# Appendix — Knight v. Minnesota Community College Faculty Ass'n

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_0002%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1983
- **Citation:** 460 U.S. 1048

## Text

pr
82-901 Nov 80 1982

No.

ALEXANDER tL. STEVAS.

IN THHe-

Supreme Court of the United States
OcroBerR TERM, 1982

Leon W. Kniaut, et al.,
Appellants,

v.
MINNESOTA COMMUNITY COLLEGE FACULTY ASSOCIATION,

et al.,
Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota

APPENDIX TO JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Dare F’, SWENSON
610 Twelve Oaks Center
15500 Wayzata Boulevard
Wayzata, Minnesota 55391
(612) 473-0474

EpwIn Vieira, JR., Counsel of Record
13877 Napa Drive
Manassas, Virginia 22110
(703) 791-6780

Attorneys for Appellants
1 December 1982

| NS RS TS ET
FANNON PRINTING CENTER, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22301 (703) 663-5600

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Memorandum Opinion and Order of the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota,
DE MD becccccccesescevesesodovcsevese

Findings of Fact and Order of the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota,
ME Sis cbs ciedebebesecvesseceses

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, 535 F.2d 466, 17 May 1976 ......

Memorandum Opinion and Order of the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota,
Eb conc svdescbecscctéedecccsece

Clerk’s Notice of Judgment of the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota,
EE cclubiebaebeess 00 60seceseeonees

Order of the United States District Court fer the
District of Minnesota, 13 August 1982 .........

Clerk’s Notice of Order of the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota, 13 August
ee BES

Notice of Appeal, 4 October 1982 ............00000.

Text of constitutional and statutory provisions
DE CEG GebOneScebseseeswobcerseseccecece

Plaintiffs’ Objections to the Court’s Findings of Fact
and Motion to Amend the Court’s Findings of
Fact to Conform to the Law and to the Evidence,
SE Crchesehs ipeessebercccesstcovcese

Page

31

67

87

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

(31 March 1982)

3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
FOURTH DIVISION

4-74 Civ. 659

Leon W. Kniont, et at, Plaintiffs,
v.

Minnesota Community Cotiece Facuity AssoctaTion,
et AL, Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before Heaney, Circuit Judge, Atsop, District Judge, and
Larson, Senior District Judge.

Heaney, Circuit Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs are community college faculty members who
challenge the constitutionality of the Minnesota Public
Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA) as applied
in the community colleges. Essentially two issues are
raised: whether the Minnesota Community College Faculty
Association (MCCFA) may act as an exclusive represent-
ative under PELRA, and whether the ‘‘meet and confer’’
provisions of PELRA are valid on their face and as ap-
plied. Following extensive proceedings and an independent
review of the exhaustive record, we entered findings of fact
on November 17, 1981, which are attached hereto. This
memorandum opinion incorporates our conclusions of law
and order for judgment.

I.
MCCFA As An Exclusive Representative

The structure of collective bargaining under PELRA and
MCCFA’s role thereunder may be summarized as follows.

4

PELRA provides several mechanisms by which an em-
ployee organization may be designated as the exclusive
representative of an appropriate bargaining unit. See Minn.
Stat. § 179.67. The MCCFA is an association of faculty
members of the community colleges in Minnesota. It is not
disputed that the MCCFA facially qualifies as an employee
organization, that community college [2] faculty are an
appropriate unit under PELRA,' and that the MCCFA
was properly certified as an exclusive representative in
1971.

Public employers have an obligation, under PELRA, to
‘*meet and negotiate’’* with respect to compensation and
other ‘‘terms and conditions of employment.’’ Jd., § 179.66,
subd. 2. When an exclusive representative has been certi-
fied, the employer may negotiate only through that repre-
sentative. Zd., § 179.66, subd. 7. The Minnesota State Board
for Community Colleges (MSBCC) has negotiated four
collective bargaining agreements with the MCCFA since
1971.

Employees are not required by statute to join the
MCOFA. Indeed, PELRA expressly provides that em-
ployees have ‘‘the right not to form [or] join’’ an employee
organization. Id., § 179.65, subd. 2. The contract negotiated

* The certification of community college faculty as a single, state-
wide bargaining unit was upheld in Minn. State College Bd. v.
Public Employment Relations Bd., 228 N.W.2d 551 (Minn. 1975).

*The duty to meet and negotiate is defined as:

the performance of the mutual obligations to meet at reason-
able times, including where possible meeting in advance of the
budget making process, with the good faith intent of entering
into an agreement with respect to terms and conditions of em-
ployment; provided, that by such obligation neither party is
compelled to agree to a proposal or required to make a con-
cession.

Minn, Stat. § 179.63, subd. 16.

5

by the MCCFA applies to all community college faculty
members and its economic benefits flow to all faculty re-
gardless of whether they are members of the MCCFA.
PELRA provides that a fair share fee may be collected
by an employee organization from nonmember employees
that it represents, not to exceed 85% of members’ regular
dues. Id. Such a fee has been collected from plaintiffs by
the MCCFA. Determination of the amount of the fee is
not in dispute, but we note that PELRA does provide a
procedure by which employees may challenge calculation
of the fair share fee. Id.

The foregoing describes a system of public sector col-
lective bargaining which is common to many states insofar
as it applies [3] to traditional subjects of collective bar-
gaining.’ See generally, Edwards, The Emerging Duty to
Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 885 (1973).
The essential character of such systems is implicated by
two claims which the plaintiffs advance here.

A.

Plaintiffs’ first contention is that because the MCCFA is
a private organization, it holds an impermissible power
under PELRA to make ‘‘economic laws”’ and its function
constitutes an impermissible delegation of state sovereign-
ty. Under this theory, only a quasi-state agency—some
branch of the public employer—may constitutionally serve
as the employee representative. We reject this theory.

The State of Minnesota has not impermissibly delegated
its sovereign power. The employer’s duty to negotiate
under PELRA ‘‘does not compel the public employer or
its representative to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession.’’ Minn. Stat. § 179.66, subd. 2.

* The ‘‘meet and confer’’ provisions of PELRA fall outside the
traditional scope of collective bargaining and are examined infra
at p. 9.

6

Negotiated agreements with state employees and even arbi-
tration awards must be ‘‘submitted to the legislature to be
accepted or rejected.’’ Id., § 179.74, subd. 5. Contract terms
successfully bargained by the MCCFA have been, in fact,
subsequently modified by the state legislature. The state
might well find it in its own interest to confer more au-
thority upon its employers or to afford public employees
more of the rights held by private employees, but we need
not speculate on modifications of PELRA that might occur.
It is clear that the present structure under PELRA does
not impermissibly abridge the state’s sovereign power.

In contending that the legislature’s retained authority
under PELRA is constitutionally inadequate, plaintiffs rely
heavily on Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936),
and Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935). Plaintiffs also rely on these cases for the proposi-
tion that PELRA confers upon the MCCFA an impermissi-
ble power to make [4] ‘‘economic laws.’’* The continuing
vitality of Schecter and Carter Coal, however, is doubtful
at best.’ Moreover, even if Schecter and Carter Coal might
have some vitality in another context, plaintiffs’ reliance

*The plaintiffs called several witnesses and devoted extensive
time and resources to develop the theory that PELRA is the func-
tional equivalent of both the legislation struck down in Schecter
and Carter Coal, and of the ‘‘corporate-state model of Italian
fascism.’’ These theories are without merit in light of the con-
trolling principles of Abood.

5 See e.g., Quincy College v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 328 F.
Supp. 808, 811 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (‘‘The Schecter and Panama cases
have been severely limited to their own facts’’) ; Simon v. Cameron,
337 F. Supp. 1380, 1382 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (Carter Coal ‘‘has
been distinguished and disregarded in recent years to such an ex-
tent that it is believed that the Carter non-delegation doctrine is
dead’’). See also, Davis, Administrative Treatise, §§ 3:2, 3:8, 3:12
(1980) (‘‘That the literal opinions in the Panama and Schecter
cases do not embody the effective law is entirely clear’’).

7

on them here is clearly foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S.
209 (1977). Abood squarely upholds the constitutionality of
exclusive representation bargaining in the public sector.

Abood is central to this case and warrants elaboration.
Abood involved a public employee bargaining statute simi-
lar to Minnesota’s PELRA.* The plaintiffs in Abood were
teachers who had not joined the private employee organi-
zation which served as their exclusive representative. Like
the plaintiffs here, the teachers objected to compulsory
fair share fees on First Amendment grounds. The Supreme
Court had previously rejected such claims in the private
sector, holding that agency shop arrangements were sup-
ported by compelling state interests. See Machinists v.
Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); I’atlway Employees Dept. v.
Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956). In Abood, the Court re-
affirmed that exclusive representation

avoids the confusion that would result from attempting
to enforce two or more agreements specifying different
terms and conditions of employment. It prevents inter-
union rivalries from creating dissension within the
work force and eliminating the advantages to the em-
ployee [5] of collectivization. It also frees the em-
ployer from the possibility of facing conflicting de-
mands from different unions, and permits the employer
and a single union to reach agreements and settlements
that are not subject to attack from rival labor organi-
zations.

Id. at 220-221 (citations omitted).

*The Michigan statute at issue in Abood provided for designa-
tion of an exclusive representative and for collection of fair share
fees from employees who were represented by, but not members of,
the employee organization. Abood, supra at 212-215.

Moreover, the Abood Court reiterated that the agency shop
arrangement has been found to ‘‘distribute fairly the cost
of [collective bargaining] among those who benefit, and it
counteracts the incentive that employees might otherwise
have to become ‘free-riders’—to refuse to contribute to the
union while obtaining benefits of union representation that
necessarily accrue to all employees.’’ Id. at 222.

These state policy interests are just as compelling in the
public sector. As the Court stated in Abood, supra at 224,
‘*[t]he desirability of labor peace is no less important in
the public sector, nor is the risk of ‘free riders’ any
smaller.’’ Although the agency shop in the public sector
necessarily impacts on First Amendment rights, the Abood
Court found such concerns outweighed by the compelling
state interests in orderly labor relations. Jd. at 222-223,
229-231.

The Abood decision is controlling here.’ The State of
Minnesota has expressly declared that the purpose of
PELRA is ‘‘to promote orderly and constructive relation-
ships’’ between public employers and employees and that
such a purpose ‘‘may best be accomplished’’ by the bar-
gaining structure provided under PELRA. Minn. Stat.
§ 179.61. As the Abood Court noted, such a determination
by the state is io be afforded great weight in the consti-
tutional balance. Abood, supra at 229. Moreover, such a
determination rests on a long tradition in Minnesota of
recognizing the importance of the agency shop in resolving
traditional subjects of collective bargaining. See e.g., Minn.
Stat. § 179.16 (providing for exclusive representation in
the private sector since the 1940’s) ; see also, Note, Certifi-
cation of a Bargaining Representative under the Minnesota

* The concurring opinion in Abood, supra at 254, 259 n.13, makes
clear that the majority holding forecloses the specific claim of
plaintiffs here. Even if we were not bound by Abood, however, we
would reject the plaintiffs’ claim for the reasons set forth herein.

9

Labor Relations Act, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 827 (1954); Note,
History and Provisions of the Minnesota Labor Relations
Act, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 217 (1940). Minnesota may provide
for exclusive representation by an employee association
[6] in the public sector and may require that nonmembers
of the association financially support its collective bargain-
ing efforts through a fair share fee. No constitutional in-
firmity arises merely because the employee association is
a private organization.

Plaintiffs’ second contention rests on a factual assertion
that the MCCFA, alone and in conjunction with its affili-
ates, constitutes a quasi-political party or predominantly
a political-action organization. The legal claim is that com-
pulsory fair share fees therefore result in forced associa-
tion with a political party contrary to Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347 (1976), and its progeny. Our resolution of this
claim is again guided by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Abood, supra.

The teacher-plaintiffs in Abood argued that bargaining
activity of a public sector union is inherently political and
that compulsory financial support of such activity therefore
violates First Amendment associational rights. The Su-
preme Court ackuowledged that ‘‘decisionmaking by a pub-
lic employer is above all a political process,’’ id. at 228,
and noted ‘‘[t]here can be no quarrel with the truism that
because public employee unions attempt to influence govern-
mental policymaking, their activities * * * may be properly
termed political.’’ Jd. at 231. The Court, however, made
clear that such ‘‘differences between public and private
sector collective bargaining simply do not translate into
differences in First Amendment rights.’’* Zd. at 232. Fol-

*The plaintiffs here argue that allowing a public sector union
to be politically active in any respect will confer an unconstitu-

10

lowing the precedent set in the private sector,’ the Court
held that public sector unions may collect compulsory fair
share fees notwithstanding the ‘‘political’’ character of
public bargaining—so long as the fees ‘‘are applied to col-
lective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance
adjustment purposes.’’ 7d. [7] at 232. The crucial distine-
tion is union political activity unrelated to collective bar-
gaining. The Abood Court held that persons opposing such
activity may not be compelled to support it through fair
share fees. Id. at 235-236.

