# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1991
- **Citation:** 502 U.S. 974

## Text

/ Bupremo Court, U.S.
& WY) P FILED
L* § 0 .
ae, SEP 20 1997
OFFI@E OF THE CLERK
IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 199]
ands - > en Ae

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC..
Petitioner,
—_V —

WHEELABRATOR TECHNOLOGIES INC. and
WESTCHESTER RESCO COMPANY, L.P..
Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Leon M. Despres Of Counsel:
(Counsel of Record)
R. Edward Wilhoite, Jr. Karen Florini
DESPRES, SCHWARTZ & ENVIRONMENTAL
GEOGHEGAN DEFENSE FUND
77 W. Washington Street 1616 P Street, N.W.
Suite 711 Suite 150
Chicago, IL 60602 Washington, D.C. 20036
(312) 372-2511 (202) 387-3500

Attorneys for Petitioner

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Does section 3001(i) of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (“RCRA”) exempt a resource recovery facility
from the obligations imposed on generators of hazardous
waste by Subtitle C of RCRA where the ash generated by such
a facility from the mass burning of household waste and com-
mercial and industrial non-hazardous waste routinely exhib-
its a characteristic of hazardous waste?

2. Ifso, does a resource recovery facility remain exempt
from the requirements of Subtitle C of RCRA in spite of the
fact that the resource recovery facility receives and burns
hazardous waste from small quantity generators of hazardous
waste?

ee

li

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
py.) 8 Be why 8 fy) SS ree Vv
eo see ee eer ee ee eee l
PR 6 oc cp tccn tp eeesereeveces 2
ye vei. Bs Bs re ire 2
STATERGEIe) OF THRE CAGE 2 .w i cc ctcces. 3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ...... 5

I. The Court of Appeals For The Second
Circuit Wrongly Concluded That A
Resource Recovery Facility Is Exempt
From The Obligations Imposed On
Generators Of Hazardous Waste By Section
3001(i) Of The Resource Conservation And
ge ree eae eee 5

A. The Plain Language Of Section 3001(i)
Does Not Exempt A Resource
Recovery Facility From Federal
Hazardous Waste Management
Requirements As A Generator Of
eT eT error 5

B. The Environmental Protection Agency
Has Consistenuy Interpreted Section
3001(i) Not To Exempt A Resource
Recovery Facility From The
Requirements Of Subtitle C If The Ash
Generated By Mass Burning Exhibits A
Characteristic Of Hazardous Waste . . 11

II.

Hl.

The Court Of Appeals Has Construed
Section 3001(i) Inconsistently With The
Policy Underlying The Management Of
Hazardous Waste And In A Manner That
Renders RCRA’s Entire Regulatory
Se Eww kt tee ce

A. The Judgment Of The Court of Appeals
Is Fundamentally Inconsistent With
The Policy Underlying RCRA’s
Hazardous Waste Management
EE

B. The Judgment Below Renders RCRA’s
Entire Post-Generation Hazardous
Waste Regulatory Scheme Inoperable
As It Applies To Ash ............

The Court Of Appeals Wrongly Concluded
That A Resource Recovery Facility May
Accept Hazardous Waste From A Small
Quantity Generator Of Hazardous Waste And
Remain Exempt Under Section 3001(i) ...

EE
EE eee

3

JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND
Es es Cb ae oes cee veces re

OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND
ER ae

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT
RE, bee cee ct were eee

14

15

18

A-3

iV

4. TEXT OF RELEVANT PORTIONS OF

.

THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND
pi wa, 3 ty RP ee eee

TEXT OF RELEVANT PORTIONS OF
FEDERAL REGULATIONS ..........

JULY 15, 1985 REGULATORY
PREAMBLE

ee ele SS ee Ce OC Ries 2.2.9 8.9.5

PAGE

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases PAGE(S)
American Fed’n of Musicians of the United States &

Canada v. Wittstein, 379 U.S. 171 (1964) ..... 14
Burlington Northern R.R. v. Oklahoma Tax

Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454 (1987) ............. 9
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) .. 8, 10
Chemical Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, 470 U.S. 116 (1985).............. 12, 14
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979)....... 8, 18
Crandon v. United States, 110 S.Ct. 997 (1990)... 16

Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n vy.
Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107

NE ne re re ee a ee oe wo 11
E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46

ee Sere a Od hs eine oh 560 0 12
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.

A ares ah Sa) ea a arene oe We * 8 10
Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl.

Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986) ............ 15, 17
Morton v. Ruiz, 329 U.S. 296 (1974) .......... 14
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana,

See MT EU og 6 6 6a hos cece eaccese 18, 20
In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989) .... 10
United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985)...... 9
United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822 (1984) .... 18

United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235 (1989) 8

Statutes and Regulations

28 USC. ee ences
42 U.S.C. 60008 deitida ee eee.
42 U.S.C. CURRIES 0 es eek
42 US.C. § GUM SR ee eect
42 U.S.C. CGRRIIE coe eee. sss
42 U.S.C. 6 GRR es eae
42 U.S.C. § CUR a poe wae des
42 U.S.C. § OR tence
42 U.S.C. § ORRMII res eae nase
42 U.S.C. (QRGREE ik cee eee dss

42 U.S.C. § 6921 note

42 U.S.C. (GE... 2 eee ss
42 U.S.C. $ @ORRR eae sss:
42 U.S.C. RORMMIE seater ce. ow
42 U.S.C. (@RGBMA. Banaras oe oes os
40 CER. § 260GMR Do es ews se
40 CER. § EG ee ee
40 CER. § SE es

40 C.F.R. § 262.20-23

40 C.F.R. § ZO. : 5 a0 sete ees twee ces eess:

Legislative and Administrative Materials

S. Rep. No. 284, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 61 (1983). .
S. Rep. No. 988, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1976) ..

PAGE(S)

17, 20
passim
9

19

Vii
PAGE(S)
H.R. Rep. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1984) 15

H.R. Rep. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976) 5
50 Fed. Reg. 28,/25-26 (July 15, 1985)........ *, $4, 83
51 Fed. Reg. 21648-49 (June 13, 1986) ........ 6

Congressional Testimony

Statement of J. Winston Porter before the
Subcommittee on Hazardous Waste and Toxic
Substances of the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works (December 3,
EE SR eae SN ee Da 13

Regulation of Municipal and Solid Waste
Incinerators: Hearing Before the Subcommittee
on Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
101st Cong., Ist Sess. (May 11, 1989) (testimony
of Sylvia Lowrance, Director, EPA Office of Solid
NS SR Oe es i eee aos oe eee ew ek ws 13

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1991

>

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC.,
Petitioner,

—)—

WHEELABRATOR TECHNOLOGIES INC. and
WESTCHESTER RESCO COMPANY, L.P..,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Petitioner Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. (““EDF’’)!
respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the
judgment and decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, entered in this proceeding on April 24,
1991.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit is reported at 931 F.2d 211, and is includ-
ed in the Appendix at A-2. The memorandum opinion and
order of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York is reported at 725 F. Supp. 758, and is
included in the Appendix at A-14.

| EDF is a not-for-profit public benefit membership corporation.
EDF has no stockholders or subsidiaries and is not a subsidiary of any
corporation.

re eT Te

2
JURISDICTION

On April 24, 1991, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit entered judgment affirming the district
court’s entry of summary judgment against petitioner EDF.
EDF did not petition for rehearing or suggest rehearing in
banc. This Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment
below by writ of certiorari pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTES INVOLVED

The statute involved in this case is the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., and regula-
tions promulgated thereunder. Specifically, this case involves
section 3001(i) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i), which provides that:

A resource recovery facility recovering energy from
the mass burning of municipal solid waste shall not
be deemed to be treating, storing, disposing of, or
otherwise managing hazardous wastes for the pur-
poses of regulation under this subchapter [Sub-
title C], if —

(1) such facility —
(A) receives and burns only —

(i) household wasie (from single and multiple
dwellings, hotels, motels, and other residential
sources), and

(ii) solid waste from commercial or industrial
sources that does not contain hazardous waste identi-
fied or listed under this section, and

(b) does not accept hazardous wastes identified or
listed under this section, and

3

(2) the owner or operator of such facility has established
contractual requirements or other appropriate notifi-
cation or inspection procedures to assure that hazard-
ous wastes are not received at or burned in such
facility. Additional relevant statutory provisions and
regulations are included in the Appendix, beginning at
A-79.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondents Wheelabrator Technologies Inc. and West-
chester Resco Company, L.P. (collectively ““Wheelabrator’’)
own and operate the Westchester Resource Recovery Facility
(“Facility”) in Peekskill, New York. The Facility is a resource
recovery facility that receives and burns municipal solid
waste, including household waste and non-hazardous com-
mercial and industrial waste, for the purpose of generating
electricity. The Facility processes approximately 650,000
tons of waste annually. As a result of the mass burning of this
waste, the Facility generates approximately 500 tons of ash
daily. Over 4 million tons of ash are generated annually by
resource recovery facilities nationwide.

Under the relevant testing method promulgated by the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), the ash generat-
ed by the Facility is a hazardous waste. However, the Facility
does not comply with the obligations imposed on a generator
of hazardous waste by Subtitle C of the federal Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”). For example,
Wheelabrator does not prepare a manifest designating the ash
as a hazardous waste. Nor is the ash otherwise handled and
disposed of in a manner consistent with the hazardous waste
requirements of RCRA.

On January 27, 1988, petitioner EDF brought this action
in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York. EDF alleged that Wheelabrator was violating
RCRA by its failure to handle the ash generated at the Facility

ee ee ee

4

as a hazardous waste. Wheelabrator did not dispute that it
was not handling the ash as a hazardous waste, but argued
that it was exempt from the requirements of Subtitle C by
section 3001(i) of RCRA.

The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.
On November 21, 1989, the district court denied both mo-
tions. The court concluded that the ash generated by the
Facility is exempt from the requirements of Subtitle C by
section 3001(i). The court further concluded that Whee-
labrator had in place adequate procedural safeguards to in-
sure that the Facility did not receive hazardous waste and
that, as a matter of law, a resource recovery facility could
receive hazardous waste from a small quantity generator
without forfeiting the exemption provided under section
3001(i). However, the district court denied summary judg-
ment on Wheelabrator’s motion in order to determine wheth-
er the Facility actually received hazardous waste on more
than an inadvertent and occasional basis.

After further discovery on this issue, EDF stipulated to
the entry of summary judgment against it. On May 4, 1990,
EDF timely filed notice of appeal.

On April 24,1991, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit entered judgment affirming the grant-
ing of summary judgment by the district court for the reasons
stated by the district court in its opinion dated November 21,
1989.

On July 12, 1991, EDF applied to the Honorable
Thurgood Marshall for an extension of time to file the peti-
tion for writ of certiorari on the ground that a companion
case was pending in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit. Oral argument was had in that case on
May 10, 1991. Because that case involves the same issue, its
disposition could potentially conflict with the ruling below or
further elucidate the issue involved. By order dated July 16,
the Court granted EDF’s application. On August 6, 1991,

5

EDF again applied for an extension of time to file the petition
on the ground that judgment still had not entered in the
companion case. By order dated August 13, 1991, the Court
extended EDF’s time to file the petition for writ of certiorari
to September 20, 1991.2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The Court Of Appeais For The Second Circuit
Wrongly Concluded That A Resource Recovery Facility
Is Exempt From The Obligations Imposed On
Generators Of Hazardous Waste By Section 3001(i) Of
The Resource Conservation And Recovery Act.

A. The Plain Language Of Section 3001(i) Does Not
Exempt A Resource Recovery Facility From
Federal Hazardous Waste Management
Requirements As A Generator Of Hazardous
Waste.

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. § 6901, et seqg., imposes on persons comprehensive
hazardous waste management requirements regulating the
handling and disposal of hazardous waste in order to protect
the public health and the environment from waste that is
potentially harmful, toxic or lethal. H.R. Rep. No. 1491, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad-
min. News 6238, 6241. Under Subtitle C of RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6921-6939b, solid waste that is specifically listed by the
EPA as a hazardous waste or that exhibits a characteristic
(ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity or toxicity) of hazardous
waste, and that is not otherwise exempt, must be managed as

? As of the date this petition was filed, the companion case was still
pending in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Thus, the
possibility that there will be a conflict between the circuits on this
significant issue of federal environmental law remains.

ee

6

a hazardous waste. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3a.° Solid waste that is not
“hazardous” is regulated under subtitle D of RCRA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949a, which merely forbids disposal of such
waste in open dumps. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6944(a), 6945(a).

In 1984, Congress enacted, as part of the Hazardous and
Solid Waste Amendments (“HSWA”), section 3001(i) of
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i), to clarify the household waste
exclusion promulgated by the EPA in 1980.‘ Section 3001(i)
provides that a resource recovery facility shall not be deemed
to be treating, storing, disposing of, or otherwise managing
hazardous wastes for the purposes of regulation under Subti-
tle C if such facility receives and burns only household waste
and non-hazardous commercial and industrial waste. Ac-
cordingly, a qualifying resource recovery facility is exempt

3 “(T]he characteristics define broad classes of wastes that are clearly
hazardous, while the listing process defines some wastes that may pass
the characteristic, but are nonetheless hazardous wastes.” 51 Fed. Reg.
21648, 21649, Col. 1 (June 13, 1986).

