# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n v. Aubry > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_2619%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 1992 - **Citation:** 504 U.S. 979 ## Text %7 = 54 9 | ~ as «Crust oS ! i nN a es am No. AUS 19 t99) TRE a, In the ! Supreme Cottier’! °°, OF THE United States OCTOBER TERM, 1991 PACIFIC MERCHANT SHIPPING ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF MERCHANT SHIPPING, OFFSHORE MARINE SERVICE ASSOCIATION, WESTERN OIL & GAS ASSOCIATION AND CLEAN SEAS, Petitioners, vs. LLOYD W. AUBRY, JR., LABOR COMMISSIONER, DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI THOMAS E. HILL Counsel of Record CAROLINE G. SMITH MUSICK, PEELER & GARRETT One Wilshire Boulevard Suite 2100 Los Angeles, California 90017 (213) 629-7676 GarRY M. BRIGHT BRIGHT & POWELL 1090 Eugenia Place Carpinteria, California 93013-2011 (805) 684-8480 Attorneys for Petitioners Bowne of Los Angeles, Inc., Law Printers. (213) 627-2200 i QUESTIONS PRESENTED Respondent is responsible for enforcing California’s wage and hour laws. This case arises out of Respondent’s decision to apply state overtime requirements designed for land-based employment within California to maritime employment on the high seas. The questions for review are: 1. Whether federal admiralty law preempts the appli-~ cation of state overtime laws to maritime employment on the high seas under the constitutional principles esta)- lished by this Court in cases such as Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), and Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920)? 2. Whether the Fair Labor Standards Act preempts the application of state overtime laws to maritime employ- ment on the high seas? li LIST OF PARTIES Petitioners in this Court (plaintiffs-appellees below) are Pacific Merchant Shipping Association, American Institute of Merchant Shipping, Offshore Marine Service Association, Western Oil & Gas Association and Clean Seas. Respondent in this Court (defendant-appellant be- low) is Lloyd W. Aubry, Jr., Labor Commissioner, Divi- sion of Labor Standards Enforcement, Department of Industrial Relations, State of California. The remaining parties in the lower court proceedings (i1.e., plaintiff- intervenors Tidewater Marine Service, Inc. and Western Boat Operators, Inc.) have not been named as respon- dents in this Court since their interests are not adverse to those of Petitioners, and since they have filed their own separate petition for writ of certiorari in these proceedings. RULE 29.1 STATEMENT Petitioners have no parent or subsidiary companies. ili TABLE OF CONTENTS QUESTIONS PRESENTED................... rib ves cecevcrcscecereess Es oy |) 1) y aa i crip bh aes eee degen eee EG cre Gab Nieds sds ccccceseess CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND OTHER EE GU TUIU ED secs cescccceccces STATEMENT OF THE CASE................. ER gS Sel er rr I cnc cccrucceclebveeeenes REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ...... I. The Ninth Circuit Erred In Holding That Federal Admiralty Law Does Not Preempt The Applica- tion Of State Overtime Laws To Maritime Em- ployment On The High Seas ................. II. The Ninth Circuit Erred In Holding That The Fair Labor Standards Act Does Not Preempt The Application Of State Overtime Laws To Maritime Employment On The High Seas .............. SE 10 10 EE ores wees ee dees essen A-1 — A-85 iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Page Agsalud v. Pony Express Courier Corp. of America, 833 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1987) ................ 4 Branch v. Schumann, 445 F.2d 175 (Sth Cir. 1971)... 0... cccccccece 14 Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1981) .............06. 14 C.M. Rousseau, Jr. v. Teledyne Movable Offshore, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1513 (D.La. 1985), cert. denied, GT I ED o.0.db dn cc cdepesccctacives 12 California Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, Be eee 4 Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., Inc., ee Se EY 5 wkceddscuevewenseeeses ex 14 Coastal Iron Works, Inc. v. Petty Ray Geophysical, 783 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1986) .............6.. 14 De Canas v. Bica, le cn cuss oeneekncecen ous 4 Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, ee ee i a eee ea hasan es 14 Indiana Civil Rights Commission v. American Commercial Barge Line Co., 523 N.E.2d 241 (Ind. App. 1988), cert. denied, ee ee ee oe Ce webeue 14 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, Bik Se 2. eee 3, 10, 19, 21, 22, 23 Kossick v. United Fruit Co., ee a haves ee wan 14 v TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. —_, 111 S.Ct. 317, 112 L.Ed.2d 275 SEE AeA cca ka hehe es vas ee ee eee eae s 3,17 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers, International Union, AFL-CIO, 504 F.2d 272 (Sth Cir. 1974) .............. 13, 23, 24 Nelson v. United States, 639 F.3d 460 (Oth Cir. 1960) ......cccccecess 14 Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, et eS | ee re 10, 14, 21, 22 Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, International Union, AFL-CIO v. Mobil Oil Corp., GP Ga Ie CE eo ch oh eeasscaccesccs 14, 20, 21, 23 Pettis Moving Co., Inc. v. Roberts, 784 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1986) ................. 4 Ramsauer v. United States, ee ee ee Ce eNO ovo ie wie CNeacaes 12 Sorensen v. City of New York, 202 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, Se We NED ag vac kciva sew cesses eeun 11 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, ee Re Fs er ee 10, 11, 14, 21 State of Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., ee ee I ics wawevccusscaasenanks 19, 22 Sun World Lines, Lid. v. March Shipping Corp., 801 F.2d 1066 (8th Cir. 1986) ............... 14 The Youngstown, 110 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, ee Cee ee ED 6 koh web eee cae kl cee eben. 12 Nisin vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Page Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, Sane rh rs See 11 United States v. California, ee ge 13 Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 431 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970) ................ 14 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, BO Se Pe COD 6k ooo chk hve 4 Williams v. W.M.A. Transit Co., 472 F.2d 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1972) .............. 4 3 ccceaiiataenaiiataatatiaaaaatcae iia vil TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Federal Statutes Page United States Constitution Article III, Section 2, Clause 1............... 2 28 United States Code ED cc eccccvecvudecuaveswcunsnss 2 SS LEE EET PETE TTT ET TICE ETE TE 3 29 United States Code cnt veseaceveeuwbtheawenaes 20 eR PPP eerrreererrrreere ie 15 cc cceccceeusnsevevancevessas 16 I IS go cco cccnseesveesseetwees 16 eR NOD oc cccccrcccececeveseuesess 2 EIT PTET ECT E TEETER Ce 3,18 46 United States Code I Ee OF OO noc ce cccureservereccseees 21 I ys cues cate cect eavceeweeenseeuts 21 I UD 66 kc ocevescccttarecemeees 13 Mostiows TITANS 2c cc ccccccccsccescenevces 7 es ccc b ev peuswevesuenseues 7 ee ARIE cov cccucvocessevvccncuns 13 ee BNO 6 ccc rte vcvescncvvesssesecs 7 cst cssesssetercewesess eh 7 ee ck eee redue wee eee eee eee es 7 I NEED . vccccveeccusssueoocoses 5 a EEE on occ ckccesenceasvenctes 5 i ga vn ese eee eeeenbeennt> 5 viii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES State Statutes Page Alaska gS 8 ee er errr 9 California Re 8 re 8 Wage Order 4-80, 8 Cal. Code Regs. ee OE, ss ss wo nn 66% wens 3, 8, 9, 15 Connecticut Gem. Beat. Gootion S1-7E) .. .. ww cece ce cwceses 9 Hawaii mov. Stat. Geotion SETOla) .. 2. ccc cccccccccss 9 Maine Rev. Stat. Ann., tit. 26, Section 664........... 9 Massachusetts Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 760, Section 1A.......... 9 Minnesota Stat. Section 177.23(7) (1)-(19) .............. 9 North Carolina Gen. Stat. Section 95-25.14(c) ............... 9 Pennsylvania Min. Wage Act Section 5(b) ................. 9 Washington Rev. Code Section 49.46.130(1) .............. 9 ix TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Treatises Page Friedell, Benedict on Admiralty (7th Ed. 1987) .. 14 Norris, The Law of Seamen (4th Ed. 1985) ...... 13 Miscellaneous Joint Hearings on S. 2475 and H.R. 7200 Before the Senate Comm. on Educ. and Labor and the House Comm. on Labor, 75th Cong., lst Sess., 81 Cong. Rec.—Part 7, p. 7875 (1987) ..........ccc0e- 18 No. In the Supreme Court OF THE United States OCTOBER TERM, 1991 PACIFIC MERCHANT SHIPPING ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF MERCHANT SHIPPING, OFFSHORE MARINE SERVICE ASSOCIATION, WESTERN OIL & Gas ASSOCIATION AND CLEAN SEAS, Petitioners, vs. LLOYD W. AUBRY, JR., LABOR COMMISSIONER, DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI Petitioners pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered in these proceed- ings on November 13, 1990. 2 OPINIONS BELOW The majority and dissenting opinions of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals are reported at 918 F.2d 1409 and are reprinted in the Appendix beginning at A-1. The opinion of the United States District Court for the Central District of California that granted Petitioners’ motion for summary judgment is reported at 709 F.Supp. 1516 and is reprinted in the Appendix beginning at A-46. JURISDICTION Petitioners invoke the jurisdiction of this Court pursu- ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). The judgment of the Ninth Cireuit Court of Appeals was entered on November 13, 1990. Petitioners’ timely petition for rehearing with sug- gestion for rehearing en banc was filed on November 27, 1990, and was denied by the Ninth Circuit on May 28, 1991. See Appendix at A-45. CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND OTHER AUTHORITY INVOLVED Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part: “The judicial power shall extend ... to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” Section 13(b) (6) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213(b) (6), provides: “The provisions of section 207 of this title [relating to maximum hours and overtime compensation] shall not apply with respect to — (6) any employee employed as 4 seaman.” 3 Section 18(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 218(a), provides, in pertinent part: “No provision of this chapter or of any order there- under shall excuse noncompliance with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing ... a maximum workweek lower than the maximum work- week established under this chapter... .” California Wage Order 4-80, 8 Cal. Code Regs. §$§ 11040, et seg., regulates the wages, hours and working conditions of professional, technical, clerical, mechanical and similar land-based occupations. Wage Order 4-80 is reprinted in the Appendix beginning at A-68. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1. Introduction For over two centuries, maritime employers operating vessels on the high seas have governed their employment practices with reference to a uniform system of federal admiralty law applicable throughout the nation. This case arises from Respondent’s unprecedented attempt to im- pose a state scheme of wage and hour regulation onto a conflicting federal scheme where uniformity is constitu- tionally mandated.’ Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. $1331, the District Court (Judge A. Wallace Tashima) granted Peti- tioners’ motion for summary judgment and declared Cali- fornia’s overtime laws to be preempted insofar as Respondent seeks to apply those laws to maritime em- ‘This Court has long recognized the constitutional mandate for a uniform body of federal admiralty law. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 164 (1920). Accord Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. ___.,, 111 S.Ct. 317, 322, 112 L.Ed.2d 275 (1990). + ployment on the high seas. In a 2 to 1 decision, the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court’s judgment, issuing a majority opinion (authored by Judge Harry Pregerson) and a separate dissenting opinion (authored by Senior Judge William P. Copple). Relying exclusively on inappo- site cases involving land-based workers, the Ninth Circuit majority upheld Respondent’s actions based on Califor- nia’s traditional “police powers” over its “resident work- ers.” (Appendix at A-11.)’ The Ninth Circuit majority opinion misconstrues the analytical framework applicable to issues of maritime preemption and misapprehends the controlling facts of this case. Contrary to the controlling legal premise of the majority opinion, the issues raised by this admiralty case cannot properly be addressed under a standard, land- based preemption analysis. The majority opinion fails to recognize that a maritime preemption case presents a fundamentally different set of constitutional issues than is raised in other types of preemption cases. In addition, contrary to the controlling factual premise of the majority opinion, this case does not involve the application of a limited state law to a narrow category of maritime workers who are employed “off the California Coast” and who do not engage in “voyages.” (Appendix at A-11.) As the District Court properly found, Respon- dent has expressed his sworn intent to apply California’s * All of the labor cases cited by the Ninth Circuit majority in deciding this admiralty case involved land-based employees such as migrant farmworkers, De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), bank tellers, California Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987), chambermaids, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), and truck drivers, Agsalud v. Pony Express Courier Corp. of America, 833 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1987), Pettis Moving Co., Inc. v. Roberts, 784 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1986), and Williams v. W.M.A. Transit Co., 472 F.2d 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 5 overtime laws to maritime workers engaged in (i) coast- wise voyages, (ii) voyages between California and Canada or Mexico and (iii) voyages between the Pacific and Gulf Coasts.’ Respondent has further expressed his sworn intent to enforce this policy regardless of whether the maritime employees in question entered into employment contracts in California or are residents of California or some other state. These are the controlling facts of this case.* *Respondent has only eschewed regulatory authority over vessels engaged in “foreign” or “intercoastal” voyages as those terms are defined by the Shipping Act. 46 U.S.C. 10301(a)(1) and 10301 (a) (2). (Appendix at A-57 — A-58.) A voyage between Califor- nia and any other state on the Pacific or Gulf Coasts is not an “intercoastal” voyage, and a voyage between California and Canada or Mezico is not a “foreign” voyage. Respondent’s regulatory ‘re- straint” also fails to encompass “coastwise” voyages; 1.¢., voyages between ports in different (non-adjacent) states on the same coast. 