In attempting to show that the MCCFA is predominantly
a political action organization, the plaintiffs have persist-
ently ignored the distinction between activities related and
those unrelated to collective bargaining. The plaintiffs have
instead insisted that activity of the MCCFA which is in any
sense ‘‘ political’? must be considered wholly separate from
collective bargaining activity.”° This approach paints with
a brush so broad as to obliterate the distinction that the
Abood Court found to be crucial for constitutional pur-
poses.

We emphasize that the plaintiffs do not advance a nar-
row claim that some part of their fair share fees are mis-
used for political activity unrelated to collective bargaining.
Calculation of the fair share fee is not in dispute here and
we note that there is a statutory procedure for resolving

tional political advantage upon public employees. The Abood Court
acknowledged that public employees might achieve additional in-
fluence through political activity. Jd. at 228. In upholding publie
sector bargaining and political activitiy related to such bargaining,
the Abood Court found no constitutional significance in this ‘‘poli-
tical advantage’’ theory. Nor do we.

*See Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Railway Em-
ployees Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).

1° See ¢.g., findings of fact at 12-13.

11

any such dispute.” The plaintiffs’ claim is that the MCCFA
and its affiliates are so overwhelmingly engaged in political
activity that they must be deemed to be the equivalent of a
political party for constitutional purposes. In light of
Abood, the factual inquiry turns on whether the activities
of MCCFA are related or unrelated to collective bargain-
ing. We have placed the burden on the defendant labor
organizations to establish that their activity properly re-
lates to collective bargaining.”

[8] Extensive evidence was adduced with respect to the
activities of the MCCFA and the other defendant labor or-
ganizations, the Minnesota Education Association (MEA),
the National Education Association (NEA) and IMPACE
(a political action committee affiliated with the MEA).
Hundreds of exhibits were introduced by plaintiffs and
defendants that relate to the character of activity under-
taken by the labor organizations. Numerous staff and offi-
cers of the organizations testified as to the extent and
character of their political activity. We have independently
reviewed the exhaustive record developed before the special
master. As our findings indicate,” the record establishes
beyond any doubt that the MCCFA, MEA and NEA are
properly characterized as public employee organizations

™ See Minn. Stat. § 179.65, subd. 2. In a challenge to the fair
share fee, the burden is on the employee association to justify the
determination of the fee amount. Id.

” The plaintiffs in a constitutional challenge ordinarily have the
burden of establishing that a constitutional violation exists. In
Abood, however, the Supreme Court indicated a special concern
for the difficulty that individual nonmembers of a union would
face in attempting to trace and account for the use of their fair
share fees. Accordingly, we have placed the burden on the de-
fendants here to establish whether their activities predominantly
relate to collective bargaining.

18 See findings of fact at 7-13.

12

whose political activities relate closely and directly to col-
lective bargaining.

Plaintiffs devoted extensive time and resources to a
theory that the MCCFA, MEA, NEA, IMPACE and NEA-
PAC (a political action committee affiliated with the NEA)
are a single, integrated organization that functions as a
quasi-political party. This theory is without merit as a
factual matter. IMPACE and NEA-PAC are indeed politi-
cal action committees, but even members of MEA and NEA
do not automatically give support to these committees.
These are independent political action committees or-
ganized under state and federal law for the purpose of
participating in partisan election contests; membership in
and support for IMPACE and NEA-PAC is wholly volun-
tary. MCCFA is affiliated with MEA and NEA and has
derived substantial assistance from the latter two organi-
zations during strikes and other collective actions. The
MCCFA, however, independently charts its course of col-
lective bargaining on behalf of community college faculty.
Finally, even if MCCFA, MEA and NEA were deemed
to be in some sense ‘‘integrated,’’ the outcome would not
change because each of these organizations is predomi-
nantly engaged in activities closely and directly related to
collective bargaining.

The MCCFA has engaged in legislative activity virtually
of necessity because collective bargaining agreements nego-
tiated by the MCCF'A must be submitted to the legislature
for approval or rejection. See slip op., supra at 3. There is
simply no basis in this record, however, on which the
MCCFA could be deemed anything other than a public
employee organization whose purpose [9] is to improve
through collective bargaining the terms and conditions of
employment for the college faculty it represents.

The plaintiffs’ claim therefore fails in two respects. To
the extent it rests on the notion that a public sector labor
organization cannot engage in political activity that relates

13

directly to collective bargaining, it is plainly wrong as a
matter of law. To the extent it rests on a factual claim that
the MCCFA is predominantly engaged in political activity
unrelated to collective bargaining, it is flatly contradicted
by the record. Such activity is not even a significant, much
less a predominant, part of the MCCF'A’s total activity.

Il.
Meet and Confer

PELRA distinguishes traditional subjects of collective
bargaining from all other issues that arise between em-
ployers and employees. The traditional matters—compen-
sation and other ‘‘terms and conditions of employment’’—
are subject to mandatory bargaining in which employers
and the exclusive representative of employees must negoti-
ate in good faith to reach an agreement. See Minn. Stat.
§§ 179.63, subd. 16, subd. 18; 176.65, subd. 4; 179.66, subd. 1,
subd. 2, subd. 7. On all matters not subject to this ‘‘meet
and negotiate’’ process, professional employees have the
express right to ‘‘meet and confer’’ with their employer.
Id., § 179.65, subd. 3. Similarly, PELRA imposes a duty
upon employers to meet and confer on such matters with
professional public employees. Id., § 179.66, subd. 3.

The state interest underlying the meet and confer pro-
cess is set forth in the statute:

The legislature recognizes that professional em-
ployees possess knowledge, expertise, and dedication
which is helpful and necessary to the operation and
quality of public services and which may assist public
employers in developing their policies. It is, therefore,
the policy of this state to encourage close cooperation
between public employers and professional employees
by providing for discussions and the mutual exchange
of ideas regarding all matters not specified under [the
meet and negotiate provisions]. ’

Id., § 179.73, subd. 1.

14

[10] As a general matter, the meet and confer concept
reflects enlightened labor policy and a legitimate state
interest in securing the insight of public employees on
questions outside the traditional scope of collective bar-
gaining. There is no constitutional infirmity in requiring
public employers to solicit and meaningfully consider the
views of public employees.

As applied to higher education, the meet and confer
process recognizes and codifies a longstanding tradition of
a faculty participation in college governance. In light of
this tradition of shared decisionmaking, the state has a
special interest in securing the views of faculty members
on questions of college governance. No college adminis-
trator needs this Court to describe the faculty response
to unilateral decisionmaking on issues of importance on
campus—the literature in the field is more than sufficient.
See e.g., Mayhew, L. B., Surviving the Eighties, p. 226
(1979) (‘‘It is really the faculty that grants administrators
the mandate to govern, and that mandate can be removed
by both overt and covert means’’); Ladd & Lipset, The
Divided Academy, pp. 243-299 (1975); D. Walker, The
Effective Administrator (1979); H. Mason, College and
University Government, pp. 44-99 (1972) (suggesting that
shared authority is ‘‘the mode of rapprochement between
bureaucracy and professionalism in institutions of higher
education’’).

Nothing in the Constitution would require that the state
abandon what appears to be an essential component of
college administration—involving the faculty in a broad
range of governance decisions. Thus, no infirmity whatso-
ever attaches to the threshhold meet and confer provisions
of PELRA—those which require administrators to meet
and confer with faculty and which declare the right of the
faculty to meet and confer with administrators. See Minn.
Stat. §§ 179.65, subd. 3; 179.66, subd. 3.

15

The state also requires that professional employees select
a representative for purposes of the meet and confer
process. Minn. Stat. § 179.73, subd. 2. This requirement is
separate from the selection of an exclusive representative
for purposes of mandatory bargaining.* Regardless of
whether a bargaining [11] representative has been selected,
PELRA requires some selection system for purposes of
the meet and confer process. As applied to higher educa-
tion, this effectively compels the establishment of a faculty
governance system to function in the meet and confer
process.

The meet and confer committees that presently operate”
are in fact the exclusive formal governance system for
resolving issues outside the scope of mandatory bargaining.
The collective bargaining agreement provides, for example,
that the meet and confer committees ‘‘will have full au-
thority in the assigned area to present the views of the
employees * * * .’’ The testimony of college administrators
confirms that, although persons may still express their
individual views outside the formal process, the ‘‘official’’
view of the faculty is the position adopted by the meet
and confer committees. Thus, the weight and significance
of individual speech interests have been consciously dero-
gated in favor of systematic, official expression. On any
issue that has campus-wide impact, it is difficult to imagine
that isolated individual views would have any weight when

Minn. Stat. § 179.73, subd. 2, is a one-sentence requirement
that is silent as to the method of selecting meet and confer repre-
sentatives. In contrast, elaborate procedures are set forth elsewhere
for selecting an exclusive representative for purposes of collective
bargaining. See Minn. Stat. § 179.67.

** The committees are called ‘‘exchange of views’’ committees at
the local campus level and ‘‘meet and confer’’ committees at the
statewide level. Use of the term ‘‘meet and confer’’ herein refers
to both levels of committees.

16

compared to the ‘‘official’’ view of the faculty. If some
faculty members are excluded from participation and de-
liberation in the meet and confer process, they are effeec-
tively denied any meaningful expression on the issues re-
solved through that process.

The subjects considered by meet and confer committees
at the community colleges have included the college budget,
curriculum reviews, new course proposals, college organi-
zation and campus faccilities. Moreover, the scope of the
meet and confer process in community colleges sweeps
across all issues in college governance that are not subject
to mandatory bargaining. These issues in higher education
have a special character as a matter of tradition, public
policy and constitutional law.

Traditionally, the subjects of meet and confer have been
resolved through governance systems in which all faculty
members have an opportunity to participate. In the present
case, governance at community colleges prior to passage of
PELRA consisted of faculty senates and committees, se-
lected through elections in which every faculty member was
eligible to both vote and seek election.

[12] Public policy supports the tradition of participation
by all faculty members. The free and full exchange of ideas
lies at the core of academia’s contribution to our society.
To protect these values, our society has attempted to in-
sulate institutions of higher education from the orthodoxies
of life outside the campus—be they commercial, religious
or political orthodoxies that might inhibit the marketplace
of ideas.

The right of expression by faculty members also holds a
special place under our Constitution, as the Supreme Court
has broadly declared. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents of
New York, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967), the Court stated:

Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding
academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to

17

all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.
That freedom is therefore a special concern of the
First Amendment.

In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 480, 487 (1960), the Court
emphasized that ‘‘[t]he vigilant protection of constitu-
tional freedoms is no where more vital than in the com-

munity of American schools.’’ Similarly, in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957), the Court declared:

The essentiality of freedom in the community of
American universities is almost self-evident. * * * To
impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders
in our colleges and universities would imperil the fu-
ture of our Nation.

These cases do not directly control the present matter,”
but they illustrate that the Frist Amendment has a special
significance in higher education. The vital concern for aca-
demic freedom warrants a heightened standard of scrutiny
when, as here, the state regulates the forum for academic
speech.

We must weigh these constitutional values against the
state interest in making the meet and confer process an
orderly one. The state has provided that the right to meet
and confer may only be exercised through selection of
representatives in a governance system. It vigorously con-
tends that requiring some selection process is essential if
the meet and confer process [13] is to be effective. We
are inclined to agree. Absent such a requirement, adminis-
trators in the community college system would be expressly

**The issue here is whether faculty members may be excluded
from participating in selection of meet and confer representatives
and from serving as such representatives, which is a question of
first impression.

18

compelled to meet regularly’ with each faculty member
and group of members that desired to so confer. The result
could well be that no meaningful faculty expression would
emerge and that both faculty and administrators would be
deprived of the benefits from an orderly, systematic ex-
change of views.

We cannot ignore, however, that the state has created a
forum for the exchange of views between faculty and ad-
ministrators on all issues outside the scope of mandatory
bargaining. The meet and confer process may not be a gen-
eral public forum,” but it is an important academic forum.
Indeed, it is the only significant forum for the faculty to
resolve virtually every issue outside the scope of mandatory
bargaining. This structure effectively blocks any meaning-
ful expression by faculty members who are excluded from
the formal process. If the state is going to intervene in
this manner, we think it must afford all faculty members a
fair opportunity both to serve as and to participate in the
selection of meet and confer representatives, Thus, Minn.
Stat. § 179.73, subd. 2, which requires faculty members to
select such representatives, is constitutionally valid so long
as every faculty member is afforded a fair opportunity to
participate in the selection process.

