# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Butler v. Buick Motor Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1991
- **Citation:** 502 U.S. 911

## Text

EDITOR'S NOTE

THE FOLLOWING PAGES WERE POOR HARD COPY
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S Sourt, U.S
91-400. [Sm mts

SEP 6 1991
si ' pean OF BE aut |

IN THE SUPREME COURT ™
OF THE UNITED STATES

( term, 19 )

GEORGE B. BUTLER and wife,
LEAH BEA BUTLER
Plaintiffs,

vs.

BUICK MOTOR COMPANY, A DIVISION
OF GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, and
STATE OF TENNESSEE,
Defendant

(Petition for review of a Final Decision of the State
Courts of Tennessee)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

ROBERT L. HUSKEY
(COUNSEL OF RECORD)
P.O. BOX 777
514 HILLSBORO BOULEVARD
MANCHESTER, TN 37355
(615) 728-1800

(a) QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

(1) Does a purchaser for value of a motor vehicle from
a recognized and licensed salvage dealer, who applies for
and obtains a certificate of title from the state have a
constitutionally protected property interest in that vehicle?

(2) Would the good faith purchaser for value of an
automobile from a recognized salvage dealer, who applied
for and obtained a certificate of title from the state of
Tennessee, which certificate of title was only issued by the
state after checking with the manufacturer to determine
that the vehicle was not stolen, have superior claim to the
vehicle over the manufacturer, General Motors Corporation,
if it developed that the vehicle had actually left General
Motors possession and control and their title surrendered
as a result of the dishonesty of its principal supervisory
official at the Milford Proving Ground to whom the vehicle
was specificaily entrusted for the purpose of scrapping?

(b) PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS: The only
parties to this proceeding are those reflected in the heading,
being George B. Butler and wife, Leah Bea Butler and Buick
Motor Company, division of General Motors Corporation.

(c) TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED BY

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REFERENCE TO THE OFFICIAL

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.................2.0.

APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE

CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES ................

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(1)

(2)

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution

Section 1, Fourteenth Amendment, United States
Constitution

42 U.S.C.S., Section 1983

42 U.S.C.S., Section 1985 (3)

Article 1, Section 17, Constitution of Tennessee
Article 1, Section 21, Constitution of Tennessee

Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 55-5-108, et seq.

iv.

(qd) REFERENCE TO THE OFFICIAL AND
UNOFFICIAL REPORTS:

The case references of official opinions in this case will be
Butler et ux., v. Buick, Coffee County Chancery Action No:
86-164 and Court of Appeals Docket No: 01-A-01-9003-CH-
00101; and George B. Butler, et ux, Leah Bea Butler vs.
Buick Motor Company, a division of General Motors Cor-
poration, Coffee Circuit No: 21,881 and U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Tennessee, Winchester Division,
CIV No: 4-87-088.

(e) STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

(1) The order, which is actually sought to be over-
turned is that of the Court of Appeals for the Western
Section of Tennessee, sitting for the Middle Section, entered
February 6, 1991.

(2) A timely petition to rehear was filed, which
petition was denied on February 27, 1991. Thereafter, a
timely application to appeal to the State Supreme Court
was filed, which application was denied by Order entered
June 10, 1991, which is the triggering date for the petition
for certiorari to this Honorable Court.

(3) Authority for the Writ of Certiorari in this case is
found in 28 U.S. Code Section 1257.

(4) The substance of the underlying cases involved in
this litigation is the taking of a motor vehicle, which the
Plaintiff, George and Lea Butler had purchased from Gaylen
Fann, a recognized and licensed dealer of automobiles, both
new and used and scraped, by the Defendant company,
through the aid of the state of Tennessee law enforcement
agency, without the providing of any due process hearing or
any other proceeding to protect their constitutional right of
property in the automobile. Two litigations came from this

1

circumstance, one filedin Chancery Court to recover posses-
sion of the automobile itself and a second action filed in
Circuit Court, both courts of Coffee County, Tennessee to
obtain damages for the wrongful taking of the property
through the aid of the state law enforcement authorities
without due process. The Circuit Court action was removed
to Federal District Court. An Agreed Order was entered in
the respective cases authorizing the taking and utilization
of discovery to apply in both cases. In other words, the
respective cases involve both parties and by agreed order,
all discovery taken in the respective cases would be subject
to utilization in both cases. Thereupon all discovery was
taken under the duplicate heading. A Motion for Summary
Judgement was made in Federal District Court contending
that the automobile constituted stolen property and as such
there could be no property interest in the vehicle. The case
proceeded to trial in Coffee County Chancery Court for
determination of who the proper owner of the vehicle was or
who had better title, the Plaintiff or the Defendant. The
Chancellor, after the trial on the merits in Coffee County
Chancery Court ruled that the vehicle was not stolen prop-
erty in the normal sense of the word and since a supervisory
official of General Motors, by his action, being entrusted
with vehicle had caused it to be placed in the stream of
commerce and ultimately sold to the Plaintiffs as good faith
purchasers for value. The Chancellor ruled that the Plain-
tiffs had superior title to the vehicle and ordered the return
of the vehicle from General Motors to George and Bea
Butler. The car had been taken in June of 1986, and it was
approximately a little over three (3) years later that the
Chancery Court ordered the return of the vehicle. It had
been sitting in storage in the possession of Buick ever since
its taking by the state of Tennessee. The District Judge,
after the ruling by the Chancellor, held that the determina-
tion was binding as to whether or not the vehicle was stolen
and concluded that issue in the Federal proceeding as well.
The Defendant appealed the case to the Court of Appeals of
the state of Tennessee, Middle Section and the Federal

2

District Judge in relation to the Federal case, entered an
Order continuing the case until the completion of the appel-
late process in the state action. The federal action is the
proceeding in which the Plaintiffs seek to recover for the
violation of their constitutional rights in relation to their
property, but by the order of the Federal District Judge, his
ruling will be contingent upon the outcome of the state case
for possession. The Court of Appeals for the Western Section
of Tennessee; apparently without the entrance of an order
as required by the rules, heard the case for the Middle
Section and entered an Order overturning the Chancellor.
The Plaintiffs filed a petition to Rehear, which was denied
and thereafter applied to the State Supreme Court for
review, which application was denied. Asa result, under the
current status of the rulings, this holding by the Court of
Appeals overturning the Chancellor will not only serve to
terminate the Plaintiffs claim for recovery of the vehicle, but
also his suit for damages for the violation of his Constitu-
tional Rights. Therefore, relief of this Court is necessary to
determine the application of constitutional rights and the
Plaintiffs property interest in the automobile as a bona fide
purchase for value of a vehicle properly titled in the state of
Tennessee.

(f) APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES

(1) "Criminal actions - Provisions concerning -
Due process of law and just compensation
clauses. - No person shall be held to answer for
a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment by the grand
jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service
in time of war or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
3

against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law: nor

shout j ae

Fifth Amendment
United States Constitution

(2) "Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal
protection. - All persons born or naturalized in
the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the stete wherein they reside. No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens

ofthe United States; norshall any state deprive

Section 1, Fourteenth Amendment
United States Constitution

(3) "Civil action for deprivation of rights - Every
person who, under color of any statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or »xther person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress. ..."

4

' 42 U.S.C.S., Section 1983

(4) "(3) Depriving persons of rights or privi-
leges. If two or more persons in any State or
Territory conspire, or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the
purpose ofdepriving, either directly orindirectly,
any person or class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of
preventing or hindering the constituted au-
thorities ofany State or Territory from giving or
securing to all persons within such State or
Territory the equal protection of the laws;... in
any case of conspiracy set forth in this section,
if one or more persons engaged therein do, or
cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the
object of such conspiracy, whereby another is
injured in his person or property, or deprived of
having and exercising any right or privilege of
a citizen of the United States, the party so
injured or deprived may have an action for the
recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury
or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators.”

42 U.S.C.S., Section 1985 (3)

(5) "Sec. 17. Open courts - Redress of injuries
Suits against the State. - That all courts shall be
open; and every man, for an injury done him in
his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law, and right and
justice administered without sale, denial, or
delay. Suits may be brought against the State
in such manner and in such courts as the

5

Legislature may by law direct."

Article 1, Section 17
Constitution of Tennessee

(6)"Sec. 21. Noman's services or property taken
without consent or compensation. - That no
man's particular services shall be demanded, or
property taken, or applied to public use, with-
out theconsent of his representatives, or without
just compensation being made therefor."

Article 1, Section 21
Constitution of Tennessee

(7) "55-5-108. Records to be kept - Inspections -
Contraband - Seizure of stolen property -
Reclamation - Forfeiture.

Tennessee Code Annotated
Section 55-5-108, et seq.

(g) CONCISE STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

General Motors is a huge corporate entity with
divisions making several different types of motor vehicles
one being Buick. General Motors or Buick has testing
facilities at Milford Proving Grounds in Michigan (Tr. 412-
413) (Tr. 441-443). The General Supervisor of those Buick
proving grounds at the time in question was a Jack
Clingingsmith, who had supervision over approximately
300 people, which included other supervisors under his
control and also drivers and those connected with the
testing and ultimate removal or elimination of vehicles (Tr.
425-426) (Tr. 419-421). According to Buick officials and

6

engineers, certain vehicles made by Buick were utilized for
testing purposes or also for yard cars in and around the
facilities. Other vehicles by them are utilized by Buick
officials to ride and try out when a new type vehicle is being
tested. According to Buick officials, the vehicle in question
was one that Buick officials were trying out and thus was
utilized by Buick officials for a period of time. After comple-
tion of such at Flint, Michigan, the fleet coordinator of
Buick, Mr. Barcome, sent the vehicle to the Milford Proving
Grounds to the attention of Jack Clingingsmith, Buick
general supervisor at Milford for the purpose of scrapping or
ultimately destruction of the vehicle (Tr. 419-421) (Tr. 425).

