# Opposition Brief — Citrus County v. Redner > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_2582%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Opposition Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1991 - **Citation:** 502 U.S. 909 ## Text NO \ LeRK In | SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES () lern YQ () oat COUN ORIDA I O IC] REDNER LHOMAS GEORGI SECCHIARI. PHYLLIS PATRICK. TAMMY BENARD. and AMANDA OLIVER () Petition for Writ of Certiorari to (he United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit () RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI () l uke ( / ror, Esquire PHOMAS C. LITTLE, P.A. + N.I Coachman Road Ss C \ : ¢ I () { +46 / 4s) + \ } \I () ¢ ) t Tt 1deE QUESTIONS PRESENTED [. Whether the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, requires the federal courts (below), where Respondents challenged two adult-entertainment licensing ordinances on the same constitutional grounds to accord to the identical provisions of a successor, permanent licensing ordinance, containing a severability clause, the same preclusive effect, under Florida law, from a final judgment of the Florida courts, which upheld the constitutionality of the earlier, temporary, licensing ordinance, even in light of the clear facial unconstitutionality of the ordinance. [1. Whether under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the federal courts (below) lack jurisdiction to consider Respondents’ challenges to the constitutionality provisions in a successor, permanent adult-entertainment licensing ordinance, when the ordinance presented to the State courts was a different ordinance and was never considered by the highest state court LIST OF PARTIES PETITIONERS Appellees in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals CITRUS COUNTY, FLORIDA, a municipal corporation CHARLES S. DEAN, individually and as Sheriff of Citrus County, Florida SKIP HUDSON, acting Citrus County Commissioner sued individually * ALEX GRIFFIN, acting Citrus County Commissioner sued individually * WILLIAM F. BROSKA, acting Citrus County Commissioner sued individually* JOHN BARNES, acting Citrus County Commissioner sued individually * NICK BRYANT, acting Citrus County Commissioner sued individually WAYNE WEAVER, current Citrus County Commissioner CHESTER WHITE, SR., current Citrus County Commissioner WILBUR LANGLEY, SR., current Citrus County Commissioner GARY BARTELL, current Citrus County Commissioner itl RESPONDENTS Appellants in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals JOE REDNER THOMAS GEORGE SECCHIARI PHYLLIS PATRICK TAMMY BENARD AMANDA BENARD OLIVER *Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 40.3, Commissioners Hudson, Griffin, Broska. and Barnes will be replaced in their official capacity in this case by their successors in office Wayne Weaver, Chester White, Sr.; Wilbur Langley, Sr.; and Gary Bartell. acting Commissioners. Petitioners did not list these individuals as parties — TABLE OF CONTENTS Page QUESTIONS PRESENTED LIST OF PARTIES i | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Vi OPINIONS BELOW 2 JURISDICTION 2 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES INVOLVED 3 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 5 WHY THE WRIT SHOULD BE DENIED 14 I. THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT ACT, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, IS MISAPPLIED BY PETITIONER AND DID NOT REQUIRE THE COURT OF APPEALS TO AFFIRM THE LOWER COURT'S INVOCATION OF ABSTENTION. 14 A. The District Court’s Abstention From The Merits Of Respondents’ Challenges To 88-05 And 88-06 Was Improper. 14 B. The State Court Judgment On Respondents’ Constitutional Challenges To 88-05 Does Not Preclude Challenges To The Provisions Of 88-06. aa Il. THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY REJECTED THE PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT THAT THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE REQUIRES ABSTENTION OF RESPONDENTS’ CONSTITUTIONAI CHALLENGES TO THE PROVISIONS OF 88-06. 22 CONCLUSION 30) V1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Authority Page Allen v. Allegheny Co., 196 U.S. 458, 25 S.Ct. 311, 49 L.Ed. 551 (1905) 29 ~ ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605. 109 S.Ct. 2037, 104 L.Ed.2d 696 (1989) 29 Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 677 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1981) 17, 18 Barnes v. Glen Theater, 59 U.S.L.W. 4745, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991) 17 Ballard v. Wilson, 857 F.2d 1568 (Sth Cir. 1988) 24 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 83 S.Ct. 631, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1963) 25 | Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971) 27 California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 93 S.Ct. 390, 34 L.Ed.2d 3342 (1972) 17 Cotton States Mutual Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 749 F.2d 663 (11th Cir. 1984) 23 District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460°U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) 29 Authority Page Dombrowski v. Pfister. 380 U.S. 479. 85 EG & B 1116 (1965) 2 Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 42 U.S. 922. 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975) 15 Ielrod v. Burns. 427 5». 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673 (1976) 2) l'reedman \ Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) Pa Se 'reehling v. MGIC Financial Corp., 437 $0.2d 191 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) 23 I! W/PBS v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990) 12. 