We emphasize the narrowness of this holding.” We are
not confronted with a faculty governance system developed

** PELRA requires that formal meet and confer sessions he held
at least three times a year. See Minn. Stat. § 179.73, subd. 2. The
spirit and practice, however, have been to meet more often than
this, generally on a monthly basis.

8 If the meet and confer sessions were a public forum, an abso-
lute free speech right would attach in terms of access to that
forum. See City of Madison v. Wisc. Empl. Comm., 429 U.S. 167
(1976). See also, Finkin, The Limits of Majority Rule in Collec-
tive Bargaining, 64 Minn. L. Rev. 183, 245-249 (1980).

* This holding, of course, applies only to higher education.

19

independent of state compulsion, which would present dif-
ferent considerations. We are not confronted with ad hoc
committees or other temporary governance mechanisms
which might present special needs for [14] expediency.
Nor have we yet addressed what role a faculty union might
play in a governance system. We hold only that when the
state compels creation of a representative governance
system in higher education and utilizes that forum for on-
going debate and resolution of virtually all issues outside
the scope of collective bargaining, it must afford every
faculty member a fair opportunity to participate in the
selection of governance representatives.”

The State of Minnesota has gone one step further in
structuring the meet and confer process. PELRA provides
that the employer may meet and confer ‘‘only through the
exclusive representative,’’ if there be one. See Minn. Stat.
§ 179.66, subd. 7. Pursuant to this provision, the collective
bargaining contract confers upon the MCCFA the sole
authority to select the meet and confer representatives.
The MCCFA has held this exclusive power since the pas-
sage of PELRA, and has exercised it to exclude nonmem-
bers of the MCCFA from serving on the meet and confer
committees.

This practice of systematically excluding nonmembers of
the MCCFA obviously deprives such persons of a fair
opportunity to participate in the meet and confer process.
It also infringes the First Amendment associational rights
of faculty members who do not desire to join the MCCFA.

2° Selection of the present meet and confer committee members,
for example, might be conducted under MCCFA auspices in fully
open elections—such that members and nonmembers of MCCFA
could both vote and seek election, We could not find that such a
system deprived anyone of a fair opportunity to participate. To
precisely define ‘‘fair opportunity,’’ however, would require that
we speculate on governance structures that are not before us. We
decline to do so.

20

Moreover, the MCCFA’s exclusive authority to select
the committee representative—regardless of how it is actu-
ally exercised—inherently creates a chilling effect on the
associational and speech interests of faculty members. The
scope of the meet and confer committees reaches many
issues that are integral to the professional function of a
college professor. If one risks exclusion from these com-
mittees by not joining or speaking out against the MCCFA,
it seems self-evident that one’s freedom not to join or to
so speak out is seriously impaired. This risk of exclusion
is inherent in the MCCFA’s sole authority to select the
committee [15] members. The actual practice only bears
out that the risk of exclusion is a real one.

Because these effects infringe fundamental First Amend-
ment guarantees, the MCCFA’s exclusive selection author-
ity can be upheld only if it is supported by compelling,
legitimate state interests which cannot be furthered by
less intrusive means. We find no such interests here.

The state does not contend that it has a legitimate in-
terest in excluding nonmembers of the MCCFA from serv-
ing on meet and confer committees. Indeed, the state in-
terest expressly underlying the meet and confer process—
obtaining the views of employees on matters outside the
scope of collective bargaining—argues for hearing the
views of all employees not just those that are union mem-
bers. The state does contend that the meet and confer
process must be an orderly, systematic one, but this in-
terest can be fully served without excluding nonmembers
of the MCCFA. The process would be no less orderly, for
example, if both members and nonmembers of the MCCFA
participated in electing committee members.

The core issue is whether the rationale for the agency
shop in traditional collective bargaining applies with the
same force to the meet and confer process in higher educa-
tion. We think it does not.

21

A fundamental element of the agency shop rationale is
that, absent collective representation, the employees as a
whole could not effectively participate in decisions that
are the subject of representation. This, indeed, is a key
factor in making union security a legitimate interest of
the state. In higher education, however, faculty members
have long enjoyed substantial formal and informal par-
ticipation in college governance—present here in the form
of faculty senates prior to PELRA. Such a tradition of
shared decisionmaking has not been generally true in other
areas of employment or even at other levels of public
education. In these other contexts, the state may properly
seek to balance labor relations by providing the strongest
possible role for a union, but the same state interest is
simply not as strong in higher education. If college admin-
istrators excluded faculty from matters of governance, there
would be a more compelling justification for exclusive union
control of faculty governance selection.

[16] Another crucial factor involves the largely economic,
tangible nature of traditional collective bargaining. Joining
a union cannot constitutionally be made a condition of em-
ployment and it is thought that because the tangible benefits
of bargaining flow to both members and nonmembers alike,
no coercion to join will result in practice. The subjects of
meet and confer, however, are generally intangible issues
of governance, such as curriculum proposals and academic
standards. It simply cannot be said that the benefits of
conferring on such issues flow equally to persons who are
excluded from conferring. Indeed, the record shows that at
least one faculty member joined the MCCFA because he
considered participation in the meet and confer process
essential to his particular position. Several others also
testified that they considered such participation to be an
essential part of serving on the faculty. This is precisely
the kind of impermissible ‘‘joining as a condition of em-
ployment’’ which results from the unique character and
tradition of governance in higher education. It does not

22

result, however, from exclusive representation on matters
within the traditional scope of collective bargaining because
the tangible fruits of such bargaining flow to all employees
regardless of whether they are members of the labor
organization.

A third factor involves the union’s legitimate need for
security, which is generally promoted by excluding rival
unions from representing segments of the same bargaining
unit and by requiring nonmembers of the union to pay their
fair share of the costs of collective bargaining, contract
administration and grievance processing. Union security
will not be jeopardized by allowing nonmembers of the
MCCFA to participate in selection of meet and confer
representatives. The MCCFA remains the exclusive repre-
sentative for all matters subject to the mandatory bargain-
ing provisions. No rival unions could simultaneously repre-
sent community college faculty. The MCCFA continues to
have sole control over mandatory bargaining, contract ad-
ministration and grievances. It continues to collect fair
share fees from ronmembers to defray the costs of such
efforts. No one therefore gets a free ride on the important
efforts expended in these areas.

Another facior in the agency shop rationale is that, ab-
sent such a system, the employer would be subject to
irreconcilable conflicting demands from rival unions. Much
of this concern [17] arises because the employer is under
a mandatory duty to bargain. Here, however, the manda-
tory bargaining process remains under the sole control of
the MCCFA. In no event would the employer be forced
to bargain with more than one group.

The subject matter of meet and confer committees and
the scope of mandatory bargaining are mutually exclusive.
Of course, it is difficult to draw a line between the two
jurisdictions, but this is inevitable unless all issues are
subject to just one process or the other. This line drawing
has already reached the Minnesota Supreme Court three

23

times since PELRA was enacted. See General Drivers
Union Local 346 v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 704, 283 N.W.2d 524
(Minn. 1979) ; Mpls. Fed. of Teachers v. Mpls. Special Sch.
Dist. No. 2, 258 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 1977); Int’l Union of
Operating Engineers v. City of Mpls., 233 N.W.2d 748
(Minn. 1975). Although there may be an added dimension
to the line drawing if the meet and confer committees are
open to nonmembers of the MCCFA, the line drawing itself
is essentially unchanged. The question remains one that
frequently arises in labor law—whether a particular issue
is subject to mandatory bargaining.

We thus conclude that the rationale which properly
supports the agency shop generally does not justify the
MCCFA’s sole authority to select meet and confer repre-
sentatives in the community colleges.

The MCCFA contends that the present practice is not
different in any material way from the faculty senate sys-
tem which preceded PELRA. The argument is that majority
selection of a labor organization is the equivalent of ma-
jority selection of a faculty senate. Despite its superficial
appeal, this contention glosses over constitutional differ-
ences between the two systems. The plain fact is that all
faculty members formerly had the right to vote for in-
dividual representatives that would deal with issues of
college and faculty governance. All faculty members could
also seek to serve in such roles. These rights are now com-
pletely lost unless one joins the MCCFA. The right to even
speak out on such issues is further impaired by the knowl-
edge that one could be excluded from serving in the process
if the MCCFA should desire to retaliate for protected
speech activity. The former faculty senate system did not
impair these First Amendment interests, interests which
are paramount in the context of higher education.

[18] We hold that the First Amendment interests of
faculty members are infringed if the labor organization has
sole authority to select meet and confer representatives

24

and that such infringement, in the context of higher educa-
tion, is not supported by overriding state interests.” The
contract provision establishing such exclusive selection is
therefore void and section 179.66, subd. 7, of PELRA is
declared unconstitutional insofar as it requires or allows
such a practice in the meet and confer context.

In so holding, we do not suggest that a labor organiza-
tion cannot play a major role in the meet and confer pro-
cess. To the contrary, the state has an obvious interest in
harmonizing the meet and negotiate process with the meet
and confer process. Moreover, the MCCFA, as the repre-
sentative of a majority of the faculty, has a legitimate
claim to a significant role in the meet and confer process.
If, for example, the present structure were operated under
the auspices of the MCCFA, but committee memberships
were open to and elected by all faculty, including nonmem-
bers of the MCCFA, legitimate state interests could be
served without the constitutional impairments of the pres-
ent system.

We again emphasize the narrowness of our holding. We
are not confronted with a faculty union’s role in ad hoc
governance mechanisms which might arise from time to
time. The need for administrative expedience and potential
for impairment of associational rights might well lead to a
different result. We will not speculate, however, on the
constitutionality of governance mechanisms that are not
before us.

Summary

1. The Minnesota Community College Faculty Associa-
tion (MCCFA) may act as an exclusive representative pur-
suant to PELRA, Minn. Stat. § 179.61 et seq.

** Nothing in our holding should be viewed as if it also applies
outside the context of higher education.

25

[19] (a) The provisions of PELRA that allow for an
exclusive representation system of collective bargaining
and that impose duties to ‘‘meet and negotiate’’ with re-
spect to compensation and other terms and conditions of
employment are constitutionally valid on their face and as
applied in the community colleges ;

(b) No constitutional violation arises from the
MCCFA’s status as a private organization. PELRA, on its
face and as applied, does not impermissibly delegate sov-
ereign state power nor impermissibly confer any power to
make ‘‘economic laws;’’

(c) No constitutional violation arises from the MCCFA
engaging in limited political activity which relates directly
to its collective bargaining efforts. MCCFA’s function as
an exclusive representative under PELRA does not result
in any compelled association with a quasi-political party.
The MCCFA and the organizations with which it is affiliated
(The Minnesota Education Association and National Edu-
cation Association) do not together constitute a single
integrated organization nor are they, alone or in conjunc-
tion, a quasi-political party.

2. The present practice of having the MCCFA select all
representatives on meet and confer committees is unconsti-
tutional. Such practice has an inherent chilling effect on
the associational and speech interests of nonmembers of the
MCCFA and, unlike exclusive control over the ‘‘meet and

negotiate’’ process, is not supported by compelling state
interests.

(a) The meet and confer provisions of PELRA are
valid insofar as they impose upon employers the duty to
meet and confer and provide employees the right to meet
and confer. Nothing in the Constitution requires that the
state abandon what appears to be essential in college ad-
ministration—involving the faculty in college governance;

(b) The provisions requiring employees to select meet
and confer representatives, Minn. Stat. § 179.73, subd. 2, as

26

applied to the community colleges, effectively requires and
has resulted in the establishment of a formal governance
system which is the primary mechanism for expressing
faculty views on all issues outside the mandatory bargain-
ing process. This provision is valid as applied to community
colleges only if all faculty members have a fair opportunity
both to select and serve as governance representatives.

[20] (c) The clause of the collective bargaining contract
which gives the MCCFA sole authority to select meet and
confer representatives is void, and the statutory provision
which requires the employer to meet and confer only
through such organization is invalid insofar as it allows or
requires the present practice. See Minn. Stat. 4 179.66,
subd. 7.

(d) The foregoing would not preclude conducting the
meet and confer process under the auspices of the MCCFA,
so long as both members and nonmembers have a fair
opportunity to select and serve on the meet and confer
committees.

