
does not show firmly and unequivocally that you purchased
the bill in good faith, without any notice of defect in title or
that you paid value for the bill.” Both before and after the
plaintiff presented his certificate of ownership, the Trea-
sury indicated that a valid court decree establishing the
plaintiff's ownership would be accepted in lieu of a proper
certificate of ownership.

In February 1981, the plaintiff sued the Treasury Depart-
ment in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia for a declaratory judgment that he owned the
bill. The Treasury impleaded the indemnitors. In Septem-
ber, the district court transferred the case to this court
under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(c) (1976), because the plaintiff was
seeking money damages in an amount beyond the court’s
jurisdiction. Id. § 1346(a\2) (Supp. IV 1980).

In his petition in this court, the plaintiff seeks the
$1,000,000 face value of the bill, interest from September 5,
1974, and consequential damages of up to $10,000,000. The
government has moved for summary judgment. The plain-
tiff has cross-moved for partial judgment on the pleadingsor,
alternatively, for partial summary judgment for $1,000,000.
We grant the government’s motion.

II.

The statute of limitations provides that: “Every claim of
which the Court of Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred
unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after
such claim first accrues.” 28 U.S.C. §2501 (1976). The
statute is jurisdictional. Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S.
270, 273-74 (1957); Nager Electric Co. v. United States, 177
Ct. Cl. 234, 249, 368 F.2d 847, 857 (1966).

4

A claim first accrues ‘‘when all events have occurred to
fix the Government's alleged liability, entitling the claim-
ant to demand payment and sue here for his money.”
Nager, 177 Ct. Cl. at 240, 368 F.2d at 851 (footnote omitted).
Therefore, when the plaintiff has done all he must do to
establish his entitlement to payment, e.g., perform on his
contract, the claim accrues. /d. at 240-41, 368 F.2d at 851-
52; International Potato Corp. v. United States, 142 Ct. Cl.
604, 161 F. Supp. 602 (1958). If disputes are subject to
mandatory administrative proceedings, then the claim does
not accrue until their conclusion. Crown Coat Front Co. v.
United States, 386 U.S. 503, 511 (1967); Nager, 177 Ct. Cl. at
242-44, 368 F.2d at 853; Friedman v. United States, 159 Ct.
Cl. 1, 8-9, 310 F.2d at 381, 385-86 (1962), cert. denied, 373
U.S. 932 (1963). Pursuit of permissive administrative
remedies, however, does not toll the statute of limitations.
Soriano, 352 U.S. at 274-75; Clyde v. United States, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 38 (1871); Camacho v. United States, 204 Ct. Cl.
248, 259, 494 F.2d 1363, 1369 (1974); Friedman, 159 Ct. Cl.
at 11-12, 310 F.2d at 388.

It.

A. Plaintiff's claim accrued on September 5, 1974, when
the bill was presented to the Federal Reserve Bank.

A contract claim accrues “when the contractor could
ordinarily demand his money and bring his suit if payment
was not made.” Nager, 177 Ct. Cl. at 240-41, 368 F.2d at
852. It is the completion of the contractor’s work and the
resulting entitlement to payment, not the failure to pay
which creates the claim. In personnel cases, the claim
accrues when the employee is entitled to payment, not
when the government fails to pay him. Sauer v. United
States, 173 Ct. Cl. 642, 354 F.2d 302 (1965); Friedman, 159
Ct. Cl. at 20-24, 310 F.2d at 393-95. Similarly, in the
present case, the critical question is when the plaintiff first
had an enforceable right to payment.

The bill provided that it would be paid on presentation to
the Treasurer of the United States or to any Federal
Reserve Bank. The general regulation governing United
States securities provides for payment upon presentation

5

and surrender in the regular course of business. 31 C.F.R.
§ 306,.25(a) (1981).

The plaintiff became entitled to redeem the bill on July
30, 1974, when the bill matured. The bill required the
plaintiff to present it as a condition of payment, however,
and the plaintiff was not entitled to payment until Septem-
ber 5, 1974, when Irving Trust presented the bill. See
United States, v. Taylor, 104 U.S. 216, 221-22 (1881). On
that date, however, the plaintiff had done everything he
had to do to establish his right to payment. Therefore, his
claim accrued on that date.

The plaintiff himself recognizes he was entitled to
payment on September 5, 1974, since he seeks interest from
that date. Interest is due when money owed is not paid, For
the plaintiff to seek interest from September 5, 1974, he
must contend that he was entitled to payment then. If he
was entitled, he could have enforced the claim and the
statute began to run.

B. The plaintiff makes six arguments to avoid this
conclusion. We reject them all,

1. The plaintiff contends that because the bill was
overdue, the regulations required him to present his
certificate of ownership. 31 C.F.R. § 306.25(b). He says that
he was not entitled to payment until he presented the form
and hence that the claim did not accrue until the govern-
ment refused to pay him after he filed the certificate.

