# op — Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** op
- **Published:** January 1, 1991
- **Citation:** 502 U.S. 994

## Text

~ t prams wut, U.S |
(3) FILED
; No. 91-397 NOY 12 198

OFSIGE OF THE CLEKK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1991

Citizens Against Burlington, Inc., William Reuter
Daniel Kasch, Carol Vaughan, and
Richard VanLandingham, ITI,
Petitioners,
Vv.

James B. Busey, IV, Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
Toledo-Lucas County Port Authority,
and Burlington Air Express, Inc.,
Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

JIM J. MARQUEZ JOHN W. SIMPSON
McNAIR LAW FIRM KELLEY, DRYE & WARREN
1155 15th Street, N.W. 2300 M Street, N.W
Suite 400 Washington, DC 20037
Washington, DC 20005 (202) 9§5-9600
(202) 659-3900 BRIAN E. COLE
Counsel for Respondent, 18200 Van Karman Avenue
Toledo-Lucas County Port Irvine, CA 92715
Authority (714) 752-1212

Counsel for Respondent,
Burlington Air Express
Inc.

L/i

i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The threshold question presented is whether this
Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction on a
writ of certiorari to review a decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia where that
court, after thorough review of a complete administra-
tive record compiled by the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration, concluded that the agency fulfilled the require-
ments of the National Environmental Policy Act and the
Airport and Airway Improvement Act, and that the
agency acted reasonably and did not commit a clear
error of judgment. If this Court determines further
review is necessary, the substantive questions which
should be considered by the Court are (a) whether the
D.C. Circuit acted unreasonably when, on review, it
approved of the FAA’s definition of reasonable alterna-
tives, which definition excluded alternatives which
could not achieve the agency’s defined project goals;
and (b) whether the D.C. Circuit properly concluded
that the discussion of mitigation contained in the Final
Environmental Impact Statement (“FEIS”’) complies
with the requirements of AAIA.

ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

The petitioners in the court of appeals and in this
Court are Citizens Against Burlington, Inc., an organi-
zation of property owners residing near Toledo Express
Airport, and four members of the group, William Reuter,
Daniel Kasch, Carol Vaughan, and Richard VanLan-
dingham, III.

The respondents in this Court are James B. Busey,
IV, Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion, who was the respondent in the court of appeals; the
Toledo-Lucas County Port Authority, a political subdivi-
sion organized and existing pursuant to Chapter 4582 of
the Ohio Revised Code which operates Toledo Express
Airport and which was an intervenor in the court of
appeals; and Burlington Air Express Inc., which was an
intervenor in the court of appeals.

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Ee 1
ES . il
i ED ces ec e sete wneseeeeeseees Vv
ee 1
SES OC eee eee ee Tee eee 2
I EE ee 2
EE UM pci cece cree ccecereevcees 4
poeemoes Sor Rrermyime Wee Writ... .. 2... ccc eceeees 11

I. This Court Should Not Grant Certiorari Be-
cause the D.C. Circuit Properly Reviewed the
FAA’s Definition of Reasonable Alternatives
and Because its Decision is Not in Conflict

with the Seventh Circuit ................... 11

A. The Decision Below Is In Accord with the
Courts Limited Authority on Review ...... 11

B. The D.C. Circuit Decision Is Not in Conflict
with Seventh Circuit Precedent ........... 14

C. The Decision Below Does Not Authorize
Agencies to Abdicate the Responsibility to

EPOUEED PARUGEUUMRIVES 6c ccc ccc recevecess 17

D. An Agency May Consider the Goals of a
SE 19

II. The FEIS Discussion of Mitigation Complies
with Requirements of AATA................ 2a

a as le 30

iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS — (Continued)
Page
APPENDIX

A. Letter, dated June 27, 1990 from David L.
Marshall, Chairman, Burlington Air Express to
Peter A. Serini, Manager, Detroit Airports Dis-
trict Office, Federal Aviation Administration ... A-1

B. Affidavit of David L. Marshall................ B-1

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). . 22-23

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401

fr TE ks cea 1D, Ze, 2 O27
Crosby v. Young, 512 F. Supp. 1363 (E.D.
Ms . } Peer nos nen ar RoraeEt a Cees 21
Kleppe_ v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390
CREE 6a sacs ncaa can denna ees Li, de
Loutsiana Wildlife Federation v. York, 761
ee ge Se a |. re 20
National Small Shipments v. CAB, 618 F.2d
a Car eee EE 65.6 ban cee 8 eae beeen 13
North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589
ay EE teh bea ncacaneacemanwand 18
Robertson v. Methow Valley, 490 U.S. 332
(Ss £55 veaaicca eee anes wie eaKens 26, 27

Roosevelt Campobello International Park Com-
mission v. U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, 684 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1982) ..... 20

Strvcker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v.
Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) .............. 11

Suburban O’Hare Commission v. Dole, 787
Fee BOD C7URE CAE. Bc ccc ckscssevescvin 13

Van Abbema v. Fornell, 807 F.2d 633 (7th Cir.
a ara ape peerage ge A Fenn hh an 7 Parle giao oe 14-17

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978)....:.... ia, 37, a2

Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605
eo Se AR Pr ee ee 27-28

Vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — (Continued)

Statutes: Page
PE Rieti PASTA Avec vececcesauccesavesens 2
Ce ee OEE 6 kav Cheese see ndeese neds wes 2
49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(4) and (b)(2)........... 13
49 U.S.C. app. § 2201(a)(7) and (11).... 3 12-13
49 U.S.C. app. § ZZ0B(O)(S) ... ccc ceccee 3-4, 22

Regulations:
eG Ea ak kcsavw deme ece kee wae ibid

CEQ Guidance Regarding NEPA Regulations,
48 Fed. Reg. 34263 (July 28, 1983)...... 19-20

No. 91-397

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1991

Citizens Against Burlington, Inc., William Reuter
Daniel Kasch, Carol Vaughan, and
Richard VanLandinghan,, III,
Petitioners,

Vv.

James B. Busey, IV, Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
Toledo-Lucas County Port Authority,

and Burlington Air Express, Inc.,
Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals is
reported at 938 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1991) and appears in
the Petitioners Appendix A (“Pct. App. A”) at pages
la-46a.

The Record of Decision (“ROD") and Order issued
by the Federal Aviation Administration on July 12, 1990

.

are not reported. They are, however, reproduced at Pet.
App. C, pp. 49a-134a.

JURISDICTION

The Judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered
on June 14, 1991. (Pet. App. B at 47a-48a) Petitioners
have invoked this Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTES INVOLVED

Section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332, provides:

The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the
fullest extent possible: ... (2) All agencies of the
federal government shall —

(C) include in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement by the
responsible official on —

(i) the environmental impact of the proposed
action,

(ii) any adverse environmental effects which
cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented,

(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,

(iv) the relationship between local short term
uses of man’s environment and maintenance
and enhancement of long-term productivity, and

(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commit-
ments of resources which would be involved in
the proposed action should it be implemented.

2

Section 502(a) of the Airport and Airway Improve-
ment Act (AAIA), 49 U.S.C. app. § 2201(a)(7) and (11),
provides:

(a) In general, the Congress hereby finds and de-
clares that— ;

ba * ba

(7) cargo hub airports play a critical role in the
movement of commerce through the airport and
airway system and appropriate provisions should
be made to facilitate the development and en-
hancement of such airports;

~ ~ sd

(11) airport construction and improvement
projects which increase the capacity of facilities
to accommodate passenger and cargo traffic,
thereby increasing safety and efficiency and re-
ducing delays, should be undertaken to the max-
imum feasible extent;....