19 5 | Ss é Hicks v. Miranda, 42 U.S. at 349. 95 S.@ 2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 2223 (1975) % Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592. 95 S$ (1 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975) 1.A. Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson National Bank, 793 F.2d 1541] (11th Cir. 1986) Johnson v. New York Life Ins. Co.. 187 U.S 491, 23 S.Ct. 194, 47 L.Ed. 273 (1903) } Kremer v. Chemical Construction ¢ Orp., 45¢ U.S. at 483, 102 S.Ct. at 1898 22, 24 Vill Authority Page Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 95 S.Ct. 1524, 44 L.Ed.2d 15 (1975) 16 McDonald v. City of West Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284, 104 S.Ct. 1799, 80 L.Ed.2d 302 (1984) 2 Migra v. Warren City School District, 465 U.S. 75, 104 S.Ct. 892, 70 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984) 22 Mobile Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372 (Fla. 1977) 3 Morgan v. City of Rawlins, 792 F.2d 975 (10th Cir. 1986) 28 National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) 27 New_York Times Co. v. United States, 402 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (194]) 25 11126 Baltimore Blvd. v. Prince George’s County, Maryland, 110 S.Ct. 2580 (1990) 19 Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. at £ ©, 106 S.Ct. at 772 22 Pennzoil Company v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) 15 Provau v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 772 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1985) 23 Authority Page R&S Partnership v. Martin Schaffel Enterprises, Inc., 529 So.2d 794 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) 23 Redner v. Citrus County, 919 F.2d 646 (11th Cir. 1990) | 2, 16 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Company, 263 U.S. 413 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) 29 Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66. 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971) 1S Schad v. Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981) seaboard Coastline R.R. Company v. Cox, 338 So.2d 190 (Fla. 1976) 23 S.b.L. Maduro (Fla.), Inc. v. M/V_ Antonio de Gastaneta, 83 F.2d 1477 (11th 1987) 23 Sendak v. Nihiser, 431 U.£. 961. 97 S.Ct 2914, 53 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1977) pa Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 89 S.Ct. 935 (1971) 754 Orange Ave. v. City of West Haven, Conn.. 761 F.2d 105 (1985) 19. 20) United Books v. Conte. 739 F.2d 30 (Ist Cir. 1984) 24 Authority Page United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) 18 Western Life Indem. Co. v. Rupp, 235 U.S. 261, 35 S.Ct. 37, 59 L.Ed. 220 (1914) 29 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) 14, 15 16, 17 21, 23 Constitutional Provisions: United States Constitution Amendment | 3 United States Constitution Amendment 14 re Federal Statutes: 28 U.S.C. § 1254 2 28 U.S.C. § 1257 29 28 U.S.C. § 1738 3, 14 22, 24 42 U.S.C. § 1983 4,10 24 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) 4,11 No. 91-307 In The SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES October Term, 1991 CITRUS COUNTY, FLORIDA, Petitioner, V. JOE REDNER, THOMAS GEORGE SECCHIARI, PHYLLIS PATRICK, TAMMY BENARD, and AMANDA OLIVER, Respondents. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI Respondents, Joe Redner, Thomas George Secchiari, Phyllis Patrick, Tammy Benard and Amanda Benard Oliver urge this Court to deny the Petition for Writ of Certiorari to review the judgments and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, entered in this proceeding on December 18, 1990, and May 20, 1991. OPINIONS BELOW lhe Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 1 Circuit are a December 18, 1990 affirmance In part and reversal in part with remand (of the ruling by the district court), 919 F.2d 646 (1 Ith Cir. 1990). set out as Appendix A of the Petition: and a May 20. 1991 order QO t denying a motion for rehearing, set out a Appendix B of the Petition JURISDICTION 3 CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND ORDINANCE PROVISIONS UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Amendment 1 Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech ... Amendment 14, Section 1 All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protections of the laws. UNITED STATES CODE 28 U.S.C. Section 1738 The Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, is set forth as Appendix "C" of the Petition. 4 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 Every person who, under color of any Statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. ... 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3) If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire ... for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws ... whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against one or more of the conspirators. ORDINANCES ENACTED BY CITRUS COUNTY, FLORIDA Ordinance 88-OS5 and Ordinance 88-06 of Citrus 5 County, Florida are reprinted and included in their entirety in the Appendix to the Petition in Appendices "D" and "E". STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Petitioner sets out a Statement of the Case which fails to include a substantial amount of historical factual material which is critical for this Court to adequately consider the questions presented for review. This material is respectfully submitted herein. Tt is important to note that the same decision of the Court of Appeals, which is at issue herein, is also