# Opposition Brief — American Economy Insurance v. Smith

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1991
- **Citation:** 502 U.S. 939

## Text

_ ~~

No. 91-375

=4y

In The

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1991

+

AMERICAN ECONOMY INSURANCE
COMPANY, et al.,

Petitioners,

BEVERLY L. SMITH, et al.,

Respondents.

¢

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The
Court Of Appeals For
The Second District Of Texas

¢

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

¢

Counse! for Respondents
Beverly L. Smith &
William Smith

FRANK R. JEWEL!

Jewett & Associates
3100 Monticello Avenue
Dallas, Texas 75205
(214) 528-2800 telephone
(214) 528-4907 telefax

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-4964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTIONS PRESENTED (RESTATED)

An exception to ERISA coverage exists for employee
benefit plans “maintained solely for the purpose of com-
plying with applicable workman’s compensation laws.”
29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3).

The questions (restated) presented in this petition
are:

1) Does this ERISA exception apply to a policy of
Workers’ Compensation obtained by an employer in com-
pliance with applicable state law which penalizes non-
conforming employers by withdrawal of common law
defenses in direct negligence actions by injured
employees not covered by such insurance?

2) Does this exception apply to a policy of Workers’
Compensation insurance which complies solely with
applicable state workers’ compensation laws and admin-
istrative procedures under which benefits are adminis-
tered by a separate administrative unit?

ii
LIST OF PARTIES AND RULE 29.1 LIST

The parties to the proceedings below were the peti-
tioner American Economy Insurance Company, the peti-
tioner Lindsey & Newsom Claim Services, Inc. (formerly
known as Lindsey & Newsom Insurance Adjusters, Inc.),
and the respondents Beverly L. Smith and William Smith.

Petitioners have identified the parent company of the
petitioners as follows:

The parent company of American Economy Insur-
ance Company is American States Insurance Company,
whose parent company is Lincoln National Corporation.
American Economy Insurance Company has no non-
wholly-owned subsidiaries.

The parent company of Lindsey & Newsom Claim
Services, Inc., is Morden & Helwig Group, Inc.; Lindsey &
Newsom Claim Services, Inc., has no non-wholly-owned
subsidiaries.

ili

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
EE SS ee i
List of Parties and Rule 29.1 List.................. ii
ee ideas waves es vesudvaseeees iii
Table of Authorities ..... fae a apd dane ie, gl aan EAR ee iv
ee gs a VA a'e ao 90k 9 05-02 1
i, sees wie eh eu valeee rar 2
Statutory Provisions Involved...................... 2
re 3
How the Federal Questions Were Presented........ 5
Reasons for Denying the Writ ..................... 5

I. A SEPARATE POLICY OF INSURANCE WHICH
PROVIDES ONLY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
BENEFITS REQUIRED BY STATE LAW AND
ADMINISTERED AS A SEPARATE UNIT IS
EXEMPT FROM ERISA PREEMPTION ......... 6

Il. THOSE PLANS LIMITED TO WORKMENS’
COMPENSATION BENEFITS, UNEMPLOY-
MENT COMPENSATION BENEFITS AND DIS-
ABILITY BENEFITS SPECIFIED BY LAW,
WHICH DO NOT IMPINGE UPON THE
ADMINISTRATION OF OTHER CO-EXISTING
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS PROVIDED BY
AND ADMINISTERED BY THE EMPLOYER,
QUALIFY FOR EXEMPTION FROM ERISA PRE-
et ere ea ose bese asec cei tess s 9

I a 2 Oe er eS a cee uns 11

STATUTES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
Cases
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504
St SRR Aah iE ese aay aaa Fier ae neg g ed 9
Ft. Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1
ky SORE DARE Seen BIS Bane os renal eee 9
Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473
| SR SEN Serie ee setg weer Heat sy a We 5

Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983)....6, 10

Smith v. American Economy Ins. Co., 794 S.W.2d 574
(Tex. App. — Ft. Worth 1990, writ denied)......... l

poe a ee ae ee rr rer ee ee ee
a ee SS ee eee 6, 7
ae! ee ee ee ee
Tex. Rev. Stat. art. 8306 § 3.22..... Peery Tir eer s
Tex. Rev. Stat. art. 8306 § 4........ > .7, 10
Tex. Rev. Stat. art. 8506-6309... .. 1.0... eens cess eer
Tex. Rev. Stat. ast. GSG7 & 1... 62... eee ; 6
ro Sie |) 2
EF UF POE ss cocky cr ce can ees 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES
Texas Register, “Rules of the Industrial Accident
Board” 3, 6

No. 91-379
+

In The

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1991
*

AMERICAN ECONOMY INSURANCE
COMPANY, et al.,

Petitioners,

BEVERLY L. SMITH, et al.,

Respondents.