Section 509(b)(5) of the AAIA, 49 U.S.C. app. §
2208(b)(5), provides:

It is declared to be national policy that airport
development projects authorized pursuant to this
chapter shall provide for the protection and enhance-
ment of the natural resources and the quality of the
environment of the Nation. In implementing this
policy, the Secretary shall consult with the Secretary
of the Interior and the Administrator of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency with regard to any project
included in a project grant application involving
airport location, a major runway extension, or run-
way location which may have a significant impact on
natural resources including, but not limited to, fish
and wildlife, natural, scenic, and recreation assets,
water and air quality, and other factors affecting the
environment, and shall authorize no such project
found to have significant adverse effect unless the

4

Secretary shall render a finding, in writing, following
a full and complete review, which shall be a matter
of public record, that no feasible and prudent alter-
native exists and that all reasonable steps have been
taken to minimize such adverse effect.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondents’ Statement of the Case will focus pri-
marily on correcting certain inaccuracies, omissions or
misstatements in the Statement of the Case as presented
by petitioners.

In April, 1988, the Toledo-Lucas County Port Au-
thority (“Port Authority”), which operates Toledo Ex-
press Airport, began to develop a Master Plan Update
Study which included the development of a new airport
layout plan (“ALP”) (Pet. App. C [the ROD] at 49a-50a).
At the same time, the airport commenced a Noise
Compatibility Planning Study pursuant to 14 C.F.R. Part
150 (the “Part 150 Study”) the purpose of which was to
identify a program of noise reduction measures and land
use controls. (Pet. App. C [ROD] at 49a-51a). The Part
150 Study was completed and submitted to the FAA in
August 1991, two months after the D.C. Circuit decided
the case below.

Subsequent to the initiation of the master plan
update, the Port Authority was approached by Burling-
ton Air Express (“Burlington”) which was seeking to
establish a permanent air cargo hub. (Pet. App. C [ROD]
at SOa) Since 1985, Burlington had been operating from
temporary facilities at Baer Field in Fort Wayne, Indi-
ana. (/d.) After examining 17 sites in four midwestern
states, Burlington chose Toledo Express Airport to es-
tablish its permanent hub. (/d.) Toledo Express was
chosen for a number of reasons, including its proximity
to major geographic and industrial markets (mainly
Detroit and Chicago), its excellent access to major
highways, the quality of its work force and base of skilled
labor, the condition of the airport’s existing facilities,

5

maintenance record and operating efficiency, and the
Port Authority’s commitment to work with Burlington to
secure funding and competitive financing for the new
permanent hub. (FEIS 2-1 through 2-2)

For its part, the Port Authority served as sponsor of
the project by asking the FAA to approve its revised ALP
which depicted the facilities necessary to construct the
hub. The Port Authority made this request in its role as
the lead agency for economic development in the Toledo
metropolitan area, and to ensure that the economic
benefits which accompany the project will benefit the
Toledo area. The Toledo metropolitan area particularly
needs those benefits.!

On February 2, 1989, the Port Authority submitted
to the FAA its ALP revisions for approval. The FAA
immediately commenced the necessary studies to deter-
mine the acceptability of the ALP revisions from an
airspace utilization standpoint, and commenced the
preparation of an environmental impact statement.
Throughout that process, the FAA painstakingly ana-
lvzed all environmental aspects of the project, and
responded to voluminous comments from interested
individuals, organizations, and governmental agencies.

1. Since 1980, over 50 major companics have ceased opcra-
tions in Toledo and/or closed thcir facilitics resulting in a loss of over
7.000 jobs. Toledo is ranked in the bottom third of the nation’s 75
largest citics in job creation and retention, and currently ranks last
among the major Ohio urban arcas in cconomic devclopment. Up to
1.150 new tull and part time jobs will be created for Toledo
residents by the project. An annual cconomic impact of over
$42.000,000.00, growing to over $67,000,000.00 will be injected
into the depressed Toledo cconomy. (Pct. App. C [ROD] at 74a)

The majority of funding for the project will come directly from
uscr fees and/or lease agreements, and the sale of land not necded
for airport purposes after it has been made compatible, or rcim-
bursed ata later date from such sources, after borrowing moncy for
tront cnd costs. In fact, of the 64.5 million dollars designated for
costs other than for mitigation, over 46 million dollars will be
derived trom bond issucs to private investors, and only a very small
percentage will be derived from local and state participation for
economic devclopment.

6

In response to comments on the draft environmental
impact statement by the EPA, the FAA conducted
supp!emental studies in the area of noise analysis and
wetlands delineation, and obtained assurances that mit-
igation measures would be carried out expeditiously.
(FEIS E-39)

The Final Environmental Impact Statement
(“FEIS”) was issued May 11, 1990, and the FAA issued
its Record of Decision (“ROD”) on July 12, 1990.
Chapter two of the FEIS contains an extensive discus-
sion of alternatives to the proposal. The FEIS gave
detailed consideration both to the proposed action of
expanding Toledo Express and to the “no action” alter-
native. (FEIS 2-2 through 2-6, and Chapter 4) In
addition, the FAA considered alternative designs and
runway configurations at the airport, and alternative
distributions of projected air traffic. (FEIS 2-7 through
2-13) The FAA also considered alternative airports, both
in and outside of the Toledo area. (FEIS 2-14 through
2-16)

Petitioners claim that the FAA “[r]efus[ed] to [a]na-
lvze the Fort Wayne [a]lternative” (Pet. 6), but a review
of the record shows that is simply not true. To the
contrary, the FAA analyzed the Fort Wayne alternative,
but found it to be unreasonable. Specifically, the FAA
made the following findings:

Since 1985, Burlington has operated an interim hub
at Baer Field in Fort Wayne, Indiana. ... However,
the air cargo facility at Fort Wayne is antiquated and
was not designed specifically as an air cargo hub. ...

Fort Wayne is 163 miles from Detroit, involving 3
hours of ground travel distance to Burlington’s au-
tomotive markets. The major highway does not
connect with the airport. There is a limited available
labor pool, and Burlington has experienced difficulty
attracting skilled workers and part time employees.
At Baer Field, a new building, ramp, and other
airport improvements are needed. Fort Wayne was

7

unable to put together a competitive funding pack-
age and development plan for a permanent hub.

Given these negative factors at Fort Wayne and the
advantages of the Toledo Express Airport... Fort
Wayne is not a reasonable alternative to Toledo for
Burlington. Burlington officials have indicated their
intention to renew their search for another location
should the Toledo Express Airport prove to be un-
available to them. For these reasons, an expanded air
cargo facility at Fort Wayne was not evaluated
further as an alternative in this document. (em-
phasis added)
(FEIS 2-14; see also Pet. App. C [ROD] at 56a-64a).
These findings were supported by substantial evidence
in the record. (FEIS B-94 through B-96, E-21 through
E-33, E-62 through E-64)

Petitioners mischaracterize the record when they
assert that Burlington selected Toledo “primarily be-
cause Toledo offered it millions of dollars in local, state
and federal funds to locate its hub there”, without
mentioning other important considerations. (Pet. 6) Of
course, the package of state, local and private funding
designed by Toledo was a factor in Burlington's choice of
Toledo, but the FEIS and ROD also made specific
findings based on record evidence as to Toledo's prox-
imity to major industrial markets, particularly the auto-
motive industry which accounts for a substantial part of
Burlingtons business, the inadequacy of the Fort
Wayne facilitics, Toledo's superior work force including
part time college students, the major north-south and
cast-west highways that cross in Toledo, the forcign
trade zone in Toledo and strong community support.
(Pet. App. C at 62a) Based on all of this evidence in the
record — not just financing — the FAA madc the
findings cited above.