the basis for another Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed with this Court (Case No. 91-316). The questions presented for review bear some similarity, but are not identical, and the Petitions focus on different aspects of the Court of Appeals’ decision. A proper recitation of all pertinent facts 1s still critical for any consideration. In early March of 1988, Respondent Redner became interested in opening and operating an adult entertainment establishment in Homosassa Springs, an unincorporated community located in Citrus County, Florida. In this endeavor, Redner investigated all applicable Citrus County ordinances, rules, regulations and permitting requirements. On the basis of this investigation, which included direct inquiries to Citrus County employees regarding any such restrictions which applied to the contemplated business, 6 Redner determined properly that there were no regulatory obstacles in effect which would prevent him from opening an adult entertainment establishment at a specific premises. Redner was clear and candid in his description of the proposed business. On or about March 17, 1988, on the basis of this reliance, Redner entered into a lease for the subject . premises for eighteen (18) months, thereby incurring an obligation of $36,000.00 for the term of the lease. At this point in time, Redner also underiook repairs and alterations to the premises to facilitate the presentation of performance dance exhibitions at a cost of approximately $10,000.00. The leased premises was located in a commercially zoned area and was formerly a bar which served alcoholic beverages. In an effort to comply with all existing local requirements to open the business, the proper agencies were contacted in order to secure all appropriate inspections and permits. On March 23, 1988, the premises was inspected by the Citrus County Public Health Unit for food service inspections and permits. § EL. Maduro (Fla.). Inc. v. M/V_ Antonio de Gastaneta, 833 F.2d 1477, 1483 (11th Cir. 1987); LA. Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson Nat'l Bank, 793 F.2d 1541, 1449-51 (1 Ith Cir. 1986); Provau v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 772 F.2d 817, $21- 22 (11th Cir. 1985); Cotton States Mutual Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 749 F.2d 663, 665-67 (Lith Cir. 1984). 24 subject of the application of the full faith and credit clause. In support of this, the cases cited by Petitioner as persuasive authority [Ballard v. Wilson, 856 F.2d 1568 (Sth Cir. 1988); United Books, Inc. v. Conte, 739 F.2d 30 (Ist Cir. 1984)] involved factual situations where the federal and state actions both involved the same legislation. It must also be stressed that, in the instant case, the federal action is predicated on 42 U.S.C. § 1983'°. Any analysis must be undertaken with a consideration of the underlying purposes of Section 1983 against the purposes of the Full Faith and Credit Act. This distinction becomes critical when the fact that the preclusive effect of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 may not be given in federal court to a constitutionally infirm judgment. Kremer _v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982)."" The Respondents provided clear evidence in every state court forum that Ordinance 88-05 was constitutionally infirm.'’ Substantial authority questioning the lack of 942 U.S.C. section 1983 was drafted to provide a federal forum for litigants who Congress feared might not receive substantial justice from a state court. The implementing statute for the full faith and credit clause, 28 U.S.C. section 173%, provides that a state's preclusion rules should control matters originally litigated in that state. When a state court has decided, or could have decided, issues related to a subsequent 1983 action, the underlying purposes of sections 1983 and 1738 are in direct conflict. Full Faith and Credit and Section 1983: A Reappraisal, 63 N.C.L.Rev. 59 (1985). '4See also the discussion of Kremer in Parker v. Danville Metal Stamping Company, Inc.. 603 F.Supp. 182 at 188 (C.D. Il. 1985). ‘The facial invalidity of Ordinance 88-05 was stressed in every forum. The Respondents were effectively and entirely precluded from the presentation of First Amendment protected expressive entertainment through the reactionary enactment of “emergency” Ordinance 88-05. The combination of this, with the irreparable harm caused by the Respondents’ loss of their First Amendment mghts, indicates that none of the state courts involved in this case adequately recognized the unconstitutionality of the ordinance. The following was stressed to every state court: 25 procedurai safeguards and the possibility of an unconstitutional prior restraint (which became a reality) was pointed out in every forum. Cited by Respondents in every state court forum was the case of EW/PBS v. The City of Dallas, supra. '° "The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even a minimal period of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971). Since such injury was both threatened and occurring at the time of Respondents’ motion and since Respondents sufficiently demonstrated a probability of success on the merits, the Court of Appeals might properly have held that the District Court abused its discretion in denying preliminary injunctive relief. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 98, 67, 83 S.Ct. 631, 637, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1963)." Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673 (1976). ‘In FW/PBS, this Court reviewed a comprehensive ordinance adopted by the City of Dallas, which regulated sexually oriented businesses. ff There are several criticai similarities between the Dallas ordinance and Citrus County Ordinance 88-05. The Dallas ordinance was struck down as being violative of the First Amendment, on the grounds that it constituted a prior restraint upon protected expression, and that 1 failed to provide adequate procedural safeguards 2s required by Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. $1 (1965). This Court used the analogy that, like a censorship system, a licensing scheme creates the possibility that constitutionally protected speech will be suppressed where there are inadequate procedural safeguards to ensure prompt issuance of a license. Tuis Court held that a license for a First Amendment protected business must be issued in a reasonable period of time and, therefore, the first wo Freedman safeguards are essential. In the Dallas ordinance, there was a requirement that the Chief of Police approve the issuance of a license within 30 days after the receipt of an application, and also conditioned such issuance upon approval by other municipal inspection agencies without setting forth time limits within which those inspections must occur. Since the ordinance failed to set forth an effective time limitation on the licensing decision, and since it also failed to provide an avenue for prompt judicial review so as to minimize suppression of speech in the event of a license denial, its licensing requirement was unconstitutional, Citrus County Ordinance 88-05, in § 2-5 (a)(1), “Time Pernod for Granting or Denying License”, places a forty-five (45) day limit after proper filing to process an application with the County Administrator. Subsection (c) of the section provides, just like the Dallas ordinance, that denial can be conditioned on any disapproval of other local government inspection agencies, namely (as set forth in § 2-4(a)), the Department of Development Services, Fire Protection, and the Health Department. Under Florida law, forty-five (45) days is adequate time to pass a zoning 7 2% A In recognizing the fact that a licensing scheme creates the possibility that constitutionally protected speech will be suppressed where there are inadequate procedural safeguards to insure the prompt issuance of a license, this Court found that the absence of these procedura! safeguards would result in legislation which was facially unconstitutional.’ Id. ordinance, which in actuality Citrus County did, resulting in zoning non-compliance for the anticipated premises of Respondent's business. Section 2-4(a) of Ordinance 88-OS states only that: ”... Each department shall promptly conduct an inspection of the applicant, application and the proposed establishment in accordance with its responsibilities ...” Ordinance 88-05, § 2-4(a). Clearly, just like the Dallas ordinance, Citrus County places no specific time limitation on the County's inspection agencies other than the vague suggestion that they be “prompt”. In addition to this infirmity, allowing an applicant to begin operation pursuant to § 2-S(a)(1) after the expiration of the forty-five (45) day period, “unless and until the County Administrator notifies the applicant of a denial of the application and siaies the reasons for the denial” results in inadequate procedural safeguards under this Court’s prior decisions. The forty-five (45) day approval period leaves an applicant vulnerable not only to penal sanctions for any County code or regulatory violations which may occur during the interim between submission and approval or denial, but is also compounded by other infirmities in the ordinances. ‘'Section 2-11 provides for the suspension of a license for a variety of alleged local government regulatory vioiations. This oection states that: “The Department shall promptly notity the licensee of the violation and shall allow the licensee a seven (7) day period in which to correct the violation, If the licensee fails to correct the violation before the expiration of the seven day period the Department shall notify the County Administrator, who shall forthwith suspend the license, and shall notify the licensee of the suspension. The suspension shall remain in effect until the Department notifies the County Administrator in writing that the violation of the provision in question has been corrected.” Clearly, by not limiting the time in which the Department must notify "in writing” the County Administrator, this infirmity would also invalidate the ordinance under the FW/PBS Inc. decision. Not only do these subtle “loopholes” allow unbridled administrative discretion, the entirety of § 3 of the ordinance, which imposes an 27 Another critical flaw brought to the attention of the state courts involved the second required procedural safeguard set forth in Freedman, supra: expeditious judicial review. As stressed in the FW/PBS, Inc. case, the existence of this prompt judicial review is absolutuy essential. EW/PBS, Inc. cites not only Freedman, supra, but also Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 89 S.Ct. 935 (1971) (at 155) for the proposition that a content-neutra! time, place and manner regulation must provide for "expeditious judicial review". '* In Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971), this Court held that administrative hearings similar to those set out in the Citrus County ordinances came nowhere near the standards required for "judicial review". The Court found that an administrative censorship scheme created by the additional permitting provision on any potential employee, emphasizes