4 The household waste exclusion provided simply that household
waste, including the residue remaining after incineration, was not haz-
ardous waste. In enacting RCRA, Congress was concerned that the
hazardous waste permit program not be used “to control the disposal of
hazardous substances used in households cr to extend control over
general municipal wastes based on the presence of such substances.”
S. Rep. No. 988, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1976). Congress did not
intend that individual households be deemed generators of hazardous
waste subject to the requirements of Subtitle C, which would have
imposed on households and municipalities a comprehensive regulatory
scheme both unworkable and unnecessary. If households were to be
deemed not to generate hazardous waste, then logically the subsequent
management activities, which, under Subtitle C, are initiated by the —
generator, would similarly be deemed not to be hazardous waste man-
agement. Concern for the burden imposed on individual households
and municipal management of household waste, however, says nothing
about congressional intent as to the generation of ash with the charac-
teristic of a hazardous waste by the incineration of household waste and
commercial and industrial non-hazardous waste at a resource recovery
facility. Nor would imposing the requirements of Subtitle C on the
generators of such ash affect the exemption Congress intended for
households and household waste.

7

from the hazardous waste management requirements of Sub-
title C in its management activities.

Rather than simply ratify the existing EPA regulation,
however, Congress clarified the household waste exclusion as
it applied to a resource recovery facility in several significant
respects. First, the exemption codified in section 3001(i) ap-
plies specifically, and exclusively, to a resource recovery facil-
ity, not a waste stream. Second, section 3001(i) provides that
a resource recovery facility may receive and burn non-haz-
ardous waste from commercial and industrial sources. Prior
to 1984, waste from commercial and industrial sources was
not exempt from the requirements of Subtitle C by the house-
hold waste exclusion.’ Thus, if a resource recovery facility
received such waste, it also would have been subject to these
requirements. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, section
3001(i) limits the scope of the household waste exclusion by
making explicit that a resource recovery facility that receives
and burns qualified municipal solid waste only “shall not be
deemed to be treating, storing, disposing of, or otherwise
managing hazardous wastes for the purposes of regulation
under [Subtitle C].” 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i).

Section 3001(i) does not provide, either explicitly or
implicitly, that a resource recovery facility shall not be
deemed to be generating hazardous waste. Nor does section
3001(i) provide that ash generated by a resource recovery
facility that routinely exhibits a characteristic of hazardous
waste shall be exempt from the requirements of Subtitle C. It
is the absence of the term “generating” in section 3001(i) that
is fatal to the construction of section 3001(i) adopted by the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. “[WyJhere, as here,
‘the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts

5 The EPA has indicated that ash from the incineration of household
waste and commercial and industrial non-hazardous waste had a/ways
been subject to regulation under Subtitle C: “These residues would be
hazardous wastes under present [1980] EPA regulations if they exhibit-
ed a characteristic.” 50 Fed. Reg. 28,725 (July 15, 1985).

ne |

8

is to enforce it according to its terms.’ ”” United States v. Ron
Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 {quoting Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). Not otherwise exempt, like
any other generator of hazardous waste, a resource recovery
facility must comply with the requirements of Subtitle C as to
the ash generated by the incineration process.

Under RCRA, both “management” and “generation”
are terms of art with statutorily defined, non-overlapping,
meanings. Hazardous waste generation is defined as “the act
or process of producing hazardous waste.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 6903(6). Hazardous waste management is defined as “the
systematic control of the collection, source separation, stor-
age, transportation, processing, treatment, recovery, and dis-
posal of hazardous wastes.” 42 U.S.C. § 6903(7).

Thus, the scope of the exemption in section 3001(i) is
precisely ascertainable. First, hazardous waste management
necessarily presumes the prior generation of hazardous waste.
One cannot manage what does not exist. For this reason, the
referent in section 3001(i) cannot be ash, which is generated
after incineration. Rather, it is the systematic control of the
municipal solid waste received by the resource recovery facili-
ty that is deemed not to be the management of hazardous
waste. Second, section 3001(i) lists “treating,” “sorting,”
“disposing of,” and “or otherwise managing” as activities not
attributable to a qualifying resource recovery facility for pur-
poses of Subtitle C regulation. “Managing”, of course, is
merely the act of management. Accordingly, “or otherwise
managing” can only mean what is left of the statutorily de-
fined term: the collection, source separation, transportation,
processing and recovery of the municipal solid waste received
by a resource recovery facility. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379, 392 n. 10 (1979) (“definition which declares what a
term ‘means’... excludes any meaning that is not
stated’’).°

6 Significantly, a resource recovery facility engages in none of these
management activities relative to ash.

3

Nothing in the plain language of section 3001(i) suggests
that a resource recovery facility cannot be a generator of
hazardous waste. Indeed, Congress clearly recognizes the siz-
nificant difference between the management and generation
of hazardous waste. Where Congress intends that a particular
recovery process, in its entirety, be exempt from regulation
under Subtitle C, it recognizes the necessity that it state so
specifically. For example, RCRA also provides that “the own-
er and operator of equipment used to recover methane from a
landfill shall not be deemed to be managing, generating, trans-
porting, treating, storing, or disposing of hazardous or liquid
wastes.” 42 U.S.C. § 6921 note. The Court of Appeals inexpli-
cably ignores this critical statutory comparative. Yet, the in-
escapable conclusion from Congress’ failure to include the
term “generating” in section 3001(i) is that Congress did not
intend so to extend the statutory exemption.

The Court of Appeals also relied on legislative history to
support its conclusion. The Senate Report that accompanied
the HSWA, in discussing section 3001(i), stated that “{aJll
waste management activities of such a [resource recovery]
facility, including the generation, transportation, treatment,
storage, and disposal of waste shall be covered by the exclu-
sion.” S. Rep. No. 284, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 61 (1983). Re-
gardless of the meaning of this language, section 3001(i)
expressly does not exempt either a resource recovery facility
as a generator, or the ash generated by such a facility, from the
requirements of Subtitle C. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred
in resorting to legislative history at all to contradict the unam-
biguous statutory language. See Burlington Northern R.R. vy.
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987); United
States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95-96 (1985).

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10

In fact, the legislative history is in direct conflict with
section 300i(i).’? To that extent, of course, it must be disre-
garded. It is an obvious rule of statutory construction that
when a conflict exists between a statute and its legislative
history, the statute prevails. Caminetti v. United States, 242
U.S. 470, 490 (1917) (“the [statutory] language being plain,
and not leading to absurd or wholly impracticable conse-
quences, it is the sole evidence of the ultimate legislative
intent”). Legislative history “is not a source of legal rules
competing with those found in the U.S. Code.” Jn re Sinclair,
870 F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1989). This notion of statutory
primacy is particularly apt here. RCRA is a highly reticular
statute, regulating the complex problem of solid and hazard-
ous waste in the United States. Accordingly, a court should be
particularly wary of departing from its statutory schema. Cf.
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144
(1985) (where Congress has carefully crafted an enforcement
scheme with express remedies, a court must be chary of read-
ing others into it).

The unsoundness of the tortured construction adopted
by the Court of Appeals is made more evident by the alterna-
tive. If Congress really had intended to accomplish what re-
spondents argue, it could easily have provided simply that a
resource recovery facility that receives or burns only house-
hold or commercial or industrial non-hazardous waste, or the
ash residue, shall not be subject to the requirements of Sub-
title C. It did not. Moreover, nowhere does section 3001(i)
state that the mass burning of municipal solid waste shall not
be deemed to be generating hazardous waste. On its face, the
section 3001(i) exemption only extends to those activities

7 This fact is confirmed by subsequent statements of the very Con-
gressman involved in drafting section 3001(i) and the committee report
on which the Court of Appeals relies. All six senator signatories to a
letter to the EPA stating that section 3001(i) was not intended to ex-
empt a resource recovery facility or ash from the requirements of Sub-
title C, for example, were conferees and members of the Senate
Committee that wrote the committee report. (See R-11 at Exh. 9.)

1]

that can be deemed hazardous waste management. And
under RCRA, the term “managing” does not include the term
“generating.”

B. The Environmental Protection Agency Has
Consistently Interpreted Section 3001({i) Not To
Exempt A Resource Recovery Facility From The
Requirements Of Subtitle C If The Ash Generated
By Mass Burning Exhibits A Characteristic Of
Hazardous Waste.

It is axiomatic that the interpretation of a statute by the
agency having primary enforcement responsibility for that
statute is entitled to deference. Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Comm'n v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S.

8 Loose draftsmanship is perhaps the best explanation for the lan-
guage used by the committee, but, even assuming that it was proper for
the Court of Appeals to consider legislative history in construing sec-
tion 3001(i), the committee report does not necessarily contradict the
plain meaning of section 3001(i). Although the report includes the term
“generation” among waste management activities, the report signifi-
cantly refers only to “waste,” not toxic ash residue or hazardous waste,
and is discussed in the context of incoming waste, and prior to incinera-
tion. This language is necessary to ensure a comprehensive exclusion
for a resource recovery facility’s management of the incoming munici-
pal solid waste. For example, some waste received at the resource
recovery facility that should be rejected at the gate could nonetheless
inadvertently be accepted. If that waste is subsequently removed from
the tipping floor, rather than put in the burning chamber, this could be
regarded as waste “generated” at the facility. For the same reason, the
committee report includes the term “disposal,” although a resource
recovery facility is obviously not a disposal facility. In fact, a significant
portion of the solid waste received at any resource recovery facility
either cannot be processed (5-15%) or must be bypassed. (R-40 at App.
26, p. 21.) For example, construction rubble, automobile parts and
household appliances received by a resource recovery facility must be
directly landfilled. (/d.) Further, waste received in excess of recovery
capacity or during shutdown for maintenance or repairs must also be
disposed of directly. (/d.) Without the deeming provision of sec-
tion 3001(i), a resource recovery facility might have to dispose of this
waste pursuant to the requirements of Subtitle C.

12

107, 115 (1988) (agency interpretation need not be the best
one by grammatical or any other standards, it need only be
reasonable). As this Court has previously stated, to sustain
the view of the agency charged with administering the statute,
a court “need not find that it is the only permissible construc-
tion that EPA might have adopted but only that EPA’s under-
standing of this very ‘complex statute’ is a sufficiently rational
one to preclude a court from substituting its judgment for that
of EPA.” Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985). Moreover, a contempora-
neous agency construction is entitled to great weight. E. /.
duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 55 (1977).

Contemporaneously with the enactment of section
3001(i), the EPA published a regulatory preamble interpret-
ing Congress’ clarification of the household waste exclusion.
See 50 Fed. Reg. 28,725-26 (July 15, 1985) (“1985 Pream-
ble”). The EPA recognized congressional intent to promote
the development of resource recovery facilities, and that “the
principal purpose of Section 3001 [(i)] was to prevent resource
recovery facilities that may inadvertently burn hazardous
waste, despite good faith efforts to avoid such a result, from
becoming subject to the Subtitle C regulations” applicable to
a hazardous waste treatment, storage or disposal (“TSD”)
facility. 1985 Preamble at 28,726.

The EPA also recognized, however, that ash generated
by a resource recovery facility from the burning of household
and commercial and industrial non-hazardous waste “could,
in theory, exhibit a characteristic of hazardous waste even if
no hazardous wastes are burned, for example, if toxic metals
become concentrated in the ash. Thus, the requirement of
scrutiny of incoming wastes would not assure non-hazardous-
ness of the residue.” Jd. (emphasis added.) Recognizing the
fundamental difference between incoming waste and the ash
generated from the mass burning of that waste, the EPA un-
equivocally concluded that by the language of section 3001(1)

13

Congress did not intend “‘to exempt the regulation of inciner-
ator ash from the burning of non-hazardous waste in resource
recovery facilities if the ash routinely exhibits a characteristic
of hazardous waste.” /d.’

The EPA further concluded, however, that it then had
“no evidence” as to whether the ash generated by a resource
recovery facility would exhibit a characteristic. Because the
EPA did not “believe the HSWA impose new regulatory bur-
dens on resource recovery facilities that burn household and
other non-hazardous waste,” it therefore indicated that “the
Agency has no plans to impose additional responsibilities on
these facilities.” Jd. Thus, the EPA did not intend additional-
ly to regulate ash generated by a resource recovery facility by
listing that ash as a hazardous waste regardless of characteris-
tic. As noted previously (supra, p. 7 n. 5), under existing
regulations, ash displaying a characteristic would not be ex-
empt from the requirements of Subtitle C.'°

Significantly, the EPA had before it the legislative histo-
ry that the Court of Appeals found so compelling. In spite of

* In 1987, one EPA official stated that the EPA was re-evaluating its
1985 interpretation, which “may have been in error.” Statement of J
Winston Porter, Assistant Administrator for Sotid Waste and Emergen-
cy Response before the Subcommittee on Hazardous Waste and Toxic
Substances of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works (December 3, 1987) 16-17. However, the EPA subsequently
reaffirmed its contemporaneous interpretation. See Regulation of Mu-
nicipal and Solid Waste Incinerators: Hearing Before the Subcomm. ttee
on Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce, 10\st Cong., Ist Sess. (May 11, 1989) (testimo-
ny of Sylvia Lowrance, Director, EPA Office of Solid Waste). Thus.
although the EPA has indicated, from time to time, that it considers the
language of section 300 1(i) ambiguous or that it wishes further congres-
sional clarification, as a matter of interpretative policy, the EPA has
never revised its 1985 interpretation.