ORDER FOR JUDGMENT

The constitutional infringements caused by the present
meet and confer process in the community colleges clearly
occur under color of state law. The Minnesota State Board
for Community Colleges, in its official capacity, and the
Minnesota Community College Faculty Association must
equally share liability inasmuch as they together negotiated
the aspects of the present structure which we have found
violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. There is no basis
for individual liability or for finding any defendants liable
other than the MSBCC and the MCCFA,

The parties have stipulated to nominal money damages
of one dollar and we find that no other money damages
are appropriate. The plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory
and injunctive relief in accordance with this opinion. There-
fore, PELRA as applied to the community colleges is de-
clared valid in all respects, except

27

(1) Minn. Stat. § 179.73, subd. 2, is declared valid so
long as all community college faculty members are pro-
vided a fair opportunity both to select and serve as meet
and confer representatives;

(2) Minn. Stat. § 179.66, subd. 7, is declared unconstitu-
tional only insofar as it allows or requires an exclusive
representative in the community colleges to have sole
authority to select meet and confer representatives;

(3) The clause of the collective bargaining contract con-
ferring sole selection authority upon the MCCFA is de-
clared invalid, and the MCCFA is enjoined from making
any further selections of meet and confer representatives
pursuant to such clause.

[21] The defendants shall bear their own costs in this
proceeding and 20% of plaintiffs’ costs shall be taxed to
the MSBCC and the MCCFA, to be borne in equal shares.

Judgment shall be entered in accordance with this order.

/s/ Gerald W. Heaney
Geratp W. Heaney
United States Circuit Judge

/8/ Donald D. Alsop
Donatp D. ALsop
United States District Judge

Larson, Senior District Judge, concurring and dissenting.

I am in substantial agreement with the Memorandum
Opinion and Order but dissent as to paragraphs (1), (2),
and (3) in the Order for Judgment.

/s/ Earl R. Larson
Ean R. Larson
U.S. Senior District Judge

Darep: March 31, 1982

FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER OF THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

(16 November 1981)

31

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
FOURTH DIVISION

4-74 Civ. 659

Leon W. Kwniont, er at, Plaintiffs,
v.

Minnesota Community Couiece Facuury Association,
et aL, Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER

Pursuant to the Order of this Court dated December 13,
1979, the parties have presented extensive evidence before
Special Master Leonard E. Lindquist. Proceedings before
the Special Master involved 41 hearing days, 6,000 pages
of transcript, the introduction of over 500 exhibits and the
filing by each party of various briefs and elaborate pro-
posed findings of fact. The Special Master filed his recom-
mended findings of fact with this Court on March 13, 1981.

The following constitutional issues remain for this Court
to determine:

(1) Whether it is constitutional, under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, for the Minnesota Community
College Faculty Association (MCCF A) to act as ‘‘exclusive
representative’’ of plaintiffs pursuant to the collective bar-
gaining provisions of the Minnesota Public Employment
Labor Relations Act (PELRA), Minn. Stat. § 179.61 et
seq.; and

(2) Whether the ‘‘meet and confer’’ provisions of
PELRA, Minn, Stat. §§ 179.63, subd. 15, 179.65, subd. 1, and
179.66, subd. 3, 7, are constitutional on their face and as
applied to plaintiffs under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.

32

Before adopting findings of fact, we carefully reviewed
the trial record, the stipulations of fact, the parties’ pro-
posed findings of fact and the briefs in support thereof.
The findings herein represent our independent judgment
based upon that review.

[2] In making these findings, we have allocated the bur-
den of proof as follows: plaintiffs must establish that ex-
ercise of a specific constitutional right is impaired by the
challenged statute or practice and that such a right is
deemed a fundamental one. If plaintiffs meet this burden,
the defendants must then demonstrate that there is a com-
pelling legitimate state interest served by the challenged
statute or practice which outweighs the impairment of the
protected right, and that no less restrictive means are rea-
sonably available to pursue such compelling interest.’ See
generally Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S.
209 (1977); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).

Based upon the foregoing, the Report of the Special
Master is adopted as modified and set forth herein.

I. Parties

1. Plaintiffs are residents of Minnesota, ‘‘public em-
ployees’’ under Minnesota law,’ and are employed by the
Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges (MSBCC)
as follows:

‘ As to plaintiffs’ claim that defendant labor organizations are
predominantly political in character, we have placed the burden
upon the defendants to show that their activities predominantly
relate to collective bargaining. See Abood v. Detroit Board of Edu-
cation, 431 U.S. 209, 239 n.40 (1977); ef. Finkin, The Limits of
Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 64 Minn. L. Rev. 183, 241-
249 (1980).

* See Minn, Stat. § 179.63, subd. 7.

33

a. Leon Knight and Morgan Kjer are faculty members
of North Hennepin Community College, located in Brook-
lyn Park, Minnesota;

b. James D. Wallace, Terrence D. Florin, Harold J.
Gardner, Eugene D. Mielke, Joan M. Farkas and Ronald
Lievense are faculty members of Normandale Community
College, located in Bloomington, Minnesota; and

c. Ralph G. Powell and Cresston Gackle are or were
faculty membere at Anoka-Ramsey Community College,
[3] located in Coon Rapids, Minnesota.’

2. Plaintiffs are represented collectively in the negotia-
tion of collective bargaining agreements, grievance adjust-
ment, and arbitration issues in dispute with MSBCC by
defendant Minnesota Community College Faculty Associa-
tion (MCCFA) which is certified as their exclusive repre-
sentative pursuant to PELRA. Minn. Stat. § 179.61 et seq.

3. Certain of the plaintiffs are not and do not desire to
become formal members or supporters, financial or other-
wise, of defendants * MCCF'A, Minnesota Education Asso-
ciation (MEA), Independent Minnesota Political Action

*The defendant labor organizations assert, and the plaintiffs
have not challenged, that the following plaintiffs are no longer
employed as community college faculty members: William B. Bau-
man, Thomas J. Patin, Dr, Richard A. Thompson, Gary Nelson,
Lucille Johuson, Virginia Lanegran and Richard Isenhart. In
addition, three plaintiffs, Donald A. Dahlin, David R. Grout and
Max A. Malmquist, had previously expressed a desire to withdraw
their participation in the case, which request was denied together
with other matters in this Court’s Order dated April 24, 1980. The
plaintiffs’ proposed findings did not include these three persons as
identified plaintiffs.

* The following plaintiffs are presently members of the MCCFA:
Harold J. Gardner, Eugene D. Mielke, Joan M. Farkas and Cress-
ton Gackle. Ralph G. Powell has become a faculty member at
Minneapolis Community College and thereafter joined the MCCFA.

34

Committee for Education (IMPACE) or National Educa-
tion Association (NEA), nor do they desire to be repre-
sented either individually or collectively by said organiza-
tions with respect to terms and conditions of employment,
other personnel or educational policies subject to the ‘‘meet
and confer’’ provisions of PELRA, or any other matter
in which defendant labor organizations are involved.

4. Defendant labor organizations are the MCCF'A, MBA,
NEA and IMPACE, the structures of which are described
infra at pp. 4-7.

5. Defendant state officials are as follows:

a. The Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges
(MSBCC) is an agency of the State of Minnesota, a ‘‘pub-
lic employer’’ under PELRA, and is responsible for man-
aging the [4] public community colleges of Minnesota, in-
cluding those which employ plaintiffs ;

b. Phillip C. Helland is the chancellor of the com-
munity college system and is the chief executive officer of
the MSBCC;

c. Dale A. Lorenz is the president of Normandale
Community College, John Helling is the president of North
Hennepin Community College ;

d. The Minnesota State Treasurer and Commissioner
of Finance are involved in the implementation of PELRA
for purposes of this action only to the extent that their
duties include withholding ‘‘fair share fees’’ from em-
ployees’ wages and transmitting such fees to the exclusive
representative; and

e. The director of the Bureau of Mediation Services’
only involvement in this action was his certification of the
MCCFA as the exclusive representative of the bargaining
unit in 1971 and his subsequent refusal to change that
certification in 1974.

35

II. Structure and Activities of Defendant Labor Organizations
A. Structure

1. NEA. NEA is a national voluntary organization of
teachers, governed by its Representative Assembly, Board
of Directors and Executive Committee, that has both state
and local affiliates. Through reciprocal membership re-
quirements as a condition of affiliation, members of a local
or state affiliate must become members of the NEA and of
both the state and local affiliates.

The principal policymaking body of the NEA is its
Representative Assembly, comprised of members of the
national, state and local associations, NEA’s program
budget, constitution, bylaws and standing rules, and resolu-
tions with respect to issues and goals are all voted upon
by the Representative Assembly. It also elects the pvresi-
dent, vice president, secretary, treasurer, at-large members
of the Board [5] of Directors, and the at-large members
of the Executive Committee.

Only the NEA may amend its constitution and bylaws,
which are separate from those of MEA or MCCFA. The
NEA is the exclusive employer of its professional staff and
such staff are not subject to supervision by any staff of
MEA or MCCFA. No sta‘e or local affiliate has any au-
thority over any collective bargaining agreement entered
into by the NEA with its professional staff. NEA sets its
own budget and no affiliate has authority to interfere with
such determinations.

2. MEA. The MEA is a statewide voluntary organization
of teachers that operates under the direction of its own
Representative Assembly, Board of Directors and Execu-
tive Committee, all of which are separate from the repre-
sentative or delegate assemblies, boards and committees
of the NEA and MCCFA. The MEA has divided the state
into various geographic regions and other units known as
UniServ units, each of which serves one or more local asso-

36

ciations. Every UniServ unit, including the MCCFA, is en-
titled to representation on the MEA’s Board.

MEA has its own constitution and bylaws, which it alone
may amend. Such amendment does not require approval by
the NEA or any local affiliate.

MEA’s staff operate under the direction of MEA’s ex-
ecutives and is separate from the staff of NEA and
MCCFA, although some MEA staff may be assigned to
assist affiliates, including MCCFA.

MEA’s boards, committees and assemblies determines its
program budget and other expenditure decisions, without
any power of review by the NEA or local affiliates.

3. MCCFA. The MCCFA is a voluntary organization of
community college faculty members operating under the
direction of its own Delegate Assembly, Board of Directors
and Executive Committee. As an affiliate of the MEA and
NEA, MCCFA requires its members to become members of
MEA and NEA.

[6] MCCFA’s relationship with the NEA and MEA is
set forth in the affiliation agreement between these orga-
nizations. Under this agreement, MCCFA members pay
‘unified dues’’ to the MCCFA, MEA and NEA. The dedi-
cation of a portion of such dues to MEA and NEA is in
exchange for staff, office and other assistance to MCCFA.
Extensive evidence was submitted with respect to account-
ing for the budgets and allocations between the organiza-
tions. The evidence established that at least 75% of
MCCFA member dues are expended by or on direct behalf
of MCCFA. The portion allocable to the MCCFA is higher
if regular indirect MEA and NEA assistance, or emergency
aid such as strike assistance, is included.

The authority of MCCFA to maintain the autonomy
specified under its constitution, to conduct its own meet-
ings, to elect its own officers and to adopt its own policies,
are also provided for in the affiliation agreement.

37

MCCFA’s constitution and bylaws are separate from
those of MEA and NEA. MCCFA’s bylaws may be
amended only by its membership. MCCFA’s board of di-
rectors, officers and member assemblies are all separate
from those of MEA and NEA.

MCCFA alone determines the scope, content, subject
matter and direction of its collective bargaining with the
MSBCC. NEA and MEA have no authority to determine
or participate in the determination of such matters by
MCCFA.

4. IMPACE. IMPACE is a voluntary, nonprofit com-
mittee of individual educators which may be characterized
as MEA’s political action arm. Its Board of Directors are
appointed by the MEA Board of Directors. The IMPACE
board exercises general supervision and control of its orga-
nization, including all determinations of financial contri-
butions to the campaigns of candidates for public office in
Minnesota.

Membership in and contributions to IMPACE are wholly
voluntary and distinctly separate from membership in or
contributions to MEA, NEA or MCCFA.

IMPACE has sole authority over its funding decisions
and other activities. IMPACE contracts and pays for the
services of certain MEA staff members together with pay-
ing MEA for IMPACE’s office space and other support
services. [7] IMPACE has no authority to participate in
or exercise influence over budget, program, collective bar-
gaining or other regular operations of NEA, MEA or
MCCFA.

5. NEA-PAC. NEA-PAC is not a defendant. It is a na-
tional voluntary, nonprofit committee of teachers which
may be characterized as NEA’s political action arm. It is
governed by its own Steering Committee which determines
which campaigns of candidates for federal office shall re-
ceive financial contributions. The NEA-PAC Steering Com-

38

mittee and NEA officers and directors are separate entities.
IMPACE Chairman, Roger Johnson, is a member of the
NEA-PAC Council by virtue of his IMPACE chairmanship.

Membership in or contribution to NEA-PAC is wholly
voluntary and distinctly separate from membership in or
contribution to NEA, MEA or MCCFA.