It is equally incorrect for petitioners to claim that
Fort Wayne was Burlington's “backup alternative if its
plans for Toledo fell through”. (Pet. 8) A dispassionate

8

review of the record and Burlington’s own evaluation of
Fort Wayne indicates that Fort Wayne was simply not a
practical or reasonable alternative for a number of rea-
sons. Establishing a permanent facility for Burlington at
Fort Wayne would require the construction of essen-
tially the same new facilities as those required for Phase
I of the construction at Toledo, i.e., a new sortation
facility, an aircraft parking ramp, a fuel farm and related
infrastructure and other airport improvements. (FEIS
2-15, B-93) It is the responsibility of the airport, not the
carrier, to pay for some of these improvements, and the
FAA cannot direct any airport to make necessary im-
provements in its infrastructure to accommodate an
airline. There has never been a financial program in
place, or even proposed, that would provide a basis for
establishing these improvements which are necessary
for a permanent hub in Fort Wayne. (FEIS B-93)

Petitioners claim that the Director of the Fort Wayne
Airport represented in a letter dated April 25, 1990 that
locating a facility there was feasible, and even claim that
in an extra-record letter the Chairman of Burlington
admitted Fort Wayne was its “backup alternative”. (Pet.
7-8)- In fact, meetings on financing between Burlington
and Fort Wayne officials never proceeded beyond a very
general stage. At no time during the course of many
discussions did any representative of the Chamber of
Commerce, the Airport Authority or its investment bank-
ing company ever offer any specific package for the
financing of a permanent hub facility at Fort Wayne.
(FEIS B-93, E-28)

2. Those letters are not a part of the FAA record in this casc
and therefore were not properly before the court below or this Court.
Since the issuc as to these Ictters was not raised before the FAA,
Section 1006(c) of the Federal Aviation Act (49 U.S.C. § 1486(c))
prohibits consideration of them. Nevertheless, if those Ictters are
rclicd upon, Burlington's response to them in Burlington's Answer
to Petitioners’ Request for a Stay and Burlington's Surreply should
also be considercd.

9

In short, the evidence before the FAA indicated that
while it was possible for Burlington to remain in Fort
Wayne temporarily — which might be accomplished
with the continuing goodwill and support of both the Air
National Guard and Fort Wayne, albeit at a great cost —
it was not feasible to establish a permanent hub at Fort
Wayne for the reasons set forth in the FEIS (FEIS 2-15),
and in Mr. Marshall’s June 27, 1990 letter. (Respon-
dent's Appendix (Resp. App.”) A; see also Resp. App. B)
The May 2, 1990 letter from Burlington’s Chairman
(Pet. App. E), at most, only recognizes that Burlington
might need Fort Wayne’s help to remain there on a
temporary basis a while longer. The vague and indefinite
statements contained in the letter can hardly be inter-
preted as an admission that “Fort Wayne was Burling-
tons backup alternative”. (Pet. 8)

In addition to the discussion of alternatives, the
FEIS also contained a full and fair discussion of the
noise impacts, including impacts on sleep, that the
project would produce. (FEIS Chapter 4) That docu-
ment and the ROD also presented a detailed plan for
mitigating the noise impacts of the proposal by eliminat-
ing “almost all existing noncompatible land uses within
the 65 L,y,, noise contour.” (Pet. App. C [ROD] at 69a)
The ROD stated that a total of approximately 100
residences and two nursing homes within the 75 L,,,
contour will be acquired and residents will be relocated.
(Pet. App. C [ROD] at 68a) Further, the ROD states that
the Port Authority will assemble a relocation team to
accomplish the process with as little disruption as pos-
sible to the residents. The Port Authority has committed
to implement a sound attenuation or casement acquisi-
tion program for houses within the 65-75 Ly,,, corridor.
(Pet. App. C [ROD] at 69a) The Port Authority has
committed to take appropriate actions within its powers
to implement the mitigation program with or without
federal funds. (FEIS E-39)

The mitigation program described in the FEIS and
ROD is now well underway. The Part 150 Study, which

10

is intended to help flesh out the details of the mitigation
plan, was completed and submitted to the FAA in
August of 1991, before the completion of the hub and
the commencement of flight operations, which occurred
in September 1991. The Port Authority has been in-
formed by the FAA of an allocation of $7.4 million of
Airport Improvement Program discretionary grant funds
to be used for property acquisitions. This amount is an
increase of approximately $2.6 million in FAA grant
funds since the case was argued before the court below.
Even before flight operations commenced, the Port
Authority, through its relocation consultant, had made
many offers to purchase properties, and had received
numerous written acceptances. The process of obtaining
property appraisals and making offers is on-going at the
time this brief is being written.

1]

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I. This Court Should Not Grant Certiorari Because
the D.C. Circuit Properly Reviewed the FAA’s
Definition of Reasonable Alternatives and Be-
cause its Decision is Not in Conflict with the
Seventh Circuit

A. The Decision Below Is In Accord with the
Court's Limited Authority on Review

The D.C. Circuit’s review of the Record of Decision
(“ROD”) issued by the FAA on the question of “alterma-
tives” was fully consistent with the requirements for
review established by this Court. This Court has held
that “once an agency has made a decision subject to
NEPA’s procedural requirements, the only role for a
court is to insure that the agency has considered the
environmental consequences; it cannot “ ‘interject itself
within the area of discretion of the executive as to the
choice of the action to be taken’””. Strycker’s Bay
Netgehborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223,
227-28 (1980), citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S.
390 and 410 n.21 (1976)). In Kleppe, this Court empha-
sized that neither NEPA nor its legislative history con-
template that a court may substitute its judgment for
that of the agency as to the cnvironmental consequences
of its action. (Aleppe, supra, at 410 n.21)

Review of an agency's discussion of alternatives in
an FEIS is made pursuant to a “rule of reason”, by
Which a court determines whether the FEIS contains
sufficient discussion of the relevant issues and opposing
viewpoints to permit the decision maker to take a “hard
look” at the environmental factors, and to make a
reasonable decision. (See id)

Obviously, a discussion of alternatives cannot be
limitless. CEQ regulations obligate agencies to discuss
only “reasonable” alternatives. In much the same way,
AAIA only requires a finding that no “feasible and
prudent’ alternative cxists to the proposed project. This
Court recognized that it is senseless to require more of

12

an agency when it observed in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978) that
“the concept of alternatives must be bounded by some
notion of feasibility.” Thus, the D.C. Circuit correctly
recognized in this case that the FAA was required only
to discuss feasible, prudent, and reasonable alternatives.
(Pet. App. A [the D.C. Circuit Opinion (D.C. Op.”)] at
9a-13a) The court below concluded that the FAA’s FEIS
met those requirements — a conclusion fully borne out
by an examination of the FEIS and ROD.