The practice of General Motors or Buick when they
scrap a vehicle as was the practice in this case, is that they
would do so only when they had completed all the utility
that they sought to obtain from the vehicle and would at that
time remove the VIN plate from the car, surrender the title
of the vehicle back to the Michigan Secretary of State and
then arrange for a private company to crush the vehicle and
remove the crushed scrapped parts or metal of the vehicle
from their facilities. Where and what the scrap man did
with the metal was not known or of no concern to Buick, but
the vehicle would be totally removed from Buick's posses-
sion and control and Buick would have nothing, no posses-
sion further of the vehicle or any of its parts. It appears in
this case, that the particular car as indicated above was sent
by the fleet coordinator, Mr. Barcome, who was located at
Flint, Michigan, to Milford Proving Grounds and in particular
to general supervisor, Jack Clingingsmith for such destruc-
tion. Mr. Clingingsmith had general supervision over the
operations at the proving grounds including the destruction
of the vehicles and the documentation for that destruction.
It was Buick's intention at this stage having completed their
utilization of the vehicle to have no longer possession of the
vehicle or any of its parts. The title to the vehizle was
surrendered to the state of Michigan. The VIN plate was
removed under the control and supervision of Jack
Clingingsmith, but apparently in this case, Mr.

7

Clingingsmith did dispose of the vehicle, but he this time
disposed of it. without first crushing the vehicle (Tr. 419-
421) (Tr. 425). Had he carried out what Buick officials
testified was their intent, the vehicle would have totally
parted from Buick's control, but would have been in a
crushed state, but in any event in whatever form it was in,
Buick would not have it anymore. It appears that the vehicle
was actually transferred from Buick under the direction of
Jack Clingingsmith in a whole state rather than a crushed
state. As Buick intended, it parted with possession of the
vehicle just in a different form. Investigation disclosed that
Mr. Clingingsmith transferred the vehicle to Mr. Holloway,
who was a salvage dealer in the Michigan area. Investiga-
tion disclosed that these three individuals, Clingingsmith,
Nicolay and Holloway worked together in that regard (Tr.
44'7-449).,

Test vehicles are often available for sale and are
acquired by dealers such as Mr. Fann, and test vehicles of
most type motor vehicles have been available in the Michigan
area for years (Tr. 109).

Gaylen Fann is a reputable automobile and salvage
dealer in the Coffee County area and has been in business
for many years buying and selling large quantities of late
model vehicles with anywhere from minor defects to need-
ing complete reconstruction. They buy cars from insurance
companies, where they have been wrecked or buy test
vehicles where they are available or buy fleets of vehicles
where there would be flood or disaster in the area with a
range of damage to the vehicles. Gene Taylor worked with
Fann over a period of sixteen (16) to eighteen (18) years.
Fann's operation is located in Coffee County, Tennessee,
and Gene Taylor while working with him would generally
work a particular state or states buying cars where there
were quantities available, such as Michigan or Louisiana
and then after buying the cars would ship them to Fann's
operation in Coffee County, from which they would be sold.
In the course of his transactions, it would be normal also to
buy cars from other salvage dealers. To indicate the size and

8

type of operation according to Mr. Taylor's testimony, he
had bought and sold through Fann's operation as many as
1,500 cars a year. On many of the transactions, Mr. Taylor
worked really as an employee of Gaylen Fann, but on a
number of the purchases throughout the years, they worked
as partners with the two working together and sharing
profits or losses associated with the transaction (Tr. 104-4).
During this period of time, Gene Taylor was working pn-
marily in Michigan and learned of the availability of some
approximately 20 late model test vehicles, that were prima-
rily Buicks. He learned of these from a friend or acquain-
tance that he knew in the car business by the name of Jack
Kruppa. Taylor checked with Fann to see if he would be
interested in acquiring the vehicles, and he was, and they
agreed to proceed on this venture together, sharing in the
profits or losses (Tr. 107-110). The transaction as herein
described was one that was just arelatively minor transaction
in the normal course of the salvage business that Fann
operated. Kruppa did not actually have the vehicles them-
selves, but could get them from Holloway. Holloway was a
recognized dealer. Kruppa confirmed the validity of the
vehicles to Taylor, and Taylor bought them on behalf of
himself and Fann's business. Kruppa then in turn would
actually make a profit on the transaction in that he would
obtain the vehicles from Holloway and transport them to
the state of Tennessee to Fann’s business operation in
Coffee County (Tr. 107-110). As indicated, there are ap-
proximately 20 vehicles total, one of which was the vehicle
ultimately purchased by the Butlers, which is subject of this
litigation, and it appeared from the proof and the investi-
gation that each of the vehicles passed through this same
process conducted by General Motors by which then the
vehicles were ultimately placed in the market by Jack
Clingingsmith, Buick's general supervisor at Milford Prov-
ing Grounds (Tr. 447-449). Acquisition of these vehicles and
the handling of these vehicles was carried on by Fann and
Taylor in the normal fashion for their type of business and
in accordance with the laws under which they operate. Once

9

a particular vehicle was brought to the state of Tennessee,
Fann made application to the state for the appropriate
documents of title utilized in his business for such vehicles.
These documents of title are technically labeled permits to
dismantle, but not only authorize him as a salvage dealer to
dismantle, the vehicle, or reconstruct them with other
vehicles, but also authorize him to transfer ownership of the
vehicles to a purchaser such as Mr. Butler (Tr. 151-9, 306-
7). Most vehicles obtained in this fashion will have a VIN
plate on them, however it is not unusuai for vehicles to be
obtained in some appropriate fashion such as this with the
VIN plate removed (Tr. 151-159). When this is the case,
there are provisions under the law of the state of Tennessee
for a new VIN plate to be issued. All proper course and
applications appropriate to be done in such a situation were
done by Fann to secure proper documents of title to the
vehicles (Tr. 306-307).

The vehicles were not all acquired at the same time
or not all sold at the same time, but once Fann started
submitting the normal applications to the Department of
Safety, the department and in particular Pat Ethridge
started investigating the vehicles to determine whether or
not to issue title. She acknowledged in her testimony that
before the department can issue title toa vehicle, they must
check to determine ifit is stolen, and they can only issue the
title after they have completed their investigation and
determined that it is not a stolen vehicl. (T.C.A. Section 55-
3-201, 55-3-207). In this case the Department of Safety went
above and beyond the normal to make sure that the vehicles
were not stolen. The state of Tennessee like the state of
Michigan has a process by which when a vehicle is scrapped,
the original title or old title to the vehicle is turned in if it is
scrapped and that title can never again be utilized (Tr. 307).
A new owner who receives or reconstructs the car may then
obtain a reconstructed title, which would be the new man-
ner and means of ownership of that vehicle, and the old title
has no more force and effect (T.C.A. 55-3-110, 55-3-112).
Not only did the state of Tennessee in this case check NCIC

10

to confirm that the vehicles were not listed as stolen, but
since these were General Motors’ product automobiles, and
in particular Buick's, Ms. Ethridge contacted Buick to make
sure that it had no claim to the vehicles. It was not until
after waiting an extended period of time, and Buick having
made no claim to the vehicles that the Department of Safety
then under the statute had determined that the vehicles
were not stolen and proceeded to issue titles on the various
vehicles which included a permit to dismantle to Fann on
each of the vehicles and subsequently respective titles to the
respective purchasers, such as Mr. and Mrs. Butler(Tr. 289-
294) (Tr. 300-303).

Plaintiffs, George and Bea Butler are residents of
Manchester, Coffee County, Tennessee, and have lived here
for a number of years. Mr. Butler is a lead designer with
Calspan Corporation working at Arnold Engineering De-
velopment Center at Arnold Air Force Base, Tennessee. Bea
Butler is an official at the People's Bank and Trust Com-
pany in Manchester. Mr. Butler was well familiar with
Fann's type of operation and knew his sound reputation for
honest and fair dealing in his line of business. Mr. Butler in
addition to his regular occupation is handy with mechanical
aspects of a vehicle and capable of doing reconstruction
work on vehicles. Prior to this transaction, he had pur-
chased nine (9) other vehicles from Fann, one of which was
a flood vehicle which he and his wife totally disassembled,
cleaned and reassembled (Tr. 23-31). When he learned that
Fann had acquired or was acquiring some test vehicles, he
went to his lot in Manchester and saw a 1985 Park Avenue
Buick, which on the surface was grubby and filthy and
jacked up in the back, but Mr. Butler saw its potential as a
diamond in the rough (Tr. 32). After purchasing the vehicle,
Mr. Butler and his wife completely went over the vehicle,
cleaning and repairing electrical contacts and relubricating
where it needed it, cleaning the upholstery and brought the
vehicle to the point where it was showroom perfect (Tr. 37-
40). They got it cleaned up so nicely that they put towels on
the seats so that they wouldn't get the seats dirty and kept

11

using those towels on the seats until the car was taken from
them. Mr. and Mrs. Butler paid $9,500.00 for the vehicle on
an "as is" condition, then spent a multitude of hours in time
making itinto the show vehicle they knew it could be(Tr. 37-
39).