NEA-PAC has no authority to participate in or exercise
influence over budget, program, collective bargaining or
other regular operations of NEA, MEA or MCCFA.

6. INTERRELATIONSHIPS. In limited circumstances,
NEA, MEA, MCCFA, NEA-PAC and IMPACE provide
to or share with one another various services and facilities.
Such sharing of services, facilities or staff is generally fi-
nanced by each separate organization to the extent such
organization directly benefits from the particular sharing
arrangement. Officials, staff personnel and representatives
of NEA, MEA, MCCF'A, NEA-PAC and IMPACE regu-
larly attend meetings with one another, plan certain co-
operative programs, report to their respective organiza-
tions concerning the activities of the other organizations,
and maintain continuous channels of communications
among themselves. In special cases, the degree of support
for an affiliate may be quite substantial (see p. 10, infra,
regarding strike assistance).

MCCFA, MEA and NEA are related by their agreement
of affiliation, by having certain common goals and by oc-
casional sharing arrangements. They are not and do not
function or operate, however, as a single integrated unit.
In making this finding, we have considered the testimony
of Professors Schneier and Morgan, presented by plain-
tiffs, and the record [8] as a whole. Each organization has
a separate board of directors, officers, committees, consti-
tution and bylaws. Each organization maintains exclusive
control over its budget, program activity and general pol-
icy-setting process. Each organization maintains separate

39

and exclusive control over its professional staff and man-
agement operations. Each organization maintains separate
and exclusive control over its collective bargaining deter-
minations. The record thus shows that MCCFA, MEA and
NEA are not a single integrated organization. The record
also establishes that IMPACE and NEA-PAC are separate
political action committees of MEA and NEA, respectively.
Because membership in or contribution to IMPACE and
NEA-PAC are wholly voluntary and separate from any
participation in MCCFA, MEA or NEA, IMPACE and
NEA-PAC are also not part of any single integrated
organization.

B. General Activities of Defendant Labor Organizations

1. MCCFA. Since 1971, MCCFA has been the certified
exclusive bargaining agent for the faculty of Minnesota’s
community colleges. MCCFA was actively engaged for over
a year negotiating the 1973-75 collective bargaining con-
tract with MSBCC. This accord was reached without strike
or arbitration. The 1975-77 and 1977-79 contracts were
also negotiated by MCCFA for approximately one year
each; both resulted in arbitration proceedings and awards;
and, in both cases, the Minnesota Legislature failed to fully
fund the arbitration award. MCCFA also negotiated the
1979-81 contract for nearly a year. In this case, a three-
week strike resulted from a refusal by MSBCC to arbitrate
the dispute.

The subject matter of these negotiations by MCCFA has
included teaching loads, work assignments, salaries, leave
policies, grievance procedures, seniority rights, fringe
benefits, grounds for dismissal and the scope of arbitration.

Roughly one-half of MCCFA’s annual budget is ex-
pended on the costs of operating its 22-person Board of
Directors, its Executive Committee and the salary of its
president. The president chairs meetings of the Board and
Executive Committee, which take place at least monthly;
appoints members and serves as an ex officio member of

40

standing committees (Negotiations [9] Committee, Meet
and Confer Committee, Legislative Committee, Profes-
sional Growth Committee, Resolutions Committee and oth-
ers); chairs the negotiation teams and serves generally as
the chief spokesperson of MCCFA.

The MCCFA Executive Director is salaried by the MEA,
pursuant to the affiliation agreement, but is primarily in-
volved in grievance of MCCFA claims, MCCFA contract
interpretation and negotiations and other MCCFA matters.

Roughly one-fifth of the MCCFA budget is expended on
its committee activities in such areas as negotiations, meet
and confer, legislative matters and professional growth,

The testimony and exhibits relating to MCCFA activities
clearly establish that nearly all such activities relate di-
rectly to collective bargaining, formulation of a bargaining
position, contract administration or closely related orga-
nizational and professional growth.

2. MEA. MCCFA is affiliated with MEA, a statewide
organization of local teacher affiliates that represent more
than half of the public school teachers in Minnesota.

MEA assists its affiliates in virtually all areas in which
they are active. MEA has departments (paid staff of MEA)
and councils (volunteer teacher members who receive only
expenses) in the following areas, on which well over half
of the MEA budget is expended: Negotiations, Teacher
Rights, Field Services (including UniServ), Instructional
and Professional Development, Communications, Economic
Services, and Governmental Relations. The activities of
these departments and councils include training of teachers
in grievance procedures, legal defense or promotion of
teacher rights, research and consultation on the broad
range of subjects treated in negotiations, consultation on
arbitration matters, investigation of unfair labor practice
charges, direct field staff assistance to local affiliates in all
of the foregoing areas, researching and organizing teacher

41

education programs dealing with classroom skills and other
professional development, and assembling insurance, travel
and other group benefits. Roughly one-third of MEA’s
budget is expended on administration, governance and
physical facilities, including offices, equipment, officer sal-
aries and costs of Board [10] meetings and Representative
Assemblies.

The testimony and exhibits relating to MEA activities
clearly establish that all bnt an insignificant portion of
such activities relate directly to collective bargaining issues
such as teacher salaries, fringe benefits, size of classes, job
security and other aspects of teacher welfare.

The MEA directly assisted the MCCFA during the latter
organization’s 1979 strike action. MEA granted MCCFA
$200,000 to maintain strike facilities, paid $100 per week
to striking faculty members after the tenth day of the
strike, and, together with NEA, guaranteed approximately
$300,000 in loans to the strikers. This strike aid alone ex-
ceeded three years of MCCFA dues to MEA.

3. NEA. The NEA is a national teacher organization
which engages in a variety of activities aimed at promoting
public education, teacher welfare and improving the bar-
gaining ability and position of its members and affiliates.

The overwhelming majority of NEA’s budget expendi-
tures relate to training teachers in grievance procedures,
professional growth and skill development of teachers, tech-
nical management and other organizational assistance to
its affiliates, extensive research support relating to collec-
tive bargaining issues, and direct assistance to affiliates
engaged in collective bargaining.

C. Political Activity of Defendant Labor Organisations

1. NEA-PAC and IMPACE are political action arms of
NEA and MEA, respectively. NEA-PAC makes contribu-
tions to the campaigns of federal candidates, and IMPACE

42

makes contributions to state and local candidates. The
funds for such contributions are independent of dues-
money and are raised through separate voluntary contribu-
tions, primarily from teachers.

2. There is some overlap of NEA-PAC activity with
regular NEA organizational activity and staff, and some
NEA political activity that may be only incidentally re-
lated to collective bargaining. The NEA has a rebate pro-
cedure which refunds, to each member who desires, the
portion of [11] regular dues expended on political activity
which does not bear directly on collective bargaining,
grievance procedures and teacher welfare. Rebated costs
include those related to any overlap with NEA-PAC, the
preparation or dissemination of candidate ratings or any
other indication of candidate preference, certain ideologi-
cal or charitable activity, and other lobbying not related
directly to collective bargaining or terms and conditions of
employment. The rebatable amounts, as determined by
NEA, have always aggregated to less than 10% of NEA
dues. There was no evidence introduced showing that NEA
expended more than the rebatable amounts on political
activity unrelated to collective bargaining matters.

Separate from NEA-PAC and rabatable activity, NEA
does engage in political activity at the federal level that the
record shows relates directly to collective bargaining, edu-
cation funding and other issues that are integral to teacher
welfare,

3. There is some overlap between IMPACE activity and
the regular MEA organizational activity and staff. For ex-
ample, local government relations councils participate in
screening local candidates, as does IMPACE. In addition,
some MEA staff members participated in political activity
on behalf of the 1976 Carter-Mondale campaign, but the
evidence showed that such partisan activities, taken as a
whole, would be less than 2% of MEA’s total budgeted
activities.

43

Separate from any IMPACE overlap, MEA regularly
engages in political activity at the state and local levels in
the ureas of education funding, teacher tenure rights, class-
size policy, retirement benefits and other teacher welfare
concerns affected by state or local budget decisions.
Through its government relations committee and depart-
ment and through a coordinated program of local volunteer
members, MEA organizes lobbying efforts directly related
to the foregoing teacher concerns, The record establishes
that such political activities relate closely and directly to
the collective bargaining efforts of MEA.

4. MCCFA has engaged in political activity that the
record shows relates chiefly to securing legislative approval
of the employment contracts negotiated or arbitrated with
the MSBCC and to other collective bargaining issues,

{12} 5. Taken as a whole, the record establishes that
MEA and NEA are properly characterized as public em-
ployee organizations actively engaged in improving through
collective bargaining the terms and conditions of employ-
ment for teachers, and that MCCF'A is organized and affi-
liated with MEA and NEA to pursue similar efforts on
behalf of the community college faculty it represents. All
three organizations engage in a wide range of legislative,
governmental and public relations activities that are closely
and directly related to furtherance of each organization’s
collective bargaining activities. IMPACE and NEA-PAC
are separate from the regular operations of MCCFA, MEA
and NEA and engage in partisan political activity financed
by the independent, voluntary contributions of individual
teachers and others.

This finding is based on the testimony of numerous offi-
cers and staff of MCCFA, MEA and NEA concerning the
character of their political activity and the proportion of
their time spent on political activity of any kind, in addi-
tion to the many exhibits relating to budget allocations of
each organization.

44

There were two types of affirmative evidence presented
by the plaintiffs to show that the defendant organizations
are predominantly political action organizations: (1) writ-
ten or oral statements made by the defendant organizations
to the effect that political action is an integral, essential
element of their activities; and (2) a ‘‘content analysis’’ of
selected publications and meeting minutes of various de-
fendant organizations, from which it was inferred that 50-
100% of each organization’s activity is ‘‘political’’ as op-
posed to ‘‘collective bargaining.’’ We find this affirmative
evidence unpersuasive. It fails to distinguish between activ-
ity related to collective bargaining and political activity
unrelated to that end. The content analysis in particular
treats all ‘‘lobbying, organizing and litigation’’ matters as
separate from ‘‘collective bargaining.’’ Lobbying, organiz-
ing and litigation activities that directly relate to collective
bargaining issues are thus excluded from the ‘‘collective
bargaining’’ category of the analysis. The content analysis
also assumes that the publications analyzed accurately re-
flect the range of activities actually undertaken by the
organizations, an assumption unsupported by the record
as a [13] whole. The analysis of organizational publica-
tions was also outweighed by the firsthand testimony of the
officers and staff of such organizations and the budgetary
and other records of their activity.

Ill, Faculty-Employer Relations
A. The Structure of PELRA

Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 179.67, the MCCFA has been
certified as the exclusive representative of community col-
lege faculty for purposes of collective bargaining and has
negotiated four such employment contracts since 1971.

PELRA imposes upon the employer a duty to ‘‘meet and
negotiate’ with an exclusive representative with respect
to ‘terms and conditions of employment,’’ as defined in
the Act, and imposes a duty to ‘‘meet and confer’’ with

45

‘*professional employees’’ with respect to employee con-
cerns that fall outside the definition of ‘‘terms and condi-
tions.’’ See Minn. Stat. 44 179.66, subds. 2 & 3, and 179.63,
subds. 15, 16 & 18. PELRA further provides that, when an
exclusive representative has been certified, ‘‘[t]he em-
ployer shall not meet and negotiate or meet and confer with
any employee or group of employees * * * except through
the exclusive representative.’’ Minn, Stat. 4 179.66.

Public employees under PELRA have a right not to join
any labor organization which may be certified as their ex-
clusive representative, but a ‘‘fair share fee’’ may be de-
ducted from nonmembers and paid to the representative.
Minn. Stat. § 179.65, subd. 2.

Public employees have the right to communicate with
their employer with respect to terms and conditions of em-
ployment so long as such activity ‘‘does not circumvent the
rights of the exclusive representative if there be one.’’
Minn. Stat. § 179.65, subd. 1.

Professional public employees, such as plaintiffs, have
the right to ‘‘meet and confer’’ with the employer regard-
ing matters other than ‘‘terms and conditions’’ of employ-
ment, Minn. Stat. § 179.65, subd. 3.