46 U.S.C. § 10501. It is uncontroverted that many of the members of Petitioner trade associations operate vessels engaged in coastwise voyages, as well as in voyages between California and Mexico or Canada, or between California and ports on the Gulf Coast. For the sake of analytical expedience, the Ninth Circuit majority opinion simply brushes aside these employer-parties as if they didn’t exist, and proceeds to analyze _ this action as if it were a two-boat, two-employer case. This factual error inevitably taints the majority’s analysis and inflicts great injustice on the vast majority of maritime employers involved in this case. *Respondent’s designated policy expert on maritime employment testified as follows during his deposition: “Q. [A vessel] is permanently stationed outside the territorial boundaries of the State of California...,and you have got employees working on the vessel. Some reside in Nevada; some reside in Oregon; some reside in California. Do you have jurisdiction — A. Yes. (continued ...) 6 The District Court correctly concluded that Califor- nia’s overtime laws (i) conflict with those provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act that relate to maritime employment and (ii) otherwise impinge upon established principles of federal admiralty law. In reaching this conclusion, the District Court embraced the “common sense’’ notion that rules applicable to land-based employ- ees working fixed schedules at fixed locations are inher- ently ill-suited to the unique working conditions of seamen aboard vessels plying the high seas. Petitioners respectfully submit that a proper assessment of this case based on (i) the correct analytical framework, (ii) the controlling facts and (iii) a modicum of common sense, compels the conclusion that California’s overtime laws must be found preempted to the extent that they are applied to regulate the employment of maritime workers on the high seas. Il. Factual Background The members of Petitioner trade associations own and operate vessels registered and regulated pursuant to federal law and provide maritime employment to individu- *’... continued) 7 o a © Even [over] the Oregon residents? That’s right. I think so. Even [over] the Nevada resident? Right. a Q. Do you think that [Respondent] can properly exercise juris- diction over a non-California resident, non-California inhabi- tant whose work situs is outside the State of California? A. Yes.” Sebo acs. 7 als who are licensed as masters, mates or engineers by the United States Coast Guard (“USCG”’), or who are other- wise certificated by the USCG as seamen.” It is common for these maritime employers to employ on the same vessel, during the same work period, employees who re- side in many different states. These employees normally work continuous periods of service that can last from days to months depending upon the length of a particular voyage or other factors. During any given period of service, an employee will typically live and work on the vessel until the conclusion of the period of service. Petitioner Clean Seas is an unincorporated joint under- taking formed to contain and clean up marine oil spills and perform other maritime activities. To accomplish its environmental protection mission, Clean Seas operates Mr. Clean III, a 181 foot, 292 gross ton ocean-going vessel. Mr. Clean III is permanently stationed on the high seas over the Point Pedernales and Point Arguello oil fields on the Outer Continental Shelf, four to ten nautical miles off the California Coast. Except when it is actually underway, Mr. Clean III is normally tied to a mooring buoy located approximately seven nautical miles off the California Coast.® ‘The usce has broad regulatory authority with respect to the licensure and certification of masters, mates, engineers and other maritime employees. 46 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7114, 7302, 8101(g), 8304(c) and 8701. °Since June of 1986, Mr. Clean III has continuously been on station over the Point Pedernales and Point Arguello oil fields, excepting a two-month period in a shipyard for the installation of a marine fire- fighting system, occasional visits to port for repairs, resupply or annual USCG inspections, and a three-month open ocean oil spill recovery assignment off the coast of Alaska in connection with the Prince William Sound oil spill. 8 Mr. Clean III is manned by rotating 12-member crews consisting of a licensed master, mate and engineer, and nine USCG-certificated seamen. These individuals are permanently assigned to Mr. Clean III and the vessel is their sole work situs. The crewmembers assigned to Mr. Clean III normally work either 14-day or 7-day periods of service aboard the vessel, alternating with 14-day or 7-day periods of leave on shore. Crewmembers are transported fifty miles via helicopter from California to Mr. Clean III’s permanent station on the high seas at the beginning and end of their periods of service. Respondent is responsible for enforcing California’s wage and hour laws. These laws are codified in a series of industrial and occupational Wage Orders issued by the California Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC’’). The IWC has been delegated authority to promulgate Wage Orders to regulate the wages, hours and working condi- tions of employees “in’’ California. Cal. Lab. Code § 1173 (emphasis added). Pursuant to this statutory authority, the IWC has issued Wage Orders covering employees in 12 industries and three occupational groups. Among these Wage Orders is Wage Order 4-80, which is expressly limited to professional, technical, clerical, mechanical, and similar land-based occupations. (Appendix at A-68 — A-85.) Commencing in 1987, Respondent began to assert the right to exercise jurisdiction over, investigate, adjudicate and prosecute the wage claims of seamen and other maritime employees, and to do so regardless of whether the vessels on which these employees work are normally situated within the state’s territorial waters or operate entirely on the high seas. In a series of cases involving Petitioner Clean Seas and other maritime employers, Respondent exercised jurisdiction over the wage claims of 9 employees assigned to work as members of the crews of American flag vessels in navigation on both the high seas and California’s territorial waters. In adjudicating these claims pursuant to Wage Order 4-80, Respondent coilec- tively awarded the 12 seamen involved over $800,000 in overtime pay and interest for periods of employment of less than 18 months. This collective award essentially required that crewmembers be compensated at an annual rate of close to $70,000 for work they had agreed in writing to perform for as little as $9 an hour. Wage Order 4-80 is expressly designed to regulate the wages, hours and working conditions of land-based em- ployees such as librarians, dental hygienists, bank tellers and legal secretaries. (Appendix at A-69 — A-70.) Re- spondent contends that Wage Order 4-80 applies equally to maritime employment on the high seas. This unprece- dented state regulatory policy is wholly inimical to well- settled principles of federal admiralty law and has caused great concern and confusion within the maritime indus- try. As a result, Petitioner trade associations (represent- ing over 100 individual maritime employers) have joined Clean Seas in this litigation.’ "Petitioners are unaware of any coastal state other than California that has asserted jurisdiction to apply its overtime laws to maritime workers employed primarily on the high seas. Indeed, many coastal states, including the only other state (1.e., Alaska) with a daily overtime requirement, expressly exempt seamen from their land- based wage and hour laws. See Alaska Stat. § 23.10.060; Wash. Rev. Code § 49.46.130(1); N.C. Gen. Stat. 95-25.14(c); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-761; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 760, § 1A; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., tit. 26, § 664; Minn. Stat. § 177.23(7)(1)-(19); Pa. Min. Wage Act § 5(b); and Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 387-3(a). 10 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT I The Ninth Circuit Erred In Holding That Federal! Ad- miralty Law Does Not Preempt The Application Of State Overtime Laws To Maritime Employment On The High Seas The Ninth Circuit majority opinion employs a land- based preemption analysis predicated on the erroneous assumption that this case involves the exercise of tradi- tional state police powers over the employment of resi- dent workers. The majority state: “(I]n addressing the preemption question before us, ‘we start with the assumption that the historic pow- ers of the States were not to be superseded by [federal legislation] unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ”’ (Appendix at A-11, emphasis in original.) However, the point of departure in a maritime preemption case is not the sanctity of the states’ police powers, but rather the constitutional requirement that Congress and the federal courts develop and maintain a uniform and harmonious system of national maritime law. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); Knickerbocker Ice. Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149.° The preemption analysis adopted "In Jensen, this Court established principles of maritime preemp- tion that still govern the admiralty area today. See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986). This Court stated in Jensen: “(I]t must now be accepted as settled doctrine that... Congress has paramount power to fiz and determine the maritime law which shall prevail throughout the country. (continued .. .) 11 by the Ninth Circuit majority flies in the face of this constitutional mandate. Under the general maritime law of the United States, maritime workers and their employers are free to deter- mine, pursuant to agreement, the wages, hours and work- ing conditions applicable to maritime employment. (See Ninth Circuit dissenting opinion, Appendix at A-40 — A-41.) Unlike many industries, the written employment agreement is a common (and, at times, statutorily-man- dated) feature of maritime employment, and it is gener- ally viewed as the governing “law” with respect to such employment.’ Absent an express contractual right to overtime pay, the admiralty law does not require that a seaman receive such pay. Sorensen v. City of New York, 202 F.2d 857, 858-859 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 8’... continued) [N]o [state] legislation is valid if it contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress, or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law, or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations.” 244 U.S. at 215, 216 (emphasis added). *In Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308 (1919); this Court held California’s statute of frauds to be preempted and concluded that any claim under a maritime employment contract must be resolved pursuant to federal admiralty law. “In entering into this [employment] contract the parties con- templated no services in California. They were making an en- gagement for the services of the master of the vessel, the duties to be performed ... mainly upon the sea. The maritime law controlled in this respect, and was not subject to limitation because the particular engagement happened to be made in California. The parties must be presumed to have had in contemplation the system of maritime law under which it was made.” Id. at 313 (emphasis added). in iinet 12 U.S. 951 (1954) (court finds no federal statutory require- ment to pay overtime to seamen). Concomitantly, the admiralty law does not recognize an implied legal right to overtime pay. Ramsauer v. United States, 21 F.2d 907, 908 (9th Cir. 1927) (court finds no implied right to overtime under the admiralty law). Accord C.M. Rousseau, Jr. v. Teledyne Movable Offshore, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1513, 1518-1519 (D.La. 1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 827 (1987) (maritime employees held bound by employment agree- ment with respect to overtime claim). Rather, the right to overtime pay for maritime work has traditionally been governed exclusively by the employment agreement. The Youngstown, 110 F.2d 968, 970 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 690 (1940) (overtime performed and paid for in accordance with employment contract fully complies with the federal admiralty law). The lack of an express overtime pay requirement for seamen under the federal admiralty law in no way reflects a lack of Congressional concern for the welfare of seamen. Throughout the history of the United States, seamen (as “wards of admiralty”) have been the beneficiaries of special federal statutory and common law protections wholly inapplicable to land-based workers. “It has been truly said that the seaman is the ward of the legislature for perhaps no other class of worker has received from a national legislative body the pro- tection, care and the degree of solicitude as that given to merchant seamen. Practically every phase of the seaman’s working conditions aboard ship from the time he first ships out as an apprentice or as an ordinary seaman, to the disposal of his estate at his decease, has been accorded legislative attention. 13 Chief among these are the statutes governing his wages.” Norris, The Law of Seamen, § 121, p. 424 (4th Ed. 1985) (emphasis added). A statutory illustration of these facts is found in subtitle II of Title 46 of the United States Code. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 2101-14702." This subtitle consists of a codification of most of the federal maritime safety and seamen protection laws, including laws regulating the wages, hours and working conditions of seamen employed on vessels engaged in various types of voyages. Jd. at §§ 8101-11507. This comprehensive federal scheme pro- vides evidence that Congress understood the need for, and intended to create, a uniform body of federal law to govern the wages, hours and working conditions of mari- time employees, and that Congress left no room for the states to intrude within this legisla ‘ve sphere. The Ninth Circuit majority concluded that California’s interest in applying its overtime laws to maritime employ- ment outside the territorial waters of the state supersedes any competing federal interests in such employment. This conclusion simply will not float. As this Court has stated: “(N]ational interests, responsibilities, and therefore na- tional rights are paramount in waters lying to the sea- ~ward [of] the three-mile belt.” United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 36 (1947). A state surely has no greater interest in applying its wage and hour laws to maritime employment (particularly where such employment takes place on the high seas) than it does in applying its workers’ compensation laws, employment discrimination 4 good overview of the substantial statutory and common law protections that have historically been afforded general maritime law seamen is found in Motil Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers, International Union, AFL-CIO, 504 F.2d 272, 284 and n. 6 (5th Cir. 1974). 