The record shows, as the D.C. Circuit noted, that
five alternatives to the proposal were identified in the
FEIS. Three alternatives, which were identified and
discussed, were rejected for more detailed analysis as
unreasonable alternatives, including the alternative of
locating the hub outside of Toledo. Specifically, the FAA
found that “Ft. Wayne is not a reasonable alternative to
Toledo for Burlington.” (FEIS 2-1, 2-2, 2-15)° After
examination of the ROD and FEIS, the D.C. Circuit
concluded that the FAA’s reasoning as set forth in the
FEIS “fully supports this decision to evaluate only the
preferred and do nothing alternatives.” (Pet. App. A
[D.C. Op.] at 15a)

The D.C. Circuit explained that the FAA reviewed a
variety of factors before making this decision. In partic-
ular, the FAA examined Congress’ expressed views on
how the nation is to build civilian airports. Congress has
declared that cargo hub airports play a critical role in the
movement of commerce throughout the airport and
airway system and appropriate provisions should be

3. The FAA's decision to climinate the alternative of Burling-
ton remaining in Fort Wayne was supported by substantial evidence
in the FEIS, and was reinforced and amplified in the ROD. (sce
FEIS 2-14: Pet App. C [ROD] at 56a-64a; and p.7, supra) These
findings of fact arc supported by substantial evidence in the record
(FEIS B-94 through B-96, E-21 through E-33, E-62 through E-64),
and thus are conclusive as provided in Section 1006(c) of the
Federal Aviation Act. (49 U.S.C. § 1486(c))

13

made to facilitate the development and enhancement of
such airports. (AAIA § 502(a)(7); 49 U.S.C. app. §
2201(a)(7)) Further, airport construction and improve-
ment projects which increase the capacity of facilities to
accommodate passenger and cargo traffic “should be
undertaken to the maximum feasible extent”. (AAIA §
502(a)(11); 49 U.S.C. app. § 2201(a)(11))

The D.C. Circuit further explained “[c]ongress has
also said that the free market, not an ersatz Gosplan for
aviation, should determine the siting of the nation’s
airports’. (Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at 15a) Prior to the
deregulation of air cargo transportation, the Federal
Aviation Act regulated every aspect of air transportation,
including the routes a cargo carrier could operate and
the cities it could serve. (See National Small Shipments
v. CAB, 618 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Under deregu-
lation, Congress decreed that such matters should be
decided by private management pursuant to “compet-
itive market forces.” (/d. at 823; see also Section
102(a)(4) and (b)(2) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49
U.S.C. § 1302(a)(4) and (b)(2)). Therefore, as the Court
stated in Suburban O'Hare Commission v. Dole, 787
F.2d 186, 196 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 847
(1986), “[t]he decision to make O'Hare, or any other
airport a ‘hub’ belongs to the airlines, and not to the
government.” These Congressional policies clearly limit
the extent to which the federal government can exert
authority over hub placement decisions and, thus, were
important considerations for the FAA when determining
the scope of alternatives which were feasible, prudent
and reasonable.

In addition, the FAA took into consideration the Port
Authority's reasons for proposing that the cargo hub be
built in Toledo. The information in the FEIS established
that the Port Authority pushed for development of the
hub at Toledo Express in order to reinvigorate the
Toledo economy. The project was expected to create
hundreds of jobs, pump millions of dollars into the local
economy, and attract spin-off business to the area.

14

Based upon these considerations and other informa-
tion in the FEIS, the FAA defined the goal for its action
as the establishment of a new cargo hub for Burlington
Air Express in Toledo. (Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at 17a)
The agency eliminated from detailed discussion those
alternatives which would not accomplish this goal, in-
cluding alternatives of locating the hub airport else-
where. (/d.) The D.C. Circuit found that the FAA’s
decision making process was valid and that the agency
acted reasonably in defining the purpose of its action, in
eliminating alternatives that would not achieve that
purpose, and discussing the alternative that would
achieve that purpose. (Pet. App. C [D.C. Op.] at 18a)
Given the policy directives of Congress, the limited
scope of review authority vested in the Court of Appeals,
and the analysis engaged in by the agency, that decision
was Clearly correct and need not be reviewed here.

B. The D.C. Circuit Decision Is Not in Conflict with
Seventh Circuit Precedent

In requesting that this Court review the decision of
the D.C. Circuit, petitioners primarily rely upon the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Van Abbema v. Fornell, 807
F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1986). Van Abbema involved the
review, by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, of the
environmental impact of the construction and operation
of a facility designed to “transload” coal from trucks to
barges along the Mississippi River. During the course of
this review by the Corps, several parties raised specific
objections concerning the false, misleading and inaccu-
rate data provided by the project sponsor concerning the
economic viability of alternatives to the proposed project.
Van Abbema, 807 F.2d at 640. The Corps, without any
regard for these objections or any investigation into the
accuracy of the disputed data, accepted the factual
assertions made by the project sponsor as true and, after
reversing the decision of the local district engineer that
the project was not in the public interest, granted a

15

permit for the construction and operation of the trans-
loading facility.

The Van Abbema court found fault in the Corps’
evaluation of alternatives to the proposal, stating that:

the Corps, in considering alternative sites, relies
upon a record replete with important and factual
inconsistencies and ambiguities that the Corps did
not attempt to resolve.

(Jd. at 642) When specifically addressing the issue of
whether the Corps adequately evaluated the alternative
of utilizing the temporary facility at Quincy, the court
further statea:

[a] review of the record reveals that the Corps never
adequately evaluated Quincy, the “no build” alterna-
tive. The only comments directed to Quincy were
based on false data or unexplained assumptions.

(Jd. at 640) In further expounding upon the issue of
false data, the Van Abbema court noted that “no one now
contends that these mileage figures are right.” (/d. at
641) The D.C. Circuit did not find any such errors of fact
in this case.

It was the Corps’ blind reliance upon factually
deficient data which was the focus in the Seventh
Circuit's decision to reverse the district court’s endorse-
ment of the Corps’ analysis of alternatives in Van
Abbema. The Corps’ duty to conduct an independent
investigation into the adequacy of an evaluation of
alternatives, which petitioners contend extends from
Van Abbema to all cases in which an agency utilizes
information provided by a project sponsor or other
outside party (Pet. 20), was imposed in Van Abbema
because the Corps relicd upon false facts in the record
after the validity of those facts had been specifically
challenged.

Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit, in Varr Abbema,
clearly delineated the court’s role in reviewing an
agency s evaluation of alternatives when it stated:

16

Here the Corps did undertake a serious review of
alternatives to the proposal. . . [and] [s]uperficially at
least there appears to be record evidence to support
the Corps’ decision that no preferable alternatives
exist. ... Generally, that would end the matter, and
we would agree with the district court that the

Corps decision was not arbitrary or capricious and

would uphold the issuance of the permit. However,

the attorney general, in particular, contends that the

Corps based its conclusions on evidence so inade-

quate and misleading that we must undertake a

closer scrutiny. The plaintiffs and the intervenor

have a point to the extent that the Corps’ conclusions
must find some reasonable support in the record.

(emphasis added)

(Van Abbema at 639 (citations omitted)) Therefore,
according to the Van Abbema court, in instances where
the data underlying an agency's decision is not false, the
agency's “scrious review of alternatives” should be given
deference, and an “arbitrary and capricious” standard,
under which the agency's determination must merely
“find some reasonable support in the record”, should be
the rule of law. (/d.)