[14] B. The Effects of PELRA in Practice

1. The 1979-81 employment contract between MCCFA
and MSBCC provides inter alia that:

a. ‘*The Employer will not interfere with the rights of
employees to become or not to become members of
[MCCFA] and there shall be no discrimination or inter-
ference, restraint, or coercion by the Employer * * * against
any employee because of [MCCFA] membership or non-
membership[ ;]’’

b. The MCCFA has the sole right to ‘‘establish’’ up to
six faculty committees at each campus for the purpose of
holding ‘‘exchange of views’’ meetings with the college

46

administration in the areas of ‘‘Personnel, Student Affairs,
Curriculum, Facilities, Fiscal Matters, and General Mat-
ters;’’ and ‘‘[e]ach committee will have full authority in
the assigned area to present the views of the employees’’
in such meetings;

c. Alternative structures for exchanging views may be
agreed to by the campus chapter of MCCFA but ‘‘such
agreement shall not in any way regulate or control the
right of selection or participation by the local [MCCFA]
association ;’’

d. A statewide-level ‘‘meet and confer’’ committee
shall also be established by the statewide MCCFA, shall
meet with the MSBCC at least three times per year, and
shall include as subjects ‘‘all items submitted by the State
[MCCFA];’’

e. Statewide and campus faculty representatives for
contract administration matters are designated by the
statewide or local MCCFA;

f. Class-size issues shall be resolved ‘‘through the ex-
change of views process ;’’

g. The academic year and summer school calendar
shall be established by a committee comprised of the college
president, student body president and campus MCCFA
president;

h. The designation of academic departments and the
responsibilities of ‘‘department coordinators’’ shall be de-
termined through the exchange of views process;

[15] i. Employee ‘‘complaints’’ may be presented to
administrators with or without participation of the MCCFA
grievance representative; formal grievances must be
signed by the affected employee and the MCCFA grievance
representative ; and

j. The employer ‘‘will not during the life of this con-
tract meet and negotiate or meet and confer relative to

47

terms and conditions of employment with any employee or
group of employees * * * except through the exclusive bar-
gaining representative.’’

2. Prior to the implementation of PELRA, the faculty
of at least some community college campuses were orga-
nized in ‘‘faculty senates or councils,’’ with various com-
mittees thereof focusing on such subject areas as new
course proposals and other curriculum matters, degree re-
quirements, student activity budgets, academic standards
and related discipline procedures for students, teacher
evaluation and general budget and planning issues at each
such campus.

The faculty senates or councils and committees thereof,
together with general faculty assemblies, were the primary
formal mechanism for formulating faculty views and com-
municating such views to the administration. Faculty repre-
sentatives in this formal system were selected by election
processes in which every faculty member was eligible to
vote and seek election.

3. Since PELRA was adopted, ‘‘meet and confer’’ and
‘*exchange of views’’ committees (hereafter, meet and con-
fer) have replaced faculty senates and councils and are the
principal formal mechanisms, at the campus and statewide
levels, for formulating faculty positions on their concerns,
The subjects covered by the meet and confer system in-
clude new course proposals and other curriculum matters,
budgetary planning, development of facilities, student
rights and student affairs generally, evaluation of adminis-
trators, selection of college presidents, academic accredita-
tion of the community colleges, and other matters.

4. The degree and effectiveness of faculty organization
varied from campus to campus prior to PELRA. The duty
to ‘‘meet and confer,’’ however, requires administrators at
each [16] campus to listen to and consult with the faculty
on policy questions other than ‘‘terms and conditions of

48

employment.’’ Together with the establishment of ‘‘meet
and confer’’ committees, the duty imposed by PELRA has
made the formal meet and eonfer process the primary me-
chanism for any significant faculty-administration com-
munication on such policy questions,

5. The views of a faculty meet and confer committee are
considered by administrators to be the official faculty posi-
tion on matters discussed in meet and confer sessions, but
the administrators recognize that there are other positions
held by individual faculty members.

6. No community college administrator or MSBCC mem-
ber plays any role in the selection of the members on the
faculty’s meet and confer committees.

7. Pursuant to the employment contract, the MCCFA
has exclusive control over designation of all faculty mem-
bers on meet and confer committees at the campus and
statewide level. Although there is no express policy against
including nonmembers of MCCFA on such committees, in
practice nonmembers have not been designated to serve in
such roles.

8. Regardless of membership or nonmembership in
MCCFA, all faculty have the right to informally com-
municate their individual views to administrators and the
MSBCC and MCCFA have never attempted to deny or
abridge such rights. The exclusive formal process for for-
mulating and communicating a collective faculty position
on policy questions, however, is through the meet and con-
fer committees.

9. There are few formal rules with respect to determin-
ing which faculty members may appear before or present
proposals to the meet and confer committees, In practice,
however, committee members determine the agenda and
focus of faculty expressions and committee meetings are
not a general forum for individual faculty members or
others to discuss matters of interest to them.

49

[17] IV. First Amendment and State Interests
A. Associational Interests

1. The decision to join or contribute to IMPACE or
NEA-PAC is wholly an individual, voluntary one, This
record is devoid of any evidence that the plaintiffs have
been required or in any manner coerced into supporting,
joining, or refraining from opposing the efforts of 1M-
PACE or NEA-PAC.

2. The only statutorily-imposed relationship between
plaintiffs and MCCFA, MEA and NEA involves the deduc-
tion of a fair share fee from the plaintiffs that is paid to
MCCFA as the exclusive bargaining representative of com-
munity college faculty, a portion of which is paid to MEA
and NEA for various collective bargaining and related
assistance the latter groups provide to MCCFA.

3. To obtain or retain their faculty positions, or to derive
the economic, job security and other benefits under the
‘*terms and conditions’’ (as defined by PELRA) of their
employment, the plaintiffs have not been and are not re-
quired or coerced into joining, or refraining from opposing,
MCCFA, MEA or NEA. Such rights and benefits flow
equally to ali faculty members regardless of their member-
ship or nonmembership in MCCFA.

4. The ability of the plaintiffs to participate in the meet
and confer process, and to serve on meet and confer com-
mittees, is impaired by nonmembership in MCCFA as fol-
lows: The employment contract provides MCCFA with ex-
clusive control over the selection of faculty members on
meet and confer committees; such committee members have
principal control over formulating the agenda of faculty
concerns and the adoption of faculty views; and nonmem-
bers of MCCFA have not been, in practice, selected for
participation on such committees.

5. Having the opportunity to fully participate in the
meet and confer process is viewed by some plaintiffs as

50

essential to their role on the faculty. Some plaintiffs felt
pressure to join the MCCFA in order to have such an
opportunity and at least one plaintiff joined MCCFA for
this reason.

[18] 6. No evidence was introduced demonstrating that
service on meet and confer committees was available
equally to members and nonmembers of MCCFA.

B. Free Speech Interests

1. The right of all faculty, both members and nonmem-
bers of MCCFA, to communicate informally and individu-
ally with administrative officials has not been impaired by
the MCCFA, MEA, NEA or the MSBCC.

2. Certain rights that might be characterized as elements
of academic freedom are expressly protected by the em-
ployment contract, e.g., the right of faculty members to
select their course materials and text books, to choose their
methods of teaching, to research and publish their work, to
evaluate student performance and to select library ma-
terials.

3. There is a potential for impairing free speech rights
arising from MCCF'A’s exclusive control over selection of
faculty members on the meet and confer committees, as
follows: A faculty member could be inhibited from speak-
ing out against MCCFA generally or against particular
issue positions strongly held by MCCFA because it might
be feared that such action could result in exclusion from
serving on the meet and confer committees.

The plaintiffs have not demonstrated that MCCFA selec-
tions of meet and confer committee members have in any
way been conducted to ‘‘retaliate’’ in such a manner, nor
that any faculty member’s exercise of free speech has been
impaired in practice by virtue of this potential inhibition.

4. The plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate any direct,
indirect, actual or potential impairment of their associa-

51

tional and free speech rights, except as indicated in Find-
ings IV(A) (4-5) and (B)(3).

C. State Interests

1. The parties have stipulated to a number of state in-
terests that independent review of the record establish as
true and relevant to these proceedings:

[19] a, The State of Minnesota has a legitimate inter-
est in promoting orderly and constructive relationships
between public employers and employees. Unresolved dis-
putes between public employers and their employees are
detrimental to the public interest as well as to the interests
of the involved parties.

b. The State of Minnesota has determined that enact-
ment of the Public Employment Labor Relations Act is the
means by which it can best deal with its employees in a fair,
efficient and peaceful fashion.

ce. A statutory system which permits employees in a
unit to be represented by an exclusive representative re-
sults in the avoidance of confusion, conflicting demands,
and dissension that would result from more than one repre-
sentative claiming to represent all the employees in an
employee unit.

d. The State of Minnesota has a legitimate interest in
maintaining ‘‘labor peace’’ by entering into agreements
with an exclusive representative for each employee unit,
which agreements are not subject to direct challenge by
rival employee organizations claiming to represent the
same employees in each unit.

2. Creating a procedure for systematic expression of
faculty views on a broad range of campus policy questions
furthers each of the foregoing state interests.

3. The record does not demonstrate, nor does the State
of Minnesota assert, any state interest in allocating the

52

benefits and obligations of the exclusive representation
collective bargaining system in a manner which discrimi-
nates between members and nonmembers of the employee
organization.

4. Additional state interests appear on the face of and
by inference from the PELRA statute, which therefore
need not be set forth here.

[20]
ORDER

1. Each party to this proceeding shall submit proposed
conclusions of law based upon the facts as found herein on
or before December 9, 1981.

2. Each party may submit a memorandum of points and
authorities in support of their position, together with their
proposed conclusions. Such memorandum shall not exceed
twenty-five (25) pages in length.

3. Final oral argument will be December 16, 1981 at 2:30
o’clock p.m.

/s/ Gerald W. Heaney
Geratp W. Heaney
United States Circuit Judge

/s/ Donald D. Alsop
Donatp D. ALsop
United States District Judge

/s/ Earl R. Larson
Kart R. Larson
U.S. Senior District Judge

Datep: November 16, 1981.

OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT,
535 F.2d 466

(17 May 1976)

55

Leon W. Knicut, et au., Petitioners,
we

Tue Honoraste Donan D. Atsop, District Judge,
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota,
Respondent.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,
EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

No. 76-1051

Submitted March 11, 1976.
Decided May 17, 1976.

Faculty members employed by community colleges
brought action challenging constitutionality of state’s Pub-
lice Employee Labor Relations Act. Following denial of
motion to convene three-judge court, faculty members
sought mandamus. The Court of Appeals, Stephenson, Cir-
cuit Judge, held that mandamus was proper remedy; that
the complaint raised sufficiently substantial constitutional
questions to require convening of three-judge court; and
that complaint formally alleged basis for equitable relief.

Writ granted.

[467] Before Lay, Ross and Stepnenson, Circuit Judges.
SrepHenson, Circuit Judge.

The critical issue raised in this case is whether a three-
judge court should have been convened under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2281 and 2284. Petitioners request a writ of manda-
[468] mus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651 and Fed.R.App.P.

56

21 directing the district court’ to convene a three-judge
court. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the
district court exceeded its jurisdiction in denying pctition-
ers’ motion to convene a three-judge court and grant the
petition for writ of mandamus.

Twenty faculty members (petitioners) employed by vari-
ous Minnesota community colleges initiated this action con-
tending that the Minnesota Public Employee Labor Rela-
tions Act (PELRA), Minn.Stat.Ann. § 179.61 et seq., con-
travenes the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983, 1985(3), 1986 and 1994. In particular, the petition-
ers assert that the exclusive representation® and fair
share® provisions of the PELRA, on their face and as
applied, are violative of the First, Ninth, Tenth, Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The amended complaint
named as defendants, respondents, the Minnesota Commu-
nity College Faculty Association (MCCF'A), an employee
organization certified as the exclusive representative of
petitioners under the PELRA; its affiliates, the National
Education Association (NEA), the Minnesota Education
Association (MEA) and the Independent Minnesota Po-
litical Action Committee for Education (IMPACE) ; vari-
ous officers and former off.cers of the unions; and officials
of the state of Minnesota who administer the PELRA.

None of the petitioners is either a member or supporter
of the unions nor desires any representation by them.
Ostensibly, the MCCFA through the PELRA has the au-
thority to act as the petitioners’ exclusive representative

*The Honorable Donald D. Alsop, United States District Judge
for the District of Minnesota.

2 Minn.Stat.Ann. §§ 179.63(1)-(7), (15)-(18) ; 179.64(7) ; 179.-
65(1)-(2), (4)-(5), (7); 179.66(2), (7)-(10) ; 179.67; 179.68(1),
(2), (5)-(6), (9), (11); 179.69; 179.70; 179.71(2)-(4), (5), (6)-
(7); 179.72(3), (6)-(7), (9), (12); 179.74(3)-(5).

*Minn.Stat.Ann. § 179.65(2).

57

in collective bargaining with the Minnesota State Board for
Community Colleges (Board) concerning terms and condi-
tions of employment in the community college system.
Essentially, the petitioners allege that the PELRA denies
the right to bargain with the Board on an individual level
and prohibits an individual from petitioning the Board
with regard to employment matters.