14 laws, wrongful death laws or right-to-work laws, all of which have been held preempted by the federal maritime law.” See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207; Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, International Union, AFL-CIO v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407 (1976); Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205; and Indiana Civil Rights Commission v. American Commercial Barge Line Co., 523 N.E.2d 241 (Ind. App. 1988), cert. dented, 492 U.S. 920 (1989). Through the years, this Court and other federal courts have applied the maritime preemption principles established in Jensen to invali- date dozens of state laws. See, ¢.g., Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallen- tire, 477 U.S. 207 (state wrongful death statutes held preempted by the federal maritime law); Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961) (state statute of frauds held preempted by the federal maritime law); Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., Inc., 247 U.S. 372 (1918) (state indemnity law held preempted by the federal maritime law); Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 914 (1987) (California survivor law held preempted by the federal maritime law); Nelson v. United States, 639 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1980) (California wrongful death statute held preempted by the federal maritime law); Sun World Lines, Ltd. v. March Shipping Corp., 801 F.2d 1066 (8th Cir. 1986) (state contract law held preempted by the federal maritime law); Coastal Iron Works, Inc. v. Petty Ray Geophysical, 783 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1986) (state trade practices law held preempted by the federal maritime law); Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1981) (state interspousal immunity law held preempted by the federal maritime law); Branch v. Schumann, 445 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1971) (state standard of care held preempted by the federal maritime law); Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 431 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970) (state statute of limitation held preempted by the federal maritime law); and Friedell, Benedict on Admiralty, §§ 112, et seq., pp. 7-45 (7th Ed. 1987), and over 50 cases cited therein. ‘ — 15 Il. The Ninth Circuit Erred In Holding That The Fair Labor Standards Act Does Not Preempt The Applica- tion Of State Overtime Laws To Maritime Employ- ment On The High Seas The District Court and the Ninth Circuit majority agreed that the Fair Labor Standards Act (‘““FLSA’’), 29 U.S.C. §$§ 201, et seg., and California’s wage and hour laws (including Wage Order 4-80) are patently inconsistent with each other. (Appendix at A-21 and A-61.) As applied to maritime workers, these state and federal laws impose: (i) different minimum wage rates; (ii) different methods of calculating hours worked; (iii) different overtime re- quirements; (iv) different overtime exemptions; and (v) different methods for calculating the overtime rate of pay. The legislative history of the FLSA provides ample evidence that Congress recognized (i) the unique nature of maritime employment, (ii) the preexistence of a well- developed body of federal law to govern such employment and (iii) the overriding importance of preserving uni- formity in the regulation of such employment. As origi- nally enacted in 1938, the FLSA expressly exempted all “These conflicts are not just legal abstractions; they have real life consequences. A non-exempt maritime employee working the same schedule (1.¢., 12 hours per day for seven consecutive days at $10 per hour) for the same employer on the same vessel would be entitled to $1,502 more per week under California law than he would be entitled to under federal law. Multiply this amount by 26 weeks (assuming that the worker gets every other week off) and you have a $39,052 annual chasm between the state and federal requirements for a $10 per hour employee. Muitiply this $39,052 figure by thousands of employees and the staggering financial implications of Respondent’s ill-considered enforcement position become clear. 16 seamen from its minimum wage and maximum hour provi- sions. In subsequent years, including 1945, 1948, 1955 and 1961, repeated efforts were made to repeal this complete exemption for seamen. During the many Con- gressional hearings held to consider such a repeal, repre- seutatives from the maritime industry testified at length regarding the unsuitability of land-based wage and hour rules to maritime employment. Congress was told that rules used to calculate the hours worked by land-based employees are simply inapplicable to maritime employ- ment where employees work and live on vessels for ex- tended periods of service. Congress was further advised that the FLSA’s overtime requirements are ill-suited to maritime employment, and that the maximum hour pro- tections afforded seamen under the Shipping Act are sufficient to ensure employee safety and prevent over- work. Finally, Congress was warned that the extension of the FLSA’s overtime provisions to seamen would destroy existing principles of uniformity in the federal admiralty law under which maritime employers had governed their conduct for decades. Congress did amend the FLSA in 1961 to extend the Act’s minimum wage provisions to seamen employed on American flag vessels. 29 U.S.C. § 206. In taking this action, however, Congress also established a special method by which the hours worked by seamen are to be calculated. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (4). Congress thereby reaf- firmed its view that many of the wage and hour rules developed for land-based employees are simply ill-suited for application to sea-based employment. At the same time, Congress again declined to repeal the overtime exemption for seamen. Indeed, Congress has seen fit to retain this exemption for over fifty years despite repeated legislative attempts at repeal. 17 As recently as last term, this Court emphasized the importance of affording substantial deference in admi- ralty cases to the policy considerations underlying those federal statutes that govern the maritime area. In Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. —_, 111 S.Ct. 317, 323, this Court stated: “In this era, an admiralty court should look prima- rily to... legislative enactments for policy guidance. We may supplement the statutory remedies where doing so would achieve the uniform vindication of such policies consistent with our constitutional mandate, but we must also keep strictly within the limits imposed by Congress. Congress retains superior authority in these matters, and an admiralty court must be vigilant not to overstep the well-considered boundaries imposed by fed- eral legislation. These statutes both direct and limit our actions” (emphasis added). Here, the manifest purpose behind the overtime exemp- tion for seamen in the FLSA was to free maritime commerce from impractical land-based wage rules and preserve the preexisting uniformity in maritime wage regu- lation. In enacting the FLSA, Congress never intended the wages, hours and working conditions of seamen and other maritime employees to be subject to a myriad of conflicting and potentially ever-changing state laws and regulations.”® The Ninth Circuit majority was unable to glean any Congres- sional intent from the FLSA’s legislative history to preclude the application of state overtime laws to seamen or other maritime employees. The majority concede, however, that “Congress intended to prevent overlapping regulation of wage and hour conditions of seamen by different federal agencies.” (Appendix at A-17, emphasis added.) Indeed, during the Congressional hearings preceding the (continued .. .) 18 Given the patent conflicts between the FLSA and California’s wage and hour laws, the District Court and the Ninth Circuit agreed that a finding of preemption in this case would be automatic were it not for the FLSA’s state law savings provision. 29 U.S.C. §218(a). This provision provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “No provision of this Chapter or of any order there- under shall excuse noncompliance with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher than the minimum wage estab- lished under this Chapter or a maximum workweek lower than the maximum workweek established under this Chapter.” The FLSA’s savings provision has been construed to permit state legislatures in regulating land-based employ- ment to enact higher minimum wage rates and lower maximum workweek standards than those set forth in the FLSA. " (... continued) enactment of the FLSA, Senator (later Supreme Court Justice) Black stated: “(I]t was the policy of the committee, in cases where regulation of hours and wages are given to other governmental agencies, to write the bill in such way as not to conflict with such regulation. That action was taken with reference to maritime workers.” See Joint Hearings on S. 2475 and H.R. 7200 Before the Senate Comm. on Educ. and Labor and the House Comm. on Labor, 75th Cong., Ist Sess., 81 Cong. Rec.—Part 7, p. 7875 (1937). The Ninth Circuit majority simply defy logic by concluding that Congress, in enacting the seamen exemption and other special maritime provisions of the FLSA, sought to safeguard maritime commerce from overlapping federal regulations while simultaneously exposing such commerce to a crazy-quilt patchwork of conflicting state regulation. 19 It is axiomatic that Congress may not delegate its legislative authority over maritime matters to the States. In Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920), this Court addressed the constitutionality of an act through which Congress sought to grant the states au- thority to apply their workers’ compensation laws to maritime employment. In holding such action to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, this Court stated: “TWle conclude that Congress undertook to permit application of Workmen’s Compensation Laws of the several states to injuries within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction....And, so construed, we think the enactment is beyond the power of Congress. Its power to legislate concerning rights and liabili- ties within the maritime jurisdiction, and remedies for their enforcement, arises from the Constitution .... The definite object of the [constitutional] grant was to commit direct control to the Federal govern- ment; to relieve maritime commerce from unneces- sary burdens and disadvantages incident to discordant legislation; and to establish, so far as practicable, harmonious and uniform rules applicable throughout every part of the Union.” Id. at 163-164 (emphasis added). Accord State of Wash- ington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 227 (1924) (“{[C]ongress has power to alter, amend or revise the maritime law by statutes of general application ...; but [this power] may not be delegated to the several states’ (emphasis added) ). Consistent with this Court’s holdings in Knickerbocker Ice and State of Washington, the District Court found that the FLSA’s savings provision would represent an uncon- stitutional delegation of legislative authority to the states 20 if held applicable to maritime employment on the high seas. (Appendix at A-62.) The District Court therefore construed the savings provision properly in finding it to be inapplicable to all maritime employees whose work situs is a vessel normally situated on the high seas. The District Court’s construction of the FLSA’s sav- ings provision is entirely consistent with the limiting constructions that this Court has placed on the much broader savings provisions found in other federal laws regulating maritime matters on the high seas. In Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, International Union, AFL-CIO v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407 (1976), this Court was asked to construe the scope of the savings provision found in the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), see 29 U.S.C. § 164(b), that preserves state “right-to-work” laws. In Mobil Oil, the operator of a fleet of oil tankers transporting petroleum products between Texas and certain Atlantic Coast ports sought a declara- tory judgment invalidating an agency shop agreement executed by a union on behalf of the certificated seamen employed on those tankers. Th: employer argued that since its headquarters were in Texas, and since the vast majority of the subject seamen were residents of Texas and had applied for employment and been hired in Texas, the Texas right-to-work statute served to invalidate the agency shop agreement under the NLRA’s savings provi- sion. In sum, the employer argued (similar to Respon- dent’s argument in this case) that since the subject seamen had more contacts with Texas than with any other state, the labor laws of Texas (including the Texas right- to-work law) must be applicable to their employment. This Court rejected these arguments because the sub- ject employees performed most of their services aboard 21 vessels on the high seas. In reaching its conclusion, this Court stated: “Because most of the employees’ work is done on the high seas, outside the territorial bounds of the State of Texas, Texas’ right-to-work laws cannot govern the validity of the agency shop provision at issue here. It is immaterial that Texas may have more contacts than any other state with the employment relation- ship in this case .... It is therefore fully consistent with national labor policy to conclude, if the predomi- nant job situs 1s outside the boundary of any State, that no State has a sufficient interest in the employment relationship and that no State’s right-to-work laws can apply.” 426 U.S. 407, 420-421 (emphasis added). This Court similarly placed a limiting construction on another federal savings provision affecting maritime af- fairs in Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986). The issue presented in Tallentire was whether the Death On The High Seas Act (“DOHSA”), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761, et seg., provides the exclusive remedy for the wrongful death of a seaman employed on the high seas, or whether a state statute may also provide a wrongful death remedy in such a situation. In deciding this issue, this Court was forced to construe DOHSA’s broad savings provision that preserves “any State statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death.” 