'” EDF has offered undisputed evidence that the ash generated by
the Facility routinely exhibits a characteristic of toxicity due to the
concentration of lead and cadmium.

14

the language in the committee report, however, which includ-
ed the term “generation,” the EPA determined that section
3001(i) did not exempt toxic ash residue, or a resource recov-
ery facility as the generator of that ash, from the hazardous
waste regulatory scheme. Mindful of the purpose of RCRA
generally and section 3001(i) specifically, the EPA, unlike the
courts below, properly disregarded, or interpreted, the seem-
ingly contradictory language in the legislative history.

Courts are not in the business of assessing the relative
wisdom of competing statutory interpretations. The EPA’s
interpretation of section 3001(i) is not only reasonable, which
is all that it must be, it is required by the statutory language
and congressional intent. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
erred in rejecting the EPA’s interpretation.

II. The Court Of Appeals Has Construed Section 3001(i)
Inconsistently With The Policy Underlying The
Management of Hazardous Waste And In A Manner
That Renders RCRA’s Entire Regulatory Scheme
Inoperable.

The Court of Appeals has wrongly construed the lan-
guage of a significant federal statute. This Court has frequent-
ly granted a petition for writ of certiorari for that reason
alone. See, e.g., Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985) (certiorari granted
to resolve a conflict and to decide an important question of
environmental law); Morton v. Ruiz, 329 U.S. 296, 301-02
(1974) (certiorari granted because of the significance of the
issue and the assertion that the appellate court judgment was
inconsistent with long-established administrative policy);
American Fed’n of Musicians of the United States & Canada v.
Wittstein, 379 U.S. 171, 175 (1964) (certiorari granted be-
cause federal question important and one of first impression).

That said, this Court typically does not act as a reviewing
court to correct every wrong appellate decision. Here, how-
ever, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not

15

simply misconstrue section 3001(i) of RCRA, itself the statu-
tory linchpin of hazardous waste management in the United
States. The hoiding of the Court of Appeals is fundamentally
inconsistent with, indeed vitiates, the policy underlying the
management of hazardous waste codified by Congress in
RCRA. Moreover, the effect of the appellate court’s judgment
is to render the entire post-generation regulatory scheme of
Subtitle C inoperable as it applies to toxic ash residue. For
these additional reasons, the Court should grant this petition.

A. The Judgment Of The Court of Appeals Is
Fundamentally Inconsistent With The Policy
Underlying RCRA’s Hazardous Waste
Management Requirements.

Section 3001(i) was enacted as part of the Hazardous
and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984. The primary purpose
of the HSWA was to fill ‘serious gaps” in RCRA’s regulatory
scheme that allowed significant amounts of hazardous waste
to escape control. H.R. Rep. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
19-20, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
5576, 5578-79. The HSWA “broadened the scope of [RCRA]
and tightened the regulatory restraints.” Midlantic Nat’!
Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494,
506 (1986). In so doing, Congress intended to “minimize the
present and future threat to human health and the environ-
ment’ caused by the improper management of hazardous
wastes. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b); see also Midlantic, 474 U.S. at
505 (HSWA indicative of repeated congressional emphasis
on its goal of protecting the environment against toxic
pollution).

It is undisputed that Congress also intended to promote
the development of “resource recovery and resource conser-
vation systems which preserve and enhance the quality of air,
water and land resources.” 42 U.S.C. § 6902(7) (emphasis
added). From this language, however, it is clear that any
attempt to construe section 3001(i) must be consistent with
the overarching policy objective to protect human health and

16

the environment. Cf. Crandon v. United States, 110 S.Ct. 997,
1001 (1990) (courts should look to object and policy of statute
in construing statute).

In order to encourage the development of commercially
viable resource recovery facilities, Congress excluded such
facilities from, among other requirements related to the man-
agement of hazardous waste, the substantial requirements
imposed on a hazardous waste treatment, storage or disposal
facility. Section 3001(i) makes clear that a qualifying resource
recovery facility will not be deemed to be a TSD facility.''
However, recognizing the fundamentally transformed char-
acter of ash generated by the mass burning of municipal solid
waste, Congress chose not to exclude that ash, or the resource
recovery facility that generates the ash, from the require-
ments of Subtitie C. Because the regulatory burden imposed
on generators of hazardous waste under Subtitle C is far less
onerous than that imposed on managers of hazardous waste,
Congress could thus still encourage the development of re-
source recovery facilities while ensuring that management of

'! The Court of Appeals misapprehends the purpose and structure of
the “deemed to be” phrase in section 3001(i). The Court of Appeals, in
adopting the reasoning of the district court, concluded that if a resource
recovery facility only accepts non-hazardous waste (as household waste
is defined, for example), it could not be designated a TSD facility
anyway, and if it did accept hazardous waste, the facility would lose the
exemption. Thus, the district court reasoned that section 3001(i) must
apply to the ash generated by a resource recovery facility, otherwise
there would be no benefit to the statutory exemption. (A-30 n. 12.) The
argument, however, is circular: to the extent this is true, it is true
because of section 3001(i). Household waste contains material, such as
paints, waste oils, pesticides, solvents and cleaning agents, that, reading
RCRA literally, could require that household waste be identified as a
hazardous waste. In order to avoid this result, section 3001(i) provides
that a resource recovery facility, although perhaps literally doing so,
shall not be deemed to be managing hazardous waste. Without ‘his
exclusion, a resource recovery facility would be subject to the require-
ments of Subtitle C upon receipt of municipal solid waste. This is
precisely the reason Congress enacted, and the benefit of,
section 3001(1).

17

the ash is accomplished in a manner consistent with the pri-
mary objective of RCRA to protect human health and the
environment.

“In the face of Congress’ undisputed concern over the
risks of the improper storage and disposal of hazardous and
toxic substances” (Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 506), it is remarka-
ble to suggest that Congress, in an effort to encourage resource
recovery from waste, would be indifferent to the generation of
hundreds of tons of ash each day (at only one facility, see
R-11 at p. 6) with a characteristic of toxicity that exceeds the
legal limit by as much as five times for lead and seven times
for cadmium. (R-34 at § 23.)!2

In fact, as of 1988, there were 111 resource recovery
facilities in operation in the United States, with more than
200 additional facilities in the planning or construction stage.
(R-16 at App. 21, p. 6.) These facilities generate approximate-
ly 4 million tons of ash residue annually. (/d., p. 1.) It defies
logic to conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that Congress
would exempt this staggering quantity of toxic ash residue
from regulation as hazardous waste when, in fact, the HSWA
amended RCRA so that a person who generates hazardous
waste only in excess of ]00 kilograms per month, rather than
the previous 1000 kilograms per month, is subject to the
requirements of Subtitle C. See 42 U.S.C. § 6921(d). Indeed,
it is NO Overstatement that such a construction of section
3001(1i) vitiates the policy underlying RCRA that hazardous
waste shall be properly managed. Fundamental to this policy
surely is the notion that millions of tons of hazardous waste
cannot be simply landfilled alongside newspapers and soda
bottles.

'2 References to the record below are cited by record index number
as “R- at

18

The Court of Appeals improperly disregarded the careful
balance of benefits and controls struck by Congress in enact-
ing section 3001(i). That balance should not be disturbed by
mere judicial fiat, especially where the result is so demonstra-
bly at odds with Congress’s effort safely to control the han-
dling and disposal of hazardous waste. Therefore, this Court
should reject the appellate court’s conclusion that ash with
the characteristic of toxicity, and the facility generating that
ash, are exempt from the requirements of Subtitle C.'°

B. The Judgment Below Renders RCRA’s Entire
Post-Generation Hazardous Waste Regulatory
Scheme Inoperable As It Applies To Ash.

It is “the elementary canon of construction that a statute
should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoper-
able.” Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana,
472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985) (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379, 392 (1979)). The Supreme Court does not “con-
strue statutory phrases in isolation; [it] read[s] statutes as a
whole.” United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984).

It is undisputed that the ash generated at the Facility
routinely exhibits a characteristic (toxicity) of hazardous
waste. The appellate court concluded that pursuant to section
3001(i) a resource recovery facility generating this identifi-
able hazardous waste is nonetheless exempt from the require-
ments of Subtitle C. Recall, however, that section 3001(i) is
specifically limited to a resource recovery facility. Section
3001(i) provides only that a resource recovery facility shall
not be deemed to be managing hazardous waste. Section
300 1(i) says nothing about the ash residue itself, which, if a

'3 Numerous states have recognized that section 3001(i) does not
exempt ash residues from hazardous waste regulations, including Ala-
bama, California, Maine, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Wis-
consin. (R-12 at p. 3.)

19

hazardous waste, remains subject to the handling and Jispo-
sal requirements of Subtitle C. Nor does it provide, for exam-
ple, that a transporter who transports ash shail not be deemed
to be transporting a hazardous waste.

Under RCRA, it is the generator that must determine
whether a particular solid waste is a hazardous waste. 40
C.F.R. § 262.11. If the waste is identifiable as a hazardous
waste, the generator must then prepare a manifest “to identi-
fy the quantity, composition, and the origin, routing and
destination of hazardous waste during its transportation from
the point of generation to the point of disposal, treatment or
storage.” 42 U.S.C. § 6903(12). The generator is also required
to designate on the manifest a licensed disposal facility to
receive the hazardous waste. 40 C.F.R. 262.20-.23. Thus, the
entire hazardous waste management scheme depends upon
the generator’s “gatekeeper” function and the preparation of
the manifest.

Even assuming that the Court of Appeals properly con-
strued section 3001(i), as indicated above, section 3001(i)
applies only to the resource recovery facility generating the
ash. Under Subtitle C, a transporter, for example, still may
not accept hazardous waste unless it is accompanied by a
manifest. 40 C.F.R. § 263.20. Nor can a disposal facility
regularly accept ash not accompanied by a manifest. See 42
U.S.C. § 6924. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded
that a resource recovery facility need not prepare a manifest.
In other words, no transporter could transport, no disposal
facility could dispose, no storage facility could store the ash
received from a resource recovery facility without violating
Subtitle C! This statutory “catch-22” highlights the basic flaw
in the appellate court’s construction of section 3001(i).

Transporters and TSD facilities are in violation of
RCRA each time they accept unmanifested ash identifiable as
a hazardous waste from a resource recovery facility, and are
subject to criminal and civil penalties. But there literally is no
way they can comply with RCRA’s requirements so long as

|

20

the resource recovery facility that generates the ash is not
required to prepare a manifest. It is obviously undesirable to
construe a statute to impose obligations on a person where
that person lacks the ability to comply with those obligations
by virtue of a provision within the same statute. Yet this is
precisely the result of the judgment below: hazardous waste in
a regulatory vacuum.

Not surprisingly, respondents and the courts below have
“offered no reason for attributing this futile design to... .
Congress.”” Mountain States, 472 U.S. at 249. There is none.
The on/y construction that renders all the parts of Subtitle C,
as it applies to ash that exhibits a characteristic, a compatible
whole is that adopted by the EPA in 1985 and advanced by
EDF in the court below, and which treats a resource recovery
facility as a potential generator of hazardous waste. There-
fore, this Court must correct the unworkable construction of
section 3001(i) adopted by the Court of Appeals.

III. The Court of Appeals Wrongly Concluded That A
Resource Recovery Facility May Accept Hazardous
Waste From A Small Quantity Generator Of
Hazardous Waste And Remain Exempt Under Section
3001(i).

Hazardous wastes generated by small quantity genera-
tors are identified as hazardous wastes under section 3001(d)
of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6921(d). However, small quantity gen-
erator hazardous waste is expressly exempt from much of the
regulato-ry scheme imposed on hazardous waste under
RCRA. For example, a small quantity generator is generally
authorized to deliver its waste to a non-hazardous waste man-
agement facility. 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.5(a), 261.5(g)(3)\iv).