Furthermore, during the academic years 1973-1974, 1974-
1975, and 1975-1976, the MCCFA apparently has caused
fair share fees to be deducted by the Board from the peti-
tioners’ wages in amounts equal to 94-97% of the formal
membership dues levied by the MCCFA during those years.
The petitioners in this regard further contend that such
fees have been deducted or checked off without notice or
hearing and without a determination that expenditure of
the fees confers any benefit on the petitioners. It is also
asserted that some of the fees have been transferred by
the MCCFA to the NEA, the MEA and IMPACE.

[1] The amended complaint requested a declaration that
the exclusive representation and fair share schemes are
constitutionally invalid and injunctive relief restraining the
unions and state officials from enforcing the applicable pro-
visions of the PELRA. In their amended complaint, the
petitioners also requested that a three-judge court be con-
vened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284. On Decem-
ber 22, 1975, after oral argument the district court issued
a memorandum opinion and order denying the motion for
a three-judge court. The district court held that the peti-
tioners’ aliegations concerning the exclusive representation
aspect of the PELRA failed to constitute a substantial
federal constitutional question.* Although the petitioners’

*On a motion to convene a three-judge court, a single district
judge may determine whether the constitutional question is sub-
stantial, whether the complaint formally alleges a basis for equita-
ble relief, and whether the case otherwise comports with the

58

[469] contention surrounding the fair share fee was found
to present a substantial constitutional question, the district
court determined that injunctive relief against state officials
was not necessary with respect to that claim.

[2-4] A threshold consideration is whether the district
court’s refusal to convene a three-judge court is reviewable
through a petition for writ of mandamus.’ The remedy of
mandamus is typically available only in circumstances in
which the district court exceeds ‘‘the sphere of its discre-
tionary power.’’ Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 104,
88 S.Ct. 269, 278, 19 L.Ed.2d 305, 315 (1967). See In re
Cessna Aircraft Antitrust Litigation, 518 F.2d 213, 216-17
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947, 96 S.Ct. 363, 46 L.Ed.
2d 282 (1975); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 545, 547-48
(8th Cir. 1972). The writ is an extraordinary remedy that
is to be granted when the lower court has committed a
‘‘clear abuse of discretion.’’ Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379
U.S. 104, 110, 85 S.Ct. 234, 238, 13 L.Ed.2d 152, 159 (1964).
See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612, 614-15 (8th Cir. 1975).
Despite the limited availability of the mandamus remedy,
we conclude that the ruling of the district court is review-
able through mandamus. In Gonzalez v. Automatic Em-
ployees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 100 n. 19, 95 S.Ct. 289,
295, 42 L.Ed. 2d 249, 258 (1974), the Supreme Court clearly
indicated that ‘‘Where a single judge refuses to request

requirements for a statutory three-judge court. See Idlewild Bon
Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 (1962). A single
judge may also determine whether there is a statutory claim that
is dispositive of the case. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 543-
44, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1382, 39 L.Ed.2d 577, 591 (1974).

5 Since the district court retained jurisdiction, this is not a case
arising from an appealable order. Cf. Majuri v. United States,
431 F.2d 469, 472 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943, 91 S.Ct.
245, 27 L.Ed.2d 248 (1970). Further, petitioners did not request
certification for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) of the district
court’s order.

59

the convention of a three-judge court, but retains juris-
diction, review of his refusal may be had in the court of
appeals * * * through petition for writ of mandamus
** * 9 See Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein,
370 U.S. 713, 715, 82 S.Ct. 1294, 1296, 8 L.Ed.2d 794, 796
(1962) ; see also Schackman v. Arnebergh, 387 U.S. 427, 87
S.Ct. 1622, 18 L.Ed.2d 865 (1967). In this particular in-
stance, judicial economy can be served by exercising the
‘*supervisory control of the District Courts * * * necessary
to proper judicial administration in the federal system.’’
La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259-60, 77 S.Ct.
309, 315, 1 L.Ed.2d 290, 299 (1957). See J. Moore & B.
Ward, 9 Moore’s Federal Practice J 110.-28, at 312-13 (1975
& Supp.). The writ of mandamus is an appropriate method
‘‘to confine [the district court] to a lawful exercise of its
prescribed jurisdiction.’’ Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n,
319 U.S. 21, 26, 63 S.Ct. 938, 941, 87 L.Ed. 1185, 1190 (1943).

Accordingly, we must proceed to determine whether the
district court acted in excess of its jurisdiction or com-
mitted a clear abuse of discretion in refusing to convene
a three-judge court under the circumstances of the instant
case.

The district court, relying on Railway Employees’ Dep’t
v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 76 S.Ct. 714, 100 L.Ed. 1112 (1956),
concluded that the petitioners’ constitutional claims con-
cerning the exclusive representation scheme failed to pre-
sent a substantial federal constitutional question. We, how-
ever, disagree with its holding that Hanson rendered peti-
tioners’ claims wholly insubstantial.

[5] It is well established that a three-judge court need
not be convened when the issues presented have been set-
tled beyond question. The Supreme Court in Bailey v. Pat-
terson, 369 U.S. 31, 33, 82 S.Ct. 549, 551, 7 L.Ed.2d 512, 514
(1962), has expressly stated that 28 U.S.C. § 2281 ‘‘does not
require a three-judge court when the claim that a statute
is unconstitutional is wholly insubstantial, legally speaking
nonexistent.’’ Moreover, in Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512,

60

518, 93 S.Ct. 854, 858, 35 L.Ed.2d 36, 42 (1973), the Court
equated ‘‘constitutional insubstantiality’’ with such con-
cepts as ‘‘essentially fictitious,’’ ‘‘wholly insubstantial,’’
‘‘obviously frivolous,’’ and ‘‘obviously without merit.’’? The
Supreme Court concluded:

[470] The limiting words ‘‘wholly’’ and ‘‘obviously’’ have
cogent legal significance. In the context of the effect
of prior decisions upon the substantiality of constitu-
tional claims, those words import that claims are con-
stitutionally insubstantial only if the prior decisions
inescapably render the claims frivolous; previous de-
cisions that merely render claims of doubtful or ques-
tionable merit do not render them insubstantial for the
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2281. A claim is insubstantial
only if ‘‘ ‘its unsoundness so clearly results from the
previous decisions of this court as to foreclose the
subject and leave no room for the inference that the
questions sought to be raised can be the subject of
controversy.’ ”’

Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518, 93 S.Ct. 854, 859, 35
L.Ed.2d 36, 42 (1973), quoting from Ex parte Poresky,
290 U.S. 30, 32, 54 S.Ct. 3, 4, 78 L.Ed. 152, 153 (1933).
See also Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103,
105-06, 53 S.Ct. 549, 550, 77 L.Ed. 1062, 1064 (1933) ; Hannis
Distilling Co v. Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285, 288, 30 S.Ct. 326,
327, 54 L.Ed. 482, 483 (1910); McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U.S.
70, 80, 30 S.Ct. 27, 31, 54 L.Ed. 95, 101 (1909). Under the
test announced in Goosby v. Osser, supra, we conclude that
Hanson is not a prior decision of the Supreme Court that
‘*foreclose[s] the subject’’ of petitioners’ constitutional
attack upon the Minnesota exclusive representation scheme.
Similarly, it is not a decision that ‘‘leave[s] no room for
the inference that the questions sought to be raised [by
petitioners] can be the subject of controversy.’’

In Railway Employees’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225,
76 S.Ct. 714, 100 L.Ed. 1112 (1956), the Supreme Court

61

confirmed the validity of union shop agreements negotiated
according to congressional authorization in the Railway
Labor Act of 1926 (RLA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63, against
challenges grounded on the First and Fifth Amendments.
Under the RLA, union shop agreements could condition
union membership on the payment of ‘‘ periodic dues, initi-
ation fees, and assessments.’’ 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh.
The Supreme Court held that such a condition, on its face,
neither denied union employees of their right to work as
ensured by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
nor interfered with their right of free speech or freedom
of association as secured by the First Amendment. Jd. at
227-38, 76 S.Ct. at 715-721, 100 L.Ed. at 1128-1134. In so
holding, however, the Court predicted:

[Ilf the exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assess-
ments is used as a cover for forcing ideological con-
formity or other action in contravention of the First
Amendment, this judgment will not prejudice the deci-
sion in that case. * * * We only hold that the require-
ment for financial support of the collective-bargaining
agency by all who receive the benefits of its work * * *
does not violate either the First or the Fifth Amend-
ments.

351 U.S. at 238, 76 S.Ct. at 721, 100 L.Ed. at 1134. The
Cupreme Court in Hanson emphasized that it was approv-
ing exclusively union shop agreements which condition
union membership on the payment of union dues, fees and
assessments utilized to defray the costs of collective bar-
gaining. Id.

[6, 7] The petitioners’ constitutional challenge to the
exclusive representation scheme of the PELRA is distinct
from Hanson. The essence of petitioners’ allegation® con-

° The existence of a substantial constitutional question is deter-
mined by the contentions of the complaint, and the allegations of
the complaint are assumed true. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 US.
371, 373, 91 S.Ct. 780, 783, 28 L.Ed.2d 113, 116 (1971).

62

cerning exclusive representation relates to their unwilling-
ness to accept a union organization as their sole bargaining
representative for the purpose of negotiating and adminis-
tering collective agreements with the Minnesota Commu-
nity Faculty Association. Correspondingly, the petitioners
contend that the PELRA prohibits an individual from peti-
tioning the Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges
with regard to employment conditions. In contrast, the Su-
preme Court in Hanson was confronted with an attack on
the RLA, which allows [471] for exclusive representation
similar to that of the PELRA, but it did not resolve the
validity of such a scheme. See 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth.
Furthermore, the Court’s decision in Hanson was rendered
in a private rather than public sector collective bargaining
context. Collective bargaining in public employment has
been considered different from collective bargaining in
private employment.’ See Winston-Salem/Forsyth County
Unit v. Phillips, 381 F.Supp. 644, 647 (M.D.N.C.1974). See
Generally Blair, Union Security Agreements in Public Em-
ployment, 60 Cornell L.Rev. 183 (1975); Summers, Public
Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 Yale L.J.
1156 (1974).*

We conclude that the district court acted beyond its juris-
diction in denying petitioners’ motion to convene a three-
judge court under 28 U.S.C. § 2281. Hanson does not ‘‘fore-
close the subject’’ of petitioners’ challenge to the exclusive
representation scheme of the PELRA. There is ‘‘room for
the inference that the questions sought to be raised [by

7The district court recognized but rejected the distinction be-
tween public and private collective bargaining.

® We note that the Supreme Court has granted review in a case
involving a constitutional challenge to the validity of a Michigan
publie collective bargaining statute. See Abood v. Detroit Board
of Education, 60 Mich.App. 92, 230 N.W.2d 322 (1975), prob. juris.
noted, US. , 96 8.Ct. 1723, 48 L.Ed.2d 192, 44 U.S.L.W.
3603, 3608, (U.S. April 27, 1976).

63

petitioners] can be the subject of controversy.’’ Goosby v.
Osser, supra, 409 U.S. at 518, 93 S.Ct. at 859, 35 L.Ed.2d
at 42. We, of course, neither decide not express any view
on the merits of this case.

[8, 9] In summary, we are satisfied that all formal
requirements for a three-judge court which are determina-
ble by a single judge exist with regard to the exclusive
representation scheme of the PELRA.® Since it has been
determined that a substantial federal constitutional ques-
tion has been presented and that a three-judge court should
be convened, it is unnecessary to reach the remaining ques-
tion of whether the complaint formally alleges a basis for
equitable relief with respect to the fair share provision of
the PELRA. The petitioners’ allegation concerning the
fair share provision may be considered by the three-judge
court as a pendent claim.”

The petition for writ of mandamus to compel the con-
vention of a three-judge court is granted.

® Although the district court did not reach the issue of whether
the complaint formally alleges a basis for equitable relief with
regard to the exclusive representation scheme, we have necessarily
decided the question in the affirmative.

© Following the district court’s order of December 22, 1975, the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that the fair share provision of
the PELRA was not violative of due process. See Robbinsdale
Education Ass’n v. Robbinsdale Federation of Teachers, Local 872,
239 N.W.2d 437 (Minn. 1976). On March 31, 1976, the Minnesota
Legislature enacted Minn.H.F. No. 2244, amending Minn.Stat.Ann.
§ 179.65(2), which significantly alters the manner in which fair
share fees are assessed and possibly renders this claim moot.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

(22 December 1975)

67

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
FOURTH DIVISION

4-74 Civ. 659

Leon W. Kniont, er av, Plaintiffs,
v.