The D.C. Circuit, in holding that the FAA’s
“judgment [in evaluating alternatives] was not unin-
formed” (Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at 20a, citing Robertson
v. Methow Vallev, 490 U.S. 332 (1989)), made no
finding that the FAA relicd on false, misleading or
inaccurate data. Therefore, the decision by the D.C.
Circuit not to second-guess the reasoned evaluation of
alternatives by the FAA does not conflict with the
Seventh Circuit's holding in Van Abbema.,

ban Abbema and the present case turn primarily on
the facts unique to cach situation. For this reason, each
courts analysis is equally unique. The D.C. Circuit's
determination that the language of Van Abbema was too
broad (Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at 19a) is correct. The
Seventh Circuit's assertion that an agency must evalu-
ate alternatives to achieve the “general goal” of a project

17

is so broad that it would require examination of imprac-
tical, unfeasible and irrelevant alternatives. Such a re-
sult would undermine this Court’s holding in Vermont
Yankee, supra, and thus was rightfully criticized by the
D.C. Circuit. In any event, it is not necessary for this
Court to examine the broad language of Van Abbema
because the undisputed factual errors in that case
clearly required the Seventh Circuit to reverse the
decision of the district court so that the Corps could
reexamine the alternatives based on the correct facts.
When the two cases are properly read, based on their
unique facts, there is no conflict of legal principle which
requires resolution by this Court.

In short, petitioners are asking the Court to grant
certiorari in this case so that this Court may resolve a
nonexistent conflict among the circuits. The practical
implication of petitioners’ request is that they are asking
this Court to review the opinion of the D.C. Circuit so
that the Court can impose a broad, burdensome duty
upon federal agencies that no court in this country,
including the Seventh Circuit, has said it would be
willing to impose.

C. The Decision Below Does Not Authorize Agen-
cies to Abdicate the Responsibility to Define
Alternatives

Petitioners also claim that the D.C. Circuit holding

authorizes agencies to abdicate the role of defining
reasonable alternatives to private project sponsors. (Pct.
19) A careful reading of the Opinion below and the ROD
reveal, however, that the D.C. Circuit did no such thing.
To the contrary, the FAA, and not the Port Authority, or
even Burlington, made the final decision as to the scope
of reasonable alternatives that required discussion in the
FEIS, and it was that decision making process which
the Court below approved.

The D.C. Circuit repeatedly emphasized throughout

its Opinion that the responsibility for deciding what
alternatives to consider in an FEIS belongs to the

|

18

agency. (“An agency bears the responsibility for decid-
ing which alternatives to consider in an FEIS.” (Pet.
App. A [D.C. Op.] at 1la, citing North Slope Borough v.
Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). In fact, the
D.C. Court stressed “... it [an agency] must evaluate
alternative ways of achieving its goals, shaped by the
application at issue and by the function that the agency
plays in the decision process.” (Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at
19a (emphasis in the original)) Given this kind of
language, it is clear that the D.C. Circuit decision does
not create precedent permitting applicants to define the
goals and scope of alternatives to be included in an
impact statement. Rather, the D.C. Circuit specifically
recognized that this responsibility remains vested in the
agency. Therefore, petitioners’ stated reason for review
in this Court — that the decision allows nonfederal
applicants to define and control the alternatives ana-
lyzed in an impact statement — is without foundation.

In this case, the Port Authority’s status as the
applicant seeking approval of a specific project, and the
Congressional limitations placed on federal government
involvement in private decisions regarding the develop-
ment of hub airports, defined the limits of the reasonable
alternatives which the FAA believed should be consid-
ered. The FAA in its expertise made this discretionary
decision itself after consideration of the nature of the
project involved. It did not, as petitioners’ contend,
abdicate the responsibility for developing of alternatives
to either the project sponsor, or the project beneficiary.
When the D.C. Circuit refused to second-guess the
agency s decision regarding the scope of alternatives
requiring full examination, it did not sanction the aban-
donment of the responsibility for defining alternatives to
the project sponsor. Instead, as the Opinion makes clear,
it merely refused to criticize an agency decision-making
process which included consideration of the nature of
the project, the identity of the applicant, and the extent
of permitted federal involvement in the proposed project.

19

D. An Agency May Take Into Account the Goals of
a Project Sponsor

In essence, petitioners object to the FAA’s decision
to take into account the needs and goals of the sponsor.
(But see Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at 12a, 16a (holding that
FAA may take such considerations into account)). The
FAA’s decision to take into account the needs of the Port
Authority when defining the scope of alternatives and
goals for the project is clearly not in violation of any
regulatory or statutory mandate. It actually represents
the proper understanding of the limited role agencies
play in such projects. Petitioners’ argument is nothing
more than an attempt to have the D.C. Circuit and now
this Court, substitute their judgment on the weight
given this factor for that of the agency, a standard
repeatedly rejected by this Court. (E.g., Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971))

Petitioners assert that the Council on Environmen-
tal Quality (“CEQ”) has stated, in defining which alter-
natives are feasible, “[n]Jeither NEPA nor CEQ regula-
tion make a distinction between actions initiated by a
federal agency and by applicants.” (Pet. 16, citing CEQ
Guidance Regarding NEPA Regulations [48 Fed. Reg.
34263. 34266 (July 28, 1983)]). In fact, the CEQ actu-
ally pointed out, in that same document, that an agency
should consider an applicant's purposes and needs when
defining the goals of a project. The CEQ said:

NEPA has never been interpreted to require exami-
nation of purely conjectural possibilities whose im-
plementation is deemed remote and speculative.
Rather, the agency's duty is to consider “alternatives
as they exist and are likely to exist”

* - *
There is, however, no need to disregard the appli-
cants purposes and needs and the common sense
realities of a given situation in the development of
alternatives. (emphasis added)

20

The CEQ made these comments in response to a
decision by the First Circuit in Roosevelt Campobello
International Park Commission v. U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 684 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1982), which
recognized that an agency’s choice of alternatives may
be focused by the primary objectives of the permit
applicant. In that case, the court stated:

EPA's evaluation of alternatives was explicitly based
on the premise that its role in reviewing privately
sponsored projects “is to determine whether the
proposed site is environmentally acceptable”, and
not, as in the case of a publicly funded project, “to
undertake to locate what EPA would consider to be
the optimum site for a new facility”...

We are unable to fault EPA’s reasoning. .. No pur-
pose would be served by requiring EPA to study
exhaustively all environmental impacts at each al-
ternative site considered once it has reasonably
concluded that none of the alternatives will be
substantially preferable to the proposed site. More-
over, the guideline adopted by EPA to limit its study
of alternatives appears, in this case, to be consistent
with the “rule of reason” by which a court measures
federal agency compliance with NEPA’s procedural
requirements.

(Roosevelt Campobello at 1046-7) The CEQ refused to
criticize the Roosevelt Campobello holding in its subse-
quent discussion of the selection of alternatives in
licensing and permitting situations. (48 Fed. Reg.
34263. 34266 (July 28, 1983); see also Louisiana Wild-
life Federation v. York, 761 F.2d 1044, 1048 (Sth Cir.
1985))* Thus, while NEPA or CEQ regulations may not
muke a formal distinction between actions initiated by a

4. As the Louisiana Wildlife and Roosevelt Campobello dcci-
sions demonstrate, the D.C. Circuit was hardly the first court to
recognize that the goals of private project sponsors must be
considered. or to use Petitioners’ charactcrization, to “create a
distinction between pure and hybrid federal actions.” (Pct. 16)

21
federal agency and by private applicants, as a practical
matter, the CEQ has acknowledged that the applicant’s
purposes and needs and the common sense realities of a
given situation inevitably play a role in the definition of
reasonable alternatives and project goals. Therefore, it
was not improper for the FAA to consider the applicant's
purposes here.

Petitioners contend that the D.C. Circuit Opinion
creates a “subclass” of EISs for “hybrid federal actions”.
(Pet. 16) Petitioners claim that under the D.C. Circuit’s
decision, once the applicant states its preferred alterna-
tive, the feasibility of other possible alternatives become
irrelevant. (/el. at 17) Nowhere in its decision does the
D.C. Circuit go this far. At most, the D.C. Circuit merely
acknowledged that the definition of goals must be
shaped by the nature of the application at issue and the
function the agency plays in the decision-aking process
the very considerations the CEQ has instructed should
not be disregarded in developing alternatives.