Section 3001(i), however, specifically provides that a re-
source recovery facility is exempt from the requirements of
Subtitle C if it receives and burns on/y household waste and
non-hazardous solid waste from commercial and industrial

21

sources. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i)1 (A).'* Consequently, if the Fa-
cility knowingly or regularly receives and burns small quanti-

ty generator hazardous waste, it is not exempt under section
300 1(1).'5

Only by fundamentally rewriting section 3001(i) could
the Court of Appeals construe section 3001(i) to allow the
Facility routinely to receive hazardous waste from small
quantity generators. Section 3001(i) does not read “house-
hold waste, non-hazardous commercial or industrial waste or
small quantity generator hazardous waste.”’ Indeed, its terms
could not be plainer. Nor does the straightforward reading of
section 3001(i) significantly limit the ability of a small quanti-
ty generator to dispose of its waste. A small quantity genera-
tor can still dispose of its waste virtually unfettered (the vast
majority of waste in the United States is disposed of in land-
fills). Section 3001(i) only provides that a resource recovery
facility may not accept such waste without foregoing its
exemption.

In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals appar-
ently ignored the fundamental transformation that takes
place when municipal solid waste is incinerated to ash. The
fact that heavy metals concentrate in ash residue only under-
scores why Congress was so stringent at the “front end” by

'4 The legislative history indicates that the language in section
3001(1i) is not as absolute as it seems. Even assuming this is true, receipt
by a resource recovery facility of hazardous waste can only be inadver-
tent and occasional, not routine. See S. Rep. No. 284, 98th Cong., Ist
Sess. 61 (1983).

'5 Because the district court concluded that a resource recovery facil-
ity may accept waste from a small quantity generator without losing its
exemption under section 3001(i), and granted Wheelabrator motion for
summary judgment on this issue, EDF did not conduct discovery on
Wheelabrator’s actual receipt of small quantity generator hazardous
waste.

22

providing that resource recovery facilities shall not burn haz-
ardous wastes. The Court of Appeals’ conclusion to the con-
trary is inconsistent with section 3001(i) and must be
rejected.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the requested writ of Certiora-
ri should issue.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/

Leon M. Despres
(Counsel of record )

R. Edward Wilhoite, Jr.

DESPRES, SCHWARTZ &
GEOGHEGAN

77 W. Washington Street

Chicago, IL 60602

(312) 372-2511

Attorneys for petitioner

Of counsel

Karen Florini

ENVIRONMENTAL
DEFENSE FUND

1616 P Street, N.W.

Suite 150

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 387-3500

APPENDIX

' *
See eee ee ee

amd

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT

At a Stated Term of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the United States Courthouse in the
City of New York, on the 24th day of April,
one thousand nine hundred and ninety-one.

Present: HON. THOMAS J. MESKILL
HON. ROGER J. MINER
HON. FRANK X. ALTIMARI

Circuit Judges,

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-V=

WHEELABRATOR TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
WESTCHESTER RESCO COMPANY, L.P.,

Defendants~-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New
York.

This cause came on to be heard on the
transcript of record from the United States
District Court for the Southern District of
New York and was argued by counsel.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now
hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that
the appeal from a judgment of said district
court be and it hereby is affirmed in
accordance with the opinion of this court

A-2

with costs to be taxed against the
appellant.

A TRUE COPY Elaine B. Goldsmith,
ELAINE B. GOLDSMITH Clerk
By:
/sl
/38/

Edward J. Guardaro,
Deputy Clerk

A-3

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

*

No. 1219--August Term, 1990
(Argued March 18, 1991
Decided April 24, 1991)

*
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

-V.-

WHEELABRATOR TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
WESTCHESTER RESCO COMPANY, L.P.,

Defendants-Appellees.

*

Before

MESKILL, MINER and ALTIMARI,
Circuit Judges.

*

Appeal from a judgment entered in the
United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, Haight, J.,
granting summary judgment in favor of the
defendants.

Affirmed.

A-4

R. EDWARD WILHOITE, JR., Despres,
Schwartz & Geoghegan, Chicago,
IL (Robert L. Graham, Laura A.
Kaser, Gretchen M. Livingston,
Robert L. Denby, Jenner & Block,

Chicago, IL, Karen Florini,
Environmental Defense Fund,
Washington, D.C., of counsel),

for Appellant.

JOHN G. KOELTL, New York, NY (Daniel
G. Murphy, Ted Ss. Ward,
Debevoise & Plimpton, New York,
NY, Harold Himmelman, David M.
Friedland, Stanley S. Sokul,
Beveridge & Diamond, Washington,
D.Ce, of counsel), for
Appellees.

*

MESKILL, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from a judgment
entered in the United Sates District Court
for the Southern District of New York,
Haight, J., on April 16, 1990, granting
summary judgment in favor of the defendants
Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc. and West-
chester Resco Company, L.P. (collectively
"“Wheelabrator"), and dismissing plaintiff
Environmental Defense Fund's (EDF) com-

plaint with prejudice. Judgment was

A-3S

entered pursuant to Judge Haight's order of
April 9, 1990. Prior to ordering entry of
judgment, Judge Haight had issued an
opinion dated November 21,1989, which
examined EDF's claims. See Environmental
Defense Fund v. Wheelabrator Tech., Inc.,
725 F.Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). In that
opinion, Judge Haight fully set forth his
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
See id. The district court, however,
delayed ordering the entry of final judg-
ment pending further discovery. The
district court's findings and conclusions
of November 21, 1989 provide the basis for
this appeal. Assuming the reader's famil-
iarity with that opinion, we offer only a
limited discussion of the relevant back-
ground.

Wheelabrator operates a resource
recovery facility, popularly known as a
"trash-to-energy" facility, where solid

waste generated in Westchester County is

an

A~6

delivered and incinerated. The end-product
of this incineration process is residue
ash. The manner in which Wheelabrator
disposes of this residue ash provides the
underlying basis for the instant controver-
sy. EDF contends that this residue ash is
a "hazardous waste" which must be disposed
of in accordance with the provisions of
Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) (often called
the "Solid Waste Disposal Act"), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6921-39b. Wheelabrator maintains that
the ash, under the existing statutory and
regulatory scheme, can be disposed of as
non-hazardous solid waste under Subtitle D
of the _ RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-49a.
Wheelabrator argues that Section 3001(i) of
the RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i), which was
adopted in 1984, specifically grants an
exclusion from the hazardous waste regula-

tions to the ash that is the end-product of

A~-7

a resource recovery facility's incineration
process.

EDF also advances an alternative
argument. EDF contends that even assuming
Section 3001(i) grants an exclusion to the
residue ash, Wheelabrator cannot avail
itself of the benefits of that exclusion
because it has taken inadequate steps to
ensure that hazardous wastes are not being

incinerated and it accepts small amounts of

hazardous waste from "small quantity
generators." See 40 C.F.R. § 261.5(a)
(defining the term). In response, Wheela-

brator asserts that "small quantity genera-
tors" are authorized by federal regulation
to deliver their hazardous waste for
disposal to any waste facility that is
"(pjermitted, licensed, or registered by a
State to manage municipal or industrial
solid waste." 40C.F.R. § 261.5(g) (3) (iv).
Wheelabrator also claims that its contrac-

tual arrangements with those who deliver

a ET ee

A-8

solid waste for incineration adequately
ensure against the receipt of hazardous
wastes.

The threshold question that we must
address is whether Congress, in adopting
the Clean Air Act, [sic] Amendments of
1999, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399
(1990), intended to preclude the enforce-
ment of existing environmental laws and
regulations as they relate to the disposal
of incinerator ash, thereby mooting the
controversy currently before us. We note
that this legislation was enacted after the
district court's decision.

Our review of the relevant statutory
provision and the accompanying legislative
history convinces us that Congress did not
intend to erect a bar to the enforcement of
pre-existing environmental statutes and
regulations. Section 306 of the Clean Air

Act Amendments of 1990 provides:

A-9

For a period of 2 years after the
date of enactment of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990, ash from
solid waste incineration units burn-
ing municipal waste shall not be
regulated by the Administrator of the
[EPA] pursuant to section 3001 of the
Solid Waste Disposal Act. Such ref-
erence and limitation shall not be
construed to prejudice, endorse or
otherwise affect any activity by the
Administrator following the 2-year
period from the date of enactment of
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.

Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399, 2584
(1990). The plain language of the statute
precludes the EPA from "regulating" incin-
erator ash for two years. The precise
meaning of the term "regulate," however, is
in our view at best ambiguous. We, there-
fore, look to the statute's legislative
history for guidance.

The legislative history provides us
with a rather clear indication of Congress'
intent. The House and Senate Conferees
offered the following explanations:

The conferees do not intend to preju-

dice or affect in any manner ongoing

litigation, including Environmental
Defense Fund v. Wheelabrator Inc.,

A-10

725 F. Supp. 758 (2d Cir.) [sic] and
Environmental Defense Fund v. City of
Chicago, Appeal No. 90-3060 (7th
Cir.), or any State activity regard-
ing ash.
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 952, 101st Cong., 2nd
Sess. 335, 342 reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 3867, 3874. The plain
import of this statement is that Congress
consciously made a decision not to express
an opinion regarding the instant case and
a companion case being litigated in the
Seventh Circuit. Indeed, it is obvious
that Congress had no intention of rendering
judicial review of the instant case moot.
Moreover, the statement is consistent with
a congressional intention to see that the
applicable regulatory scheme currently in
existence is not rendered null and void as
it relates to the regulation of incinerator
ash. Finally, by imposing a two year
moratorium on any new EPA regulatory

activity concerning incinerator’ ash,

Congress simply may have desired to main-

A-1l1

tain the status quo pending judicial
resolution of the issues presented here and
in City of Chicago. Once the courts have
spoken, Congress will be in a better
position to evaluate its options regarding
the treatment of incinerator ash and to
direct its future legislative efforts
accordingly.

Having concluded that the case is
properly before us, we now direct our
attention to the district court's decision.
The district court rejected EDF's arguments
and ultimately ordered that judgment be
entered in favor of Wheelabrator. Specifi-
cally, in its November 21, 1989 decision,
the district court held that Section
3001(i) of the RCRA grants an exclusion
from the hazardous waste regulations to the
residue ash which is produced by the
incineration of solid municipal waste. The
district court also concluded that applica-

ble federal regulations permit "small

A-12

quantity generators" of hazardous waste to
dispose of that waste at any facility,
including a resource recovery facility,
that is "{p]jermitted, licensed, or regis-
tered by a State to manage municipal or
industrial solid waste." 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.5(g) (3) (iv). Finally, the court held
that Wheelabrator, through its contractual
arrangements for the delivery of solid
municipal waste, had in place legally
sufficient controls to ensure that unautho-
rized hazardous wastes would not be deliv:
ered to the resource recovery facility for
disposal.

After carefully reviewing Judge
Haight's thorough and well reasoned opin-
ion, we agree with his analysis of the
legal issues. Accordingly, we affirm the
April 16, 1990 judgment of the district
court for the reasons stated by Judge
Haight in his opinion dated November 21,

1989. Environmental Defense Fund v.

A-13

Wheelabrator Tech., Inc., 725 F.Supp. 758

(S.D.N.Y. 1989).

A-14

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-_-_ -— = = -—-— = = — = -—-& = =— =— =— =—- =—& —_— = x
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC., : 88-
: CV.-
Plaintiff, : 0560
>: (CH)

-against- :

WHEELABRATOR TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
and WESTCHESTER RESCO COMPANY,

LcPes 3
Defendants. :

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC., 257
Park Avenue South, New York, New York
10010, Michael E. Herz, Esq., of counsel.

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC., 1616
P Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036,
Karen Florini, Esq. and Kathie A. Stein,
Esq., of counsel.

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON, 875 Third
Avenue, New York, New York 10022, John G.
Koeltl, Esq., Daniel G. Murphy, Esq., and
Terry E. Thornton, Esq., of counsel.

BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND, 1333 New Hamp-
shire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036,
Harold Himmelman, Esq., Karl S. Bourdeau,
Esq., and David M. Friedland, Esq., of
counsel.

aA~i5

KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, 1500 Oliver
Building, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222,
Joseph A. Katarincic, Esq., of counsel.

COUNSEL FOR AMICI CURIAE

NEW YORK LAWYERS FOR THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, 135 East 15th Street, New York,
New York 10003, Herbert Semmel, Esq., of
counsel.

Attorneys for the American Public
Health Association.

DISTRICT COUNCIL 37, 125 Barclay
Street, New York, New York 10007, Joel
Giller, Esq. and Leonard Shrier, Esq., of
counsel.

Attorneys for American Federation of
State, County & Municipal Employees.

NITKIN, ALKALAY, HANDLER, ROBBINS &
KORN, 122 East 42nd Street, New York, New
York 10168, Henry Korn, Esq., of counsel.

CROWELL & MORING, 1001 Pennsylvania
Avenue N.W., Washington, D.C., 20004,
Ridgway M. Hall, Jr., Esq., Robert C.
Davis, Jr., Esq., and B. Michael Hodge,
Esq., of counsel.

Attorneys for Tricil, Inc.
ROSENMAN & COLIN, 575 Madison Avenue,
New York, New York 10022, Marvin R. Lange,

Esq., of counsel.

Attorneys for County of Westchester.

A-16

ROBERT ABRAMS, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK, 120 Broadway, New York,
New York 10271, Marc S. Gerstman, Esq., of
counsel.