46 U.S.C. § 767. Although the actual language of this savings provision does not exclude deaths on the high seas, this Court held tne provision to be inapplicable to such deaths. In Tallentire, this Court relied on the principles of maritime law enunciated in the Jensen and Knickerbocker Ice cases in evaluating Congress’ intent in enacting ~ 22 DOHSA’s savings provision. This Court imputed to Con- gress knowledge of the constitutional limitations on Con- gress’ power to delegate legislative authority to the states with respect to maritime affairs. In direct contrast to the analysis of Congressional intent employed by the Ninth Circuit majority in the instant case, this Court in Tallen- tire concluded that Congress could not have intended DOHSA’s savings provision to preserve state laws pur- porting to regulate deaths on the high seas, since such intent would have envisioned an unconstitutiona! delega- tion of legislative authority to the states. “To read [Section] 7 as intended to preserve intact largely non-existent or ineffective state law remedies for wrongful death on the high seas would, of course, be incongruous. Just as incongruous is the idea that a Congress seeking uniformity in maritime law would intend to allow widely divergent state law wrongful death statutes to be applied on the high seas.” 477 U.S. 207, 230 (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit majority opinion tip toes around this Court’s holdings in Knickerbocker Ice and State of Wash- ington by summarily dismissing the District Court’s rea- soning with respect to the FLSA’s savings provision. The majority opinion states: ‘“‘We disagree with the District Court’s holding that section 218, if construed to allow [Respondent’s] actions with respect to maritime employees on the high seas, would in effect be a delegation of congres- sional maritime powers to the state. California’s actions in this case represent an exercise of tradi- tional police powers firmly in place before Congress enacted the FLSA .... Thus Congress did not ‘dele- gate’ authority to the states through Section 218, but 23 simply made clear its intent not to disturb the tradi- tional exercise of the states’ police powers with re- spect to wages and hours more generous than the federal standards. We cannot read section 218 as a delegation, and, therefore, conclude that Knicker- bocker Ice does not control this case.” (Appendix at A-24 — A-25, emphasis in original.) This analysis with respect to the FLSA’s savings provi- sion is fundamentally wrong. Over 200 years of federal admiralty jurisprudence confirms that the states do not have the unfettered right to exercise ‘traditional police powers” over maritime employment on the high seas. As this Court has stated: “The Constitution ... took from the states all power... to interfere with [the] proper harmony and uniformity in [admiralty law].” Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 160 (emphasis added). In ratifying the Constitution and becoming states, the states relinquished all power to enact maritime legislation that is disruptive of the national uniformity mandated by the Constitution.” The idea that a state may apply its labor laws to any maritime worker who the state decides has sufficient “contacts” with it is wholly antithetical to the concept of a In Mobil Oil, 426 U.S. 407, this Court upheld the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit’s en banc dissenting opinion in that case which states: “In no employment field is the master-servant relationship so predominantly controlled by federal maritime law than in that existing aboard ship between the master of the vessel and the men who man it. Indeed, it does not appear that there is any aspect of the employment relationship which [state] law may properly control....In practical effect, state regulation of this employer-employee relationship stops at the water’s edge.” 504 F.2d 272, 285 (5th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added). 24 uniform system of federal admiralty law. Regardless of the number of “contacts” that an employee has with any state, the paramount need for national uniformity re- mains constant with respect to maritime employment on the high seas. As former Justice Powell aptly noted in his concurring opinion in Mobil Oil: ‘“Seamen... have been accorded a special status and protection under federal maritime law unknown to state law in the domain of the master-servant rela- tionship. Unlike the land-based worker, the seaman’s employment and all of the rights and restrictions flowing therefrom, are determined by federal statutory and admiralty law, not state law.... The consistent and traditional control by federal law of every phase of maritime employment relationships and contracts refutes the proposition that [an em- ployee’s} contacts with [a state] justify injecting state law into federal maritime affairs.’ ”’ 426 U.S. 407, 421-422 (emphasis added). In sum, the Ninth Circuit majority grievously erred in holding that the FLSA’s savings provision can properly be construed to preserve state laws that seek to regulate the employment of seamen and other maritime employees on the high seas. Since the FLSA’s savings provision is constitutionally inapplicable to such employment, and since California’s overtime laws are in patent conflict with the FLSA, it follows that the state laws at issue should properly have been held preempted by the federal admi- ralty law. 25 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, review by this Court is appropriate and certiorari should be granted. ses Respectfully submitted, THOMAS E. HILL Counsel of Record CAROLINE G. SMITH MUSICK, PEELER & GARRETT Gary M. BRIGHT BRIGHT & POWELL Attorneys for Petitioners ee eS ee ON a ee eS we ey els SS we ee : i 4 f APPENDIX ‘ ; we ¥. oN. %, r 8? a x A . ay P . } . ey 14) “nersoe tm Smee } is : . oy oe ® j , . ne 4 A-1 FOR PUBLICATION United States Court of Appeals FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT PACIFIC MERCHANT SHIPPING ASSOCIATION; AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF MERCHANT SHIPPING; OFFSHORE MARINE SERVICE ASSOCIATION; WESTERN OIL AND GAS ASSOCIATION; CLEAN SEAS, Plaintiffs-Appellees, VS. LLOYD W. AUBRY, JR., Labor Commissioner, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, Department of Industrial Relations, State of California, Defendant-Appellant, vs. TIDEWATER MARINE SERVICE, INC.; WESTERN BoaT OPERATORS, INC., Plaintiff /Intervenors-Appellees. No. 89-55379 D.C. No. CV-88-0848-AWT OPINION Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California A. Wallace Tashima, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted June 5, 1990 — Pasadena, California Filed November 13, 1990 Before: James R. Browning and Harry Pregerson, Circuit Judges, and William P. Copple, District Judge.* *The Honorable William P. Copple, Senior United States District Judge, District of Arizona, sitting by designation. A-2 OPINION PREGERSON, Circuit Judge: Lloyd W. Aubry (“Aubry”), California’s labor commis- sioner, enforced California’s overtime pay laws against Clean Seas, an employer operating vessels off the Califor- nia coast. Pacific Merchant Shipping Association and other shipping associations’ (“PMSA”) brought suit in the district court on behalf of Clean Seas and other member companies, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that California’s overtime pay laws are preempted by federal admiralty law. Tidewater Marine Service, Inc., and Western Boat Operations, Inc. (“Tidewater”) intervened in the action after an employee filed an overtime wage claim with the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement. The district court granted summary judgment for PMSA and Tidewater, declared Aubry’s actions preempted by federal admiralty law, and enjoined further enforcement of California’s overtime pay laws against Clean Seas, Tidewater, and other maritime employers. Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass’n v. Aubry, 709 F. Supp. 1516 (C.D. Cal. 1989). We have jurisdiction over the district court’s final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse. BACKGROUND I. Admiralty Terminology At the outset, and for the sake of clarity, we explain basic admiralty terminology used by the district court and in this opinion. ‘American Institute of Merchant Shipping; Offshore Marine Ser- vice Association; Western Oil and Gas Association. a ae Le Le eh ee eat Pier 9 er et 8 ee * TT 8 em et Bla eS ee ~~ A-3 A. Maritime Employees: Historically, those who work on ships have been called “seamen.” As a matter of general maritime law, the term “seamen” includes a broad range of marine workers whose work on a vessel on navigable waters contributes to the functioning of the vessel, to accomplishment of its mission, or to its operation or welfare. See 46 U.S.C. § 10101(2); Norris, The Law of Seamen, §§ 2.1, 2.3, 2.10 (4th ed. 1985). “Seamen”’ is also used, in a much nar- rower sense, in the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §$§ 201-219, to define a category of maritime workers exempted from coverage under federal overtime pay provisions. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(b) (6).” Under federal regulations, a “seaman” exempted from the FLSA’s over- time pay provisions is one who works “primarily as an aid in the operation of [a] vessel as a means of transporta- tion, provided he performs no substantial amount of work of a different character.” See 29 C.F.R. § 783.31 (1989). A “substantial amount of work of a different character” is more than 20 percent of the time worked by an employee during any given work week. 29 C.F.R. § 783.37 (1989). This appeal involves workers who are FLSA-exempt “seamen” and workers who, while not exempted from the F'LSA’s overtime pay provisions, are still “seamen” in the broader, general sense. Because the distinction is impor- *Under the FLSA, with certain exceptions, all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week must be compensated at “a rate not less than one-and-one-half times the regular rate.”’ 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1). The statute also provides in relevant part: The provisions of section 207 of this title shall not apply with respect to — (6) any employee employed as a seaman.... 29 U.S.C. § 213(b). A-4 tant, and to avoid confusion, we use the following terms to describe the employees affected by this opinion: a “mari- time employee” is a “seaman” in the general maritime sense; and a “seaman” is a maritime employee exempted from the FLSA’s overtime pay provisions under 29 U.S.C. § 213(b) (6). B. Seas: Two zones of “navigable waters” are involved in this appeal. The “territorial sea” is the sea from shore to three nautical miles off shore. The “high seas” are ocean waters outside the territorial sea, i.e., more than three miles offshore. C. Voyages: The Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 2101-14701, divides “voyages” into three types. “Foreign voyages” are voy- ages between ports in the United States and ports in foreign countries (except Canada, Mexico, and the West Indies). See 46 U.S.C. § 10301 (a) (1). “Intercoastal voy- ages” are voyages between ports on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. See 46 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2). “Coastwise voyages” are voyages “between a port in one State and a port in another State (except an adjoining State).” See 46 U.S.C. § 10501(a). United States Coast Guard regula- tions define “coastwise vessels” as those “normally navi- gating the waters of any ocean or the Gulf of Mexico 20 nautical miles or less offshore.” 46 C.F.R. § 70.10-13 (1988). II. Facts and Procedural History PMSA and the other associations involved in this ap- peal are maritime trade associations that represent merchant maritime shippers, other maritime employers, A-5 and employers in the oil and gas industry. Among these organizations’ members are Clean Seas and Tidewater. Clean Seas is an unincorporated, cooperative association, formed by several major oil companies to contain and clean up marine oil spills off the California coast. Tidewa- ter provides offshore transportation and support services worldwide, and provides transportation services to oil drilling platforms from one to 12 nautical miles of the California coast. Clean Seas operates three vessels: Mr. Clean, Mr. Clean II, and Mr. Clean III. The employees whose wage claims led to this appeal work on Mr. Cleaa II and Mr. Clean III (three on Mr. Clean II; nine on Mr. Clean III). Both vessels’ duties involve control and clean up of oil spills and other environmentally hazardous discharges in the Santa Barbara Channel off the California coast. Mr. Clean II is a 138-foot vessel moored in Port San Luis Harbor, California, where it remains moored approximately one- quarter mile offshore about 90 percent of the time. Mr. Clean III is a 181-foot vessel permanently stationed on the high seas off the California coast. Mr. Clean III conducts containment and clean up operations around four oil drilling and production platforms over the Pedernales and Arguello oil fields, from four to ten nautical miles off the California coast. When not on active duty, Mr. Clean III is tied to a buoy approximately seven miles off the California coast. Clean Seas employees who work on Mr. Clean III are organized into two crews of six.’ Each crew works seven day “hitches” at sea, alternating with seven day rest periods on shore. While at sea, Clean Seas employees ®*The record does not indicate whether Mr. Clean III crewmembers are organized this way. A-6 typically work 12 hour shifts, alternating with 12 hour rest periods. Mr. Clean III crew members are transported to the vessel by helicopter from the Santa Barbara Air- port. Of the 12 Clean Seas employees involved in the underlying action, two were licensed “mates” and ten, who worked primarily on clean up operations, were certi- fied as “seamen” by the United States Coast Guard.* The specific terms of Clean Seas’ employees’ work are usually set out in contracts negotiated between each employee and Clean Seas. Tidewater operates two types of vessels off the Califor- nia coast. Tidewater’s supply boats are 180- to 190-foot vessels with seven-member crews that pick up and deliver cargo at the Port Hueneme Pier, south of Santa Barbara, for delivery at various offshore oil platforms. Tidewater’s crew boats are 65-foot vessels with two-member crews that transport passengers, light supplies and mail from ‘Under applicable federal regulations, the United States Coast Guard inspects vesseis and issues certificates to qualifying maritime employees. See 46 C.F.R. §§ 71.01-71.75 (1988). A “mate” is a “qualified officer in the deck department other than the master.” 46 C.F.R. § 10.103 (1989). Marine employees are certified as “seamen” upon meeting a range of age and training requirements. 46 C.F.R. §§ 12.01-1 to 12.25-40 (1989). Certification as a “seaman” under Coast Guard regulations does not bear on an employee's status as a “seaman” for purposes of exemption from federal overtime laws under 29 U.S.C. § 213(b) (6). See 29 C.F.R. 783.31-.37 (1989). The district court made no findings on the question whether Clean Seas’ employees were FLSA-exempt seamen. That question is one of fact, and must be decided by the district court. Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 714, on remand, Worthington v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 796 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1986). In this case, however, because we hold that California may apply its overtime provisions to both the FLSA-exempt seamen and the non-exempt maritime employ- ees involved in this suit, we need not remand the case to the district court to determine the status of Clean Seas’ employees. are PE aE CL eee UL) Cee em Meet Sen te i eee: Ree eee Te Te Y yaad PD tbs en ae BAS 4 OR. A-7 the Carpinteria and Ellwood piers, also near Santa Bar- bara, to offshore oil platforms. These vessels are on call at all times. When a vessel is called, it goes to a pier to pick up cargo or passengers, travels to its destination, and then returns to the pier. The employee whose wage claim led to Tidewater’s intervention in this action was a deck engineer on a crew boat. The parties agree that the employee is a seaman exempted from the FLSA’s overtime provisions under 29 U.S.C. § 213(b) (6). Typically, Tidewater crew boat crews work 7 day hitches alternating with 7 day rest periods onshore; employees work 12 hour shifts alternating with 12 hour rest periods. The specific terms of most Tidewater crew members’ work are set out in employment contracts negotiated between individual employees and Tidewater. The record indicates that all the Clean Seas employees and the Tidewater employee are California residents who live in California when not on board ship. The workers are hired in California, receive paychecks at California ad- dresses, and pay California taxes. In 1987, the twelve Clean Seas employees filed claims for unpaid overtime compensation with the California Labor Commissioner. The California Labor Code grants the Labor Commissioner authority to enforce Wage Or- ders issued by the California Industrial Welfare Commis- sion (“IWC’’). See Cal. Lab. Code §§ 98, 1173. IWC Wage Order 4-80 sets out wage and overtime requirements with respect to “professional, technical, clerical, mechanical, and similar occupations.” Cal. Code Regs. § 11345(2) (c). After a hearing, Aubry applied Wage Order 4-80 to the Clean Seas crewmembers and granted an average of $45,000 in back wages to each of the 12 Clean Seas employees. PMSA then filed the complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief underlying this appeal. Meanwhile, A-8 in February 1988, Frank Kleman, the Tidewater em- ployee, filed a claim for $50,000 unpaid over-time compen- sation (for a 12-month period) with the California Labor Commission. Tidewater then intervened in PMSA’s fed- eral court action. Kleman’s case and all other similar administrative claims were stayed pending the outcome of the federal court action. After a hearing on cross-motions for summary judg- ment, the district court granted PMSA and Tidewaters’ request for declaratory and injunctive relief, holding that California cannot apply its overtime provisions to mari- time employees employed primarily on the high seas or to seamen. 709 F. Supp. at 1526. The district court enjoined all enforcement of Californie’s overtime pay provisions against employers of these maritime workers. Aubry filed a timely notice of appeal. JURISDICTION AND SCOPE OF RELIEF Because PMSA and Tidewaters’ complaints sought to enjoin enforcement of California law based on federal preemption, this case “arose under” federal law, and the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over PMSA’s action for injunctive relief. See Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm’n of State of Cal., 716 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1983). Actions for declaratory and injunctive relief, however, must be carefully limited in scope to meet the “case and controversy” requirements of Article III of the Constitu- _ tion. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S 488, 493-95 (1974); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pac. Coal and Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941). Before the district court, PMSA, Tide- ee Me Se eee See Ne its clON SEY! Rtn, Vln oF OR he es Whe eS sac an hh at apes A-9 water, and Aubry argued at length over the precise scope of the declaratory and injunctive relief action. PMSA and Tidewater sought a ruling on all employees of its mem- bers with respect to a broad range of California labor code provisions. 709 F. Supp. at 1522-23. Aubry, on the other hand, sought to limit the scope of the action to only those employees to which he had applied California’s overtime provision. Jd. Applying the constitutional rule that “[a] plaintiff who challenges a statute must demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute’s operation or enforcement,” Babbit v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S 289, 298 (1979), the district court limited the scope of relief to cover only application of California’s overtime pay laws to (1) FLSA-exempt seamen, whether working within the territorial zone or on the high seas; and (2) maritime employees working pri- marily on vessels on the high seas that are not engaged in foreign, intercoastal, or coastwise voyages. 709 F. Supp. at 1522-23,-1526.° The district court expressly stated that ‘There is some ambiguity in the record and in the district court's opinion about whether the relief granted also covered maritime employees working primarily on vessels on the high seas that are engaged in coastwise voyages. The district court cited the deposition testimony of a California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement official that suggested that Aubry intended to apply California overtime wage laws to non-inhabitant maritime employees. The court apparently concluded that the commissioner might possibly apply California law to employees who voyage from California to other states, 709 F. Supp. at 1255, and that the threat of enforcement of California wage laws against employers engaged in coastwise voyages was sufficient to present a justiciable controversy under Article III of the Constitution as to those employers. On the other hand, the overall thrust of the district court’s analysis strongly suggests that the discussion was limited to employees, like those who brought claims in the underlying state administrative action, who work only on vessels A-10 its decision did not affect the rights of non-FLSA exempt maritime employees working within California’s territo- rial waters. 709 F. Supp. at 1523 n.7.° We conclude that, within these limits, the scope of the declaratory relief met the Constitution’s case and controversy requirements. See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. at 298-305. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Kruso v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3217 (1990). DISCUSSION This appeal turns on one core issue: Does federal law preempt California from applying its overtime pay laws to off the California coast that do not engage in foreign, intercoastal, or coastwise voyages. See 709 F. Supp. 1519, 1523-25. This ambiguity may be due to the fact that the employees involved in this action work on coastwise vessels, see 46 C.F.R § 70.10-13 (1988) (defining “coast- wise vessels” as vessels “normaliy navigating the waters... 20 nautical miles or less offshore”), but were not in fact engaged in coastwise voyages, see 709 F. Supp. at 1524. We resolve any arguable ambiguity over the scope of the relief granted by the district court by limiting the scope of our opinion to those employees described and discussed by the district court, i.e., maritime employees who work off the California coast on vessels that do not engage in foreign, inter- coastal, or coastwise voyages. We do not address the question whether Aubrey is preempted by federal law from applying Califor- nia’s overtime pay laws to maritime employees employed primarily on the high seas on coastwise vessels engaged in coastwise voyages. *‘PMSA agrees in its brief to this court that Aubry “is currently free to apply California’s overtime laws to non-FLSA-exempt, general maritime law seamen [i.e., maritime employees] with respect to work that takes place primarily within California's territorial waters.” ill aaa AAD ws Real le. 7 talod del nes PN Belek A A Nad BL, abbr A-11 seamen working on territorial waters and on the high seas off the California coast and to maritime employees work- ing primarily on the high seas off the California coast, when the vessels on which the employees work do not engage in foreign, intercoastal, or coastwise voyages? For the reasons stated below, we hold that it does not. PMSA and Tidewater contend that California’s over- time pay laws are preempted by two federal statutes—the Shipping Act and the FLSA—and by general admiralty law. To decide whether a federal statute preempts state law, “our sole task is to ascertain the intent of Congress.”’ California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987). Federal law preempts state law if (1) Con- gress expressly so states, (2) Congress enacts compre- hensive laws that leave no room for additional state regulation, or (3) state law actually conflicts with federal law. Id. at 280-81: see Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 486 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. dented, 471 U.S. 1140 (1985). States, however, possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate the employment relationship to protect resident workers. De Canas v. Bica, 424,U.S. 351, 356 (1976). Thus, in addressing the preemption question before us, “ ‘we start with the assumption that the historic powers of the States were not to be superseded by [federal legislation] unless that was the clear and mani- fest purpose of Congress.’” Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Ham- mond, 726 F.2d at 488 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) (emphasis added in Hammond). A-12 I. The Shipping Act PMSA and Tidewater assert that Congress preempted Aubry’s actions in this case by extensively regulating maritime employment through the Shipping Act. The district court rejected this contention and held thai Aubry’s enforcement of California’s overtime provisions to maritime employees on the high seas and seamen is not preempted by statutory maritime law. See 709 F. Supp. 1523-24. According to the district court, “[m]aritime statutes simply do not purport to govern the overtime wages of employees such as those in this action.” 709 F. Supp. at 1524. We agree with the district court’s conclu- sion that the Shipping Act does not preempt California overtime pay laws with respect to the seamen and mari- time employees at issue in this case. The Shipping Act does govern some maritime employ- ees’ wages, hours, and working conditions. See 46 U.S.C. $§ 10301-10908. As the district court noted, however, these provisions do not apply to the employees involved in this appeal, because they cover only vessels engaged in foreign, intercoastal, or coastwise voyages. Id.’ Further, while all maritime employees are covered by certain provi- sions relating to “protection and relief,” e.g., aecommoda- tions on ship, 46 U.S.C. §11101, medical care for maritime workers, 46 U.S.C. § 11102, and limitations on attachment of wages, 46 U.S.C. § 11109, these provisions in no way regulate overtime pay. "The district court found: “The crewmembers whose claims precipi- tated this action were not on ‘voyages’ that fall under any of these three categories. Their vessels either stayed on the high seas sur- rounding the oil rigs or ‘voyaged’ between one port and the oii rigs.” 709 F. Supp. at 1519. er EN nd ih ebilil ibe Be Sb cabin rR Sd AS BN lade tm Hol MR Bond en A-13 PMSA and Tidewater both argue, however, that to apply California’s overtime pay laws to maritime employ- ees and seamen conflicts with 46 U.S.C. § 8104, which sets “manning requirements” — including maximum hours and minimum “watches” — for maritime workers.° Under 46 U.S.C. § 8104(b), [o]n an oceangoing or coastwise vessel of not more than 100 gross tons (except a fishing, fish processing, or fish tender vessel), a licensed individual may not be required to work more than 9 of 24 hours when in port, including the date of arrival, or more than 12 of 24 hours at sea, except in an emergency when life or property are [sic] endangered. Maritime employers who violate this section are subject to civil penalties. 46 U.S.C. § 8104(i), (j). PMSA and Tide- water contend that California’s overtime pay laws, which require overtime pay for hours worked in excess of eight hours per day, conflict with this federal statutory provi- sion by creating a maximum below the 12 hour maximum established in section 8104(b). We reject this contention. We addressed a similar argument in Agsalud v. Pony Express Courier Corp. of Am., 833 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Agsalud”’). In that case, a motor carrier contended that the state of Hawaii’s overtime pay law was preempted by the federal Motor Carrier Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3104. Regulations issued under the Motor Carrier Act generally provided for a maximum work week of 60 hours, while the Hawaii statute required overtime pay for work in excess of 40 hours per week. Jd. at 810. We held that, absent a showing that the "Section 8104 is not limited to vessels engaged in foreign, inter- coastal, or coastwise voyages, and, therefore, applies to the employees at issue in this case. See 46 U.S.C. § 8101-81085. A-14 state law had the effect of establishing a firm maximum on hours worked different from the maximum set by federal law, Hawaii’s overtime pay provisions did not conflict with federal law, and were not preempted. Jd. We ex- plained that “[o]ne need not be an economist to realize that some employers may continue to provide more than 40 hours of work even though an overtime premium is required, because paying the premium may be cheaper than the alternatives of not providing service to custom- ers or hiring new help.” Jd. Our reasoning in Agsalud applies with equal force here. PMSA and Tidewater have made no showing that the effect of Aubry’s enforcement action will be to set a firm maximum different from that set in 46 U.S.C. § 8104. The argument that California’s overtime pay law conflicts with section 8104 of the Shipping Act and is preempted, therefore, fails. While the Shipping Act does comprehensively regulate maritime activities, it does not regulate overtime pay for the workers involved in this case. The Shipping Act does not preempt California from applying its overtime pay laws to the seamen and maritime employees involved in this action. Il. The FLSA After rejecting PMSA and Tidewaters’ Shipping Act preemption argument, the district court held that the FLSA preempted California overtime pay laws with re- _ spect to the employees at issue in this case. The district court concluded that, with respect to FLSA-exempt seamen, Congress’ decision to exclude seamen from the federal act’s overtime provisions evinced its intent to preempt all state overtime laws as to those employees, whether on territorial waters or on the high seas. 709 A-15 F.Supp. at 1525. The district court further held that, with respect to general maritime employees, California over- time provisions conflict with the FLSA, and that the FLSA’s savings clause’ cannot save state laws regulating workers on vessels “primarily situated on the high seas.”’ 709 F.Supp. at 1524-25. A. Exemption of Seamen from the FLSA We address first the question whether, by exempting seamen from federal overtime coverage under 29 U.S.C. 213(b) (6), Congress preempted California’s overtime laws with respect to seamen. We hold that section 213(b) (6) does not preempt California from applying the state’s overtime pay laws to FLSA-exempt seamen work- ing off the California coast. The Seamen involved in this case work both on Califor- nia’s territorial waters and on the high seas.’