even more the extent to which the ordinance in guestion is unconstitutional, SSee also, National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977). Section 6, titled "Miscellaneous Provisions” provides in § 6-1 - Appeals: "(1) Within fifteen (15) days of the mailing of a notice of denial of an application for a license or permit or a notice of suspension or revocation of a license or permit, the aggrieved party may file a notice of appeal with the Board. "(2) The notice of appeal shall be filed with the Clerk of the Board. The notice of appeal shall be accompanied by payment of a filing fee of fifty dollars ($50.00) to cover administrative costs. Upon receipt of the notice of appeal and upon payment of the accompanying fifty dollars ($50.00) filing fee, the Clerk shall schedule a hearing for as soon as the Board's calendar will allow. The Clerk shall provide the appellant with at least ten (10) days notice of the time and place for the hearing.” Ordinance 88-05, § 6-1; 6-2. Not only does this section crumble from the weight of Constitutional scrutiny when the vague period of time “as soon as the Board's calendar will allow ...” is tested against the previous points and authorities contained herein, but it also fails the second part of the Freedman test. The review afforded in § 6 is insufficient. 28 Postal Reorganization Act and allowing the Postmaster General, following administrative hearings, to effectively decide which materials be afforded First Amendment protections, was totally unacceptable. As a fundamental right, freedom of speech demands due process to be regulated, and the amount of process "due" was held to be of the strictest judicial requirement. The Court held that because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression,only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint. Id. at 424. The Citrus County ordinances at issue herein are clearly unconstitutional. The failure to include adequate procedural safeguards on the face of these ordinances make them invalid. The preclusive effect of the full faith and credit clause may not be given in Federal court to a constitutionally infirm judgment.'? The Petitioner's arguments are neither meritorious nor compelling, and this Court should decline to exercise its discretion in this matter. Il. THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY REJECTED THE PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT THAT THE ROOKER-FELBMAN DOCTRINE REQUIRES ABSTENTION OF RESPONDENTS’ CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE PROVISIONS OF 88-06. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which stems from the If there is reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness or fairness of procedures followed in prior litigation in state court, redetermination of issues in federal court is warranted. Morgan v. City of Rawlins, 792 F.2d 975 (10th Cir. 1986). / 29 two Supreme Court decisions Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed 362 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983), is misapplied in the instant case. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine interprets 28 U.S.C. § 1257 as ordinarily barring direct review in the lower federal courts of a decision reached by the highest state court, for such authority is vested solely in tnis Court.” It is also clear that a consideration of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 triggers consideration of full faith and credit.“' (See discussion in previous section). The Petitioner urges that the court of appeals failed to adhere to the principles of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine by considering provisions of 88- 06. As the court of appeals properly recognized, there are several substantive differences between 88-05 and 88-06.~ Because these considerations involve entirely different ordinances, and also because no decision was ever reached or presented to the Florida Supreme Court, the Rooker- Feldman doctrine has no application in the instant case. Respondents would also urge that cogent considerations of the facial unconstitutionality of the ordinance (not only as “PASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 622, 109 S.Ct. 2037, 2048, 104 L.Ed.2d 696 (1989). *l Allen v. Allegheny Co., 196 U.S. 458, 25 S.Ct. 311, 49 L.Ed. 551 (1905); Johnson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 187 U.S. 491, 23 S.Ct. 194, 47 L.Ed. 273 (1903); Western Life Indem. Co. v. Rupp. 235 U.S. 261, 35 S.Ct. 37, 59 L.Ed. 220 (1914). 2Redner v. Citrus County, 919 F.2d at 650, n.9. 30 applied to the concepts of abstention and full faith and credit) would indicate that a deprivation of the federal courts to address the clear federal questions involved in this case would continue the pattern of prejudice which has been imposed on Respondents. In light of the points and authorities presented by the Respondents and the undeniable fact that the bases asserted by Petitioner to invoke this Court’s discretionary review are all interrelated. The Petitioner has failed to show adequate in this context for the granting of the writ. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed herein, this Court should decline to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in this matter. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Luke Charles Lirot LUKE CHARLES LIROT THOMAS C. LITTLE, P.A. 2123 N.E. Coachman Road Suite A Clearwater, Florida 34625 (813) 874-2030 Attorney for Respondents --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385009_2582%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.