There are situations when a plaintiff must demand
payment from the government before the claim accrues.
Eg., Taylor, 104 U.S, at 221-22; B-W Construction Co. v.
United States, 100 Ct. Cl. 227, 235 (1943); Austin Engineer-
ing Co, v. United States, 88 Ct. Cl. 559, 562-63 (1939), In
those circumstances, the demand is required either by
statute or by contract. In this case, the demand for payment
took the form of presentation of the bill. When, however,
performance of a contract is complete and the exact amount
due is known, even the presentation of the final voucher is
not essential to the accrual of a claim. Henry Products Co. v.
_ United States, 180 Ct. Ct. 928, 931-32, 932 n.2 (1967), Pink

v. United States, 85 Ct, Cl. 121, 124-25 (1937), cert, denied,
303 U.S. 642 (1938),

Presentation of the certificate of ownership for an
overdue bill is not an element of accrual of the claim for

payment of the bill under the statute of limitations, The
requirement is merely an administrative procedure de-
signed to protect the Treasury from double liability. The
regulation requiring the certificate so indicates. It states:
"(Tjhe Secretary .. . will ordinarily require satisfactory
proof of ownership.” 31 C.F.R. § 306,.25(b), It also authorizes
the Secretary to waive the requirement. /d. § 306.126.

Throughout the plaintiff's protracted attempts to obtain
payment of the bill, the Treasury took the position that
instead of supplying the certificate, the plaintiff could file
suit and thereby establish his right to payment. Filing the
certificate pursuant to the regulations was a permissive
administrative remedy which did not affect the creation of
the plaintiffs rights. “In this case no more than in any
other would the mere fact that the Government could
conceivably refuse to pay the sum due ... delay the
running of limitations once the plaintiff was in a position to
ask for its money.” Henry Products, 180 Ct. Cl, at 932.

To hold otherwise would be to say that the plaintiff could
delay the running of the statute, after his rights had
matured, by postponing his administrative claim. In this
case, the delay was four-and-a-half years from when the
bond matured. “The purpose of a statute of limitation
requires that it should not leave the time at which it is to
attach at the control of the creditor.” Battelle v. United
States, 7 Ct. Cl. 297, 301 (1871).

2. The plaintiff argues that his right to payment did not
mature until the Swiss prosecutor dropped the criminal
investigation of him. The prosecutor's action did nothing to
establish the plaintiff's rights under the bill and did not
affect those rights.

3. The plaintiff says that section 306.25 of the regula-
tions requires a bill to be presented and surrendered before
payment is due. He contends that Irving Trust never
surrendered the bill because it took the bill back to its
office. Irving Trust’s presentation for redemption, however,
necessarily was an offer to surrender the bill upon pay-
ment. The Federal Reserve Bank refused to accept the bill
because it refused to redeem it. The plaintiff had done
everything he could and the fact that he retained the bill
did not prevent his claim from accruing.

7

4. The plaintiff argues next that the criminal investiga-
tion tolled the statute of limitations. He cites three cases for
this proposition. Two, First Beverages, Inc. v. Royal Crown
Cola Co., 612 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S, 924
(1980), and Wager v. Pro, 195 U.S. App. D.C, 423, 603 F.2d
1005 (1979), have nothing to do with statutes of limitations.

The third, Leigh v. MeGuire, 613 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1979),
vacated, 446 U.S. 962 (1980), dismissed, 507 F. Supp. 458
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), was an action under the Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980), in which the parties had
already litigated the same issues in state civil and criminal
proceedings. The court of appeals held that, under the
special circumstances, the interests of federalism required
the statute of limitations to be tolled during the state
proceedings, particularly the civil proceedings. The Su-
preme Cour! vacated the decision for reconsideration in
light of Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S, 478 (1980), in
which the Court held that when a federal court berrows a
state statute of limitations for section 1983 actions, it must
borrow also the state tolling rules unless they are inconsis-
tent with the purposes of section 1983. The Second Circuit
remanded the case to the district court, which held that the
section 1983 action was not tolled. The case is thus of no
help to the plaintiff.

In /nternational Potato, even a pending indictment of the
plaintiff did not toll the statute of limitations. Although the
criminal investigation might have prevented the plaintiff
from obtaining a judgment, it did not prevent him from
filing suit. It did not toll the statute of limitations.

5. The plaintiff argues that the government fraudulent-
ly concealed relevant facts from him because it did not tell
him of the indemnity bond until June 1981. The existence
of the bond, however, had no bearing on the plaintiff's
rights. It was designed to protect the government, not the
plaintiff, and his knowledge of it is irrelevant.

6. Finally, the plaintiff claims the government acknowl-
edged the debt on February 26, 1980, when it wrote him
that his certificate of ownership “clearly establishes that
you acquired $1,000,000 Treasury Bill No. 130331B before
maturity.” An acknowledgment will start the limitations
clock running again. The letter, however, was not an
acknowledgment of indebtedness. It merely recognized

8

that the plaintiff had acquired the bond before maturity.
The very next sentence stated: “However, it does not show
firmly and unequivocally that you purchased the bill in
good faith, without any notice of defect in title or that you
paid value for the bill.”

The letter does not recognize the plaintiffs right to
payment, but denies that right. There is, moreover, no
promise, not even an implied promise, to pay the plaintiff.
See Elliott v. United States, 134 Ct. Cl. 197, 198-99, 138 F.
Supp. 873, 874-75 (1956),

C. The plaintiff's complaint in the district court was
filed on February 25, 1981. That was almost six-and-a-half
years after Irving Trust presented the bill. The suit is tuo
late.