Attorneys for New York State Depart-
ment of Environmental Conservation.

WILSON, ELSER, MOSKOWITZ, EDELMAN &
DICKER, 420 Lexington Avenue, New York, New
York 10170, David L. Wong, Esq., of coun-
sel.

NATIONAL SOLID WASTES MANAGEMENT
ASSOCIATION, Officer of the General Coun-
sel, 1730 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W., Suite
1000, Washington, D.C. 20036, Bruce J.
Parker, Esq., of counsel.

Attorneys for The Institution of
Resource Recovery.

NIXON, HARGRAVE, DEVANS & DOYLE, 30
Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York
10112, Frank H. Penski, Esq., Philip F.
Cronin, Jr., Esq., Richard M. Cogen, Esq.,
and Dexter Ewel, Esq., of counsel.

THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF
MAYORS, Office of the General Counsel, 1620
Eye Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006,
Gerard L. Lederer, Esq., of counsel.

Attorneys for The United States
Conference of Mayors and The National
Resource Recovery Association.

This important environmental case
raises issues of the proper construction of
a federal statute governing hazardous
waste, and defendants' compliance with the
statutory and regulatory scheme.

The case is now before the Court on
defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to
Rule 12(b) (6), Fed. R. Civ. P., or in the
alternative, for summary judgment pursuant
to Rule 56(b), and plaintiff's cross-motion
for summary judgment pursuant to Rule

56(a). V

i/ = By leave of Court, briefs amici curiae sup-
porting plaintiff were filed by the American Public
Health Association, the American Federation of
State, County & Municipal Employees, and Tricil,
Inc.

Briefs supporting defendants were filed by
the County of Westchester, the New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation, the
Institution of Resource Recovery, and the National
Resource Recovery Association and the United States
Conference of Mayors (joint brief).

Plaintiff the Environmental Defense

Fund, Inc. ("EDF") contends that defendants
have violated certain portions of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seg.,
and the regulations promulgated thereunder
both by the federal Environmental Protec-
tion Agency ("EPA") and the New York
Department of Environmental Conservation
("DEC") .¥/

Subtitle C of the RCRA "established a
‘cradle to grave' regulatory scheme govern-
ing the treatment, storage, and disposal of

hazardous wastes." vi e-

&/ EDF does not allege an independent violation
of state law, but rather claims that "[v]jiolation
of the New York regulations . . . constitutes
violation of regulations that have become effective
pursuant to Subtitle C of RCRA.” Complaint at
q ll.

3/ ‘The EPA promulgated regulations pursuant to the
RCRA dealing with the classification of solid
wastes as either hazardous or non-hazardous.
Certain wastes are listed as per ge hazardous. 40

(continued...)

A-19

fense Fund v. E.P.A., 852 F.2d 1316, 1318

(D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1120 (1989). Solid wastes not classified

as hazardous are regulated under Subtitle
D of the statute.

Pursuant to Section 3006(b) of
the RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b), a state may
seek authorization from the EPA to adminis-
ter and enforce a hazardous waste program
in that state. If the Administrator of the
EPA accepts the state's proposed program as
in keeping with the strictures of federal
law, the state is authorized to administer
its program in place of a federal program.
The EPA, however, retains responsibility
for overseeing the hazardous waste programs

of the states.

3/ (...continued)

C.F.R. 5 261.30-261.33(f£). Those wastes not listed
by the EPA as per se hazardous are deemed such only
if they exhibit one of the following four charac-
teristics: corrosivity, ignitability, reactivity,
Or toxicity, 40 C.F.R. § 261.21-261.24, and are not
otherwise exempt from classification as a hazardous
waste. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(1).

A-20

On May 29, 1986, New York's applica-
tion to operate a hazardous waste program
in lieu of the federal program was granted.
The New York regulations, which mirror
those promulgated by the EPA, are codified
at 6 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. Parts 370-
374 ("NYCRR").

Factual Background

Plaintiff EDF is a "non-profit, public
benefit membership corporation organized
under the laws of the State of New York."
Complaint at ¢¥ 4. EDF characterizes itself
as "a national environmental advocacy
organization supported by approximately
60,000 dues-paying members." Id.

Defendants Wheelabrator Technologies
Inc. ("WTI") and Westchester Resco Company,
L.P. ("Resco") own and operate the West-

chester Resource Recovery Facility’ ("the

‘/ A resource recovery facility "refers generally
to facilities that burn solid waste in order to
recover useful thermal energy (as steam or elec~
tricity) and to reduce the weight and volume of

(continued... )

A-21

Facility") in Peekskill, New York. Resco
designed the Facility pursuant to a 1981
agreement entered into by the County of
Westchester and Wheelabrator-Frye Inc.¥
The Facility processes approximately
650,000 tons of solid waste, both household
and non-hazardous municipal waste, annual-
ly. In processing that amount cf solid
waste, the Facility generates roughly 330
million kilowatt hours of electricity each
year. A byproduct of the waste recovery
process is ash. Approximately 500 tons of
ash are produced by the Facility daily.

EDF contends that the ash is a hazardous

/ (...continued)

waste requiring landfill disposal.” Affidavit of
Ronald J. Broglio sworn to on March 19, 1988 at
q 4.

2/ Wheelabrator-Frye Inc. is a predecessor of WTI.

A-22

waste” and must therefore be disposed of
as such.

Specifically, EDF contends’ that
defendants are in violation of federal
regulations requiring that generators of
hazardous waste apply for and receive a
United States EPA number before engaging in
the treatment, storage, disposal, transpor-
tation, or offering for transportation of
hazardous waste. 40 C.F.R. § 262.12. An
analogous requirement is found in the New
York state framework. 6 NYCRR § 371.3.

It is uncontested that the ash pro-
duced by the Facility is not dealt with
pursuant to the regulations governing the

handling and disposal of hazardous wastes.

§/ The ash produced at the Facility failed the EP
toxicity test, Procedure set forth at Appendix II
to 40 C.F.R. § 261.33, nine out of the past ten
times samples have been tested. Exhibit 2 attached
to Plaintiff’s Memorandum; Defendants’ Exhibit 24
at B-6. The EP toxicity test is a measure of the
hazardous qualities of solid waste. See Al Tech
Specialty Steel Corp. v. E-P.A., 846 F.2d 158, 160
(2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (waste is subject to
regulation as hazardous where it fails the EP
toxicity test, a characteristic of hazardous
wastes).

A-23

The Westchester County Refuse Disposal
District No. 1 ("District") owns and
operates an ashfill where the Facility’s
ash is brought for disposal. That ashfill,
the Sprout Brook Residue Disposal Site
("Sprout Brook"), located in Cortlandt, New
York, is not a licensed hazardous waste
disposal facility./ Defendants have
further not complied with those regulations
governing the transportation and disposal

of hazardous waste.

L/ Disposal facilities dealing with hazardous
waste must also obtain an EPA identification
number. 40 C.F.R. § 262.12. Again, an analogous
regulation is found in the New York state scheme.
6 NYCRR § 371.3.

8/ Generators of hazardous waste are required to
prepare a shipping manifest designating a licensed
disposal facility. The generator is to maintain a
copy of the manifest on file. 40 C.F.R. § 262.20-
-23. 6 NYCRR § 372.2(a), 372.2(b)(5) (iii).

Before shipping, hazardous waste must be
packaged, labelled, marked, and placarded according
to specific regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 262.30-.33,
6 NYCRR § 372.2(a)(4)-(7). Hazardous waste must
further be accumulated in labelled containers. 40
C.F.R. § 262.34, 6 NYCRR § 372.2(a) (8).

A generator of hazardous waste must also
maintain certain records and is required to submit
an annual report to the state DEC. 40 C.F.R.
§ 262.40-.43, 6 NYCRR § 373.2(c).

A-24

EDF contends that defendants' genera-
tion of ash which fails the EP toxicity
test subjects the handling of that ash to
federal regulations governing the genera-
tion, management and disposal of hazardous
wastes. Defendants do no contest that they
are not in compliance with those regula-
tions, but rather argue that the RCRA
itself exempts resource recovery facilities
from the strictures of Subtitle C.

Plaintiff argues that the regulatory
"EP [toxicity] test governs as a matter of
law", citing Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp.
v. _E.P.A., supra; and, "since defendants
have admitted that their ash fails the EP
toxicity test and that they do not comply
with the hazardous waste laws, plaintiff is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum at 3-4, l.

The argument assumes its basic prem-
ise: that defendants are subject to hazard-

ous waste regulation under Subtitle C, of

A-25

which the EP toxicity test forms a part.
But if a proper construction of the statute
excludes defendants from compliance with
hazardous waste laws, their conceded non-
compliance has no legal significance. The
Second Circuit's opinion in A] Tech does
not change this analysis, since the corpo-
rate defendant in that case, a specialty
steel maker which constructed a collection
basin on its property to deal with toxic
precipitations, did not claim a statutory
exclusion from hazardous waste regulation,
and could not have done so.

I turn then to the statutory and
regulatory scheme.

Discussion

In May 1980, after the 1976 passage of

the RCRA, the EPA implemented a regulatory

provision termed the "household waste

A-26

exclusion."2/ In the preamble to the 1980
household waste exclusion, the EPA made
clear that the ash residue produced as a
byproduct of the incineration of household
waste was exempt from regulation under
Subtitle C of the RCRA.

The Senate language makes it clear
that household waste does not lose
the exclusion simply because it has
been collected. Since household
waste is excluded in all phases of
its management, residue remaining
after treatment (e.g., incineration,
thermal treatment) are not subject to
regulation as hazardous waste. Such
wastes, however, must be transported,
stored, treated and disposed in ac-

2/ That exclusion provided as follows:

§ 261.4 Exclusions

(b) Solid wastes which are not hazardous
wastes.

The following solid wastes are not hazardous
wastes:

(1) Household waste, including household
waste that has been collected, transported,
stored, treated, disposed, recovered (e.g.,
refuse-derived fuel) or reused. "Household
waste” means any waste material (including
garbage, trash and sanitary wastes in septic
tanks) derived from households (including
single and multiple residences, hotels and
motels. )

45 Fed. Reg. 33,120 (May 19, 1980) (codified as
amended at 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(1) (1987)).

ee

A~37

cordance with applicable State and

federal requirements concerning man-

agement of solid waste (including any

requirements specified in regulations

under Subtitle D of RCRA.) ....
45 Fed. Reg. 33,099 (May 19, 1980). The
EPA went on to note that when "household
waste is mixed with other hazardous wastes,
. . . the mixture will be deemed hazardous"
and thus subject to the regulations of
Subtitle Cc. Id. It is common ground that
the ash resulting from the incineration of
household waste is not subject to regula-
tion as a hazardous waste. 1!

In 1984 Congress sought to "clarify"
the household waste exclusion in respect of

its applicability to municipal wastes

generally, including non-hazardous commer-

12/ Although the parties are in agreement that the
1980 exclusion extends to ash residue, EDF takes
exception to the EPA’s judgment that Congress
intended such an exemption. Plaintiff’s Memorandum
at 25 n. 14 (“plaintiff considers the application
of the pure household waste exclusion to ash
residues inconsistent with the statute”); Plain-
tiff’s Reply Memorandum at 12 ("EPA’s justification
for applying the household waste exclusion to ash -
- itself of doubtful validity -- was the perceived
Congressional intent to exclude an entire waste
stream").

A-28

cial and industrial wastes. Congress
therefore enacted the following provision:

(i) Clarification of household waste
exclusion

A resource recovery facility re-
covering energy from the mass burning
of municipal solid waste shall not be
deemed to be treating, storing, dis-
posing of, or otherwise managing
hazardous wastes for the purposes of
regulation under this subchapter
if --

(1) such facility --
(A) receives and burns only --

(i) household waste (from single
and multiple dwellings, hotels,
motels, and other residential
sources), and

(ii) solid waste from commer-
cial or industrial sources that
does not contain hazardous waste
identified or listed under this
section, and

(2) the owner or operator of such
facility has established contractual
requirements or other appropriate
notification or inspection procedures

to assure that hazardous wastes are not
received at or [sic] burned in such facili-

ty.

A-29

RCRA Section 3001(i), 42 U.S.C.

§ 6921(i) .v The instant controversy

i/ The equivalent regulation is found in the New
York scheme.

(2) Solid wastes which are not hazardous wastes.
The following solid wastes are not hazardous
wastes:

(i) household waste, including household
waste that has been collected, transported,
stored, treated, disposed, recovered (e.g.,

refuse-derived fuels) or reused. Household
waste means any waste material (including

garbage, trash and sanitary wastes in septic
tanks) derived from households (including
single and multiple residences, hotels and
motels, bunkhouses, ranger stations, crew
quarters, campgrounds, picnic grounds and
day-use recreation areas). A resource
recovery facility managing municipal waste
shall not be deemed to be treating, storing,
disposing of, or otherwise managing hazardous
waste for the purpose of regulation, if such
facility:

(a) receives and burns only:

(1) household waste (from single and
multiple dwellings, hotels, motels and
other residential sources); and

(2) solid waste from commercial or
industrial sources that does not con-
tain hazardous waste; and

(b) does not accept hazardous waste and the
Owner or operator of such facility has
established contractual requirements or other
appropriate notification or inspection proce-
dures to assure that hazardous wastes are not
received at or burned in the facility.