+

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The
Court Of Appeals For
The Second District Of Texas

+

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
+

The Respondents, Beverly L. Smith and William
Smith, respectfully pray that Petitioners’ petition for a
writ of certiorari to review the judgment and opinion of
the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas, be
in all things denied.

—-— —---— 6

OPINIONS BELOW

[he opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second
District of Texas is reported at 794 S.W.2d 574.

The Supreme Court of Texas denied discretionary
review without opinion.

JURISDICTION

The opinion and judgment of the Court of Appeals
were entered on August 1, 1990. Timely motions for

rehearing of that decision were overruled on September
11, 1990.

Timely applications to the Supreme Court of Texas
for a writ of error were denied on March 27, 1991. A
timely motion for rehearing of that decision was over-
ruled on June 5, 1991.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. § 1257(a).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) states in pertinent part:
The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to
any employee benefit plan if -

(3) such plan is maintained solely for the
purpose of complying with applicable work-
men’s compensation laws or unemployment
compensation or disability insurance laws; ... .

¢

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a suit by Respondents Beverly Smith
(“Smith”) and her husband William Smith arising out of a
workers’ compensation claim filed by Smith in 1984. Peti-
tioners are the American Economy Insurance Company
(“American Economy”), which is a workers’ compensa-
tion carrier, and Lindsey & Newsom Insurance Adjusters,
Inc. (“Lindsey & Newsom”), which is American Econ-
omy’s adjuster.

At the time of her injuries, Beverly Smith was
employed by Braum’s Ice Cream Stores, Inc. (“Braum’s”)
in Tarrant County, Texas. Braum’s was then insured
under a workers’ compensation program that was totally
separate and apart from any other insurance coverage
provided by Braum’s to its employees. Moreover,
Braum’s workers’ compensation plan was administered
under totally separate and independent procedures from

any other employee benefits plan provided by Braum’s.
(R. 20, 22, 23).

After sustaining her injury, Smith sought medical
treatment from an orthopedic doctor, but she was refused
medical care because Petitioners refused to accept finan-
cial responsibility for her treatment. Petitioners instead
directed Smith to report to three different doctors, who
rendered opinions on her condition.

In reliance on the medical records and reports of
these three doctors, Smith settled her claim. This settle-
ment was approved by the Texas Industrial Accident
Board in accordance with the Texas Workers’ Compensa-
tion Act and the administrative procedures established by
the Texas Industrial Accident Board. (R. 24, 38).

Subsequently, Smith learned that her injury was more
severe than the mild back strain as diagnosed by Peti-
tioners’ doctors. Smith’s physicians performed further
diagnostic tests and discovered that she suffered from a
herniated, intervertebral disk. She underwent surgery for
the removal of the disk and was left with a permanent
partial disability and future medical expenses.

Smith then filed suit to set aside her prior settlement
and to reopen her claim before the Texas Industrial Acci-
dent Board. In addition, Smith sued Petitioners for dam-
ages on the basis of misrepresentation by Petitioners’
agents, Smith’s detrimental reliance on Petitioners’ doc-
tors’ reports, and Petitioners’ breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing. (R. 19-38).

American Economy and Lindsey & Newsom moved
for summary judgment on the ground, inter alia, that the
Smiths’ damage claims were preempted by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”); (R.
46-121, 308-13). The trial court granted summary judg-
ment to both defendants. (R. 368, 369).

The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the summary
judgment and remanded the case for trial. The Court of
Appeals held that Braum’s workers’ compensation plan
was maintained solely for the purpose of complying with
Texas’ workers’ compensation law. Thus, under 29 U.S.C.
§ 1003(b)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), the Court of Appeals found that
Smith’s claims were not preempted by ERISA federal
laws. The Court of Appeals rejected Petitioners argu-
ments that the plan was intricately embedded with

Braum’s other insurance and employee benefits. Pet.
A-1-8.