° The district court held that the FLSA preempts California’s overtime provisions as applied to seamen on the high seas and on territorial waters, reasoning that, because seamen are exempt from federal overtime provisions under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §213(b)(6), “Congress has spoken directly on the issue of overtime pay for seamen.” 709 F.Supp. at 1525. This holding raises an important issue regarding the effect of a specific exemption of a category of maritime workers — seamen — from coverage under federal law, i.e., should the specific legislative provision *Under 29 U.S.C. § 218(a), no provision of the FLSA preempts another federal, state, or municipal law from “establishing a mini- mum wage higher than the minimum wage established under [the FLSA] or a maximum workweek lower than the maximum workweek established under [the FLSA].” As noted above, “seamen” as used by the district court is defined more narrow!y than “maritime employee.” A-16 exempting seamen from the FLSA’s overtime compensa- tion standards be read broadly to indicate congressional intent to preclude states from regulating the subject of seamen’s overtime compensation? No Ninth Circuit case squarely addresses this issue. We turn, then, to an examination of the language and legislative history of the FLSA. When Congress originally enacted the FLSA of 1938, it exempted seamen from coverage under the act’s minimum ‘wage and overtime provisions. In 1961, Congress brought seamen employed on American vessels under the FLSA’s minimum wage provisions, but maintained their exemp- tion from coverage under the act’s overtime provisions. At no time has Congress expressly prohibited states from applying their overtime laws to seamen. Further, PMSA and Tidewater point to nothing in the legislative history of § 213(b) (6) — either in the 1938 act or in the 1961 amendments to the FLSA — that suggests that Congress intended to preclude application of state overtime provi- sions to seamen. Our review of the legislative history has revealed no such congressional intent.” "See Joint Hearings on S. 2475 and H.R. 7200 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor and the House Comm. on Labor, 75th Cong., lst Sess. 544-549, 1216-17 (1937); 82 Cong. Rec. 1784 (1937); 82 Cong. Rec. 7875 (1937). See also Hearings on Various Bills Regarding Minimum Wage Legislation Before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 885-92, 895-96, 920-48, 1522-23 (1960); Hearings on H.R. 3935 and Various Bills Regarding Minimum Wage Legislation Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., lst Sess. 63-64, 83, 379-80, 597-99 (1961); Hear- ings on S. 256, 8. 879, 8. 895 and Bills Amending the Fair Labor Standards Act Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 87th Cong., lst Sess. 15, 41, 376-93, 558, A-17 The legislative history of the FLSA does show that Congress considered the special circumstances of mari- time and other types of labor when it exempted seamen and other employees from the FLSA’s overtime and minimum wage provisions. Federal Amicus argues, how- ever, and we agree, that in exempting seamen from cover- age under the 1938 act’s overtime and minimum wage provisions, Congress intended to prevent overlapping reg- ulation of wage and hour conditions of seamen by differ- ent federal agencies. See Joint Hearings on 8. 2475 and H.R. 7200 Before the S-nate Comm. on Education and Labor and the House Comm. on Labor, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. 546-49, 1216-17 (1937); 82 Cong. Rec. 1784-85, 7875 (1937); see also 29 C.F.R. § 783.29 (1989) (discussing legislative history of exemption).’ Further, the extensive legislative history of the 1961 amendments to the FLSA makes clear Congress’ determination that federal mini- mum wage levels for seamen were necessary, but discloses nothing indicating that, by leaving the exemption of 682-83 (1961); H.R. Rep. No. 75, 87th Cong., lst Sess. 13-14, 31 (1961); S. Rep. No. 145, 87th Cong., lst Sess. 103 (1961). “Under the FLSA of 1938 as proposed, all wage and hour claims were to be handled by a new Labor Standards Board. At the time Congress was considering the proposed legislation, however, mari- time employees’ wage and hour claims were handled by the Maritime Commission under the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. See Joint Hearings on 8. 2475 and H.R. 7200 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor and the House Comm. on Labor, 75th Cong., lst Sess. 1216-17. At least one witness testifying on behalf of organized labor supported the exemption of seamen from the FLSA’s overtime and minimum wage provisions on the ground that overlapping federal agency jurisdiction over seamen’s wage and hour claims could threaten gains already achieved by organized maritime labor before the Maritime Commission. See id. at 544-49 (testimony of Ralph Emerson, Legislative Representative, National Maritime Union of America). A-18 seamen from the FLSA’s overtime provisions in place, Congress intended to preclude states from applying over- time pay provisions to FLSA-exempt seamen.”® Related case authority supports the conclusion that, absent clear congressional intent to the contrary, the exemption of seamen from the FLSA’s overtime provi- sions does not, per se, preempt California from applying its overtime pay laws to seamen. In Agsalud, for example, we held that the exemption of truck drivers engaged in interstate transportation of goods from the FLSA’s over- time provisions did not preempt state overtime laws as to those workers. 833 F.2d at 810. In reaching that conclu- sion, we expressly adopted the reasoning of Pettis Moving Co., Inc. v. Roberts, 784 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1986) (‘Pettis Moving Co.”), and Williams v. W.M.A. Transit Co., 472 F.2d 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“Williams’’), two cases involving the question whether exemption of certain em- ployees from the FLSA’s wage provisions, per se, preempts state law with respect to those employees. See Agsalud, 833 F.2d at 810. In Pettis Moving Co., a New York motor carrier argued that, because Congress exempted employees of interstate motor carriers from coverage under the FLSA’s overtime See Hearings on Various Bills Regarding Minimum Wage Legisla- tion Before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. of Education and Labor, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 885-92, 895-96, 920-48, 1522-23 (1960); Hearings on H.R. 3935 and Various Bills Regarding Minimum Wage Legislation Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., lst Sess. 63-64, 83, 379-80, 597-99 (1961); Hearings on 8. 256, 8. 879, 8. 895 and Bills Amending the Fair Labor Standards Act Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 41, 376-93, 558, 682-83 (1961); H.R. Rep. No. 75, 87th Cong., lst Sess. 13-14, 31 (1961); S. Rep. No. 145, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 103 (1961). A-19 provisions, New York could not apply its overtime pay laws to those employees. The Second Circuit first empha- sized that “[t]raditional powers of the states... are not superseded by federal acts unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” 784 F.2d at 441 (citing Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978) ). The court then noted that the FLSA’s savings clause “explicitly permits states to set more stringent overtime provisions than the FLSA,” and held that “Congress did not prevent the states from regulating overtime wages paid to workers exempt from the FLSA.” 7d. at 441. In Williams, the D.C. Circuit addressed the question whether the District of Columbia’s minimum wage laws could be applied to bus drivers who were employed by interstate motor carriers and, therefore, were exempted from the FLSA’s minimum wage provisions. That court also relied on the FLSA’s savings clause in finding no preemption: “This section expressly contemplates that workers covered by state law as well as FLSA shall have any additional benefits provided by the state law — higher minimum wages; or lower maximum workweek. By necessary implication it permits state laws to operate even as to workers exempt from FLSA.” 472 F.2d 1261. Finally, at least one district court in our circuit has held that Congress’ exemption of certain maritime em- ployees from coverage under a maritime wage statute did not preempt a state from regulating those employees’ wages. In Sewell v. M/V Point Barrow, 556 F. Supp. 168 (D. Alaska 1983) (Fitzgerald, D.J.), workers employed on vessels engaged in offshore test drilling off the Alaska coast filed an action to recover unpaid wages and for penalties under state and federal law. After holding the employees were exempted from coverage under the fed- A-20 eral statute,‘ the court reached the employer’s contention that “the exemption of coastwise vessels from the [fed- eral] penalty provisions...demonstrate[d] a congres- sional intent that seamen employed on coastwise vessels not receive delayed wage payment penalties.” Jd. at 169. The court rejected this argument based on its conclusion that Congress did not intend, by exempting coastwise seamen, to preempt state wage penalty laws, but rather intended that coastwise seamen would be treated like other workers under state law. Jd. at 170. Based on these authorities and on general principles of : federal preemption, we hold that, in light of the plain language of the FLSA’s savings clause and in the absence | of a clear indication from Congress to the contrary, | § 213(b) (6) does not preclude enforcement of Califor- nia’s overtime provisions to protect the California-resi- dent seamen in this case. The district court erred by holding that section 213(b) (6) preempts California over- time pay laws with respect to FLSA-exempt seamen on the high seas and within the territorial zone off the California coast. B. Non-FLSA-Exempt Maritime Employees on the High Seas We next address the question whether the FLSA preempts California from applying the state’s overtime “The employees sought penalties for failure to pay wages under 46 U.S.C. § 596, which provides that an employer who fails to pay wages shal] pay a penalty equal to two days’ wages for each unpaid day. Under 46 U.S.C. § 544, however, employees on “coastwise” voyages are exempted from 46 U.S.C. § 596. The district court in Sewell v. M/V Point Barrow held that the employees who brought the action were employed on vessele engaged in coastwise trade and were exempt from coverage under 46 U.S.C. § 596. A-21 pay laws to maritime workers, not exempt from the FLSA, who work on vessels situated primarily on the high seas off the California coast. The parties agree that California’s overtime pay laws and the FLSA overtime provisions that cover non-exempt maritime employees conflict, and that California’s provi- sions are more generous than the FLSA.” The key issue is whether the FLSA’s savings clause allows California to apply its more generous overtime laws to the maritime workers involved in this case. The savings clause provides in relevant part: No provision of this chapter or of any order there- under shall excuse noncompliance with any federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing a mini- mum wage higher than the minimum wage estab- According to the district court, “the California overtime provi- sions and the FLSA provisions produce widely differing results.” 709 F. Supp. at 1524. The most important differences between Califor- nia’s overtime pay provisions and the FLSA are as follows: under California law, overtime at one and one-half times an employee's regular rate must be paid after eight hours work per day, 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 11040.3(A)(1), while under the FLSA, overtime must be paid after 40 hours work per week, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a); 29 C.F.R. § 778.101; under California law, all hours in excess of 12 per day must be paid at double time, 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 11040.3(A) (2), while the FLSA contains no such provision; under California law, “hours worked” is defined broadly, to include “the time during which an employee is subject to the contro! of an employer,” 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 11040.2(H), while under the FLSA “hours worked” as applied to seamen includes only hours when the employee is “actually on duty,” 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (4); and under California law, payments to em- ployees on a “fluctuating workweek” basis — i.e., by fixed salary that reflects average hours worked — are not permitted, Skyline Homes, Inc. v. Dept. of Indus. Relations, 165 Cal. App. 3d 239, 211 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1985), while under the FLSA, such payments are allowed in certain limited circumstances, 29 C.F.R. § 778.114. A-22 lished under this chapter or a maximum workweek lower than the maximum workweek established under this chapter.... 29 U.S.C. § 218(a). Aubry and federal amicus contend that the savings clause signals Congress’ intent that the wage and hour standards set in the FLSA are a floor, and that states are free to establish wage and hour levels higher or more generous than the FLSA standards. They further argue that Congress, in enacting the FLSA, evinced no intent to preclude maritime workers’ benefiting from the savings clause. The district court rejected this argument, based on its conclusion that principles of federal admiralty law require that the FLSA’s savings clause be construed restrictively in this case. The district court reasoned: [T]he FLSA’s savings clause cannot properly be construed to save state laws that seek to regulate the employment of maritime employees whose work situs is a vessel normally situated on the high seas. This is so because Congress may not constitutionally dele- gate its maritime jurisdiction to the states. Such a delegation would destroy the harmony and uniform- ity of admiralty law established by the Constitution. Thus, under compulsion of the Constitution, the sav- ings clause must be interpreted as not applying to maritime employees employed primarily on the high seas. 709 F. Supp. at 1524-25 (citations omitted). According to the district court, while this restrictive interpretation of the savings clause “lacks direct precedential support,” common sense demanded it. Jd. at 1525. For the reasons stated below, we hold that the district court erred. Neither the FLSA, by its terms, nor general paiidaiiansiimeatiititindl Ae Raga tee. had oP a a aa A-23 admiralty law preempts California from applying the state’s overtime pay laws to non-exempt maritime workers at issue in this case. 1. Jensen and its Progeny The district court based its restrictive reading of sec- tion 218 on a long line of cases, beginning early in this century, in which courts limited states’ power to regulate maritime activities on the ground that the United States Constitution requires uniformity in admiralty law. Arti- ele III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides in part that the judicial power of the United States shall extend “to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” The Supreme Court has held that this provision, by implica- tion, grants Congress the power to revise and supplement the maritime law, and grants federal courts power to develop the general maritime law. See Romero v. Interna- tional Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360-61 (1959). In Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917) (“Jensen”), the Supreme Court restricted states’ author- ity in maritime matters based on this constitutional grant of authority to the federal government. Under the so- called Jensen doctrine, no state legislation concerning navigation is valid if it contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law, or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations. A-24 This limitation, at the least, is essential to the effective operation of the fundamental purposes for which [the maritime] law was incorporated into our na- tional laws by the Constitution itself. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216. This rule was extended in Knick- erbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) (“Knicker- bocker Ice’), where the Supreme Court struck down an act of Congress that directly granted states authority to apply state workers compensation laws to maritime em- ployers. The Court stated that the delegation was “‘be- yond the power of Congress.” 7d. at 164. Here, the district court reasoned that the constitutional considerations underlying Jensen and Knickerbocker Ice foreclosed straightforward application of the FLSA’s sav- ings clause to a specific category of workers — maritime employees employed primarily on the high seas. According to the district court, allowing the FLSA’s savings clause to permit California’s actions in this case would effect a delegation of maritime authority, invalid under Knicker- . bocker Ice, and would otherwise be invalid as destructive of harmony in federal admiralty law. We disagree with the district court’s holding that section 218, if construed to allow Aubry’s actions with respect to maritime employees on the high seas, would in effect be a delegation of congressional maritime powers to the state. California’s actions in this case represent an exercise of traditional police powers firmly in place before Congress enacted the FLSA. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 393 (1937) (“In dealing with the relation of employer and employed, the [state] has neces- sarily a wide field of discretion in order that there may be suitable protection of health and safety, and that peace A-25 and good order may be promoted through regulations designed to insure wholesome conditions of work and freedom from oppression.”). Thus Congress did not “delegate” authority to the states through section 218, but simply made clear its intent not to disturb the traditional exercise of the states’ police powers with respect to wages and hours more generous than the federal standards. We cannot read section 218 as a delegation, and, therefore, conclude that Knickerbocker Ice does not control this case. This conclusion, however, does not settle the issue before us. General principles of admiralty law still limit states’ authority to regulate maritime activities. We must determine whether, under Jensen and its progeny, those principles require a restrictive reading of section 218 in this case. “The Jensen doctrine, though easily stated, is not easily applied.” 1 Friedell, Benedict on Admiralty, § 112, at 7-36 (7th ed. 1987).’® ‘the Supreme Court long ago rejected a rigid per se rule that all state regulation of maritime activities is constitutionally invalid. In Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 338 (1973), for example, a unanimous court explained that Jensen and Knickerbocker have been “limited by subsequent holdings of [the} Court.” In Romero v. Intl Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. at 373, the Court explained that Jensen’s limitation on state authority “still leaves the States a wide scope.” See also Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 388 See generally 1 Friedell, Benedict on Admiralty, §§ 11-114, at 7-31 to 7-72 (reviewing doctrine limiting power of states to independently regulate maritime matters); Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admi- realty 49-50 (same); D. Robertson, Admiralty and Federalism 200 (1970) (same); Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: “The Devil’s Own Mess,” S. Ct. Rev. 158 (1960) (same). A-26 (1941) (state may modify or supplement maritime law); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 429 (Black, J., dissenting) (except in limited circumstances, “states are free to make laws relating to maritime affairs’). Yet the Court has demonstrated the continuing force of Jensen. In Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986) (‘‘Tallentire’’), the Court held that the federal admiralty law — specifically, the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 — preempted Loui- siana’s wrongful death statute, notwithstanding a DOHSA savings clause that provided that “[t]he provi- sions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be affected” by the DOHSA. The Court cited Jensen for the proposition that ““*tnjo [state] legislation is valid if it contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress.’”’ Jd. at 298 (quoting Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216); see also Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. at 344 (acknowledging that Jensen “has vitality left’’). Our review of relevant case authority leads us to con- clude that the general rule on preemption in admiralty is that states may supplement federal admiralty law as applied to matters of local concern, so long as state law does not actually conflict with federal law or interfere with the uniform working of the maritime legal system.’’ The "See 1 Friedell, Benedict on Admiralty § 112, at 7-36; Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty 50 (2d ed. 1975); Tribe, American Constitutional Law 304 (2d ed. 1988). There is ample support for this rule in our circuit. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 496 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1140 (1985) (state law should be preempted only to the extent necessary to protect the achievement of the aims of the federal act in question); Wasyl, Inc. v. First Boston Corp., Inc., 813 F.2d 1579, 1582 (9th Cir. 1987) (same); Ne ee eee ee eed iy Dos, A-27 questions, then, are (1) whether applying California’s overtime provisions to maritime employees on the high seas contravenes an act of Congress, and (2) whether applying the provisions would unduly disrupt uniformity in maritime law. 2. Does California’s Overtime Pay Law Contravene an Act of Congress? The district court found, and we agree, that the mari- time employees “fall in the interstices between express federal maritime statutes.” 709 F. Supp. at 1525. Mari- time statutes do not apply to maritime employees, like these, who are not on vessels making foreign, intercoastal, or coastwise voyages. In addition, Congress has specifi- cally allowed states to enforce overtime laws more gener- ous than the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 218(a), and we find no indication that Congress intended that maritime employ- ees not benefit from more generous state wage and hour laws. California’s attempt to supplement federal law in this case does not present an irreconcilable conflict with the statutory maritime law or with the FLSA; it does not “contravene the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress.” Cf. Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 298; Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216. Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345, 1348-49 (9th Cir. 1987) (“ ‘there is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress’ silence and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted’”’) (quoting Mobile Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 624-25 (1978)); Sewel v. M/V Point Barrow, 556 F. Supp. 168, 169 (D. Alaska 1983) (“admiralty courts may recognize and enforce rights and obligations created by state law”). Other circuits’ cases also support the rule. See Carey v. Bahama Cruise Lines, 864 F.2d 201, 207 (1st Cir. 1988); Ezzon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d 307, 317-18 (5th Cir. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, U.S. , 108 S. Ct. 1684 (1988); Steelsnet, Inc. v. Caribe Towing Corp., 779 F.2d 1485, 1488 (11th Cir. 1986). A-28 This case, therefore, differs significantly from two re- cent Supreme Court decisions the district court relied on in narrowly construing section 218 of the FLSA: Oil, Chem., & Atomic Workers, Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407 (1976) (“Mobil Oil’), and Tailen- tire. Mobil O1l Corp. and Tallentire both involved interpre- tation of savings clauses in federal statutes, and the Court construed the savings clauses narrowly in each case. Mobil Oil and Tallentire, however, do not require a restrictive interpretation of section 218 of the FLSA in this case. The issue in Mobil Oil was whether Texas could apply its “right-to-work” laws to workers employed on oil tank- ers on the high seas off the Texas coast. Like the present case, Mobil O1l required interpretation of a savings clause — federal labor statutes expressly allow so-called union “agency shop” agreements,’® 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3), but also allow states to prohibit such agreements through “right-to-work” laws, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b). The Court, as a matter of statutory interpretation, held that tie savings clause at issue could not be read to allow Texas to apply its right-to-work laws to maritime employees who worked on the high seas outside of the state’s territorial waters. In so holding, however, the Court relied on clear legisla- tive history expressing congressional intent to restrict the savings clause’s reach. Congress, the Court concluded, “viewed [the savings clause] as allowing a State to ban [agency shop] agreements calling for work to be per- formed within the State.” 426 U.S. at 418 (emphasis “An ‘agency shop’ agreement generally provides that while em- ployees do not have to join the union, they are required . . . to pay the union & sum equal to the union initiation fee and are obligated as well to make pericdic payments to the union equal to the union dues.” Mobil Oil, 426 U.S. at 409 n.1. ee ee en ae ee A-29 added). Further, the Court noted that the purpose and effect of Texas right-to-work law directly conflicted with the federal statute. Jd. at 417. In Tallentire, the Court held that a DOHSA savings clause that allowed wrongful death actions in state courts for deaths on the high seas did not allow states to apply their substantive state wrongful death laws to deaths on the high seas, but instead only preserved state court jurisdiction to hear wrongful death actions under the DOHSA. 477 U.S. at 220-32. As in Mobil Corp., the Court based its restrictive interpretation of the savings clause at issue on the language, purpose, and legislative history of the federal statute.’ And again, the Court noted the clear conflict between the state law and federal statute: “No reasonable doubt could be entertained of the dis- placement of state remedies for deaths occurring on the high seas because the conflicting federal standard was not derived just from general federal maritime law; it was explicitly provided for by federal legislation directly on point.” Jd. at 228. Further, the Court noted that an express purpose of Congress in enacting the DOHSA was to achieve uniformity in wrongful death actions for deaths on the high seas. Jd. at 230-31. In contrast to the savings clauses at issue in Mobil Oui and Tallentire, we find no indication in the language or legislative history of the FLSA’s savings clause that Congress intended that section 218 not allow states to apply more generous overtime pay laws to maritime work- That history revealed strong expressions by bill supporters that federal law would apply exclusively to actions for deaths on the high seas. See Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 223-30. See also Gray, Applicability of State Wrongful Death Statutes on the High Seas, 18 J. Mar. L. & Com. 67, 81-88 (1987) (discussing Tallentire and legislative history of DOHSA savings clause). — A-30 ers working on the high seas. In addition, California’s more protective overtime provisions are compatible with, rather than conflict with, the federal statute. Compatible state law may supplement federal admiralty law. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d at 495-501 (finding no conflict between federal maritime statute and more stringent state maritime law provisions); Sewell v. M/V Point Barrow, 556 F. Supp. at 170-71 (same). Neither Mobil Oil nor Tallentire requires preemption in this case.” 3. Does California’s Overtime Pay Law Unduly Disrupt Uniformity in Admiralty Law? The district court based its holding in part on the “eommon sense” notion that “the uniformity of federal admiralty law would be destroyed if the states were permitted to ‘add on’ to the federa! law enacted by Congress.” 709 F. Supp. at 1525. Likewise, PMSA and Tidewater argue on appeal that allowing states to enforce their overtime provisions against maritime employers would produce a “crazy-quilt pattern of regulation.” Cases in our circuit relied on by PMSA and Tidewater are also distinguishable on the ground that the state laws invalidated as preempted by federal law in those cases were in direct conflict with federal admiralty law. See Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256, 257-58 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 914 (1987) (state survival action pre- empted by conflicting federal maritime survival law); Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345, 1348-49 (9th Cir. 1987) (state punitive damages remedy in wrongfu! death action preempted by DOHSA, which disallows punitive damages remedy); Nelson v. United States, 639 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 1980) (state wrongful death action preempted by conflicting federal maritime wrongful death law); Daughtry v. Diamond M Co., 693 F. Supp. 856, 961-63 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (state procedural rules on effect of s..clement on joint tortfeasors’ duty to contribute preempted by conflicting federal procedural rules). ieee eiaimeeen A-31 The Constitution tolerates some disharmony in admi- ralty law. As discussed above, states may supplement admiralty law, and states’ supplementation of admiralty law necessarily creates some discord in that law.” Never- theless, Mobil Oil, Tallentire, and Jensen and its progeny make clear that the interest in uniformity in admiralty law must be considered in determining the validity of state regulation of maritime activities. Our circuit has also acknowledged the importance of uniformity in admi- ralty law. See, e.g., Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256, 257-58 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 914 (1987); Nelson v. United States, 639 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 1980). We are left, therefore, with the difficult question whether apply- ing California’s overtime provisions to maritime employ- ees who work on vessels on the high seas that do not engage in foreign, intercoastal, or coastwise voyages un- duly disrupts harmony in the federal admiralty system, so as to render unconstitutional Aubry’s actions. We hold that it does not. Whether Aubry’s application of California’s overtime provisions unduly disrupts federal maritime harmony in violation of the Constitution depends on the balance of federal and state interests involved in application of the overtime provisions. See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 741-42 (1961); East River 8. 