To prohibit agencies from considering the goals and
desires of a private project sponsor when defining the
scope of alternatives to be studied would be to ignore
realitv and force an agency to consider alternatives that
are simply not feasible. That kind of futile exercise is
unnecessary under NEPA, as this Court and others have
repeatedly acknowledged. (E.g., Vermont Yankee, su-
pra, at 435 U.S. at 551; Crosby v. Young, 512 F. Supp.
1363, 1373 (E.D. Mich. 1981))*

S. Expounding on this point, this Court observed: “Common
sense also atcuches us that the ‘detailed statement of alternatives’
cannot be found wanting simply because the agency failed to
include every alternative device and thought conccivable by the
mind of man. Time and resources are simply too limited to hold that
an impact statement fails because the agency failed to ferret out
every possible alternative... .°) (Vermont Yankee, supra, at 551)
Similarly another Court has stated: “T cannot perccive of a morc
useless requirement than one that would require an agency to
consider alternatives in detail that are not workable... 2” Crosby v.
Your, supra, at L373)

22

Even if the D.C. Circuit opinion could be read to
create a subclass of EISs composed of projects which are
privately sponsored, as petitioners contend, that result
would be of no consequence unless it resulted in a
violation of the agency’s duty to take a “hard look” at the
environmental consequences of its action. (Kleppe, su-
pra, 427 U.S. at 410 n. 21) In light of the record created
by the FAA and reviewed by the Court below, there can
be no doubt that a “hard look” occurred here.

II. The FEIS Discussion of Mitigation Complies
with the Requirements. of AAIA

Section 509 of the Airport and Airway Improvement
Act of 1982 (AAIA) provides that the FAA shall not
authorize a project which involves a major runway
extension or runway location and which has a signifi-
cant adverse environmental effect unless it first finds
that all reasonable steps have been taken to minimize
adverse effects. (49 U.S.C. app. § 2208(b)(5)). Petition-
ers contend that the FEIS’ program of mitigation, as
approved by the D.C. Circuit, did not meet that statutory
requirement of the AAIA. (Pet. 22) Petitioners also ask
that this Court substitute its judgment for that used by
the FAA and require mitigation to be actually completed
and/or fully funded prior to commencement of flight
operations. (/d.) Such a substitution of judgment would
be crroncous.

In reviewing the FEIS and ROD, a reviewing court
considers “whether the decision was based on a consid-
cration of the relevant factors and whether there has
been a clear error of judgment”. (Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (cita-
tions omitted)). The D.C. Circuit's duty in this case was
to determine whether the FAA committed a “clear error
of judgment” when it determined that all “reasonable
steps’ had been taken. “Reasonable steps” is not defined
in the AAIA. Therefore, as this Court stated in Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837, 842-844 (1984):

23

[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permis-

~sible construction of the statute ... [A] court may

not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.® (emphasis added)

The D.C. Circuit found that the FAA’s FEIS and
ROD contained a full and complete discussion of the
mitigation efforts that will be undertaken over a three-
year period to bring the project within the government's
established land use compatibility guidelines and that
the FAA had obtained unequivocal assurances from the
Port Authority that the efforts will be carried out. Briefly
summarized, the FEIS describes the following mitiga-
tion commitments:

3.

No

2

6.

Acquisition of dwellings subjected to noise ex-
ceeding 75 Ly, and a portion of the dwellings
within the 70-75 Lg, range and relocation of
residents at an estimated cost of $10 million;

Acquisition and relocation of two nursing homes
impacted by noise exceeding 75 L,,, at an esti-
mated cost of $6.2 million;

The priority basis on which acquisition will
occur;

Inclusion of a detailed relocation plan as a
companion document to the FEIS;

A description of a sound attenuation program
and noise and avigation casement purchase
program recommended for dwellings in the 65-
75 Ly, area, including the number of homes
affected, the nature of attenuation efforts, and
the mobile home and nursing homes excluded;

A description of typical sound attenuation im-
provements;

6.

See Overton Park, supra, 401 U.S. at 416 (The court is not

empowered to substitute its pudgment for that of the agency.”)

hasnt

24

7. A discussion of the suitability of sound attenu-
ation to the Toledo site;

8. A description of the alternative of noise and
avigation easement acquisitions and the advan-
tages of this alternative; and

9. Cost estimates for sound attenuation.

Reviewing the FEIS, the D.C. Circuit found that it
contained a detailed and specific program of mitigation.
(Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at 34a) The Court specifically
found: ;

[Mitigation] measures include buying out the own-
ers of every private house and nursing home within
range of more than Ly, 75 decibels, insulating doors
and windows in homes subjected to noise between
L,,, 70 and 75 decibels, and buying easements from
the owners of homes within the reach of Ly,, 65 to 70
decibels.

Likewise, the D.C. Circuit found that the FEIS and
its supporting documents clearly reflected the Port
Authority's commitment to undertake mitigation. (Pet.
App. A [D.C. Op.] at 36a) The FEIS contains correspon-
dence from the Port Authority’s Director of Ports which
assured the FAA that:

The Toledo-Lucas County Port Authority is very
seasitive to the need of establishing appropriate
mitigation measures to accompany the development
of an air cargo hub at Toledo Express Airport. The
Port Authority wants to be as flexible as possible, in
order to work with all local, state and federal inter-
ests... The Port Authority will take appropriate
action within its powers to implement, with or with-
out federal funds, the Mitigation measures identified
in the final environmental impact statement for the
establishment of an air cargo hub at Toledo Express.
We are also prepared to provide for all local share
funding portions of federal or state grants to be used
to accomplish the mitigation.

25

The Port Authority intends to comply with all appli-
cable regulations regarding mitigation and will en-
deavor to. accomplish the mitigation as expeditiously
as possible.

(FEIS E-39) The FAA, thus, obtained a strong and
unequivocal commitment from the Port Authority to
complete mitigation. Moreover, as the D.C. Circuit
found, the FAA will ensure that mitigation is carried out
by imposing special conditions to that effect in its grant
agreements. (Pet App. A[D.C. Op.] at 35a; FEIS at 4-31)
Based on these findings, the D.C. Circuit properly held
that the FAA reasonably concluded that a detailed
mitigation plan, coupled with grounds to believe that the
plan will be implemented, is enough of a ‘reasonable
step.” (Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at 36a) The D.C. Circuit
also concluded that the FAA did not commit a “clear
error of judgment” and the “FAA has therefore met its
obligations under the statute.” (Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at
36a-37a)

The Petition does not allege that the mitigation
program is inadequate or ineffective.” Petitioners assert
that the FAA violated the AAIA because it did not require
all mitigation, including the Part 150 Study, to be
completed prior to commencement of flight operations.
(Pet. 22) Petitioners also contend that the FAA violated
the AAIA because it did not require the Port Authority to
have assembled all funds necessary to implement the
recommended mitigation measures and/or have a fixed
timetable for completion of mitigation prior to com-
mencement of flight operations. (/d.)

As stated by the D.C. Circuit, petitioners “read [sic]
too much into... section 509(b)(5).” (Pet. App. A [D.C.

7. If the cryptuc and largely unintelligible footnote on p. 11 of
the Petition ts intended to assert that the FAA violated the DOT Act
because it approved the cargo hub without adcquatcly cvaluating
mecusures to mitigate the project's adverse cffects, it should be
disregarded. Petitioners did not address this point in their argu-
ment. so it must be considered waived.