Mr. Butler, then in the process of redoing the car and
caring foritin the fashion that he did, made several contacts
with Buick or Buick representatives to gain further infor-
mation about his car. He exchanged written correspondence
with Buick and made phone communications with a local
dealer and directly with the Buick Corporation Service
Center about finding the automatic key code in the trunk
and in the process providing them with the information
about his car. Still no claim by Buick (Tr. 45-49).

Ultimately and some time after the initial contacts
with the state of Tennessee which occurred first in about
March or April of 1985, Buick did an internal investigation
and came to the conclusion that Mr. Butler's car and, in fact,
some of these other cars that had been purchased and sold
by Fann were vehicies that had once been owned by Buick
and were supposedly scrapped, and the documentation |
showed that they were scrapped. Ultimately Buick officials
determined that although their agent and employee, who
was in fact their supervisor at the proving ground and head
of the operation and personnel who would see tothe scrapping
and disposal of the vehicles, had arranged for the disposal
of the vehicles but not in the form that Buick had intended.
It would appear that at first they were only concerned with
whether or not they would be liable in case any untested and
unapproved parts of the vehicle would be on the roadway
(Tr. 400-407). Contact was made with Gene Taylor, since he
was the one that acquired the vehicles, and they told him
that they might need to get some of the vehicles back, and
they wanted his help to reacquire the vehicles from the
purchasers. Mr. Taylor cooperated with them as to locate all
the vehicles. He was assured that if they needed toreacquire
the vehicles, they would go through him to do so (Tr. 110-
116). The security representative, Mr. Marler, made contact

12

in Tennessee with the District Attorney, serving this area,
about the vehicles and was allegedly concerned at the first
juncture about any liability that Buick might have if some
unsafe vehicles or part had gotten on the roadway. Buick
officials disclosed to Buck Ramsey, the district attorney,
that the man, Mr. Clingingsmith, who had apparently put
the vehicles into the stream of commerce had the authority
to dispose of the vehicles, but he just was not supposed to
have disposed of them in the manner that he did. Later,
apparently Buick officials changed their mind and wanted
to treat the vehicles as stolen vehicles and again approached
the District Attorney about the vehicles. The DA told Buick
officials that under che circumstances, he would not consider
the cars stolen vehicles and would not treat them as such
(Tr. 195-196). Don Duncan was the head of the Commercial
Enforcement Division also known as Motor Vehicle En-
forcement and State Auto Theft Units for the Department
of Safety holding the title of Colonel and was two levels
above Pat Ethridge. He in essence was the head of that
department. He confirmed that with the type of operations
that were included under his department was supervision
over salvage yards such as Gaylen Fann's operation, and
that in the course of such operations, one would acquire the
vehicles without VIN plates. He confirmed that Fann had
gone through all the proper channels to obtain documents of
title. T.C.A. 55-3-203. He likewise testified that under the
facts as they were presented to him, that the vehicles in
question would not constitute stolen vehicles (Tr. 151-159).
Billy Thomas was at that time head of the Regional Field
Office of the FBI serving a multi-county area including
Coffee County. At the request of the FBI in Michigan, he
opened an investigative file on the matter, and he in his
official capacity with the FBI did not consider the vehicles
as stolen vehicles (Tr. 208-232). When the officials at Buick

* wanted to treat the cars as stolen vehicles and just have

them picked up as opposed to having to purchase them from
the owners, and they were unsuccessful in getting the help
of the attorney general to treat them as stolen cars (Tr. 193-

13

196), they and law enforcement contacts in Michigan made
contact with lower level officials in the Tennessee Depart-
ment of Safety levels below Col. Duncan and requested the
state's aid in picking up the cars as stolen vehicles. These
officials then at the request of Buick sent J.C. Northcutt, an
official with the Department of Safety Auto Theft Division
to Coffee County with Buick officials, and Mr. Northcutt
proceeded to take possession of the various vehicles. In
regard to this particular vehicle, Mr. Northcutt came to Mr.
Butlers’ place.of employment at AEDC and told him that he
was driving a stolen car and that he had "come after” it. He
followed Mr. Butler to his residence to get the personal
property out of the vehicle including the towels that they
used to cover the seats. The car was now in show place
quality unlike it was when Mr. Butler purchased it. Agent
Northcutt testified that his basis of picking up the Butler
vehicle was it being listed as stolen in NCIC; but both he and
Pat Ethridge had both "lost" their copies of the NCIC report
and "couldn't find” them in their files, but they knew that it
was in the NCIC as stolen and that is why they picked it up
(Tr. 326-342). (It was later disclosed on cross examination of
a law enforcement witness from Michigan who did have a
copy of the NCIC report that in fact the NCIC report of Mr.
Butler's vehicle as being stolen was not made or in essence
the vehicle was not reported to the NCIC as stolen until
after Mr. Northcutt had taken the vehicle from Mr. Butler.)
In essence, what the proof disclosed was that Mr. Northcutt
along with others went to pick up the vehicle, checked in it
and got the identification data from the VIN number in-
stalled by the state in the car and then called Buick in
Michigan to give them that number so they could in turn
report it as stolen tojustify Northcutt picking it up (Tr. 389-
390, ex. 28). State officials acknowledge that Buick did not
have proper documentation on the Butler vehicle when they
came to the state of Tennessee (Tr. 326-342). In any event,
on June 12, 1986, agent Northcutt, acting on the power of
the state, confiscated and took Mr. Butler's car from him,
which he had purchased some ten (10) months prior. Im-

14

mediately Mr. Butler contacted counsel and the following
day appeared in Chancery Court to get a restraining order
to restrain the state from disposing of the vehicle or turning
it over to Buick before there could be a hearing to determine
the one with the right to possession; however, the very next
day, the 14th and supposedly before the Restraining Order
was served on the state, officials turned it, along with the
other vehicles, over to Buick officials, who in turn hustled
them out of the state and back to Michigan. Reportedly this
vehicle, which Mr. Butler and his wife paid on for approxi-
mately three (3) years, has been sitting in a Buick lot
somewhere in the state of Michigan waiting for the deter-
mination of its lawful owner. Mr. and Mrs. Butler have not
had the car since June 12, 1986, but they paid on it for ap-
proximately three (3) years to pay off the debt that they
made in purchasing it.

When Mr. Butler learned that the car had been
taken by Buick back to Michigan, he amended his complaint
and included Buick as party Defendant and has been liti-
gating for the past years, trying to get back the car for which
he has worked and paid. In addition the Butlers filed suit for
damages in Circuit Court against Buick whoin turn removed
the damage case to Federal Court.

(h) RAISING OF CONSITUTIONALAND FEDERAL
ISSUES 5

Constitutional issues were raised in the first inci-
dence in the litigation. The lawsuit was-first filed, merely to
restrain the state, then amended to get possession of the
vehicle. The unconstitutionality of the taking of the vehicle
was always a question, and was specifically set out in detail
in the Complaint for damages upon which the Plaintiff
relied upon certain statutes and in particular on the U.S.
Constitution and the State Constitution. These are set out
in detail under paragraph (f). Also the trial court by Order
entered December 4, 1986, in ruling upon a motion for
Summary Judgement filed by Buick, denied that Motion for

15

- Summary Judgement and in doing so found as a matter of
fact that the state of Tennessee, after titling this subject
vehicle to the Butlers, took that vehicle from the Butlers and
immediately after taking the vehicle turned the vehicle over
to Buick, who in turn removed the car from the state of
Tennessee; and that the Plaintiffs thereby, had no oppor-
tunity for a hearing or a proceeding with the state or
otherwise to prevent the removal of their car from the state.
As a result Plaintiffs had no alternative but to seek relief of
the Court for this taking.

Gj) NOT APPLICABLE

(j) CONCISE ARGUMENT JUSTIFYING
ISSUANCE OF WRIT

The Defendant in this case, a huge influential cor-
porate entity, used its power and influence with lower
officials of the state and secured the aid of the state in using
state action to obtain possession of that vehicle from Mr.
Butler without any due process hearing. Mr. Butler filed
two actions to remedy the wrongs done to him. At first a
Chancery Action for the recovery of the vehicle was filed,
and second a related Circuit Action for the damage to his
constitutional rights in the wrongful taking. The damage
action was removed from State Court to Federal Court so
two actions proceed, one through State channels and one
through Federal channels. Defendant has moved for Sum-
mary Judgement in the Federal action, contending that the
Plaintiffs could have no property interest in the vehicle,
which they purchased and for which they had title issued by
the state of Tennessee, because the vehicle was in fact
stolen, and thus they had no constitutiona! protection. The
Plaintiffs contend that he should have constitutional pro-
tection, because of the title to the vehicle which was issued
by the state to him, a good faith purchaser of value, and that
the title was issued only after checking with Buick and
receiving no claim. The state trial court held that this

16

vehicle was not stolen in the normal sense of the word, and
that the Plaintiff should have his vehicle returned to him.
The Federal District Judge has ruled that this determina-
tion will be binding on parties in the Federal action. The
Defendant appealed the Trial Judge's ruling and the Fed-
eral Judge stayed the damage action in Federal Court
pending the ultimate conclusion of the state action, deter-
mining whether or not the vehicle was stolen and the
entitlement to the vehicle. The Court of Appeals for the
Western Section of Tennessee heard the case, which was
appealed to the Middle Section Court and issued an opinion
overturning the Chancellor; Application to Appeal to the
State Supreme Court was denied. If this Court of Appeals
decision on the issue of whether or not the vehicle was stolen
is allowed to stand, it will be used as a bar by the Defendant
to prevent the Plaintiffs from obtaining recovery for the
damages sustained to their constitutional rights as sought
in the damage suit. As indicated, the two suits are tied
together and, even by Agreed Order, the discovery in one
was to be utilized in the other. A hearing of this matter by
this Honorable Court is essential to prevent further viola-
tion of the Plaintiffs constitutional rights in property as set
out by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

(k) APPENDIX OF ORDERS AND PLEADINGS

The following Orders and or documents are included
herein as an appendix to this petition for Certiorari.