8. Corp. v. Trans- america Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 864 n.2 (1986); Exzon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d 307, 317 (5th Cir. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 108 S. Ct. 1684 (1988); 7 All state laws, if given effect in admiralty cases, interfere to a degree with the uniformity of admiralty law.” Friedell, 1 Benedict on Admiralty § 12, at 7-36; see also Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. at 374 (“Maritime law is not a monistic system.”). A-32 Steelmet, Inc. v. Caribe Towing Corp., 779 F.2d 1485, 1488 (11th Cir. 1986). We conclude that the balance tips in favor of California in this case. Under California law, the Labor Commission is charged with enforcing state wage provisions to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of resident employees. Cal. Labor Code § 1173. Here Aubry has attempted to provide additional protection to employees involved in work of critical importance to the state — containment and clean- up of marine oil spills. In addition, the record indicates that the maritime employees involved in this case are California residents, were interviewed and hired in Cali- fornia, and pay California taxes. Their contacts with the state are quite close: the vessels involved in this case do not make coastwise, intercoastal, or foreign voyages; Mr. Clean IT is moored in a California harbor 90 percent of the time and works exclusively on oil rigs off the California coast; and Mr. Clean III is stationed exclusively off the California coast and visits only California ports. PMSA and Tidewater contend, however, that Califor- nia’s interest in enforcing its overtime pay laws in this case are undercut by Aubry’s failure to comply with state administrative and procedural requirements regarding wage and hour rulemaking and law enforcement. This argument is misplaced. We emphasize that we are not deciding here whether Aubry’s actions are valid as a matter of California administrative and labor law. Our task is te determine only whether, in this case, federal law preempts California’s overtime pay provisions. The state’s interests in applying its overtime provisions here are plain. PMSA and Tidewaters’ challenges to Aubry’s ac- tion on state law grounds must be directed to the state’s agencies and courts, and we assume here that the labor A-33 commissioner’s actions comply fully with state law and procedures.” In contrast to the [sic] California’s strong interests, Federal interests in precluding enforcement of Califor- nia’s overtime provisions in this case are relatively weak. There is no indication that Congress, in enacting the FLSA’s savings clause, intended to preempt states from according more generous protection to maritime employ- ees on the high seas off a state’s coastal waters. Further, the purpose behind the FLSA is to establish a national floor under which wage protections cannot drop, not to establish absolute uniformity in minimum wage and over- time standards nationwide at levels established in the FLSA. In some circumatances, comity requires that federal courts ab- stain from considering actions for declaratory and injunctive relief against state proceedings. See Fresh Int’l Corp. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 805 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1986); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). According to the parties, however, no state court is currently considering the issues raised in this appeal. “ ‘{T]he salient fact’ in determining whether Younger abstention is appropriate ‘is whether federal-court interference would unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the state.’’’ Sable Communications of Cal. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 890 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 433 n.12 (1982)). Here, we address only the purely federal question of whether federal statutes and general admiralty law preempt Califor- nia’s overtime pay laws. We do not address any state law issues raised by Aubry’s actions. Because there is no ongoing state adjudi- cation of the claims here at issue, and because the state law chal- lenges to Aubry’s actions necessarily involve issues distinct from those federal issues now before us, concerns of comity underlying the Younger abstention doctrine are not present here. See Id.; Fresh Intl Corp. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 805 F.2d at 1358. The district court was not required to abstain. A-34 Most important, because the maritime employees in- volved in this action are California residents who work on vessels that operate exclusively off the California coast, application of the state’s overtime law will not disrupt international or interstate commerce. Uniformity in mari- time law « required “only where the essential features of an exclusive federal jurisdiction are involved.” 1 Friedell, Benedict on Admiralty § 111, at 7-32; see Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. at 388. The minimal impact that Aubry’s actions would have on international and interstate maritime com- merce leads us to conclude that the “essential features” of exclusive federal jurisdiction are not unduly burdened in this case.” We have focused in this section on the question whether, under general admiralty principles, California is preempted from applying the state’s overtime pay laws to non-exempt maritime employees who work on vessels situated primarily on the high seas that do not engage in foreign, intercoastal, or coastwise voyages. But our analy- sis applies as well to FLSA-exempt seamen who work on such vessels. As we held above, allowing California to apply its overtime pay laws to seamen does not conflict with the FLSA; exemption from the FLSA’s overtime provisions does not, per se, preempt state overtime laws. Also, the balance between state and federal interests is the same with respect to the seamen at issue in this case as it is with respect to nonexempt maritime workers. The “This further distinguishes the present case from Mobil Oil, in which the Court noted the practical difficulties of allowing applica- tion of the state law in that case. See 426 U.S. at 418-19. In Mobil Oil, of the workers to which Texas sought to apply its laws, over half were residents of other states; over one-third listed New York, rather than Texas, as their port; and all were on vessels that voyaged regularly from Texas to New York or Rhode Island and back. 426 U.S. at 411. The practical problems present in Modi! are not present in this case. A-35 Tidewater employee involved in the underlying action is a California resident; he works, like other California-based Tidewater employees, exclusively in California ports and on the high seas off the California coast. Thus, as with the maritime workers, we hold that allowing Aubry to apply California’s overtime pay laws to the seamen involved in this suit does not unduly disrupt federal admiralty law, and, for that reason, is not constitutionally invalid. Our conclusion that Aubry may constitutionally apply California’s overtime provisions to maritime employees and seamen who work on the high seas off the California coast on vessels that do not engage in foreign, inter- coastal, or coastwise voyages is supported by two recent decisions in this circuit. In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Ham- mond, 726 F.2d 483, we upheld an Alaska statute gov- erning the discharge of ballast by oil tankers in Alaska’s territorial waters where federal maritime law — the Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, 46 U.S.C. § 391 — also regulated coastal ballast discharge. We recognized in Hammond Alaska’s strong interest in preventing oil pollu- tion off its coast, noting that “[t]he subject matter of environmental regulation ... has long been regarded by the [Supreme] Court as particularly suited to local regu- lation.” Id. at 488. We concluded that state and federal regulation of the oil tankers were compatible, and that “there is no ... dominant national interest in uniformity in the area of coastal environmental regulation.” Jd. at 492.™ California has an equally strong interest in protect- *We did note in Hammond that the interest in uniformity in environmental regulation is greater where regulations cover activities on the high seas. 726 F.2d at 492 n.2. Our concern there, however, was clearly with regulation of international oil transport and international environmental protection efforts. Jd. Here, as discussed above, the federal interest in uniformity is not as great, because the employees A-36 ing maritime employees that reside in the state and work to protect California’s coastal environment. Hammond thus lends support to Aubry’s actions on the facts of the present case. Also, in Sewell v. M/V Point Barrow, 566 F. Supp. 168, the Alaska District Court applied the state’s wage laws to certain maritime employees working off the Alaska coast. The statute involved provided penalties, in the form of extra wage payments, to state workers not timely paid by maritime employers. Jd. at 169-70. The district court held that, even though federal law did not provide such penal- ties for the employees in the case, enforcement of the Alaska statute was “fully compatible with federal mari- time law,” and no “feature of federal maritime law... would be impaired or frustrated by application of [the statute].” Id. at 170. Sewell thus supports the conclusion that California may constitutionally apply its more gener- ous overtime laws to protect California-resident workers employed on the high seas off California’s coast under the circumstances of this case. The district court erred by holding that, under princi- ples of federal admiralty law, the FLSA’s savings clause cannot allow Aubry to apply California overtime laws that afford greater protection than the FLSA to California- resident maritime employees working primarily on the high seas off the California coast on vessels that do not engage in foreign, intercoastal, or coastwise voyages, whether or not the employees are exempted from the FLSA’s overtime provisions. involved in this case are not engaged in foreign, intercoastal, or coastwise voyages. A” abate, - valid A-37 CONCLUSION Neither the Shipping Act nor the FLSA precludes Aubry’s actions in this case, and, under the principles underlying Jensen and its progeny, applying California’s overtime pay laws to these workers is not constitutionally invalid. Here, California’s interest in protecting Califor- nia-resident workers is great, the employees involved in the action work exclusively in waters off the California coast on vessels not engaged in foreign, intercoastal, or coastwise voyages, and Congress has shown no intent to preclude more generous state regulation of maritime workers. Aubry is not preempted from applying Califor- nia’s overtime provisions to the seamen and maritime employees involved in this suit. The district court’s judgment is REVERSED. COPPLE, Senior District Judge, dissenting: Judge Pregerson’s majority decision explains in exten- sive detail the factual and procedural background of this appeal. Those facts will therefore only be highlighted. Twelve maritime employees filed complaints with the California Labor Commission seeking recovery of unpaid overtime wages due under the provisions of the California Industrial Welfare Commission Orders (8 Cal. Code of Regulations § 11345, et seg.). These maritime employees were hired by CLEAN SEAS, a company that owns and operates vessels which provide open ocean oil spill con- tainment and recovevy. The vessels are usually stationed over oil fields located in the Santa Barbara Channel approximately four to ten nautical miies off the California coast. Some of the maritime employees are organized into crews that alternate work assignments in which they work seven days on the vessel followed by seven days rest on A-38 shore. At the beginning and end of the seven day work assignments, the employees are transported via helicopter or vessel to and from the California coast. In addition to those twelve employees, a deck engineer employed by TIDEWATER also filed a claim with the California Labor Commissioner for overtime against his employer. For that reason, TIDEWATER filed a com- plaint in intervention and was an intervenor on appeal. TIDEWATER provides offshore transportation in the Santa Barbara Channel between its pier or mooring buoy and oil rigs located between one and twelve miles offshore. The Labor Commissioner of the State of California held a hearing pursuant to Cal. Lab. Code $98 et seq. and made an award to each employee for unpaid overtime wages. In response to these awards, the employers along with various maritime associations filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in the District Court. The District Court found that al! of the employees in this action were engaged in activities on vessels which either stayed on the high seas surrounding the oil rigs or travelled between one port and the oil rigs located on the high seas. The District Court concluded that California could not apply its wage and hour provisions upon these employees who were primarily employed on the high seas because the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA’’), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seg., preempted the application of such state laws to employees on the high seas. In so conclud- ing, the District Court granted the employers’ request for declaratory and injunctive brief, but limited the scope of the relief to, “(i) the FLSA-exempt seamen, whether working within the territorial zone or on the high seas, and (ii) maritime employees working ;rimarily on vessels on the high seas that are not engaged in foreign or A-39 intercoastal voyages.” Pacific Merchunt Shipping Ass’n v. Aubry, 709 F.Supp. 1516, 1526 (C.D. Cal. 1989). The District Court rejected a general federal admiralty law preemption argument, but held that the FLSA preempted California overtime pay laws with respect to the employ- ees in this case. A Court of Appeals may affirm a district court decision either on the same grounds, or on different grounds as those relied upon by the district court. J.M. Martinac Shipbuilding v. Director, Office of Workers Compensation Programs, 900 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1990). Therefore, it is appropriate to examine whether the Distr ct Court’s deci- sion [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_2619%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.