NYCRR § 371.1(e)(2)(i) (1987) (emphasis in origi-
nal).

ae

A-30

centers on the proper construction and
scope of the 1984 clarification.
Defendants contend that Section
3001(i) exempts the Facility from those
regulations, codified at 40 C.F.R. Part
262, governing the generation of hazardous
waste. Plaintiff argues that Section
3001(i) does not exempt resource recovery
facilities accepting commercial wastes from
regulations governing the generation of
hazardous waste, but only from those
regulations, codified at 40 C.F.R. Parts
264-68 and 270, concerning the management

of hazardous waste.l%/

12/ EDF contends that Section 3001(i) merely
exempts the Facility from regulation as a treat-
ment, storage and disposal ("TSD") facility (fa-
cilities that manage, rather than produce hazardous
waste). However, by its own terms Section 3001(i)
does not apply to resource recovery facilities that
accept hazardous waste for incineration, and
plaintiff argues that if a resource recovery
facility should ever accept hazardous waste, even
accidentally, it would not be eligible for exemp-
tion even from regulation as a TSD facility. Under
plaintiff’‘s construction of Section 3001(i) it is
difficult to understand what, if any, benefit the
Facility derives from the exemption. Plainly, if
the Facility never accepts hazardous waste for
processing, it would not be subject to regulation
as a TSD facility even absent the exclusion.

A. Plain Language of the Statute

Defendants contend that Section

3001(i) is clear in its intent to exclude
the ash generated by the waste recovery
process from regulation under Subtitle C.
Arguing that this Court need not look
beyond the pleadings and the plain meaning
of Section 3001(i), the defendants move for
dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6).
Defendants argue that the "otherwise
managing" language in Section 3001(i)
"applies to all the waste management
activities of a facility, including manag-
ing and disposing of the ash residue."
Defendants' Memorandum at 15. Therefore,
any waste resource recovery facility that
"burns only residential and other non-
hazardous waste and establishes the requi-
site contractual or other specified safe-

guards is not subject to regulation under

A-32

Subtitle c." Id. I do not think the
meaning of the statute so clear.

Section 3001(i) does not, in plain
words, exclude the Facility from those
regulations regarding the generation of
hazardous waste; that term is nowhere
mentioned in the statutory language.
Further, the ash produced as a byproduct of
the resource recovery process is not
specifically exempted from regulation under
the terms of Section 3001(i). The “otner-
wise managing" language of the statute
could arguably be read as that sort of
general catchall provision often included

in involved statutory frameworks.’ The

13/ =r EDF argues that the plain language of the
statutory exclusion, when read in conjunction with
the definitional section of the statute, establish-
es its construction of Section 3001(i). The
definitional section of the statute sets forth the
meaning of “disposal”, “hazardous waste genera~-
tion", and “hazardous waste management” separately.
EDF contends that the separate definition of these
terms is dispositive of Congress’ intent in enact-
ing Section 3001(i).

(3) The term “disposal” means the discharge,
deposit, injection, dumping, spilling,
(continued...)

A-33

precise meaning of the phrase is not

43/ (...continued)
leaking, or placing of any solid waste into
Or on any land or water so that such solid
waste or hazardous waste or any constituent
thereof may enter the environment or be
emitted into the air or discharged into any
waters, including ground waters.

(6) The term "hazardous waste generation”
means the act or process of producing haz-
ardous waste.”

(7) The term “hazardous waste management”
means the systematic control of the collec-
tion, source separation, storage, transpor-
tation, processing, treatment, recovery, and
disposal of hazardous wastes.

42 U.S.C. § 6093(3), (6), (7).

Although the statute does not define
“otherwise managing hazardous wastes, the defini-
tion most on point is that of “hazardous waste
management". Plaintiff concludes that the Facility
cannot argue exemption from those regulations
governing the generation of hazardous waste and the
disposal of the waste it generates because the term
generation is defined separately from management
and is not specifically mentioned in Section
3001(i). I do not agree.

The definition of “management” is suffi-
ciently broad, particularly in view of the fact
that the term disposal is specifically enumerated
in Section 3001(i), to warrant examination of the
legislative history on the point. I say this also
in view of the fact that Section 3001(i) is explic-
itly termed a clarification of the 1980 household
waste exclusion which is understood by the parties
to extend to the ash byproduct generated by the
waste recovery process. Further, Subtitle C as a
whole is captioned “HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT,” a
fact which lends support to defendants’ argument
that the “otherwise managing” language of the
exclusion is meant to exempt the Facility from all
regulation under that subtitle.

A-34

ascertainable without turning to the legis-
lative history.

B. Legislative History

The legislative history of the 1984
exclusion makes clear Congress' intent to
exclude ash generated by an excluded
facility from regulation under Subtitle C
of the RCRA. Commenting on Section
3001(i), the Report of the Senate Committee
on Environment and Public Works, which
accompanied the proposed legislation, said
the following:

The reported bill adds a subsec-
tion (d) [sic] to section 3001 to
clarify the coverage cf the household
waste exclusion with respect to re-
source recovery facilities recovering
energy through the mass burning of
municipal solid waste. This exclu-
sion was promulgated by the Agency
[EPA] in its hazardous waste manage-
ment regulations established to ex-
clude waste streams generated by
consumers at the household level and
by sources whose wastes are suffi-
ciently similar in both quantity and
quality to those of households.

Resource recovery facilities
often take in such "household wastes"
mixed with other, non-hazardous waste
streams from a variety of sources

A-35

other than "“households," including
small commercial and _ée industrial
sources, schools, hotels, municipal
buildings, churches, etc. ze (O48
important to encourage commercially
viable resource recovery facilities
and to remove impediments that may
hinder their development and opera-
tion. New section 3001(d) [sic]
Clarifies the original intent to
include within the household waste
exclusion activities of a resource
recovery facility which recovers
energy from the mass burning of
household waste and non-hazardous
waste from other sources.

Ww ivities
of such a facility, including the
generation, transportation, treat-
ment, storage and disposal of waste
shall be covered by the exclusion, if
the limitations in paragraphs (1) and
(2) of subsection (d) [sic] are met.

S. Rep. No. 284, 98th Cong., lst Sess. 61

(1983) ("Senate Report") (emphasis added).

The Conference Committee adopted,
without change, the provision proposed by
the Senate:

SECTION 223 == CLARIFICATION OF
HOUSEHOLD WASTE EXCLUSION

House Bill. -- No provision.
Senate amendment. -- The Senate

amendment clarifies that an energy
recovery facility is exempt from haz-
ardous waste requirements if it burns

A-36

only residential and non-hazardous
commercial wastes and establishes
procedures to assure hazardous wastes
will not be burned at the facility.
- e The
Conference substitute is the same as
the Senate amendment.
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1133, 98th Cong., lst
Sess. 79, 106 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5649, 5677.
The report of the relevant Senate
Committee, delivered contemporaneous with
the provision at issue, makes clear that
the exclusion was meant to extend to ash
and other wastes generated in the process
of resource recovery, so as long as the
particular facility does not accept hazard-
ous waste for ‘ncineration and has in place
the appropriate mechanisms for ensuring
that no such waste is accepted. The Senate
report could not be more explicit. ps 4
includes the term "generation", the term

upon which EDF places so much emphasis.

While it is true that the legislation

A-37

itself does not include the term generation
and that it is the legislation with which
we are concerned, the legislative history
is probative on the issue of Congress'
intent, given that the scope of the statute
is unclear on its face.

Moreover, I think it important to
note, as does the report of the Senate
committee, that the 1984 statutory provi-
sion "clarifies" a previously existing
regulatory exclusion, which clearly extend-
ed to ash. See supra at n.10. Nowhere in
the 1984 exclusion, nor in the Committee
report which accompanied it, is there any
hint of a congressional intent to limit the
scope of that earlier exclusion. EDF
argues that the ash resulting from the
incineration of household waste remains
exempt from regulation under Subtitle S,
pursuant to the 1980 exclusion, but that
ash generated by a facility that accepts

municipal as well as household waste is not

A-38

so exempt. I do not think that a fair
reading of the statute. More important,
neither, according to its declarations,
would Congress.

Congress clearly knew of the EPA's
interpretation of the 1980 regulation, and
had it disagreed, would have made clear its
disagreement. See Young v. Community
Nutrition Institute, 476 U.S. 974 983
(1986) (quoting NLRB _v. Bell _ Aerospace,
Co., 416 US.. 267, 275 (1974)) (“congres-
sional failure to revise or repeal the
agency's interpretation is persuasive
evidence that the interpretation is the one
intended by Congress"). Instead Congress
clarified its "original intent to include
within the household waste exclusion
activities of a resource recovery facility

-which recovers energy from the mass burning
of household waste and non-hazardous waste

from other sources." Senate Report at 61.

A-39

C. Agency Interpretation
In 1985, the EPA promulgated a regula-

tion that mirrored Section 3001(i). 40

C.F.R. § 261.4(b) (1). Ina preamble to the
regulation, the EPA interpreted the clari-
fication as follows:

The statute is silent as to
whether hazardous resides from burn-
ing combined household and non-house-
hold, non-hazardous waste are hazard-
ous waste. These residues would be
hazardous wastes under present EPA
regulations if they exhibited a char-
acteristic. The legislative history
does not directly address this ques-
tion although the Senate report can
be read as enunciating a general
policy of non-regulation of these
resource recovery facilities if they
carefully scrutinize their incoming
wastes. On the other hand, residues
from burning could, in theory, exhib-
it a characteristic of hazardous
waste even if no hazardous wastes are
burned, for example, if toxic metals
become concentrated in the ash.
Thus, the requirement of scrutiny of
incoming wastes would not assure non-
hazardousness of the residue. EPA
believes that the principal purpose
of section 3001(g) [{sic] was to pre-
vent resource recovery facilities
that may inadvertently burn hazardous
waste, despite good faith efforts to
avoid such a result, from becoming
subject to the Subtitle C regula-
tions. EPA does not see in this

A-40

provision an intent to exempt the
regulation of incinerator ash from
the burning of non-hazardous waste in
resource recovery facilities if the
ash routinely exhibits a characteris-
tic of hazardous waste. However, EPA
has no evidence to indicate that
these ash residues are hazardous
under existing rules. EPA does not
believe the HSWA (Hazardous and Solid
Waste Amendments of 1984] impose new
regulatory burdens on resource recov-
ery facilities that burn household
and other non-hazardous waste, and
the Agency has no plans to impose
additional responsibilities on these
facilities. Given the highly benefi-
cial nature of resource recovery
facilities, any future additional
regulation of their residues would
have to await consideration of the
important technical and policy issues
that would be posed in the event
serious questions arise about the
residues.

50 Fed. Reg. 28,725-26 (July 15, 1985).
Although at the time of issuing the
Preamble, the EPA was manifestly of the
view that Section 3001(i) did not wholly
exempt ash exhibiting characteristics of
hazardousness from regulation as such, that
view rests on a questionable reading of the
statute and the legislative history. For

this reason, the EPA's interpretation,

Nl

A-41

normally entitled to substantial deference,
carries little weight with this Court. See
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985) ("[{ajn
agency's construction of a statute it is
charged with enforcing is entitled to
deference if it is reasonable and not in
conflict with the expressed intent of
Congress") (citations omitted). The EPA's
interpretation of Section 3001(i) is in
direct conflict with the expressed intent
of Congress as that intent is manifested in
the legislative history.

Deference to an agency's construction
of the statute which it administers “is
appropriate only when Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at
issue, Chevron U.S.A. v. N.R.D.C., 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984), a circumstance that arises
if it can fairly be said that Congress ‘did
not actually have an intent' regarding the

point at issue." New tate Mot

A-42

Truck Association, Inc. v. City of New
York, 654 F. Supp. 1521, 1536 (S.D.N.Y.),

aff'd. per curiam, 833 F.2d 430 (2nd Cir.
1987). In the case at bar, the congressio-
nal intent with respect to the statutory
exemption at issue appears with sufficient
clarity from the legislative history.”
Even the EPA appears to have recog-
nized the questionable basis for its
determination that ash is subject to
regulation as a hazardous waste. On
December 3, 1987, J. Winston Porter, the
Assistant Administrator for the Office of
Solid Waste and Emergency Response, who was

then responsible for the implementation of

i4/ = Moreover, the EPA’s views on the subject are
internally inconsistent, even in the 1985 Preamble.
To the extent the EPA thought ash exhibiting
characteristics of hazardousness should be regulat-
ed, it appears to have left open the question of
how such regulation should be accomplished.
Specifically, the EPA seems to have left for
another day the issue of whether a new set of
regulations, taking into account existing technolo-
gy for the treatment of ash, should be promulgated,
or whether regulation should proceed under Subtitle
C of the RCRA. Of course, whether such regulation
would be in violation of Section 3001(i) is a
question not before me.