Page

(1) Order of Chancellor Stewart, dated

December 2, 1986 20
(2) Complaint for Damages 23
(3) Agreed Order entered

January 3, 1989 34
(4) Final Order in Chancery Court

entered August 11, 1989 36
(5) Federal District Court Order

entered September 8, 1989 44

17

(6) Order of Western Section Court
of Appeals, entered
February 6, 1991

(7) Order by Court of Appeals on
Petition to rehear, entered
February 27, 1991

(8) Tennessee Supreme Court Order
entered June 10, 1991.

18

45

55

56

RESPECTFULLY SUBMIITED,

(eh? TRE

ROBERT L. aoatty
(Counsel of Record)
P.O. Box 777

514 Hillsboro Blvd.
Manchester, TN 37355

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the “em of Ble TaN 1991,
I have served three copies of the foregoing pleading upon
opposing counsel, the Honorable Albert F. Moore, Neal &
Harwell, 2000 One Nashville Place, 150 Fourth Avenue
North, Nashville, Tennessee 37219, first class mail, postage
prepaid.

63-22 Ze

ROBERT L. es

19

IN THE CHANCERY COURT OF COFFEE COUNTY,

TENNESSEE
DEC. 4, 1986
GEORGE B. BUTLER and wife, LEAH
BEA BUTLER,
Plaintiffs,
vs. CIVIL ACTION NO: 86-164

STATE OF TENNESSEE and BUICK
MOTOR COMPANY, A DIVISION OF
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,

Defendants.

IN RE:1985 Buick
VIN NO: 1G4AX69E6E1400109

ORDER

THIS MATTER CAME ON to be heard on the 30th
day of October, 1986, upon the Motion of the Defendant,
Buick Motor Company, a Division of General Motors Cor-
poration, to dismiss or in the alternative for summary
judgement, by which the said defendant contended that the
herein Court does not have jurisdiction or venue to try the
matter, contending that it must proceed administratively
under the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated, § 55-5-
108.

Upon the hearing of this matter, including the pre-
sentation by the representative of the State Attorney
General, and in consideration of the sworn answers to the
interrogatories filed by the State, and from consideration of
the entire file of this cause, from all of which the Court finds
that the said Motions of the Defendant, Buick Motor
Company, are not well taken and should be denied. In
particular, the Court finds that the State after taking the

20

car titled to Mr. Butler immediately turned that vehicle
over to Buick, who in turn removed the car from the State
of Tennessee; that the Plaixtiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Butler, had
no opportunity for any hearing or proceeding with the State
or otherwise to prevent the removal of the car from the
State, and no alternative but to seek reliefin this Court; and
finally the Court finds that it is the contention of the State
whether rightfully or wrongfully that the vehicle in fact was
not taken pursuant to the Code Section relied upon by
Buick, but rather was merely taken on the basis of it being
claimed to be astolen vehicle and returned to the party that
claimed to own it, Buick.

Based on all the foregoing, the said Motions of the
Defendant, Buick Motor Company, a Division of General
Motors Corporation, be and same hereby are denied. Based
upon the nature of the issue raised by the Defendant, the
Court will grant said Defendant an interlocutory appeal
should said Defendant choose to pursue same.

To which action of the Court, in overrulingits motion
to dismiss the Defendant, Buick Motor Company excepts
and reserves its exception to the final hearing on the merits
in this cause.

ENTER: this the 2nd day of December, 1986.

S-L.F. Stewart 3
L.F. Stewart, Chancellor
APPROVED FOR ENTRY

ROBERT L. HUSKEY

L, tee elrBectgater 6. cda enees toteerss SU

S-Robert L. Huskey mens OE

Attorney for Plaintiffs mc es “flo fs
Clerk & :

H.J. GARRETT

S-H.J. Garrett

Attorney for Buick Motor Company
21

JANE W. YOUNG

S-Jar.e W. Young
Attorney for State of Tennessee

CLATWICAIET OF St mwK

Tre uendersiqaed Rerrey certifies what © tiwe and see.
COPY Of IMIS ple-rding Ras Dees Ber west Ug Corre ert fee ol parties at
tmpereet fe tere Crete Oy Oe te uret a 4 tee a Hee omy FF woe
Oe Cet fer Pee Ofer es OF aE FO ete hy pie toy “i eeere
cory oft bl Die ding athe Ueto gs betes stad cate
CONS EE PE EG ee 5, eben Be Dele MN Berti am.* Len gte ony

‘ et
seme tn 1's Orale ala.

Tris the LV i oy : %

——T
aan gtacee
Sr ee ee ee |

-

22

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR THE FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, AT
MANCHESTER

GEORGE B. BUTLER and wife,

ed In Office "30, (AM PM,
LEAH BEA BUTLER, Fede Ome
CT ys

Chorlene J. Camp (J TY
Plaintiffs, Circuit Court Clerk

vs. CIVIL ACTION NO: 21,881
BUICK MOTOR COMPANY, A DIVISION OF
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, and
STATE OF TENNESSEE,

Defendants.

COMPLAINT

COME NOW THE PLAINTIFFS, George B. Butler
and wife, Leah Bea Butler, and would show unto this
Honorable Court the following:

I.

That the Plaintiffs are citizens and residents of
Coffee County, Tennessee. That the Defendant, Buick Motor
Company, a Division of General Motors Corporation, is a
non-resident corporate entity which is licensed to do busi-
ness in the State of Tennessee and which sells and distributes
motor vehicles within the State of Tennessee through its
authorized dealerships. The Defendant, State of Tennessee,
is a State governmental entity operating under recognition
of the U.S. Constitution and federal laws and the State of
Tennessee Constitution and appropriate state statutes.

II.

This litigation is brought pursuant to and in accor-

dance with the following authorities: :

23

(1) "Criminal actions - Provisions concerning
- Due process of law and just compensation
clauses. - No person shall be held to answer for
a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment by a grandjury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service
in time of war or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty,
_orproperty, without due process of law: nor shall

Fifth Amendment
United States Constitution

(2) “Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal
protection. - All persons born or naturalized in
the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the state wherein they reside. No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without

‘thin its jurisdiction t) on of
the lowe *

Section 1, Fourteenth Amendment
United States Constitution

(3) "Civil action for deprivation of nghts -
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any

24

State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be lable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C.S., § 1983

(4) "(3) Depriving persons of rights or privi-
leges. If two or more persons in any State or
Territory conspire, or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the
purpose of depriving, either directly orindirectly,
any person or class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of
preventing or hindering the constituted au-
thorities of any State or Territory from giving or
securing to all persons within such State or
Territory the equal protection of the laws;....
in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section,
if one or more persons engaged therein do, or
cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the
object of such conspiracy, whereby another is
injured in his person or property, or deprived of
having and exercising any right or privilege of
a citizen of the United States, the party so
injured or deprived may have an action for the
recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury
or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators.”

42 U.S.C.S., § 1985 (3)

25

(5) “Sec. 17. Open courts - Redress of injuries
- Suits against the State. - That all courts shall
be open; and every man, for an injury done him
in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law, and right and
justice administered without sale, denial, or
delay. Suits may be brought against the State
in such manner and in such courts as the
Legislature may by law direct.”

Article 1, Section 17
Constitition of Tennessee

(6) "Sec. 21. No man's services or property
taken without consent or compensation. - That
no man's particular services shall be demanded,
or property taken, or applied to public use,
without the consent of his representatives, or
without just compensation being made there-
for.”

Article 1, Section 21
Constitution of Tennessee

(7) "55-5-108. Records to be kept - Inspections
- Contraband-Seizure of stolen property - Recla-
mation - Forfeiture.

Tennessee Code Annotated
§ 55-5-108, et seq.

(8) Common law conspiracy and conversion
(9) Malicious and intentional tort

(10) Outrageous conduct

26

ITI.

Plaintiffs woulc show unto this Honorable Court
that in August of 1985 they purchased a subject automobile,
being a 1985 Buick, from Gaylen Fann Motor Company and
paid a fair and reasonable price for the vehicle in its state
and conditic . at the time of purchase. Pursuant thereto,
with Gaylen Fann being the proper title holder of the vehicle
at that time under the laws of the State of Tennessee, he
obtained and transferred title of said vehicle, pursuant to
proper authority and payment, to the Plaintiffs. Attached
hereto please find a photocopy of the Certificate of Title
number 34288740 issued by the State of Tennessee, Motor
Vehicle Division of the Department of Revenue, certifying
title to the subject vehicle in the Plaintiffs.

Gaylen Fann is a well knowri and recognized dealer
of motor vehicles in the Manchester, Coffee County area,
having been in business and maintaining a favorable
reputation for such business for a number of years and
known in the area to buy and sell new, used, damaged and
reconstructed vehicles. The vehicle in question as purchased
from Mr. Fann, although a new car with low mileage,
needed a great deal of repair and cleanup which was
performed by the Butlers providing many many hours of
labor in cleaning the vehicle. This vehicle was of a type and
style just as the Plaintiffs had desired and so they with love
spent many hours of work cleaning and repairing this car.
The car from general appearance at the time of purchase
was somewhat of a mess, in that it was covered inside and
out with an oily film and layers of a sandy substance; the
rear end was jacked out of place causing the car's front end
to be almost touching the ground; the upholstery was filthy
and the carpets were dirty and greasy. After obtaining the
vehicle, the Butlers, realizing its potential, then for the
most part disassembled and refitted the car from a layman's
point of view, and in essence they spent many many hours
making this car into the vehicle they knew it could be.