Minnesota Community Couiece Facuury Association,
eT AL, Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiffs are faculty members employed by several
Minnesota community colleges and have instituted the
present action alleging that the Minnesota Public Employee
Labor Relations Act of 1971, Minn. Stat. Ch. 179, (PELRA)
violates the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983, 1985(3), 1986 and 1994. Specifically, plaintiffs at-
tack the exclusive representation’ and fair share* provi-
sions of the PELRA on the grounds that they violate the
First, Ninth, Tenth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution.

[2] Defendants are the Minnesota Community College
Faculty Association, which is an employee organization
certified as the ‘‘exclusive representative’’® of the plain-
tiffs under M.S.A. § 179.67; its affiliates, the National Edu-

*M.S.A. §§ 179.63, Subds. 1-7, 15-18; 179.64, Subd. 7; 179.65,
Subds, 1-2, 4-5, 7; 179.66, Subds. 2, 7-10; 179.67; 179.68, Subds. 1,
2, 5-6, 9, 11; 179.69; 179.70; 179.71, Subds. 2-4, 5(a-e, g-j), 6-7;
179.72, Subds. 3(b), 6-7, 9, 12 and 179.74, Subds, 3-5.

*M.S.A. § 179.65, Subd. 2
°M.S.A. § 179.63, Subd. 6.

68

cation Association, the Minnesota Education Association,
and the Independent Minnesota Political Action Committee
for Education; various officers and former officers of the
latter union defendants; and principal officials of the State
of Minnesota.

In their complaint, plaintiffs request that a three-judge
court be convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 and 2284,
Presently before the court are motions by the plaintiffs
and the defendants relating to that request. Defendants
have made a motion to stay or dismiss, and in response,
plaintiffs have moved for the convening of the statutory
three-judge court.

None of the plaintiffs are members or supporters of any
of the defendant organizations and do not desire any form
of representation by them. Nonetheless, the Minnesota
Community College Faculty Association (hereinafter ‘‘ As-
sociation’’), under color of the PELRA, allegedly claims
the authority to act as the exclusive representative for the
plaintiffs in collective bargaining with the Minnesota State
Board for Community Colleges (hereinafter ‘‘Board’’)
with respect to terms and conditions of employment in the
community college system, Plaintiffs contend that under
color of the PELRA, they have been and will be denied
any right, power, or privilege to bargain or to contract
with the Board on their own behalf, or to petition the
Board on employment matters within the purportedly ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the Association.

During the academic years 1973-74 and 1974-75, the As-
sociation has allegedly caused ‘‘fair share’’ fees to be de-
ducted by the Board from the plaintiffs’ wages in amounts
equal to 94-97% of the formal membership dues levied by
the Association during those years. Such fees have been
checked-off without notice, hearing, or any form of govern-
mental oversight or review. It is further alleged that some
of the fees have been transferred by the Association to
the National Education Association, the Minnesota Educa-

69

tion Association and the Independent Minnesota Political
Action Committee for Education.

[3] It is well established that when an application for a
statutory three-judge court is addressed to a district
court, the single judge’s inquiry is limited to determining,
(1) whether the constitutional question is substantial,
(2) whether the complaint at least formally alleges a basis
for equitable relief, and (3) whether the case otherwise
comes within the requirements of the three-judge statute.
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713,
715 (1962); Potter v. Meier, 458 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1972) ;
Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121, 1125 (2d Cir. 1971); See
Nielsen, Judge, Three-Judge Courts: A Comprehensive
Study, 66 F.R.D. 495, 506 (1975).

A recently developed exception to this general rule arises
when a statutory claim is appended to the constitutional
claim. In that circumstance, the district court judge must
make a determination of the statutory claim and if it is
dispositive of the case he need not invoke the machinery
of a three-judge court. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528,
543-44 (1974); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403 (1970).
Of course, if the single judge rejects the statutory claim,
a three-judge court must be called to consider the consti-
tutional issue. Wagans v. Lavine, supra at 544.

No statutory claim is made which could dispose of the
present case,

The enjoining of the enforcement of a state statute by
a three-judge court is an ‘‘. . . extraordinary step ....’’
Toomer v. Whitsell, 334 U.S, 385, 391 (1948). The serious-
ness of this procedure has led to the ‘‘. . . oft-repeated
admonition that the three-judge court statute is to be
strictly construed.’’ Board of Regents v. New Left Educa-
tion Project, 404 U.S. 541, 545 (1972) (citing Allen v. State
Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) ; Phillips v. United
States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941)).

70

Defendants’ motion to stay or dismiss on the grounds of
abstention becomes necessarily intertwined with the request
for a three-judge court and is considered in examining the
requisites for a three-judge court.‘

[4] Substantial Constitutional Question

Federal courts are without power to entertain claims
otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are ‘‘so attenu-
ated and insubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,’’
Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579
(1904); ‘‘wholly insubstantial,’’ Bailey v. Patterson, 369
U.S. 31, 33 (1962); ‘‘obviously frivolous,’’ Hannis Dis-
tilling Co. v. Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285, 288 (1910) ; ‘‘plainly
unsubstantial,’? Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289
U.S. 103, 105 (1933); or ‘‘no longer open to discussion,’’
McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U.S. (0, 80 (1909).

The general test as applied to the convening of a three-
judge court was set forth in Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512
(1973), where the Court stated:

‘Title 28 U.S.C. § 2281 does not require the conven-
ing of a three-judge court when the constitutional
attack upon the state statutes is insubstantial. ‘Con-
stitutional insubstantiality’ for this purpose has been
equated with such concepts as ‘essentially fictitious,’
Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S., at 33, 82 S.Ct. at 551,
‘wholly insubstantial,’ ibid.; ‘obviously frivolous,’
Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285, 288,
30 S.Ct. 326, 327, 54 L.Ed. 482 (1910); and ‘obviously
without merit,’ Ea parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 32, 54
8.Ct. 3, 4-5, 78 L.Ed. 152 (1933). The limiting words
‘wholly’ and ‘obviously’ have cogent legal significance.
In the context of the effect of prior decisions upon the

*Defendant state officials have made an additional argument
concerning the necessity of enjoining state officials. This argument
is likewise considered in examining the requisites of a three-judge
court,

71

substantiality of constitutional claims, those words im-
part that claims are constitutionally insubstantial only
if the prior decisions inescapably render the claims
frivolous; previous decisions that merely render claims
of doubtful or questionable merit do not render them
insubstantial for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2281. A
claim is insubstantial only if ‘its unsoundness so
clearly results from the previous decisions of this court
as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for the
inference that the questions sought to be raised can be
the subject of controversy.’ Ex parte Poresky, supra,
at 32, 54 S.Ct. at 4, quoting from Hannis Distilling Co.
v. Baltimore, supra, 216 U.S. at 288, 30 S.Ct. at 327;
see also Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S.
103, 105-106, 53 S.Ct. 549, 550, 77 L.Ed. 1062 (1933) ;
McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U.S. 70, 80, 30 S.Ct. 27, 31, 54,
L.Ed. 95 (1909).’’

Td, at 518.

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint alleges three separate
federal claims, which may be fairly summarized as
follows :°

[5] I. That the system of exclusive representation created
by the PELRA (including the ‘‘fair-share’’ scheme) is
repugnant, on its face and as applied, to the First, Ninth,
Tenth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.

II. That the ‘‘fair share’’ provision, considered inde-

pendently, is repugnant, on its face and as applied, to the
latter Amendments.

III. That even if the entire system of exclusive repre-
sentation is constitutional on its face in all its particulars,
and could be applied to the plaintiffs in a constitutional

5 Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Their Motion to Convene a Statutory Three-Judge Court, pp. 6-7.

72

manner, nevertheless its past and threatened application
by the defendant organizations violates federal statutes
which protect plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

Specific issues raised by plaintiffs’ claims are as follows:

A. Plaintiffs allege that a portion of their ‘‘fair
share’ fees are being expended for political activities.
(Amended Complaint, {If 22, 30, 34 (B,G,H.(3))). The un-
ambiguous language of the statute clearly does not permit
the collecting of fees for those purposes. M.S.A. § 179.65,
Subd. 2 provides in relevant part:

‘In no instance shall the required contribution [fair
share fee] exceed a pro rata share of the specific
expenses incurred for services rendered by the repre-
sentative in relationship to negotiations and adminis-
tration of grievance procedures.’’

Plaintiffs are challenging the statute on grounds of un-
constitutionality. 28 U.S.C. § 2281. Such attack is clearly
insubstantial where the statute itself does not permit the
conduct complained of. Plaintiffs would be able to recover
any contribution which was collected and used contrary to
the terms of the statute.

B. Plaintiffs allege that the ‘‘fair share’’ fee is being
deducted :°

1) without notice;

2) without a timely hearing before judicial officers
or tribunals;

([6] 3) without timely judicial review;

4) in an amount determined by the Association’s
arbitrary criteria of necessity and propriety; and

5) without reference to any objective or rational
standards.

* Amended Complaint {| 38.

73

The authorities cited by defendants do not foreclose the
plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge on due process grounds.
On the contrary, the procedural due process questions
raised by the plaintiffs are substantial. The assessment of
fees under such circumstances, without any notice or hear-
ing raises serious constitutional questions. See Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadich v. Family Finance
Corp., 305 U.S. 327 , 1905).

C. Plaintiffe assert that exclusive representation in
public employment viclate:. “heir constitutional rights un-
der the First asd You: «ih Amendments. The constitu-
tionality of a similar provision was challenged in Railway
Employees’ Department v. Hanson, 251 U.S. 225 (1956).
In Hanson, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the
union shop provision of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C.
§ 152, Eleventh), which permitted the execution of collec-
tive bargaining agreements containing clauses requiring
both that employees become members of the exclusive bar-
gaining agent within 60 days, and that those employees
subsequently pay the periodic dues, initiation fees and
assessments uniformly required as a condition of acquiring
or retaining membership. The Court held that the require-
ment for financial support of the collective-bargaining
agency by all who received the benefits of its work was
within the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause
and did not violate either the First or Fifth Amendments.
Td. at 238.

Likewise, the PELRA only assesses a fee for specific
limited services provided by the exclusive representative.
M.S.A. § 179.65, Subd. 2 provides in pertinent part:

‘*Tn no instance shall the required contribution [fair
share fee] exceed a pro rata share of the specific ex-
penses incurred for services rendered by the repre-
sentative in relationship to negotiations and adminis-
tration of grievance procedures.’’

74

[7] Moreover, the PELRA does not require the employees
to become members of any labor or employee organizations.
It specifically provides that employees ‘‘. . . shall have the
right not to form and join such [labor or employee] or-
ganizations.’’ M.S.A. § 179.65, Subd. 2. Rather, the PELRA
only seeks to impose a requirement of financial support of
the representative by all who receive the benefits of its
efforts.

Although the facts of Hanson, supra, indicate that those
challenging the provisions were employed by the private
sector (the Union Pacific Railroad Co.) and not by the
public sector (e.g. State of Minnesota) the court is con-
vinced that such distinction does not lessen its precedential
nature to the existing case. The arguments advanced in
Hanson and the rationale of the Court are revealing. The
Court stated:

‘*Wide ranged problems are tendered under the
First Amendment. It is argued that the union shop
agreement forces men into idealogical and political
associations which violate their right to freedom of
conscience, freedom of association, and freedom of
thought protected by the Bill of Rights. It is said that
once a man becomes a member of these unions he is
subject to vast disciplinary control and that by force
of the federal Act unions now can make him conform
to their idealogy. On the present record, there is no
more an infringement or impairment of First Amend-
ment rights than there would be in the case of a lawyer
who by state law is required to be a member of an
integrated bar.’’ [Footnotes omitted] 351 U.S. at
236-238.

The court concludes that the PELRA is legislation well
within the dictates of Hanson and plaintiffs’ constitutional
attack based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments is
‘obviously without merit’’ and does not present a sub-
stantial constitutional question.

75

That Hanson was decided under the Fifth, and not under
the Fourteenth Amendment is inconsequential. The Su-
preme Court has stated, ‘‘The restraint imposed upon
legislation by the due process clauses of the two amend-
ments is the same.’’ Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 326
(1932), citing Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582, 596 (1931).

[8] D. Plaintiffs’ claims also seek to raise substantial
constitutional questions under the Ninth,’ Tenth* and
Thirteenth® Amendments. After carefully reviewing plain-
tiffs’ claims and the authorities cited by both plaintiffs
and defendants the court concludes that such claims are
‘‘obviously without merit’’ and do not raise a substantial
constitutional question.

Basis for Equitable Relief

Plaintiffs contend that the Amended Complaint sets forth
an adequate basis for equitable relief on the grounds that
irreparable injury necessarily arises fr

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385010_0002%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