A-43

the RCRA at the EPA, testified before the
Senate Subcommittee on Hazardous Waste and
Toxic Substances of the Committee on
Environment and Public Works. He did so in
response to a letter invitation of the
Subcommittee in which it was requested that
he address nine separate issues, including
the status of incinerator ash. On that

question, Porter said the following:

Currently, EPA's regulations
merely restate the statutory lan-
guage. In the preamble codifying

this statutory language, however, EPA
advanced an interpretation of the
statute that would subject ash resi-
due's [sic] from energy-recovering
MWC's [Municipal Waste Combustors] to
Subtitle C regulation if the ash
exhibited a characteristic of hazard-
ous waste. The Agency has reexamined
that interpretation and now concludes
that it may have been in error. The
Agency believes that the language and
legislative history of Section
3001(i) were probably intended to ex-
clude these ash residues from regula-
tion under Subtitle Cc.
| It seems clear that Congress'
interest in Section 3001(i) was to
encourage energy recovery. Under the
section, the reach of the household
exclusion was to be extended for
facilities that recover energy. The
Agency's prior interpretation of the

A-44

section would restrict the exclusion
with respect to ash residue for fa-
cilities that recover energy as well
as those that do not. This appears
inconsistent with the reach of the
household exclusion itself (which
Clearly covers ash). It also appears
inconsistent with the expressed leg-
islative intent that "[a]ll waste
management activities of such a fa-
cility, including the generation,
transportation, treatment, storage,
and disposal of waste shall be cov-
ered by the exclusion. ..." S.
Rep. at 61 (emphasis added).

December 3, 1987 testimony of J. Winston
Porter at 16-17. Thus, in 1987, the EPA
official responsible for the implementation
of the RCRA questioned whether the agency's
1985 interpretation of the statute was
consistent with Congress' intent as ex-
pressed in the Senate Report. Although

Porter did not officially announce a

reversal in agency policy on the mat-

A-45

ter,’ he clearly indicates the EPA's
confusion on the point.

On May 11, 1989, Congressman Thomas A.
Luken, Chairman of the House Subcommittee
on Transportation and Hazardous Materials,
called a hearing on H.R. 2162, a proposal
to regulate ash as a "special waste" under
Subtitle D of the RCRA. In his opening
comments, Congressman Luken~ said _ the
following:

A statutory ambiguity has caused

a great deal of uncertainty with

respect to how this ash should be

regulated.

The very basic question of
whether or not ash should be regulat-

13/s porter’s testimony calls into question the
finality with which the EPA views its own 1985
interpretation of Section 3001(i). Porter says the
following:
First, in the near term we [EPA] are
planning to develop the following items:
* Technical guidance for the proper
handling for MWC ash; and
* Our legal interpretation of the
status of MWC ash with respect to
Subtitle C (hazardous waste) and Sub-
title D (solid waste) portions of the
RCRA.
After taking comment on those above aspects,
our intent is to develop a regulation for MWC
ash as a “special waste” [under Subtitle D}.
December 3, 1987 testimony of J. Winston Porter at
14-15.

nn

A-46

ed under Subtitle D, as a solid
waste, or under subtitle C as a haz-
ardous waste, remains ambiguous in
the statute.

x *

This uncertainty has been exac-
erbated by conflicting signals sent
by the EPA. That is not a criticism
of EPA.

Originally the EPA stated that
incinerator ash must be tested for
toxicity, and managed accordingly,
but more recently the EPA has made
various pronouncements which conflict
with that original policy.

It has become clear that legis-
lative action is needed.

x * ®
The bill which we will consider
today . . . clarifies once and for

all that municipal solid waste incin-

erator ash is to be regulated under

subtitle D, and not subtitle C, of

RCRA.
Regulation of Municipal Solid Waste Incin-
erators: Hearings on H.R. 2162 before the
Subcommittee on Transportation and Hazard-
ous Materials of the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
1-2 (May 11, 1989) (emphasis added).

In that May 11, 1989 hearing, Sylvia

Lowrance, the then Director of the Office

A-47

of Solid Waste, offered the fcllowing

comments:

In our codification of it [Sec-
tion 3001(i)] we stated that, in our
view, the provision excludes energy
recovery facilities burning household
waste along with nonhazardous waste
from commercial and industrial sourc-
es from regulation under subtitle Cc.

With regard to the ash, however,
produced from such facilities, we
said in a 1985 notice that the ash
generated by these facilities which
exhibits a characteristic of the haz-
ardous waste must be managed as a
hazardous waste.

We continue to follow that 1985
policy, and that is our current in-
terpretation. However, there is
substantial controversy surrounding
that interpretation. We are in liti-
gation challenging the EPA's inter-
pretation of section 3001(i). We

believe the law is ambiguous given it
is silent with regard to treatment of
ash under that section.

We *do believe it needs to be
clarified. What we believe is of
paramount importance is that ash be
safely managed in a technically sound
matter.

Until this legal controversy is
resolved, there is going to continue
to be uncertainty on the part of
communities trying to deal with their
garbage crisis with regard to what
ultimate requirements and costs will
be for their municipal solid waste
management.

We very much support an approach
such as the one taken in H.R. 2162,

xO

A~-48

which would provide clear authority
to the EPA to regulate municipal
combustor ash as a special waste
under subtitle D of RCRA.

Id. at 33 (emphasis added); see also id. at
44 ("a special waste program under Subtitle
D, tailored to ash, could be consistent,
practical, and environmentally safe"). It
is clear from Ms. Lowrance’s testimony that
although she regards official EPA policy to
have remained unchanged since 1985, the
agency regards the statute as ambiguous on
the issue of ash and is desirous of clari-
fication on the point.

Although the EPA's official position
has arguably remained unchanged since the
agency first interpreted the exclusion in
1985, the agency has certainly called the

validity of its own views into doubt,

calling for legislative clarification of
the issue. Indeed, in the 1987 hearings
before the Senate Subcommittee on Hazardous

Waste and Toxic Substances, the finality of

OO

A-49

that 1985 interpretation was called into
question. See supra note 15 ("in the near
term we [EPA] are planning to develop. .
. [oO)ur legal interpretation of the status
of MWC ash with respect to Subtitle C
(hazardous waste) and Subtitle D (solid
waste) portions of the RCRA"). In these
circumstances, an additional reason for
rejecting the agency interpretation urged

upon this Court by EDF!” is the "incon-

i8/ Of course, the EPA’s interpretation, even if
it were entitled to deference in these proceedings,
would not be binding on this Court. As an "inter-
pretative rule”, the agency’s views would at most
carry a heightened power of persuasion, but not the
force of law.
As a starting point, .. . the agency’s
characterization of a rule is “relevant,”
although not necessarily “dispositive.” °
- “An interpretative rule simply states what
the administrative agency thinks the [(under-
lying) statute means, and only ‘"reminds”
affected parties of existing duties.’ On the
other hand, if by its action the agency
intends to create new law, rights or duties,
the rule is properly considered to be a

legislative rule.”
- «

Stated slightly differently, "’interpretative
rules are statements as to what the adminis-
trative officer thinks the statute or regula-
tion means, ‘"“whereas legislative rules have

"effect(s} completely independent of the

statute.”

(continued...)

A-50

sistency of the positions the [EPA] has
taken through the years." Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonesca,
480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1986).
An agency interpretation of a rele-
vant provision which conflicts with
the agency's earlier interpretation
is "entitled to considerably less
deference" than a consistently held
agency view.
Id. (citations omitted).
D. Subsequent Congressional Views
EDF submits two letters of October 2,
1987, one signed by six Senators and the
other by a member of the House of Represen-
tatives, in support of its construction of
Section 3001(i). The first letter, signed
by Senators Stafford, Durenberger, Chafee,
Burdick, Baucus, and Mitchell ("Senators'

Letter"), addressed to Lee Thomas of the

EPA, said the following:

is/ Ss (.... continued)

Vv PA
ronmental Protection Agency, 821 F.2d 714, 718
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (citations omitted) (emphasis in
Original).

a-S3

We are writing to urge that the
Agency [EPA]) refrain from issuing any
policy statements or legal interpre-
tations of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act as it relates to the
management of ash generated by munic-
ipal solid waste incinerators pending
further consultation and coordination
with the Congress. We are concerned
that the Agency may be on the verge
of interpreting these requirements,
possibly in a manner inconsistent
with the law, at a time our Committee
is considering legislation specifi-
cally resolving this issue.

In our view, section 3001(i) of
the Solid Waste Disposal Act, often
known as RCRA, as amended in 1984
does not exempt owners or operators
of municipal solid waste incinerators
from their obligations: 1) to deter-
mine whether the ash residues gener-
ated by the incineration process are
hazardous wastes, and 2)~’to handle
ash exhibiting hazardous waste char-
acteristics as hazardous wastes in
accordance with the requirements of
Subtitle C of RCRA. Thus, we concur
in the Agency's statement in the
preamble to the July 15, 1985 codifi-
cation rule that in the 1984 amend-
ments Congress did not “exempt the
regulation (sic) of incinerator ash
from the burning of non-hazardous
waste in resource recovery facilities
if the ash routinely exhibits a char-
acteristic of hazardous waste."

Senators' Letter at l.

A-52

A similar theme is echoed in the
letter of Representative James J. Florio,
then Chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competi-
tiveness.

While such an exclusion obvious-
ly lacks any justification on envi-
ronmental grounds, it is equally
clear that there is no statutory
basis for such an exclusion. Al-
though those seeking an exclusion
have focused on the "household waste
clarification" contained in the 1984
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments,
this provision does not exempt owners
or operators of municipal solid waste
incinerators from their obligations:
1) to determine whether the ash resi-
dues generated by the incineration
process are hazardous wastes and
2) to handle ash exhibiting hazardous
waste characteristics as hazardous

: wastes in accordance with the re-
quirements of Subtitle C of RCRA.

Letter of Representative Florio to Lee
Thomas dated October 2, 1987 at 1 ("Florio
Letter").

EDF argues that the views expressed in
these letters are entitled to "significant
weight .. . particularly .. . when the

precise intent of the enacting Congress is

_

A-53

obscure." Plaintiff's Memorandum at 23.
In support of that proposition, plaintiff
cites Seatrai ipbuilding Corp. v. She

Qil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980). Howev-
er, that was a case dealing with a commit-
tee report which accompanied the legisla-
tion at issue. Such is not the case here.
The letters on which plaintiff relies were
written a full three years after the
passage of Section 3001(i). They are not
even the contemporaneous views of the
authors, much less of Congress as a whole.
See Consume roduct Safety Comm'n v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117 (1980)
("'the views of a subsequent Congress form
a hazardous basis for inferring the intent

of an earlier one'") (citation omitted).

Thus the Senators' and Florio letters,
while certainly not "waste", are "“hazard-

cus" to the present purpose of statutory

construction.

A-54

Moreover, the intent of the enacting
Congress is not obscure. The legislative
history makes clear that at the time of its
passage, Congress intended Section 3001(i)
to exempt ash from regulation under Subti-
tle C in order to pave the way for in-
creased use of the resource recovery
process. It may well be true that such an
exclusion “Lecks ‘any justification on
environmental seaeeal , Florio Letter atl,
but that is a judgment made with the
benefit of hindsight and one that can be
acted upon only by Congress, not by this
Court.

E. New York Exclusion

It is common ground that the DEC
interprets the state exclusion, codified at
6 NYCRR § 371.1(e)(2)(i), to extend to ash
residue. However, because "no State...
may impose any requirements less stringent
than those authorized by [Subtitle C]", 42

U.S.C. § 6929, plaintiff argues that New

A-55

York's interpretation of its own regula-
tions is invalid under the federal scheme.
Of course, that argument turns on the
proper construction of Section 3001(i), and
for the reasons discussed above I conclude
that to be the one set forth by the defen-
dants and not that argued for by EDF.
Although the DEC's interpretation of
its own exclusion, which contains language
virtually identical to that of the federal
statute, could be considered probative of
the meaning of Section 3001(i), I need not
look to such far removed evidence for a

proper construction of the federal statute.

II. Defendant's Compliance with Section
3001(1)

EDF further argues that even if
defendants' construction of Section 3001(i)
is correct, the Facility cannot advantage
itself of the exclusion. That is so,
plaintiff contends, because the Facility

does not comply with the requirements of

A-56

Section 3001(i) (1) (A) (ii) and 3001(i) (2).
Specifically, EDF maintains that WTI and
Resco have not established that they do not
accept hazardous commercial or industrial
waste for processing, and that the requi-
site contractual provisions are in place
for ensuring that no such waste is accept-
ed. Plaintiff contends that the lack of
such compliance, or defendants [sic]
failure to demonstrate such compliance on
the present record, precludes the grant of
summary judgment in defendants' favor.