Plaintiffs actually owned and had possession of the
said vehicle from August of 1985 when they purchased it

27

from Fann Motor Company, and the Plaintiffs had legal title
to the vehicle on title issued by the State on a proper
Certificate of Title from the State of Tennessee since Feb-
ruary 3, 1986, being the date of the issuance of their current
Certificate of Title referenced above.

IV.

It developed that this vehicle, as well as other vehicles
which had been manufactured by the Defendant, Buick
Motor Company, a Division of General Motors Corporation,
herein referred to as Buick, had been sold or transferred by
a high corporate official of Buick by the name of Mr.
Clingingsmith, who was the corporate official in charge of
the proving grounds of Buick at Flint, Michigan. A practice
had been developed by Mr. Clingingsmith on behalf of Buick
over a period of time whereby either vehicles or parts of
vehicles that had been utilized in the testing process at the
Buick proving grounds were then sold by Buick or
Clingingsmith on behalf of Buick to certain distributors or
dealerships in the Michigan area and the funds utilized
then by Clingingsmith and others involved with the operation
at the proving grounds for public relation activities of Buick.
In addition to the sale of these such vehicles, some of them
were donated to driver training programs and other such
activities which would draw favorable public relations for
Buick. This general practice had been first developed by Mr.
Clingingsmith, who was the head Buick official of the
proving grounds at Flint, Michigan, and was known by and
accepted by the corporation itself and the benefits there-
from utilized to the benefit of Buick. The general practice in
such transaction where the cars had been utilized for test
purposes was to remove any test parts from the vehicles so
that the cars as delivered or parts as sold would be as the
normal dealership vehicles. As indicated above, it developed
that this vehicle, as well as other vehicles, passed in this
chain of transfer from Buick to a man named Nicolay and a
man named Holloway, and then in turn were ultimately
sold to Gaylen Fann Motor Company of Manchester, Coffee

28

County, Tennessee, and then in particular this vehicle, a
1985 Buick, being Vehicle Identification Number
1G4AX69E6E1400109, was then in turn sold through the
normal course of business to your Plaintiffs.

V.

It thereafter developed and was determined by other
officials of Buick that in addition to Mr. Clingingsmith and
others utilizing the practice of disposition of vehicles for the
benefit of Buick in its public relations, that he was also
keeping part of the proceeds for himself, and further that he,
in the course of carrying on this practice, had allowed
certain vehicles, including the one which was ultimately
sold to your Plaintiffs, to be sold, transferred or otherwise
with experimental equipment thereon. This prompted Buick
and its officials to seek to recover this vehicle at all costs,
including the deprivation of the rights, property and interest
of your Piaintiffs.

Meanwhile, your Plaintiffs who owned by proper
title and registration the subject vehicle, had made no secret
of their proud ownership of this vehicle and had in fact made
contact with the Buick dealership and direct contact with
the Buick corporation pertaining to some of the equipment
on their new Buick vehicle. Buick and its officials, however,
once they realizéd that not all of the test equipment had
been removed from the Butler vehicle before it was trans-
ferred or conveyed, sought to recover this and other vehicles
that might have similar equipment. Rather than contacting
your Plaintiffs directly, who had had individual contact
with Buick about the vehicle, Buick officials and in particular
officials of the security department of General Motors
Corporation who were well familiar with the practice by
which the vehicles were transferred into commerce, made
contact with officials of the State of Tennessee, claiming the
vehicles, and in particular your Plaintiffs’ vehicle, were
stolen vehicles and should be returned to Buick immediately.
The State of Tennessee accepted the contentions of the
Buick officials without proper verification of any ownership

29

or entitlement on the part of Buick officials, and in fact they
failed to have proper documentation or proper entitlement
to ownership and in turn went with Buick officials and on
behalf of Buick officials under the color and authority of the
State of Tennessee, using police authorities of the Depart-
mentof Safety andin particularJ.C. Northcutt, investigator
of the Tennessee Department of Safety, and L.D. Moiree of
the Department of Safety, and with the power and authority
of the State of Tennessee on behalf of Buick went tothe place
of employment of your Plaintiff, George B. Butler, without
any warrant or other official process as though Mr. Butler
were a criminal or a thief, and under the authority and
power of the State took physical possession of his new
vehicle from him on June 12, 1986, leaving your Plaintiff
only a pink copy of a Notice of Impoundment (copy attached
hereto) which reflected that the vehicle was impounded by
the State and advised Mr. Butler then where the vehicle
would be maintained at the State impoundment lot in
Tullahoma, Coffee County, Tennessee. Your Plaintiffs would
show that the Defendants and each of them conspired
together to obtain the personal property of your Plaintiffs
from them without proceeding through due process of law,
and thereby deprived your Plaintiffs of their right to property
under the Constitution of Tennessee and the Constitution of
the United States, that the State acted on behalf of the
Buick officials without proper authority and without proper
documentation and not following proper State procedures
for the obtaining of the property.

VI.

Following the taking of the property by the State
officials on behalfof Buick, your Plaintiffs immediately that
same night sought the aid of counsel and the next morning
filed an action in Chancery Court, being the 13th day of
June, 1986, and sought and obtained a Restraining Order
restraining the State of Tennessee from removing the vehicle
from the State or from turning it over to Buick or allowing
it to be disposed of or destroyed. Meanwhile, the very next

30

day before the process was actually served upon the State
formally, the State contrary to due process rights and equal
protection rights of the Plaintiffs and contrary to the stat-
utes of the State of Tennessee, delivered the Butler's vehicle
to the officials of Buick on the morning of Saturday, June the
14th, which officials immediately transported that vehicle
out of the State and jurisdiction of its courts. Although
action is pending for the return of that vehicle in the
Chancery Court of Coffee County, that vehicle has never
been returned to the State of Tennessee and your Plaintiffs
have been out their money and out their vehicle and the use
of their vehicle ever since, now for a period of which has been
nearly a year.

VII.

Your Plaintiffs would show unto this Honorable
Court that the Defendant, Buick, determined thatit wanted
to regain possession of the Butler's vehicle and was willing
to do so at whatever cost, including specifically the depri-
vation of the rights, both constitutional and statutory, of the
Butlers in and to that vehicle; that the Buick officials in
conjunction with the State officials wrongfully converted
property which was properly titled to the Butlers from them
and removed it from the State of Tennessee in violation of
statutory and constitutional rights of the Butlers; that this
action was taken by Buick with the aid of the State for the
purpose of recovering that vehicle at whatever cost; that the
vehicle in question was not a stolen vehicle, but rather was
one placed in the course of commerce by officials of Buick,
which corporation acts through its officials, and under a
practice that was known, that had been established and
existed at the proving grounds for a period of time and
carried on by Buick officials; that the Butlers were the
proper and legal owners of the vehicle in question under the
laws of the State of Tennessee, but that the Defendant,
Buick, by aid and conspiracy with officials of the State of
Tennessee influenced by the power, size and corporate
wealth of the said Defendant, aided the Defendant, Buick,

31

in obtaining possession of the subject vehicle from the
Butlers without due process by use of the power of the State.
Plaintiffs would show that the vehicle of the Plaintiffs
should never have been impounded by the State in the use
of the State's power, but even thatifthere was authority and
propriety for the impoundment, that the State law provides
a procedure for such impoundments, which procedure will
require that the State hold the vehicle for the protection of
all concerned and cannot turn that vehicle over toaclaimant
unless it appears that there is only one claimant to the
vehicle and then only upon making bond for twice its value,
while in this case it was clear and well xnown to the State
officials that there were at least two claimants to the
vehicle, that being Buick and your Plaintiffs and that under
that circumstance under State law the vehicle could not be
turned over to anyone; yet despite this the State officials
took the Butler vehicle which was properly titled to them
under the laws of this State andon a title issued by the State
itself, and after taking their vehicle less than 48 hours
thereafter turned that vehicle over to Buick contrary to
State law, whereupon Buick immediately rushed that vehicle
out of State before the Butlers could, through the court
process, block the removal of the car, while ail the time a
Restraining Order had been issued and was in circulation
for service upon the State preventing that very thing.

VIII.

Plaintiffs would show that the Defendant, State of
Tennessee, and the Defendant, Buick, intentionally and
willfully violated your Plaintiffs’ right to property, wrong-
fully converted their property, taking their property with-
out due process oflaw andin violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the law, and removed and converted their prop-
erty in violation of the above referenced state and federal
constitution and state and federal statutes, and further in
violation of common law conversion and common law con-
spiracy, and that said action and conduct on their part, and
each of them, constitutes all the above and in addition

32

thereto an outrageous conduct whereby a huge wealthy
corporate entity such as the Defendant, Buick, by use of its
power and influence obtained the usage of the power and
authority ofthe State to wrongfully and intentionally deprive
the Plaintiffs of their property.