The Supreme Court of Texas denied discretionary
review of this decision. (P. A-13, infra).

+

HOW THE FEDERAL QUESTIONS WERE PRESENTED

Respondents acknowledge that Petitioners sought to
raise the federal questions presented herein as stated in
their petition.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

This case presents a fact question as to whether the
workers’ compensation policy as written by American
Employers and administered by the Texas Industrial
Accident Board is a plan “maintained solely for the pur-
pose of complying with applicable workmens’ compensa-
tion laws...” and thus exempt from ERISA coverage
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3).

Petitioners concede that “ . . . state courts undoubt
edly have full jurisdiction to adjudicate federal law
issues,” e.g. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S.
473, 478-79 (1981); Petitioners’ Brief, p. 10. Here the state
court, fully recognizing the ERISA preemptions and regu-
lations applicable to employee benefit plans, made a fac-
tual determination that American Economy’s policy of
insurance in question fell squarely within the ERISA
exemption. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3).

I. A SEPARATE POLICY OF INSURANCE WHICH
PROVIDES ONLY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
BENEFITS REQUIRED BY STATE LAW AND
ADMINISTERED AS A SEPARATE UNIT IS
EXEMPT FROM ERISA PREEMPTION.

In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983), this
Court established a two-fold test to determine whether a
plan is “maintained solely for a purpose of complying
with applicable workmen’s compensation laws” under 29
U.S.C. 1003(b)(3). The test is whether, in practice, the plan
is administered as a separate administrative unit and
whether it provides only those benefits required by state
law. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 107.

Texas created a statutory administrative body, the
Industrial Accident Board, now known as the Texas
Workers’ Compensation Commission. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Art. 8307 § 1. This administrative body was empowered
to create rules to carry out the provisions of the workers’
compensation benefit program in Texas. Texas Register,
Rules of the Industrial Accident Board Workers Compen-
sation. These administrative rules, together with the stat-
utory provisions of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act
(Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. arts. 8306-8309-1), provide a complete
administrative plan for the workers’ compensation pro-
gram in Texas.

Under this statute, employers in Texas are not
required to subscribe to workers’ compensation insurance
(Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 8306). However, once the
employer elects to provide workers’ compensation cover-
age, the «mployer then is required to accept the rights
and responsibilities imposed by the statute.

Upon subscription, the employer must obtain insur-
ance coverage through a licensed insurance company or
through self-insurance. Texas has provided comprehen-
sive guidelines and requirements that mandate what
medical benefits and disability benefits must be provided
by the employer through its insurance carrier to qualify
as workers’ compensation coverage. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Art. 8306. The employer is not free to establish his own
plan to compensate employees who suffer from occupa-
tional injuries. Only by providing those benefits required
by the Texas workers’ compensation statute and by sub-
mitting to administration of such benefits by the appro-
priate state agency can the employer avoid penalties set
by the workers’ compensation statute.

The insurer for an employee who subscribes to the
Act becomes absolutely liable to pay workers’ compensa-
tion benefits when an employee is injured in the course
and scope of his employment. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 8306
§ 3a. However, the employer’s liability is limited. In
return, the employee of subscribers lose their right to sue
their employer under the common law or under statute,
unless the employee timely notifies the employer that he
declines the workers’ compensation coverage.

If the employer chooses not to subscribe, however,
the injured employee may sue for common law and statu-
tory damages. In addition, the non-subscribing employer
loses all common law defenses in the law suit against it
by an injured employee. In addition, the employer faces
unlimited liability. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 8306, § 1, 4.
Thus the benefit and importance of obtaining coverage
under the state workers’ compensation law is obvious.

Moreover, a non-subscribing employer must notify
the Commission that he is declining to subscribe in the
manner and time prescribed by Commission rules. Other-
wise, his failure to notify the Commission subjects the
employer to a monetary penalty for each day of noncom-
pliance. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 8306 § 3.22. Thus,
although the employer may opt out of Texas workers’
compensation program, the employer is still bound by the
workers’ compensation law in important respects. The
decision to subscribe or not to subscribe is not wholly
“free,” and “voluntary,” or “strictly elective,” as Peti-
tioners would have this Court believe.