A. Contractual Requirements

EDF argues that defendants do not have
in place the required mechanisms for
ensuring that no "solid waste from commer-
cial or industrial sources", RCRA Section
3001(i) (1) (A) (ii), is accepted for process-
ing by the Facility. Plaintiff concedes
that defendants have in place a series of

procedural safeguards for guarding against

the acceptance of hazardous waste, but it

A-57

questions the adequacy of those safeguards.
Additional factual background is required
at this juncture to understand the contrac-
tual provisions at issue.

In 1974, the Westchester County Board
of Legislators instituted a Solid Waste
Disposal Plan for the County. Pursuant to
that plan the County assisted municipali-
ties within the County in their efforts to
deal with disposal of municipal solid
waste. Resource recovery was emphasized in
those efforts. Affidavit of Ronald J.
Broglio dated March 19, 1988 at 45
("Broglio Affidavit").

The County subsequently entered into
Inter-Municipal Agreements ("IMA's") with
35 municipalities in the County. Those
municipalities generate approximately 90%
of the municipal solid waste in Westchester
county. Id. at ¢ 6. The IMA's provide

that each municipality deliver a minimum

amount of the solid waste collected by the

A-58

municipality to the County's solid waste

disposal system.

A fee is paid for the
disposal services. Id. The County's waste
disposal system is operated through the
District.

In 1981, Westchester County, the
Westchester County Industrial Development
Agency ("Agency"), and Wheelabrator-Frye

Inc. entered into a Solid Waste Disposal

Agreement ("Agreement"). That Agreement

i)
i// The County’s disposal system includes, but is
not limited to the Facility and Sprout Brook. Also
included in the County System are five waste
transfer stations, all of which are located within
the County itself. Broglio Affidavit at q 7.

A-59

governs the disposal of waste at the Facility.Y

The Agreement states that the Facility
is not designed to "store or process toxic,
pathological, biological or other hazardous
wastes which by law require special han-
dling in their collection, treatment or
disposal." Agreement at 2.03(b)(i). The
Agreement further provides that Resco
"operate the Project in compliance with all
applicable federal, state and local laws
and regulations .. . relating to envircn-
mental control .. . and other regulatory
requirements." Id. at 5.04. Section 5.04

of the Agreement makes clear that Resco can

i8/ Resco consented to be bound by the Agreement
pursuant to an Assignment and Assumption Agreement
dated September 30, 1982.

On October 1, 1982, the County withdrew as a
party to the Agreement. The Agency and the Dis-
trict then entered into a separate agreement, the
Solid Waste Disposal Service Agreement ("Service
Agreement"), which requires the District to deliver
the solid waste received from the municipalities
pursuant to the IMA’s to the Facility for disposal.
Under the Service Agreement, the District is
essentiallytssubject to the same requirements as is
the Agency under the Agreement. Furthermore, the
IMA’s were assigned by the County to the District.
Broglio Affidavit at q 3l.

A-60

refuse to take certain actions if in its
judgment such actions would amount to a
violation of any statute or governmental
rule, including the RCRA.’ That same
provision requires the County to use its
best efforts to ensure that the Facility is

not classified as a hazardous waste facili-

42/ The relevant portion of Section 5.04 reads as
follows:

Notwithstanding any other provisions of this
Agreement, Resco shall not be obligated
hereby to take any action which, in its
reasonable judgment, would result in the
violation of any statute or governmental
rule, regulation or requirement, including,
without limitation, the Resource Recovery
[sic] Conservation Act of 1976, or adversely
affect the operation of the Facility. The
Agency agrees to use its best efforts to take
all necessary or appropriate action to ensure
that the Facility does not become classified
as a hazardous or toxic materials storage or
processing facility and, without limiting the
generality of the foregoing, the Agency
agrees that it will not, and will use its
best efforts to cause the Municipalities not
to, contract for the disposal by the Facility
of any Special Handling Waste .. . or of any
other Solid Waste which Resco reasonably
determines and notifies the Agency is likely
to cause damage to or adversely affect the
operation of the Facility . . . provided that
neither the Agency nor any Municipally
Collected Solid Waste any Special Handling
Waste included therein during normal munici-
pal collections.

(emphasis in original).

A-61

ty, and that it will not contract for the
delivery of or itself deliver special
handling waste,*” which includes hazard-
ous waste, to the Facility. Analogous
restrictions are found in the Service
Agreement, the IMA's, and the contracts
with the outside operator of the County's

five transfer stations.

20/ Special Handling Waste is defined by the
Agreement as follows:

(a) radioactive, toxic, pathological, bio-
logical and other hazardous wastes which
according to federal, state or local rules or
regulations from time to time in effect
require special handling in their collection,
treatment or disposal; (b) explosives and
hazardous chemicals which are likely to cause
damage to or adversely affect the operation
of the Facility; (c) dirt, concrete and other
nonburnable construction material and demoli-
tion debris; (d) large items of machinery and
equipment, such as motor vehicles and major
components thereof (transmissions, rear ends,
springs, fenders), agricultural equipment,
trailers and marine vessels, and other
oversize items, including tree trunk sections
and branches in excess of six feet in length
and eight inches in diameter, which are
likely to interfere with the operation of the
Facility; and (e) other materials which are
likely to cause damage to or adversely affect
the operation of the Facility.

Agreement, Article I at ll.

A-62

Furthermore, the truck drivers of
those private carters who are authorized to
deliver to the Facility for the County's
account, are required to sign a certifica-
tion as to the type of waste being deliv-
ered. In essence, the certification states
that no hazardous waste or other prohibited
substance is contained in the load.

Although the terms of 8 Section
3001(i)(2) are clear in that only contrac-
tual requirements or notification or
inspection procedures are required to

—comply with the statute, the Facility also
has in place notification procedures.
Specifically, a sign is posted in plain
view of the trucks as they enter the
Facility, the substance of which is a
statement as to what types of waste the
Facility will and will not accept for
processing. Broglio Affidavit at gq 14.
The trucks arriving at the Facility are

subject to random inspection at any time.

A-63

Id. at Q@ 16. Trucks arriving at the
station must pass through a weigh station
at which point their loads are checked with
a radiation detective device. Id. at | 15.
Defendants represent that any load failing
the radiation test is not accepted for
processing. Id.
i. ia enerators

Plaintiff argues that defendants'
contractual safeguards are inadequate
because they do not account for hazardous
waste produced by individuals or entities
known in the regulatory’ scheme as "small
quantity generators. "2/ It is common
ground that the hazardous waste produced by
these small quantity generators is not
exempted from classification as hazardous.
See 40 C.F.R. § 261.4. However, it is

exempt from many of the regulations govern-

2i/ The regulations promulgated by the EPA provide
that “{a]) generator is a conditionally exempt small
quantity generator in a calendar month if he
generates no more than 100 kilograms of hazardous
waste in that month.” 40 C.F.R. § 261.5(a).

A-64

ing the management of hazardous wastes.
EDF argues that Section 3001(i) requires a
resource recovery facility to refrain from
accepting hazardous wastes, including that
produced by small quantity generators, and
to maintain contractual safeguards which
ensure that no such waste is accepted for
processing.

Specifically, EDF contends that the
provision regarding Special Handling Waste,
supra at n.20, does not ensure that hazard-
ous waste from small quantity generators
will not be accepted for processing. That
is so, plaintiff maintains, because hazard-
ous waste produced by small quantity
generators does not require special han-
dling and therefore would not come within
the category of waste prohibited by the
Agreement. Defendants maintain that a
proper reading of the regulations reveals
that the Facility is not required to turn

away hazardous waste produced by small

A-65

quantity generators, but that if it is so
required under law, the proper procedural
safeguards are in place.

I thus address whether, as a matter of
law, hazardous waste produced by small
quantity generators may be accepted by a
resource recovery facility without that
facility losing its exempt status under
Section 3001(i). The pertinent regulation
provides that the small quantity hazardous
waste generator may deliver its waste to an
off-site facility for disposal where such
facility is "[{p]ermitted, licensed, or
registered by a State to manage municipal
or industrial solid waste." 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.5(g)(3) (iv). It would make no sense
to allow small quantity generators to
dispose of their waste in a facility
licensed to deal with municipal or indus-
trial waste and then to deem that facility
a hazardous waste disposal site subject to

regulation as such. Such a construction

A-66

would vitiate the right of the small
quantity generator to contract for the
disposal of its waste with a non-hazardous
waste facility, which perforce would become
a hazardous waste facility upon acceptance
of the small generator's waste.

I therefore hold that the Facility may
accept hazardous waste from small quantity
generators without subjecting itself to
regulation as a hazardous waste disposal
facility.&

2. Requirement to Reject Haz-

ardous Waste

The second argument EDF makes in

support of its contention that the proce-

dural safeguards are inadequate is that

22/ This conclusion is consistent with the EPA’s
determination that "‘[a] sanitary landfill that
receives household wastes .. . and only those
hazardous wastes generated by small-quantity
generators will not be considered a hazardous waste
disposal facility and will not require a RCRA
permit.’” Defendants’ Reply Memorandum at 27-28
n.* (quoting U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Questions and Answers on Hazardous Waste Regula-
tions at New Facilities -- Sanitary Landfills
(1980), quoted in, J. Stensvaag, Hazardous Waste
Law & Practice § 6.32 at 6-103 & n.29 (1986)).

A-67

defendants are nowhere required to reject
hazardous waste it it is brought to the
Facility for disposal. EDF relies princi-
pally on that portion of Section 5.04 of
the Agreement, supra at n.19, that states
as follows: "neither the Agency nor any
Municipality shall be required to separate
out from Municipally Collected Solid Waste
any Special Handling Waste included therein
during normal municipal collections." Of
course, that provision deals with what the
municipalities must do in respect of
separating out hazardous from non-hazardous
waste.

However, the County and the Agency
clearly remain under contractual obligation
to use their best efforts to ensure that no
Special Handling Waste, including hazardous
waste, is delivered to the Facility.
Agreement Section 5.04 and 5.06. No
absolute guarantee is present in these

precautions, and as a practical matter

A-68

probably could not be given. In any event,
none is required by the statute. 1985
Preamble, 50 Fed. Reg. at 28,725 ("the
statutory language contains no exception
(from the Section 3001(i) exemption] for
facilities that, in spite of their best
efforts, receive hazardous waste").
Consistent with the statute, the 1985
preamble requires only that "good faith
precautionary" measures against the accep-
tance of hazardous waste be in place.
Nowhere is an absolute guarantee required.
Moreover, while the County and the
Agency have made no absolute guarantees not
to deliver hazardous waste for disposal,
the operating permit obtained from the DEC
expressly prohibits the processing of such
waste. That permit provides as follows:
Facility shall accept for incinera-
tion only municipally and commercial-
ly collected residential and commer-
cial refuse. The following waste
shall not be accepted at this facili-

ty: septage; sewage sludge less than
20% solids by weight; industrial

A-69

waste (unless approved by this De-

partment); liquid wastes, industrial

sludges, explosive or other type of

hazardous waste as listed in 6 NYCRR

Part 366.
Permit at ¢ 1,2

In sum, the contractual provisions in
place are adequate under the statute.
Consequently, plaintiff's objection to the
procedural safeguards maintained by the
defendants fails.

B. Actual Receipt of Hazardous Waste

EDF next argues that judgment cannot
enter in favor of defendants on account of
their failure to establish that hazardous

waste is not actually accepted by the

Facility. Plaintiff further maintains that

23/ EDF argues that little comfort can be taken in
the terms of the operating permit because Part 366
has been repealed. However, the DEC adopted
successor Part 371 concurrent with the repeal of
Part 366. Resco thus remains responsible for
operating the Facility in compliance with Part 371
and "all applicable laws, rules or regulations,
including rules and regulations of the department
promulgated pursuant to subdivision one of section
27-0703 and taking effect after the date applica-
tion [for the operating permit] was made to the
department.” N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 27-
0707(5).

A-70

even if defendants have made out a paper
case on point, judgment should not enter in
advance of EDF's taking discovery pursuant
to Rule 56(f).

In order to qualify for the resource
recovery exemption, a facility must not
only have in place the appropriate proce-
dural safeguards, Section 3001(i)(2), but
must also not accept hazardous waste from
commercial or industrial sources’ for
processing. Section 3001(i)(1)(A)(ii). In
other words, the Facility must show that
the procedural safeguards it has in place
work in keeping out hazardous waste.

The statute does not require a showing
that absolutely no hazardous waste from the
municipal waste stream is ever accepted for
processing. Rather, the Senate Report says
the following:

[SJjuch facilities cannot accept haz-

ardous waste identified or listed

under section 3001 from commercial or

industrial sources, and must estab-
lish contractual requirements or

A-71

other notification or inspection
procedures to assure that such wastes
are not received or burned. This
provision requires precautionary
measures or procedures which can be
shown to be effective safeguards
against the unintended acceptance of
hazardous waste. If such measures
are in place, a resource recovery
facility whose activities would nor-
mally be covered by the household
waste exclusion should not be penal-
ized for the occasional, inadvertent
-

ee A ges
industrial sources. Facilities must
monitor the waste they receive and,
if necessary, r

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_2768%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