WHEREFORE AND FOR ALL, your Plaintiffs sue
the Defendants and each of them under the above said facts,
under the theories elucidated above and all other legal
theories applicable under those facts, and demand judg-
ment against them for all their entitlements at law, for the
value of the vehicle, loss of its use, for the deprivation of
their rights and for applicable punitive damages, and would
seek judgment against the Defendants in the amount of
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS
($150,000.00) compensatory damages and TWENTY-FIVE
MILLION DOLLARS ($25,000,000.90) punitive damages,
and would respectfuily demand a jury to try this case.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

ROBERT L. HUSKEY

S-Robert L. Huskey

Attorney for Plaintiffs
P.O. Box 439

105 E. High Street
Manchester, TN 37355

33

IN THE CHANCERY COURT
OF COFFEE COUNTY, TENNESSEE

GEORGE B. BUTLER, and wife,
LEAH BEA BUTLER, cme

Plaintiffs, JAN. 3, 1989
CLERK & MASTER
si COFFEE COUNTY, TN
BUICK MOTOR COMPANY, mang
a division of General NO: 86-164
Motors Corporation
Defendant.

QRDER

This matter came on to be presented before the
Honorable L.F. Stewart, Chancellor, Chancery Court of
Coffee County, Tennessee, on the 9th day of December,
1988, upon the Motion of the Defendant, Buick Motor
Company, division of General Motors Corporation, to delay
this litigation until after the trial of the related suit in
Federal Court.

Upon the Presentation of the matter to the Court the
Court finds that the motion of the Defendant should be
denied; however, as an alternative, the Court grants a
continuance of the case from the presently scheduled trial
date of January 16, 1989, to a later date of May 16, 1989. It
is further ordered that the discovery taken in this and the
related case will be taken in such a manner that it can be
utilized in either case thus eliminating duplication of ex-
penses.

34

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED;

(1) That the motion of the Defendant stay
proceedings in this action is hereby denied.
(2) The trial of this case is continued from
January 16, 1989, and is hereby scheduled for
trial on May 16, 1989.

(3) Discovery taken in this case and in the
related Federal case by agreement may be uti-
lized in either of the actions pending between
these parties.

ENTER: This the 3lst day of December, 1988.

S-L.F. Stewart

L.F. Stewart
APPROVED FOR ENTRY
ROBERT L. HUSKEY 1, the undersi*ti2 Cicck and blaster do
he certily thet this is @ true and
S-Robert L. Huskey envest ye ihe »f 9
instrement this a 94
ATTORNEY FORPLAINTIFFS “2... 07, /2 —

Clerk & waster

NEAL & HARWELL

S-Albert F. Moore
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT

RERERAEAEES

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Robert L. Huskey, certify that I have served a copy
of the foregoing proposed Order, to the Honorable Al Moore
of the Firm of Neal & Harwell, 2000 One Nashville Place,
150 Fourth Avenue North, Nashville, TN 37219-2414, First
Class, Postage Pre-Paid, this the 21st day of December,
1988.

S-Robert L. Huskey

ROBERT L. HUSKEY
35

IN THE CHANCERY COURT OF COFFEE
COUNTY, TENNESSEE

GEORGEB. BUTLER and wife FUED
LEAH 5. BUTLER, AUG. 11, 1989
Plaintifts, CLERK & MASTER

a COFFEE COUNTY, TN

BUICK MOTOR COMPANY, Civil Action No: 86-164
a division of General Motors i: tho undersigned Clerk ond Master do
Corporation, et al. hereby certily Ur) thin ia eo twe aad

concct copy cl tha olgwal of this
Bee ul. Se La} 2

Defendant. tne
FINAL ORDER

This matter came on for trial before the Honorable
L.F. Stewart, Chancellor of the Chancery Court of Coffee
County, Tennessee on the 17th, 18th and 19th days of July,
1989, to determine which of the two parties were entitled to
possession of the subject Buick automobile. At the conclu-
sion of the trial of the case, including the presentation of
witnesses, exhibits and arguments of counsel, the Court
announced its finding, which findings and rulings have
been transcribed and filed with the Court and which are
adopted herein by reference; and based thereupon, the
Court holds that the Plaintiffs, George Butler and wife,
Leah Bea Butler, are entitled to the possession and return
of the subject Buick automobile; and IT IS, THEREFORE,
ORDERED, that the Defendant, General Motors Corpora-
tion, return the subject Buick automobile to the Butlers.
Court costs are adjudged against the Defendant for which
execution may issue if necessary.

ENTER: this the 11th day of August, 1989.

36

es

S-L.F. Stewart
L.F. STEWART, CHANCELLOR

APPROVED FOR ENTRY:
ROBERT L. HUSKEY

S-Robert L. Huskey

Attorney for Plaintiffs,
George and Leah Butler

37

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Robert L. Huskey, certify that I have served a copy
of the foregoing proposed order upon opposing counsel, the
Honorable Albert F. Moore, by mailing a copy to his law
offices of Neal & Harwell, 2000 One Nashville Place, 150
Fourth Avenue North, Nashville, Tennessee 37219-2417,
First Class Mail, Postage Pre-Paid, this the 10th day of
August, 1989.

S-Robert L. Huskey
ROBERT L. HUSKEY

38

TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC RECORDING OF

PROCEEDINGS
IN THE CHANCERY COURT FOR COFFEE COUNTY,
TENNESSEE AT MANCHESTER

GEORGE B. BUTLER, and wife,
LEAH BEA BUTLER,

Plaintiff

vs. NO. 86-164

APPEARANCES:
FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:
Robert L. Huskey, Esq.

514 Hillsboro Boulevard
Manchester, Tennessee

FOR THE DEFENDANT:
Albert F. Moore, Esq.
Neal & Harwell

2000 One Nashville Place
Nashville, Tennessee

39

This cause came on to be heard on the 17th, 18th and
19th days of July, 1989, before the Honorable L. F. Stewart,
Chancellor presiding over the Chancery Court in and for
Coffee County, State of Tennessee, at the Coffee County
Courthouse, Manchester, Tennessee, when the following
proceedings were had and evidence introduced, to-wit:

PROCEEDINGS

(Thereupon other proceedings were reported, but
are not transcribed herein.)

THE COURT: I think the facts of this case are pretty
well understood by all. Basically the facts that I need to find
are simply this: GM made a test vehicle and sent it to
Detroit. It became the property at that time --according to
Mr. Barcomb -- of the engineer. A number of people there
drove it testing it to complain about its functionings as a
vehicle just to be driven around. Then he ordered it sent to
Milford Proving Grounds where Mr. Jack Clingingsmith
was the general supervisor and took charge of the vehicle.
I'm not clear what all was done at that point, but Mr.
Barcomb said he ordered it crushed. Mr. Clingingsmith,
being the general supervisor, was the agent for General
Motors -- the corporation can't act otherwise -- and instead
of crushing it, he forged some papers or did something
fraudulent here and turned it over to a Mr. Nicholay, I
believe his name was, who, in turn, gave it to Mr. Holloway
who, in turn, soldit to Mr. Gene Taylor or through Mr. Gene
Taylor to Mr. Fann herein Manchester. Mr. Butler came by
Mr. Fann's place, looked at it, saw it, liked it and purchased
it. The VIN number had been removed by Mr. Clingingsmith's
mechanic in Detroit and had been turned into General
Motors headquarters. The title had been sent tothe Secretary
of State of Michigan surrendering it so when that vehicle
arrived here in Manchester it had no title and it had no VIN
number. Mr. Fann makes application for -- let's see, what do
you call those things he --

MR. MOORE: (Interposing) Permit to Dismantle.

40

THE COURT: On the back of that he had a right to
sell it to somebody else and he endorsed it over to Mr. and
Mrs. Butler and they made application for title and title was
issued to them. It had the same VIN number on it, as I
understand it, as the General Motors VIN number that was
removed from it. Now, if it were a situation where Mr.
Nicholay had gone over the fence at the Milford Proving
Grounds and cut a hole in it and driven this vehicle off, we
wouldn't be here right now because that would be clearly a
stolen vehicle that passes no title whatsoever. If Mr.
Nicholay had been in league with a night watchman or a
mechanic and gotten possession of it in that fashion, there
wouldn't be any question about it because no title could
pass.

Our problem in this case is that Jack Clingingsmith
was the general supervisor in charge to see that it was
crushed and then of disposing the crushed vehicle by selling
it tosomeone else. He had some authority and was the agent
of General Motors. It's not exactly the Jernigan case, Mr.
Huskey, because in the Jernigan case the owner actually
gave his authority to sell it. He gave his consent for the sale.
He was tricked out of it. Mr. Clingingsmith, on the other
hand, has repetitiously and fraudulently delivered the
vehicle to Mr. Nicholay covering his trail by turning in the
VIN number and doing the necessary paperwork that ap-
peared that that vehicle had been crushed.

In this situation we have a General Motors agent
disposing of the property illegally, fraudulently -- there's no
question about that -- embezzling. The question in our mind
comes, could title arise in a good faith purchaser. I don't
think there's any question about Mr. Butler or Mr. Fann
being good faith purchasers. They knew nothing of this.
They had no understanding of it whatsoever. Mr. Butler and
Mr. Fann both gave good money for the vehicle. Under these
circumstances I think we would invoke a rule of equity
which says that between two parties one must suffer a loss.
The ones who had suffered the loss who were not responsible
for the action or negligence that set about the loss. General

41

Motors certainly was responsible for Mr. Clingingsmith.
They had no check on him and allowed him through their
failure to dispose of this vehicle as he did to the detriment
of Mr. and Mrs. Butler and for that reason I think I'm going
to order General Motors to return the vehicle to Mr. and
Mrs. Butler.