26

Op.] at 36a) Significantly, petitioners do not cite a single
case from any court requiring that mitigation be com-
pleted before service begins. The Ninth Circuit imposed
such a requirement in one case, but that decision was
reversed by this Court in Robertson v. Methow Valley,
490 U.S. 332 (1989). Petitioners seek to distinguish
Methow Valley by arguing that this Court left open the
issue of mitigation where there is a “substantive” statute
requiring mitigation measures. The issue is not whether
AAIA is a substantive statute since the District Circuit
held the FEIS complied completely with the terms-of
AAIA.’ The D. C. Circuit correctly noted that “Section
509(b)(S) does not order agencies to take all steps to
lessen environmental trauma, just all reasonable ones.
(Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at 36a)

The FAA has the statutory authority to determine
that all reasonable steps have been taken to minimize
adverse environmental effects before it authorizes a
project under § 509(b)(5) of the AAIA. The mitigation
plan contained in the FEIS is a detailed, comprehensive,
three-vear plan. In interpreting § 509(b)(5), the D.C.
Circuit concluded that FAA’s determination that a de-
tailed mitigation plan combined with grounds to believe
that the mitigation plan will be implemented constituted
enough of a reasonable step for purposes of AAIA
compliance, and that the FAA did not commit a clear
error of judgment. (Pet. App. A[D.C. Op.] at 36a) Insofar
as the D.C. Circuit properly determined that the FAA’s
mitigation determination was reasonable, it is unneces-
sary for this Court to review and reiterate the D.C.
Circuit's holding.

S. Petitioners give no citation for their claim at Pet. 20-21 that
“the decision below holds, in cffect, that “substantive” mitigation
requirements are no different from “procedural” ones, and therefore
robs substantive requirements of their action forcing character.”
The D. C. Circuit made no such holding but merely held that the
FEIS complicd with AAIA in full.

27

Petitioners’ assertion that mitigation must be com-
pleted or fully funded before Burlington begins opera-
tions from Toledo is unreasonable because petitioners
attempt to impose an environmental standard which
exceeds the requirements of the AAIA. The statute
requires completion of all reasonable steps prior to
authorization of a project. By requiring completion of a
detailed mitigation plan combined with assurances that
the plan will be competed within a specified time frame,
the FAA assured that all reasonable steps had been
taken prior to authorizing the project to proceed. Requir-
ing completion of mitigation prior to authorization of the
project is unreasonable because it would have unneces-
sarily delayed the project for three years, despite Toledo
and Burlington’s compelling need for the hub which
could not wait that length of time.

This Court in Robertson v. Methow Valley, stated:
“[b]ecause NEPA imposes no substantive requirement
that mitigation measures actually be taken, it should not
be read to require agencies to obtain an assurance that
third parties will implement particular measures.” (490
U.S. at 353 n.16) This language implies that where a
statute does contain a substantive requirement, such as
the AAIA, that requirement can be met where an agency
has obtained assurances from third parties that particu-
lar measures will be implemented, as is true in this
case.”

9. In Methow Valley, this Court also cited statutes imposing
substantive cnvironmental obligations such as the Lndoangered
Species Act (ESA). (490 U.S. at 351 n.14) An example of a
substantive statute referred to by this Court was before the Ninth
Circuit in Millage of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d GOS (Oth Cir
1984). The Fisherics Service in that case issucd a final Biological
Opinion, making several rcasonable suggestions by which the
Seerctary could censure that a proposed sale of oil leases did not
jeopardize the continucd existence of any endangered species. The
court of appeals noted that the gencrality of the recommendations
implied that the Seerctary could choose the appropriate method
after the lease saic. Nonetheless, the court held that the Secretary
ot the Interior did not abuse his discretion under the ESA by

28

The FEIS provides a detailed mitigation plan that
will be implemented over a three-year period. Signifi-
cantly, the Port Authority has already been informed by
the FAA of an allocation of $7.4 million of Airport
Improvement program discretionary grant funds that
are available for use in property acquisitions and reloca-
tion assistance.'° The mitigation is well underway. Ac-
tual implementation of mitigation demonstrates that the
FAA reasonably relied on the Port Authority's commit-
ment to implement the detailed mitigation plan con-
tained in the FEIS and that the Port Authority’s com-
mitment satisfies the AAIA.

Petitioners also contend that the FAA violated the
AAIA because it did not require completion of the Part
150 Noise Compatibility Study prior to commencement
of flight operations. (Pet. 22) While the FAA did not
require the Part 150 Study to be completed prior to
commencement of flight operations, the Study was, in
fact. completed and submitted to the FAA in August
1991 — a full month prior to commencement of Bur-
lington’s flight operations. The fact that the study is now

Fn. 9 (Cont.)
deferring imposition of specific protections for cndangered whales
until after the proposed sale of oil Icascs.

In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that the Fishcrics
Service had reached an agreement with the Secretary providing for
the continucd monitoring activity after the Icase sale and that the
Secretary had placed special disclaimers in the Final Notice of Sale
specifying “his continuing control of any post-sale drilling.” (733
F.2d at 611) While appcliants charactcrized these factors as “only a
plan for later actica”™, the court concluded that by choosing this
plan, the Secretary recognized his obligation under the ESA to
implement the plan. (/d.) Significantly, the court found that the
monitoring agreement with the Fishcrics Service would “help the
Seerctary take these steps and diligently pursuc ESA compliance
atter the Icase sale.” (/d.)

10. This amount is an increase of approximatcly $2.6 million
in FAA grant funds since this case was argucd before the court
below.

29

complete also shows that the FAA reasonably relied on
the Port Authority's commitment to implement mitiga-
tion plans.

The D.C. Circuit properly concluded that “the Port
Authority's Part 150 study will be detailed, as the law
requires, and we do not think that the agency committed
a ‘clear error of judgment in deciding to use the study to
perfect the timing of an otherwise concrete proposal.”
(Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at 36a, citing Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971))

A proper understanding of the function that this
Study will serve in relation to the mitigation plan dem-
onstrates that it was reasonable for the FAA to issue its
ROD prior to completion of the Part 150 Study. The Part
150 Study is not the commitment to engage in mitiga-
tion or even the description of the nature of that mitiga-
tion. Those matters are included in the FEIS. Rather,
the Part 150 Study is the document which fine-tunes the
defined steps described in the FEIS that will aciually be
undertaken. As the court below found, the Part 150
Study “will help flesh out the details of the mitigation
plans.” (Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at 35a)

The D.C. Circuit properly concluded that “section
509(b)(5) does not order agencies to take all steps to
lessen environmental trauma, just all reasonable ones.”
(Pet. App. A [D.C. Op.] at 36a (emphasis in original)).
The court below properly held that the FAA has taken all
reasonable steps and has met its obligations under the
Statute. Accordingly, review of this case by writ of
certiorari is unwarranted.

30

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Petition for a writ of certiorari
to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit should be denied.

November, 1991

Respectfully Submitted:

JIM J. MARQUEZ
McNAIR LAW FIRM
1155 15th Street, N.W.
Suite 400

Washington, DC 20005
(202) 659-3900

Counsel for Respondent,
Toledo-Lucas County Port
Authority

and

JOHN W. SIMPSON
KELLEY, DRYE & WARREN
2300 M Street, N.W
Washington, DC 20037

(202) 9§5-9600

BRIAN E. COLE

18200 Van Karman Avenue
Irvine, CA 92715

(714) 752-1212

Counsel for Respondent,
Burlington Air Express
Inc.