CONCLUSION

The defendant's motion for summary judgment is grant-
ed, the plaintiff's motion is denied and the petition is
dismissed.

t US. Government Printing Office: 361-518/1015

9

A) «Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Telephon call memorandum

C2

Problem or question:

Irving Trust C. received from ***Bank in Hng. Cng.
Called Agent Jares Brown (LE 5-7700 X 249)

Security was returned to Irving
with request for c/o. Sept. 5, 1974» *)

B) «Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Date: 9/5/74 T-bill
Please complete Part II. of form PD 1071» **)

*) R. Deft’s motion, filed Feb. 26, 1982, App. at 14
**) R. Exhibit, lit. Y-1

10

United States District Court
Southern District of New York

(Grand Jury Subpoena)

To: Any officer, Irving Trust Co. 1 Wall Street New York

We command you . . . appear and attend before the Grand
Inquest . . . to be held at Room 1401 in the United States Court
House, Foley Square . . . on the 6.th day of September 1974, at
10 o'clock in the forenoon, to testify and give evidence in
regard to an alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371(...)

and that you produce at the time and place aforesaid the
following:

1 United States Treasury bill in the denomination of $ 1000000
(one million dollars) serial No. 130221B, due 7/30/74.

Paul J. Curran Raimond F. Burghard
US Attorney Clerk
Note: (...)

Assistant Joel N. Rosenthal, Room 421, Telefone 264 - 6421
Compliance with this sulypoena will be satisfactory if the above-
mentioned Treasury bill 1; delivered forthwith to Special Agent
Robert Kaminski F.B.I.

R. Exhibit, lit. Y-1

ll
Decree of Department of Prosecution, Ziirich

(dated: August 4, 1978)
R. E. Lins, defendant
R. Ruch, defendant

Page 4:
«Treasury bill Nr. 130.331.B»

«According to Sec. 935 of Civil Code, bearer securities or
government bonds cannot be claimed against a credulous re-
ceipient. The file of investigation does not show a knowledge
by Lins of the origin of Treasury bill. In other words: a male-
volence according to the law mentioned, is not existing. Because
acts of business, which are protected by Civil Code, must be
excluded from penal prosecution — by reasons of surety of
rights — the case must be dropped (see decision of Federal
Court 90.1V.19).»

Page 5:

«As result of the investigation shows there is not to find a
legally sufficient indice for malevolence by the alleged person
(like in case of the person of Lins). In other words: it is not
possible to prove that he knew his employer (Lins) as a male-
volent receipient of the Treasury bill Nr. 130.331.B.»

Page 6:

«Regarding the further proceeding with the Treasury bill,
neither him (Lins) nor Ruch can be reproached an objec-

tionable or inconsiderate behaviour.»

(Costs therefore to be burdened on Treasury of State).

R. Exhibit, lit. P

Oct.9, 1973
Nov. 5,

Dec. 12,
Dec. 17,
Dec. 17,
Dec. 27,

Jan. 10, 1974
Jan. 14,

Jan. 17,

July 29,

Aug. 20,
Aug. 22,
Aug. 29,
Aug. 30,
Sept. 5,
Sept. 6,
Sept. 12,
Sept. 13,
Sept. 24,
Jan. 16, 1976
Jan. 30,

Mar. 17,
July 30,
Nov. 5,
Aug. 4, 1978
Sept. 10,
Feb. 14, 1979
Feb. 26, 1980

Jan. 21, 1981

Feb. 25,
Sept. 8, 1982

12
Time-Table

Execution of Treasury bill 130.331.B

Treasury bill 130.331.B «missed»

Plaintiff's inquiry at Merrill Lynch

Execution of the Bond of Indemnity
Acquisition of Treasury bill by plaintiff

US Embassy, letter to Swiss Federal Police
Telex Swiss Fed. Pol. to Cant. Pol. Ziirich
Swiss Fed. Pol. to Cant. Pol. Ziirich

Report by Cant. Pol. Ziirich

Israel Nat. Police activities

Report to F.B.1, New York

Swiss Fed. Police to US Embassy Bern

Report Questura di Roma to Min, of Interior
US Dept. of Justice (F.B.1.)

Presentation of bill (whitout surrender)
Subpoena by District Court, Seizure of title
Interpol Roma Italy to Swiss Fed. Pol.

US Embassy to Swiss Fed. Police

Swiss Dept. of Justice to Cant. Pol. Ziirich

US Embassy to Swiss Fed. Police

Swiss Dept. of Police to Cant. Pol. Ziirich
Report by Cant. Police Ziirich

Request by Distr. Attorney to Thailand
Interlocutory decree by States Attorney Zch.
Discharge of the plaintiff

Demand for payment of the bill

Certificate of Ownership submitted
Acquisition of title by plaintiff acknowledged
by respondent

Respondent's last demand for compliance with
the regulations «as a matter of law»
Commencement of suit against respondent
Dismissal of action by Court of Claims

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