MR. HUSKEY: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. MOORE: Your Honor, the vehicle, as I under-
stand it, is on a lot somewhere in Michigan and it's been
sitting there for about two and a half years so it's not in the
best of shape. I'm not sure what General Motors intends to
do in terms of the possibility of appealing the decision of the
Court, but I suppose just from my perspective in trying to
determine what your Honor wants to doin this case I think
that there's a good dispute, a fair dispute, an honest dispute
between the counse! here about what law applies and I
guess that I would ask your Honor's permission to stay any
order requiring us to bring the car down until the mattercan
be considered.

THE COURT: Post a bond, yes, sir. You have the
right to do that.

MR. MOORE: Shouid I file a motion or something to
that effect?

THE COURT: Well, I think you just have and I see
no reason why you shouldn't have that right.

MR. MOORE: Your Honor, it would be difficult to
put a value on a bond at this point.

MR. HUSKEY: That's what I was going to ask you
about.

MR. MOORE: Is that something that perhaps Mr.
Huskey and I could talk about and --

THE COURT: (Interposing) You all talk it over and
see if you can get to it. If you can't, I will. I'll give you two
minutes to do it.

MR. MOORE: Thank you.

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF TENNESSEE:
COUNTY OF COFFEE :

I, Valerie P. Smith, being a Court Reporter and
Notary Public at Large for the State of Tennessee, do hereby
certify that I reported in machine shorthand the case of
GEORGE B. BUTLER and wife, LEAH BEA BUTLER vs.
BUICK MOTOR COMPANY, on the 17th, 18th and 19th
days of July, 1989, in the Chancery Court of Coffee County
before Chancellor L. F. Stewart; that the foregoing pages
constitute a true record of the Chancellor's Ruling in the
above-entitled case.

I further certify that I am not an attorney or counsel
of any of the parties, nor a relative or employee of any
attorney or counsel connected with the action, nor financially
interested in the action.

Witness my hand and seal in the City of Tullahoma,
County of Coffee, State of Tennessee, this 28th day of July,

1989.
S-Valerie P. Smith

Valerie P. Smith
Notary Public and
Court Reporter

My Commission Expires
April 21, 1993

43

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WINCHESTER DIVISION

GAYLEN FANN, GENE TAYLOR,
GAYLEN FANN ENTERPRISES,

t
FILED

GEORGE B. BUTLER and wife,
LEAH BEA BUTLER, aaah
lela
_— U.S. DISTRICT COURT
Plaintiffs yi } |
Oap. Clerk P
¥.
BUICK MOTOR COMPANY, Civ. 4-87-087
Da Civ. 4-87-088
a division of General Motors
Corporation, et al.,
Defendants
ORDER

This action is hereby CONTINUED from its present
trial date and STAYED pending resolution by a Tennessee
Court of Appeals of the pending state court action between
the Butlers and General Motors.

ENTER:

S-James H. Jarvis

James H. Jarvis,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

rill

ae

APPEAL BY PERMISSION FROM APPELLATE
COURT TO SUPREME COURT:

JUDGEMENT ENTERED ON THIS
RE: TIME DATE: FEB. 6, 1991

Application for permission to appeal shall be filed with the
Clerk of the Supreme Court WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS
after the date of entry of the judgement of the Court of
Appeals or Court of Criminal Appeals [Rule 11(b) Tennessee
Rules of Appellate Procedure].

7 01-A-01-9003-CH-00101
BUICK MOTOR COMPANY,
a division of GENERAL L. F. STEWART

MOTORS CORPORATION Chancellor
Defendant/Appellant.

ROBERT L. HUSKEY, Manchester, Attorney for Plaintiffs/
Appellees

ALBERT F. MOORE, of NEAL & HARWELL, Nashville,
Attorney for Defendant/Appelant

REVERSED AND DISMISSED

OPINION FILED: FEB. 6, 1991

TOMLIN, P.J., W.S.

George B. Butler and wife, Leah Butler, (hereafter
"Plaintiffs" or "Butler”) initiated this suite in the Chancery
Court of Coffee County against Buick Motor Company, a
division of General Motors Corporation, ("defendant” or
"Buick”). Plaintiffs sought to regain possession of a 1985

45

Buick Electra Park Avenue automobile they had purchased
from Gaylen Fann Auto Sales, Inc. ("Fann"), a used car and
auto salvage dealer in Manchester, after the vehicle had
been confiscated by a department of the state of Tennessee
and possession surrendered to Buick. Following a bench
trial, the chancellor held that Butler had acquired title to
the automobile and was entitled to its possession.

Buick raised three issues on appeal contending that
the chancellor erred in: (1) holding that plaintiffs acquired
good title to the automobile on the ground that as innocent
purchasers for value they bought the car from one holding
avoidable title; (2) incorrectly applying an equitable maxim
to the facts of this case; and (3) exercising jurisdiction and
thereby hearing the case prior to plaintiffs’ exhausting their
administrative remedies. Our resolution of the first issue
disposes of this litigation. We accordingly pretermit the
second and third issues and reverse and dismiss.

Many of the material facts are undisputed. We
would state parenthetically that inasmuch as we do not
address the issue pertaining to the exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies, we will touch on those facts tangentially
as we relate the facts material to the primary issue.

The automobile which is the subject of this suit was
what the trade would consider a "prototype test vehicle” or
"pre-production" model. It was one of approximately 250
test vehicles similarly produced and tested by GM. These
vehicles could not be approved for sale to the public because
many of the parts on the cars had not been certified for
inclusion on a production model automobile by the Depart-
ment of Transportation. The automobile was built by General
Motors in August, 1983, and was originally shipped that
same month to its GM Buick Division in Flint, Michigan.
There it was used by management-level GM employees for
transportation on the public highways of Michigan. The
automobile was evaluated and critiqued by the various
employees who drove and used it. It was shipped with a
certificate of origin from the GM factory and was appropri-
ately titled and licensed for use on the public roads. It was

46

li

Heal

a style and series that was ultimately produced and sold to
the public in 1985

After abcut a year and one-half of testing, Buick
determined that the automobile had undergone an adequate
testing process at Flint, and on February 19, 1985, the
automobile in question was transported to GM's proving
ground in Milford, Michigan ("Milford"). Milford consists of
approximately 4,000 acres of GM-owned property, and
includes a variety of test facilities such as a test track, wind
tunnels, salt baths, robotics, and other testing procedures.
Current and future products are regularly tested for safety
and durability. The testing at Milford is done in order to
obtain federal certification of certain vehicles. None of the
vehicles used for testing is sold to the public.

At the time the automobile in question was delivered
to Milford, Buick requested that the plate bearing the
vehicle identification number ("VIN"), located on the
dashboard, be removed. The VIN plate was removed from
the subject automobile and returned to the appropriate
office in Flint. At the same time the certificate of title that
had been issued in the name of Buick engineering in Flint
was surrendered to the Secretary of State. The surrender of
the title certificate to the Michigan Secretary of State and
the removal of the publicly-displayed VIN plate prevented
and inhibited the possibility of unlawful transfer of title to
this vehicle.

Jack L. Clingingsmith ("Clingingsmith") was em-
ployed by GM as a supervisor in charge of driver training
and durability testing at Milford. In that capacity he was
permitted to use vehicles such as the subject automobile as
"yard cars" for transportation on and about the proving
ground itself but not on the public roads of Michigan. When
the cost of maintaining a “yard car" exceeded its usefulness,
it was destroyed in accordance with standing orders.
Standard scrapping orders accompanied the subject car
when it arrived in Milford. It was not part of Clingingsmith's
duties to scrap the car, but it was his responsibility to
witness the scrapping and to document its destruction.

47

From the time the subject vehicle was produced and deliv-
ered to the Buick Division in Flint, it was GM's intention
that it would end up as scrap.

Without GM's knowledge and authority,
Clingingsmith disposed of the subject automobile, along
with others, by selling it as an operating vehicle to Mr. Ingo
Nicolay, an employee of a used-car lot in Michigan.
Clingingsmith covered the transfer of the subject automo-
bile and others to Nicolay by a false paper trail. He supplied
false documents to Buick at Flint indicating that this
automobile had been reduced to scrap. Nicolay transferred
the vehicle to Donald Holloway, who operated an automo-
bile salvage yardin Michigan. Neither Nicolay nor Holloway
was employed by GM. Both of them were aware that
Clingingsmith did not have the authority to sell the subject
auto or the other vehicles, but they went ahead and accepted
the automobiles without properly endorsed certificates of
title or the required VIN plates in violation of state and
federal law.

Gene Taylor was a buyer and salesman for Fann.
Taylor and Fann formed a joint venture in connection with
the buying and selling of these untitled and non-VIN-plated
test vehicles. Taylor acquired the subject automobile and
others from Holloway, with only a bill of sale to document
the transfer. Holloway did not furnish Taylor with a cer-
tificate of title or other documents verifying his ownership,
but neither did he conceal the fact that the VIN plate had
been removed. Taylor testified that he never dealt with
Clingingsmith or anyone else at GM in connection with
purchasing these automobiles. He dealt only with Holloway.
Taylor further testified he understood that the cars were to
be used for parts and that he sold them for parts only. He
stated that he never made any investigation about the title
to the vehicle.

When this and other automobiles arrived in Ten-
nessee, Fann applied to the state of Tennessee for a "permit
to dismantle" each vehicle. The permit issued by the Depart-
ment of Revenue was required in order to disassemble a

48

ads

vehicle so that the component parts could be sold sepa-
rately.

Taylor testified he had purchased "test cars” from
other manufacturers, but he had never before purchased
test cars manufactured by GM. Taylor further testified he
“could have" told GM investigators that he did not "intend
to sell the cars to anyone to be driven around in Tennessee."