APPENDIX

A-1
APPENDIX A

BURLINGTON David L. Marshall

AIR EXPRESS CHAIRMAN
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

June 27, 1990

Mr. Peter A. Serini

Manager

Detroit Airports District Office

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Willow Run Airport, East

8820 Beck Road

Belleville, MI 40111

Dear Mr. Serini:

During the course of the Environmental Impact State-
ment (EIS) process in relation to the creation of a
permanent air cargo hub at the Toledo Express Airport,
I have had the opportunity to review comments submit-
ted to the record by numerous parties. The purpose of
this letter is to respond to comments submitted by Mr.
Thomas E. Frank on May 15, 1990, which I have
become aware of only this week, concerning discussions
Burlington has held with the Fort Wayne-Allen County
Airport Authority, and remarks attributed to me which
appeared in the Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette on May 12,
1990. With this letter I intend to set the record straight
that Burlington Air Express remains committed to the
establishment and utilization of an air cargo hub at
Toledo Express Airport.

Mr. Frank alleges that Burlington has a “siandby second
choice to Toledo”, with those views apparently based on
a newspaper article which suggested that Burlington
would consider staying in Fort Wayne if it were unable
to move to Toledo. Mr. Frank also stated that Burlington
and Fort Wayne are “already actively dismissing Fort

A-2

Wayne as an alternative to Toledo.” Apparently these
statements are also based on the same newspaper arti-
cle.

I wish to affirm for the record that Burlington Air
Express does not have any existing viable alternative to
the proposed new hub project in Toledo. Very simply,
the Fort Wayne-Allen County Airport Authority has not
been able to develop sources of financial support for the
extensive airport improvements required in connection
with our hub project. Specifically, Fort Wayne lacks the
necessary aircraft parking ramp, fuel farm, related infra-
Structure and other airport improvements. Despite the
continuing good will of the Fort Wayne airport manage-
ment, funding for these improvements has not been
achievable in Fort Wayne. On the other hand, adequate
funding and planning for this major project has been
created in Toledo with the assistance of the Toledo-
Lucas County Port Authority. There are other very
important reasons for our need to relocate to Toledo,
including location closer to our primary market, the
existence of a preferred highway network and the avail-
ability of an expanded labor pool. These factors, together
with the lack of financial support for the project in Fort
Wayne, lead to the necessary decision to relocate to
Toledo.

Burlington's recent discussions with Fort Wayne have
related to a temporary extension of our existing hub
agreement pending completion of the delayed Toledo
project. Throughout those discussions with Fort Wayne,
Burlington maintained very openly its continued com-
mitment to its permanent hub facility Toledo.

A-3

As Chief Executive Officer of Burlington Air Express I
am pleased to re-affirm for the record that our company
is absolutely counting on the new Toledo hub as the
most critical element in our future operating plan. For
an air Cargo company, its hub is its heart in every sense.
We are facing “heart transplant surgery” and I cannot
over-stress how fundamental it is for the future of our
company that our new hub in Toledo be developed,
completed and operated as set forth in the Environmen-
tal Impact Statement.

Sincerely,
/s/
David L. Marshall

DLM/tp

! B-1

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CITIZENS AGAINST
BURLINGTON, INC.
et al. -
Petitioners,

V.

JAMES BUSEY, No. 90-1373
Administrator,
Federal Aviation
Administration
Respondent.

AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID L. MARSHALL

I, David L. Marshall, Being duly sworn, depose and
State:

1. I am the Chairman of Burlington Air Express,
Inc. (“Burlington”).

2. When I received Mr. Koslosky’s letter dated April
25, 1990 (Petitioners’ Exhibit J) I responded with a letter
dated May 2, 1990 (Petitioners’ Exhibit M). In my letter
I stated as follows:

“Burlington remains committed to the Tolcdo
project in exactly the same manner as vou and |]
discussed last February, though the necessary ‘kick-
off time for this major event has now drawn much
closer. There are many risks ahead, and there con-
tinue to be major uncertainties. In this environment,
I remain deeply grateful for the continuing support
of the Fort Wayne/Allen County Airport Authority
and for your own leadership. I accept the spirit and
purpose of your letter, and I want to assure you that

iene

B-2

I will look to Fort Wayne for support and solutions as
and if our Toledo commitment is altered by any of
the risks or uncertainties that lie ahead.” (Emphasis
added.)

3. Those statements were true when written and are
still true today. Burlington was and is “deeply grateful
for the continuing support of the Fort Wayne/Allen
County Airport Authority” in extending the Burlington
lease and thus allowing Burlington to remain at Fort
Wayne for 15 months pending the development of the
Toledo project. By the same token Burlington may need
a further extension of its Fort Wayne lease in the event
of further delays and thus would have to “look to Fort
Wayne for support and solutions as and if our Toledo
commitment is altered by any of the risks or uncertain-
ties that lie ahead.”

4. Mr. Koslosky’s letter of April 25, 1990 (Petitioners’
Exhibit J, p.3) also indicated that financing might be
available for a permanent Burlington hub at Fort Wayne.
Burlington's prior dealings with Fort Wayne gave Bur-
lington no reason to believe that the hopeful statements
in the April 25, 1990 letter reflected a dramatic change
in the existing situation in Fort Wayne. Nevertheless, I
took this letter very seriously. I believed it highly desir-
able to maintain the good relationships which had
facilitated the previous lease extension covering Bur-
lington’s temporary hub. As a matter of courtesy and
prudent due diligence, therefore, I instructed Glen Bee-
cher to meet with the Fort Wayne Authorities which he
did with the results described in Glen Beecher’s Affidavit
(Burlington’s Exhibit C). As stated in Beecher’s Affidavit
those meetings and conversations took place after my
letter of May 2, 1990. They confirmed the prior situation,
i.e., that there was no viable financial plan in prospect
for establishing a permanent hub and related airport
improvements at Fort Wayne.

B-3

5. My letter to the FAA dated June 27, 1990, which
is attached to the ROD, was written after those meetings
and correctly confirmed that no viable alternative had
been developed for a permanent hub at Fort Wayne. The
statements in my letter dated May 2, 1990, to Mr.
Koslosky and my letter to the FAA dated June 27, 1990,
are both true and are mutually consistent.

6. There is also no basis in fact for the Petitioners’
claim (p.9) that “Burlington itself says it can even
accommodate a project cancellation by remaining in
Fort Wayne Pet. Ex. M.” As indicated at length in
Burlington’s Answer, pp.1-8, Petitioners confuse the
possibility of remaining at Fort Wayne temporarily —
which might be accomplished with the continuing good-
will and support of the Fort Wayne Airport Authority,
albeit at a great cost — with establishing a permanent
hub at Fort Wayne which is not feasible for the reasons
set forth in my letter to the FAA dated June 27, 1990.

7. The top of Petitioners’ Exhibit M indicates that it
was faxed to them by “FWAC Airport Authority,” i.e., the
Fort Wayne Allen County Airport Authority. It is there-
fore significant that Petitioners’ Reply contains nothing
which refutes or even takes issue with Glen Beecher’s
Affidavit stating that Fort Wayne never offered “any
specific package for the financing of a permanent hub
facility at Fort Wayne” and that Burlington would be
faced with significant environmental issues at Fort
Wayne (Exhibit C to Burlington’s Answer).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746, I declare under penalty
of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on July 31, 1990

/s/
David L. Marshall

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_2665%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