In this case, Braum’s elected to provide workers’
compensation coverage under Texas’ workers’ compensa-
tion statute. Braum’s activities with respect to its
workers’ compensation coverage was governed exclu-
sively by the Industrial Accident Board. The rules of
administration of the workers’ compensation plan was
governed by the Industrial Accident Board with penalties
for non-compliance imposed and determined by the
Industrial Accident Board.

Moreover, Braum’s procured a policy of workers’
compensation insurance from American Economy which
by its very terms complied with those terms required by
the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act. American Econ-
omy, as the employer’s insurer for workers compensation
carrier, is also governed by rules of the Industrial Acci-
dent Board. es

II. THOSE PLANS LIMITED TO WORKMENS’ COM-
PENSATION BENEFITS, UNEMPLOYMENT COM-
PENSATION BENEFITS AND DISABILITY
BENEFITS SPECIFIED BY WORKERS’ COMPEN-
SATION LAW, WHICH DO NOT IMPINGE UPON
THE ADMINISTRATION OF OTHER CO-EXIS-
TING EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS PROVIDED
BY AND ADMINISTERED BY THE EMPLOYER,
QUALIFY FOR EXEMPTION FROM ERISA PRE-
EMPTION.

The presence of exclusionary clause 29 U.S.C. 1003(b)
(3) in the ERISA statute bespeaks the intent of the framers
of the statute to exclude workers’ compensation pro-
grams which do not impact upon other aspects of
‘employer benefit plans’ or their administration. In Alessi
v. Raybestos — Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981), this
Court upheld the preemption by federal law in New
Jersey’s workers’ compensation statute only insofar as it
impacted upon pension benefits governed by ERISA.
Allessi, 451 U.S. at 506. However, this Court did not
mandate preemption of the whole New Jersey workers’
compensation statute.

The purpose of ERISA preemption is to provide uni-
form regulation and administration by employers of
employee benefit plans. Ft. Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v.
Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987):

Congress intended preemption to afford
employers advantages of a uniform set of
administrative procedures governed by a single
set of regulations. This concern only arises,
however, with respect to benefits whose provi-
sions by nature require an ongoing administrative
program to meet the employer's obligation. It is for

10

this reason that Congress pre-empted state laws
relating to plans rather than simply to benefits.

Id. at 11 (emphasis added).

Where a state, by law, has established required bene-
fits for workmens’ compensation plans, unemployment
or disability insurance benefits and where such programs
are not administered by the employer as part of his total
employee benefit plan, but as a separate administrative
unit, the ERISA exemption applies. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3).
Accord Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983):

Only separately administered disability plans
maintained solely to comply with the Disability
Benefit Law are exempt from ERISA coverage
under § 4(b)(3).

Id.

As a Braum’s employee, Smith was eligible to partici-
pate in Braum’s employee benefit plan (R 49-50). That
plan provided a group life and accidental death and
dismembership insurance policy issued by a company
other than American Economy and a group accident, med-
ical and non-occupational disability benefit program that
was self-insured. (R 53-121, 130-98). There was no inter-
connection between the workers’ compensation plan and
other benefits provided through other programs offered
by Braum’s as part of its employee benefit plan.

American Economy’s policy serves no other purpose
than to comply with the Texas Workers’ Compensation
Act. ERISA expressly does not apply to plans that have as
their entire purpose compliance with state law. In this
case, the entire policy at issue was a workers’ compensa-
tion plan that was required to be in place strictly

11

pursuant to Texas’ workers’ compensation law to which
Braum’s elected to subscribe. The entire plan was regu-
lated by the workers’ compensation statute. Braum’s
workers’ compensation policy did not contain a single
benefit not required by Texas’ workers’ compensation
law. Therefore, ERISA does not preempt the legal issues
considered in this case.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the writ of certiorari
should be denied in this case.

Respectfully submitted,

FRANK R. JEWELL

Jewett & AssociaTEs

3100 Monticello, Suite 8J0
Dallas, Texas 75205

(214) 528-2800 telephone
(214) 528-4907 telefax

Counsel for Respondents
Beverly Smith and
William Smith

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_2647%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