At the time Fann sold the subject automobile to the
plaintiffs, he endorsed over to them the certificate to dis-
mantle. Plaintiffs, however, did not intend to disassemble
the vehicle and sell its parts. To the contrary, on the day of
purchase in August, 1985, they applied to the Tennessee
Department of Revenue for a “reconstructed title," sub-
mitting the "permit to dismantle" as proof of ownership. In
October, following plaintiffs’ application for a certificate of
title, the state of Tennessee requested that plaintiffs take
the automobile to the Tennessee Highway Garage in
Tullahoma for inspection. In February of the following year
a certificate of title was issued to plaintiffs by the Depart-
ment of Revenue.

The inspection of the subject auto resulted from an
ongoing investigation that began in the fall of 1985. The
investigation involved automobiles Fann sought to have
titled that were not accompanied by necessary supporting
documents. The issuance of the title to Butler was delayed
somewhat during the investigation. The title was issued,
however, before the Tennessee Department of Revenue
ascertained with certainty that the automobile had been
stolen from GM.

Once the result of the investigation into the status of
this and similar automobiles became known to Taylor,
Fann, and the state of Tennessee, Taylor supplied infor-
mation to GM security officers that led to Clingingsmith.
Upon learning that he had stolen the test vehicles and
disposed of them, GM discharged Clingingsmith. Ultimately,
Clingingsmith, Nicolay, and Holloway were summoned to
appear in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan. There they pled guilty to and were

49

convicted of conspiracy to traffic in motor vehicles without
identification numbers.

As a result of this investigation, the Tennessee
Department of Safety impounded the subject automobile
and delivered it toa member of the Security Department of
GM, who returned it to Michigan. The Tennessee Depart-
ment of Revenue later revoked the plaintiffs’ "reconstructed
title." Following the impoundment, plaintiffs filed suit
against the state of Tennessee. They alleged that they had
proper title and were entitled to possession of the vehicle.
Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs amended their complaint to
include as defendant Buick Motor Company, a division of
GM, and asked the trial court to determine who was the
proper party entitled to the automobile. The state was later
dismissed from the lawsuit by an order agreed to and
entered by plaintiffs.

I, PLAINTIFFS' TITLE -- VOID OR VOIDABLE?

The trial court rejected the case of Jernigan v. Ham,
691 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn. App. 1984), as authority for ruling in
favor of plaintiffs. The chancellor ruled that plaintitfs were
good-faith purchasers from a seller who had a voidable title,
and they were entitled to claim title as well as possession.

Whether the title was void or voidable, however,
depends upon whether Clingingsmith had the authority to
dispose of the vehicles in the way he did. Necessarily, we
look to the actions of both GM and Clingingsmith to see if
such authority existed. First, the proof shows that GM
caused the VIN plate to be removed from the vehicle. GM
also delivered the vehicle's title certificate to the Michigan
Secretary of State, which prevented the lawful transfer of
the vehicle under the laws of Michigan. It is undisputed that
GM contemplated the destruction of this automobile at the
end ofits useful life and had taken appropriate steps to have
it destroyed. However, Clingingsmith's sale of the vehicle
thwarted its destruction.

50

i

Furthermore, plaintiffs failed to show that
Clingingsmith had the actual or ostensible agency author-
ity to do what he did--sell and dispose of GM property. Both
Butler and Taylor admitted they never dealt with
Clingingsmith or any other- GM employee in connection
with the purchase of this automobile. To the contrary,
Butler dealt exclusively with Gaylen Fann.

To establish their claim of good title as good faith
purchasers for value, plaintiffs rely upon a section of the
U.C.C., codified as T.C.A. § 47-2-403, which reads in perti-
nent part as follows:

47-2-403. Power to transfer -- Good |
faith purchase of goods -- "Entrusting." --
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which
his transferor had or had power to transfer
except that a purchaser of a limited interest
acquires rights only to the extent of the interest
purchased. A person with voidable title has
power to transfer a good title to a good faith
purchaser for value. When goods have been
delivered under a transaction of purchase the
purchaser has such power even though:

(d) the delivery was procured through

fraud punishable as larcenous under

the criminal law.

Although itis not clear from the chancellor's opinion,
he may have had the above Code section in mind when he
made the following observation in his memorandum opin-
ion:

Now, if it were a situation where Mr. Nicholay
[sic (Nicolay)] had gone over the fence at the
Milford Proving Grounds and cut a hole in it
and driven this vehicle off, we wouldn't be here
right now because that would be clearly a stolen

51

vehicle that passes no title whatsoever. If Mr.
Nicolay had been in league with a night watch-
man ora mechanic and gotten possession of it in
that fashion, there wouldn't be any question
about it because no title could pass. .. . Mr.
Clingingsmith, oa the other hand, has repeti-
tiously and fraudulently delivered the vehicie
to Mr. Nicolay covering his trail by turning in
the VIN number and doing the necessary pa-
perwork that appeared that that vehicle had
been crushed.

In this situation we have a General
Motors agent disposing of the property illegally,
fraudulently -- there's no question about that -
-embezzling.

The principle of law that we find to be applicable is
well stated in 63Am.Jur.2d Property § 44, which reads in
part as follows:

§44. Theft of personal property as affecting
owner's title and rights.

The theft of goods or chattels does not
divest one whoowns, or has title to, such property
from his ownership of the property; the owner
may follow and reclaim the stolen goods wher-
ever he may find them, even if such goods have
been changed or improved.

This rule has long been applied by the courts of this
state. In Insurance Co. of North America v. Cliff Petit
Motors, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 785 (Tenn. App. 1974), it was
declared that the subsequent purchaser of stolen property,
however innocent he may be, does not acquire title to the
property (citing cases). In so holding the court stated:

52

cilia

The aforementioned rules remain the law in
Tennessee, therefore, it necessarily follows that
Judy Faye Woods [the ultimate purchaser] had
neither a legal or equitable interest in the
stolen vehicle; but rather, she had only a bare
possessory interest therein.

Id. at 787.

The proof is uncontradicted that Clingingsmith,
without GM's consent or authority, unlawfully and feloni-
ously misappropriated several GM automobiles, including
the one involved in this litigation. He unlawfully sold the
subject automobile, without a certificate of title or VIN
plate, to Nicolay, who in turn sold it to Holloway, who acted
as a distributor of this and other stolen automobiles. With-
out knowledge of these larcenous acts, Taylor purchased the
automobile, accompanied by a bill of sale, from Holloway.
Ultimately, the automobile appeared on the lots of Gaylen
Fann's Auto Sales and was sold to the plaintiffs under an
endorsed title to dismantle.

We find that Clingingsmith had no authority to
dispose of the automobile at all. Inasmuch as he was
without such authority, his actions constituted theft. All
purchasers of the subject automobile thus took possession
with void title. At all times GM remained the true owner.
Under these circumstances, we hold that plaintiffs acquired
neither a legal nor an equitable interest in the vehicle that
could prevail over the rights of GM. Plaintiffs acquired
nothing more than a possessory interest.

GM, being the true owner of the automobile, is
entitled to its possession. Accordingly, the decree of the
chancellor is reversed. Costs in this cause on appeal are
taxed to plaintiffs, for which execution may issue if neces-
sary.

S-Tomlin
TOMLIN, P.J., W.S.

53

S-Highers
HIGHERS, J. (Concurs)

S-Farmer
FARMER, J. (Concurs)

54

APPEAL BY PERMISSION FROM APPELLATE
COURT TO SUPREME COURT:

JUDGEMEN1 ENTERED ON THIS
RE: TIME DATE: FEB. 27, 1991

Application for permission to appeal shall be filed with the
Clerk of the Supreme Court WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS
after the date of entry of the judgement of the Court of
Appeals or Court of Criminal Appeals [Rule 11 (b) Tennes-
see Rules of Appellate Procedure].

COFFEE CHANCERY
be NO. 01-A-01-9003-CH-000101

BUICK MOTOR COMPANY, a division
of GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,

Defendant/Appellant

ORDER ON PETITION TO REHEAR

Appellant's Petition to Rehear is denied.
ENTER: This 27th day of February, 1991.

S-Tomlin
TOMLIN, P.J., W.S.

S- Highers
HIGHERS, J.

S-Farmer__
FARMER, J.

55

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE B. BUTLER AND WIFE,
LEAH B. BUTLER,

Plaintiffs-Appellants, FILED
JUNE 10, 1991
A.B. NEIL, JR., CLERK

V. Coffee County Chancery Court
Civil Action No. 86-164

Court of Appeals Docket No.
01-A-01-9003-CH-00101

BUICK MOTOR COMPANY, A DIVISION
OF GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the application for permission
to appeal filed by the Appellants, the answer of the Appel-
lee, the briefs of counsel and the entire record, it is the
decision of the Court that the application be and the same
is hereby denied.

PER CURIAM

Counsel, Trial Judge, c/c Trial Clerk
56

RESPECTFULLY SUBMIITED,

baa Fhe K
ROBERT L. HUSKEY “~~
(Counsel of Record)

P.O. Box 777
514 Hillsboro Blvd.
Manchester, TN 37355

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the day of Aperr~, 1991,
I have served three copies of the foregoing pleading upon
opposing counsel, the Honorable Albert F. Moore, Neal &
Harwell, 2000 One Nashville Place, 150 Fourth Avenue
North, Nashville, Tennessee 37219, first class mail, postage
prepaid.

Oe Meir he

ROBERT L.HUSKEY 7

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_2668%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
